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CANADIAN ISSUES
THÈMES CANADIENS

Fall / Automne 2005

Diasporas in Canada and the United States

Selected texts from the Canadian American Research on Diversity Symposium

With an introduction by/
Introduction faite par

Lise Thériault

Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities of Quebec/
Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles

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

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This magazine is a special publication of Canadian Issues based on selected texts from the Canadian American Research on Diversity Symposium. The content will be of great use to students and teachers who want to understand more about the challenges that face Canada. By comparing our experiences with the United States, it provides us with a broader perspective on the roots, origins and history of cultural communities on both sides of the border.

We have received numerous requests from readers to better situate the Canadian experience within a global framework. This issue is designed to respond appropriately.

Enjoy.

Leah Hendry, Managing Editor

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

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INTRODUCTION

Le rapprochement interculturel : une vision d'ensemble

Par Lise Thériault, Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles

Le rapprochement interculturel est un outil de changement, un mécanisme de transformation sociale en vue de bâtir une société inclusive, plurielle et ouverte sur le monde.

Dans sa forme concrète, le rapprochement interculturel s'incarne dans des activités ou des projets communs qui font œuvre de connaissance et de démystification. Qu'ils soient de nature civique, éducative, sportive, culturelle, familiale ou communautaire, les projets de rapprochement interculturel promeuvent les valeurs communes de l'égalité, de la solidarité et de la dignité.

Remarques préliminaires : le Québec change

L'immigration participe au renouvellement de la population active ainsi qu'au développement social, économique et culturel du Québec et, ce faisant, elle contribue à faire du Québec un État moderne, ouvert sur le monde et fier de sa diversité.

L'immigration s'est également transformée au cours des dernières décennies. Depuis la fin des années 1980, on ressent les effets de la conjoncture internationale. D'une part, le Québec accueille un plus grand nombre d'immigrants. D'autre part, les personnes admises récemment proviennent d'Europe, des pays arabophones du Moyen-Orient et d'Afrique du Nord, des pays d'Asie méridionale et orientale ainsi que des pays des Antilles et d'Amérique centrale. En somme, depuis 20 ans, l'immigration s'est considérablement diversifiée, tant sur le plan social que religieux.

Ces récentes transformations dans la composition ethnoculturelle de l'immigration se sont traduites par une diversification croissante de la population du Québec, particulièrement dans la région de Montréal. L'île de Montréal accueille la vaste majorité de la population immigrée et des minorités visibles du Québec. En effet, près de 70 % de la population immigrée et près de 76 % des personnes appartenant à des minorités visibles du Québec résident sur l'île de Montréal. Avec Laval, Montréal compte des parts de la population immigrée et des minorités visibles supérieures à son poids démographique (25 %) dans l'ensemble de la population québécoise. De plus, Montréal dénombre plus de 125 communautés culturelles différentes sur son territoire.

La concentration de l'immigration et, *de facto,* des communautés culturelles à Montréal n'est pas sans conséquences sur les relations interculturelles au Québec. Si les contacts interculturels ne surviennent pas exclusivement dans l'île de Montréal, force est d'admettre qu'ils y sont plus fréquents qu'ailleurs. Au fil du temps, les Montréalaises et Montréalais ont su développer une sorte de « cohabitation tranquille », comme l'a si bien caractérisé Annick Germain[1], entre les membres des différentes communautés culturelles et la population dans son ensemble. L'étude de Germain sur la dynamique des rapports interculturels (ou « interethniques ») dans les quartiers de la région de Montréal montre que la cohabitation des communautés culturelles se vit sur le mode de l'urbanité, avec une sociabilité publique animée et marquée par une grande civilité et une distance respectueuse. Les situations d'échange et de rapprochement sont l'exception plutôt que la règle, mais l'apprivoisement des différences est un acquis dans les espaces publics montréalais.

La même chose ne peut pas être dite des autres régions. À part Laval et peut-être la Rive-Sud de Montréal, la situation vécue en région diffère largement sur le plan des relations interculturelles. Il s'est établi au fil du temps un « hiatus », une disparité, entre Montréal et le reste du Québec dans les domaines du pluralisme culturel et des rapports identitaires[2]. Ce hiatus s'explique en grande partie par le faible poids démographique que représentent les communautés culturelles au sein des populations des régions et par le peu de moyens structurants qui peuvent faciliter l'attraction et l'établissement durable des personnes immigrées en région.

Cette situation devrait toutefois se modifier au fur à mesure que s'intensifient les efforts de régionalisation de l'immigration. En effet, l'immigration devient un enjeu majeur de développement des régions. Les acteurs régionaux et locaux sont de plus en plus conscients de l'apport potentiel de l'immigration pour le dynamisme des régions, notamment celles en déclin démographique ou celles aux prises avec des pénuries de main-d'œuvre. Des actions sont entreprises pour sensibiliser les employeurs et la population en général des régions à l'apport de la diversité au développement du Québec et pour susciter le dialogue interculturel.

Depuis une quinzaine d'années, la population québécoise se montre plus ouverte à l'immigration et aux relations interculturelles. Les résultats de sondages d'opinion publique québécois[3] réalisés depuis 1992 font état de tendances favorables aux attitudes et comportements des Québécoises et Québécois, que ce soit en termes de contacts interculturels ou encore de perceptions quant à l'intégration des immigrants à la société québécoise. En ce qui concerne les jeunes particulièrement, les enquêtes montrent que les élèves qui ont vécu la pluriethnicité dans le quotidien sont d'avis

que l'école pluriethnique joue un rôle positif quant à la compréhension et à la bonne entente entre les jeunes[4]. Ce constat appuie les résultats obtenus dans le cadre d'une étude qualitative[5] auprès d'adolescents du secondaire que « c'est l'école qui, par sa haute diversité et les réseaux sociaux étendus qu'elle offre, incarne aux yeux des jeunes, l'espace pluraliste dans ce qu'il a de plus prometteur. Non pas qu'elle soit exempte de tensions. Mais les jeunes réussissent à mettre en place, dans son cadre, un ensemble de principes opérationnels leur permettant de maximiser leurs échanges avec les autres, malgré la distance qui les sépare ». Ce cas de figure permet de cerner ce qui est susceptible de favoriser le rapprochement chez les jeunes : la primauté accordée aux caractéristiques individuelles sur celles du groupe, la relativisation des cultures, la reconnaissance de la nécessité des accommodements et de la réciprocité dans l'échange.

En somme, les perceptions et les attitudes ont évolué au Québec au regard des relations interculturelles et l'appui à des mesures de sensibilisation au rapprochement est de plus en plus grand.

Assises d'une approche favorisant le rapprochement interculturel

Depuis la fin des années 1960, un consensus s'est lentement établi en ce qui concerne l'accueil et l'intégration des personnes immigrantes. D'abord, l'intégration est un phénomène indissociable de l'immigration. La détermination des volumes d'immigrants destinés au Québec doit tenir compte des besoins et de la capacité d'accueil de la société québécoise. De plus, l'accueil et l'intégration doivent être réalisés en français. Le français comme langue commune de la vie publique et de la société doit être largement partagée. Les efforts d'accueil et d'intégration doivent également viser la pleine participation et la contribution de toutes et tous au développement économique, social et culturel du Québec et à la vie démocratique. L'ouverture aux apports culturels multiples est encouragée mais dans le respect des valeurs fondamentales de la société québécoise. La reconnaissance de la réalité pluraliste dans l'ensemble de la population et le soutien au rapprochement avec la majorité francophone constituent des facteurs essentiels à la réussite d'une politique d'intégration.

Trois modèles ont guidé successivement les interventions du Ministère dans ces domaines depuis l'adoption, en 1990, de l'Énoncé de politique en matière d'immigration et d'intégration, *Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble :* le modèle intercommunautaire, le modèle civique et le modèle interculturel.

Le modèle intercommunautaire est celui qui a eu cours dans les premières années suivant l'adoption de l'Énoncé en 1990. Tout en affirmant les nouvelles orientations en matière d'intégration économique et linguistique, le gouvernement de l'époque s'était engagé, dans sa stratégie d'éducation et de sensibilisation à la diversité, à mettre en œuvre des mesures qui visaient à *valoriser* les « cultures d'apport » à la société québécoise. Axée autour de l'intégration des nouveaux arrivants, cette conception, qu'on pourrait qualifier de « culturaliste », poursuivaient trois objectifs : une meilleure connaissance et compréhension de la société québécoise, une plus grande reconnaissance de la réalité pluraliste dans l'ensemble de la population et le rapprochement entre les communautés culturelles et la « communauté majoritaire ». Cette approche misait d'abord et avant tout sur le rapprochement entre les communautés plutôt qu'entre les personnes, dans ce qu'elles ont de distinctes et de spécifiques culturellement. Les activités financées évoluaient vers un programme de rapprochement interculturel tel qu'on le préconise aujourd'hui, c'est-à-dire axé sur le projet à réaliser ensemble, et ce, dans la poursuite d'objectifs communs, au delà des différences, et dans le respect de chacun.

En créant le ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration, en 1996, le gouvernement marquait sa volonté de rompre avec le modèle intercommunautaire et de mettre l'accent sur ce qui unit et rassemble les Québécoises et Québécois plutôt que sur ce qui les particularise. Le modèle civique délaisse donc l'approche de catégorisation des citoyens en fonction de leur origine ethnoculturelle ou de leur parcours migratoire en choisissant une approche ou un modèle axé sur les responsabilités civiques et sur l'engagement moral de participer au développement du Québec, et ce, quel que soit le statut de citoyen. Au centre de cet engagement était la responsabilité de vivre et d'agir selon les valeurs et les principes sous-jacents aux droits et libertés inscrits dans la *Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec.* Au nombre des autres valeurs et principes, on peut souligner notamment l'acceptation de la primauté du droit, la tolérance envers les opinions dissidentes, le respect des droits des minorités et le rejet de la force et de la violence comme moyens de promouvoir des idées. Le modèle civique visait en outre à combler les déficits de participation civique, politique, sociale et culturelle par une éducation civique et à favoriser l'adhésion la plus large possible à une « citoyenneté québécoise ».

Une telle conception comportait néanmoins une exigence particulière, soit celle d'avoir à circonscrire l'espace de respect pour la diversité. Or, cet espace était plutôt restreint. Le modèle civique niait les différences sur la base de l'origine ethnoculturelle. Il avait du mal à prendre en compte des phénomènes de repli communautaire et d'isolement social et culturel ainsi que des difficultés en emploi que vivent des personnes des minorités visibles, notamment les femmes et les jeunes.

Le modèle interculturel que préconise le présent gouvernement vise justement à mettre en valeur le vaste potentiel – non seulement culturel, mais économique et social – que représentent les femmes, les hommes, les jeunes et les familles que le Québec accueille, en établissant des ponts entre le gouvernement du Québec et les communautés culturelles, pour faire en sorte que toutes et tous puissent contribuer pleinement au développement de la société québécoise. S'inscrivant en continuité avec l'Énoncé de politique de 1990, le modèle interculturel formalise la nécessaire rencontre entre le projet individuel d'intégration de l'immigrant ou de la personne issue d'une communauté culturelle et un projet collectif d'une société qui souhaite accueillir des personnes pouvant contribuer à sa croissance démographique, à son développement économique, à la pérennité du fait français ainsi qu'à son ouverture sur le monde. Pour ce faire, il interpelle

et responsabilise tous les acteurs de cette rencontre – la personne immigrante, bien sûr, mais également l'employeur, l'élu, l'intervenant communautaire, l'enseignant, l'éducateur en milieu de garde, l'entraîneur sportif et le simple citoyen – comme une condition de réussite. Il prend ancrage dans le vécu quotidien des personnes en processus d'intégration de manière à mieux faire face aux difficultés particulières de certaines populations spécifiques.

Trois objectifs sont poursuivis :

- Accroître l'ouverture à la diversité en encourageant le rapprochement et le dialogue interculturels au sein de la société québécoise ;
- Promouvoir l'apport économique, social et culturel de l'immigration et des communautés culturelles au développement du Québec ;
- Lutter contre la discrimination et le racisme.

Concevoir le rapprochement interculturel

Le rapprochement interculturel est conçu de ce point de vue comme un enjeu fondamental dans le processus conduisant à la pleine participation des personnes issues des communautés culturelles. Il interpelle à la fois ces dernières et les différents acteurs du milieu de vie. Tout en étant un objectif et un enjeu de la politique d'intégration québécoise, le rapprochement interculturel est également un outil de changement, un mécanisme de transformation sociale. Il vise, d'une part, à habiliter les personnes issues des communautés culturelles à devenir des acteurs à part entière de la société québécoise et à influencer les enjeux qui les concernent, à partir de leurs besoins et de leurs aspirations de sorte qu'elles puissent participer pleinement à la vie économique, sociale, communautaire, politique, culturelle et sportive de la société québécoise sans égard à l'origine ethnique ou nationale, à la race, à la couleur, à la religion, à la langue, au sexe ou à l'orientation sexuelle. Le rapprochement interculturel vise, d'autre part, à sensibiliser la population québécoise à l'apport de ces personnes au développement du Québec en vue de surmonter les obstacles au dialogue et à la communication interculturelles, d'abolir les distances culturelles, de faire tomber les préjugés et les stéréotypes ainsi que de faire échec à la discrimination et au racisme. Ultimement, le rapprochement interculturel vise à bâtir une société inclusive, plurielle et ouverte sur le monde.

Dans sa forme concrète, le rapprochement interculturel s'incarne dans des activités ou des projets communs qui font œuvre de connaissance et de démystification. Qu'ils soient de nature civique, éducative, sportive, culturelle, familiale ou communautaire, les projets de rapprochement interculturel promeuvent les valeurs communes de l'égalité, de la solidarité et de la dignité.

Lise Thériault
Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles

13 mai 2005

Notes

1 A. Germain et collaboratrices (1995), *Cohabitation interethnique et vie de quartier,* ministère des Affaires internationales, de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles, collection Études et recherches nº 12, 325 p.

2 M. McAndrew (2003), « Immigration, pluralisme et éducation », dans Alain-G. Gagnon (sous la direction de), *Québec : état et société,* T. 2, Montréal, Québec Amérique, 345-368.

3 Des sondages ont été réalisés par la firme JTD pour le compte du ministère en 1992 et en 1996. Ils portaient sur les relations raciales et interculturelles. Un autre sondage réalisé en 2000 par la firme Ekos mesurait l'opinion québécoise en comparaison avec l'opinion canadienne.

4 M. Jodoin, M. McAndrew et M. Pagé (1997), *Le vécu scolaire et social des élèves scolarisés dans les écoles secondaires de langue française de Montréal : une analyse comparative,* Rapport de recherche, ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration.

5 A. Laperrière et collaboratrices(1993), *La construction sociale des relations ethniques et de l'identité culturelle chez les adolescents de quartiers multiethniques,* Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, Québec.

INTRODUCTION

Crosscultural Communication: A Global View

By Lise Thériault, Quebec Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities

Crosscultural communication is a force for change and social transformation in building an inclusive and pluralistic society that is open to the world.

Crosscultural communication takes the concrete form of joint activities or projects designed to break down barriers between groups and enhance understanding. Whether these crosscultural communication projects are civic, educational, athletic, cultural, familial, or communal in nature, they promote the shared values of equality, solidarity, and dignity.

Preliminary remarks

Immigration has long contributed to the renewal of the labour force and assisted in Québec's social, economic, and cultural development. This contribution has helped make Québec a modern, open state that is proud of its diversity.

Immigration has also undergone change during this time. Since the late 1980s, we have felt the effects of international conditions. On the one hand, Québec is admitting more immigrants. On the other hand, fewer of these immigrants come from traditional immigration pools, such as Mediterranean and Northern Europe, and more of them come from Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East and North Africa, countries in South and East Asia, as well as the Caribbean and Central America. In short, immigration has diversified considerably in 20 years, both socially and religiously.

These recent transformations in the ethnocultural composition of immigrants have led to an increasing diversification of the Québec population, particularly in the Montreal region. The Island of Montreal welcomes the vast majority of Quebec's immigrants and visible minorities. Nearly 70% of Québec's immigrants and nearly 76% of Quebec's visible minorities live on the Island of Montreal. With Laval, Montreal has a share of the immigrant and visible minority population that exceeds its demographic weight in Québec as whole (25%). In addition, over 125 cultural communities call the Montreal region home.

The concentration of immigrants and — *de facto* — cultural communities in Montreal has not been without impact on crosscultural relations in Québec. Though crosscultural contacts are not exclusive to Montreal, they are in fact more frequent than elsewhere in Québec. Over the years, Montrealers have developed a sort of "peaceful cohabitation" between members of cultural communities and the population as a whole, as Annick Germain[1] has described so well. Germain's study on the dynamic of crosscultural (or interethnic) relations in the Montreal area has shown that cohabitation between cultural communities is an urban phenomenon defined by lively public interaction, a high degree of civility, and a respectful distance. Exchange and communication are exceptions rather than the rule, but tolerance for differences is a given in Montreal public spaces.

The same cannot be said about the other regions. Aside from Laval and perhaps Montreal's South Shore, the regional status of crosscultural relations is quite different. A "hiatus" or disparity has developed over the years between Montreal and the rest of Québec in the areas of cultural pluralism and identity associations[2]. This hiatus is explained in large part by the demographic weakness of cultural communities within regional populations and the lack of appropriate measures to attract immigrants and help them settle in the regions on a long term basis.

However, this situation should change with efforts to increase immigration to the regions. Moreover, immigration is becoming a major factor in regional development. Regional and local players are increasingly cognizant of the potential benefits of immigration for regional growth, notably for regions with declining populations or labor shortages. Steps are being taken to raise awareness among employers and the general public in the regions about how diversity contributes to Québec's development as well as to foster crosscultural dialogue.

For 15 years now, Quebecers have been more open to immigration and crosscultural relations. The results of Québec public opinion surveys[3] conducted since 1992 show Quebecers are increasingly favorable to immigration in their attitudes and behaviors, whether in terms of crosscultural contacts or perceptions regarding the integration of immigrants into Québec society. The results also show that young people who have been exposed to ethnic pluralism on a daily basis believe that ethnically diversified schools play a positive role in promoting understanding and harmony between young people[4]. This bears out the finding of a qualitative study[5] of high school students that "for young people, school embodies pluralism in its most positive incarnation given the great diversity and extensive social networks encountered there. Not that school is free of tensions. But youth have succeeded in putting in place a set of operational principles in school that allow them to

maximize their contact with others, despite the distance that separates them." This study helps identify those factors conducive to communication between young people: prioritizing individual versus group characteristics, relativizing cultures, acknowledging the need to accommodate, and ensuring reciprocal contact.

In summary, perceptions and attitudes regarding crosscultural relations have changed in Québec, and support for crosscultural awareness measures is increasing.

The foundation of an approach that fosters crosscultural communication

Since the late 1960s, a consensus has slowly developed regarding the admission and integration of immigrants. First, that immigrant integration is inseparable from immigration. Immigrant admissions must take into account the needs of Québec society and its ability to accommodate newcomers. Second, that admission and integration must occur in French. French is the common language of public life and society and must be widely shared. Furthermore, admission and integration efforts must seek to ensure full, universal participation in and contribution to Québec's economic, social, and cultural development and its democratic life. Openness to multiple cultures is encouraged, provided the fundamental values of Québec society are respected. Acknowledgement of pluralism by the population as a whole and support for closer ties with the francophone majority are crucial factors to the success of any integration policy.

Three models have successively guided MICC's involvement in these areas since the adoption in 1990 of the policy statement on immigration and integration, *Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: le modèle intercommunautaire, le modèle civique et le modèle interculturel.*

The inter-community model was used in the years following adoption of the policy in 1990. While affirming its new economic and linguistic integration goals, the government of the day undertook as part of its diversity education and awareness strategy to implement measures aimed at recognizing "cultures that contribute" to Québec society. Centered on integrating newly arrived immigrants, this model, which could be called "culturalist," had three goals: increase knowledge and understanding of Québec society, strengthen support for pluralism among the Québec population as a whole, and bring cultural communities and the "majority community" together. This approach focused mainly on bringing communities rather than people together based on their unique cultural differences. Funded activities were moving towards a crosscultural communication program such as it exists today, namely one focused on working together to achieve common goals that transcend differences, in full respect of one another.

By creating Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration in 1996, the government showed its desire to break with the inter-community model and stress what unites and brings Quebecers together, rather than what divides them. The civic model therefore rejected the categorization of citizens based on their ethnocultural origin or migrational history by opting for an approach or model that stressed civic responsibilities and the moral duty to participate in Québec's development, regardless of citizen status. At the heart of this pact was the responsibility to live and act in accordance with the principles underlying the rights and freedoms in Québec's *Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.* Among other values and principles to be respected were the acceptance of the rule of law, tolerance for dissenting opinions, respect for minority rights, and the rejection of force and violence as ways to promote one's ideas. The civic model was also aimed at encouraging greater civic, political, social, and cultural participation through civic education and by making as many people as possible feel that they were truly "citizens of Québec."

Such a concept nonetheless required special effort to make room for diversity, as the importance accorded it was rather limited. The civic model negated ethnocultural differences and had trouble taking into account the phenomena of community "ghettoization" and social and cultural isolation, as well as the barriers to employment facing visible minorities, women and young people especially.

The crosscultural model favored by this government is aimed at drawing on the enormous potential— not just cultural, but economic and social as well— of the women, men, children, and families that Québec welcomes, by building bridges between the Québec government and cultural communities to ensure that all can contribute fully to the development of Québec society. This model is in line with the 1990 policy and formalizes the need for harmony between the individual integration of immigrants or people from cultural communities and the collective welfare of a society that wishes to welcome people who can contribute to its demographic growth and economic development as well as ensure the continuity of the French fact in North America and its openness to the world. To do so, it calls on and holds accountable all players involved in this process — including immigrants, of course, but also employers, elected officials, community workers, teachers, daycare educators, sports coaches, and ordinary citizens — to help ensure its success. This model is anchored in the daily lives of people in the process of integrating so as to better address the particular difficulties some groups may experience.

It has the three following goals:

- Increase openness to diversity by encouraging crosscultural communication and dialog within Québec society
- Promote the economic, social, and cultural contribution of immigration and cultural communities to Québec's development
- Fight discrimination and racism

Perspectives on crosscultural communication

Crosscultural communication is a fundamental part of the process by which members of cultural communities can participate fully in society. It requires the involvement of these members as well as various community figures. As a goal and challenge of Québec's integration policy, crosscultural communication is also a force for change and social transformation. On the one hand, it is aimed at helping people from cultural communities become full-fledged members of Québec society and influence the issues that concern them based on their needs and aspirations so that they can participate fully in the economic, social,

community, political, cultural, and athletic life of Québec society, regardless of ethnic or national origin, race, color, religion, language, sex, or sexual orientation. On the other hand, crosscultural communication is aimed at raising awareness among the Québec population of how these people contribute to Québec's growth while also seeking to overcome barriers to dialog and crosscultural communication, abolish cultural distance, eliminate prejudice and stereotypes, and fight discrimination and racism. The ultimate purpose of crosscultural communication is to build an inclusive, pluralistic society that is open to the world.

Crosscultural communication takes the concrete form of joint activities or projects designed to break down barriers between groups and enhance understanding. Whether these crosscultural communication projects are civic, educational, athletic, cultural, familial, or communal in nature, they promote the shared values of equality, solidarity, and dignity.

Lise Thériault
Quebec Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities

Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles
May 13, 2005

Notes

[1] A. Germain et al. (1995), *Cohabitation interethnique et vie de quartier, ministère des Affaires internationales,* de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles, collection Études et recherches No. 12, 325 p.

[2] M. McAndrew (2003), "Immigration, pluralisme et education", in Alain-G. Gagnon (under the direction of), *Québec: état et société,* T. 2, Montréal, Québec Amérique, 345-368.

[3] JTD conducted surveys on racial and crosscultural relations for the department in 1992 and 1996. Another survey conducted in 2000 by Ekos compared Québec opinions to Canadian opinions.

[4] M. Jodoin, M. McAndrew, and M. Pagé (1997), *Le vécu scolaire et social des élèves scolarisés dans les écoles secondaires de langue française de Montréal: une analyse comparative,* research report, Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration.

[5] A. Laperrière et al. (1993), *La construction sociale des relations ethniques et de l'identité culturelle chez les adolescents de quartiers multiethniques,* Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, Québec.

AN INTERVIEW WITH MARLENE JENNINGS

Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister with special emphasis on Canada-U.S.

1. How important is your identity to you and how does it express itself in your daily life and career?

My identity is very important to me. It forms the basis of my very core. I am a Black Canadian woman of diverse ethnic origins, a proud Quebecer and Anglophone! However my self-identity is much more complex than that; I am also a wife, a mother, a sister, a friend. How I think of issues is shaped by my personal history, past and present. In day-to-day life, the manner in which my identity will express itself will and is determined by the set of circumstances with which I am confronted. For example, when the four terrorist bombs went off in London last month, the part of my self-identity that is that of being a member of a family superseded that of race and colour. My first thoughts went to my sister, nephew and brother-in-law who reside in London, and I immediately emailed my sister, asking if she and her family were okay. It was only after I'd received assurances from my sister that all was well with her family that the parts of my identity relating to race and colour began to kick-in and I began to wonder about the race of the terrorists and whether this time we'd see involvement from Black Africa. As for my professional life/career, my identity has played a significant role in choices I have made about job offers. Had I not been a Black Quebecker, I do not think I would have accepted the appointment to the Quebec Police Commission in 1988. It was a time when Quebec in general and Montreal in particular were experiencing serious issues regarding race relations between our police services and the Black communities. It had become clear to all who had extensively studied the situation that public policies on policing had to change. I felt that as a Black Quebecker, I could have a positive impact on those policies and on the type of policing required in an increasingly ethnically and racially diverse society.

2. Canada and the U.S. differ greatly with respect to how each country integrates immigrants. The United States has often been described as a melting pot, while Canada has been known for its more multicultural, cultural mosaic approach. Do you think that distinction still holds true? If so, in what ways?

I do think and believe that the distinction between Canada and the United States' integration of immigrants hold true today as it did 100 years ago. Our country continues, thru public policies to promote the multicultural mosaic approach while the USA's approach of the melting pot is weakening, or appears to be undergoing some erosion. In some ways, I believe the Canadian approach has positioned us well to deal with the world of the 3rd millennium. Immigrants to Canada have historically maintained a core attachment to their countries of origin, their culture of origin. In today's world of accessible, affordable travel, communications (internet, wireless communications, etc), many immigrants to the USA are no longer identifying themselves as Americans first and foremost but rather are maintaining their "original" identity as equally important to that of their adopted country.

3. The face of Canada and the U.S. has changed due to immigration. The U.S. has received significant immigration from Latin American countries while Canada has received a lot of immigration from Asian countries. If these immigration patterns continue, how do you think it will impact the relationship between Canada and the U.S.?

If the current immigration patterns that exist for United States and for Canada continue, it will surely have an impact on Canada's relationship with the USA. The reality of our shared border means, I believe, that Canada will continue its many ties to the USA, trade, cultural, familial, and so forth. However, the United States will of necessity also look to enhance its relationships with Latin and South America, as will its citizens who originate from those areas. Meanwhile Canada, given the growing importance of its Asian immigration, is determined to strike the right balance, at least on the international trade front, between trade with the USA and enhancing its bilateral trade links with

Asian countries, primarily China, and India (South Asian). One has only to examine Canada's recently announced Strategy for the Emerging Markets to understand this.

4. Is Canada doing enough to promote cultural diversity abroad?

Well, I think the announcement of Michaelle Jean's appointment as Canada's next Governor General is certainly proof that our government is committed to promoting cultural diversity within Canada but also on the international scene. And that diversity for which Canada is known doesn't only signify ethnic, racial and religious diversity. It also means the ability to include a diversity of political and cultural thought; Bloc Quebecois, Parti Québécois, for instance. Where else in the world have we witnessed the birth of a political movement that calls into question the very existence of a country and its political and social mores, and ably integrate said movement into its very fundamental institutions? Can we do more? Certainly! We must do more to recruit, hire and promote members of Canada's ethnically and racially diverse communities into our public service, especially the Foreign Service and the military so that the public face we witness everyday in Canada's cities and communities is also witnessed abroad by officials and citizens of other countries.

5. Do you think racism is a problem in Canada? What needs to be done to combat it?

Is racism a problem in Canada? Of course racism is a problem in Canada. Canada is not exempt from the history of institutional, political, legislative discriminatory practices that characterized the "modernization" and "industrialization" of our societies over the centuries. It has also not been exempt from exclusionary policies; witness our first official immigration legislation and subsequent Immigration Acts in the 20th Century, the very fundamental basis of which was to exclude non-whites from setting foot in Canada. Our Chinese Head Tax, treatment of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War, of Italian and Ukrainian Canadians during that very same period. And don't get me started on exclusion of Blacks from virtually every facet of normal, regular activities in our country until just a couple of decades ago. Still today, study after study demonstrates that regardless of the indicator chosen, persons of African heritage/descent are to be found at the bottom… double and triple the level of unemployment, of under-employment. While the term the "glass ceiling" has become symbolic for the obstacles women face within our society, the term that best describes the situation with which Blacks are faced even today, would be the "Steel Ceiling". The first, while constituting a barrier, still leaves one with the impression that it can be broken, shattered. The second on the other hand, leaves one with the impression of a nearly impenetrable obstacle.

6. Do you think Canada takes advantage of its diversity? What can we do to better benefit from it?

Canada does attempt to take advantage of its diversity whether thru public policy, international trade for instance and the recently announced Emerging Markets Strategy. And we have become leaders in the domain of cross cultural accommodation, mediation, and conciliation. Much more is required and essentially to ensure Canada improves the benefits of multiculturalism and diversity, the very notion must evolve past a simple numbers game… how many have been hired (that of course remains an important component of benefiting from cultural diversity), to have we examined our policies, traditions, processes to integrate diversity.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: DIASPORA NATIONS

ABSTRACT

Both Canada and the United States have been built by successive waves of immigration. In this essay, the author examines the construction of diaspora communities and how these communities integrate or reject contact with mainstream culture. Milton Esman argues that as earlier arrivals are gradually integrated into the mainstream, their community atrophies. However, future diasporas composed of visible minorities such as the Sikhs in Toronto or the Hispanics in Los Angeles may establish a new set of relationships with the mainstream.

Diasporas are the consequence of transnational migration.[1] The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented levels of transnational migration, facilitated by cheap and reliable transportation and communication technologies. Some migrants are escaping political or religious persecution, but most are motivated by the promise of improved economic opportunity for themselves and their children. From their outset, Canada and the United States have served as refuges for the oppressed and magnets for those seeking to improve their economic prospects. Both countries have been built by successive waves of immigrants and the process continues unabated. During the 1990s, the U.S. admitted a record number 9.1 million immigrants, plus an estimated 7 million, the majority from Mexico, who entered the country illegally.[2] Canada's average annual intake at the turn of the century was a record 238,000.

In the year 2000, 5.8 million Canadians were foreign born, comprising 18.4 percent of the population. 38 percent of the residents of Toronto and 30 percent in Vancouver were born outside Canada (for all Ontario and British Columbia the figure is 26 percent).[3] The proportion of recent immigrants from non-European countries, thus "visible" minorities in both countries, hovers at 80 percent.

Beginning with the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620, some migrants have moved as intact communities, but most have uprooted themselves and moved as individuals or families. Upon arriving in a strange country, they sense the indifference and all too often the hostility of indigenes or earlier arrivals toward persons who speak, dress and eat differently and may become economic competitors. Feeling the need for protection, mutual assistance, fellowship, and community, they cluster together in Little Italies, Chinatowns, Polish Hills, Little Saigons, and New Havanas. For most new arrivals, these diaspora communities already exist; they are taken in and helped to start their new lives. In a few cases, such as Vietnamese fleeing the victorious Viet Minh regime, arriving migrants must build their community institutions anew.

Diaspora communities provide essential services to their members. They help their members find jobs and housing, provide shops and restaurants where familiar and distinctive food is available. They provide religious services, educational opportunities including English language classes, publications in the native language, insurance programs and burial societies, sports teams, savings and loan societies. However, earlier arrivals are not above exploiting the labour, lodging, and financial needs of later arriving compatriots. Some diasporas develop specialized economic niches that provide employment and outlets for entrepreneurial energies, such as Korean produce vendors on the U.S. east coast, Italians in construction, and Jewish manufacturers and wholesalers in the fashion industry. Initially, the focus of diaspora energies is internal, helping to secure a foothold for their members, while promoting the survival of their culture and collective identity in a new country. Some members spend a lifetime in the sheltering cocoon of their own community, maintaining little or no contact with mainstream culture or economic activity.

Some diaspora communities insist on maintaining their distinctive identity and way of life, rejecting integration into the national mainstream. Amish in Pennsylvania and New York, Hutterites in Manitoba, ultra-Orthodox Jews in Brooklyn cling to their traditional dress and customs and ask mainly to be left alone. Most diasporas, however, find it expedient to come to terms with the dominant mainstream. Their children watch the mass media, attend public schools, and become fluent in the mainstream language. They develop career aspirations that cannot be satisfied within the diaspora enclave. While retaining links to their community and its institutions, they begin to participate

MILTON J. ESMAN

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in the economic and cultural opportunities available in mainstream society. The second generation gradually assumes leadership in diaspora institutions, shifting the focus of its activities gradually from inward looking to outward directed goals. The latter include demands for symbolic recognition and respect for their community, a fair share of government services, political jobs, and business contracts, and government policies that take account of their needs and preferences. Examples include bilingual education in Texas, the regulation of kosher slaughter in New York, and the vigorous demands of the large and well-organized German and Irish diasporas — unsuccessfully as it turned out — that the U.S. decline to enter World Wars I and II on the side of the British. The third generation, no longer competent in the ancestral language, becomes fully involved in the mainstream economy, moves out of diaspora neighborhoods, and raises their families in mainstream communities.

As diaspora communities become more secure and more assertive, they also become more pluralistic. Some elements of pluralism are present from the outset, for example, differences among Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, and Mexicans in what have been aggregated as the "Hispanic" diaspora in the United States. Their economic interests may diverge and so may their attitudes toward cultural integration with the mainstream. This fragmentation may include their orientation to foreign affairs and the overseas interests of their communities. Pluralism generates factions which then compete for control of their diaspora institutions and the right to represent their community to outsiders. Minorities may break away and establish competing institutions. Irish in the U.S. and Canada have been split between those who support the IRA and its violent tactics, and those who favor a negotiated accommodation with Protestants in Northern Ireland. The Jewish diaspora in North America has lobbied actively for U.S. support of Israel, but is divided into several factions, some supporting the militant religious settlers in the West Bank, others supporting accommodation with Palestinians, others favoring the pragmatic expansionist policies of the current Sharon government.

The rate at which a diaspora integrates into the national cultural, economic, and political mainstream depends on the inclinations of its members, juxtaposed against the receptivity of mainstream society, the latter directly influenced by government policy. The possibilities are reflected in the following matrix:

Figure 1 – Diasporas and the Mainstream

Attitudes of Host Society	Disapora Preferences	
	Receptive	Resistant
Receptive	U.S. and Canada post 1960s.*	Amish
Resistant	U.S. and Canada toward Asians prior to 1960s.*	Nation of Islam (Black Separatists)

* From the mid 1920s, immigration law and practice in both countries excluded Asians and discriminated against Europeans from southern and eastern Europe. In the 1960s, preferences and discrimination based on national origins were eliminated in both countries.

There are two stages of integration: cultural and social. As individuals become educated and fluent in the mainstream language, they adopt its way of life, including occupational choices, leisure time activities, styles, and food tastes that are inspired by mainstream models. They become acculturated to the mainstream and the mainstream, in turn, accepts elements of their culture in food, speech, and musical tastes. Pizza, tacos and bagels have been incorporated into North America's mainstream culinary culture. Second and especially third generation individuals, the latter no longer proficient in the ancestral language, move away from diaspora centers, while maintaining nominal and nostalgic affiliation with its institutions, often for the sake of their parents. But their interests and way of life conform increasingly to mainstream patterns. Social integration occurs as members of successive generations of the diaspora participate in mainstream social institutions — churches, clubs, schools — and marry outsiders, abandoning their remaining linkages and those of their children with their ethnic community.

As this process occurs, the diaspora shrinks in numbers, the average age of its participants rises, its institutions can no longer be sustained, and it gradually withers. This process can be extended in time for ethnic communities that also comprise a distinctive religious faith, such as Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Hindus. But for most ethnic diasporas in the U.S. and Canada — Italians, Poles, Irish, Germans, Japanese, Swedes — the generational passage from cultural to social integration is relentless, diaspora communities eroding at their margins and finally losing their constituents, unless they are reinforced by fresh arrivals such as Dominicans in New York and Chinese in British Columbia. More than 50 percent of the marriages of third generation American Japanese and Jews are to partners outside their ethnic community.

The diaspora phenomenon in countries such as the U.S. and Canada is part of the dynamic demography of these immigrant friendly polities. The U.S. is believed to favor the assimilationist-melting pot approach, encouraging immigrants to acculturate rapidly, become Americanized, and join the mainstream. In practice, however, diaspora communities are free to function, to build and maintain their institutions and to serve their members, without interference or support by government. They lobby government at all levels, local, state, and federal, on behalf of their collective interests, as defined by their leadership. The Armenian diaspora, for example, demands that the U.S. government refuse to sell arms to its Turkish ally until Turkey acknowledges and apologizes for the genocide of Armenians during and after the First World War. In practice, ethnic diasporas in the United States behave and are treated as interest groups, exchanging benefits and influence for financial contributions and votes in the group interest pattern of American democracy.

Canadians are proud of their ethnic "mosaic" and of their multicultural policy, in presumed contrast to the melting pot strategy of their southern neighbor. In addition to subsidizing the educational and cultural institutions of official language minorities — Anglophones in Quebec, Francophones elsewhere — the Government of Canada provides funding to support the literary, educational, linguistic, mass media, and artistic activities of diaspora communities, helping them maintain and invigorate

their inherited cultures. Yet, despite these multicultural efforts, members of these diaspora communities appear to be integrating to the cultural and social mainstream at about the same rate as counterparts across the border. A similar North American dynamic describes and explains the evolution of diaspora communities in both countries. Both belong in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1.

Transnational activities of diasporas may occur without reference to their host government. Tamils in Canada and the United States have provided substantial financial aid to the Sri Lankan Tamil's armed rebellion in pursuit of an independent Tamil Eelam. They have, however, insisted that the "Tigers" put a stop to the practice of recruiting children as cannon fodder. Initiatives frequently come from the country of origin. On a recent official visit to the United States, the Prime Minister of Vietnam announced that "it is our government's consistent policy to consider the community living abroad as an important and integral part of our nation and our resources".[4] Yet, the million strong Vietnamese diaspora in the United States remains bitterly opposed to the current Communist Party government of their native country and defiantly flies the flag of the defunct South Vietnamese regime. Foreign governments tend to regard their North American diasporas as "resources" because of their potential to influence Canadian and U.S. foreign policy, and because of the funds they remit to families in the old country.

There are two important exceptions to the American pattern of gradual acculturation and eventual incorporation into the national mainstream. The first is the oldest diaspora, African-Americans, who were transported to the Americas in chains. After emancipation and the success of the civil rights movement a century later, and long after their acculturation to the English language and Christian religion, persistent racism has delayed their integration into the social mainstream. The integrationist majority of African-Americans fits into the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, a minority separatist faction into the lower right.

The current wave of unimpeded Hispanic immigration into the U.S. from the Caribbean basin and especially from Mexico may constitute a second exception. Between Mexicans, Salvadorians, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans there are historical and social differences, but what they have in common is the Spanish language which, in the U.S. context, has bundled them into a common "Hispanic" identity. By virtue of sheer numbers, exceeding 40 million in 2005, (projected to grow to 72 million, 20 percent of the US total by 2030), mostly young and with a high birth rate, this unskilled and under-educated labor migration constitutes a fresh reality in many areas of the United States, especially in the southwest bordering Mexico and in Florida. 75 percent of the third generation speak mainly English and a third marry outside their ethnic community, thereby integrating into the social mainstream. Several have achieved high positions in corporate America, one is the U.S. Attorney General, two now serve in the U.S. Senate, and many hold high offices in state and local government. Yet, the dropout rate of young Hispanics from high school approaches 50 percent and many of the graduates are unprepared for college.[5] Lacking the skills needed for upward mobility in the labor force, they are condemned to unskilled, low wage employment.

The Government of Canada provides funding to support the literary, educational, linguistic, mass media, and artistic activities of diaspora communities, helping them maintain and invigorate their inherited cultures. Yet, despite these multicultural efforts, members of these diaspora communities appear to be integrating to the cultural and social mainstream at about the same rate as counterparts across the border.

Because of their numbers, their limited education, the proximity of their homelands, and the continuing arrival of fresh recruits, many remain tied to their diaspora communities. The insatiable demand of employers for docile, low cost labor accounts for government toleration of the unlimited supply of illegal immigrants, overwhelming the complaints of those who insist on the regulation of immigration and the policy of English only. To accommodate this reality, both government and private firms have found it expedient to provide services and communicate with members of the diaspora in the Spanish language. With no diminution in the rate of Hispanic immigration, several regions of the United States are becoming de facto bi-national, bi-cultural, and bi-lingual areas. The Mexican government provides a network of services to its diaspora in the United States, facilitates the remittance of funds, and encourages its members to vote in Mexico's elections. This effective process of bi-nationalization is occurring without legal recognition and with minimal policy response by the government in Washington. It remains to be seen whether the massive and expanding Hispanic diaspora will gradually integrate into the American mainstream, as many of its members already have, or whether certain regions of the U.S. will evolve into bi-national societies that will eventually be recognized as such in U.S. law and public policy.

Reverting to our opening theme: immigration creates diasporas. As long as the U.S. and Canada continue to welcome large annual cohorts of new arrivals, existing diaspora communities will be refreshed and new ones will be built. These diaspora communities will help to meet the economic and cultural needs of new arrivals and serve as interest groups for their ethnic constituents. Many of their members, whose parents participated in and benefited from the institutions of their diaspora, will choose to acculturate and be drawn into the national mainstream. But some, perhaps a majority,

of permanent residents in expanding Hispanic communities, may find that their needs are fulfilled within the institutions of their diaspora. Unequipped to integrate culturally or socially into the American mainstream, they are likely to remain attached to their diaspora communities and to their roots in nearby homelands.

Every diaspora creates its distinctive history that is interpreted, often celebrated, sometimes demeaned in a robust literature. Yet, there has been a common pattern. In the life cycle of North American diasporas, as immigration fails to replenish their communities while the progeny of earlier arrivals gradually integrate into the mainstream, the community atrophies. Its shrinking institutions are maintained by a corporal's guard, clinging to their ethnic identity largely for nostalgic reasons. This has been the fate of European diasporas in North America. In the future, the more active and influential diasporas will be composed of "visible" minorities — Sikhs in Toronto, Hispanics in Los Angeles — who provide the bulk of immigration. Will they conform to the European pattern, or will they establish new sets of relationships with the mainstream?

Notes

[1] For a more extended treatment of diaspora politics, see Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1994. 176-215.

[2] "Undocumented" persons in the US currently estimated at 10.4 million. Data from the Pew Hispanic Center reported in the *New York Times,* July 20, 2005, page C4.

[3] Data from the US Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002.* Washington: Government Printing Office. 2003. page 10; and US Immigration and Naturalization Service, *World Migration Report* 2005, from the internet. Also, Statistics Canada, 2001 Census report on immigration.

[4] Associated Press dispatch printed in the *Ithaca Journal,* Monday June 20, 2005. page 2

[5] 53.2 percent of Hispanics who enroll in high schools manage to graduate (the US average is 68 percent, the Asian figure is 76.8). Source: Gary Orfield, ed, *Dropouts in America: Confronting the Graduation Rate Crisis.* Cambridge MA: Harvard Education Press. 2004. 23-4. 10 percent of Hispanics in the US have earned university degrees.

THE CANADIAN JEWISH DIASPORA: A TALE OF TWO CITIES

ABSTRACT

Canadian Jews form the third largest Jewish diaspora community in the world after the United States and France. Despite many people's belief that the Canadian Jewish experience is an extension of the U.S., Harold Troper argues that it's a uniquely Canadian product, a product that really remains a tale of two cities – Montreal and Toronto.

The Jewish diaspora has been described as the classic or "ideal type" diaspora, dispersed to the four corners of the world almost two thousand years ago but still retaining a sense of shared identity and communal memory.[1] Today, Canadian Jews form the third largest Jewish diaspora community in the world after the United States and France. Yet, in spite of the community's size, it remains largely unknown, perhaps even invisible among diaspora communities. In part this is because Canadian Jews are often thought to be little more than a subset of the much larger American Jewish community to the south, virtually indistinguishable in their own right. If there is a difference it is put down to generational lag. Simply stated, Canadian Jews are said to be just American Jews, only one generation behind. Since Canadian Jews tend to be a little closer in time to their immigrant roots, the argument goes, it will just take them that much longer to melt into the great homogenizing caldron that is North America. But be assured, where American Jews are today, Canadian Jews will be tomorrow or maybe the day after tomorrow. The timing may not be precise, but there is no denying that the direction Canadian Jews are heading is pre-ordained. America is destiny. And, given the options, is that so bad?

Bad or not, this determinist thesis is wrong. The Canadian Jewish experience is not a tardy branch plant of the American Jewish community. Far from it. The Canadian Jewish community is a uniquely Canadian product, rooted in Canadian experience. It has given rise to different identity assumptions, community priorities, forms of organization and expression of bonding with Jews elsewhere than is true of American Jews.[2]

Let us focus on but one distinguishing Canadian Jewish characteristic. The Canadian Jewish experience has been and remains today a tale of two cities. In the next decade the number of Jews in Canada will break the 350,000 mark. And while Jews can be found in every province and every major urban center, from the turn of the last century onward, approximately 80 percent of all Canadian Jews have lived in either Montreal or Toronto. Montreal is home to something less than 100,000 Jews. Toronto, or rather the Greater Toronto Area, will likely exceed 200,000 within the next few years securing Toronto's place as home to one of the 10 largest Jewish communities in the world outside of Israel.

What of the rest of Canada? Without prejudging what population size is necessary to sustain vibrant Jewish community life, in 2001 only four other Canadian cities had Jewish populations of more than 5,000 Jews: Vancouver (17,300), Winnipeg (12,800), Ottawa (11,200) and Calgary (6,500). The Jewish communities of Vancouver, Ottawa and Calgary are growing, but almost all other Jewish communities across Canada, including Winnipeg, are graying and hemorrhaging their young, many to Toronto.

While Toronto and Montreal remain home to the lion's share of Canadian Jews, there is a core difference between these two communities that is sometimes difficult for those living in either city to articulate. It bespeaks a historical cleavage in the Canadian body politic – French-English relations. Far more than Toronto, Montreal has been a city of boundaries, of separate English and French estates or solitudes in which the city's Jews have often self-identified as a 'Third Solitude'. The Jews of Montreal, overwhelmingly English speaking, have long regarded themselves and been regarded by others as distinct and at a distance from the rest of English speaking Montreal. And if Jews felt a separation between themselves and other English-speakers, they also felt just as distant, if not more so, from Francophone Montreal. This feeling persisted in Montreal even after the significant immigration of Francophone Jews from North Africa beginning in 1957.[3] The lines of separation were, and

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for many still are, so fixed in the Montreal Jewish mind that they could be laid out on a map. And in some ways they were. In his book about an earlier day, *The Main,* Mordecai Richler speaks of the Main, Saint Laurent Boulevard, the central artery of Montreal's old inner-city Jewish neighborhood, as a border between Jews and others. He explained:

If the Main was a poor man's street, it was also a dividing line. Below, the French Canadians. Above, some distance above, the dreaded WASP. On the main itself there were some Italians, Yugoslavs and Ukrainians, but they did not count as true gentiles. Even the French Canadian who were our enemies, were not entirely unloved. Like us, they were poor and coarse with large families and spoke English badly.[4]

Thus, in this earlier day the Main was a boundary and Jews need no map to tell them on which side of the boundary they belonged. In the decades after World War II, as Jews moved off the Main, boundaries remained. And these boundaries were more than just those of geography or neighborhood. For decades Jews knew boundaries, formal and informal, that differentiate them from others with regard to residential clustering, educational options, community organizations and political, business and, above all, social interaction. Of course, as a group Montreal Jews have prospered and their children have become increasingly well educated, but even those with money likely had fewer non-Jewish social, business and even school contacts than would have been true of Jews in Toronto. Only in the approaching shadow of Quebec's 1960s Quiet Revolution, which forever shifted the political and economic center of gravity in Quebec, did McGill University finally remove restrictive quotas limiting the admission of Jews.[5] Knowing McGill's past, many Jewish students still felt themselves on campus as much by sufferance as by ability. Still other public and private institutions remained separated along religious or linguistic lines, and often both.

Instead of a frontal assault against entrenched walls of exclusion, Jews in Montreal tended to acknowledge boundaries as a fact of Montreal life and got on with their lives. They did better than that. Living behind boundaries of separation, Montreal Jews over decades constructed a community at once diverse and close with an élan all its own. With little fear of assimilation into the larger surrounding society – English or French speaking – Montreal Jews found a deep sense of intra-group belonging, a sense that it didn't really matter what others were thinking because, for the most part, with limited non-Jewish interaction, Jews were left to their own devices. Thus, behind social, cultural, political and even economic walls of difference, Montreal Jews created a self-contained but spirited and energetic community, an institutionally complete and economically successful urban village full of *ta'am* and *savoir faire.*

Instead of a frontal assault against entrenched walls of exclusion, Jews in Montreal tended to acknowledge boundaries as a fact of Montreal life and got on with their lives. They did better than that. Living behind boundaries of separation, Montreal Jews over decades constructed a community at once diverse and close with an élan all its own.

But no matter how internally complete, the community was not immune to convulsions in the surrounding world. And Montreal Jews, feeling themselves in Quebec but never really part of Quebec, were blindsided by the 1960s and 1970s Quiet Revolution. Convulsive debates over language, culture and identity and its street-level impact raised doubts about the long term plans of individual Quebec Jews. In his short 1998 book about Jewish Montreal, Mackay Smith argues that if Quebec ever ceded from Canada, "the Jewish community will disband in Montreal and move to Canada."[6] Right or wrong, through the 1970s and 1980s growing numbers of younger, more-mobile Jews, uneasy at the rapidity and direction of change, packed it in, many heading for Toronto. As a result of this youthful exodus, the in-place Montreal Jewish community is now proportionately smaller and graying – half the size of Toronto but with an equal number of those over 65. The overriding concerns of the current Montreal community are to assure high level services and infrastructure while, at the same time, instilling confidence that Jews enjoy a positive future in Montreal and that the next generation of Jews will have the skills and resources necessary to grasp that future.

And what of Toronto? If Montreal has been a community of boundaries, Toronto has been more a community of accommodation. Until after World War II, Toronto is remembered as a solid and stolid Anglo-Saxon city, an outpost of British conservative values in North America. The dominant community imagination was so overwhelmingly Anglo-centric that Toronto was commonly described as the "Ulster of the North", a municipality where Anglo-Protestant Victorian restraint, draconian liquor legislation and Sunday blue laws still dominated. It was certainly that way in 1923 when Ernest Hemingway was a reporter for the *Toronto Star.* At the time Hemingway maintained an active correspondence with Ezra Pound. In a letter to Hemingway, Pound asked about his friend's impressions of Toronto. Hemingway, seldom at a loss for words, replied, "It can't be worse. You can't imagine it. I'm not going to describe it." Others were less reluctant. In 1940, visiting English author Wyndham Lewis described Toronto as "a mournful Scottish version of an American city" and dismissed the rest of English Canada as "a sanctimonious icebox."[7] However, to a significant degree Toronto was less marked by the mindset of boundaries that characterized Montreal. While Toronto was marked by a deep stain of anti-Semitism, economic, social and political boundaries were somewhat more fluid or permeable.[8] As a result, into the postwar years, there were also more avenues open to Jewish participation in the

larger civic society. But this came at a price. In the name of accommodation, the Jewish community was expected to take the shape of the pan it was baked in – to outwardly at least demonstrate the self-imposed reserve of the surrounding community. As a result, the Toronto Jewish community seemed outwardly less spirited than that of Montreal. But reserved or not, the Jewish community of Toronto proved more aggressive than Montreal in challenging legally sanctioned and informal anti-Semitism.[9]

But did this combination of rights activism and accommodation work? Arguably yes. Impossible as it might be for Montreal Jews to imagine this in their city even today, by the time of the 1970s Jewish exodus from Montreal, there had already been two popular Jewish mayors in Toronto, Nathan Philips (1955-1962) and Philip Givens (1963-1966).

But like Montreal, during the past several decades Toronto has been subject to dramatic change. Even as the Jews of Montreal were caught up in the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the Jews of Toronto were caught up in a revolution of another kind – a pluralist revolution. It is an urban legend that the United Nations has designated Toronto the most multicultural city in the world, but it is true that during the past several decades the political and economic force of large scale immigration from around the world deeply eroded Anglo-centric hegemony, opening the door wide to assertions of ethnic particularism. Anglo-accommodation of the past has been superseded by a new multi-ethnic urban paradigm.[10] Toronto is the world in a city and Jews remain very much part of that world. All this was taking place even as the Jewish community itself was becoming more internally diverse by origins, range of religious expression and political leanings. In addition to the presence of the highest proportion of Holocaust survivors of any western Jewish community outside of Israel, a distinction Toronto shared with Montreal, today almost 60 percent of Toronto Jews were born elsewhere – elsewhere in Canada and elsewhere in the world. Toronto is home to Jewish immigrants from Ukraine, Russia, South Africa, Iran, Argentina, Israel and the United States to name but a few. More than 20,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union arrived in Toronto since 1990. There is also a growing Sephardic presence in Toronto and even a tiny community of Jews from India. Importantly, the population growth rate among Jewish 15 to 24 year olds in the past decade or so was more than 20 percent, forecasting continued population growth into the future.

With such a diverse Jewish community it is dangerous to make any overarching generalizations. But several conclusions present themselves. Toronto, home to half of all Canadian Jews, has replaced Montreal as the Jewish capital of Canada. For all its diversity, the Jewish community of Toronto, educated, increasingly professional and middle class, is conspicuous by its engagement in all areas of community activity. Like Montreal, the Toronto Jewish community also remains more religiously traditional, affirming of Zionism and geographically contiguous than it true of most American centers today and, while intermarriage is on the rise, there is little fear of wholesale assimilation. Accommodation, however, is still very much the fact of Toronto urban life. But it is accommodation of a new order, accommodation to a publicly sanctioned pluralism that, respectful of the rule of law, finds no contradiction between assertions of ethnic particularism and access to public square. In this atmosphere of ethnic acceptance and with half of all Canadian Jews living in the Greater Toronto Area, the Toronto Jewish community stands out in its affirmation of identity, healthy institutional growth, and vibrancy of cultural expression. And with Toronto as its keystone, the larger Canadian diaspora is today also growing in numbers, organizationally active and affirming both as Jews and as Canadians.

Notes

1 William Safran, "The Jewish Diaspora in a Comparative and Theoretical Perspective" *Israel Studies* 10 (2005), 36-60.

2 For an examination of the myth of congruency between the American and Canadian diasporas see Gerald Tulchinsky, "The Canadian Jewish Experience: A Distinct Personality Emerges," in Ruth Klein and Frank Dimant (eds.), *From Immigration to Integration: The Canadian Jewish Experience* (Toronto. 2001), 19-30.

3 Jean-Claude Lasry, "A Francophone Diaspora in Quebec," in M. Weinfeld, W. Shaffir and I. Cotler (eds.) *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* (Toronto. 1983), 221-240

4 Mordecai Richler, *The Main* (Toronto. Key Porter, 1987), 184.

5 Gerald Tuclchinsky, *Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community* (Toronto. 1998), 275-276; Michael R. Marrus, *Mr. Sam: The Life and Times of Samuel Bronfman* (Toronto. 1991), 298-299.

6 Mackay L. Smith, *Jews of Montreal and Their Judaisms: A Voyage of Discovery* (Montreal. 1998), 165. A more optimistic prognosis is offered in Morton Weinfeld, *Like Everyone Else But Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian Jews* (Toronto. 2001).

7 Hemingway as quoted in, James Lemon, *Toronto Since 1918. An Illustrated History* (Toronto. 1985), 57; Lewis as quoted in Robert Fulford, *Accidental City: The Transformation of Toronto* (Toronto. 1995), 2.

8 For an overview discussion of anti-Semitism in Ontario and Toronto in the interwar years see Stephen Speisman,"Antisemitism in Ontario: The Twentieth Century" in Alan Davies (ed.), *Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation* (Waterloo. 1992), 113-133.

9 Carmela Patrias and Ruth A. Frager, "This Is Our Country, These Are Our Rights': Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaigns." *Canadian Historical Review* 82 (2001), 1-35.

10 Harold Troper, "Becoming an Immigrant City: A History of Immigration into Toronto Since the Second World War," in Paul Anisef and Michael Lanphier, *The World in a City* (Toronto. 2003), 19-62; Michael Doucet, "The Anatomy of an Urban Legend: Toronto's Multicultural Reputation," Working Paper Series No. 16 (CERIS, Toronto, 2001).

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ARE UNITED STATES JEWS A DIASPORA POPULATION?

ABSTRACT

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 created major demographic changes in the population of the world Jewry and the notion of what constitutes a diaspora community. A little more than 80 percent of the world's Jewry lives in either Israel or the United States. The high level of acceptance and participation of Jews in American society challenges the idea that a diaspora consciousness exists among the U.S. Jewry. Most Jews feel very much at home in America. Religiously committed Jews however are more likely to perceive themselves as part of a diaspora community.

Marshall McLuhan and Bruce Powers (1989) use the term 'global village' to express the ease with which people all over the world move and communicate with one another. The term globalization likewise expresses the growing interaction of people, markets, economies, and cultures without regard to national borders. At the same time, there is a growing awareness of what are termed 'diaspora communities', persons displaced from their homeland who perceive themselves as living in exile. This latter emphasis on ethnicity and the importance of place contrasts with the spread of a global culture.

According to Safran "…through the ages, *the Diaspora* had a very specific meaning: the exile of Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion throughout many lands, signifying as well the oppression and moral degradation implied by that dispersion" (Safran 1991:83). To counter the negative effects of this dispersion, Jewish theology promises that Jews will return to their historic homeland of Israel as part of the Redemption process that includes the coming of the Messiah and the ingathering of Jews from all over the world. This ethno-religious framework regarding the Land of Israel led many Jews and others to view the establishment of the State of Israel as the start of the promised Messianic era: Others rejected its religious significance.

In any case, since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 there have been major demographic changes in the population of world Jewry and thus, in what is called the *Diaspora* community. Jews living in Moslem lands were forced to flee their homes immediately following the establishment of the State. During its first three years, until 1951, the population of Israel doubled with approximately 680,000 Jews immigrating from over one hundred countries. Homeless Jews from Europe and concentration camp survivors arrived first followed by Jews from Asia and later from Africa. Entire Jewish communities were uprooted in countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Bulgaria, and Libya so that "By the end of 1951 hardly any Jews were left in the Arabic-speaking countries of Asia" (Rebhun 2004:11).

Various forces led Jews from other parts of the world to leave their countries and immigrate to Israel in the second half of the twentieth century. The dramatic rearrangement of World Jewry that resulted from the establishment of the State of Israel meant that by 2004, 39.8 percent of world Jewry lived in Israel and another 40.7 percent lived in the United States. Of the 60.2 percent of Jews living outside of Israel, percent reside in the Americas with 43.6 per cent in North America. This means that only 14.2 percent of Jews currently live outside the Land of Israel and the Americas. Israel and the United States together account for 80.5 percent of world Jewry. When Jews living in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are factored in the total comes to 89.5 percent of world Jewry (DellaPergola 2004:489-521). Demographically, the *Diaspora* appears to be shrinking with United States Jewry constituting its primary population. However, this demographic aspect is only one dimension of the Jewish *Diaspora.*

Jews scattered across the world generally live as subcultures in their countries. Their lack of acceptance and integration into a larger culture is thought to result in a sense of alienation that finds comfort in the promised redemption and return to the Land of Israel. Historically, this understanding of Jewish life found support in the constant upheavals experienced by Jews who were forced to leave their homes and travel to unknown lands. Although there is no direct social science evidence of a *Diaspora* consciousness, its presence in Jewish liturgy and folklore suggests that a longing for the

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redemption and the coming of the messiah played a role in the lives of Jews throughout the centuries.[1] Countering this perspective however, is the very human attachment to one's home and desire to stay rooted in the land of one's birth.

The high level of acceptance and participation of Jews in American society challenges the idea that a *Diaspora* consciousness exists among United States Jewry. Acceptance of Jews is perhaps best symbolized by the nomination of Joseph Lieberman, a religiously observant Jew, as the Democratic candidate for the vice-presidency in the 2000 election. His nomination signaled that Jews can participate in and benefit from the American bounty and still retain distinctly Jewish beliefs and behaviors. Historically, this represents a new level of Jewish integration in a larger society, so significant in fact that the historian Paul Johnson finds "the growth of U.S. Jewry was an accession of power of an altogether different order, which gave Jews an important, legitimate and permanent part in shaping the policies of the greatest state on earth" (Johnson 1987:566). He then makes the amazing statement that: "The expansion and consolidation of United States Jewry in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was as important in Jewish history as the creation of Israel itself; in some ways more important" (ibid.).

> *"It was necessary to coin a new word to define their condition, for American Jews came to form, along with the Jews of Israel and the Jews of the diaspora proper, the third leg of a new Jewish tripod, on which the safety and future of the whole people equally depended. There was the diaspora Jew, there was the ingathered Jew and, in America, there was the possessing Jew"* (ibid. 568).

Because of their great power in other words, Johnson does not regard American Jews as a Diaspora population. For reasons relating to their definition of a Diaspora consciousness, Rebhun and Levy reach a similar conclusion. Based on their examination of Jewish identification in America and Israel they find that for the population as a whole,

> *"Americans lack a self-image of people on the move. They do not feel displaced nor do they see themselves as being a Diaspora. Using Vertovec's theoretical notion (1997), American Jews do not have a Diaspora consciousness which involves an awareness of more than one locality that stimulates connections with others with whom they share the same roots. In no way, is this a trans-national community. Thus, Diasporism does not constitute a component of their group identity"* (ibid. 3).

Indeed, while the overall United States Jewish population is a highly assimilated population — the intermarriage rate for first marriages since 1996 is approximately 50 percent — there are sectors with significantly different patterns of assimilation. Rebhun and Levy note that "…American Jews are polarized with a large proportion who observes only Jewish holidays and a small segment which maintains an intensive Jewish life-style" (Rebhun and Levy, forthcoming, p. 15). They suggest that further research focus on these Jewish subpopulations.

Indeed, an examination of existing data for Jews who maintain an "intensive Jewish lifestyle" suggests they are more likely to possess a *Diaspora* consciousness and are more likely to define themselves as a *Diaspora* community than the American Jewish population as a whole. Lacking the direct experience of uprootedness to which Rebhun and Levy refer, a *Diaspora* consciousness in America may be thought of as consisting of two major components: a sense of separateness or difference from the larger American population and secondly, familiarity with Jewish history, religious texts, and traditions, which provide a framework for constructing a *Diaspora* consciousness. This definition incorporates the Jewish religious framework of *Diaspora,* which does not require a direct experience of living in the land from which one feels he or she was exiled.

Lacking the direct experience of uprootedness to which Rebhun and Levy refer, a Diaspora consciousness in America may be thought of as consisting of two major components: a sense of separateness or difference from the larger American population and secondly, familiarity with Jewish history, religious texts, and traditions, which provide a framework for constructing a Diaspora consciousness.

The subculture of Jews who maintain an intensive Jewish lifestyle within the larger Jewish population do so by living in largely homogeneous communities, observing religious rituals and customs, and ensuring their children receive intensive Jewish education. All Orthodox sects for example, require full time religious schools for both boys and girls. Among students in Jewish schools from kindergarten to 12th grade, 80 percent are Orthodox with only 20 per cent non-Orthodox (Schick 2005).[2] Access to multiple adult Jewish education opportunities continues to reinforce the central importance of Jewish education to maintaining a Jewish lifestyle.

Currently popular enclave communities among the ultra-Orthodox are even more physically separated from other types of Jews and non-Jews. The separation is regarded as necessary to maintain distinctive patterns of behavior and thought. However, it is also a practical arrangement in that home and neighborhood constitute the base for religious behaviors since traveling in a car, bus or train is prohibited on the Sabbath and holidays. Religious, ethnic, social and neighborhood life are thus all tightly intertwined (Farber 1995).

Jewish intermarriage may be seen an extreme expression of the intertwining of Jewish and American cultures referred

to by Fishman as 'coalescence' (Fishman 1999, 2004). The relative, though not complete absence of intermarriage among the Orthodox suggests a differentiation and separateness that is particularly striking in contemporary America where group boundaries are so fluid.[3] In their analysis of the New York Jewish population survey of 1990, Horowitz and Solomon comment that a Jew who marries a Gentile is not likely to define him/herself as Orthodox (Horowitz and Solomon 1992, footnote 1). For Jewish Orthodox baby boomers, Waxman (2001) likewise finds a statistically insignificant intermarriage rate.

Another measure that can be used to indicate the presence of a *Diaspora* consciousness is the voluntary migration of American Jews to Israel. Although they constitute between only 10-20 percent of American Jews, religiously observant Jews represent over 80 percent of American immigrants to Israel (Shain 2000:195). Indeed a recent article in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* noted that "The right-wing Orthodox… are far and away the leading source of American *aliya* [immigration to Israel] over the last generation…" (Derfner 2005). In addition, all Orthodox groups without exception regard Israel and Jerusalem in particular as the spiritual center of the world.

Among those who live an intensely religious lifestyle, a small portion of this already small percentage of American Jewry may even be regarded as transnational in that individuals travel back and forth, continuing to work in America while living in Israel. This group is more likely to possess a *Diaspora* consciousness. What proportion this is remains unclear as this sub-population includes groups and individuals who do not recognize the current State of Israel as the one promised in religious texts. In addition, the Orthodox includes sectors who are quite at home in America where they believe they live an authentic Jewish life, perhaps even more so than in Israel which, even though religious law determines personal status issues, because it has a primarily secular government it does raise theological issues around the fulfillment of religiously mandated obligations that apply to a Jewish State.

Among the affiliated, sixty-five percent of American Jews have never been to Israel, have no relatives or friends there and know little of the customs, culture, or politics of the country (NJPS 2000-01). They are unlikely to envision Israel as a homeland just as they are unlikely to regard their life in the United States as a *Diaspora.* Rather, most Jews, like their non-Jewish compatriots feel very much at home in America. Religiously committed American Jews however, are more likely to perceive of themselves as a *Diaspora* community. It is understandable that this community differs from other American Jews in that they maintain greater separateness and sense of difference. In addition, the concept and meaning of *Diaspora* derives from religious texts with which this sector of American Jewry is the most familiar.

Notes

[1] The show and movie, "Fiddler on the Roof" portrays this experience.

[2] Interestingly, the 80-20 ratio is the same in 2004 as it was in 1998-99 indicating that despite the far higher fertility rate of the Orthodox, requiring additional school space, the non-Orthodox have retained their percentage of Jewish Day School seats (Schick 2005).

[3] Coalescence to some degree nevertheless exists for all segments of the American Jewish population. See for example, Fishman's (1995) description of the way in which various feminisms are now accepted by all segments of the American Jewish population.

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SURVOL HISTORIQUE DU GRAND DÉRANGEMENT ET DE LA DÉPORTATION DES ACADIENS*

RÉSUMÉ

L'année 2005 souligne le 250e anniversaire de la Déportation des Acadiens, événement fondateur dans l'histoire de l'identité acadienne, voire même dans celle des provinces Maritimes du Canada et de certaines régions du Québec. À la demande de la Société Nationale de l'Acadie, une fédération des différentes associations acadiennes et francophones du Canada atlantique, le gouvernement fédéral canadien, par une proclamation royale de décembre 2003, a décrété le 28 juillet de chaque année comme journée nationale de commémoration de la Déportation des Acadiens. Cette année, plusieurs cérémonies ont marqué cette première journée de commémoration, au Canada, aux Etats-Unis (notamment en Louisiane et à Boston) et en France. Le texte qui suit trace les grandes lignes de cet événement historique qui demeure encore assez mal connu dans les annales de l'histoire coloniale de l'Amérique du Nord.

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La décision

La Déportation des Acadiens est l'expulsion vers les colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord, l'Angleterre et la France de la population acadienne de la Nouvelle-Écosse, de l'île Saint-Jean, de l'île Royale, et du Nouveau-Brunswick actuel par les autorités militaires britanniques, de 1755 à 1764. La société acadienne comptait alors une population d'environ 14 000 personnes ; la majorité d'entre elles seront déportées, les autres ayant fui en forêt ou s'étant réfugiées dans la vallée du Saint-Laurent.

Cette déportation débute le 28 juillet 1755, alors que les autorités coloniales britanniques de la Nouvelle-Écosse, appuyées par le gouverneur William Shirley du Massachusetts, ordonnent l'expulsion des Acadiens et la saisie de tous leurs biens et propriétés, au nom du roi George II de Grande-Bretagne. Colonie établie par les Français en 1604, l'Acadie était devenue possession britannique suite au traité d'Utrecht de 1713 et avait pris le nom de *Nova Scotia,* ou *Nouvelle-Écosse.* Les Acadiens avaient refusé de prêter un serment d'allégeance inconditionnelle au monarque de Londres et avaient plutôt proposé une politique de neutralité ; un *modus vivendi* possible en temps de paix, mais intenable en temps de guerre.

En juin 1755, le fort français de Beauséjour, situé dans l'isthme de Chignectou, capitule devant une expédition militaire britannique commandée par le lieutenant-colonel Robert Monckton. Cette victoire stratégique sonne le glas de la présence acadienne en Nouvelle-Écosse ; en effet, elle permet aux autorités coloniales anglaises de mettre à exécution le projet d'expulsion des Français neutres de la province. Plusieurs miliciens acadiens se trouvent à l'intérieur du fort Beauséjour au moment de sa reddition, ce qui prouve, selon le lieutenant gouverneur de la Nouvelle-Écosse, Charles Lawrence, que les Acadiens ne sont pas aussi neutres qu'ils le prétendent. Lawrence fera lourdement peser cet argument lors de la décision du 28 juillet 1755.

The Difficult Policy of Neutrality

With the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Acadie becomes Nova Scotia, a British colony. Acadians living in Nova Scotia must choose: swear an unconditional oath of allegiance to the English monarch, or leave for French territory. Faced with these two options, the majority of Acadians propose a third one: political neutrality. British colonial authorities reluctantly accept this neutrality, as they do not have sufficient military means to impose their will on the Acadians.

The founding of Halifax in 1749 and the arrival of new troops in Nova Scotia now give the British the advantage. More and more Acadians are conscious of this new, stronger British presence in their country; hundreds of them decide to move and start anew on île Saint-Jean or in the Chignectou Isthmus region, a territory over which France claims ownership and where she has built Fort Beauséjour and Fort Gaspareau.

In 1754, in what is officially a time of peace between France and Great Britain, British and French troops collide in the Ohio Valley. It is the beginning of a war that will seal the fate of both French America and Acadie.

La déportation vers les colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord et l'Angleterre

À l'automne 1755, l'embarquement des premiers exilés acadiens commence dans la région du fort Beauséjour, et non à Grand-Pré, comme l'a popularisé le célèbre poème *Evangeline, A Tale of Acadie* de Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Les colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord seront très réticentes à recevoir les déportés acadiens, la Virginie allant même jusqu'à les refuser et à payer leur passage en Angleterre. Le Massachusetts, par exemple, à l'instar de plusieurs colonies, vote des lois afin d'interdire le déplacement d'Acadiens d'une ville à l'autre ; ces réfugiés francophones et catholiques sont perçus comme étant suspects. Pour sa part, le Maryland adopte une loi, en avril 1756, qui autorise les juges de paix de cette colonie à mettre les enfants des familles acadiennes nécessiteuses au travail chez des artisans locaux, ou encore dans les plantations. Plusieurs familles acadiennes ont été séparées lors des neuf années que dure la Déportation ; ainsi, en 1755, quelque 160 Acadiens de l'isthme de Chignectou sont déportés vers la Caroline du Sud et la Georgie, sans leur femme et leurs enfants. Confrontés à de telles conditions, plusieurs Acadiens cherchent à fuir ces colonies et retourner en Acadie, ce que plusieurs d'entre eux réussissent à faire.

Plusieurs centaines d'Acadiens et d'Acadiennes sont déportés en Angleterre, où ils seront détenus jusqu'au traité de paix de Paris, signé en 1763. Ils sont surtout installés dans des villes portuaires, comme Bristol et Liverpool. Une bonne partie d'entre eux y laisseront la vie, victimes d'une épidémie de variole qui fait des ravages dans les familles acadiennes. Les survivants passeront en France.

Les Acadiens déportés en France

La France va accueillir près de 3 000 Acadiens et Acadiennes durant les années de la Déportation, en plus d'un important nombre de Français, que les Britanniques déportent de la ville-forteresse de Louisbourg, après sa chute en 1758. Ces déportés acadiens sont surtout de l'île Saint-Jean, mais aussi de la Nouvelle-Écosse et de l'île Royale, sans oublier les survivants de la variole venus de l'Angleterre. Ils s'installent à Saint-Malo, à Boulogne-sur-Mer, au Poitou, à Morlaix, à Cherbourg, à Belle-Île-en-Mer et à Nantes, mais s'adaptent difficilement à cette France d'Ancien régime. Plusieurs centaines d'entre eux choisiront d'aller recommencer leur vie en Louisiane, alors que d'autres opteront pour l'archipel de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. Mais certains Acadiens qui sont embarqués sur des navires à destination de la France ne voient jamais les côtes françaises ; ainsi, en décembre 1758, deux navires anglais, le *Violet* et le *Duke William,* font naufrage dans l'océan Atlantique, avec à leur bord des centaines d'exilés acadiens.

Une nouvelle terre d'accueil pour les exilés acadiens : la Louisiane

La Louisiane, colonie espagnole à l'époque, reçoit des exilés acadiens suite à la signature du traité de Paris, en 1763, alors que cette colonie cherche à peupler ses terres de catholiques. Quelques centaines d'Acadiens vont s'y réfugier et recevront des terres au sud-est de la colonie, dans une région qui deviendra plus tard l'*Acadiana*. Vers la fin des années 1760, plus de 600 Acadiens des colonies du Maryland et de la Pennsylvanie les y rejoignent.

La vague la plus importante d'exilés acadiens vers la Louisiane quitte le port de Nantes, en France, en 1785 ; à l'initiative du gouvernement espagnol, environ 1 600 Acadiens et Acadiennes, déçus de leur séjour en France, font le voyage. Les autorités espagnoles de la colonie leur fournissent, à leur arrivée, des provisions, des soins médicaux et la liberté de choisir leurs terres. Les Acadiens installés en Louisiane vont donner naissance à une culture dynamique et originale, la culture cajun, connue à travers le monde pour sa cuisine et sa musique. Environ un demi-million de Cajuns vivent aujourd'hui en Louisiane.

Louisiana

Following the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, Louisiana, a Spanish colony at the time, receives Acadian exiles as the Spanish want to populate their territory with Catholics. A few hundred Acadians will take refuge and receive land in the southeastern part of the colony, in a region later known as Acadiana. Around the end of 1760, more than 600 Acadians from Maryland and Pennsylvania will join them.

The most important wave of Acadian exiles destined for Louisiana leave the port of Nantes, France, in 1785. Under an initiative of the Spanish government, approximately 1,600 Acadians, disillusioned with their stay in France, make the voyage. Upon their arrival in Louisiana, Spanish colonial authorities supply them with provisions, medical care and the freedom to choose their land. The Acadians who settle in Louisiana will give birth to a dynamic and original culture, the Cajun culture, recognized around the world for its cooking and music. Today, around a half million Cajuns live in Louisiana.

Les Acadiens réfugiés au Québec

Lorsque la Déportation des Acadiens commence en 1755, plusieurs centaines d'Acadiens et Acadiennes prennent la fuite en direction de la vallée du Saint-Laurent, le cœur de la Nouvelle-France. Même si les Canadiens partagent la langue et la religion des Acadiens, l'accueil qu'ils leur réservent n'est pas toujours favorable, selon les régions. La ville de Québec, qui connaît une disette à l'époque, voit d'un mauvais œil ces exilés qui viennent grossir la population déjà nécessiteuse de la capitale. La conquête de la Nouvelle-France par les Britanniques, en 1760, ne laisse guère présager des jours plus heureux pour les Acadiens. Malgré des années difficiles au début, l'établissement des Acadiens au Québec va en marquer l'histoire ; aujourd'hui, plusieurs milliers de Québécois professent une double appartenance, soit au Québec et à l'Acadie.

Du Grand Dérangement à la Déportation des Acadiens

Les expressions « Grand Dérangement » et « Déportation » des Acadiens sont utilisées comme synonymes depuis plusieurs décennies, à la fois par les historiens et le grand public, afin de désigner les années noires de

l'Acadie. Cependant, lorsqu'on examine de plus près la documentation historique produite par les déportés eux-mêmes, il appert que le Grand Dérangement couvre une période plus longue. Il aurait débuté dès 1749, au moment où les Britanniques fondent la ville d'Halifax, ou en 1750, où les villages acadiens de la région de Beaubassin sont incendiés par ordre des Français. Selon des historiens contemporains, le Grand Dérangement s'étend jusqu'aux années 1780, voire même jusqu'au début du 19e siècle ; il aura fallu près d'un demi-siècle d'errance avant de véritablement reconstruire une nouvelle société acadienne. Aujourd'hui, quelque 300 000 Acadiens habitent dans les quatre provinces du Canada atlantique et constituent l'Acadie de l'Atlantique.

A Brief Story of Two Expressions

The expressions Grand Dérangement and Déportation, or expulsion, of the Acadians have been used as synonyms for decades by both historians and the general public to describe Acadie's darkest years. However, upon further examination of historical documents produced by the deportees themselves, it appears that the Grand Dérangement covers a longer period than what was first thought. It could have started as early as 1749, when the British founded Halifax, or in 1750, when the Acadian villages of the Beaubassin region were set on fire under order of the French. The expulsion, which started in the Fort Beauséjour region in the fall of 1755 and continued until 1764, was the most significant and terrible period of the Grand Dérangement. According to contemporary historians, the Grand Dérangement lasted until the 1780's, or even up until the beginning of the 19th century. It would take more than half a century before displaced Acadians could finally settle and rebuild their society.

* Une version modifiée de ce texte paraîtra dans le Dictionnaire Québécois préparé par une équipe de l'Université de Sherbrooke.

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

À l'occasion du 250e anniversaire de la Déportation des Acadiens, la Chaire d'études acadiennes de l'Université de Moncton présente une publication qui offre de nouvelles perspectives sur un événement qui a marqué non seulement l'histoire des provinces Maritimes, mais également celle du Canada et des États-Unis. Des spécialistes américains, canadiens et européens y proposent des analyses portant sur différentes facettes du Grand Dérangement et de la Déportation des Acadiens, l'une des pages les moins bien connues de l'histoire coloniale de l'Amérique du Nord.

On the 250th anniversary of the Deportation of the Acadians, the Chair of Acadian studies of the Université de Moncton presents a publication that examines new perspectives on an event that has not only marked the history of the Maritime Provinces but also that of Canada and the United States. American, Canadian and European specialists analyse different aspects of the Grand Dérangement and the Deportation of the Acadians, one of the least well-known pages of North America's colonial history.

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The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians and Japanese Americans during the 1940s:

SECURITY OF WHOM?

ABSTRACT

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Japanese Canadians and Americans were uprooted from their homes, incarcerated and exiled. This article examines the larger context of human rights and racism. Although the legal protection of citizenship made significant differences, the overriding context of racism went beyond the law. Audrey Kobayashi argues that until the legal system is framed in a way that addresses racism, the law will be inadequate protection.

On 7 December 1941, Japan bombed a military base at Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, initiating the Pacific War. In the following days, more than 130,000 Canadians and Americans of Japanese descent embarked upon a journey of horror.

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which required the "evacuation" of Japanese Americans from military. 110,000 Issei and Nisei were shipped from "assembly centers" along the Pacific coast to concentration camps in the interior states. Despite their location in the Pacific theatre, Japanese Americans in Hawai'i were not uprooted, although selected individuals were interned. By 1943 several thousand Nisei men had joined the military, and formed the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Also in 1943, the U.S. Army and the War Relocation Authority initiated procedures for "Loyalty Registration." Men who refused to sign the form (known as the "no-no" boys) were sent to federal penitentiaries. In three court cases, the Supreme Court upheld the government's exclusion and imprisonment of a group of citizens based solely on their "race." (See Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 1943; Yasui v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 1943; and Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 1944). Over this time period, eight prisoners were shot to death by guards and a number wounded. In December 1944, Public Proclamation No. 21 allowed those interned to return home and the Supreme Court ruled that "loyal" citizens could not be interned because of their "race" (Endo, Ex Parte 323 U.S. 283 1944). The camps were closed.

In 1981, following intensive lobbying by Japanese Americans, including a group of federal politicians, the U.S. government set up a "Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians," which recommended redress for internees. In 1984, Fred Korematsu's conviction for being unlawfully in a place where Japanese Americans were not allowed was vacated. Yasui's conviction was overturned in 1985, and Gordon Hirabayashi's in 1987, citing evidence that the government knew that there was no military justification for the forced removal but withheld the information from the Supreme Court (Korematsu v. U.S. 584 F.Supp. 1406 N.D. Cal. 1984; Yasui v. U.S. 772 F.2d. 1496 9th Cir. 1985; Hirabayashi v. U.S. F.2d 592 9th Cir. 1987). On 10 August 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed H.R. 442, the Civil Liberties Act, issuing an acknowledgement of injustice and an apology and authorizing symbolic redress payments of $25,000, as well as a public education fund. The first payments were made by President George Bush in 1990.

On 24 February 1942, Prime Minister Mackenzie King passed Order-in-Council P.C. 1486 using the power of the War Measures Act to authorize compulsory removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast. On 26 February, Justice Minister Louis St. Laurent issued a ministerial, "Notice to all persons of Japanese Racial Origin" initiating the uprooting and incarceration in "protective custody" of more than 21,000 Canadians of Japanese ancestry through the British Columbia Securities Commission. As citizens were rounded up and channelled through a holding facility, the livestock buildings at Hastings Park in Vancouver, the Custodian of Enemy Property began a forced liquidation of material assets, thus physically destroying the communities that had been established in British Columbia since the late 19th Century. Those uprooted were placed in internment camps in the interior or sent as labourers on sugar beet farms in the prairie provinces. In September 1945, a second uprooting required those in the camps to re-locate east of the Rocky Mountains or undergo "repatriation" to Japan. Of 10,000 initially slated for expulsion, more than 4,000 (of whom more than half were Canadian-born) were sent to Japan. On 2 December 1945 the Privy Council upheld a Supreme Court decision that the actions under the War Measures Act on the basis of racial background were within federal government jurisdiction., including the right to deport its own citizens (Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et. al.) In late 1945, the government used the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act (Bill 15) to extend the conditions imposed by the War Measures Act, which would have expired on 1 January 1946. On 27 January 1947, after significant public lobbying, the Order-in-Council authorizing deportation of Canadian citizens was revoked. On 31 March 1949, all restrictions on Japanese Canadian citizens were removed.

On 21 July 1988, revocation of the War Measures Act came into effect. On 22 September 1988, after a decade of negotiation, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Art Miki, President of the National Association of Japanese Canadians, signed the Redress Agreement, which was approved by Order-in-Council and announced in parliament. The settlement included an acknowledgement of injustice, payment of $21,000 to all living individuals who had been affected by the War Measures Act, establishment of a fund for community re-building, a purge of criminal records of those convicted under the War Measures Act, restitution of citizenship to those exiled, and the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, established in 1997.

AUDREY KOBAYASHI

Audrey Kobayashi is a professor in the department of geography at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. Her research Intersts include the history of Japanese-Canadian communities, racism and post-election descourse and the option of emigration from the United States.

These outlines of the institutional processes through which Canadian and American Nikkei (people of Japanese ancestry) were uprooted from their homes, stripped of their human and civil rights, incarcerated, and exiled can hardly do justice to the personal and family stories of lives disrupted, families separated, and freedom violated. Those stories are well chronicled in both countries.[1] My concern in this short paper is with the larger context of human rights and racism in which the two stories occurred. Racism was nothing new for either group. It had defined their communities since the first immigrants arrived in the 1870s. But after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, they were redefined as Canadian and American citizens and racism erupted into a full blown denial of their rights to citizenship. Comparing their experiences shows that the legal protections of citizenship made significant differences, but that the overriding context of racism went beyond the law.

The chronicles have much in common. The wording of official documents, including such euphemisms as "evacuation" and "protected zone" was similar, and reflected a similar public discourse over the "threat" posed by Japanese Canadians and Americans. The Canadian government generally followed the American by a few days at each stage in the uprooting and dispersal, indicating that there was discussion between the two governments. Even the redress settlements in 1988 occurred a month apart.

Japanese Canadians generally believe that conditions were much harsher for them than for their American counterparts. The government followed a deliberate policy of splitting families, men sent to labour or prisoner-of-war camps and women, children, and the elderly to internment camps. About 4,000 took the option of labour on sugar beet farms because it was presented as the only means of moving as a family group. In the U.S., families were kept intact but there was not, as in the Canadian case, a "choice" of destinations. Everyone went to concentration camps surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards. In Canada, the government liquidated all property, except the two items of luggage allowed to each individual. In 1948, they received settlements of a tiny fraction of the value. The majority of properties were taken over by the department of Veteran's Affairs and designated for distribution to returning white veterans. In the U.S., property was held in trust by the Federal Reserve Bank, although many had sold their land at very low prices in the days before internment. The U.S. also took responsibility to provide food and housing, while the Canadian government—in contravention of what would be the Geneva Convention—required Japanese Canadians to pay their own costs, deducted if necessary from the sale of confiscated property. Most significantly, the Japanese Americans were released following the Endo decision in 1944, while Japanese Canadians were subject to a second relocation east of the Rocky Mountains. The provisions of the War Measures Act were extended for four years after the end of the Pacific War until 1949, at which time there was still a small number of families living in the camps. The government had no legal obligation to rescind the measures, but public opinion was by then turning in support of Japanese Canadians.

Some of these contrasts are rooted in differences between the two legal systems. The War Measures Act (1914) invested the Canadian government with tremendous power, allowing the "Governor in Council" to act without consulting Parliament in the event of a "real or apprehended" emergency. Ironically, the redress agreement of 1988 was also ratified by an Order-in-Council and only subsequently announced to Parliament and the Canadian public. In contrast, although the initial uprooting was authorized by executive order of President Roosevelt and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, subsequent American actions depended much more strongly on the authority of Congress and the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, as Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark stated many years later, "Despite the unequivocal language of the Constitution of the United States that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, and despite the Fifth Amendment's command that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, both of these constitutional safeguards were denied by military action under Executive Order 9066" (Clark 1992). In both countries, the highest courts, the Supreme Court in the United States and the Privy Council in Canada,[2] however, confirmed the authority of the governments to take action on the basis of racial background. The Endo case, while it prevented the incarceration beyond 1944 of loyal citizens, did not vacate the findings of other decisions that sanctioned government actions. It was not until after World War II that both countries began to promote legal and legislative reforms to prevent the abrogation of civil rights on the basis of "race."

U.S. legal scholars have argued that protection against arbitrary government actions on the basis of race has still not been achieved. The Civil Rights Act (1964) and related legal cases provide protection against public discrimination to individuals and guarantee equal rights,[3] but scholars have argued recently, especially in cases over affirmative action, that there is a significant difference between a specification of individual rights and a prohibition against racist practices. The three Nikkei cases vacated during the 1980s turned on the government's failure to provide full disclosure over the question of loyalty, not on whether the government was racist (Oh and Wu 1996). Furthermore, the redress settlement to Japanese Americans, while administered through an act of Congress, was based upon a political rather than a legal imperative (Tang 1988). Had the government not felt that the action would be well received politically, they were under no obligation to act.

As the Japanese Canadian redress campaign progressed, there was considerable discussion of prospects for suing the federal government.[4] The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which specifies both the right to equality and the legitimacy of affirmative action, had recently come into effect. The protection of the Charter, combined with the abolition of the War Measures Act (and several other pieces of legislation), should have given protection to Japanese Canadians against the actions of the 1940s had they occurred four decades later. We were advised, however, that a suit on the grounds of federal jurisdiction would likely fail.[5] Instead, like the Americans, we pursued a political route to justice, relying on public mores and a concept of human rights much different than the prevailing views of the 1940s. We were ever mindful that whereas in the U.S. it was the constitution (in the Endo case) that ended internment in 1944,

in Canada, it was public opinion that pushed the government to rescind the measures against Japanese Canadians, notwithstanding their jurisdictional power.

In both countries, public opinion supported redress and regarded the Nikkei experience as a "black mark" in their social history. But racism still frames attitudes to a significant degree, and racism has trumped the legal context, despite any restrictions on discriminatory acts that may retrospectively be read into the U.S. constitution or Canadian law. This brief review is not meant to provide a detailed analysis of the complex legal differences between the two countries but only to highlight the fact that racism occurs within, without, and in spite of the law. We need a legal system framed in a human rights context that addresses racism, rather than only individual rights and freedoms. Until that shift in thinking occurs, the law will be inadequate protection. The U.S. constitution provided individual rights for Japanese Americans that resulted in their release in 1994, while Japanese Canadians lived under the conditions of the War Measures Act until 1949. But Americans were also shot with impunity while incarcerated. It was the failure to value and respect the lives of Nikkei citizens that led to their treatment, and to date we have not come up with a law that guarantees value and respect.

That is why in both countries post-Redress activities have emphasized anti-racist education, along with legal reform, as the most enduring means of ensuring that the Nikkei experience cannot recur, to citizens of African, Muslim, Asian, or Aboriginal heritage, when international events redefine them and place them under the intensified scrutiny of a racist lens. As long as racism remains a significant part of both societies, therefore, we need to question the capacity of governments to infringe upon human rights in the name of security, always asking, "Security for whom?"

Notes

[1] There is a considerable literature in both countries chronicling the experiences of the 1940s. For Canada, see Takashima (1971), Adachi (1976), Kitagawa (1985), Miki (2005), Omatsu (1992), and Joy Kogawa's (1981) novel, *Obasan.* For the U.S., see Daniels (1977), Ichioka (1989), and Takaki (1998) and John Okada's novel, *No-No Boy.* For legal histories see Chuman (1976), Sunahara (1981), Irons (1989) and Randall (nd). For general information see Kobayashi and Ayukawa (2002) and Azuma (2002), and for web resources see the Japanese American National Museum and the Japanese Canadian National Museum.

[2] The British Privy Council was the highest court in Canada until 1949, when appeals to the Privy Council were abolished and ultimate authority given to the Supreme Court of Canada.

[3] The classic case is Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which held that the segregation and black and white students in public schools denied equal rights protection.

[4] The author was a member of the six-person committee that negotiated the Redress Agreement with the federal government; these comments are based on personal participation.

[5] In an interview with the author (Kobayashi et al. 1987) prior to the redress settlement, Irwin Cotler, now Minister of Justice, opined that the government broke four of the five principles of the rule of law during the 1940s: legitimacy, equality, due process, and remedy. He also pointed out, as have others, that notwithstanding the rule of law, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains several weaknesses, especially Section 33, a non-obstantive clause that allows the government to opt out of the guarantee of equality under certain conditions.

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Do You Know Your Canadian Issues?

Êtes-vous au fait de vos Thèmes Canadiens?

HAS FRANCE FINALLY FOUND A "USABLE DIASPORA" IN NORTH AMERICA?

ABSTRACT

Among the major European powers in the early 20th century, it was noted that France was the only one not represented in the United States by any sizeable diaspora. In the previous century, France watched as the German diaspora grew in the U.S. and feared the Germans were making considerable diplomatic inroads there. Despite France's lament, David Haglund says there is and was a firmly entrenched French community in Canada, that also spread into the United States. However, Haglund argues it is not a "useable" diaspora.

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Introduction: Duroselle's Lament

The late, great French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle once remarked that France was, among the major European powers in the early 20th century, the only one not to be represented in the United States by a diaspora of any size; and this, he added, was bound to have a negative impact upon the quality of France's relationship with America and, by extension, France's broader interests in global security.[1] The early decades of the twentieth century were, much like that century's concluding decade, a time when the role of ethnic diasporas in American diplomacy was receiving a good deal of attention. It was easy to argue that in an age characterized by the increasing prominence of "public opinion" in foreign policy, those foreign interests who were well represented by ties of demography within American society would, all things being equal, have an advantage over less well-positioned foreign states in the struggle for American sympathy.[2]

If any example needed to be adduced to prove the point, at least as far as French analysts were concerned, there was that of Germany. Throughout the nineteenth century, tales of impending demographic and economic decline had inspired anxiety in France, with the spectre of "depopulation" remaining an ever-present concern.[3] Not surprisingly, France was hardly going to be in a position to export many of its people, and those who were likely to leave the metropole for a life abroad were to do so on behalf of the country's empire, and not venture to America. At the turn of the last century, France had Europe's lowest birth rate, and its population was growing at only a tenth the rate of Germany's; in this context, it was not difficult to imagine the worst. By the eve of the First World War, France's neighbour and foe had a population of 64 million, compared with its own 39 million,[4] and because of Germany's emigrants, it was establishing, or so it appeared to French observers, demographic beachheads in America guaranteed to increase its diplomatic and other advantages at their expense.[5]

America's German Diaspora and French Interests

There was, indeed, something to these French worries a century ago. Americans (save for those moments when they have been fighting against them in world wars) really have seemed to prefer Germans to French and part of the reason lies in the extent to which the former have been a demographic presence in America. Germans emigrated to the US in vast numbers (7.1 million between 1820 and 1995) while in comparison, the French largely stayed home.[6] By the turn of the last century, more than a quarter of America's population could be said to be of German "extraction". If one went back a couple of generations; and even if demographers stuck closer to the present in establishing lineage, the German content in American society was still impressively large in the early years of the twentieth century. The 1910 US census found some 8.3 million inhabitants who regarded Germany as their land of origin, meaning either they had been born there, or they had at least one parent born there.[7]

Though too much can be claimed regarding the power of ethnic diasporas to shape American foreign policy – then or now – it is impossible to deny that at certain times certain ethnic groups have attained electoral and other means of conditioning America's position on foreign affairs. The German-American community may not have been able to prevent America's intervention in the First World War, but they were one element in delaying it, to obvious French disadvantage. Moreover, after the war they constituted one part of the opposition against America's assuming any security obligations

in Europe, especially a treaty guarantee of French security.[8] Before the first post-war decade had ended, American public opinion once more looked to prefer Germany to France.[9]

France's Own "Diaspora"

Now, it might be objected that those, such as Duroselle, who decried France's missing diaspora were themselves missing the point, namely that there was a rather large "French" community firmly implanted in North America and that this community had even managed to spread extensively into the United States starting in the mid-nineteenth century. As Jean Heffer has remarked of the million or so French Canadians who emigrated to the U.S. between 1840 and 1940, "they are the great absentees from our [France's] memory. It is not even correct to say we French have forgotten about them, because we have never even known that they existed."[10] If, as Gabriel Sheffer instructs us, a diaspora consists in "a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries," then how else are we to label the French in North America than as a diaspora?[11] And if the settlers of New France might, initially, have been a majority of the European population along the St. Lawrence, they were *always* a minority when set against the aboriginal population of New France, and would become a minority even when measured against the English settlers of New England and, subsequently, of Canada itself.[12]

So Quebeckers, and their Franco-American kith and kin, do really fill the bill as a diaspora, a French one at that, in North America. But historically they have hardly constituted – at least since France gave up the contest for North American supremacy after the Seven Years War – very much of a "usable" diaspora for France's world-order interests. The reasons for this are numerous, and cannot be recounted in the space available here; suffice it to note that, when France needed them most, i.e., when it was engaged in struggles for its survival twice in the twentieth century against its German foe, French Canadians proved resistant to committing blood and treasure – especially the former – to the defence of the former mother country.[13] Moreover, although not the sole factor accounting for Canada's own policy of isolationism during the 1920s and 1930s, Quebec opinion did influence Canadian foreign policy, so much so that during the interwar decades both Canada and the United States could be said to have effectively turned their backs on the challenges of French, and European, security.[14]

Nor was the U.S.-based branch of the diaspora any more likely to put itself at the service of the Third Republic than had been its counterpart in Quebec: indeed, as in Quebec, so in New England was there a tendency of a deeply religious Franco flock to show a disquieting preference for France's home-grown opposition to the Third Republic, and pro-Vichy sentiment flourished on both sides of the 45th parallel after the defeat of 1940.[15] But a diaspora that was never particularly useful for the Third Republic would show itself of greater interest to the Fifth Republic, first with the intervention of Gaullist France in Canadian domestic affairs – an intervention some have argued was aimed more at the U.S. and the U.K. than at English Canada[16] – and more recently, with the French-led opposition to the 2003 Iraq war.

There can be no doubt that anti-war opinion in Quebec was much firmer than in English Canada – indeed, for a brief moment in April 2003, after the fall of Baghdad, English-Canadian opinion temporarily swung over to the view that Canada had erred in not joining the U.S. and U.K. in the war. Not so in Quebec, where some analysts were speculating that a "French connection" influenced Quebec opinion.[17]

The Iraq War: A "French Connection"?

It is in respect of that recent war that one raises the question carried in this article's title, with some writers detecting in Quebec's strong opposition to the anti-Saddam coalition the hand of France. There can be no doubt that anti-war opinion in Quebec was much firmer than in English Canada – indeed, for a brief moment in April 2003, after the fall of Baghdad, English-Canadian opinion temporarily swung over to the view that Canada had erred in not joining the U.S. and U.K. in the war. Not so in Quebec, where some analysts were speculating that a "French connection" influenced Quebec opinion.[17]

Nor is there too much doubt that Quebec opinion, particularly with an important provincial election in the offing, played a role in conditioning Canada's stance on the war, which was noteworthy in that it was the first time that Ottawa would distance itself from both Washington and London on such a world-historic matter. But it is more likely that Quebec's traditional anti-militarism rather than any French connection was the determining factor in the province's and, consequently, federal government's stance on the war. The impact of ethnicity upon grand strategy, to be sure: but not really a French connection in the sense of Canada's having been summoned to do the bidding of Paris. Therefore, much as France might like to, it really cannot claim to have found for itself, at long last, a "usable diaspora" in North America.

Notes

1 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present*, trans. Derek Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 46-48.

2 See, for one attempt to gauge the impact of ethnic diasporas upon American foreign policy in this period, Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., *The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Politics* (Lexington: University of

Kentucky Press, 1967). Tellingly, O'Grady's research project included case studies of the following diasporas in the US: German, Irish, British, Italian, Magyar, South Slav, Czech, Slovak/Carpatho-Ruthenian, Polish, Jewish, and even "Mid-European Union" – but no chapter on the French.

[3] Koenraad W. Swart, *The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

[4] Shelby Cullom Davis, *The French War Machine* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), p. 29-30.

[5] Michel Winock, *La Belle Époque: La France de 1900 à 1914* (Paris: Perrin, 2002), p. 34-41; Joseph J. Spengler, *France Faces Depopulation: Postlude Edition, 1936-1976* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), chap. 6.

[6] Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers, *Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration,* 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). By contrast, only a tenth that number emigrated to the US from France since the start of the nineteenth century. Amazingly, the category that topped the list of ethnic groups with which Americans identified themselves in the census of 2000 was German, with some 46.4 million identifiers; second on the list was Irish, with 33 million so identifying. Jack Jedwab, "Demographic Dimensions of Identity in Canada and the United States at the Beginning of Century 21," *Canadian American Research Symposium* 1 (Fall 2003): 14-20, citation at p. 16.

[7] Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship"?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 28-31, 58-68; Frank A. Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945* (New York: Twayne, 1995), p. 2-3.

[8] On the general impact of diasporas, see Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society,* new and rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); and Alexander De Conde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). On the specific case of the German diaspora, see Louis L. Gerson, *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1964), p. 62-72; and Austin J. App, "The Germans," in O'Grady, *The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Politics,* p. 30-55.

[9] Elizabeth Brett White, *American Opinion of France: From Lafayette to Poincaré* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. xi-xii.

[10] Jean Heffer, "Préface" to *Les Franco-Américains,* by François Weil (Paris: Éd. Belin, 1989), p. 5.

[11] Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home and Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 9.

[12] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 71.

[13] See Ramsay Cook, *Canada and the French-Canadian Question* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986; orig. pub. 1966), p. 37, 107; Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War,* 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), p. 152; and Elizabeth H. Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec,* 1914-18 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937).

[14] See David G. Haglund, "'Are *We* the Isolationists?' North American Isolationism in a Comparative Context," *International Journal* 58 (Winter 2002-2003): 1-23. On Quebec's part in this, see John MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec's Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

[15] Gaston Henry-Haye, *La Grande Éclipse franco-américaine* (Paris: Plon, 1972); Esther Delisle, *Essais sur l'imprégnation fasciste au Québec* (Montréal: Éd. Varia, 2002); and Guy Fritsch-Estrangin, *New York entre de Gaulle et Pétain: Les Français aux États-Unis de 1940 à 1946* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969).

[16] See, inter alia, Jean-François Lisée, *In the Eye of the Eagle,* trans. Arthur Holden, Kathe Rothe, and Claire Rothman (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 48-50; Eldon Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996); J. F. Bosher, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); Vincent Jauvert, *L'Amérique contre de Gaulle: Histoire secrète,* 1961-1969 (Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 2000); and Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après de Gaulle* (Montréal: Éd. du Boréal, 1999).

[17] Among them are political scientists Denis Monière and Louis Bélanger. See Monière, *Les Relations France-Québec: Pérégrinations d'un intellectuel Québécois en France, 2001-2004* (Montréal: Chaire Hector-Fabre d'histoire du Québec, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2004); and Bélanger, quoted in Robert Wolfe, "Most Safely on the Fence? A Round Table on the Possibility of a Canadian Foreign Policy after 9/11," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 11 (Fall 2004): 97-118.

CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IRISH AMERICA

ABSTRACT

In this paper Professor J. J. Lee provides an overview of some of the shifting concerns of historians of Irish America over the past century.

The way historians have interpreted the experiences of immigrants from Ireland, and their descendants in the United States, has undergone significant change over the past century. These changes may provide a learning experience for everyone concerned with the study of immigration.

In the late 19th and early 20th century, historical writing was dominated by a filiopietistic tendency bordering on ancestor worship. At the extreme it might seem that nothing good happened in America but for an Irish initiative. But this Irish filiopietism, expressed most vigorously in the pages of the *Journal of the Irish-American Historical Society,* was simply representative of immigrant historical writing of the time. It came as a natural response to the strong anti-immigrant impulses coursing through much of American public opinion, that ethnic groups should extol their contributions to the building of America, above all through their service in the Revolutionary War. Washington's armies were now swollen through the number of Heroes of the Revolution that every self-respecting ethnic group excavated more than a century later.

In the Irish case, the desire to claim distinction was accentuated by the fact that they were not only staking out their claim to patriotic respectability, but defending it vigorously against what they held to be the claim-jumping propensities of the Scotch-Irish. Suffice it to say that much of the substantial output of the protagonists a century ago bears the whiff of cordite. A real tug-of-war developed over who could be claimed as authentically belonging to one side or the other. Yet devoted diggers in the records, like Michael J. O'Brien, the most prolific historian of the American Irish Historical Society, can be dismissed too easily as purely polemicists, for they did unearth much still-valuable material. Although the lens through which they viewed the material may have been distorted, it's not clear the temptations to which they succumbed have always been overcome a century later, however more scholarly the format in which findings are pronounced.

It is easy to overlook, too, in just what a vacuum of scholarly interest these filiopietistic enthusiasts were obliged to labor. The American historical profession, predominantly of WASP vintage, their faces turned towards the Turnerian frontier, scarcely considered immigrants of more recent vintage fit subject for serious scholarship. There were of course scholars who did labor in the lonely immigration field in the interim, and indeed planted seeds that would yield a rich harvest, but they would for long plough lonely furrows. Irish-American scholarship was itself slow to focus on this field, even by the prevailing standards of neglect, for reasons still requiring full elucidation.

Nevertheless, probably the single most influential study of the Irish experience in nineteenth century America dates from this era, Oscar Handlin's *Boston's Immigrants,* a Harvard doctorate under Schlesinger, published in 1941. Although the Irish are not featured in the title, the book has to be, of course, mainly about them. It would come to be severely criticized, but the fact that its shadow still hovers over so much of our thinking testifies to the enduring importance of Handlin's vision. That vision was a gloomy one, Handlin's powerful brush strokes conveying dark and glowering images of the fate of the immigrants, and even of their children. Of course the vision was dominated by the tragic repercussions of the Great Irish Famine of 1845-52, which would have such fateful consequences for Boston, both foetid and fecund – but with the foetid predominant in Handlin's period. Where the filiopietists wrote contribution history, Handlin's Boston is victim history. Deeply conscious of the weakness of the immigrants in the face of a fate beyond their comprehension, his is truly a depiction of a people trapped in a world they never made. It is not unduly exaggerating to suggest that the general thrust of Handlin's Pulitzer Prize winning classic a decade later, *The Uprooted,* is in fact *Boston's Immigrants* writ large. Certainly the image of immigrant loss conveyed in *The Uprooted,* of immigrants buffeted by storms and floundering in

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floods beyond their control, recalls much of the theme of *Boston's Immigrants.*

There is of course a certain irony in finding so evocative a work on the Irish stemming from the pen of the Brooklyn-born son of Ukrainian Jewish immigrants. Ironically enough, it has been suggested that Handlin looked at Boston's immigrants partly through the empathetic eyes of a Jewish boy reared in a culture of being uprooted in the Brooklyn of the Depression, where strong anti-Semitic prejudices (ironically enough, not least among the Irish) fostered in him a sympathy for the obstacles confronting Irish immigrants in the Boston of the previous century.

Handlin's vision would dominate the historiography of Irish America for a generation. But it then gradually began to be chipped away, from at least four angles. Part of this came from taking a harder look at the old world the immigrants left behind, which began to seem distinctly less romantic than when seen through immigrant nostalgia. The American experience came then to be seen much less as one of loss of an old world than of gain of a new. Even, it was argued, if the immigrants themselves often suffered a sense of irreparable loss, their children enjoyed far better prospects than they ever could have at home. A whole cadre of scholars from the 1960's, and especially the 1970's on, began to stress just how unrepresentative Boston was of America. No other major cities grew so slowly economically, or were as socially and politically rigid, with the Boston Brahmins resenting and resisting the upward pressure of the repulsive Irish Catholic lower orders. San Francisco, which scarcely existed before the 1849 gold rush, comes to be presented as the polar opposite, where the Catholic Irish flocked in as equals on a level playing field, and unhampered by ethnic or religious prejudice, rose rapidly in business and politics.

This perspective does indeed enormously enrich our understanding of the Irish immigrant and ethnic experience by providing a valuable corrective to unduly pessimistic generalizations based on Boston's nineteenth century experience. But it is also important to preserve a sense of perspective. In 1870, New York City had more Irish-born than the next six biggest centers of Irish settlement together. No generalization about Irish experience that does not touch on New York can be deemed adequate. And despite a useful 1949 book by Robert Ernst, it was not until Ronald Bayor & Tim Meagher edited *The New York Irish* in 1996 that a full scale volume, covering the entire history of the city, was devoted to the Irish. Although it was a wonderful collection, the colossal challenge of systematically studying Irish social mobility in New York City remains to be undertaken.

Handlin's interpretation of Irish immigration history helped spur massive investment in social mobility studies to assess just how the immigrants and their descendants fared in economic terms, the most celebrated those of Stephen Thernstrom on Newburyport in 1964 and Boston in 1973. Those studies have greatly illuminated the Irish as well as other group's experiences, but they in turn can be seen to require qualification for at least three reasons, two from within the field, one from outside it.

Earlier studies of social mobility were unable to follow those who had left the area under investigation. Given the rates of geographical mobility the question naturally arose whether the migrants had flourished or failed. Until one knew the answer to that, every conclusion about the original group had to be provisional. Not until Joseph Ferrie's recent *Yankees Now* has a technique been devised to capture the likely fate of the disappeared, which Ferrie finds far more positive than Thernstrom surmised. However, Ferrie's data only refers to males. This is particularly problematic for the Irish, where the sex ratio of immigrants was roughly 50:50, given the far higher rate of female emigration from Ireland than was customary from Europe in general. Although the exceptionally high ratio of domestic servants among Irish immigrant women may suggest a lower rate of internal female mobility, this issue remains to be explored.

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Of course no reader of Finley Peter Dunne's Mr Dooley stories in the Chicago of the 1890's could have been left in any doubt about that. The external criticism of the social mobility study syndrome – that it reduced the meaning of life solely to economics, shrivelling 'success' to changes in the number of dollars in the pocket – was in one sense unfair to individual researchers, but not perhaps unfair to the impression left by what seemed at times an obsession with measuring 'success' by materialistic criteria. There turned out to be three kicks in this particular trail.

Firstly, scholars apart from economists or economic historians began to ponder other perspectives on immigrant experience, none better than Charles Fanning in his studies of the aforesaid Mr Dooley. The cultural historical approach that has flourished in recent decades, whether in the hands of literary specialists like Fanning, Robert Rhodes and Daniel Casey, or of musical virtuosos like Mick Moloney and William J. Williams, fleshes out the economic dimension in ways essential to understanding the full immigrant experience.

Secondly, the extensive use of immigrant letters as source material, pioneered by Arnold Schrier in 1958 in *Ireland and the American Emigration,* has been massively extended by Kerby Miller in his 1985 classic, *Emigrants and Exiles,* and in *Irish immigrants in the Land of Canaan: Letters and Memoirs from Colonial and Revolutionary America, 1675-1815,* published in 2003. Miller has brought culture back into the center of the interpretive framework, arguing for a specific Gaelic Irish Catholic world view, which could foster a degree of fatalism about material matters among immigrants, leaving those steeped in that value system ill-equipped to cope with life in America.

The 'success' issue will not go away, partly because of its implications for Catholic-Protestant relations in Ireland, particularly Northern Ireland, where sectarian stereotypes owe much to ideas, to put it politely, about who has, and hasn't, the Protestant Ethic. But the American experience of Catholics and Protestants from Ireland can serve as ammunition too. Here irony piles upon irony. Andrew Greeley has revolutionized inherited perspectives by establishing from the seventies that, contrary to stereotype, Irish Catholics now count as more 'successful', by material criteria, than Irish Protestants – indeed than any Protestants. The surprise caused by this was nearly matched by the discovery that the majority of the 40 million plus Americans who recorded themselves as having some Irish connection in the ancestral returns in the 1980 census were – Protestant. However quick the emotionally engaged seized on these findings, to support whatever cause it may please them to champion, scholars must come to grips with them to ascertain what apparent implications survive scholarly scrutiny and what do not. It is appropriate that it should be an American in Canada, Donald Akenson, who has suggested that a close study of the Canadian religious census date may serve as a proxy for the absence of religion from the American census. This would allow some conclusion to be hazarded about Catholic and Protestant in the history of Irish America – and doubtless add to the gaiety of immigrant historiography by bringing us in a way back to the concerns of our ancestral filiopietistic protagonists, though from a scholarly perspective.

Irish Immigration to Nineteenth-Century Canada:

ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES

ABSTRACT

While the historiography of the Irish in Canada has begun to be mapped by historians in recent years, research in disciplines other than history can also contribute substantially to an understanding of the challenges, adjustments and sacrifices immigrants experienced. Life-writing texts – letters, diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, biographies and travel writing – capture the voice and thoughts of individuals engaged in conscious reformulations of the self in a new world.

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While a comprehensive history has yet to be written of Irish immigration to all regions of Canada, from the earliest settlements to the recent past, scholars have made significant strides in recent years in delineating the salient characteristics of this historiography. They have begun to chart the demographics of nineteenth-century immigration through detailed examination of specific immigrant groups and their settlement in Canada. This scholarship has sought to puncture popular notions of Irish immigration, both before and after confederation, that have taken on romanticized colourings from the tragic events associated with the Great Irish Famine of 1847. The extraordinary death and suffering caused by the Famine, the deplorable conditions of the voyage for those who managed to leave, the illness and death awaiting many who disembarked on Partridge Island in New Brunswick, on Grosse Île in Quebec and on the banks of the St. Lawrence in Montreal form a heartrending narrative that had readily been embraced by the Irish Canadian community. It is a perception reinforced by nineteenth-century Irish immigration to America, which transformed an Irish-American identity previously shaped by generations of Scots-Irish immigrants to pre- and post-revolutionary America. As Kerby Miller has argued in his 1985 study, *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and Irish Exodus to North America,* those who arrived during and after the Famine developed a sense of historical grievance by seeing themselves as exiles forced from Ireland by the policies of the British government. Such feelings were leavened by the predictable and understandable immigrant emotions associated with loss and remembrance, and created the cauldron from which emerged the popular images, iconic references and cultural traditions that came to redefine Irish-American identity. Historians of the Irish in Canada have had to revise pervasive notions of the archetypal Irish immigrant, derived from the Irish-American experience and reinforced by the specific associations of Irish Famine immigration to Canada. Arguing against the image of the poor Irish emigrant arriving in the Canadian colony, either to die of sickness or live in urban deprivation, became more challenging with the 1995 commemorations in the Irish diaspora marking the 150th anniversary of the Famine, and the creation by Parks Canada of Grosse Île as an historic site foregrounding its Irish immigrant associations. The eloquent new memorial powerfully represents all who died on the quarantine island. The historiography of the Irish in Canada, then, has had to strain against evocative emotional forces by contextualizing Irish Famine immigration in a larger narrative which asserts that Irish immigration was more historically extensive, geographically diverse and economically successful than popularly understood.

David Wilson's 1989 monograph, *The Irish in Canada,* summarizes this historiography by emphasizing that the majority of immigrants were Protestants, arrived in the decades before the Famine, and possessed sufficient personal and community resources to ensure successful settlement. Using statistics on residency, occupation and integration into the social and economic system, he demonstrates that the acculturation of nineteenth-century Irish immigrations was, in general, a story of extraordinary accomplishments. Yet, in claiming that the success rate of the Irish in these categories was comparable to the general population, Wilson concedes some crucial economic disparities along sectarian lines and concludes that "The reasons for these differences in Irish Protestant and Catholic occupational patterns in nineteenth-century Canada have yet to be adequately explained."[1]

While historians grapple with such nuances and acknowledge the need to address larger patterns of Irish settlement in such areas as Quebec and the West, research in disciplines other than history can also contribute substantially to an understanding of the varying experiences of individual immigrants

or specific groups, and how they reacted to the challenges, adjustments and sacrifices involved in immigration. Beneath the radar of demographics and statistics, such responses were frequently inscribed in life-writing texts – letters, diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, biographies and travel writing – that calibrated layers of subjectivity and delineated nodes of reference of immigrant identities. Such texts catch the voice and render the psyche of individuals engaged in conscious reformulations of the self in a new spatiotemporal world. Precisely because such textualizations of experience are subjective, shaped by imagination, influenced by the vagaries of memory, and crucially dependent on the individual's ability to wrestle with the possibilities and unreliabilities of language, they constitute rich and complex material that complements and deepens our appreciation of immigrant lives. They disclose palimpsests of emotions which speak past the realm of the personal to register the excitement, challenges and vicissitudes of emigration, capture the psychic dislocations of leaving the place that has shaped one's sensibilities, and annotate the wonder and anxiety of encountering the specific features – geographical, social, cultural, economic and political – of an alien place in which the self must continually re-orient itself. Most powerfully of all, perhaps, such inscriptions tap into and orchestrate the soundings of memory emanating from the imaginative wavelength that connects the writing self to aspects of identities shaped by past time and former geography. Life-writing texts encapsulate an alternate approach to gaining insight about the past, one that is neither superior nor inferior to what might be considered historical truth.

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Such processes are evident in the letters of William Hutton, for example, who was born into an Anglo-Irish Dublin family in 1801, arrived in Canada in 1834 and, until his death in 1861, corresponded regularly with his mother in Ireland. Settling near Belleville, Ontario, he became a scientific farmer, a warden of the Victoria District, a superintendent of schools, and the first administrative secretary of the Canadian Bureau of Agriculture and Statistics. As with the writings of his friend, Susanna Moodie, Hutton's letters provide invaluable concrete information about life in Upper Canada. But in chronicling the challenges and travails of pioneer life in the Canadian backwoods, the letters also become telling instruments of autobiographical revelation which reflect his unique identity as an immigrant. As a member of Ireland's Protestant landed class, Hutton views his migration to Canada in predictable terms: it was motivated by the desire for good land and economic security. Emigration was not perceived as forced exile but rather a strategic movement within the carapace of the British Empire from one colony to another, where hard work, entrepreneurship and commitment to family, religion and class would be appropriately rewarded. However, more nuanced iterations of subjectivity are embedded beyond the denotative textual markers. For example, writing in 1848, Hutton discusses the current troubles in Ireland (the Famine, agitations which would lead to the abortive 1848 Rebellion):

> "I hope your Irish troubles will, after all, not amount to much blood shed; but I cannot help thinking Repeal [of the 1801 Act of Union which integrated Ireland politically within Britain] must be granted… I think if Ireland cannot be put entirely, really and truly on a par with England, there is nothing else for it but Repeal. I would rather become part and parcel of England, *if possible;* but as at present Ireland can never be anything but England's dirty suburbs. It may be her want of morality and cleanliness; but bring back her absentees [Irish landlords living in England] by making it fashion to live in Ireland, and you bring back the wealthy classes, the mainspring of morality and cleanliness. A two or three month's residence of the Queen would make it the fashion…"[2]

This multivalent passage reveals various manifestations of identity, some overt, others implied. Hutton's Anglo-Irish class affiliations are readily manifest in his perception of Ireland as an English colony; his belief that a properly functioning aristocracy will cure Irish political unrest is predictable. His desire for Ireland to be integrated as "part and parcel of England" indicates the degree to which his Anglo-Irish identity is fluid and negotiable, a characteristic that makes him an ideal immigrant to the Canadian colony. Indeed, the social and political ethos required to redeem what he perceives as the dysfunctional Irish colony is understood as equally desirable for Upper Canada: the economic prosperity and social harmony of both colonies are dependent on the successful adoption of the values of the imperial centre.

The Irish troubles Hutton refers to was the agitation by Irish legislators (mostly Anglo-Irish landlords) for additional constitutional rights. He makes no acknowledgement that the increasing demands of Irish Catholics tenants (following Catholic Emancipation in 1829) for land reform were at the heart of the disturbances. To him, apparently, landlordism was the force against which Irish

Catholics needed to adjust. His very silence on the existence of Catholics, (more than 80 per cent of the population), their unnamed presence, powerfully situates them as the unspeakable threat to the Anglo-Irish world, just as in Canada his attitudes to the First Nations, to the land itself and indeed to other settlers, stem from a class-conscious and colonial mentality.

The often coded idiom of Hutton's letters – for example, "dirty suburbs," "want of morality and cleanliness" – speaks of a shared family ideology and cryptically confirms the invisible presence of a subaltern population bereft of agency to affect change. Writing fourteen years after his arrival in Canada, Hutton reveals that his immigrant experiences have done little to transform his binary conceptualizations of self and the Irish Catholic "other". At the core of Hutton's immigrant identity, then, and requiring no overt manifestation, is his Protestant religion which underscores all other defining elements of identity in a reinforcing nexus of confirmation.

Not all immigrants were as privileged as Hutton who, with his farming experience and family support, was well-positioned to become a successful settler in Upper Canada. Nevertheless, Hutton did experience the emotional pain of separation from aging parents, and the recognition that his children faced a life of physical labour in a milieu that offered little of the comforts associated with genteel society in Ireland. Accounts of personal anguishes, misgivings and regrets are woven through the letters, and achieve particular poignancy at moments of economic setback and personal tragedy, disclosing unmediated psychological insight to the immigrant self. Hutton's letters, then, serve as testaments to his own experiences as well as to a range of emotional responses that characterized Irish immigrants of a similar social, religious and economic milieu immigrating to Upper Canada in this period.

Accounts of personal anguishes, misgivings and regrets are woven through the letters, and achieve particular poignancy at moments of economic setback and personal tragedy, disclosing unmediated psychological insight to the immigrant self.

Just how distinctly the Irish immigrant experience was influenced by such factors as religion and social class, the historical moment of departure, and the chosen destination can be understood in accounts of Irish Catholic emigrants to Montreal after the Famine. For example, a Rev. Buckley of Cork visited Montreal in 1870 and wrote his perceptions of the Irish community in his *Diary of a Tour in America.* Buckley's impressions are both revealing and suggestive:

> "To some I spoke the Irish language and their delight was inconceivable. I may here remark that wherever I go I find the love of Ireland amongst the Irish to be the most intense feeling of their souls – an all-absorbing passion, running like a silver thread through all their thoughts and emotions. They think forever of the old land, and sigh to behold it once more before they die. One man who drove us one day for an hour refused to take any payment. He was from Ireland and we were two Irish priests, and that was enough for him! 'What part of Ireland do you come from?' I asked. 'From Wicklow, sir; I am 32 years in the country.' 'And do you ever think of the old country?' 'Think,' he exclaimed, 'Oh! yes, sir, I do think of the old country, not so much by day as by night. In my dreams at night I see as distinctly as ever the lanes and alleys where I played when a boy. I fancy I am at home once more, but I wake and find that I am in Montreal, and am likely never to see my native land again.' This dreaming of Ireland I found to be quite common; many people would give all they have in the world to get back again and live in Ireland steeped in poverty, rather than flourish wealthy in this strange land."[3]

This passage speaks powerfully of the emotional pull that home can have for emigrants, the magnetic effect of place on psychic orientation, and the consequent conflicted identities of those who cannot overcome the challenges of finding coherence between lives lived in two distinct mental geographies.

The historiography of the Irish in Canada being mapped by historians can be contextually and richly complemented by the inscriptions of immigrant sensibilities found in life-writing texts. How their reactions are textualized, the precise manner in which they are linguistically configured, the unique means by which they transcend the formulaic features of a given genre to present the fundamental issues inherent in transplanting identity can offer instructive and poignant perspectives on Irish immigration to Canada.

Notes

1 Wilson, David. 1989. *The Irish in Canada.* Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, p. 13.

2 Boyce, Gerald E. ed. *Hutton of Hastings: The Life and Letters of Willliam Hutton, 1801-1861.* Belleville: Hastings County Council, 1972, p. 155.

3 Buckley, Rev. M. B. *Diary of a Tour in America.* Dublin: Sealy, Bryers &Walker, 1886, p. 50-51.

"Caught between the devil and the deep white sea":

BLACK CANADA'S DIASPORIC DYS-FUNK-TION

ABSTRACT

This essay examines black Canada's frustration with several recent attempts to set up culturally appropriate and relevant broadcasting programs. With no network yet servicing Canada's black population of nearly 600,000, Theresa Runstedtler argues that black Canadians often felt lost in Canada's "deep white sea" and overshadowed by black America. Many of the recent controversies over the character and direction of Black Canadian culture have involved dispute over music as black Canada has struggled to maintain an identity unique from its southern neighbour.

In 1997, after six years of transnational lobbying involving African Americans and black Canadians, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) announced its approval of a broadcast license for the American-owned network, Black Entertainment Television (BET).[1] It was truly a historic day, or so we thought, as young people of colour throughout Canada cheered at the news. We would no longer have to rely on MuchMusic's half-hour of *RapCity* and the smattering of shows on campus radio as our sole sources of black music and urban culture. At the time, Robert L. Johnson, the CEO and chairman of BET, proclaimed, "Toronto is one of the most culturally diverse cities in North America, and we think we could do well here."[2] Reports in the Toronto press assured that Johnson's plans included the possibility of shooting programming in Canada, along with potential co-investment in a 24-hour jazz channel and radio station. Coming in the wake of the CRTC's controversial decision to grant 99.1 FM to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), rather than to the black-owned Milestone Group's proposal for an urban music station, Johnson's optimism and seeming commitment to expanding diversity on the Canadian airwaves was a refreshing change to our white-washed media status quo.[3]

However, by 2001, the initial buoyancy over BET had already begun to sink. Had BET executives simply bamboozled the black Canadian public by playing to its desperate starvation for any sprinkling of colour in the media? Writing in the *Globe and Mail* under the headline, "Not Black Like Me," journalist Vernon Clement Jones argued, "Black Entertainment Television came to Canada vowing to showcase black culture. But disillusioned viewers say what it delivered was mainly nasty stereotypes and explicit videos. Where, they wonder, is the Canadian content?"[4] Yet, Jones's public lament was still tempered by his recognition of the precarious place of black culture in Canada. He pondered, "I can't help wondering why, if black Canadians are so offended by BET, only one or two have complained to the CRTC." Ironically, Jones's breakthrough moment on this question came during a fitness class at his local gym. Amidst a crowd of "happy white faces" sweating to the sounds of Britney Spears, Jones realized, "[W]here else but BET are black Canadians going to get some black music? Now that's what you call being *caught between the devil and the deep white sea.*"[5]

Ever since I can remember, this pattern of competing sentiments – the frustration of *invisibility* within Canada's 'deep white sea' and the fear of *invasion* at the hands of the American media 'devil' – have pervaded black Canadian discussions of popular culture. The on-the-ground realities of black Canada's love-hate relationship with black America, with its simmering tensions of sameness/difference and affinity/revulsion, exemplify many of the theoretical complexities of diaspora that continue to confound scholars of the black Atlantic. As Rinaldo Walcott has suggested, black Canada, with its diverse population of multiple colonial pasts, along with its geographic proximity to the United States, provides "a matrix for the contestations that are currently taking place in black diasporic studies."[6]

In particular, many recent controversies over the character and direction of black Canadian culture have involved disputes over music, highlighting a sense of 'diasporic dys-funk-tion' with our southern neighbours.

It is worth noting that even though the case of black Canada exemplifies the transnational/intercultural perspectives of black Atlantic theory, it has been surprisingly absent from contemporary discussions of the diaspora. In addition to the overshadowing effect of its more powerful American neighbour, Canada's reputation as the 'Great White North' has contributed to this rhetorical deletion.

THERESA RUNSTEDTLER

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Its collective racial fictions have tended to position both blackness and racial discrimination outside the national consciousness, making cross-border and outer-national identifications with the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa the dominant characteristic of black Canadian culture.[7] Indeed, this historical amnesia has resulted in the woeful lack of black culture, history, and general discussions of race in mainstream Canadian society, from school curriculum to the media to public culture. It is hardly surprising that many black Canadians have turned to the Atlantic World, and particularly to black America, in search of much-needed cultural resources – even if the shoe does not quite fit.

Black Like What? BET and the Problem of Transnational Black Solidarity

With no network yet servicing Canada's black population of nearly 600,000, the viability of BET north of the border looked like a no-brainer.[8] Yet, as the controversies surrounding the introduction of BET illustrate, despite black Canada's proximity to and porous borders with the political, economic, and mass cultural powerhouse of the United States, local conditions had shaped its hybrid milieu as more than just a mere imitation of black America. From the start, Gail Scala, the editor of Toronto's *Jamaica Weekly Gleaner,* had doubts about the fit between BET's mandate and black Canada's demographic and cultural realities. In particular, Scala wondered what the potential effects of "BET's homogenous vision of black America" would have on "the more diverse Canadian audience." As Scala characterized it, "The black population in the U.S. is so much older and more blended than ours in Canada, they are Americans first and foremost."[9] Moreover, she predicted that the national tradition of multiculturalism and its celebration of the multiplicity of black Canadian cultures would further complicate BET's attempt to import its uniform template of blackness and ghetto style.

With no network yet servicing Canada's black population of nearly 600,000, the viability of BET north of the border looked like a no-brainer.[8] Yet, as the controversies surrounding the introduction of BET illustrate, despite black Canada's proximity to and porous borders with the political, economic, and mass cultural powerhouse of the United States, local conditions had shaped its hybrid milieu as more than just a mere imitation of black America.

The American network's mixed reception in Toronto's mainly Caribbean and African immigrant community points to the need to place diasporic exchange, dispute, and negotiation at the crest of the next wave of black Atlantic scholarship. BET's exemption from Canadian Content regulations and its consequent lack of programming related to black Canadian culture and politics sparked discontent.[10] In a 2001 interview with Brooke Gladstone, the host of NPR's *On the Media,* CBC journalist Clifton Joseph encapsulated the sense of betrayal that many black Canadians felt:

> [T]he other thing is we hardly see any of our Canadian entertainers profiled. They, they actually treat us like — the ugly stepbrothers! We were hoping for more black solidarity tell you the truth and – it seems to me that it's pretty duplicitous for them to come to this country – Canada – canvas us for our assistance – and then after they get it, dash us away like we don't even matter![11]

Expressions like Joseph's were, in many ways, a recognition of black Canada's seeming powerlessness to apply market pressure on the network's programming choices as such a tiny minority of its audience.

Some black Canadian commentators sought to differentiate themselves from their southern neighbours in publicly denouncing the pathological state of black American culture and society. Their scathing remarks stemmed from their dissatisfaction over BET's strategy of using materialistic and misogynistic music videos to fill roughly 65 percent of its broadcast schedule.

While the critiques levelled by these black Canadian professionals likely did not reflect the larger reception of the network across class and age, their remarks remain telling in a number of ways. After all, how seamlessly does the American industry of black ghetto images actually fit into the Canadian environment? Statistics suggest that while black Canadians do tend to live in metropolitan areas and be clustered in lower-income zones, they are much less likely than their American counterparts to reside in segregated, inner-city communities of vast public housing projects. Rather, cities like Toronto are characterized by a more scattered, suburbanized pattern of black poverty.[12] However, even with the obvious ethnic and geographical differences of blackness in Canada, it is hardly productive to retreat into a kind of protective nationalism that locates negative racial stereotypes outside of the black Canadian experience. Canadians of all backgrounds are constantly inundated with American images that undoubtedly influence local racial politics. At the same time, black American scholars can no longer deny the hegemony of popular culture, political discourse, and academic production flowing out of United States and its real impact in other ports of the black Atlantic.

Canadian Milestone or Watered-down American? FLOW 93.5 FM

Promising to bring a more relevant media forum to Toronto's diverse population, five members of the city's

black community – Denham Jolly, Zanana Akande, Carl Redhead, Reynold Austin, and Tony Davy – formed Milestone Radio in 1988, making their first application for a CRTC license to run an urban station. After three applications and 12 years of community struggle involving thousands of letters and volunteer hours, the Milestone Group finally won the rights to 93.5 FM.[13] Despite the exciting possibilities of having a black Canadian-owned radio station, the story of Milestone follows much the same trajectory as the declining optimism over BET. FLOW's own difficulties in pleasing the black Canadian public further illustrate the problems of participating in a transnational cultural exchange in which one party not only dominates the financial side of the industry, but also guards its position as the gatekeeper of black 'authenticity.'

As early as six months after FLOW went on the air in March 2001 with the sounds of Bob Marley's "Roots, Rock, and Reggae," black Canadians began wondering if Milestone Radio had any real intention of following through on its pledge to "to bring a unique Canadian urban music mix… and give a voice to the Black Community."[14] As journalist Susana Ferreira noted, in choosing Marley's song, FLOW's management appeared to be broadcasting its commitment to "the wide base of its mandate, not just for popular, mainstream hip-hop and R&B, but also digging into the roots of the African, Afro-American, and Caribbean forms of music."[15] However, was it all just a bunch of hot airwaves? Not only did FLOW seem to have abandoned its initial vision of catering to the musical diversity of Toronto's black community and supporting local artists, but it also seemed to mimic the apolitical, "cookie-cutter" formula of black American commercial radio by avoiding any controversial race-related topics. Yet, FLOW management countered that it was simply supplying an existing demand. As Milestone spokesperson Nicole Jolly contended, "People have to remember that we are a commercial radio station, which means our goal is to have as large a cumulative audience as possible."[16] With the advent of FLOW, many local urban artists had predicted increased exposure and sales since Canadian Content rules would require the station to fill its daily schedule with 35 percent Canadian music.[17] However, the continued problems facing Canadian hip hop exemplified the fundamental tension between the local and the transnational in shaping collective tastes in the marketplace. Radio airplay on FLOW did not prove to be a panacea. Some industry insiders argued that there was still no money in Canadian hip hop because of simple demographics. As Halifax deejay Jesse Dangerously put it, "Rap is like handgun deaths – it's just something that goes on more in the U.S."[18]

Nevertheless, this very admission points to an even more fundamental problem underlying the cultural politics of urban music in the 'Great White North.' With the influence of BET and other American gatekeepers of hip hop style, rap music has become so synonymous with U.S. ghettoes and gang culture that black Canadian artists have difficulty gaining 'authenticity' on either side of the border. Thus, many of the central "problematiks" that frustrate scholars of the black diaspora – uneven exchange, the flattening out or standardization of discourses, the reduction of real complexities, and the silencing of whole groups – are in fact, the very same dilemmas facing everyday people.

As these two cases of 'diasporic dys-funk-tion' illustrate, black Atlantic scholars must shift their focus to the process of diaspora. In understanding the dynamics of transnational racial formation and the possibilities for constructive political coalitions, examining the often difficult negotiation of differences is just as crucial as uncovering the multiple points of black similarity and solidarity. Both the trade of racialized culture and the development of a workable black internationalism are not immune from the global realities of capital and power, nor are they independent of local-global tensions. While black Canada's 'predicament' is not just a simple case of African-Americanization, it does reveal the silencing and frustrations of an asymmetrical relationship with the U.S. pop cultural machine and the U.S. academic establishment. In turn, the recognition that black America plays multiple rhetorical functions in Canada's racial dialogue, as a kindred spirit that brings the comforting warmth of diversity to the Great White North and also an example of the worst aspects of black pathology, can provide a starting point for understanding the dynamics of exchange in other black Atlantic ports. Neither the retreat into defensive nationalisms that simply reinforce master narratives, nor the wilful ignorance of the realities of cultural hegemony can help advance our theories of diaspora. In this way, Black Cultural Studies needs to cultivate a more substantial conversation with scholars of globalization. Understanding the flow of racial formations and how they affect the libratory possibilities of the black Atlantic represents the next wave.

In turn, the recognition that black America plays multiple rhetorical functions in Canada's racial dialogue, as a kindred spirit that brings the comforting warmth of diversity to the Great White North and also an example of the worst aspects of black pathology, can provide a starting point for understanding the dynamics of exchange in other black Atlantic ports.

Notes

1 Frances Cowley, "Black TV Finally Lands in Toronto," *Toronto Sun,* 24 January 1998.

2 Ibid.

3 Mitch Potter, "Picture this: Can Black Entertainment Television help fill radio void?" *Toronto Sun,* 18 October 1997.

[4] Vernon Clement Jones, "Not Black Like Me," *Globe and Mail,* 19 February 2001.

[5] Emphasis added, Ibid.

[6] Rinaldo Walcott, *Black Like Who? Writing Black Canada* (Toronto, 1997). 29.

[7] Popular understandings of black presence in Canada remain limited to two 'immigrant' tropes: the result of the nation's benevolent acceptance of American slaves from the Underground Railroad, and the more recent result of relocation from the Caribbean and Africa since World War II (Walcott 39, 44). In turn, since the 1970s, state-sponsored multiculturalism has served to erase the stains of slavery and discrimination from Canada's official history by promoting a mythology of ethnic tolerance, often set in opposition to America's violent story of racial prejudice. Eva Mackey, *House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada* (New York, 1999). 99. In reality, black Canadian history stretches back nearly 500 years. See Joseph Mensah, *Black Canadians: History, Experiences, Social Conditions* (Halifax, 2002), Robin Winks, *The Blacks in Canada: A History,* 2nd ed. (Montreal; Kingston, 1997). By the end of the seventeenth century up to the early nineteenth century, black slaves were an accepted part of both British and French colonial life. In the late eighteenth century some 3,000 black Loyalists who served the British during the American Revolution made the Halifax area their home. See James Walker, *The Black loyalists: The search for a promised land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 1783-1870* (London, 1976). The next wave of migration occurred after the War of 1812, when around 3,600 black people moved from the United States to Nova Scotia (Mensah 48). After the passage of the 1793 *Abolition Act* in Upper Canada, which granted freedom to runaway slaves, black American fugitives began crossing the border through the network of the Underground Railroad. By the 1850s, the number of black American fugitives to Canada soared, with settlements developing in Amherstburg, Buxton, St. Catherines, Windsor, London, and Chatham (Mensah 49-50). During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, black Americans also moved into Western Canada despite elaborate attempts by the Canadian government to bar them (Mensah 50). Also see Marie Sarah-Jane Mathieu, "Jim Crow Rides this Train: The Social and Political Impact of African American Sleeping Car Porters in Canada," (2001). With changes to Canadian immigration law in the late 1960s, black migration from the British and French Caribbean increased (Mensah 71). Since the 1980s, Africa has provided an additional surge of black Canadian immigration (Mensah 111-12).

[8] According to the 1996 Canadian census, the black population in Canada numbered 573,860, comprising the country's third largest visible minority population after the Chinese and South Asians, and constituting 2.01 per cent of the national population. As of 1996, just over 400,000 out of this total black population resided in the metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax. Mensah, *Black Canadians: History, Experiences, Social Conditions.* 53, 76, 79.

[9] Potter, "Picture this: Can Black Entertainment Television help fill radio void?"

[10] Even though the CRTC generally requires pay and specialty broadcasters to play a certain amount of Canadian programming or "Canadian Content," tailoring the number of hours according to each case, and making it a condition of license, they exempted BET from meeting any requirements. This allows BET to transmit a more-or-less direct feed from their U.S. studios into Canada.

[11] "BET Goes to Canada," *On the Media,* Brooke Gladstone, NPR, 24 February 2001.

[12] Mensah, *Black Canadians: History, Experiences, Social Conditions.* 82-83.

[13] For more on FLOW's path to licensing, see http://www.milestoneradio.com/history/milestone_story.htm.

[14] "93.5 – New all-Urban Music Radio Station for Toronto," 27 August 2000, http://www.maddflavz.com/news.htm#41 (August 2005).

[15] Susana Ferreira, "On the Air: After two years of Flow, had Canadian urban radio become a soul survivor or just another pop pretender?" 28 February 2003, http://www.exclaim.ca/index.asp?layid=22&csid=1&csid1=1424 (August 2005).

[16] Dalton Higgins, "Six Months of FLOW 93.5: Community Underwhelmed by Radio Station it Fought for Years to Get."

[17] According to Canada Heritage, the main factor in deciding if a work is "Canadian" is whether a sufficient proportion of the creative personnel (performer, composer, etc.) involved in a recording are Canadian. For more details on the requirements see, "Canadian Content Regulations," Winter 2001, http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/pubs/can-con/can_con.html (August 2005).

[18] Ibid.

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Conférence annuelle de l'Association d'études canadiennes

« Un siècle du Canada, 1905-2005 / A Century of Canada, 1905-2005 »

Organisée en collaboration avec l'Université d'Alberta et l'infrastructure de recherche sur le Canada au 20e siècle
Edmonton, Alberta. 29-30 octobre 2005

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Lorsque l'Alberta et la Saskatchewan entrèrent dans la Confédération en 1905, le Canada était une société principalement rurale et peu peuplée sur la sphère internationale. Aujourd'hui, le Canada est un pays fortement urbanisé sur la scène internationale.

Quels changements sociaux, économiques, démographiques, culturels et politiques expliquent la profonde transformation du Canada au cours du 20e siècle ? Jusqu'à quel point ces changements ont-ils variés à travers le pays et selon différents individus et groupes ? Comment ces changements au Canada se comparent-ils avec les développements dans les autres pays à travers le monde et comment sont-ils reliés avec ceux-ci ?

Cette conférence explorera de telles questions dans le but de contribuer à une plus grande compréhension du Canada au 20e siècle et encouragera une réflexion sur les défis des prochaines décennies. Nous invitons chercheurs, universitaires, décideurs politiques et toutes autres personnes intéressées des domaines des sciences sociales à proposer des sujets et des séances.

L'échéance pour les propositions est le 15 juin 2005. Veuillez, s'il vous plaît, faire parvenir l'information concernant les conférenciers, ainsi qu'une brève description des articles ou des séances proposés, à James Ondrick par courriel à james.ondrick@acs-aec.ca ou par télécopieur au (514) 925-3095.

Mix and Match:

THE FAST EVOLVING CHARACTERISTICS OF CANADIAN ETHNICITY

ABSTRACT

By 2006 it is clear that a majority of Canadians will have something other than Canadian, British and French as part of their ethnic identification. Some 36.3 percent of Canadians gave multiple responses to questions on ethnic origins in 2001. By contrast in the United States in 2000 the question on ancestral origins yielded 27.5 percent of respondents giving multiple answers. Growing multiple identifications may diminish singular ties to ethnic communities and if not reduce, then certainly redefine, the sense and orientation of community belonging as well as the oft-related link to countries of origin. By consequence in future ethnic connectedness will not be confined to ascribed or transmitted status as more individuals will choose to define themselves ethnically according to their preferences.

JACK JEDWAB
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A recent series of projections by Statistics Canada looking at the Canada of 2017 predicted considerable change to the country's landscape with the heightened degree of cultural diversity. But one of the areas that the projections did not address was the rise in multiple identifications amongst the population. By 2006 it is clear that a majority of Canadians will have something other than Canadian, British and French as part of their ethnic identification. This was already the case in 2001 for a majority of the population below the age of 35. This scenario is a function of the combined number of persons reporting only 'other' ethnic origin and those reporting other in combination with another origin. The phenomenon is more common amongst longer established-mostly European descendant-Canadians than more recently arrived immigrants. Such shifts represent an important dimension on the changing patterns of Canadian identity.

Table 1 – Declarations of Ethnic Origins and declaration of ethnic origins of persons other than Canadian, French and British (single and multiple) by age cohort, Canada, 2001

Canada	Total Age and sex	0-14 years	15-24 years	55-64 years	65 years and older
Total – Ethnic origin	29,639,030	5,737,675	3,988,200	2,847,955	3,624,850
Other with/without Canadian, British or French	13,892,970	3,101,550	2,036,630	1,133,460	1,375,075
% Other with/without Canadian, British or French	46.9	54.3	51.0	39.8	37.9

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

Overall, 36.3 percent of Canadians gave multiple responses to questions on ethnic origins in 2001. By contrast in the United States in 2000 the question on ancestral origins yielded 27.5 percent of respondents giving multiple answers. Multiple identifications are far more common amongst Canada's younger generation. Some 44.3 percent of Canadians under the age of 15 gave multiple responses to the question on ethnic origin, 35.3 percent between the age of 35 and 44 did the same and 24.1 percent above the age of 65 gave more than one response to the question on ethnic origins.

More multiple ethnic responses to the 2001 consisted of two answers often referred to as dual identity. Still, one out of six Canadians gave at least three responses when asked about their ethnic background (9.6 percent gave three responses and 6.7 percent gave four answers). Persons that included American, Swedish and Norwegian origin responses were most likely to give as many as four responses when asked about their ethnic background. On the other hand single origin declarations were most common amongst those reporting Korean (93.6 percent), Haitian (85.8 percent) and Chinese origins (85.5 percent). Amongst European ancestry groups it is the Portuguese and Greek that reported the least ethnic mixing. Single origin declarations were less common amongst the German (25.8) Polish (32.1) and Ukrainian groups (32.6).

Table 2 – Declarations of Single Ethnic Origin for selected groups, Canada, 2001

Canada	% of single origin
Total – Ethnic origin	**63.7**
Korean origin	93.6
Haitian origin	85.8
Chinese origins	85.5
East Asian origins	84.9
East African origins	83.5
South Asian origins	83.1
East Indian origin	81.5
West Asian origins	80.5
South East Asian origins	78.4
Portuguese origin	70.7
Greek origin	66.9
North African origins	65.4
Middle Eastern origins	64.9
Caribbean and Bermudan origins	64.2
African origins	63.5
Canadian origins	62.7
Latin American origins	61.2
Italian origins	57.1
Jewish origin	53.5
American origin	43.1
Ukrainian origin	32.6
Polish origin	32.1
British origins	26.9
French origin	26.5
German origins	25.8

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

Hyphenated Identities

Some describe the condition of dual individual and/or multiple identities as hyphenated identity. The notion of a hyphenated identity is usually thought of as combined national with ethnocultural identity (i.e. Canadian and other) and its increased presence in the census is a result of people being encouraged in the late 1980's to respond that they were Canadian on the question of ethnic origins. Of those Canadians who have increasingly chosen to do so many combined their answers with another ethnic response.

Hyphenated Canadian identities have become an important part of the way our origins are reported. It is a significant by product of the campaign designed to get the population to respond Canadian to the census as a way to affirm their attachment to the country. The authors of this idea may have better succeeded in getting those of European origin to hyphenate their Canadian identification than in getting people to dismiss backgrounds other than Canadian.

Those reporting either British or French origins only are generally seniors. Those reporting more multiple or hyphenated identities tend to be younger and have low shares of persons under 65 thus suggesting an important trend.

The group that was most inclined to add Canadian to the response to questions about their backgrounds were persons of American descent. In effect, the most hyphenated Canadians were those with some ancestors that hailed from the melting pot. Thereafter Metis and Dutch origin respondents were most likely to include Canadian in their response. Asian groups were amongst the least likely to have included the Canadian response in their census declaration.

Having a majority of 'other ethnicities' does not imply a rise in hyphenated identities as much as the new immigration has yet to encounter significant mixing, something which as we noted is far more common amongst the more established largely European descent segment of the population. An important number of younger Canadians have likely rolled multiple identities into the Canadian only category. Still, one observes an important generation gap in the reporting on origins with those below the age of 14, approximately 26 percent that might be described as hyphenated (3,104,235) while in the 65 and over category only 6.1 percent are hyphens. Overall in the 2001 census some 16.5 percent or one of six Canadians reported hyphenated identities.

Only 2.7 percent of persons with origins other than Canadian, French or British combined Canadian with their response in dual declarations. However when multiple declarations where Canadian is present with 'other' identification are included, the percentage rises to 6.3 percent. Not surprisingly considering more mixing of the 'other ethnics' occurred with persons of British as opposed to French descent. As observed below the group that was most inclined to add Canadian to the response to questions about their backgrounds were persons of American descent. In effect the most hyphenated Canadians were those with some ancestors that hailed from the melting pot. Thereafter Metis and Dutch origin respondents were most likely to include Canadian in their response. Asian groups were amongst the least likely to have included the Canadian response in their census declaration.

Table 3 – Declarations of Ethnic Origins in Combination with Canadian response for selected groups, 2001

Canada	Canadian and other only	Total Other with Canadian
Ethnic origin	**2.7**	**6.3**
American origin	17.6	43.8
Métis origin	9.1	28.7
North American Indian origin	6.6	18.2
German origins	6.4	17.3
Ukrainian origin	7.2	15.9
Canadian origins	6.7	15.5
Russian origin	8.7	15.4
Polish origin	7.4	14.8
Italian origins	6.7	13.2
Jewish origin	9.0	13.1
Caribbean and Bermudan origins	6.3	9.5
Guyanese origin	6.3	9.2
African origins	5.7	7.9
Latin American origins	5.7	7.7
Chinese origins	2.8	3.7

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

Conclusion

Defining the notion of community is continually the object of discussion amongst policy-makers. What terminology is best suited to characterizing persons of diverse origins and backgrounds that form communities? In the lexicon associated with diversity we have described our aboriginal population as First Nations. The British and French have been referred to as founding peoples and those who have immigrated to Canada have been called new Canadians and their children as descendants of immigrants. Each of these categories in some manner touches on the importance of ancestry in the identification of Canadians. In recent years ancestral ties have come under scrutiny from observers who believe that strong links to ethnic origins undercut attachment to Canada. But a large scale study on ethnic diversity conducted by Statistics Canada in 2003 suggested no significant contradiction between such expressions of identity. Attachment to Canada is strong amongst many individuals that retain strong ties of either a symbolic or instrumental character to countries of origin.

Growing multiple identifications can have certain policy ramifications as they may diminish singular ties to ethnic communities and if not reduce, then certainly redefine, the sense and orientation of community belonging as well as the oft-related link to countries of origin. By consequence in future ethnic connectedness will not be confined to ascribed or transmitted status alone but will increasingly include persons who choose to define themselves ethnically according to their preferences.

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