

CANADIAN ISSUES THÈMES CANADIENS

February / Février 2002

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1971-2001

30

ans
de

years
of

Multiculturalisme

Multiculturalism



CANADIAN ETHNOCULTURAL COUNCIL CONSEIL ETHNOCULTUREL DU CANADA

**Celebrating 30 years of multiculturalism policy
Célébrant 30 ans de la politique du multiculturalisme**

"Canada's Multicultural Policy has become one of our nation's guiding principles from which we can gather strength. The Policy has played a vital role in creating a nation where diverse communities are afforded respect and acceptance and where the choice to maintain one's culture and heritage is accepted as part of our Canadian identity."

Multiculturalism is an important fabric of our society. It has become a way of life, a way of doing business and a statement of who we are as a nation."

Art Hagopian, President

Founded in 1980, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council (CEC) is a non-profit, non-partisan coalition of national ethnocultural umbrella organizations which, in turn, represent a cross-section of ethnocultural groups across Canada. The CEC supports the principles of Canada's Multicultural Policy by encouraging the preservation, enhancement, and sharing of the cultural heritage of Canadians, the removal of barriers that prevent some Canadians from participating fully and equally in society, and the elimination of racism.

From Diversity Strength

The Canadian Ethnocultural Council's motto, as shown in its coat of arms, demonstrates that diversity is a natural element in our society with the power to strengthen us.



« La politique de multiculturalisme est devenue l'un des principes directeurs de notre pays et un principe d'où nous pouvons tirer de la force. La politique a joué un rôle crucial dans la création d'un pays où diverses communautés sont acceptées et traitées avec respect et où il est reconnu que le choix de conserver sa propre culture et son propre patrimoine fait partie de l'identité nationale.

Il est impossible de nier que le multiculturalisme constitue une composante essentielle de notre tissu social. Elle est devenue une façon de vivre, de faire des affaires, de même qu'un énoncé sur qui nous sommes en tant que peuple. On doit continuer à la renforcer et à l'appuyer. »
Art Hagopian, président

Fondé en 1980, le Conseil ethnoculturel du Canada (CEC) est un organisme sans but lucratif, non partisan qui regroupe un éventail d'organisations ethnoculturelles nationales représentant à leur tour différents groupes d'un bout à l'autre du Canada. Les membres du CEC s'efforcent d'assurer la préservation, la mise en valeur et le partage du patrimoine culturel des Canadiens ainsi que l'élimination des obstacles qui empêchent certains Canadiens de pleinement participer à la société, et la mise en échec du racisme.

La diversité notre force

La devise du Conseil ethnoculturel du Canada, écrite sur les armoiries, démontre que la diversité est innée à notre société et peut nous renforcer.

**CANADIAN ETHNOCULTURAL COUNCIL
CONSEIL ETHNOCULTUREL DU CANADA**

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REFLECTIONS ON Multiculturalism at Thirty

BY John Biles

Thirty years after Pierre Trudeau rose in the House of Commons to promulgate the world's first official multiculturalism policy, it is time to take stock of where we have been, ascertain where we find ourselves at present, determine where we need to go in the foreseeable future, and then set about the complex business of getting there. The articles in this issue will help with the first three, but the last depends upon us all working together.

Last fall's Durban conference is illustrative of the cross roads at which we find ourselves. There is something admirable about a global community willing to tackle the thorny issues arising from diversity in the full glare of media from around the world. At the same time, it is apparent to most that governments and NGOs are far more comfortable discussing the sins of commission and omission of others than they are discussing their own. How else do we explain the absence of discussion on sexual orientation, reluctance to engage in discussions of caste, slavery or Aboriginal peoples, or the non-response of so many to the anti-Semitism that ran amok at the NGO forum? My short-hand for this phenomenon is *my diversity is okay and yours isn't*.

For thirty years this tension has played itself out in Canada. The concerns of cultural retention and race relations have battled for pre-eminence in federal policy and programming, only occasionally forging a temporary truce and thereby effecting change. This clash has more recently been submerged beneath the cantankerous battle surrounding social cohesion. Cohesion conjures images of a glue that binds the peripheral to the central: the 21st century rendition of the elusive concepts of national unity and Canadian identity which so dominated federal policy at the end of the last century. What does one do when the centre proves to be in a constant state of flux? Globalization and post-modernity have brought researchers, NGOs and governments face-to-face with a complex world where multiple and shifting identities are the norm and relatively simple and bounded identities are as rare as a phoenix or unicorn, and just as real.

The strategic goals of the renewed multiculturalism program – social justice, identity and civic participation – have provided a more flexible means to address a complex reality. They recognize identities as contested and evolving; social justice as contingent upon the right to secure identity(-ies) and full participation as essential to the social, economic, cultural and political aspects of Canadian life. These goals do not presume a bounded unchanging centre, but a space for connections to be forged, nurtured and sustained. In a very tangible sense, the federal multiculturalism policy – and the hundreds of policies which have flowed from it at every level of Canadian society – is designed to bring Canadians together. For thirty years the policy has assisted the Government of Canada to do just that, allowing Canadians to share their stories, myths and symbols. These in turn have fostered foundational values of respect for human rights, individual freedom and equality.

Still, while much work has been done on issues of diversity and a good deal of progress has been made, we must resist resting on our laurels. The challenges for tomorrow are how to continue to effect change and how to do it in a radically changed environment. And our most pressing and urgent task is to ensure that younger hands, hearts and minds be brought in to all three critical sectors (research, policy and NGO) – that their voices be heeded and heard at all levels and that they have an opportunity to learn from their predecessors before retirement sends so many to explore other domains. The passing of the knowledge torch must begin and it must begin now.

Should we be discouraged that thirty years into this policy so much remains undone? I do not believe so. Thirty years ago, no budget speech contained a statement like, "Mr. Speaker ... if ignored, intolerance can threaten the fabric of our nation and we must answer it. It can divide our communities and we must stop it. That is why the Government will provide new funding, aimed at fostering respect and promoting our values, values which have allowed us to welcome so many to Canada, so many who have enriched us so much." (Budget Speech 2001)

We have moved a long way. We have so much further to go.

John Biles - Metropolis Project Team, Citizenship and Immigration Canada

RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE MULTICULTURALISME : trente ans plus tard

PAR John Biles

Il y a 30 ans, Pierre Trudeau se leva à la Chambre des communes et promulgua la première politique de multiculturalisme officielle au monde. Il est donc temps de faire le bilan des actions passées, d'établir où nous nous trouvons présentement, de déterminer dans quelle direction nous devons nous diriger et de se préparer à surmonter les obstacles afin de s'y rendre. Les articles rassemblés dans ce numéro nous aideront à éclaircir les trois premiers éléments mais le dernier dépend de notre capacité à travailler ensemble.

La conférence de Durban de cet automne est un excellent exemple des choix qui s'offrent à nous. Il existe quelque chose d'admirable à voir la communauté internationale débattre des questions touchant la diversité, et ce, dans la mire des médias de partout au monde. En même temps, il est apparent pour plusieurs que les gouvernements et les ONGs sont beaucoup plus à l'aise lorsque vient le temps de discuter des péchés des commissions et des omissions des autres. De quelle autre manière pouvons-nous expliquer l'absence de discussions au sujet de l'orientation sexuelle, l'indisposition face aux discussions concernant les castes, l'esclavage ou les peuples autochtones, ou encore le manque de réponses de plusieurs face à l'antisémitisme qui a fait ravage au forum des ONGs? Le diminutif que j'emploie pour ce phénomène est ma diversité est correcte mais pas la vôtre.

Depuis trente ans, cette tension s'exerce au Canada. Les questions de rétention culturelle et de relations raciales se confrontent afin d'avoir préséance à l'intérieur des politiques et des programmes fédéraux qui acceptent rarement de céder afin de permettre à un changement de se produire. Ce désaccord a récemment émergé dans le con-

flit qui entoure la cohésion sociale. La cohésion fait image d'une colle qui joint la périphérie et le centre : l'interprétation au 21^e siècle des concepts élusifs de l'unité nationale et de l'identité canadienne qui ont dominé la politique fédérale à la fin du dernier siècle. Que doit-on faire quand le centre fluctue constamment? La globalisation et la post-modernité ont mené les chercheurs, les ONGs et les gouvernements face à un monde complexe où les identités multiples et changeantes sont la norme et où les identités relativement simples et bornées sont aussi rares qu'un phénix ou une licorne, et tout aussi réelles.

Les buts stratégiques du programme renouvelé du multiculturalisme – la justice sociale, la participation identitaire et civique – ont fourni un moyen plus flexible de répondre à une réalité complexe. Ils reconnaissent les identités comme étant contestées et évolutives; la justice sociale comme étant contingente au droit de sécuriser une ou des identité(s) et la pleine participation en tant qu'élément essentiel aux aspects sociaux, économiques, culturels et politiques de la vie canadienne. Ces buts ne présument pas que le centre soit borné et immuable, ils représentent plutôt un espace permettant à des connexions de se forger pour ensuite être nourries et soutenues. De façon très tangible, la politique fédérale du multiculturalisme – et les centaines de politiques qui ont suivi à tous les niveaux de la société canadienne – est conçue de manière à rassembler les Canadiens et Canadiennes. La politique du multiculturalisme assiste depuis trente ans le Gouvernement du Canada à rassembler, permettant aux Canadiens de partager leurs histoires, leurs mythes et leurs symboles. Ceux-ci ont à leur tour appuyé des valeurs de base telles que le

respect des droits de l'homme, la liberté individuelle et l'égalité.

Par contre, même si beaucoup de travail a été fait à propos des questions de diversité et que des progrès ont été accomplis, nous devons résister à la tentation de se reposer sur nos lauriers. Le défi de demain est comment doit-on continuer d'apporter des changements et comment y arrive-t-on dans un environnement qui a radicalement changé. Notre tâche la plus pressante est d'assurer que de jeunes mains, de jeunes cœurs et de jeunes têtes prennent leur place dans les trois secteurs critiques (recherche, politique et ONG) – que leurs voix se fassent entendre à tous les niveaux et qu'ils aillent l'opportunité d'apprendre de leurs prédécesseurs avant que la retraite ne les amène à explorer d'autres domaines. La transmission de la connaissance doit commencer et elle doit commencer immédiatement.

Devrions-nous être découragés qu'après trente ans d'existence de cette politique, il nous reste encore d'énormes tâches à accomplir? Il y a trente ans, aucune allocution budgétaire contenait un énoncé tel « Monsieur le Président ... si nous laissons faire, l'intolérance peut abîmer la trame de notre société, et nous devons réagir. Elle peut diviser nos collectivités, et nous devons y faire échec. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement versera des fonds destinés à la promotion du respect et à celle de nos valeurs, ces valeurs qui nous ont poussés à accueillir tant de gens au Canada, qui nous ont tant enrichis. » (Discours du budget de 2001)


Nous avons parcouru un long chemin. Nous avons encore tellement à parcourir.

John Biles
l'Équipe du projet Metropolis,
Citoyenneté et immigration Canada

Two members of the ACS Board of Directors named to the Order of Canada Deux membres du conseil d'administration de l'AEC récipiendaires de l'Ordre du Canada

Congratulations to **Howard Pawley**, Premier of Manitoba from 1981-1988 and retired Associate Professor at the University of Windsor, and **Gerald Gall**, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, on being named to the Order of Canada.

Félicitations à **Howard Pawley**, Premier ministre du Manitoba de 1981 à 1988 et ancien Professeur associé à l'Université de Windsor, et à **Gerald Gall**, Professeur, Faculté de droit, Université d'Alberta, pour avoir été récipiendaires de l'Ordre du Canada.



ACS / ENVIRONICS

THE ASSOCIATION FOR CANADIAN STUDIES (ACS) COMMISSIONED THE ENVIRONICS RESEARCH GROUP TO CONDUCT A SURVEY OF CANADIANS 18 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER TO ASSESS THEIR OPINIONS ON AND KNOWLEDGE OF A VARIETY OF ISSUES ACROSS THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL SPECTRUMS OF THE COUNTRY. IN THIS INSTALMENT, CANADIAN ISSUES PRESENTS THE RESULTS OF QUESTIONS DEALING WITH MULTICULTURALISM. THE SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY TELEPHONE BETWEEN DECEMBER 13, 2001 AND JANUARY 5, 2002. RESULTS ARE ACCURATE TO WITHIN PLUS OR MINUS 2.2%, 19 TIMES OUT OF 20.

The poll combined a 'knowledge-based' question about who among the three levels of government has primary authority over multiculturalism with a question asking who should have such authority. Results indicate that Canadians tend to believe that the federal government does indeed have authority over this department and should continue to do so. Approximately 1 in 5 respondents would prefer the provincial government to have primary control, while a small number, though more significant in Quebec, are comfortable with multiple (2 or more) levels sharing responsibility. Support for the 'provincial' response in each question was highest among the 18-29 age group and those who considered their occupations as 'homemaker'.

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians is an objective that the government should support.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens sont un objectif que le gouvernement doit soutenir.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	42%	44	47	42	37
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	40	41	39	38	43
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	8	8	6	9	10
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	7	3	4	8	8

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians is a threat to the future of the French language in Canada.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens constituent une menace pour l'avenir du français au Canada.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	8	6	16	6	6
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	17	18	23	15	16
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	35	39	30	36	38
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	35	33	28	38	37

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians removes barriers to full and equal participation in a Canadian society.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens contribuent à abolir les obstacles à une participation pleine et entière dans la société canadienne.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	28	25	28	31	24
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	43	54	39	42	44
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	15	11	17	13	18
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	8	4	8	8	8

Public Opinion Poll

Sondage d'opinion publique

L'ASSOCIATION D'ÉTUDES CANADIENNES (AEC) A MANDATÉ LE GROUPE DE RECHERCHE ENVIRONICS AFIN DE MENÉ UN SONDAGE AUPRÈS DE CANADIENS ET CANADIENNES DE PLUS DE 18 ANS ÉVALUANT LEURS OPINIONS ET LEURS CONNAISSANCES SUR UNE VARIÉTÉ DE QUESTIONS SE RAPPORTANT AUX ÉVÉNEMENTS SOCIAUX, POLITIQUES ET LÉGAUX DU PAYS. DANS CE PREMIER VOLET, THÈMES CANADIENS PRÉSENTE LES RÉSULTATS DES QUESTIONS PORTANT SUR LE MULTICULTURALISME. LE SONDAGE A ÉTÉ EFFECTUÉ PAR TÉLÉPHONE ENTRE LE 13 DÉCEMBRE 2001 ET LE 5 JANVIER 2002. LES RÉSULTATS SONT PRÉCIS JUSQU'À PLUS OU MOINS 2.2%, 19 FOIS SUR 20.

Le sondage a combiné une question basée sur la connaissance acquise demandant lequel des trois niveaux de gouvernement a l'autorité sur le multiculturalisme avec une autre qui demandait lequel des trois niveaux devrait avoir cette autorité. Les résultats indiquent que les Canadiens semblent croire que le gouvernement fédéral détient en effet l'autorité dans ce secteur et que ceci devrait demeurer tel quel. Environ un cinquième (1/5) des répondants préféreraient voir le gouvernement provincial détenir cette autorité tandis qu'un petit nombre, quoique plus significatif au Québec, seraient à l'aise avec une autorité partagée entre au moins 2 niveaux de gouvernement. Le support de l'option « provinciale » pour chaque question était plus marqué parmi le groupe des 18-29 ans et parmi ceux qui considèrent leur occupation comme étant « homemaker ».

In the first of a series of eight questions designed to assess how Canadians view the "preservation and enhancement of their multicultural heritage", respondents across all regions and other sub-groups (such as language, religion, education and employment status) agree, either 'strongly' or 'somewhat', that such is an objective that the government should continue to support.

Dans la première d'une série de huit questions conçues afin d'établir l'opinion des Canadiens sur « la préservation et le rehaussement de leur patrimoine multiculturel », les répondants de toutes les régions et de tous les sous-groupes (tels que définis par la langue, la religion, l'éducation et l'emploi) sont d'accords, soit « fortement » ou « quelque peu », qu'il s'agit d'un objectif que le gouvernement devrait continuer de supporter.

Canadians were asked whether they considered multiculturalism to be a threat to the French language in Canada. By and large, they do not. Fully 70% of respondents, including 58% in Quebec, disagreed with this suggestion. It should be noted that a statistical difference does exist between those who speak English at home (21% agree that it poses a threat) and those who speak French at home (40%).

Nous avons demandé aux Canadiens s'ils considéraient que le multiculturalisme est une menace à la langue française au Canada. La majorité pense que non. 70 % des répondants, dont 58 % au Québec, ne sont pas d'accords avec cette suggestion. Notez qu'une différence statistique existe entre ceux qui parlent l'anglais à la maison (21 % de ceux-ci croient que le multiculturalisme menace le français) et ceux qui parlent le français à la maison (40%).

Again, Canadians across the country believe that multiculturalism works to remove barriers to full and equal participation in society. This holds true across the poll's sub-groups.

De plus, des Canadiens de partout au pays croient que le multiculturalisme aide à briser les barrières qui empêchent une participation pleine et équitable dans la société. Ceci demeure vrai parmi la totalité des sous-groupes du sondage.

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians promotes the sharing of common values.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens font la promotion de partage de valeurs communes.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	32	28	32	34	30
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	45	58	44	40	48
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	13	7	11	14	13
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	7	4	6	8	7

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians helps to solve the problems of racism and prejudice.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens aident à résoudre les problèmes de racisme et de préjugés.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	32	33	34	34	29
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	41	47	40	39	42
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	14	14	13	14	16
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	9	4	9	11	10

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians is a threat to social unity and solidarity.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens sont une menace pour l'unité et la solidarité sociales.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	11	8	11	11	11
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	21	22	20	21	21
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	31	40	28	31	30
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	33	24	34	32	34

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians is helpful in ensuring that the institutions in Canada reflect and respect cultural and racial diversity.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens aident à assurer que les institutions du Canada reflètent et respectent la diversité raciale et culturelle.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	35	32	32	38	34
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	45	52	46	43	47
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	10	7	12	10	10
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	5	4	4	5	6

The preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians enhances the value of Canadian citizenship.

La préservation et la promotion du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens améliorent la valeur de la citoyenneté canadienne.

	Canada	Atlantic/ Atlantiques	Québec	Ontario	West/Ouest
Strongly agree / Fortement d'accord	37	33	35	41	36
Somewhat agree / Plutôt d'accord	43	50	43	41	44
Somewhat disagree / Plutôt en désaccord	10	9	10	9	10
Strongly disagree / Fortement en désaccord	6	4	7	6	7

Canadians also support the idea that multiculturalism promotes the sharing of common values. Respondents from Atlantic Canada agreed most strongly (86%).

Les canadiens appuient aussi l'idée que le multiculturalisme aide à promouvoir le partage de valeurs communes. Ce sont les répondants des provinces atlantiques qui fournissent l'appui le plus fort (86 %).

Similar results can be seen when the question moves to issues of solving problems of prejudice. Consistently, Canadians (73%) view multiculturalism as a positive instrument in that pursuit. Homemakers and residents of Alberta are most likely among the sub-groups to disagree (30%).

Des résultats semblables ont été obtenus lorsque les questions abordaient le sujet de la résolution des problèmes de préjugés. Conformément aux autres résultats, 73 % des Canadiens voient le multiculturalisme en tant qu'instrument positif face à cette problématique. Les «homemakers» et les résidents de l'Alberta sont parmi les sous-groupes en d'accords (30 %) avec cette proposition.

On the question of multiculturalism being a threat to social unity and solidarity, nearly two of three respondents from every region disagreed. Of note, more concern is raised among the poor and least educated. Only 49% of those who did not complete high school and 55% of those report income of under \$20,000 disagreed.

Pour la question à savoir si le multiculturalisme est une menace à l'unité sociale et à la solidarité, presque 2 répondants sur 3, toutes régions confondus, sont en désaccord. Il est à noter que les plus démunis et ceux ayant un niveau d'éducation plus faible ont démontré un plus haut degré d'inquiétude. Seulement 49% de ceux qui non pas terminés l'école secondaire et 55% de ceux ayant un revenu de moins de 20000\$ sont en désaccord.

Does multiculturalism help ensure a respect for cultural and racial diversity in Canada's institutions? Clearly, Canadians (80%) are saying 'yes', regardless of the sub-group. Young adults aged 18-29 are especially strong in their agreement (87%).

Le multiculturalisme aide-t-il à assurer le respect de la diversité culturelle et raciale dans les institutions canadiennes? 80 % des Canadiens disent que «oui», peu importe le sous-groupe. Les jeunes adultes âgés de 18 à 29 y croient plus fortement (87 %).

Finally, fully 80% of Canadians agree that multiculturalism enhances the value of Canadian citizenship. This holds for every province and region of the country.

Finalement, 80 % des Canadiens sont d'accord pour affirmer que le multiculturalisme rehausse la valeur de la citoyenneté canadienne. Ceci est vrai pour toutes les provinces et régions du pays.

THIRTY YEARS LATER:

Reflections on the Evolution and Future Prospects of Multiculturalism

BY Tamara Palmer Seiler

Note: This paper is based on a longer article, "Canada and Multiculturalism" that appears in Bob Hesketh & Chris Hackett, eds. *Canada: Confederation to Present*. CD-ROM. Edmonton: 2001.

ON 8 OCTOBER 1971, PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU MADE A SPEECH TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED THAT HIS LIBERAL GOVERNMENT HAD INITIATED A CULTURAL POLICY THAT HE DESCRIBED AS "MULTICULTURALISM WITHIN A BILINGUAL FRAMEWORK" SHORTLY THEREAFTER, A NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS ANNOUNCED SIMILAR POLICIES. SINCE THAT TIME, THESE POLICIES HAVE EVOLVED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. THEY WERE BOLSTERED IN 1982 BY ARTICLE 27 OF THE *CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS*, WHICH STATED THAT THE CHARTER "SHALL BE INTERPRETED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESERVATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF THE MULTICULTURAL HERITAGE OF CANADA."

In 1984, the "Equality Now" federal parliamentary report, in response to the concerns of "visible minority" groups about discrimination and inequality in Canadian society, offered eighty recommendations for change, including several for affirmative action. And in 1988 the

which it is being discussed. Beyond its general meaning as a means of accommodating diversity, it can also be understood in at least four other ways – as an empirical description of a heterogeneous society, as an ideology advocating equity and a lived appreciation of differ-

(largely European) ethnic groups for cultural recognition, to being as well a vehicle for addressing issues of systemic racism and more recently to being a means of arguably downplaying difference and highlighting inclusive citizenship. While some see these different emphases as being mutually compatible, others have felt disconcerted by them. The contemporary debate around multiculturalism grows out of this complex web of meaning and inflections, as well as out of issues connected with globalization that have emerged since the Multicultural Act was passed in 1988.

Since this arguably landmark event, the first such legislative entrenchment of pluralism in the world, multiculturalism in Canada can be seen to have moved in two seemingly opposite directions. On the one hand, Canada has become more and more ethnically and racially diverse. As well, many of the key ideas of multicultural ideology (such as the notion that cultural diversity is a central and valuable part of Canadian life) have gained wide acceptance, embodied in a variety of mainstream institutions, from school systems to law courts. Canada has also become well known internationally as a leader and a model in the area of managing diversity. Moreover, the neo-conservative ideology that has become increasingly pervasive over the past decade has brought with it an emphasis on the globalization of the market place. This emphasis has focused the rhetoric of multiculturalism on the economic value of diversity, which has in a certain way broadened its appeal as Canada's means to achieving a



Conservative government's enactment (under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney) of Bill C-93 formally legislated the federal government's commitment to "the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada." Despite this thirty-year history, and Canada's pioneering role in inventing both the term and the policy, multiculturalism continues to arouse controversy.

As a number of commentators have pointed out, this controversy is generated in part by the fact that the term has a number of different, if interrelated meanings, depending on the context in

ence, as a specific governmental policy that has been implemented in a variety of quarters with varying degrees of success, and as a political process whereby minority groups negotiate their claims to space, status and power in the social order. This range of meanings has generated debate and misunderstanding, as has the evolution in the way that the official policy has been inflected since it was announced in 1971.

A product of a particular set of historical dynamics in Canada, the federal policy has evolved from being primarily an embodiment of the aspirations of

competitive advantage in the world of global business.

On the other hand, this same neo-conservative ideology has driven a reduction in spending on virtually all of the federal government's social and cultural programs, as well as fostering a no-nonsense mindset unsympathetic to such "politically correct" liberal causes as fostering an appreciation of cultural diversity and a commitment to social justice. Thus even as Canada's international reputation as a pioneer in the area of managing diversity is growing and as its social landscape – particularly in large urban centres – is being transformed by an increasingly diverse population, official multiculturalism is coming under greater attack than ever before, and its profile and budget are shrinking.

Over this thirty-year history, opponents of multiculturalism have not only seen it as a dangerous waste of money, but also as a threat to Canadian unity since it purportedly fosters old-world hatreds and a generally balkanized society. The perennial public discussion about the desirability of diverse immigration has been given new impetus since the dramatic and tragic events of September 11, as has the notion that the consequences of multiculturalism are not only problematic for Canadians, but also downright dangerous. Advocates of multiculturalism on the other hand, when not completely silenced by the force and solemnity of public debate around diversity in the months since September 11, have continued to believe – if not to argue publicly – that the philosophy of multiculturalism still offers the best long-term approach for Canadians for dealing with the challenges and opportunities posed by pluralistic national and world communities.

Perhaps the fear most often expressed with regard to multiculturalism has been that it will contribute to the fragmentation of a Canadian society that is already precariously divided along regional and linguistic lines. One such critique of multiculturalism that has received considerable press in recent years is *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (1994) by Caribbean-born novelist, Neil Bissoo-

dath. His assertion that critics of multiculturalism have been silenced in Canada is hardly accurate, given both the policy's relatively weak positioning since its inception, and the long history of criticism of the policy – academic, journalistic, and political. However, his argument that multiculturalism tends to separate Canadians from one another, focusing them on their ancestral homelands and their differences, rather than on Canada and their commonalities, struck a resonant chord for many Canadians deeply concerned about the fragmentation of the country in the aftermath of the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord and of the 1995 Quebec Referendum in which the separatist option was defeated by the narrowest of margins.

This uneasiness, combined with the pressures of globalization and of receiving in the past decade the greatest numbers of immigrants in Canadian history, to say nothing of the problems associated with an economic recession in the early 90s (and the economic downturn since September 11) has fostered something of a backlash toward highlighting racial/ethnic/cultural diversity. This feeling has been to some degree both nurtured and expressed through the growth of neo-conservatism, evident in the Reform Party's rise to the status of official opposition. This position has given prominence to the Reform view (now espoused by the Alliance Party) that the multicultural policy should be scrapped in favour of an emphasis on equality of individuals.

Given the social, economic and cultural developments that shaped the 1990s, it is perhaps not surprising that both the short-lived Conservative government of Kim Campbell and the long-standing Liberal government of Jean Chretien reduced the prominence of multiculturalism. For example, in 1993, the federal government eliminated the separate Department of Multiculturalism, making its mandate one of many within the Ministry of Canadian Heritage.

What will be the fate of multiculturalism as we move into the new millennium? Will an ideology born out of the aftermath of the Second World War, with that era's energy and prosperity, its

revulsion to racism in all its forms, its determination to inscribe liberal ideals of social justice into every aspect of life, both public and private, and perhaps in Canada in particular, its faith in the vision of the peaceable kingdom, continue to be relevant in an era seemingly defined by different imperatives?

Some would doubtless argue that the policy of multiculturalism has outlived its usefulness; that is, the goals it articulated in 1971 have, for the most part, been achieved. Ethnic/racial/cultural diversity has not only been accepted and extolled officially in Canada, enshrined in the constitution and in legislation, but also unofficially by a large number of Canadians who readily accept the mosaic symbolism and the rhetoric of diversity as definitive of Canadian identity. The negative attitudes of the pre-Second World War era toward the largely European ethnic "other" in Canada – eastern, central and southern Europeans – have virtually disappeared. That Anglo-Canadians once regarded people of, say, Ukrainian, Italian or Polish background as undesirable is a fading page of history, one that often surprises younger Canadians who may themselves be from a mixed ethno-cultural background and whose education has been shaped by a curriculum based on multicultural ideology.

As well, despite the backlash described above, many Canadians take for granted the growing racial, ethnic and cultural diversity of Canada's population, and are largely supportive of breaking down any barriers that may yet

Even as Canada's international reputation as a pioneer in the area of managing diversity is growing and as its social landscape – particularly in large urban centres – is being transformed by an increasingly diverse population, official multiculturalism is coming under greater attack than ever before, and its profile and budget are shrinking.

exist to the full participation of people of all backgrounds in all aspects of Canadian life.

In this milieu, a policy aimed at supporting what some have called “folkloric multiculturalism” (defined by its emphasis on recognizing the cultural contribution of “other” ethnic groups and promoting tolerance of ethnic diversity) seems patronizing and unnecessary. Others point out that the cultural emphasis of the early years of the policy has long been refocused on issues of equity and human rights. They also note that while negative attitudes toward European ethnicity may no longer be prevalent, racist attitudes continue to have a major impact on the lives of visible minorities. This makes programs aimed at eliminating barriers and educating Canadians for living in an increasingly ethnically and racially diverse society not only necessary, but also urgently so. In short, the debate about multiculturalism, both as ideology and as policy, persists into the twenty-first century, although the demographic and political context out of which it emerged has changed.

The perennial nature of this debate can in part be traced to the ambiguities inherent in multiculturalism, both in theory and in practice. Many of these ambiguities are due to the difficulty of reconciling the competing concepts of dualism and pluralism in Canada. Indeed, this basic conflict and power differential between dualism and pluralism has shaped the multicultural policy throughout its existence. As political scientist Yasmeen Abu-Laban puts it,

“Even when its focus expanded during the 1980s, multiculturalism never challenged state practices that reflected cultural dualism. Thus, for example, the Department of Multiculturalism was patently subordinate, both in funding and stature, to other areas of state activity such as bilingualism. Although allotments vary from year to year, funding for multiculturalism has tended to be between 2 and 8 percent of what is spent on bilingualism. Likewise, the inclusion of multiculturalism in the Charter of Rights was done in the context of also entrenching the status of

French and English as official languages, which, some have argued, also entrenched the superordinate status of French- and British-origin groups in the constitution.”

Another major cause of ambiguity in the policy, which has in turn fueled criticism, has been the problem of its having to respond to a number of different constituencies. These include not only the “two” founding peoples – British and French – and Native peoples who of course also rightly claim the status of founding peoples, but also new immigrant groups, primarily visible minorities, as well as long established groups, who are themselves diverse in terms of such variables as time of arrival in Canada, generation, region of settlement and class. Thus it is difficult for one policy (or one symbolic order) to represent Canada's diversity, especially when the vision espoused by the “founding” groups is based on claims to special status, while the ideology of multiculturalism is based on equality.

Another closely related ambiguity within the discourse of multiculturalism that has fueled debate and sowed confusion centers around the perhaps inescapable dilemma inherent in developing a policy that can at once foster two arguably incompatible processes: the championing of difference on the one hand, and of equality of opportunity and treatment for all groups and individuals on the other. Can a discourse of ‘nation’ successfully call official attention to ethno-cultural difference while at the same time demanding it be ignored? Like the idea captured in the phrase “unity in diversity,” that of extolling both diversity and equality requires an appreciation of paradox that may be in shorter and shorter supply in a globalized world driven by the no-nonsense imperatives of neo-conservatism and a war on terrorism.

Clearly, the notion of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework is not a neat conceptual construct. Some argue that it is simply an unworkable muddle. Multiculturalism reflects a compromise vision of the Canadian social contract, one that when combined with an appropriate and yet-to-be worked-out acknowledgment of the place of Aboriginal peoples arguably

embodies the historical complexity of Canada as well as its social evolution since the Second World War. Multiculturalism as both ideology and policy is to some considerable extent a Canadian invention, one for which Canada has been commended by the United Nations, and other international bodies, who see it as highly useful contribution to an increasingly interdependent world community, and who regard Canada's experience with it as exemplary, if not always perfect.

So, even though official multiculturalism has been under attack in Canada, to some degree since its inception and particularly in recent years, it is nevertheless regarded, both from within and from without, as an enlightened, even necessary approach to managing cultural diversity: a challenge which many societies have failed miserably. Sociologists Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott speak for many when they argue that:

“Multiculturalism, in short, remains the policy of necessity if not of choice for a changing and diverse Canada. As policy or practice, it symbolizes an innovative if imperfect social experiment for managing diversity ... Canada cannot afford not to embrace multiculturalism in its relentless search for political unity, social coherence, economic prosperity, and cultural enrichment.”

If this analysis is relatively accurate, the current downgrading of multiculturalism will likely be just another phase in the policy's history. However, even if the policy itself is jettisoned, it seems unlikely that the ideology of multiculturalism will disappear, or even be seriously challenged. This seems true even in the wake of September 11, given the symbolic power among Canadians of the notion that Canada is a diverse society, a cultural mosaic, and perhaps most important of all, given the remarkable increase since the 1960's in the ethnic and racial diversity of Canadians and the increasingly global nature of human interaction.

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MULTICULTURALISM AS CRITICAL DISCOURSE:

Contesting Modernity

BY Augie Fleras

MULTICULTURALISMS ON PARADE

OF THE CONCEPTUAL TRIP WIRES AND CULTURAL LANDMINES STREWN ACROSS THE WESTERN LANDSCAPE IN RECENT YEARS, FEW HAVE TRIGGERED AS MUCH VITRIOL OR CONTROVERSY AS HAS REFERENCE TO MULTICULTURALISM (POSSNER 1997). NOWHERE IS THIS MORE STRIKING THAN IN THE PARADOXES THAT ARE PLAYING POLITICS WITH THE MODERNIST PROJECT KNOWN AS OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM. INCEPTION OF MULTICULTURALISM AS OFFICIAL POLICY FRAMEWORK MAY HAVE MATERIALISED IN AN ERA OF OPTIMISM AND REFORM WHEN EVERYTHING SEEMED DOABLE WITH A DOLLOP OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING. BUT OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM APPEARS TO BE LOSING ITS LUSTRE BECAUSE OF MOUNTING DISCONTENT AND FISCAL RETREAT (CARDOZO AND MUSTO 1997; MAGSINO 2000). CRITICS POUNCE ON MULTICULTURALISM AS DECEPTIVELY POTENT ("A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING") OR GROSSLY OVER-RATED ("A SHEEP IN WOLF'S CLOTHING"), WHILE SUPPORTERS PREFER TO SEE ITS SOCIETY-BENDING POTENTIAL. NOT SURPRISINGLY, WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN OPTIMISTIC CANADA-BUILDING QUEST HAS ECLIPSED INTO A FLASHPOINT BETWEEN MULTICULTURAL DEVOTEES AND THOSE WHO RECOIL AT THE VERY PROSPECT OF FOISTING YET MORE GOVERNMENT ON AN UNSUSPECTING PUBLIC. EVEN MORE DISMAYING ARE CREEPING LEVELS OF INDIFFERENCE TOWARD OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM – A VICTIM OF IT'S OWN SUCCESS – BECAUSE OF SHIFTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES AND GROWING PUBLIC COMPLACENCY (SUGUNASIRI 1999). WITH OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM EXPERIENCING AN IDENTITY CRISIS OVER "WHAT", "WHY" AND "HOW", THE TIME IS RIPE FOR RETHINKING THIS "ADVENTURE CALLED MULTICULTURALISM" IN LIGHT OF EMERGENT REALITIES AND EVOLVING ALTERNATIVES.

But Canada's monolithic multiculturalism is not the only multicultural game in town. Other multicultural discourses can be discerned that subvert as they resist, rather than control as they conflate, and this essay addresses the possibility of a critical multicultural discourse at the cutting edge for rethinking Canada (Fleras 2002). The essay exposes an official Multiculturalism for what it is: a discourse in defence of ideology. Canada's Multiculturalism originated as a practical political program to achieve pragmatic political goals in a politically acceptable manner (Peter 1978). That it continues to remain "apolitical" is to be alternatively admired yet despised. By contrast, the discursive framework of a critical multiculturalism constitutes a "subversive" discourse that challenges and resists by transforming existing pat-

terns of privilege and power. The essay is organised around an intersectional analysis involving two mutually related yet oppositional discourses for "living together with differences". To one side, a consensus multiculturalism can be best interpreted as a hegemonic discourse; to the other, a critical multiculturalism constitutes a transformational discourse of challenge and resistance. Whereas a modernist multiculturalism secures the foundational principles of the existing constitutional order, a critical discourse proposes a "Canadian Way" so fundamentally different as to re-sculpt the very notion of what Multiculturalism is for.

THE MODERNITY OF OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM: "NEUTERING DIVERSITY"

Official Multiculturalism originated in an era that was unmistakably modernist in spirit and orientation. Inspired by the principled tenets of the Enlightenment, modernism envisaged a nation-state as the pinnacle of rational and progressive human organisation. Prosperous nation-states prescribed to a modernist formula: They sought cultural uniformity, socially integrated in securing a strong sense of national unity

Whereas a modernist multiculturalism secures the foundational principles of the existing constitutional order, a critical discourse proposes a "Canadian Way" so fundamentally different as to re-sculpt the very notion of what Multiculturalism is for.

and identity, and progressive in conferring full and equal rights for all its members. The principles of a universal liberal pluralism prevailed: What we had in common as rights bearing and equality seeking individuals superseded membership in groups that divided or stifled. Differences were permissible, but neither as a basis for entitlement nor if they interfered with full democratic citizenship. In other words, equality was synonymous with uniformity, and vice versa.

Even a superficial reading of official Multiculturalism reveals its modernist

roots. Official Multiculturalism is anchored to a modernist project that (in conjunction with passage of the Official Languages Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) envisages an inclusive Canada beyond the pettiness of 'cultural jealousies' and interethnic squabbles. An aversion toward "deep diversity" underpins modernity: Official Multiculturalism is not about promoting ethnicity or celebrating differences except as "pretend pluralisms". Nor is it about isolating minorities in ethnic enclaves. The objective and logic of an official Multiculturalism is fundamentally about Canada-building: That is, to create a coherent and prosperous Canada by incorporating diversity as legitimate and integral without undermining the interconnectedness of the whole or distinctiveness of the parts in the process. The focus is on absorbing minority women and men into a cohesive national framework instead of bringing about transformative change. The potential disruptiveness of diversity is de-politicised by the simple expedient of "neutering" differences and channelling what's left into harmless outlets. In building bridges rather than erecting walls – by working together rather than standing apart – Canada's monocultural Multiculturalism typifies a kind of assimilation in slow motion – albeit on integrative terms (Kymlicka 2001).

In what surely must seem counter-intuitive to many, Canada's official Multiculturalism is culture-blind in conviction and commitment (Fleras and Elliott 2002). It is culture blind insofar as it rejects the legitimacy of any official culture as grounds for living together with differences. Its colour-blindness is premised on the principle of treating everyone the same for purposes of entitlement. A colour-blind multiculturalism is geared toward creating culturally neutral public spaces to preclude messy ethnic entanglements. Under a culture-blind Multiculturalism, minority women and men have the right to *identify* with (not necessarily practice) the cultural traditions of their choice, *provided* these affiliations do not violate the laws of the land, interfere with the rights of others, or pose a threat to core values and institutions. Diversity is endorsed, to be sure, but only to the extent that all differences are equiv-

alent in status, subject to similar treatment, and comply with the state's self-proclaimed right to define what differences count, what counts as difference. Differences are further de-politicized ("neutered") by channelling diversity into relatively harmless avenues around identity or culture. The neutering of diversity may have sullied Multiculturalism's reputation as a progressive force in the diversity sweepstakes. But this contemporary twist on the politics of divide and rule may account for its popularity in Canada and abroad.

This conflating of monocultural multiculturalism with modernist discourses is not intended as a blanket criticism. Nor do I want to get entangled in yet another puerile polemic over the prowess or toothlessness of official Multiculturalism. To the contrary, Multicultural outputs are unmistakably dialectical in process or impact. An official Multiculturalism is neither all good nor all bad but good or bad depending on the context or criteria. More importantly, multiculturalism is simultaneously both good *and* bad in spite of the context. An official Multiculturalism can be empowering yet controlling as part of the same process, liberating yet marginalizing, unifying yet divisive, inclusive yet exclusive (Vasta 1993). Multiculturalism may provide minorities with leverage in prying open opportunities – thus enabling the powerless and dispossessed to convert the very tools for controlling them into levers of resistance (Pearson 1994). Yet, paradoxically, inclusiveness along Multicultural lines may have the controlling effect of implicating minority women and men in the dominant culture; after all, measures to improve access or participation often reverberate with assimilationist consequences. Resistance itself may prove self-defeating because of the unintended yet real effects of being co-opted into the very system minorities are challenging.

The conclusion seems inescapable: An official Multiculturalism provides a blueprint for living together with differences by ensuring diversity doesn't get in the way of togethered living. The focus of an official Multiculturalism is not about diversity but about disadvantage and the removal of those discriminatory barriers that deny or exclude. To the extent that cultural differences are acknowledged and

promoted, the commitment is largely cosmetic and geared toward shared exchanges and open-mindedness. In other words, multiculturalism is more concerned with redefining society along culture-blind lines than with exhorting minorities to become more multicultural. Such a culture blind multiculturalism with its nod to "pretend pluralism" may have worked in the past when diversity was synonymous with denial or exclusion. For those who want their differences to be taken seriously – and are looking for an inclusion without integration – a culture blind multiculturalism doesn't cut it. What is required instead is a critically-focused multiculturalism for constructively engaging diversity.

CRITICAL MULTICULTURALISM AS POSTMODERNIST DISCOURSE: "LIVING TOGETHER SEPARATELY"

A critical multicultural discourse provides such an alternative. As a transformative discourse for challenge and resistance, a critical multicultural discourse goes beyond the dominant ideology by contesting those constitutional principles underlying a eurocentric foundational order. This critical discourse is predicated on the premise that cultural institutions are fundamentally racist in privileging eurocentric values at minority expense. Under a critical discourse, there is an interrogating of the patterns of power that once secured mainstream definitions of truth, rules of normalcy, and standards of legitimacy, but often at odds with minority lives and life-chances. A transformative discourse of resistance not only unmasks the supposed neutrality of mainstream society but also exposes its inseparability from unequal power relations. A systemic eurocentrism is vigorously rebuked for cramming diversity into single paradigm, positing Europe as the epi-centre of evolutionary progress, and sanitising the record on western exploitation and human rights abuses. In that this eurocentric arrogance is sharply repudiated because of its penchant for flattening diversity while normalising mainstream norms as necessary and superior, a critical multicultural discourses is indeed subversive (Stam & Miller 2000).

Multiculturalism as critical discourse resonates with the language of postmodernism (Goldberg 1994). Postmodernism

espouses a mind-dependent world: There is no centre or authority, only different viewpoints in which everything is relative and valid because nothing is absolutely knowable in a world where everything/everyone is located in time and space. Postmodernism rejects those discourses that posit reality as coherent, objective, and amenable to rational analysis – on the grounds there is no such thing as reality, only discourses about realities. A similar line of reasoning applies to postmodernist perspectives on society. A fixed and objective way of thinking about society as a “grand narrative” is rejected, as is the principle of organising (or “essentialising”) society around a monolithic core of symbols that secure a common identity and national unity. Endorsed instead is a loosely connected social system composed of intersecting affiliations and hybridic forms that coalesce into a common vision for living together.

To date, critical multiculturalisms have generated more interest and publicity in the United States where challenging the “dominant silencing of diversity” (Eisenstein 1996) draws its energy from a postmodern turn in society (Goldberg 1994). Unlike its official counterpart in Canada, critical multiculturalisms are free to roam, unhampered as they are by the compromising demands of political engineering, policy constraints, or electoral pandering. Not surprisingly, the postmodernist discourses that animate America’s critical multiculturalism subvert as they resist, in contrast with Canada’s consensus multiculturalism that controls as it integrates. A consensus multiculturalism connotes a pluralism that is devoid of historical context and specificities of power relations. By contrast, a critical multiculturalism signifies a site of struggle in which eurocentric universalisms are exposed for self-serving discourses that they are.

Critical multicultural discourses are making their mark in Canada. Not in the carping sense of multiculturalism as divisive, counterproductive, illusory, and hegemonic (Fleras 2002). Nor in the critiquing of multiculturalism as a trumped-up ideology involving national myths that papers over the cleavages related to power and privilege while normalising the interests of the ruling class as natural, universal, or superior (Povinelli 1998; Kobayashi

1999; Bannerji 2000). A critical multiculturalism goes beyond criticism by invoking an insurgent discourse that challenges authority, resists conformity, and transforms power relations. Critical discourses are aimed at unmasking those foundational principles that continue to govern Canada’s staunchly colonial constitutional order. Differences are taken seriously as basis for identity under a critical discourse, in direct opposition to those liberal principles that universalise and homogenise. Those expressions of pretend pluralism that simply tolerate a hierarchy of minority cultures are ruthlessly exposed as hegemony (Bharucha 2000). Difference are also taken into account in defining entitlements with respect to who gets what. Principles of institutional inclusiveness are proposed in establishing culturally safe workplaces and services that do not pose risks to culturally diverse recipients (Fleras and Spoonley 1999).

DUELLING DISCOURSES: “THIS ADVENTURE CALLED CANADA”


Many have said that Canadians and Americans often use the same words but speak a different language. This “fractured howler” is especially applicable when applied to divergent multicultural discourses both in Canada and the United States. Consider the polarities at play: One set of multicultural discourses is rooted in the modernist zeal for unity, certainty, and universality; the other embraces a postmodernist zest for hybridity, provisionality, and fragmentation. One is about society-building; the other is society-transforming. One multiculturalism is directed at modifying the mainstream without shredding the social fabric; the other is driven to empowering minorities by eroding the monocultural firmament that privileges some, disempowers other. One transforms cultural differences into a discourse about social inequality; the other reformulates social inequalities into a discursive framework of an inclusive public culture. One is about a pretend pluralism that “neuters” diversity of its political sting; the other is about taking differences seriously and into account. One preaches the goals of working together by building bridges; the other contemplates the possibilities of belonging together by standing apart.

A ‘playful’ inversion is called for in capturing the underlying logic of these duelling discourses: To one side is a consensus multicultural discourse whose society-building mandate is to make Canada safe *from* diversity, safe *for* diversity. To the other side is a critical multiculturalism discourse whose animating logic is to make DIVERSITY safe *from* Canada as well as safe *for* Canada. Time will tell if Canadians can combine the complexities of a critical multiculturalism with the commitments of an official Multiculturalism in making Canada safe from itself.

Canada’s future as a pacesetter in the multicultural sweepstakes will entail a mixed package of bold advances alongside carefully calibrated compromises. Fostering a “multicultural imagination” will be critical in sorting out this challenge: On the one hand, a high threshold for ambiguity and uncertainty; on the other a willingness to accommodate different ways of accommodating diversity in a deeply divided and multi-layered Canada (Fleras 2002). Political frameworks will have to expand beyond the standardised one-size-fits-all model to incorporate an inclusive yet customised pattern of democratic citizenship. And policy structures will need to contemplate the possibility of doing the impossible: The challenge of living together is perplexing enough when everyone abides by the multicultural principle of agreeing to disagree. Co-existence can get a lot more nasty when living together also involves those who disagree with the principle of agreeing to disagree (see Fish 1997).

Construction of a post-national Canadian Way is the new ideal. But post-nationalising demands are astonishingly complex, even contradictory to the point of paralysis, and any resolution will require a deft touch. The challenge may well lie not in choosing either consensus or critical multicultural discourses, but in playing off one against the other without ignoring either. In that a living together with differences may entail a “living together separately”, this adventure called Canada has only begun.

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ENTREVUE AVEC Gérard Bouchard

GÉRARD BOUCHARD, PROFESSEUR DÉPARTEMENT DES SCIENCES HUMAINES, UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À CHICOUTIMI, EST AUTEUR, CO-AUTEUR OU CO-DIRECTEUR DE 24 OUVRAGES ET DE PLUS DE 200 ARTICLES DANS DES REVUES SCIENTIFIQUES. IL A AUSSI PRONONCÉ QUELQUES CENTAINES DE CONFÉRENCES ET COMMUNICATIONS SCIENTIFIQUES, AU QUÉBEC, AU CANADA ET À L'ÉTRANGER. SON PLUS RÉCENT OUVRAGE GENÈSE DES NATIONS ET CULTURES DU NOUVEAU MONDE : ESSAI D'HISTOIRE COMPARÉE DE BORÉAL (2000) A REÇU LE PRIX DU GOUVERNEUR-GÉNÉRAL DU CANADA.

CITC Selon vous, l'appui du gouvernement fédéral pour le patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens aide-t-il à lever les barrières qui nuisent à une participation pleine et équitable dans la société canadienne?

GB C'est une question d'équilibre. Cette politique est utile assurément pour aménager un environnement plus accueillant aux groupes ethniques qui ne sont pas d'ascendance britannique (je me réfère ici au Canada anglais, bien que la situation au Québec est analogue). D'un autre côté, il est bien connu que les politiques multiculturelles peuvent aussi enfermer en quelque sorte les individus dans des appartenances qui deviennent des ghettos. Le multiculturalisme a suscité, surtout au Canada anglais, des protestations contradictoires, en rapport avec ces deux plans. Il y a de toute évidence une dynamique délicate à mettre en place, mais c'est le genre d'antinomie qui ne trouvera jamais sa solution, seulement des compromis acceptables, toujours mouvants, toujours à renégocier. C'est le propre de la démocratie.

CITC L'approche du multiculturalisme au Canada est-elle une menace à la langue française?

GB Parlons d'abord de la situation hors du Québec. En principe, en vertu de sa définition même, le multiculturalisme devrait assurer au français une sécurité à long terme. Il en va de même avec la politique du bilinguisme. En pratique toutefois, le français ne cesse de décliner dans l'ensemble du Canada anglais. Il doit bien y avoir quelque chose qui cloche. On en

vient à douter de l'efficacité et de l'emprise réelle des politiques officielles. Concernant le bilinguisme par exemple, on observe que le pourcentage de Canadiens anglais bilingues (français-anglais) était de 5% en 1971 et de 8% seulement en 1996.

En ce qui concerne le Québec, je crois que le problème posé par la politique du multiculturalisme est bien connu. Le multiculturalisme y crée une situation incohérente dans la mesure où il fait concurrence à la politique québécoise du français langue officielle. Les immigrants sont donc incités à s'angliciser plutôt que de s'intégrer à la francophonie québécoise. Il existe deux systèmes concurrents en matière de langue d'accueil. En conséquence, du point de vue de la francophonie québécoise, qui se trouve déjà soumise à une énorme pression dans le contexte nord-américain, le multiculturalisme canadien représente effectivement un facteur négatif pour l'avenir à long terme de la langue française.

CITC Quelles sont les forces et faiblesses de l'approche canadienne?

GB Encore une fois, il est nécessaire de distinguer entre la situation du Canada anglais et celle du Québec. Dans le premier cas, je n'hésite pas à louer la politique fédérale du multiculturalisme dont le bilan me paraît largement positif. Je crois que c'est une expérience de diversification culturelle réussie, comme cela s'est produit également en Australie. Dans ces deux pays, la culture dominante (de souche britannique) a été depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale soumise à une immigration massive de plus en plus hétérogène. On aurait pu craindre un éclatement de ces deux sociétés, d'import-

antes manifestations de pathologies sociales, de nombreux conflits, désordres, etc. Cela ne s'est pas produit. Au contraire, cette immense vague migratoire a été absorbée de manière plutôt harmonieuse dans l'ensemble, au prix de remaniements identitaires substantiels. Je n'ignore pas qu'en pratique, il y a eu bien des frictions qui ont été occultées par le discours officiel, mais encore une fois, le bilan général me semble positif. Ceci pour le Canada anglais.

En ce qui concerne le Québec, on peut dresser exactement le même bilan. Là aussi, avec toutes les nuances qu'il conviendrait d'apporter, on peut parler également d'une réussite dans l'ensemble. Mais cette expérience demeure méconnue parce qu'elle a reçu très peu de publicité. Dans ce cas, l'intégration des immigrants s'est faite par le biais d'un autre modèle, celui de l'interculturalisme, et dans le cadre de la loi 101. En gros, le modèle québécois privilégie une langue officielle, qui est le français, assorti d'un multilinguisme au plan individuel. Il est également reconnu que le français y est promu comme langue de citoyenneté ouverte au pluralisme ethnique. Une langue à plusieurs voix, si l'on veut. Je dirais même que l'expérience québécoise est plus remarquable encore que la canadienne-anglaise dans la mesure où au Québec, durant les 20 ou 30 dernières années, près de 90% des immigrants non francophones se sont établis dans la métropole montréalaise. Cette région a donc été soumise à un apport migratoire extrêmement intense, davantage sans doute que la plupart des grandes villes du Canada anglais.

Tout cela a pu être réalisé au Québec malgré les effets déstabilisateurs induit

par le multiculturalisme canadien. En résumé, je dirais que le multiculturalisme, comme politique fédérale, a été une réussite au Canada anglais mais qu'il a raté son test québécois.

CITC *En quoi la gestion de la diversité au Québec diffère-t-elle de l'approche en vigueur au Canada? Qu'ont-elles en commun?*

GB Je crois que les deux approches étaient beaucoup plus différenciées dans le passé qu'elles ne le sont maintenant. Il y a 20 ou 25 ans, la politique canadienne insistait encore sur la promotion ou le développement de la diversité, alors qu'au Québec on se montrait plus soucieux de la protection de la langue et de la culture francophone. Depuis, les deux démarches ont évolué dans le sens d'une convergence. La politique canadienne est devenue plus préoccupée de cohésion, d'intégration, d'identité, de mémoire, pendant que la politique québécoise se montrait de plus en plus ouverte à la diversité ethnique ou culturelle. En somme, suivant des voies et selon des formules différentes, les deux approches attestent maintenant d'importants points de similitude et elles ont d'ailleurs produit des résultats assez semblables, comme le montre encore une fois l'exemple de la région montréalaise (je ne parle pas des autres régions du Québec, qui sont très homogènes et où la question de la diversité ne se pose pas dans les mêmes termes).

CITC *Êtes-vous d'accord avec la notion généralement partagée que le Canada a évolué pour former une mosaïque tandis que les États-Unis ont évolué pour former un melting pot?*

GB Même en faisant de nombreuses réserves, il n'en demeure pas moins que le concept de mosaïque reflète assez bien l'évolution du côté canadien depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Quant à savoir si les États-Unis se sont véritablement constitués en melting pot, c'est moins évident. À partir des années 1960, par exemple, plusieurs enquêtes d'historiens, de sociologues, d'anthropologues ont démontré qu'un important héritage pluriethnique avait survécu. On a aussi observé une reprise de conscience parmi ces descendants d'immigrants qui se sont tout à coup remis à la recherche de leur histoire, de leur racine, de leur identité. Un mouvement semblable s'est manifesté parmi les Noirs et, bien sûr, parmi les

immigrants latino-américains. Finalement, il y a toute une dynamique multiculturelle qui s'est déployée aux États-Unis durant les dernières décennies et qui prend de plus en plus de force. On le voit très clairement dans les controverses autour de la construction ou de la reconstruction de la mémoire.

Je dirais à tout prendre que la différence entre le Canada et les États-Unis est beaucoup plus nette, beaucoup plus marquée au plan des discours officiels que dans la réalité.

CITC *D'après votre expérience, comment la communauté internationale perçoit-elle l'approche canadienne à la diversité en rapport avec les questions d'immigration et de citoyenneté?*

GB Tous les signes montrent que cette perception est très positive. C'est même devenu l'image de marque du Canada à l'étranger: le respect des différences, la tolérance, la culture de l'égalité des droits, l'esprit de la charte de 1982, tout cela venant en conjonction avec une politique extérieure ou étrangère qui fait une large place à une orientation pacifiste. Je pense que c'est un succès qui s'accorde en grande partie avec la réalité; après tout le Canada vient toujours aux premiers rangs des pays considérés comme étant les plus décents et parmi les destinations les plus convoitées chez les immigrants.

Cela dit, une stratégie diplomatique habile et efficace n'est pas étrangère non plus à ce succès. Par exemple, l'opinion internationale entend peu parler du problème québécois. Je crois que si toutes les données en étaient bien connues, la réputation de tolérance et d'ouverture que s'est méritée le Canada s'en trouverait assez relativisée.

CITC *Croyez-vous que la promotion du multiculturalisme rehausse la valeur de la citoyenneté?*

GB En théorie, ces deux notions relèvent de deux ordres différents. Si on s'en remet à une définition stricte de la citoyenneté, elle tient dans le rapport juridique que l'individu entretient avec l'État. Dans les sociétés démocratiques modernes, ce rapport est gouverné par des règles qui se veulent universelles. Elles constituent un dénominateur commun en même temps que le principal fondement de la société. C'est surtout au plan sociologique, celui de l'insertion sociale, économique et culturelle de l'individu-

citoyen, que le multiculturalisme intervient principalement. Certes, on voit bien que ces deux ordres de réalité ne sont pas sans relation ou interaction, mais il me semble important de préserver leur spécificité, je dirais même leur étanchéité. En principe, il est bon que les droits fondamentaux relevant de la citoyenneté restent imperméables aux atteintes des particularismes. Mais il est bien entendu que cet énoncé n'a qu'une portée générale et toutes sortes d'impératifs ad hoc appellent des exceptions.

CITC *Quels sont, aujourd'hui, les obstacles importants au respect et à la compréhension inter-culturelle?*

GB Le principal obstacle réside dans la distance socioculturelle qui se creuse entre les groupes ou communautés ethniques. Cette distance se traduit ordi-

Je dirais que le multiculturalisme, comme politique fédérale, a été une réussite au Canada anglais mais qu'il a raté son test québécois.

nairement par une méconnaissance réciproque, la formation de fausses perceptions, de stéréotypes négatifs, d'où émerge tôt ou tard un rapport qui se durcit et dans lequel s'enracinent les comportements racistes. Un excès de multiculturalisme accentue évidemment ce genre de distance. On peut remédier à cela par des mesures favorisant ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'intercommunautarisme. Mais jusqu'ici, il semble que les essais réalisés dans cette direction se sont avérés peu efficaces.

Il faut ajouter aussi que cette distance que j'évoquais à l'instant est souvent créée par des inégalités économiques que perpétue la société elle-même. On est donc en présence d'un effet systémique. Il s'agit bien d'une mosaïque mais cette fois, c'est la mosaïque verticale de John A. Porter, celle des clivages et des privilèges constitués dans une structure de classes, et non plus la mosaïque horizontale, celle de la tolérance et de l'ouverture que le multiculturalisme veut promouvoir.

CITC *Historiquement, comment les Québécois ont-ils perçu les tentatives du Canada de promouvoir une politique multiculturelle?*

GB Si on remonte à l'époque du premier ministre Trudeau, l'introduction de la politique multiculturelle a été perçue comme une tentative destinée à réduire le poids collectif ou politique des Francophones dans l'ensemble du Canada et tout particulièrement au Québec. Il est bien connu qu'une motivation importante chez Pierre Elliott Trudeau fut de briser la vision dualiste du Canada, une vision pourtant enracinée dans son histoire très ancienne. Après bien des aléas au cours des deux siècles précédents, on peut dire que les années 1960 étaient venues bien près d'officialiser d'une façon définitive cette conception dualiste traduite dans l'idée des deux peuples fondateurs. On se rappellera qu'à cette époque, l'idée prenait peu à peu la forme d'un consensus. Parrainée par le premier ministre du temps, Lester B. Pearson, elle avait également recueilli l'adhésion du Parti conservateur et du Nouveau Parti Démocratique. Cependant, dès en arrivant au pouvoir, le premier ministre Trudeau s'est empressé de casser cette dynamique politique. Je ne suis par certain que tout le monde a bien mesuré l'importance des effets à long terme de ce revirement. S'il n'avait pas eu lieu, le Canada serait aujourd'hui un pays très différent, beaucoup plus tolérant, plus uni, plus dynamique. L'action radicale du premier ministre Trudeau a fortement contribué à l'essor du Parti québécois et du projet souverainiste au Québec. Elle a aussi été à l'origine d'une profonde division au sein du Canada actuel. Finalement, la dualité a survécu, s'est accentuée même, mais dans son versant conflictuel plutôt que complémentaire. Cet héritage-là appartient aussi à Pierre Elliott Trudeau; on ne devrait pas l'oublier.

CITC *Les manuels d'histoire devraient-ils aller plus loin dans l'exploration des contributions des minorités ethniques à la société et aux épisodes se rapportant au racisme et à l'antisémitisme?*

GB Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait de réponse globale à cette question. Le Canada est un pays très diversifié non seulement par sa composition ethnique mais aussi à cause de son histoire (par exemple, la dualité anglophone-francophone que j'évoquais à l'instant); il est diversifié également en terme de provinces, de régions, et le reste. Je dirais cependant que des pas importants ont été faits dans le sens d'une

«contribution history» et aussi dans la reconnaissance de certains épisodes très sombres qui appartiennent au passé canadien. Je pense aussi qu'on pourrait faire plus, notamment sur la question de l'antisémitisme ou le traitement des Noirs, et surtout pour tout ce qui concerne les Autochtones.

La politique d'immigration raciste pratiquée jusque dans les années 1940 commence à être mieux connue (certains historiens parlent à ce sujet d'une «White Canada Policy», faisant écho à la notoire «White Australia Policy»). Enfin, on me permettra de signaler que la façon dont les Canadiens français ont été parfois traités (pensons au conflit des droits scolaires dans diverses provinces entre 1870 et 1920) ne reçoit pas toujours l'attention qu'elle mériterait.

CITC *Pensez-vous que cela devrait être une priorité gouvernementale de tenter des rapprochements avec les minorités? Est-ce le cas au Québec? Au Canada?*

GB Oui je le pense, afin d'assurer une meilleure intégration collective. Mais une intégration d'une nouvelle manière, conçue dans un esprit renouvelé que j'appelle la «co-intégration». Cela consisterait à aménager deux plans ou deux dynamiques d'intégration à l'intention des groupes ethniques ou des immigrants récents. D'abord, une insertion au plan individuel pour ceux et celles qui veulent opérer une réaffiliation en se joignant à la culture dominante. Ensuite, une intégration de type collectif qui s'adresse aux groupes ethniques eux-mêmes, désireux de se perpétuer comme communauté au sein de la société canadienne. À l'échelle macrosociale, il en résulterait un haut degré de différenciation et de flexibilité mais aussi d'instabilité, un équilibre provisoire reposant sur des articulations variables, toujours à renégocier.

Autrement dit, l'intégration peut se faire soit directement, à la société d'accueil, à la culture dominante, soit indirectement, par procuration et délégation, en quelque sorte, dans l'interaction des groupes ethniques. Ceux-ci deviennent alors des vecteurs ou des médiateurs privilégiés entre l'individu et la nation. Je dis qu'il y a là co-intégration dans la mesure où s'institue un rapport ou une dynamique telle que les groupes ethniques et la nation se consolident ou se structurent simultanément, je dirais

même réciproquement, les uns grâce à l'autre.

CITC *Quels devraient être les principaux objectifs d'une politique d'inclusivité?*

GB Une politique d'inclusivité devrait être construite à partir d'un objectif général d'égalitarisme. Je le décomposerais en trois directions principales:

- a) La promotion des droits;
- b) L'aménagement de conditions d'insertion équitables au plan économique et social;
- c) Un programme d'actions intercommunautaires destiné à défaire les stéréotypes qui sont à la base des comportements xénophobes, ethnistes, racistes.

Je signale que ces trois directions constituent en même temps la politique d'intégration et de cohésion collective la plus sûre et la plus efficace qui soit.

CITC *Quels seront les défis les plus importants que nous rencontreront alors que la société dans laquelle nous vivons se diversifie de plus en plus?*

GB Au fond, les thèmes que je viens d'aborder renvoient tous à une politique d'intégration de la nation, à même ses diverses composantes. Votre question conduit à aborder le problème de l'intégration à une tout autre échelle, celle de la mondialisation. En effet, elle remet en question le fondement socioculturel de l'État-Nation. L'économie ainsi que la culture se mondialisent, si bien que la pertinence symbolique, identitaire de l'État-Nation s'étirole. On le voit bien avec la crise de la mémoire nationale. Comment refonder sa légitimité et même sa possibilité dans une société qui, à cause de sa diversité culturelle, se replie sur l'ordre civique, sur une culture des droits individuels? Dans un tel contexte de pluralisme, comment préserver le principe d'une mémoire unique, étroitement intégrée, suivant un fil conducteur pouvant rallier au plan symbolique des appartenances très différenciées? Presque tous les particularismes nationaux sont directement mis en cause par la mondialisation. Le problème qui est posé ici, c'est celui de l'insertion de l'État-Nation dans le monde. Personnellement, je crois qu'il est trop tôt pour risquer un pronostic ou suggérer une véritable solution; comme scientifique, j'éprouve surtout pour le moment le besoin d'observer et de comprendre les mutations en cours.

REDEFINING THE CANADIAN DEMOS:

Towards a Trans-Cultural Citizenship Charter

By Joanna Anneke Rummens

THIRTY YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE CANADA'S MULTICULTURAL POLICY WAS FIRST ARTICULATED AND PRESENTED IN OUR PARLIAMENT AS A MODEL FOR THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT ETHNIC COMMUNITIES. ITS IMPETUS LAY IN THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL MINORITIES TO THE MANDATE OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM SET UP IN 1963 IN RESPONSE TO THE GROWING ASSERTIVENESS OF FRENCH-CANADIAN POLITICAL NATIONALISM. REACTING AGAINST A BILINGUAL, BICULTURAL POLICY THEY FOUND OFFENSIVE TO NON-CHARTER ETHNIC GROUPS AND WHICH THEY FEARED WOULD RELEGATE THEM TO THE STATUS OF SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS, AND INSPIRED BY THE LEGITIMACY GIVEN THE CULTURAL CLAIMS OF FRENCH-CANADIANS, ORGANIZED SEGMENTS OF OTHER ETHNO-CULTURAL GROUPS – THE ALLEGED THIRD FORCE – DEMANDED EQUAL TREATMENT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONDED ON OCTOBER 8, 1971, BY OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCING A POLICY OF *MULTICULTURALISM WITHIN A BILINGUAL* FRAMEWORK. ITS TWOFOLD GOALS WOULD BE TO BREAK-DOWN DISCRIMINATORY ATTITUDES AND CULTURAL JEALOUSIES AND THEREBY FOSTER UNITY AMONG CANADIANS OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL ORIGINS. THE PROPOSED MECHANISM – AND UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION – WAS THAT GREATER SELF-ESTEEM REGARDING ONE'S OWN CULTURE WOULD LEAD TO A GREATER TOLERANCE OF THAT OF OTHERS. BOTH THE INITIAL POLICY STATEMENT AND LATER ACT ARTICULATED A VISION OF INCLUSION AND INCORPORATION INTO CANADIAN SOCIETY BY ALL ON AN EQUAL BASIS, AND SOUGHT TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF A SOCIETY "BASED ON FAIR PLAY FOR ALL."



That Canada has always been linguistically and culturally heterogeneous throughout its relatively short history is well established. Our country's plurality of distinct, often unique, cultures is a social reality to which each successive wave of newcomers has had in turn to adapt. Multiculturalism in Canada thus exists first and foremost as a demonstrable **fact**. Multiculturalism is, however, also clearly an **ideology** comprised of shared assumptions and normative statements about what "ought" to govern our social interaction and discourse. It rests on the primary assumptions that individuals from culturally diverse groupings within Canada actually see themselves as different and that they collectively wish to remain so for instrumental or expressive purposes. As official ideology it also asserts that no one culture is inherently better than another and that all should be celebrated equally. In envisioning a culturally plural society guided by principles of freedom, equality, tolerance and respect for individual differences, it furthermore prescribes a preferred course of action. The belief that Canada's socio-cultural pluralism must be actively managed to derive maximum benefit is evident in the articulation of Multiculturalism as state **policy**, as well as its subsequent implementation in the form of various **programme** initiatives. It thus emerges as a prescription for interethnic harmony in complex, culturally diverse societies.

Over the course of these past three decades, Multiculturalism policy and programmatic initiatives have largely realized the transition from expected assimilation to a celebration of diversity, and from cultural pluralism viewed as problem to an incipient awareness of its potential as an important resource. What began as an initial laissez-faire approach has turned into increased government regulation of

identity, commonality and pluralism. Increasingly the emphasis has also shifted from a focus on culture per se to increased concerns regarding institutional and organizational structures. These trends have been driven in large part by changing population demographics that have translated into important power shifts among groups. As such the management of Canada's pluralism has been informed by identity politics: identity construction or negoti-

ation on the part of social actors, and the politics of recognition at both the public and official level. In response the official management of Canada's diversity has seen a sequential shift from concerns about language and culture, to an increased awareness of racial and religious differences, particularly in the years preceding the establishment of the Multiculturalism Act itself. The current discourse focuses on identity, civic participation and social justice, as well as on the exploration of other dimensions of diversity such as age, gender, dis/ability and sexual orientation. Throughout these transformations the biggest apparent challenge has been the conceptualization and articulation of a Canadian national identity.

Official recognition of Canada's linguistic, cultural, racial and religious diversity has been invaluable. By establishing that Canada's non-charter ethno-cultural groups are not a transitory phenomenon nor simply "overflow" cultures, Multiculturalism has transformed formerly excluded individuals and groups into important stakeholders. It also underwrites the continuing role of ethnic communities in the resettlement and social integration of newcomer immigrants and refugees, thereby supporting a liberal immigration policy that has one of the highest intakes in the

world. As such it both reflects and supports the growing demographic complexity of our country. More importantly, the commitment to peaceful co-existence based on tolerance first articulated in the initial 1971 Multicultural Policy Statement gave rise to a series of subsequent human rights challenges that directly informed the formulation of the 1988 *Multiculturalism Act* and of the 1992 *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* itself.



Courtesy Department of Canadian Heritage

Both the policy and its programmatic implementations have nevertheless been critiqued for promoting an essentialist, flash-frozen notion of culture that emphasizes the celebration of ancestral origin and traditions over truly lived cultural lifeways. This limited view of culture as a preserved phenomenon has led some to claim that the policy's expressed interest in ethnicity is largely symbolic. Others go one step further to argue that official Multiculturalism values the superficial while forcing new immigrants to conform to the exotic image that the dominant society imposes on them; others, that it promotes differences but is unable to handle them because it is unwilling to accept any true social, economic or political equality among Canada's diverse population groups. The policy's implied and continued emphasis on "the ethnics" is also seen as limited: Canada's culturally diverse aboriginal First Nations peoples become entirely invisible while the often

dueling socio-cultural and politico-economic hegemonies of Canada's founding charter groups disappear behind simple linguistic difference. Finally, whether through intent or latent function, the directional focusing of individuals' identifications and involvement towards the activities, interests and concerns of their respective ethno-cultural communities is sometimes felt to both exacerbate separation between various cultural communities and discourage

greater participation in the wider Canadian public arena, thereby further undermining the policy's expressed unity goal.

Canada's Multiculturalism policy encourages strong identification of Canadians with their ancestral ethnic group origins while at the same time encouraging private, individual *choice of identity*. At the same time the policy

also encourages identification with Canada and Canadian citizenship, both vital to Canadian *unity*. This apparent contradiction gives rise to a number of important questions:

First, is multi-culturalism – understood as socio-cultural pluralism as opposed to political pluralism – compatible with either patriotism or *national unity*? While Canada's Multicultural Policy sees no incompatibility between the maintenance of ethno-cultural traditions and its expressed goals of social cohesion and unity, the actual mechanism by which to achieve a hither-to elusive sense of national unity seems not yet to have been worked out in full.

Second, where and how does *national identity* fit in? Given the policy's identity trajectory from language, culture, race and religion to current considerations of their intersections with other identity markers, how exactly do we move from our rather

complex accommodation of diversity to the construction of a shared sense of national identity?

Third, can a policy promoting “cultural diversity within political unity” continue to serve as the foundation of a post-modern nation state? The assumption underlying multicultural ideology is that it can; Canada’s thirty-year experiment would also appear to support this claim. The question however takes on special urgency in a new world order characterized by increased economic interdependence, geographical mobility and information flow.

In brief, how might we best resolve issues of national unity and identity in an evolving supra-national context of globalization, transnationalism, and technological transformation?

The management of Canada’s diversity remains a challenging balancing act between uniformity and heterogeneity, individual rights and collective rights, symmetry and asymmetry (Jenson and Papillon 2001). The emphasis to-date has been on diversity, understood as heterogeneity; the apparent challenge is now unity, often erroneously equated with uniformity. While our commitment to equality suggests a need for symmetry, our commitment to “fair play” often leaves us grappling with asymmetrical solutions. Similarly the policy’s explicit focus on individual rights presents the matter of collective rights as seemingly problematic. Throughout this exercise in social integration our primary focus has been on examining the various ways in which Canadians differ from each other in an effort to best accommodate the most salient distinctions in the interest of social harmony. What we have not yet figured out however, is how to make everyone different in the same kind of way, or the same in a different kind of way.

The attempt to achieve “unity in diversity” has been stymied by two erroneous assumptions. The first is that while accommodation of pluralism may be useful in maintaining social cohesion, uniformity – defined as “sameness” – is required to ensure a truly meaningful sense of national unity. This assumed inherent tension between unity and diversity arises out of a faulty equation:

homogeneity or uniformity (=unity) versus heterogeneity (=diversity). The reasoning is as follows: given that uniformity does not equal heterogeneity (they are in fact polar opposites on a continuum); since heterogeneity is synonymous with diversity, and diversity is not the same thing as unity, uniformity must equal unity, an illogical conclusion reached entirely by default. A second stumbling block is the common assumption that primary cultural and national identifications must necessarily overlap. They are instead based on quite different identity criteria that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the former deals with shared history, values, traditions and lifeways usually supported and transferred through language, the latter with geographically bound, largely autonomous, self-governing political entities. The assumption only holds true if one remains firmly committed to the notion of a nation state predicated on the belief in “one culture, one autonomous self-governing entity”; it otherwise readily collapses.

At issue is, do we really need to share a shared Canadian culture in order to have a common civic identity as Canadians? The answer is no. Civil societies do not need to be bound by a *complete* set of common values, traditions and shared history. What they do need is individual allegiance and active commitment to the continued development of a shared politico-economic community guided by shared core values and principles. This in turn then forms the basis of a national identity firmly rooted in participatory citizenship. The solution is to simply decouple culture and nation, and to redefine nation in terms of citizenship. Shared commonality of citizenship then becomes the basis for national unity and ultimately – with time – national identity.

The true mediation between unity and diversity is commonality, not sameness. In the state’s regulation of identity, commonality and pluralism, it is our *commonality* that has received short shrift. What we are now left grappling with is what defines, supports and guides us as a unique social, political and economic entity. While the current

renewed diversity discourse represents both a healthy and logical extension of multi-culturalism per se in its exploration of the various intersections of language, culture, race and religion with age, gender, class, dis/ability and sexual orientation, it is important to balance an official recognition of differences with a consideration of what we in fact have in common. While it remains both constructive and morally imperative to continue to accommodate difference in the interests of social integration, cohesion and justice, eventually we will need to venture beyond our various definitions of ‘the Other’ to also focus on our common commitment and sense of belonging. In short, we need to move from a sometimes myopic preoccupation with the numerous ways in which we are all different to an examination of what we have in common as the foundation for our shared citizenship.

The time has come to draft a **Citizenship Charter** that both embraces and transcends our linguistic, cultural, “racial,” and religious differences. Such a Charter would articulate our society’s overarching core values and locate the *responsibilities* of common citizenship in our active commitment to them. This would move us beyond the definition of our rights and freedoms outlined in the existing Citizenship and Multiculturalism Acts and Charter of Rights and Freedoms in terms that are meaningful in today’s globalizing, transnational, info-tech world. These shared values include: individual freedom of thought and expression; appreciation and respect for difference; peaceful co-existence; the rule of law; pursuit of equality; support for human rights; social “safety net” provisions; sustainable economic development; negotiation and compromise; all within a parliamentary democracy. Participatory citizenship would then be based on an expressed commitment to these existing core values, as well as a heightened sense of allegiance to Canada rooted in truly inclusive collective decision-making. As an explicit, consensual, social contract, a Citizenship Charter would simultaneously increase public awareness of our commonality and promote active commit-

ment to the responsibilities of a citizenship rooted in a clearer sense of our *obligations* to each other.

In brief, the more fruitful question is not so much “what is ‘Canadian?’” but rather “what does it *mean* to be a Canadian?” The answer lies in an expressed commitment and allegiance to a sovereign entity called Canada, firmly founded on shared societal values and enhanced participation in collective decision-making. National *unity* is thus concretely facilitated via a shared participatory citizenship rooted in a joined sense of commonality and collectivity; this common citizenship

of individuals and collectives to explore their various identities and identifications as well as the ways in which they overlap or intersect with those of others. This is in keeping with Canada's commitment to individual and collective rights and to freedom of choice of expression; it also enhances individual wellbeing and strengthens our social fabric. It would require a transition from a discourse of “tolerance and celebration” to one that articulates a cherishing of diversity rooted in acceptance, understanding and *respect* for difference – however defined. Efforts need also be made to transcend linguistic, cultural,

compensatory recognition of variations in life circumstances and opportunities based solely on differences of language, culture, ethnicity, race, religion, age, gender, class, dis/ability and sexual orientation. It is precisely in such instrumental recognition of socially ascribed differences that our experience with Multiculturalism will continue to prove itself invaluable. Actually achieving social justice however, requires a transition from the equality discourse inherent in the existing policy to one that focuses on *equity* instead. Apparent individual/collective and symmetry/asymmetry tensions collapse with the recognition that due to inherent differences in social position, opportunity and life circumstances, individuals and groups sometimes need to be accorded differential treatment in order to ensure that the same principle of “fairness” is applied equitably to all. Equality is the principle, equity its expression.

Increased *legitimacy*, *inclusiveness* and *equity* entail a redefinition of the Canadian demos, understood both as a shared sense of peoplehood and as a forum for civic debate and collective decision-making. It is time to move away from an official categorization into four solitudes – English, French, aboriginal and ethnic – based on a largely essentialist notion of “culturalism” towards the articulation of commonality more firmly rooted in our shared humanity. Only then will a multi-dimensional participatory citizenship within a trans-cultural framework be able to contribute not only to the goals of national unity and identity, but also to an expanded commitment to social equality and freedom of cultural expression beyond that envisioned within the Multiculturalism Act. Only in this way will a newly invigorated trans-cultural citizenship be able to transform a “deficiency model” of difference to an “asset-building” one better geared to a transnational, information driven, global economy. It is in the redefinition of our demos that we will fully realize Multiculturalism's original vision of inclusion and equality, and in the very articulation of a trans-cultural citizenship that Canada can best meet the challenges of an increasingly borderless world.

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National unity is thus concretely facilitated via a shared participatory citizenship rooted in a joined sense of commonality and collectivity; this common citizenship experience in turn forms the foundation for an emerging trans-cultural national identity.

experience in turn forms the foundation for an emerging trans-cultural national *identity*. Such a national (=civic) identity is neither incompatible with primary ethno-cultural self-definitions — whether primary, segmented or symbolic — nor dependent upon a pre-existing shared national culture. The de-coupling of culture from nation means that ethno-cultural identities need not fully overlap with those associated with nationality or citizenship; instead they simply intersect. This is not to say that a civic identity cannot *become* a statement about a national *cultural* identity: shared values form the very basis of social interaction that in time can translate into a distinctive lifeway. Shared citizenship, however, need neither begin with a common culture nor require it as a final end-product.

Both unity and identity are contingent upon an *experienced* sense of belonging. How might such grounding in meaningful experience best be achieved? The basic tools required for an *invigorated* citizenship — identity, civic participation, social justice — are in fact already largely in place in existing Multiculturalism programming priorities.

EXPLORING IDENTITY

Official recognition of the inherent value of difference *legitimizes* the rights

racial and religious differences to focus on a shared civic national identity defined in terms of common citizenship.

ENSURING CIVIC PARTICIPATION

Commonality rooted in shared core values requires not only official recognition and articulation but also concrete expression. The issue here is how best to act upon our democratic ideals in a way that is truly reflective of our ethnocultural diversity; the challenge, how best to engage citizens in a way that is truly meaningful to them. The key to ensuring greater civic participation lies in more *inclusive* and *enhanced* involvement in democratic decision-making. This would enable us to fully realize shared values embedded in notions of participatory democracy in a way that is furthermore responsive to an increasingly globalized context.

ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE

True inclusiveness requires striving for and achieving social justice. Fundamental to any commitment to human rights is the recognition of socially-relevant differences that unfairly favour one individual or group over another; equally important is the development of measures that effectively address enduring subtle and systemic discrimination against relevant minorities. As such, real justice often necessitates

MELTING MOSAIC:

Changing Realities in Cultural Diversity in Canada and the United States

BY Jack Jedwab

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH TRAGEDY IN NEW YORK CITY, CANADIANS HAVE BEEN REEXAMINING THEIR TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES. SOME HAVE GONE AS FAR AS TO QUESTION THE NEED FOR CONTINUED BORDERS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN SEVERAL AREAS, THERE IS PRESENTLY A DESIRE FOR GREATER COOPERATION WITH OUR NEIGHBOURS TO THE SOUTH. WHILE THERE ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE POPULATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, A VAST MAJORITY OF CANADIANS ACKNOWLEDGE A HIGH DEGREE OF SHARED VALUES WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THINGS THAT WE BELIEVE DISTINGUISH OUR COUNTRY FROM THE UNITED STATES MAY INDEED BE GROWING LESS OBVIOUS. WHILE BOTH COUNTRIES DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS NATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS, ONE TRADITIONAL DICHOTOMY HAS CANADA REFER TO ITSELF AS A MOSAIC THAT FAVORS INTEGRATION IN ITS APPROACH TO CULTURAL DIVERSITY WHILE IT REGARDS THE UNITED STATES AS A MELTING POT THAT ENCOURAGES IMMIGRANT ASSIMILATION. BUT THERE MAY BE A CONVERGENCE IN ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION. IN EFFECT THE MOSAIC IDEA IS BECOMING MORE APPEALING TO A GREATER NUMBER OF AMERICANS, WHILE THE NEED FOR A BIT MORE CULTURAL MELTDOWN SEEMS TO ATTRACT AN IMPORTANT NUMBER OF CANADIANS.

Underlying the idea of Canada as a mosaic and the United States as a melting pot are important differences in the demographic evolution of the two countries as well as continued divergence in the principal source countries of immigration. From a demographic standpoint, Canada's population is very much dominated by persons of European and Asian descent, the United States has a much greater share of persons of African and Latin American descent. Whereas ethnicity and language were the principal markers of identity in Canada (hence the policies on linguistic duality and multiculturalism), in the United States, racial identities and interracial conflict more profoundly defined that country's national identity.

Recent immigration in the two countries points to an ever-growing presence of persons of Asian descent in Canada and the heightening of the Latin American presence in the United States.

Of the approximately 30 million immigrants in the United States more than half were born in Latin America and notably in Mexico. Over one quarter were born in Asia, some one out six in Europe, 2.8% in Africa and 2.6% in Canada. By contrast in Canada, nearly one half of all immigrants were born in Europe, over one quarter were born in Asia and one out of ten in Latin America. Persons born in Africa represent just below 5% of all immigrants in Canada and those born in the United States are just over 5%.

These dominant immigration trends will imply a significantly enhanced presence of persons of Hispanic origin in the United States whereas in Canada the greater increases will be in the share of persons of Asian descent. It is worth noting that Mexican immigration is much weaker economically on average than are Asian migrants. As such the receiving countries are confronted with a different set of challenges in regards to immigrant integration.

TOP TEN COUNTRIES OF BIRTH OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA - 1998

U.S. Immigration		Canadian Immigration	
Top Ten Countries of birth		Top Ten Countries of birth	
All countries	660,447	All countries	174,100
Mexico	131,575	China	19,749
China	36,884	India	15,327
India	36,482	Philippines	8,172
Philippines	34,466	Hong Kong	8,083
Dominican Republic	20,387	Pakistan	8,081
Vietnam	17,649	Taiwan	7,164
Cuba	17,375	Iran	6,772
Jamaica	15,146	Korea	4,410
Ukraine	11,529	United States	4,764
Russia	7,448	Russia	4,299

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Services of the United States, 1998 and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1998

ATTITUDES

From an attitudinal standpoint, recent public opinion surveys point to few differences in the views amongst Canadians and Americans around such issues as the cultural make-up of the country and the extent to which promoting diversity is favored over assimilation. When in May 2000 pollster Angus Reid asked whether the cultural make-up of your country was a positive characteristic, some 84% of Americans agreed (46% strongly and 38% moderately), while 83% of Canadians agreed (42% strongly and 41% moderately).

As to the question of assimilation, some 52% of Americans believed that it was more important to encourage minority groups to change to be more like most Americans than to accept minority groups and their customs/languages, something that 43% of American respondents felt should be prioritized (5% did not know). For their part, some 50% favored encouraging minority groups to be more like Canadians while 46% preferred acceptance of minority groups customs/languages (4% did not know).

In both countries age was an important factor in attitudes towards diversity and assimilation. About one-third of those between the ages of 18 and 34 in Canada and the United States were less inclined to support the assimilationist approach whereas in the two countries approximately two thirds of respondents over the age of 55 were favorable to greater assimilation.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Another area where the evolving demographic trends are likely to have an impact is on the linguistic realities. Canada sees itself as a country that is more supportive of bilingualism and the United States more averse to this phenomenon. The increasing influx of Latin Americans in the United States has resulted in a tremendous rise in the number of Spanish speakers south of our border. In the year 1990 some 7.5% or over 17 million Americans reported that they spoke Spanish in their homes. In ten years the figure has risen to over 26.7 million, representing over one-tenth of the American population. By the 2010 census of the United States the number of Spanish home speakers in

America may well exceed the entire population of Canada! But if the United States is concerned with generalized acquisition of the English language, there appears to be a growing openness to bilingualism. This is illustrated in public campaigns endorsing second language learning such as the popular PBS ad affirming that 'learning a language opens the mind.'

MAKING SENSE OF OUR CENSUS

Over the past thirty years Canada's multicultural reality has endured a number of tests. Perhaps the most important challenge over the past few years involved the continued need to collect information on ethnic identification in a debate over whether Statistics Canada should retain the census question on ethnic origins. In the late 1980's a group of Torontonians spearheaded a campaign calling for the population to reply 'Canadian' when the 1991 census asked the population about ethnic origins. They were concerned that the population focused too much on that which makes us different and naively believed that if we would all just call ourselves 'Canadian' divisions would magically be eliminated. In 1991 some 3% of the population responded to their call. But as 'Canadian' become a more prominent feature in the examples for replying to the ethnicity question, a greater number of census respondents gave that answer. It is estimated that when the results are out for 2001, over 30% of respondents will respond Canadian to the census question on ethnic origin. Ironically, in the 1990 census of the United States, some 5% responded 'American' to the question on ancestry and ethnic origin and in the 2000 census the figure rose to 7.5%. If one were to use this debate as an example, it would be hard to distinguish the melting pot from the mosaic.

If the issue of ethnicity has been the object of much debate in the Canadian census, it is the questions on race and Hispanic origin in the United States' census that have elicited the most controversy. In her book, *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*, Melissa Nobles argues that the results of census questions on race have in the past resulted in discriminatory behavior and may further incite such actions.

Visible minority status is destined to become an increasingly important dimension of Canadian identity as nearly three out of four immigrants to the country define themselves as such. For the year 2016 it is estimated that the ethnic Chinese population will be largest visible minority group in Canada with close to two million persons, followed by Blacks and South Asians who will each constitute around 1.2 million persons. In the case of Latin Americans it is projected that they will exceed 400,000 in Canada in that year. If one were to combine the Asian and Pacific Islander population of Canada, their approximate total for the year 2016 will be nearly five million, or just under fifteen percent of the estimated Canadian population. Whereas in 1991 nearly one out ten Canadians identified with a visible minority, in the year 2016 it is estimated that some one out of five persons will identify themselves in that manner. This will have significant ramifications for multiculturalism policy as the avoidance of interracial conflict becomes the central priority.

Canada's multicultural policy has evolved considerably since it was first introduced some thirty years ago. Whereas one of its initial principal objectives was support for the ethnocultural heritage of Canadians, today the policy is primarily focused on combating racism and promoting social justice. Such goals and values are by no means incompatible with those held by most Americans where the issue of diversity is concerned. Nor is it clear that Canada invests much more in these areas than its neighbor to the South. Increasingly one hears that Canada is a country where prevailing conditions favor the maintenance of one's heritage and that there is less of a need to invest in ethnocultural promotion. There remain differences in the origins of the demographically dominant ethno-racial groups in the two countries and the discourse of Canadian and American policy-makers. What were however real divergences between Canada and the United States in their respective approach to cultural diversity in the 1970's and the 1980's have given way to attitudes and practices by state and society that are increasingly similar.

Jack Jedwab is Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies

UPCOMING CONFERENCES in Canadian Studies

CONFÉRENCES À VENIR sur les études canadiennes

MAY 3 – 5, 2002 / DU 3 AU 5 MAI 2002

University of Ottawa – Postcolonialism and Pedagogy: Canadian Literatures in the Classroom at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Contact Cynthia Sugars at csugars@uottawa.ca

MAY 9 – 12, 2002 / DU 9 AU 12 MAI 2002

Augustana University College. Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in the Liberal Arts (CIRLA) – Conference “Playing the Wild Card: Un/disciplined Thoughts at the Banff Centre for Conferences, Banff, Alberta. Visit the Conference website at <http://www.augustana.ca/departments/cirla/cirla02>

MAY 25 – JUNE 1, 2002 / DU 25 MAI AU 1^{ER} JUIN 2002

Congress of the Social Sciences and the Humanities – Annual Congress, May at the University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario. Contact Pam Gravestock at p.gravestock@utoronto.ca, or 416-978-8112 (tel); 416-971-2027 (fax)

MAY 27 – 29, 2002 / DU 27 AU 29 MAI 2002

Société historique du Canada – 81^e Congrès annuel de la Société historique du Canada à l'Université de Toronto. Contactez le Prof. Arthur Silver à asilver@chass.utoronto.ca

MAY 29 – 31, 2002 / DU 29 AU 31 MAI 2002

Association for Canadian Studies in the Netherlands (ACSN) and Netherlands American Studies Association (NASA) – ACSN 2002 conference “First Nations in North America: Politics and Representation” at the Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. For information, e-mail h.bak@let.kun.nl or jaap.verheul@let.uu.nl.

JUNE 4 – 10, 2002 / DU 4 AU 10 JUIN 2002

Le Conseil International d'études canadiennes tiendra sa vingt-et-unième Réunion générale annuelle à Ottawa. Contactez le CIEC au (613) 789-7834.

The International Council for Canadian Studies will hold its 21st Annual General Meeting in Ottawa. Contact the ICCS at 613-789-7834.

JUNE 10 – 12, 2002 / DU 10 AU 12 JUIN 2002

Association for Canadian Studies – Annual Conference “Broadcasting the Nation: Communication and the Making of Canada” to be held at the Minto Place Suites Hotel, Ottawa, Ont. Diffuser la nation: La communication et le façonnement du Canada – Le colloque annuel de l'Association d'études canadiennes aura lieu au Minto Place à Ottawa. For plus de renseignements, veuillez contactez Daniel Salée à salee@vax2.concordia.ca.

JUNE 20 – 21, 2002 / LES 20 ET 21 JUIN 2002

Institute of Commonwealth Studies – 3rd annual Canadian Studies Conference “Migration from England to Canada: Origins, Settlement, Impact” in London, England. If you would like to participate in the Conference or to be added to the mailing list for the conference, please contact Professor Phillip Buckner at phillip@pbuckner.freemove.co.uk or by telephone at +44 (0)20 7923 0206.

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JUNE 26 – 30, 2002 / DU 26 AU 30 JUIN 2002

International Small Islands Association and the Institute of Island Studies – 7th Islands of the World Conference, “New Horizons in Island Studies” to be held at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown, P.E.I. Contact the Institute of Island Studies at phone: 902-566-0616, fax: 902-566-0756 or e-mail: islandsvii@upe.ca

JUNE 30 – JULY 4, 2002 / DU 20 JUIN AU 4 JUILLET 2002

Israel Association for Canadian Studies – 9th Biennial Jerusalem Conference in Canadian Studies, June 30-July 4, 2002, Jerusalem, Israel. For more information, e-mail mccanada@mscc.huji.ac.il or msariesh@mscc.huji.ac.il.

JULY 8 – 11, 2002 / DU 8 AU 11 JUILLET 2002

Transatlantic Studies Association — Transatlantic Studies Conference at the University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland. Contact Professor Thomas W. Zeiler at zeilert@spot.colorado.edu.

JULY 16 – 18, 2002 / DU 16 AU 18 JUILLET, 2002

Association for Canadian Studies in China – 10th Biennial Canadian Studies Conference, to be held at Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, China. For further information please contact Professor QIN Mingli at mlqin@hope.hit.edu.cn or Prof. FENG Jianwen at fengjw@lzu.edu.cn.

L'ÉVOLUTION du multiculturalisme

House of Commons

October 8, 1971

Right Hon. P.E. Trudeau (Prime Minister):

Mr. Speaker, I am happy this morning to be able to reveal to the House that the government has accepted all those recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which are contained in Volume IV of its reports directed to federal departments and agencies. Hon. members will recall that the subject of this volume is "the contribution by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution."

In implementing a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, the government will provide support in four ways.

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.

Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.

QU'EST CE QUE LE MULTICULTURALISME ?

Le multiculturalisme canadien découle, à la base, de notre conviction que tous les citoyens sont égaux. Il permet à tous les citoyens de conserver leur identité, d'être fiers de leurs ancêtres et d'éprouver un sentiment d'appartenance. L'acceptation donne aux Canadiens un sentiment de sécurité et de confiance en soi qui les rend plus ouverts aux diverses cultures et plus tolérants envers celles-ci. L'expérience canadienne a prouvé que le multiculturalisme encourage l'harmonie raciale et ethnique ainsi que la compréhension interculturelle, et décourage la marginalisation, la haine, la discrimination et la violence.

Par le multiculturalisme, le Canada reconnaît le potentiel de tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes en les encourageant à s'intégrer à leur société et à participer activement à la vie sociale, culturelle, économique et politique. (Programme de Multiculturalisme de Patrimoine canadien – <http://www.pch.gc.ca/multi>)

LA CHARTE CANADIENNE DES DROITS ET LIBERTÉS

Partie 1 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982

s27. Toute interprétation de la présente charte doit concorder avec l'objectif de promouvoir le maintien et la valorisation du patrimoine multiculturel des Canadiens.

THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982

s27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.

"La politique du gouvernement fédéral en matière de multiculturalisme consiste à favoriser la reconnaissance et l'estime réciproque des diverses cultures du pays, et promouvoir l'expression et les manifestations progressives de ces cultures dans la société canadienne." - Extrait de la Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien, juillet 1988

Le Programme du multiculturalisme du ministère du Patrimoine canadien représente un moyen important dont se sert le gouvernement pour concrétiser les objectifs de la politique du multiculturalisme.

Le Programme fait converger les efforts du gouvernement vers les initiatives contribuant à la réalisation des objectifs précis suivants :

1. Contribuer à l'élaboration de stratégies qui facilitent la pleine et active participation des communautés ethniques, raciales, religieuses et culturelles au sein de la société canadienne.
2. Faciliter la mobilisation collective pour la résolution et la prévention des conflits fondés sur l'ethnie, la race, la religion et la culture et contre les actes haineux.
3. Renforcer la capacité des institutions publiques à s'adapter à la diversité ethnique, raciale, religieuse et culturelle en aidant à repérer et à éliminer les obstacles à un accès équitable et en appuyant la participation des diverses collectivités aux processus décisionnels.
4. Encourager et aider les ministères et organismes fédéraux à élaborer des politiques, des pratiques et des programmes inclusifs qui leur permettent de respecter leurs obligations en vertu de la Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien.
5. Accroître la connaissance et la compréhension du multiculturalisme, du racisme et de la diversité culturelle au Canada et alimenter un dialogue éclairé à ce sujet.

Politique canadienne du multiculturalisme

(Pris du Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien : L.R. (1985), ch. 24 (4e suppl.) [C-18.7] Loi sur le maintien et la valorisation du multiculturalisme au Canada [1988, ch. 31, sanctionné le 21 juillet 1988])

DÉCLARATION

3. (1) La politique du gouvernement fédéral en matière de multiculturalisme consiste :

- a) à reconnaître le fait que le multiculturalisme reflète la diversité culturelle et raciale de la société canadienne et se traduit par la liberté, pour tous ses membres, de maintenir, de valoriser et de partager leur patrimoine culturel, ainsi qu'à sensibiliser la population à ce fait;
- b) à reconnaître le fait que le multiculturalisme est une caractéristique fondamentale de l'identité et du patrimoine canadiens et constitue une ressource inestimable pour l'avenir du pays, ainsi qu'à sensibiliser la population à ce fait;
- c) à promouvoir la participation entière et équitable des individus et des collectivités de toutes origines à l'évolution de la nation et au façonnement de tous les secteurs de la société, et à les aider à éliminer tout obstacle à une telle participation;
- d) à reconnaître l'existence de collectivités dont les membres partagent la même origine et leur contribution à l'histoire du pays, et à favoriser leur développement;
- e) à faire en sorte que la loi s'applique également et procure à tous la même protection, tout en faisant cas des particularités de chacun;

- f) à encourager et aider les institutions sociales, culturelles, économiques et politiques canadiennes à prendre en compte le caractère multiculturel du Canada;
- g) à promouvoir la compréhension entre individus et collectivités d'origines différentes et la créativité qui résulte des échanges entre eux;
- h) à favoriser la reconnaissance et l'estime réciproque des diverses cultures du pays, ainsi qu'à promouvoir l'expression et les manifestations progressives de ces cultures dans la société canadienne;
- i) parallèlement à l'affirmation du statut des langues officielles et à l'élargissement de leur usage, à maintenir et valoriser celui des autres langues;
- j) à promouvoir le multiculturalisme en harmonie avec les engagements nationaux pris à l'égard des deux langues officielles.

LE MULTICULTURALISME FAVORISE L'INTÉGRATION ET L'ACQUISITION DE LA CITOYENNETÉ

Collection « Les preuves », no 3, novembre 1997

(Programme de Multiculturalisme de Patrimoine canadien – <http://www.pch.gc.ca/multi>)

Le professeur Will Kymlicka, Département de philosophie, Université d'Ottawa, un expert dans le domaine des relations ethniques et de la citoyenneté, a mené une étude pour savoir si le multiculturalisme s'est traduit par la « ghettoïsation » des groupes ethniques, et par leur intégration sociale et politique. Il a comparé des données en provenance du Canada et d'autres pays, pour la période allant de 1971 à maintenant. S'appuyant sur quatre indicateurs empiriques de citoyenneté et d'intégration, il présente les faits suivants :

DES TAUX ACCRUS DE NATURALISATION

Les taux de naturalisation ont continué à augmenter depuis 1971 (l'année de l'adoption de la politique du multiculturalisme). En 1995, le nombre de certificats de citoyenneté délivrés a atteint un record de 227 000. Cette tendance est particulièrement importante étant donné que les incitatifs économiques à la naturalisation ont diminué au cours des dernières années (c.-à-d. les immigrants reçus et les citoyens ont un accès équivalent au marché du travail, aux prestations sociales, etc.). Les immigrants venant de pays non traditionnels (les groupes qu'on qualifie de « multiculturels ») ont le taux le plus élevé de naturalisation au pays.

LA PARTICIPATION ACTIVE DES MINORITÉS SUR LA SCÈNE POLITIQUE

On ne constate aucune baisse de participation politique de la part des groupes ethniques. Plusieurs députés élus au Parlement du Canada proviennent d'un vaste éventail d'origines ethniques. Les groupes ethniques ne se constituent pas en parti politique distinct mais ont tendance à voter pour les partis nationaux traditionnels qui appuient les grands principes démocratiques et libéraux ayant cours au Canada.

LES COMPÉTENCES EN MATIÈRE DE LANGUES OFFICIELLES

La demande pour les cours d'anglais ou de français comme langue seconde n'a jamais été aussi élevée et elle surpasse l'offre

dans certaines villes. Des statistiques récentes indiquent que 97 % des Canadiens parlent une des deux langues officielles. Les immigrants ont la volonté d'apprendre une langue officielle malgré le fait que plusieurs d'entre eux ne sont pas admissibles aux cours à cause de la date récente de leur arrivée au Canada.

L'INCIDENCE CROISSANTE DE L'EXOGENIE

Depuis 1971, il y a eu une augmentation constante des mariages interraciaux. L'endogamie a diminué, tant chez les immigrants que chez leurs enfants nés au pays. Les amitiés ethniques et les mariages mixtes sont mieux acceptés qu'auparavant. En 1968, 52 % des Canadiens approuvaient les mariages ethniques, alors qu'en 1995, ce taux était passé à 81 %.

COMPARAISONS AVEC D'AUTRES PAYS

Après avoir comparé le Canada avec les États-Unis et l'Australie, Kymlicka a constaté que le Canada se tirait beaucoup mieux d'affaires que ces pays relativement à tous les facteurs examinés. L'auteur conclut son analyse en affirmant qu'il n'y a aucune preuve concrète que la politique du multiculturalisme crée une « ghettoïsation » quelconque des groupes ethniques. De fait, il est probable que la vérité se trouve au pôle opposé : historiquement, le multiculturalisme a été un outil essentiel pour ce qui est de promouvoir l'acquisition de la citoyenneté, la participation et l'intégration, tout en permettant aux gens de conserver ou d'affirmer leur identité si tel était leur bon vouloir.

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
MULTICULTURALISM, ADVOCACY GROUPS, And Charitable Tax Status

By Rashmi Luther

IT HAS NOW BEEN THIRTY YEARS SINCE THE MULTICULTURALISM POLICY WAS FIRST INTRODUCED INTO PARLIAMENT TO HERALD AN IDENTITY FOR CANADA AND CANADIANS THAT ACKNOWLEDGED ITS MAKEUP AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS FROM CULTURALLY MIXED BACKGROUNDS. DESPITE THE HIERARCHICAL POSITIONING OF MULTICULTURAL GROUPS AS DISTINCT FROM THE "TWO FOUNDING NATIONS" AND THEIR LANGUAGES (NOT INCLUDING FIRST NATIONS COMMUNITIES), THERE WAS STILL HOPE THAT SOMEHOW THE POLICY WOULD ENABLE ETHNOCULTURAL AND ETHNORACIAL COMMUNITIES TO ESTABLISH THEIR RIGHTFUL PRESENCE AS DISTINCT BUT EQUAL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY.

This reference to distinct but equal emanates from the Policy itself which acknowledges and supports "unity within diversity". From the outset different critiques have emerged about the possibilities of achieving what was held up as a hopeful promise. Some of these critiques contest the very nature of the concept of multiculturalism itself for being divisive, promoting fragmentation, being empty rhetoric and so on. This paper attempts to contribute to this debate by examining the possibilities and constraints faced by ethnocultural and ethnoracial groups in their attempts to establish advocacy organizations that function as legitimate voices for their issues. In light of this, the *Income Tax Act* as it pertains to charitable status registration is reviewed to provide some understanding of the contradictions that are still apparent with respect to non-Charter group communities, despite multiculturalism's promise of cultural recognition, inclusion and equity.

Historically, ethnocultural and ethnoracial advocacy groups have long faced the constraints of insufficient and unstable funding, based largely on the absence of alternative sources of funding other than that provided by the state. As a result of this socially constructed dependent relationship, they have felt the force of changing political winds that have seen their presence and contributions as opportunities to be tapped for political gain and as threats to be constrained, contained and managed. In an earlier, more favourable climate of the 1970s and 80s, many groups did emerge, at times through government initiatives, to try to advance multiculturalism from the location of rhetoric to a



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lived reality. Kobayashi (2000) addresses this link between the groups and multiculturalism in the following passage: "Although such organizations have been in place as long as the communities they represent, that is, since the communities were first established through immigration, present-day associations are direct products of the rise of federal multiculturalism policy as official recognition of the role played by non-Charter groups in Canadian society."

Some associations that emerged at this time formed as advocacy bodies to seek the opportunities and benefits supposedly available to all citizens but elusive for many of their members. The racialized nature of Canadian society was seen by them as being unjust as it opposed the principles of equality and fairness as promoted by the Canadian policy on multiculturalism. In many

respects, these advocacy groups were voices for the values of fairness and justice to be extended to all citizens, not only those privileged by race or class. The label of 'special interest', as raised by the Reform party and later adopted by liberal backbenchers such as John Bryden, has served to marginalize their issues and voices once again and to separate them and their interests as being outside those of ordinary citizens.

These volatile relations are not unique to ethnocultural and ethnoracial groups per se but reflect a reaction to the perceived threat of the function that advocacy groups perform. For instance, the essence of advocacy groups is to monitor, demand, critique and oppose state and other policies and actions. While their presence and the performance of this function is vital for the expression of a healthy civil society, they

also pose a threat to prevailing notions of justice and the existing social order. The prevailing order is represented by the dominant ideologies of the time and we have seen these shift dramatically from earlier ones that balanced liberal democratic ideals with those of social democracy to the current dominance of neoliberalism and its preoccupation with debts, restructuring, downsizing and privatizing. An example of the impact of this difference on ethnocultural and ethnoracial advocacy groups is apparent when we compare the growth period of the groups i.e., during the 1970s and 80s with that of the 1990s. In the earlier period, governments more readily assumed their shared responsibility for supporting civil society by providing vital core and project funding to many advocacy groups. However, over the 1990s, and especially since 1995, this form of support has steadily eroded and now favours short term projects and partnership activities, if supported at all. This corresponds with a shift in the dominance of political ideologies from a more participatory democracy to one that is a more rigid form of liberal democracy. As a result, groups have been forced to rely more on the charity of the general public through donations, or on organized charities such as Foundations for their survival. Often, recognition as a registered charity is an asset in the ability to tap these alternate sources of funds. For the general public or for corporations, a portion of their contributions can be claimed as a tax deduction. And, for Foundations, as they themselves are registered as charities, they are restricted to supporting other charities.

With respect to cultural communities, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Multiculturalism Secretariat within the Department of the Secretary of State became their primary funder and elected representatives and the state bureaucracy actively sought their input in the deliberation of various issues. Core funding as well as project funding was provided to enable groups to establish and develop a capacity to provide informed and sophisticated advice, initiate dialogue and debate and propose thoughtful alternatives. (Cardozo, 1996) With gov-

ernment support, there was little need for groups to diversify their funding base. In fact, the reality was that very few alternatives existed at that time. This reality was not lost on the groups and some of their advocacy efforts then attempted to increase the level of responsibility for issues of race and culture among different governmental and institutional sectors, including their financial support for activities and programs in their jurisdictions. Consequently, many advocacy groups were dependent on federal funding and were caught off guard by attacks on their credibility, precipitated by the fiscal crisis of the 1990s.

THE INCOME TAX ACT AND REGISTERED CHARITIES

The legislation that governs the registration of charities is the *Income Tax Act*. This Act is administered by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) which reviews applications for charitable status and interprets the Act. While the Act does not provide a definition of 'charity' it does identify 'charitable activities' and those organizations who are recognized to fall within these activity areas are granted the desired registration number which can be used to issue tax receipts to donors. This number then becomes a vital tool for fundraising as groups seek to diversify their sources of funding.

Groups which openly state their function as advocacy will not be recognized as charities under this Act as it is regarded as a 'political' activity. In fact groups can be denied registration even if this is a small component of their larger purpose. It is carefully specified within the Act, that only 10% of a group's resources can be used for 'political' purposes and any such activities must be 'incidental' to their other functions. (Pross & Stewart, 1993-94) In addition, multicultural activities are not recognized as charitable activities at present. This is because the Act's interpretation is based on precedence and, to date, there have been no court decisions rendered on this aspect. In its absence, "organizations promoting multiculturalism as a purpose will usually not be registered as charities." (Emphasis in original) (July 6,

2000 Canada Customs and Revenue Agency letter to the Canadian Ethnocultural Council) These restrictions then pose severe limitations on ethnocultural and ethnoracial advocacy groups in their abilities to diversify their sources for revenues such as direct appeal to donors or applications to charitable foundations.

Currently, the *Income Tax Act* with respect to charities is based on a 1601 British statute (Statute of Charitable Uses) and an 1891 judgement by Lord Macnaghten (Pemsel's case) to identify charitable purposes. (Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR):G-1)) These then continue to guide the interpretation of charitable activity four hundred years later. The four categories recognized as legitimate charitable activity areas are: relief of poverty; advancement of education; advancement of religion; and other purposes beneficial to the community. Therefore, groups making application under this Act must demonstrate that they remain within the confines of these specific areas and how they have been interpreted under common law, and that their objectives and activities are also charitable. Advocacy groups have attempted to use the category of 'advancement of education' as a way of situating their objectives and activities and avoiding the label of 'political'. At times this has meant compromising their political ideals, causing internal conflict among the membership and weakening the groups. For others who have pursued this as a category for recognition, some have found that, 'advancement of education' is interpreted rather specifically. These specifications include "training the mind' in an improvement of a useful field of human knowledge as opposed to promotion of particular political ideology or presentation of biased information" (VSR Report:G-3)

This forced suppression of 'political' intents and fitting within the narrow interpretations of 'education' can be regarded as a clear attempt by the state to stifle and discourage debate and participatory democracy. Also, in the name of requiring 'balance' i.e., the presentation of all sides of an issue in order for it to be considered a genuine educational

activity, a range of absurd situations could occur as noted in the VSR Report:

...a Jewish organization being required to give space to the Palestine Liberation Organization or an anti-poverty group to a wealthy person's forum [Drache 1994/95]. To push the argument further, a group educating school children about the history of Holocaust survivors might be required to give equal time to those denying the existence of the

vide a similar balance that incorporates the perspectives of the excluded groups. Therefore, it has been argued that advocacy groups are providing the needed balance because their perspectives are missing or misrepresented within the broader public. (VSR Report, G-4) The absence of diverse viewpoints and criteria that force silence, compliance and conformity contribute to the critique that the policy of multiculturalism is in effect an attempt to "manage" diversity. (Henry et al., 2000)

is seeking to promote the interests of its membership, it will fail to qualify for registration. It is inappropriate for charities to be vehicles to articulate or advance the interests of a particular group, although this may be an acceptable incidental result."

On reflection, it is clear that whether intended or not, one function of this legislation is to manage public support (donations) and to channel it into areas that are accepted as non-threatening and which conform to the make up of society as it existed in the Elizabethan period. Quite obviously, this conception is not relevant to the culturally and racially diverse Canada of today. Another function is to reinforce existing structural inequalities based on class and race. This reinforcement occurs through the requirement that there be a broad public benefit which prevents groups from addressing the conditions that create inequalities, thereby rectifying existing imbalances. As such, social issues are de-politicized, as are the groups wishing to address them. Projects that are safe, which encourage coping and acceptance, are preferred. Also, as assessing public benefit is largely a matter of interpretation, it is possible that what a group identifies as a public benefit i.e., advancing racial equality could be regarded by the Act's interpreters as 'self interest'. In addition, with restrictions on 'political' activities, groups face considerable difficulties in undertaking strategies that openly challenge state policies and parties or those that could be perceived as such. This danger is drawn out in the July 6, 2000 CCRA letter: "However, having a political **purpose** is not charitable and an applicant can be refused registration on these grounds. Political purposes are those intended to influence legislation and or public opinion, and those that promote a particular socio-economic ideology, for example the promotion of Canadian unity, where there can be opposing sides to an issue." (Emphasis in original)

This restriction on the "promotion of Canadian unity" is interesting indeed for, in light of the multiculturalism policy, a number of contradictions emerge. If we recall, it was originally envisioned by the Trudeau government as a mecha-



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Holocaust. Many organizations would also want to have taken into account that the viewpoints contradictory to their own are frequently widely disseminated in the mainstream, including in the media and educational forums. (G-4)

This last point regarding contradictory viewpoints in the mainstream is interesting to note. It underscores the fact that this requirement for balance is

This muzzling and containing function is also evidenced in the legislation's requirement that the goals, objectives and activities of a group must have demonstrable benefits to the larger community. For instance, if the beneficiaries are perceived to be a small segment of the population i.e., a specific ethnic group or the group's membership then there is a strong likelihood that the application will be denied. A July 6, 2000 letter from CCRA to the Canadian

On reflection, it is clear that whether intended or not, one function of this legislation is to manage public support (donations) and to channel it into areas that are accepted as non-threatening and which conform to the make up of society as it existed in the Elizabethan period.

selectively imposed on the groups seeking application for charitable status. However, there is no corresponding requirement of the larger society to pro-

Ethnocultural Council (CEC) clearly states this possibility: "If it appears that an organization is operating not for the benefit of the public at large, but instead

nism for recognizing diversity and promoting unity among Canadians i.e., 'unity within diversity'. However, the *Income Tax Act* appears to be at odds with the policy for it does not recognize this as a legitimate objective. The reason given for this is that it is restricted by law, i.e., precedence. In its letter to the CEC, the CCRA expresses this as follows: "The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) wishes to support government policies on multiculturalism to the extent allowed by the law." This means that groups denied charitable status must individually appeal such decisions to the courts for judgement and the establishment of precedence. Such a legal challenge is expensive and requires extensive resources. For ethnocultural and ethnoracial advocacy groups who are already financially limited, this becomes a near impossibility. Thus, while in theory there are avenues available to question the narrow interpretations of charitable purposes based in antiquity, financial constraints act as real and formidable disincentives to their access. Therefore, since the 1970s, 13 cases have been heard by the Federal Court of Appeal and eight have been deemed not charitable. The majority of the cases were rejected on the basis of 'political' activity. (VSR Report:G-3-6)

This apparent disjuncture between the multiculturalism policy and charitable recognition under the *Income Tax Act* begins to alert us to the fragile nature of Canadian multiculturalism. It also lends support to critiques which have called the policy "nearly empty as a public policy." (Kobayashi, 2000) Also, if multiculturalism and the promotion of Canadian unity are not seen as legitimate activities worthy of public support (donations) yet lauded as a distinctive feature of Canadian society, then an inconsistent and dangerous message is being conveyed to the public. The message, while not overtly stated but covertly implied, is that multiculturalism is in the public interest only as rhetoric and not as an enactment of that rhetoric. Consequently, as there is no public benefit, no rewards (tax incentives) are warranted. This lack of reward then can act as a disincentive

for potential donors and as a further justification for reduced public and state support.

This raises another interesting contradiction concerning the notion of charity and public vs. personal benefit. On the one hand the term carries baggage that is paternalistic. In this respect, individuals carry out philanthropic good deeds by giving money or time out of compassion for other human beings. In so doing, individuals not only express their concerns but also their responsibilities for one another in ways that are 'altruistic'. While such human expressions are commendable, they can also be 'managed' by the state through incentives or disincentives. This then raises another aspect of the notion of charity, that which pertains to tax incentives. Clearly an incentive or a 'carrot' is offered to those who give to charities recognized as legitimate in the form of a tax deduction. (Domingue, 1996) Through such enticements, a component of 'self interest' is introduced whereby those who give are materially rewarded and thus gain individual or corporate tax breaks. In some respects, this practice illuminates the individualized nature of modern Canadian society where values of altruism and collectivity conflict with those of individualism and personal gain.

In discussing 'self interest' and personal gain, yet another contradiction emerges with respect to the *Income Tax Act* and registered charities. Earlier, it was pointed out that multiculturalism was not a recognized goal or area for charitable purposes. Another reason given is that "the promotion of a particular culture can be considered to be the promotion of a 'self-interest' which ... lacks the necessary elements of altruism to enable it to qualify as a charity." (CCRA, 2000) Here, for multicultural groups, goals and activities promoting particular cultures are clearly inadmissible for charitable registration. This prevents them from engaging in political activities and from elevating their own profiles, building solidarity, self-pride and group empowerment. What is permissible are activities that educate "Canadians about a particular culture" but not those which are "promoting a particular culture." (CCRA, 2000) The

not so subtle message contained here exposes a biased understanding of 'self interest'. Self interest is acceptable for donors as long as it conforms to sanctioned charities. Self interest is not acceptable, however, if it contains the threat of group empowerment, group mobilization, group protest, and political action that could alter society's

The not so subtle message contained here exposes a biased understanding of 'self interest'. Self interest is acceptable for donors as long as it conforms to sanctioned charities.

inequitable yet acceptable social order. In other words, activities that are reactive and service oriented are fine, but activities that are preventative and challenging of inequities are not.

For all intents and purposes then, advocacy groups, whose very function is political, seem to be doomed within the current reality. Ethnocultural and ethnoracial groups, by the nature of their issues, coupled with their political activities, are also doubly doomed.

CONCLUSION

At this point it is apparent that a number of inconsistencies are evident in reference to the Multiculturalism Policy. One inconsistency pertains to the issue of credibility for, over the past 30 years, the Policy has confidently promoted the rhetoric of cultural tolerance. However, the reality has been an increase in levels of intolerance towards groups who make demands, critique or challenge the prevailing inequitable order of society. The future of Canadian multiculturalism remains an unknown, but hopefully the past will serve as its valuable teacher.

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THE WORLD CONFERENCE Against Racism

THESE COMMENTS ARE PRESENTED IN THE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY OF THE AUTHOR
AND IN NO WAY REFLECT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

BY Laurie S. Wiseberg


The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) took place at the International Convention Centre in Durban, South Africa, from 31 July – 8 September 2001. More than 12,000 individuals were accredited to attend the WCAR, including delegates from 170 Governments (16 Heads of State and 58 Foreign Ministers among them), over 4,000 representatives from more than a thousand NGOs, over 1,300 members of the media, and representatives of other UN agencies, regional bodies and national institutions. As a parallel process, an NGO Forum – which began with a one-day Youth Summit on 26 August and ended on 1 September – took place in the Kingsmead Cricket Stadium nearby, and attracted the participation of over 8,000 people.

United Nations High Commissioner Mary Robinson, who was also Secretary-General of the WCAR, asked for three things in her opening address: generosity of spirit, flexibility and a willingness to meet the views of others, and a sense of vision. “I remain convinced,” she said, “that this can be a defining moment for the international community, that we have the capacity at the start of this century to work for a better and fairer world order.” Nonetheless, neither the inter-governmental conference nor the NGO forum were easy meetings and the qualities sought by the High Commissioner were not always made manifest.

While the Conference adopted a far-reaching Declaration and Programme of Action (D&POA) which condemns the scourge of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and commits States and the international community to com-

bat it “by all available and appropriate means and as a matter of the highest priority”, the Conference had to be extended by a day in order to reach agreement. That agreement did not embrace the Governments of the United States and Israel, which had walked out on the fourth day of the WCAR over proposed language on

Zuma, which expressed concern “about the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation”, recognized “the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state,” and at the same time recognized “the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel” while calling



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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the attempt of some States to reinstitute the language of “Zionism equals racism” – a phrase which originates in General Assembly Resolution 3379 of 10 November 1975, a highly contentious resolution repealed in 1991. The first two World Conferences on Racism, in 1978 and 1983, had come to grief over precisely that same problematique. The compromise reached was the adoption of language proposed by the President of the Conference, South African Foreign Minister Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini

upon all States “to support the peace process and bring it to an early conclusion” (paragraph 61). The document also, in paragraph 57, recalls “that the Holocaust must never be forgotten”, retaining the capital “H” in Holocaust — another point that had been hotly contested; and it recognizes “with deep concern the increase in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in various parts of the world, as well as the emergence of racial and violent movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas against Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities” (paragraph 59).

There were two additional hard issues that eluded consensus during the preparatory process. One was agreement on a list of victims. Eventually it was decided that there would be no listing of victims *per se* (e.g., African descendants, Indigenous Peoples, migrants, refugees, etc.), but that the text everywhere would simply refer to “individuals and groups of individuals who are victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.” Even more difficult was the issue of reparations and compensation for past injustices.

From the first session of the Preparatory Committee (or PrepCom) in May 2000, wording in the fourth theme of the World Conference – “provision of effective remedies, recourse, redress, [compensatory] and other measures at the national, regional and international levels” – had the word “compensatory” in square brackets, meaning that the term was disputed. At the heart of the issue was whether there would be an acknowledgement by States (largely Western) of their participation in slavery, the slave trade and colonialism and a link between such an acknowledgement and preparedness to pay compensation to the victims. The acknowledgement was made in paragraphs 97, 98 and 99. Paragraph 97 reads:

We acknowledge and profoundly regret the massive human sufferings and the tragic plight of millions of men, women and children caused by slavery, slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, apartheid, colonialism and genocide and call upon States to honour the memory of the victims of past tragedies and affirm that wherever and whenever these occurred they must be condemned and their reoccurrence prevented. We regret that these practices and structures, political, socio-economic and cultural, have led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.

Paragraph 98 also notes “that some States have taken the initiative to apologize and have paid reparations where appropriate, for grave and massive vio-

lations committed”; while paragraph 99 calls on those that have not yet expressed remorse or presented apologies to find some way to contribute to the restoration of the dignity of the victims. There is, however, no direct link between regret for the past and the requirement to pay monetary compensation. As Dr. Zuma stated in her closing statement to the Conference, it was agreed “that slavery is a crime against humanity and that an apology is necessary, not for monetary gain, but to restore the dignity and humanity of those who suffered.” Yet, subsequently it transpired that, although there was agreement on the wording of these paragraphs, there was a lack of agreement on whether these paragraphs should appear in the Declaration or in the Programme of Action. As a result of this lack of consensus, as of 27 November 2001, the document had not yet been issued and the General Assembly debate on the resolution on the World Conference had not yet taken place.

The NGO Forum was, in certain respects, an even more difficult meeting, with both negative and positive outcomes.

From the outset of the process, it had been the view of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that NGO involvement would be a key to the success of the World Conference. Addressing the first session of the Preparatory Committee in May 2000, she stated: “I have in mind a Conference with the broadest possible involvement of civil society.... of NGOs, community groups, religious groups and the private sector in preparations for the Conference.” In line with this objective, the High Commissioner appointed an NGO Liaison officer to encourage and assist NGO participation throughout the conference process; this was subsequently expanded into a small unit. As well, in an unprecedented move, the High Commissioner raised funds (over \$US 2 million) to ensure that NGOs would be able to actively engage in the regional inter-governmental preparatory meetings (in Strasbourg, Santiago, Dakar and Tehran), to organize NGO networking meetings (in Warsaw,

Botswana, Amman, Kathmandu and Quito) to plan for the NGO Forum, and subsequently to go to Durban. As well, the OHCHR encouraged private foundations and other funders to support the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), which had been selected by the South African Government as the organizer of the NGO Forum, and to support other independent NGO initiatives in the context of the World Conference. Moreover, at the first session of the PrepCom, a serious effort had been made to ensure the adoption of Rules of Procedure which would permit NGOs accredited to the World Conference to be able “to participate as observers in the Conference, any Committee and any committee or working group on questions within the scope of their activities” (Rule 66). This meant that, at the discretion of the Chairs of the respective bodies, NGO representatives would be able to make oral interventions in both plenary and drafting sessions.

It is important to note that, as regards this World Conference Against Racism, there was no traditional or natural NGO constituency in place, as there had been for the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights or the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. That is, while racism is a problem that has been central to the work of many NGOs at the national and local levels, few large international NGOs had racism as their mandate and not many international human rights NGOs seriously focused on racism as a major priority. The NGO Liaison Unit was, therefore, reaching out to new actors, many of which had not previously looked to the United Nations as an arena in which they would be players. Using the Internet — i.e., sending out information via a ListServe and posting it on several NGO websites — turned out to be a highly successful strategy for mobilizing new constituencies. These included, inter alia: African descendants throughout the African diaspora, especially in the Americas; the Roma, Sinti, and Travellers throughout the world but especially in Europe; the Dalits of South Asia and other victims of the caste system such as the Burakim of Japan; and

migrants including workers, refugees, displaced persons, and trafficked persons. Despite the somewhat onerous process, the NGO Liaison Unit was able to accredit 1,249 NGOs which did not have Consultative Status, enabling them to take part in the preparatory processes and to participate in the World Conference itself. In this context, it is worth noting that, for the first time in a World Conference process, two Tibetan NGOs were accredited. The broad range of NGOs who became engaged in the WCAR process meant that it was difficult for Governments to deny the existence of racism in their societies, much as some would have liked to do so.

What this meant, however, was that those in the forefront of the NGO process, including SANGOCO in South Africa, had little experience with a UN world conference process. Understandably, there was also a lot of jockeying for visibility and access to resources. While NGOs got organized at the regional levels, and while various NGO caucuses were launched and began their drafting and lobbying work, the process of putting together an International Steering Committee (ISC) proved highly contentious. In fact, the ISC only coalesced at the second PrepCom, in May 2001, just a few months before the World Conference. This meant that SANGOCO, coming out of an exclusively South African experience, attempted to manage the drafting of an NGO Declaration and Plan of Action and to put together an NGO Forum Programme largely on its own, with the assistance of a national committee but with little international input.

Moreover, as with the inter-governmental process, the Middle Eastern issue came to dominate the discourse. The text that SANGOCO brought to the third PrepCom (which opened in Geneva on 30 July) titled "NGO Forum Declaration: Durban Draft Final Version" contained such inflammatory language that the representatives of the international human rights NGOs (INGOs), who until then had largely watched the process from the sidelines, decided that they could no longer do so. (For example, the document called upon States to "Stop the escalation of the third

holocaust perpetrated by the Israeli government and its settler community against the people of Palestine" and asserted that "that the Palestinian people have the clear right under International Law to resist such occupation by any means until they achieve their fundamental right to self-determination...") The INGOs, therefore, formed an INGO caucus and as a caucus demanded that the ISC make clear, first, that this document was only a draft and in no way final, and that it be revised to ensure, *inter alia*, that its provisions were in accordance with the tenets international human rights law. Otherwise, they would have to dissociate themselves from the document.

A new international drafting committee was then constituted and substantial work was done on the document, both during the Third PrepCom and in Durban, through a complicated process of revision involving 24 Thematic Commissions and over 40 NGO caucuses. There were large sections of the document which engendered little controversy – where caucuses – of African Descendants, Indigenous Peoples, Roma, women, migrants – were able to come up with language on which there was widespread consensus. One must, however, note that on certain issues, prominently on caste and on the continued practice of slavery, there were a large number of GONGO's (government organized non-governmental organizations) whose role was essentially to defend their government's position against the views advanced by independent and grassroots NGOs. The most bitterly disputed sections of the document were, however, those dealing with the Palestinians and with anti-Semitism.

It was particularly regrettable that, in the end, this escalated into a controversy over the process by which the document was adopted, with the Jewish Caucus walking out after a paragraph proposed by the Commission on Antisemitism was deleted by the Plenary. One member of the International Drafting Committee, an African American from the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, resigned on 4 September citing in her letter of resignation "fundamental pro-

cedural flaws" which were not sufficiently addressed when they were raised, and "deliberate interference by some members of the ISC during the preparation of the final document..."

When it was adopted, very late at night on 1 September, the NGO Declaration and Plan of Action still contained language that was both inappropriate and hurtful, for example, calling for the reinstitution of Resolution 3379, labeling Israel an Apartheid regime, and calling for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to investigate acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing by Israel. As a consequence, several caucuses, including the caucus of NGOs from Eastern and Central Europe, the Roma, the Irish NGOs, and many of the international NGOs dissociated themselves from the document. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, who received a copy when she met with a delegation from the International Steering Committee on 4 September, stated that she was unable to commend the text as a whole to Governments because of this language.

Two other aspects of the NGO Forum were particularly unfortunate. One was the atmosphere of intimidation and hatred created by what may have been intended as an anti-Israeli campaign but which was perceived as an anti-Semitic one – the ubiquitousness of posters superimposing the swastika on the Star of David, the distribution of anti-Semitism literature and cartoons, and the disruption of the work of the caucus on anti-Semitism. Such behaviour is unacceptable anywhere but especially unconscionable in the context of a World Conference Against Racism. In addition, the Middle Eastern conflict overshadowed everything else, depriving other groups – the Afro descendants, the Indigenous, the Roma, the Dalits, and those who suffer multiple forms of discrimination, on the basis of race and gender, race and poverty, race and disability – of the opportunity of getting their message out. One lesson we must take from the World Conference Against Racism is that we must not let our own pain blind us to the pain of others or denigrate their suffering; we

must not build hierarchies of pain with ours at the pinnacle.

Moreover, as we reflect on the World Conference Against Racism, we must not let this acrimony distract us from the important achievements of Durban. There was, for the first time, a clear acknowledgement by Governments in the Declaration that “slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity and should always have been so, especially the transatlantic slave trade...” (paragraph 13). There is a recognition and affirmation that, “at the outset of the third millennium, a global fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and all their abhorrent and evolving forms and manifestations is a matter of priority for the international community...” (paragraph 3). There is an acknowledgment “that xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism...” (paragraph 16) and there is an emphasis on the fact that “that poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization, social exclusion and economic disparities are closely associated with racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance...” (paragraph 19). The articulation of these general principles is followed by a detailed programme of action to which governments have committed themselves, with concrete commitments at the national, regional and international levels.

Among the practical recommendations of Durban are the following: that we target the year 2005 for universal ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; that the OHCHR develop and fund specific technical cooperation projects aimed at combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; that the OHCHR establish a database with information on practical means to address racism; that the OHCHR create an Anti-Discrimination Unit to focus on the Durban agenda; that the Commission on Human Rights consider establishing a working group to study the problems of racial discrimination faced by people of African descent living in the African

diaspora; that a new mechanism be established comprised of five independent eminent experts to follow the implementation of Durban D&POA and that, in cooperation with this body, the High Commissioner report twice a year, once to the Commission on Human Rights and once to the General Assembly, including on the stage of implementa-

tion agenda and to ensure that this agenda is pursued in parallel with international action to combat terrorism.”

The real challenge of Durban, therefore, begins now. Non-governmental organizations, those mobilized and sensitized by the WCAR process, must start monitoring developments, putting into place their own programmes, and begin



tion by governments of their commitments to introduce national plans of action against racism and discrimination.

A few days after the close of the Durban Conference, on 11 September, the world was stunned by the savage attack on the World Trade Center in New York, riveting all attention on the need to counter terrorism and threatening to force Durban from public consciousness. It has, however, become clear that Durban takes on more importance, not less, in the aftermath of the 11 September attack. As the High Commissioner has put it: “While welcoming the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 1373, requiring all countries to take specific measures to combat terrorism, it is also important to safeguard against any erosion of human rights standards which might flow as an unintended consequence of such measures. In this context it has become even more important to promote the international anti-discrimi-

pressing governments and inter-governmental organizations to ensure that Durban was more than just a talk-shop. The Durban D&POA recognizes the important role that NGOs can play and “urges states to provide an open and conducive environment to enable non-governmental organizations to function freely and openly within their societies and thereby make an effective contribution to the elimination of racism...” (paragraph 216). It also “calls upon States to explore means to expand the role of non-governmental organizations in society through, in particular, deepening the ties of solidarity among citizens, promoting greater trust across racial and social class divides...” (paragraph 217). The promise of Durban – a world of justice and equality where the only race is the human race – remains to be realized.

Laurie Wiseberg, from Human Rights Internet, was NGO Liaison at the WCAR in Durban

HUMAN RIGHTS IN A MULTICULTURAL FRAMEWORK:

IN THE QUARTER-CENTURY FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, CANADA UNDERWENT A PROFOUND TRANSFORMATION, FROM A SELF-DEFINITION AS A "WHITE DOMINION" WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE TO ONE AS A "MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY". THERE WAS NOTHING INEVITABLE IN THE CANADIAN METAMORPHOSIS TOWARD DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM, AS IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD CIRCA 1970. DESPITE A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY, THE CANADIAN SOCIETY EMERGING FROM WORLD WAR II WAS EXCLUSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE TOWARD MANY PEOPLE ON GROUNDS OF "RACE", CULTURE, RELIGION AND SOCIAL PRACTICES. CANADIAN DEMOCRACY COULD ACCEPT THESE RESTRICTIONS BECAUSE "RACES" WERE REGARDED AS ACTUAL CATEGORIES OF HUMANITY, EACH WITH ITS OWN QUALITIES AND FAULTS, AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING DEFINITION OF A CITIZEN'S RIGHTS. IN 1945 IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE RIGHT TO FREE ASSOCIATION INCLUDED THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ASSOCIATE WITH ANY CLASS OF PERSON AS NEIGHBOUR, EMPLOYEE, OR CUSTOMER; THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION INCLUDED THE RIGHT TO SLANDER OR THREATEN ENTIRE GROUPS.

Postwar reordering of individual expectations and public values was not an exclusively Canadian phenomenon, but there was a distinctiveness in the Canadian version. The global rise of a human rights consciousness was linked, in Canada, to multiculturalism and not simply to individual rights. In designing our own commitment to a new respect for human dignity and equality, Canadians acknowledged the significance of the collective identity, the interests of the individual as a member of a group, and therefore the necessity to respect the integrity of the group in order to fulfil the rights of the individual. It is that essential convergence of human rights and multiculturalism, the extension of the movement towards universalism to incorporate the concept of diversity, that characterized the Canadian experience. Communities, and community identities, would not only be tolerated but encouraged and recognized as frameworks for the full expression of the individual citi-

Defining Canadian Citizenship, 1945-1970

BY James W. St.G. Walker

zen. This distinguished Canadian definitions of citizenship from most other Western democracies at the time.

But it did not "just happen". The political ideas and social vision that contributed to the gradual formulation of official multiculturalism had their origins in demands raised by Canadian citizens, in public crusades that brought pressure on politicians and, more importantly, increased the awareness of the broader population for issues of minority-group concern. "Common sense" was challenged, and sometimes redirected; the public perspective became more inclusive of the problems faced by minorities and more receptive to demands for change. By the time Pierre Trudeau announced his policy of "multiculturalism in a bilingual framework" in 1971, Canadian civic culture had already been converted and certain principles had become not only acceptable but inevitable components of any definition of Canadian citizenship.

In a larger paper entitled "Routes of Diversity: Strategies for Change, 1945-1970", I traced four community campaigns that moved Canadian society toward an acceptance of diversity and equality in access, dignity, participation and status for all citizens. The direction was set but, as many Canadians are acutely aware, the destination has still not been reached. On the premise that our continuing journey can be enriched by an awareness of some of our travelling companions, two of those campaigns are summarized in the article that follows. The first case illustrates how a more inclusive sense of citizenship could be used to expand access to the country itself. In the second, citizens' rights are adapted to protect the special needs of individuals as group members.

TOWARD EQUAL ACCESS: CAMPAIGNING FOR ASIAN IMMIGRATION

Since 1885 Canadian governments had imposed restrictive head-taxes

against Chinese immigrants, and then the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 virtually excluded Chinese from Canada. One result was that those who were already here, mostly men, were unable to sponsor their wives and children to join them in their new homeland. From the beginning of legalized discrimination against them, Chinese-Canadian community organizations sent petitions of protest and delegations to Ottawa, and in 1923 formed a national coalition to demand the same rights as other Canadians to bring their families to Canada. At that time Canadian politicians ignored the claims of an isolated minority, but by 1943 circumstances seemed to favour greater success. That year, in the midst of a war in which China and Canada were allies, Mme Chiang Kai-Shek visited Ottawa on behalf of the government of China and appealed for the removal of this insulting legislation. The United States, meanwhile, did ameliorate its own ban on Chinese immigration, and the Canadian press seemed generally sympathetic to a similar move here. And yet the Canadian government declined to act; the legislation excluding Chinese stayed in place.

As the war ended, Chinese Canadians understood that they would have to shift their tactics, and create a much more broadly-based coalition in pursuit of reform. From Vancouver, Foon Sien launched a bombardment of telegrams and resolutions to the federal government. In Toronto K. Dock Yip, the first Asian lawyer in Canada, recruited his law school friend, the labour lawyer Irving Himel, along with Toronto surgeon S.K. Ngai, the Rev. Dr. A.E. Armstrong of the United Church, Saturday Night editor B.K. Sandwell, and others to form the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. Dr. Ngai and Dr. Armstrong became co-chairs, and Mr. Himel was the Committee's legal counsel, an unpaid position that saw him operate virtually as executive secretary. The Committee leaders enlisted a network of

connections in the Christian churches, the Jewish community, labour unions, and Chinese associations across Canada. They quickly added representatives from women's organizations and professional groups, and eventually established nine sub-committees in different cities from Halifax to Victoria. All executive positions were carefully shared between Chinese and non-Chinese, though about three-quarters of the general membership were non-Chinese, motivated by the blatant racism in the Act and a desire to promote civil rights for all Canadians.

The Repeal Committee continued the tactic of sending petitions and delegations to Ottawa, and introduced the practice of soliciting resolutions from sympathetic organizations such as labour and church groups, to be forwarded to the federal cabinet. The arguments in these resolutions, crafted by the Committee, were that the Act made unacceptable distinctions on grounds of "race", it made normal family life impossible for Canadian citizens of Chinese origin, it was contrary to the United Nations Charter, and generally it violated the principles of human rights and Canadian democracy. Prime Minister Mackenzie King seemed sympathetic, but he was receiving conflicting advice from different parts of the civil service: external affairs recognized the potential benefits to China-Canada relations; immigration officials feared that repeal would open the gates to uncontrollable numbers of new Chinese immigrants. Furthermore King's Liberal government held a slim majority of 127 of the 245 seats in the House of Commons. If the BC Liberals defected on the Chinese issue the government could fall. Mr. King had to move with extreme caution; he had to know that the Canadian people would support a change.

The best the Committee could achieve in 1947 was technical repeal of the Act, with most of the effective restrictions retained. The Committee thereupon initiated a new campaign to mobilize public opinion in favour of equal access. Previously, most Canadians either disregarded the Chinese or felt that because they were so different any discriminatory treatment was justified. The Committee had to argue that what kept Chinese Canadians from living "normal" lives was

the legislation itself. They published a pamphlet describing the continuing unfair impact of the regulations, particularly family separation, and emphasised that international human rights agreements and the Canadian Citizenship Act committed Canada to a policy of racial equality. Chinese Canadians were held out as Canadians who suffered unjustly from discriminatory rules. The pamphlet had a detachable postcard addressed to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, urging "that everyone in Canada be brought under a single immigration law which is free of racial discrimination." Masses of these postcards were sent to Ottawa by ordinary Canadians, with an eventual result that the most overt restrictions on Asian immigrants were modified and family reunification became possible. The Committee had not achieved racial equality in Canadian immigration policy, but they had gained a significant symbolic victory in eliminating the single most absolute racial barrier in Canadian legislation at the time. As Dr. Ngai pointed out, the 1923 Act created a barrier within Canada as well, between Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians, and this too began to shift during the Repeal movement.

The Repeal Committee's national campaign undoubtedly had an effect on the minds of parliamentarians. More significantly, the campaign had a direct impact on the minds of the public who were targeted in the campaign. It was the public that was converted by the consistent argument connecting immigration policy with human rights and democratic principle, the Chinese war effort, family unification, and Canadian citizenship. Chinese and other Asian Canadians were brought conceptually into view as citizens who deserved the same treatment as any other Canadian. The Repeal campaign anticipated the immigration reforms of the 1960s, and took a pioneering step toward the establishment of a new moral threshold: a democratic government should not engage in racial discrimination against its own people.

TOWARD EQUAL DIGNITY: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST HATE LITERATURE

In 1963 Canadian Jewry sustained its worst-ever onslaught of public anti-Semitic hatred, beginning in Toronto and

spreading to many other parts of the country the following year. Leaflets declaring "Hitler Was Right" rained from an office tower window onto a crowd commemorating Remembrance Day, and were stuffed in pockets and windshields of unsuspecting Canadians; swastikas and slogans were daubed on hoardings and windows; a letter was sent randomly through the post advocating the sterilization of every Jew in Canada and the execution of any "involved in Communist or Zionist plots". Until now, Jewish organizations had employed a "Quarantine Treatment" against hate-mongers: pretend to ignore them, do not give them any publicity, and they will eventually go away. But the new outburst was too blatant to be ignored, and besides some Jews feared that their fellow-citizens could be affected by this kind of propaganda. In early 1964 "Quarantine" was abandoned, and Jewish organizations mounted a national campaign to outlaw "hate literature" under the Criminal Code.

Fundamental to the argument they developed in favour of protective legislation was the notion that "hate" hurt everyone, not just Jews, by sowing suspicion and dissension among citizens and upsetting a democratic system that depended upon mutual respect and toleration. "Hate" propaganda was responsible for the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, it was argued, and subsequently for oppression, dictatorship, the Holocaust and World War II. Its restriction was obviously in the interest of the entire nation. Furthermore an anti-hate law would have an educational effect on every Canadian, declaring the public interest in opposition to racism: targeted minorities would feel confident that their well-being was of concern to their society; the majority would note that the dignity of every citizen was valued as an integral principle of Canadian democracy. Since slander and defamation were already recognized as illegal by the Criminal Code, advocates claimed that their amendment was merely extending to groups the protections already accorded to individuals.

Initially the campaign was aimed at the federal government, with briefs, delegations and a flow of letters from Jewish organizations across Canada. This was supplemented by a coordinated program of supportive resolutions and endorse-

ments from a wide variety of non-Jewish organizations, churches, unions, ethnic associations and professional bodies. As each resolution was passed it generated a story in the newspapers and, often, editorial comment. Most of the attention was favourable, and even when legislation was not considered necessary the journalists and editors made it clear that they joined in the condemnation of racist publications. The hesitation, among some influential opinion-makers, was that the lunatic fringe of Canadian hate-mongers did not require special legislation, whereas any limitation on freedom of expression could later become a threat to democratic speech in Canada.

Justice Minister Guy Favreau was willing to protect Jews and others from hateful publications, but worried that "in forbidding the licence of the vicious few" he could "endanger the deeper liberty that ennobles us all." The solution arrived during a meeting in October 1964 with Michael Garber and Saul Hayes of the Canadian Jewish Congress, and Dean Maxwell Cohen of McGill Law School. The visitors suggested that Mr. Favreau appoint an extra-parliamentary committee to make recommendations to facilitate the suppression of hate materials while keeping open the free expression of democratic opinion. The Minister grasped the opportunity, immediately appointing Dean Cohen as chair and Mr. Hayes as a member of the Committee. Law professors Pierre Trudeau and Mark MacGuigan were among the remaining five members.

The Cohen Committee examined samples of hate literature and the utility of laws in Canada and other western democracies to restrict it, and they studied the effect of hate literature on the victims and on the general public. They concluded in their 1966 Report that "The Canadian community has a duty, not merely the right, to protect itself from the corrosive effects of propaganda that tends to undermine the confidence that various groups in a multicultural society must have in each other." Since existing law did not offer such protection, the Committee recommended a new law against "group defamation" to prohibit hatred or contempt against any identifiable group distinguished by "religion, colour, race, language, or ethnic or national origin."

Exempted from the law would be anything that was true, or that the initiator reasonably believed to be true if its discussion served the public interest.

After further consultation, the government introduced a Bill into the Senate in November 1966 following the principles established in the Cohen Report. But it would take three and a half years before legislation was in place, being referred to a sequence of parliamentary committees each of which held discussions, heard witnesses and received briefs from the public. Even the election of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister and Mark MacGuigan as a government MP in 1968 was not enough to secure its passage into law until April 1970. Throughout these lengthy deliberations organized Jewry kept up a constant campaign to encourage public support for the Bill and to answer concerns about it, through letters to editors, mailings to human rights and citizenship groups, resolutions at annual meetings, endorsements and briefs. Their goal was to connect the hate issue to the broader movement for human dignity and individual rights, and to make that connection they had to venture a conceptual innovation, redefining the "public interest" to include protection for individuals as members of a definable group. The opposition it aroused gives some impression of the revolutionary nature of this extension. The terms of the debate had to be turned around, presented not as a restriction against but an enforcement of an individual human right. The focus on the holder of the "right" was shifted, from purveyor of opinion to recipient of any indignity that was grounded in the group to which the recipient belonged.

Like the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, the historical legacy of the campaign against hate literature may be more symbolic than technical. The 1970 articles adding hate literature to the Criminal Code enshrined a new standard of public morality, establishing the principle that in a multicultural society group hatred actually endangers the social structure and must be considered a threat to the entire community. Passage of the anti-hate law expanded our understanding of the implications of pluralism and diversity in Canada. It was accepted by the public as a reasonable restriction on perpetra-

tors of indignity, in order to promote the inclusion of "target" groups into the full range of opportunities available to Canadian citizens. The "hate law" was not simply a product of the times or a gift from an enlightened government. It was a very deliberate product of a deliberate campaign, carried primarily by a community concerned in the short term for its own dignity and in the longer term, conceivably, its own survival.

REFLECTIONS

When some people or some cultural characteristic became normal, it required adjustment from the entire society including its institutions and its "symbolic order". And this is what these and similar campaigns accomplished. They extended what was acceptable for citizens and what was expected of governments. They initiated a dynamic of normalization. Each campaign had its own purpose and its own impact; taken together, they show that multiculturalism and human rights were not part of a master plan but a process reflecting community initiatives that gradually reoriented both the Canadian polity and the Canadian identity. It has often been said that multiculturalism is a "fact", that is, we do have a culturally diverse population as a result of former and current immigration policy. Multiculturalism is also an "act", the 1988 federal statute and the various official policies introduced federally and provincially over the years. And thirdly, it is useful to think of multiculturalism as a "pact", as a commitment to a particular mode of relating to one another undertaken by everyone who identifies as a Canadian citizen. It was the "pact" that was being defined through the kind of campaigns examined in this study, the peculiarly Canadian route to human rights in the course of accommodating groups who wanted their citizenship to embrace their own requirements and realities. Like any pact, it requires renewal; it is part of a process that continues and will continue. Its shape will no doubt depend in the future, as it has in the past, on how we participate in it.

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EVERYONE'S A Critic

BY John Biles

CRITICISING MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA IS A GROWTH INDUSTRY. FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS CANADIANS, RESEARCHERS, CULTURAL COMMENTATORS, POLITICIANS (OR WOULD-BE POLITICIANS) OF EVERY STRIPE, AND NEWSPAPER COLUMNISTS ALONG WITH THEIR MEDIA BRETHERN HAVE RAILED AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA. EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH NOTED IN 1996 THAT, "OPponents OF MULTICULTURALISM SEEM TO USE THE WORD [MULTICULTURALISM] TO INDICATE THEIR DISLIKE OF A NUMBER OF CHANGES OCCURRING WITHIN CANADA IN THE LAST THREE OR FOUR DECADES, WITH THE NATURE OF THEIR CRITICISM GOING WELL BEYOND THE NOMINAL TARGET OF OFFICIAL MULTICULTURALISM." IN THIS ESSAY I WANT TO EXAMINE THE CRITIQUES WHICH HAVE BEEN THROWN AT MULTICULTURALISM.

Before proceeding however, it is important to be clear on what exactly I mean by multiculturalism. Although I am a strong supporter of multiculturalism as public policy, and I believe that the federal policy has been key in the development of multiculturalism in Canada, I do not believe the federal policy is the be all and end all. Rather, it is one piece of a far larger exercise that Canadians have collectively pursued over the last thirty years, or longer if you believe the work of Joshee (1995), Pal (1993), Day (2000), or Biles and Panousos (1999). Every major public institution in the country has developed a policy on multiculturalism at one time or another, and every provincial and municipal government has tackled issues arising from our diversity. This great volume of policies and concomitant discussions has developed a commitment on the part of Canadians to a continual active discourse on issues arising from diversity. This is what Fleras and Elliott (1992) have dubbed, "multiculturalism as critical discourse."

Participation in this critical discourse occurs in a myriad of forms. Neil Bissoondath's claim that "few silences are as loaded in this country as the one encasing the cult that has grown up around our policy of multiculturalism" (1994: 4) rings as false today as it did seven years ago. This animated discourse may be integral to the lived experience of individual Canadians or of Canadian communities; it may be shaped by legislative or judicial decisions; it may be used by various opinion leaders; or it may be printed in the media, in peer-reviewed academic literature, non-academic publications or vanity presses. They make take the form of brief edito-

rials or newspaper commentaries (O'Sullivan 1999, Loney 1998, Frum 1999, Amiel 1998, Lakritz 1998, 1999); articles in academic journals (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, Das Gupta and Iacovetta 2000); dialectic collected works (Charlton and Barker 1994, Cohen, Howard and Nussbaum 1999, Griffiths 2000, Cardozo and Musto 1997); or in full-scale monographs (Gairdner 1990, Bibby 1990, Bissoondath 1994, Gwyn 1995, Loney 1998, Foster 1998, Sugunasiri 1999, Bannerji 2000, Day 2000). Whatever the form, four major critiques predominate: (1) the divisive nature of pluralism; (2) political expediency; (3) threat to the status quo; and (4) cultural relativism.

THE DIVISIVE NATURE OF MULTICULTURALISM

The easiest and most often presented critique of multiculturalism in Canada is that it is divisive. This view is most clearly expressed by Martin Loney in his *The Pursuit of Division: Race, Gender and Preferential Hiring in Canada* (1998). Loney and others contend that multiculturalism is a centrifugal rather than centripetal force. This is nowhere more clear than in the most overworked of Canadian images – the mosaic. The mosaic as a central image for Canadian multiculturalism is disastrous. It conjures images of pretty little tiles which are cemented together to form a picture which can literally last millennia. It fails to capture the two-way nature of integration that has long been enshrined in the multiculturalism policy which was constitutionally entrenched through the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982); which was legislated in the *Canadian*

Multiculturalism Act (1988) and was recently recognized as a guiding principle of the *Immigration and Protection of Refugees Act* (2001). Perversely, the imagery of the melting pot seems much more applicable, even if its negative baggage renders it impolitic as an image of choice. In a melting pot the addition of every new ingredient alters the entire liquid – there is no cement! No belief in an immutable core.

Despite the inadequacy of the image, it persists and even flourishes today. John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (1965) is kept company by Leo Driedger ed. *The Canadian Ethnic Mosaic: A Quest for Identity* (1978) and most recently by Kelley and Trebilcock's *The Making of the Canadian Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy* (1998). In recent years a preoccupation with social cohesion suggests that governments are actively attempting to cement new mosaics into place (Jeannotte 2000).

In some part then, I want to argue that the conceptualization of multiculturalism as a mosaic by proponents of the approach, actually opened the doors to the critique that multiculturalism is divisive or forces minorities into ghettos. Going further, as Blommaert and Verschueren argue in their *debating diversity: Analysing the discourse of tolerance* (1998), even the most well-meaning can lapse into systemic discrimination if the starting point is flawed: one could even end up entombing inequality in the drying cement of social cohesion!

On the first count, the divisive nature of multiculturalism, Gairdner claims "Opinion polls in Canada, the U.S.A., and Australia consistently show strong to overwhelming majorities opposed to multiculturalism policies that erode the core culture. . ." (Gairdner 1990: 389) I am left wondering why an Environics poll in 1996 found that multiculturalism is identified as a common Canadian symbol more often than our winter national sport – hockey (Environics 1996: 61). Every opinion poll I have seen since actually strongly

supports multiculturalism. I also wonder if, in some sense, the very ubiquitous nature of public discourse on multiculturalism suggests that it actually unites Canadians. More work can, and should, be done in this regard to evaluate the extent to which multiculturalism represents a core belief of Canadians and respect for diversity as a core Canadian value. A periodic national opinion poll like that done by Angus Reid in 1991 would yield a wealth of information.

On the second critique, the forced ghettoization of minorities (Bissoondath 1994), more research can be brought to bear. A literal spatial interpretation can be evaluated through research initiatives like Metropolis (<http://www.metropolis.net>). Within Metropolis an incredible amount of research has been conducted in Canada and around the world on whether minority communities congregate in particular areas and why this might be the case (Lithman 1997, Blom 1997, Rose 1999). There is ample evidence that minorities choosing to live in close proximity to one another may not be harmful to the much-vaunted bridging capital Robert Putnam (1994) has written about. They may, indeed, choose to live together for much the same reason as any other group of Canadians – cost of housing, quality of life, access to sites of worship, schools, employment, proximity to public transportation and so forth. More negatively, research by Valerie Preston (2000) suggests environmental racism has a role to play in determining where people choose to live.

If we look at ghettoization in a less spatial sense and expand it to include the permanent “othering” in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres of Canadian society, we have a different range of research findings to consider. Small scale studies have been conducted in Canada on these topics, but future work to connect these disparate studies will be essential. Will Kymlicka cites a range of indicators in his *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (1998) which include intermarriage, language acquisition and naturalization. Clearly others can be developed like the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* and the social capital and time use modules of cycle

seventeen of the *General Social Survey*. The promised development of an inclusion/exclusion index by the multiculturalism program and Metropolis and continued work of the political participation network (<http://www.canada.metropolis.net/pprn>) will also continue to yield invaluable results.

POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY

The political participation of ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in Canada is frequently the subject of casual conversation, but seldom the subject of academic enquiry. The easiest off the cuff criticism to make of multiculturalism is that it is a means to “buy” the “ethnic vote.” Closely allied to this critique is the language of the “special interest group” increasingly adopted by political figures on the centre right. Somehow, in the Canadian context, the significant body of work done on interest groups, most notably by Paul Pross in his *Group Politics and Public Policy* (1986) has morphed into a dichotomy of valid and invalid interest groups. It would appear that the Canadian Alliance and the Liberal parties of Canada, the Business Council on National Issues, and the CEOs of major banks constitute valid interests, whereas the Croatian-Canadians in Toronto or the Blacks in Halifax are “special interest groups” and, therefore, illegitimate.

At the core of this critique is something that smells a great deal like racism and/or discrimination. How else can we understand the pejorative language used to denigrate the interests of some Canadians? It also has a rather essentialist air to it that echoes that of the division critics mentioned earlier. This critique suggests that there is such a thing as THE Black community in Halifax and that it is a homogeneous entity. Decades of research show that any so-called community is, in fact, a heterogeneous collection of people with competing, and often conflicting, interests and agendas. Much of the work done by the Political Participation Research Network also suggests that any claims or accusations of an “ethnic vote” are, at the very least, exaggerated, and, in most cases, fictitious.

Perhaps the best indicator of the salience of “ethnic votes” may be the

extent to which minorities are represented in the formal political system across the country. My own work in Ottawa (1998), Carolle Simard's in Montreal (2000) and Myer Siemiatycki's in Toronto (1998) demonstrates that the majority of minority communities are chronically under-represented at ALL levels of government. A decade after the *Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing*, we are no closer to having a representative democracy. Once again, more can, and should, be done in this area and future analysis of the *Canadian Election Study* data set and the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* will yield more information.

As in the case with the earlier critiques, there is also a political expediency critique emanating from supporters of diversity. This critique is centred on the symbolic nature of multiculturalism. Most of us are familiar with the ubiquitous, derogatory comments about multiculturalism that center on the fluffy stuff: the song, dance, and food. I believe there are a number of problems with this critique.

First, and foremost, is the power of symbolism. I have heard the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* referred to as a “legislated press release.” Anyone examining legislation pertaining to multiculturalism, diversity or human rights will be familiar with the “toothless” critique that is thrown at every piece of legislation or governmental approach. For a toothless, merely symbolic policy, there is has been an incredible amount of discussion, analysis and action over the last thirty years.

Second, there is scant evidence to suggest that the expenditure of billions of dollars of public funds on the whole range of issues under the rubric of multiculturalism has achieved nothing. If we examine the two stock-taking reports prepared for the Canadian Secretariat for the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Jedwab et. al. 2001, Davis and Brant Castellano 2001) we discover the depth of enquiry into diversity issues that has taken place over the last twenty years. If we expand further and examine the breadth of research, as represented by the

inventory of graduate research compiled by Mulholland (2001), we see a clear commitment, on the part of Canadians and their governments, to know more about multiculturalism in Canada and to effect change for the better. The planned index of inclusion/exclusion will also provide concrete examples of change that can be tracked longitudinally.

Third, not all human beings are profit maximizers. To decry any activity that is not economically-focused is to omit an incredible portion of the lives of Canadians. In addition, in a perfect world, the social, cultural, economic and political arenas would be equally occupied by men and women. We do not live in a perfect world. Women are still disproportionately responsible for the social and cultural aspects of our lives and seniors are largely outside of the formal economic arena. To eliminate any serious consideration of cultural and social elements of our lives leads to the systemic underestimation and belittlement of the role of many women and seniors in Canadian society. The question posed by *Toronto Star* emeritus editor, Haroon Siddiqui at the Fifth National Metropolis Conference in October 2001, still rings in my ears: "How do we value a grandmother?" She may not earn dollars, but she contributes extensively to the quality of life of her extended family, and she enables the parents of the grandchildren to participate in the economy or to pursue educational goals. Census questions on unpaid work could certainly be brought to bear on this interesting question. Issues of voluntarism also need to be explored further.

THREAT TO THE STATUS QUO

The third major critique of multiculturalism that litters the discourse, is the threat diversity poses to the status quo. Critics are well represented here by Richard Gwynn's *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian* (1995) in which he decries the end of the "tram lines of Canadian history." Chapters by Gairdner (1990) "The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Multiculturalism, Bilingualism and Immigration" and Bissoondath (1994) "Losing the Centre" are just variations

on a theme. This critique plays itself out in two large ways, one through the lament for "national" history, and the other through the evolution of "national" symbols.

The history debate is most apparent around Canada Day when the Dominion Institute surveys on knowledge of select Canadians and Canadian events have become de rigeur in all

social fabric. A whole body of literature counters Granatstein's claim and suggests that a "national" history lost credibility because it omitted the stories of many Canadians and their communities. Timothy Stanley's "Why I Killed Canadian History: Conditions for an Anti-Racist History" (2000) rebuts Granatstein's view and argues that a meta-narrative is necessarily exclusion-



Courtesy Department of Canadian Heritage

major newspapers. It also reached a boil with Jack Granatstein's *Who Killed Canadian History?* (1998). In a link back to the first critique Granatstein wrote, "Now it may only be a coincidence that the turn away from national and political history took place at the same time that Canada began to fragment. Did the historians' shift to victimization and blame-seeking on the fringes, to a peoples' history, and to abstract, abstruse language lead Canada's plunge toward dissolution, or did it merely reflect what was happening in the body politic? . . . Tragically, at a time when it was critical that Canadians understand their political and constitutional history, historians wanted to talk tiny, trivial subjects of little or no general interest" (1998: 77). His doomsday scenario fits well with the social cohesion perspective which suggests that diversity represents "fault-lines" which threaten the Canadian

ary and we would be better served by many small histories. His point is hammered home by work of historians like Jim Walker (1999), Constance Backhouse (1999), and Olive Dickason (1997) who unearth many elements of the Canadian experience overlooked by the "national" histories advocated by Granatstein.

The second major threat to the status quo surrounds the evolution of "national" symbols. This critique is best exemplified by the millinery issues which have exploded in the Canadian media over the last decade: the hijab in Quebec schools, and the turban in legion halls or as part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's dress uniform. If we consider the latter the illusion underpinning the critique is clear. The RCMP are a symbol of Canadian nationhood that harks back to pre-Confederation and to an era when

Canadian society was overwhelmingly composed of people of British or French origin. However, as *Ottawa Citizen* journalist Tom Spears noted, "for a uniform that everybody recognizes, mountie garb has undergone an incredible number of changes over the years" (Spears 1998: A6). The key point to consider is that symbols emerge and evolve over time. This is always the case and a causal link to multiculturalism is dubious at

Canadians and their governments continually negotiate the limits on what is acceptable. What multiculturalism assures is that all Canadians will have a say in the rules by which we choose to collectively live.

best. Further research into the evolution of symbols would further enhance our knowledge in this area. Daniel Francis goes further and skewers many of our "long-standing" symbols in his enlightening *National Dreams: Myth, Memory and Canadian History* (1997). Tellingly, he observes that, "It turns out that many of our cherished myths were invented by government agencies or private corporations for quite specific, usually self-serving purposes. Canadians as a whole then embraced them because they seemed to express something that we wanted to believe about ourselves" (9). The question is what did we want to believe?

CULTURAL RELATIVISM OR THERE ARE NO LIMITS

The last of the major critiques is the argument put forward by Reginald Bibby in his *Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada* (1990), and by Bissoondath (1994) in a chapter entitled "The Limits of Diversity". The essence of this critique is that if all cultures and all cultural practices are equally valid, then society will cease to function because we will be unable distinguish between the good and the bad. The most well known example in this area is female genital operations/mutilation or female circumcision.

To me, at least, this appears to be the most specious of the critiques covered here. Alissa Levine (1999) also questions the Canadian approach on this issue. Even a superficial reading of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the *Criminal Code of Canada*, not to mention an entire body of legislation and judicial decisions, argue that this is not the case. Neil Bissoondath (1994) and Naomi Lakritz (1998) cite a number of examples of judges who overstepped the mark in decisions that can only be considered outliers as proof that multiculturalism knows no bounds.

From where I sit, there are boundaries. Yes, they are flexible and subject to change from legislation and judicial decisions, but how many legal parameters in Canada are not subject to change? It is my contention Canadians and their governments continually negotiate the limits on what is acceptable. What multiculturalism assures is that all Canadians will have a say in the rules by which we choose to collectively live. Far from a violation of democratic principles, I believe this kind of inclusion is fundamental to democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly there is work to be done. As a basic starting point the discourse surrounding multiculturalism needs to be informed. Critics and proponents need to bring research that substantiates their points of view to the discussion. It is easy to disparage critics who neglect to document any sources in their work, but it is equally important to hold proponents of multiculturalism to account for the generalities that they can spout with regularity.

Longitudinal research frameworks, which can form the spine of the endeavours in this field, must be developed and implemented. Initiatives like Metropolis, which bring key policy figures (federal, provincial and municipal), researchers from across the country (centres of excellence already exist in Vancouver, Edmonton, Toronto and Montreal, and an Atlantic Centre is expected to start April 1, 2003), and practitioners together are a start. Data sources from Statistics Canada like *The Ethnic Diversity Survey* will yield more valuable

information. The inclusion of ethnicity in survey design for government-wide data gathering instruments and on public opinion polling would both meet the requirements of the *Act* and provide knowledge to guide public discourse.

The much maligned Annual Report on the Operation of the Multiculturalism Act could be redesigned to enhance its efficacy. I believe that Bohdan Kordan (1997) has it wrong when he writes of the report, it "is unquestionably an inadequate instrument." By creating an index of inclusion/exclusion, which is presented and tested at the annual Metropolis and Policy Research Initiative Conferences, and is highlighted as the first chapter of the annual report, continuity could be established and priorities for enquiry in the coming year could be flagged. Equally, the connection to cross-government initiatives, be they skills and innovations or social cohesion, could be highlighted in the report each year. As the key source document on multiculturalism as official policy, the Annual Report is frequently referenced in research and policy design. It should, therefore, be part of an integrated longitudinal design to report on where we collectively find ourselves on a range of issues arising from diversity.

Finally, at the outset of official multiculturalism, regular conferences were designed to bring the key players from across the country together. A return to this format would enable key research findings, policy considerations and past practices to be shared broadly. If each conference focused on a particular issue (say, institutional development in health care), past practices and research could be used to design future work that would assist us all in dismantling the barriers which continue to persist in the social, economic, cultural and political realms of Canadian society. These conferences would also go a long way to ensuring that the heated discourse around multiculturalism is based on knowledge and not ignorance.

John Biles is part of the Metropolis Project Team at Citizenship and Immigration Canada

CHALLENGES TO CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM:

The Case of Black Montreal

BY Peter F. Flegel

FOR OVER THE LAST DECADE, MOST CANADIANS HAVE BELIEVED THAT CANADA WAS A 'MODEL MULTICULTURAL AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY' IN WHICH ALL CITIZENS COULD PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. THE LOFTY PRINCIPLES AND GOALS EXTOLLED WITHIN THE *CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS*, THE *MULTICULTURALISM ACT*, THE *EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT* AND THE *CANADIAN RACE RELATIONS FOUNDATION ACT*, ATTESTED TO THE COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO PROTECT TRADITIONALLY DISADVANTAGED GROUPS FROM DISCRIMINATION AND TO EMPOWER THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN CANADIAN SOCIETY AS EQUALS. MOST RECENTLY, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED THIS VIEW DURING ITS PREPARATIONS FOR AND PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM THAT TOOK PLACE IN DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA LAST AUGUST. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AN OFFICIAL (AUGUST, 2001) DOCUMENT PRESENTING CANADA'S APPROACH TO THE WCAR, THE GOVERNMENT AFFIRMED ITS POSITION THAT THE COUNTRY HAD "REACHED A UNIQUE BALANCE BETWEEN NURTURING DIVERSITY AND ENSURING AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY, BASED ON EQUALITY AND THE ABILITY OF ALL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY TO REACH THEIR FULL POTENTIAL."

Despite this confidence in Canadian multiculturalism, the representatives of the Canadian government went to South Africa oblivious of one of the country's 'dirtiest secrets.' Behind the veneer of multicultural policies and legal protections for racialized groups was (and still is) concealed the suffering, widespread poverty and inequity faced by a significant group in Canada: Black Canadians. Most attempts to account for this problem have relied on "culturalist" explanations. For example, Black community organizations have been exhorted to focus on providing group members with the 'social capital' necessary to compete effectively on the job market. The possibility that racial discrimination is part of the problem is often dismissed on the grounds that the existence of various legal statutes and recourses for victims of racism demonstrate that racism no longer exists in Canada. In other words, with Canada's commitment to multiculturalism, how could racism persist today?

The recent publishing of an extensive study on the demographics of Montreal's Black community demonstrates the fallacy of these assumptions and raises serious questions about Canadian multiculturalism as an effective framework and tool to promote cultural diversity and empower minority groups to participate fully in the shaping and evolution of the country. Despite its admirable values and meritorious commitments, Canadian multiculturalism has clearly failed to live up to its expectations. Nonetheless, a renewed and more efficient multiculturalism policy is required in order to achieve a significant change in the lives of Black Canadians in general and Black Montrealers in particular.

As other articles in this magazine have explored, Multiculturalism as a framework guiding Canadian public policy and as a goal to be pursued by the state, emerged towards the end of the 1960s when a separatist movement was gaining momentum in Quebec. Realizing the threat that it posed to Canadian unity, the Pearson government appointed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to explore the problems of French-English relations and formulate a series of recommendations designed to alleviate the problem. Among its main recommendations, the commission's report suggested that non-British or French ethnic groups should be *integrated* into Canadian society through the provision of citizenship rights and participation in the basic institutional structure of the country. Acting on the recommendations, Prime Minister Trudeau ratified his



Courtesy Department of Canadian Heritage

multiculturalism policy in 1971: the *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework*. The main objectives were to encourage interethnic dialogue, promote the retention of cultural groups' identities, overcome barriers to their participation in Canadian society and help immigrants to become proficient

fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and mandated the Courts to consider multiculturalism as a factor to be considered at all levels of decision-making (Leman, 1999).

Following the ratification of the Charter, the country continued its commitment to multicultural policy

One of the most alarming findings is that a Black university graduate is more likely to be unemployed than a non-Black person who has not graduated from high school.

in one of the two official languages. The government sought to achieve those goals by creating a Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State and a Ministry of Multiculturalism in the early 1970s (Hawkins, 1988).

During the 1980s, Canadian multiculturalism policy was institutionalized through programs designed to help Canadian institutions adapt to the presence of the new immigrant groups and to combat discrimination in the workforce. This process culminated in the adoption of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in 1982. Among the many rights and fundamental freedoms that were guaranteed in the Charter were provisions to address the discrimination faced by many ethnic and visible minorities in Canada. Among these, Section 15(1) stipulated:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin...

Recognizing that certain measures might be required to compensate for the discrimination faced by minority groups, the Charter also made provision for affirmative action programs. Regarding the multicultural character of the country, Section 27 affirmed: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." This clause enshrined multiculturalism as a

and legislation through the drafting of a report on multiculturalism, *Equality Now*, by the Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities in 1984, and the creation of a House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism in 1985. Recognizing that certain ethnic groups were disadvantaged in the labor market, the government implemented an *Employment Equity Act* in 1986; it was designed to provide four disadvantaged groups – women, the disabled, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities – with equal access to employment opportunities. By 1987, the Committee was calling for the enactment of a new policy on Multiculturalism and the creation of the Department of Multiculturalism. As a result, a new multiculturalism policy, the *Multiculturalism Act*, was put into effect and adopted by the Parliament in July 1988. The policy affirmed that multiculturalism was a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and that it should play an integral role in governmental decision-making processes at the federal and provincial levels. Particular emphasis was placed on the government's role in ensuring that federal institutions enabled minorities to have equal employment opportunities. For example, Section 3(2)a declared that "all federal institutions shall ensure that Canadians of all origins have an equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in those institutions..." Despite its emphasis on federal institutions, the government was also exhorted to encourage and assist the private sector to "be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural charac-

ter" in order to ensure the full participation of minority groups (Section 3(2)f; Section 5(1)d) (Magsino, 2000).

In 1991, Parliament adopted legislation mandating the creation of a Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship whose programs would seek to promote acceptance and implementation of the principles of multiculturalism and racial equality, help Canadians enhance, preserve and share their cultural and linguistic heritage within the larger society, and facilitate the full and equitable participation of racial and ethnocultural minorities in Canadian society. Despite its high objectives, the Department was dismantled in 1993 and its programs were incorporated into a larger Department of Canadian Heritage. Nonetheless, a Secretary of State of Multiculturalism was appointed within the Minister of Canadian Heritage. By 1995, the Secretary of State modified and refined the objectives of Canadian Multiculturalism by focusing its programs on building a fair and equitable society, fostering the civic participation of all Canadians, and facilitating the development of a society which reflects, respects and recognizes cultural and ethnic diversity. The purpose was to ensure that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging to Canada. At the same time, the Secretary of State announced the establishment of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, dedicated to encouraging research on and disseminating information about strategies to eliminate racism and racial discrimination in Canada (Magsino, 2000).

With such a rich history of multicultural policies, employment equity programs, and other forms of legislation designed to enhance and protect the multicultural character of Canadian society, one would expect that the living conditions of traditionally disadvantaged and marginalized groups would have improved significantly. Unfortunately, as a demographic profile of Montreal's Black community reveals, this is not the case.

Based on data from the 1996 Canadian census, the study – "The Evolution of the Black Community of

Montreal: Change and Challenge” – paints a bleak picture of Black Montreal. Blacks in Montreal earn an average of \$15,397 compared with \$24,625 for Montrealers as a whole, and 72% of the Black community earn less than \$20,000. Fifty-seven percent of the Black community compared with only 26% of non-Blacks lives in poverty. The situation is worse among Black women and Black youth: 60% of Black women live in poverty and over 66% of Black children are living below the poverty line. Regarding employment opportunities, twenty-one percent of Blacks in the labor force compared to 33% of non-Blacks work as full time employees, and Blacks with full time jobs earn on average 30% less than the average for full time employees in Montreal. Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than non-Blacks, and 26.5% of Blacks compared to 10.7% of non-Blacks are unemployed (Torczyner and Springer).

Despite allegations that these figures represent that Black Montrealers are unable to fully integrate into Canadian society, the evidence suggests that other factors are to be blamed. For example, one of the most alarming findings is that a Black university graduate is more likely to be unemployed than a non-Black person who has not graduated from high school. In fact, at every educational level, Blacks are more than twice as likely to be unemployed as their non-Black counterparts (Torczyner and Springer). Thus, issues surrounding racism and racial discrimination seem to be involved.

The effects of these disadvantages are being felt on many levels: the rise of gang-related activity among youth, the increasing number of children attending school without having eaten a meal in the morning, increased economic strain on families that are already impacted by a breakdown in the traditional family structure and generational and cultural tensions between parents and children. An increasing number of youths are wondering whether the pursuit of postsecondary education has any worth given the possibility that they will not be able to find jobs. Black civic participation has

diminished significantly; according to a recent informal poll conducted in November, less than twenty percent of eligible Black voters exercised their right during the recent municipal elections, compared with close to fifty percent of eligible non-Black Montreal voters (poll conducted at campaign office of Reverend Darryl Gray).

The case of Montreal's Black community raises serious questions about the efficacy and future of Canadian multiculturalism policy. Clearly, the desire to promote the idea that “multiculturalism... provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future,” the attempt to ensure the “full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in... the shaping of ... Canadian society and ... [assisting] them in the elimination of any barrier to such participation” and the aim of encouraging and helping “the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character,” are still mere aspirations. Two decades of multiculturalism legislation, projects and programs have yet to yield the equitable and multicultural society that is championed by so many Canadians. In fact, the evidence suggests that “invisible barriers” in Canadian society are disempowering traditionally disadvantaged groups, limiting their ability to shape the evolution of all aspects of Canadian society, and contributing to a reluctance to help decide the political future of their country. At a more fundamental level, the daunting disparities between Black and non-Black Montrealers suggest that true Canadian citizenship – an ideal encompassing the provision of social, civic and political rights, a series of civic activities designed to actualize these rights, and a sense of belonging to the larger Canadian political community (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000) – is still but an abstraction for Montreal's Black community; their rights are still truncated by barriers that place them behind their non-Black counterparts in a number of areas and dissuade them from identifying fully with Canadian society.

It is important to stress, however, that the principles of Canadian Multiculturalism are not to blame. In fact, as many point out, the values of equality of opportunity and a group's right to maintain its ethnocultural heritage concur with the basic needs of Montreal's Black community. The problem, however, lies in the ways in which these principles or goals are implemented. Without venturing into a detailed account of the problems with the current approaches to Multiculturalism, government cut backs in the Department of Canadian Heritage, increased limits on the clout of the Secretary of State (Multiculturalism – Status of Women), and an approach to employment equity which focuses primarily on the public sector rather than incorporating the private sector and unions within its jurisdiction, seem to be involved. What is needed to rectify the problem is a renewed approach to formulating and implementing multiculturalism policy and programs that involve (i) greater discussions on the strengths and weakness of Canadian multiculturalism policy as it affects Black Canadians in general and Black Montrealers in particular, (ii) on areas in which policy and its implementation should be improved; a more coordinated approach to the implementation of multiculturalism policy; and (iii) greater leadership and activism by representatives of Montreal's and the rest of Canada's Black communities. Central to this process is collaboration among different federal and provincial governmental departments, the Canadian and Quebec Human Rights Commissions and Tribunals, unions, the private sector and key players working in the Black community in Montreal and across the country. It is only through such a joint effort pursued according to the fundamental principles of Canadian multiculturalism, human rights, and democracy that the ideal of a multicultural and equal society can be achieved in Canada.

Peter F. Flegel is the Founder and co-Chair of Black Youth in Action

PARTICIPER À L'ÉVOLUTION DES SCIENCES SOCIALES :

Un défi pour les partenaires de la recherche

Sous la direction de Frédéric Lesemann, Yves Boisvert et Diane Saint-Pierre
Les Éditions de L'IQRC (2001), 130 pages

Cette plaquette regroupe les communications présentées lors du 20 anniversaire de l'Institut National de Recherche Scientifique – Culture et Société et aborde l'importante question des pratiques et des finalités de la recherche.

D'entrée de jeu, Lesemann lance le débat : 'de plus en plus intégrés à l'action publique gouvernementale, les nouveaux savoirs issus de l'évolution des sciences sociales perdent-ils de leur 'objectivité' et, corollairement, l'identité professionnelle, bâtie autour des disciplines et de la recherche 'fondamentale', de ceux et celles qui les produisent s'en trouve-t-elle menacée?'

Ce livre vient jeter de l'eau au moulin de ceux qui palabrent sans fin sur la sacrosainte liberté académique. Il met en cause les façons de faire traditionnelles et invite la communauté universitaire à ce regarder le nombril. Le tout sans exclure la réflexion des partenaires de recherche et des organismes subventionnaires.

Le première partie s'ouvre sur un texte de Paul Bernard. En gros, celui-ci affirme que : 'la connaissance est trop complexe, trop importante, trop large pour qu'on tente de l'enfermer dans des formules qui renvoient à la logique bureaucratique et qui ne peuvent que restreindre l'innovation.' En fait, l'auteur s'oppose ici à l'instrumentalité de l'université.

Gille Gagné va encore plus loin dans sa critique de la recherche appliquée en science sociale et l'intégration à l'action publique des nouveaux savoirs. Il se fait nostalgique lorsqu'il affirme que : 'l'essentiel de la recherche en sciences humaines et sociales est encore le fait de l'université, une institution qui hier encore n'avait rien à voir avec l'infinité des 'problèmes', des 'milieux' et des 'organisations' où nous invitons maintenant 'la recherche' à aller faire son recyclage ... L'infinité des paradigmes orphelins de 'la recherche' nous cache la radicale perte de pertinence sociétale de ce savoir qui brandit son associations aux organisations ...

pour nous assurer qu'il est encore le 'savoir de quelque chose.'

Il me semble que l'attitude de Léon Bernier, qui invite les chercheurs à une démarche de partage dans l'élaboration du savoir est plus constructive.

Patrice Ouellet propose de brouiller les frontières institutionnelles, de multiplier les relais de transmission de la connaissance et de faire tomber les barrières entre les praticiens et les producteurs de savoir scientifique. 'Les partenaires sociaux concernés, particulièrement les autorités publiques, le secteur associatif et le monde de la recherche, devront par conséquent réinventer leurs modes de coopération et d'échanges' fait-il valoir.


Les organismes 'subventionnaires' sont-ils des partenaires actifs de la recherche? Voilà l'objet de la deuxième partie de cet ouvrage. À juste titre, Camil Bouchard reconnaît, sans enthousiasme, le rôle des organismes subventionnaires dans le processus de production de la connaissance.

Sylvie Dillard se dit quant à elle 'convaincue de la nécessité d'une interaction plus fructueuse entre les milieux de développement des connaissances, et les milieux de pratique ou de développement de politiques.'

Malgré qu'elle s'inquiète du contrôle structurant des organismes subventionnaires sur le processus de production de la connaissance, Madeleine Gauthier fait preuve de réalisme lorsqu'elle affirme : 'l'influence des organismes subventionnaires sur l'orientation de la recherche s'impose donc avec d'autant plus de pertinence que les chercheurs n'ont plus les moyens de s'en passer.'

La question que pose cette partie est celle de l'acceptation ou non des conditions actuelles qui structurent le processus de production du savoir. Elle réaffirme une fois de plus (une fois de trop?) la persistance nostalgique de la dichotomie traditionnelle qui oppose les chercheurs 'engagés' et les 'purs'. Les premiers étant peints comme ceux qui se salissent (le mot est choisi) les mains.

REVUE PAR Grégory Slogar,
Directeur, Communications et
Programmes de l'AEC



Dans la troisième partie intitulée *l'évolution des pratiques de recherche, des cadres de travail et de la formation*, Gérald Grandmond réaffirme l'utilité de la recherche appliquée comme aide à la décision publique. Il soutient qu'il est 'permis de croire que les chercheurs et les chercheuses seront associés plus étroitement encore à la définition même des projets de recherche et que, de plus en plus, nos rapports tendront à se resserrer'.

Pour sa part, Lesemann affirme : 'pour les bailleurs de fond : gouvernement, percepteurs de taxes, entreprises prétendant payer leur juste part d'impôts, citoyens payeurs, il est légitime d'attendre un 'retour sur l'investissement'.

Le livre se termine par la contribution d'un jeune chercheur, Yves Boivert. Après avoir blâmé les ministres Legault et Rochon pour les compressions budgétaires causant un 'énorme gaspillage de talent', après avoir dénoncé la précarité, le découragement et la frustration qui affligent les jeunes chercheurs, il rejoint le camp des 'purs' et engage la bataille pour sauver la recherche des méchants partenaires corporatistes.


Le savoir ne peut jouer son rôle qu'approprié par les partenaires, incorporant leurs intérêts (économiques ou autres), reflétant leurs préoccupations et servant à l'amélioration de leur situation particulière. En clair, leur participation n'est pas désintéressée. Ce qui n'en fait pas des impurs pour autant. Si la dernière contribution de ce livre est une fidèle représentation de l'esprit qui anime la génération montante des chercheurs, on est pas sorti du bois.

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THE GEOGRAPHIES of Identity

BY Minelle Mahtani

I'M STANDING IN LINE AT THE GROCERY STORE, DIMLY WONDERING IF I HAVE ENOUGH MILK TO MAKE IT THROUGH THE WEEK-END, WHEN SOMEONE TAPS ME ON THE SHOULDER. I TURN TO FACE A STRANGER WHO LOOKS APOLOGETIC. I LOOK AT HER QUIZZICALLY, AND BRACE MYSELF FOR THE INEVITABLE. "I'M SORRY," SHE STAMMERS. "I HOPE YOU WON'T MIND, BUT I HAVE TO ASK YOU: WHERE ARE YOU FROM?"

I sigh, and smile wanly. I'm used to this. I've been alternatively tired and thrilled throughout my life when I've been asked this utterly ambiguous question, "Where are you from?" I never know how to respond without a whole series of explanations. Am I from Toronto, where I was born and raised? Am I from Vancouver, where I currently live? Or is there another question being asked here?

I know that people want to figure out why I look the way I do. It comes with the territory of being a person of "mixed race" descent. My mother's Iranian and my father is Indian. And this identity throws people when they first see me. Because it's not easy to "place" my ethnicity.

This notion of place intrigues me. What is the relationship between place and identity? Why do people always ask me where I'm from? For me, it's all about the spaces I can be located. These spaces are always multiple and multifaceted. I believe that a politics of identity is truly a politics of location. It's no wonder that I was drawn to study issues of identity within the discipline of geography. I am convinced that who you are has a lot to do with where you are. For example, when I am in Italy, it is assumed I am Italian, because of my dark hair and olive complexion. I don't see myself as the troubled, anxious and confused biracial as the stereotypes would have us believe: rather, my multiracial status has allowed me a freedom from stifling racial categorization in many ways, providing me with an access point into many different multiracial communities.

It seems I'm not alone here. Many of the women I interviewed for a study on "mixed race" identity in Canada felt similarly. They explained that their identities as multiracial women always change, depending on where they are. In some spaces, they might be seen as black, in others they might be seen as white. But the only stable reading of their identity is that these readings are always changing, and very hard to predict. The ways we are raced, gendered and classed alter daily, as Marical, a twenty-six year old graduate student explained to me. Marical's mother was Japanese and her father European. She explains how others rely on particular physical markers in order to classify her racially:

How I'm perceived really depends on everything. It's funny because I think that race is very obvious, sometimes. For me, it depends on the time of year, where I am, how long my hair is, whether I'm wearing makeup, whether I'm not, what kind of clothes I'm wearing – people identify me as all sorts of different things.

It is a wide array of circumstances, among which skin tone is only one, which creates the potential for racial identity for some "mixed race" women. Marical explains how the intricacies of cosmetics, hair, clothes, time and space play a role in the ways in which she is racialized, thereby problematizing the polarities normally associated with racialized identities by accentuating the multiplicity and mobility of social positionings.

Davy, a health worker in her forties, and of black, white and First Nations ancestry, made clear her concern with the ways the term can create unwarranted generalizations about the individuals who adopt it. Davy suggested to me the importance of not homogenizing a 'mixed race' experience:

There's a common misunderstanding that anyone who calls themselves mixed race has had very similar life experiences. And it's not like that. We have some common threads, but you know, it changes, dependent on place. We can all look exactly the same, but our experiences are different depending on where we were located, geographically.

Davy is emphasizing that geography and material realities shape what 'mixed race' means. Social conditions in the daily landscape are more complex than the term can encapsulate. The very experience of living in different places plays a role in how an individual experiences her ethnicities. Depending upon place, she insists that the experience of 'mixed race' identity alters fundamentally.

It's important to remember that identity is always changing, and dependent upon a myriad of factors, including sexual orientation, age, class, amongst other countless dynamics. I often think about my identity as a series of transparencies, overlapping layers, one on top of the other. No-one part makes up the whole, but together the transparencies make up who I am. Our research needs to interrogate how questions of identity are always made up of various layers – that shift and change in relation to place. These aren't easy processes to map, but it's my hope that our legends will become more complex and multidimensional as we attempt to create new geographies of identity in Canada.

Minelle Mahtani is a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Geography and the School of Journalism at University of British Columbia. Her book "Where are you From? Questions of Identity among Multiracial Canadians" is forthcoming with UBC Press. She is currently working on an anthology of "mixed race" Canadians with Lawrence Hill.

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
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
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
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