CARS

canadian american research symposium

Volume 1:1 Fall 2003

Eileen Sarkar ▪ John Harles ▪ Jack Jedwab ▪ Sarah Daynes ▪ Roberta Farber ▪ Virginia Fichera
Paul Bramadat ▪ Angie Chung ▪ Micheline Milot ▪ Valerie Preston ▪ Anneke Rummens

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The Association for Canadian Studies in the United States

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The Association for Canadian Studies in Canada (ACS) and the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS) are proud to jointly release this first edition of CARS, documenting the proceedings of the Canadian-American Research Symposium held at the Ellis Island Museum in New York in September 2003. The theme of the symposium – Diversity in Canada and the United States – and the contents of the journal reflect the richness of the contributions made to this inaugural event.

CARS is designed to invite cross-national comparison between Canada and the United States on shared political, social, cultural, and intellectual interests and concerns. The academic communities on both sides of the border have long recognized the need to understand the culture and perspectives of their neighbor and largest trading partner. As geographical neighbors, we depend on one another not only for the exchange of resources, cultural and otherwise, but also for the exchange of ideas. Our similarities as well as our differences constitute a wealth of raw material, providing us with valuable resources from which to draw when thinking about our respective policies, on the national and international stages. Both countries have been undergoing profound demographic transformations. The articles of this journal direct attention to these changes, as well as to the impact of these shift upon the cultural and political landscape of our countries.

The first essay thoughtfully addresses the heated and delicate debate over affirmative action, while a subsequent piece engages more generally with broader notions of race and ethnicity. These essays point out both the convergent and divergent aspects of the debates that stir up U.S and Canadian race and ethic relations, fostering a process of reflection about our multicultural challenges. Two of the articles allow us to take a closer comparative look at, for example, the politics of transnationalism with regards to Asian communities, one in the context of the U.S and the other in the context of Canada. The issues of religion and religious identity are tackled by three of our contributors, each investigating particular dimensions of these issues. The importance of language as a crucial element of a nation's cultural identity also occupies its place in the dialogue taking place within the pages of this publication. And finally, the remaining contributions take on the analytical complexity of Canadian and U.S census questions; they decode and deconstruct, respectively, the often overwhelming quantity of information that these collections of data yield.

In addition to learning from one another, both organizations, in launching this initiative, hope to further mutual goals, which include: maintaining communication linkages; facilitating favorable relations and intellectual exchanges with other like-minded organizations; and promoting a dialogue between academia, government agencies and businesses that share an interest in improving Canadian-American relations. CARS provides a forum for academics and policy-makers from Canada and the US, who are informed and interested in the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, CARS also endeavors to reach out to those for whom knowledge about their neighbor has not been a primary focus, but whose expertise on particular issues could greatly contribute to the research and policy-making communities in the two countries.

Knowledge-sharing builds bridges. It is our hope that the symposium and the resulting publication will become regular features in the partnership they reflect between the ACS and ACSUS, and ultimately between the countries they represent.

We wish to thank all those who have contributed to the success of the CARS symposium and to making this publication possible. We respectfully invite your feedback as we go forward to identify future themes to be addressed. ▪

Jack Jedwab, Executive Director ACS
Edie Semler, Executive Director ACSUS

United States Department of the Interior

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

October 1, 2003

Mr. Jack Jedwab
Executive Director
Association for Canadian Studies
209 Ste-Catherine Street East
Suite V-5140
Montreal (Quebec) CANADA

Dear Mr. ~~Jedwab~~ Jack:

On behalf of the National Park Service, I would like to congratulate the Association for Canadian Studies and the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States on the success of the seminar "*Diversity Dialogues*" held last month at Ellis Island.

What better place to bring together Canadian and American thinkers, scholars, and policy makers to deliberate on current issues related to diversity than at the preeminent symbol of this nation's immigrant heritage. Visitors to Ellis Island are given the opportunity to understand the experiences of the 12 million immigrants who came through Ellis Island. The many exhibits in the Immigration Museum are intended to communicate the personal stories of these immigrants. By bringing a very human face to our history, we hope to enable the lessons of the past to better inform the present and the future.

I am certain that participants in the seminar recognized that the many of the issues they were discussing were also debated when Ellis Island served an immigration station. I am also sure the participants in the seminar could feel the "spirit" of Ellis Island help stimulate the discussions!

The exchange of ideas that took place during the Diversity Dialogues and presented in this publication will result in increased awareness and the ability to develop workable approaches to resolving these complex issues.

I look forward to future collaborations together.

Sincerely

Cynthia R. Garrett

Cynthia R. Garrett
Acting Superintendent

OPENING REMARKS

Eileen Sarkar

Assistant Deputy Minister
Citizenship and Heritage
Department of Canadian Heritage

Times are indeed changing. We are challenged by major changes in our social and demographic environment. To name a few, Canada has an increasingly diverse ethnocultural and linguistic composition; a shift in population structure due to age; and growing disparities between 'haves and have-nots,' in particular Aboriginal and new Canadians, which can weaken our traditional self-image as a caring and compassionate society.

Diversity is not new: it has always been part of the Canadian experience, from the period of settlement, through the development of our society and constitutions, to the present day. These principles of mutual accommodation, respect and equity reflect a reality that the Government of Canada embraces and works to bring into all of its policies and programs. One of the cornerstones of Canadian diversity is the existence of Multiculturalism, a policy first formally adopted in 1971 and in the Multiculturalism Act in 1988, and which is featured as an interpretative clause in the Constitution.

We believe that diversity is to be valued, and that citizens can have multiple attachments and identities while having a strong attachment, and a sense of belonging, to Canada. This model can only work when we have both diversity and inclusion – a society where all Canadians can participate fully in, contribute to, and benefit from Canada's social, economic, civic, cultural and political life.

We see diversity as an advantage, not a barrier; in a knowledge economy, every mind matters. Diversity is a source of creativity and innovation and we believe that our approach makes Canada a magnet for talent and investment. Increasingly, the rest of the world is looking to the Canadian model as a global best practice.

Our record is not perfect; we have learned some difficult lessons from our history and we have seen the costs of exclusion. We are conscious that we must make deliberate efforts to reinforce our approach to address risks of fragmentation.

As noted previously, diversity has always been a characteristic of our population, beginning with the many different languages and societies of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. From the earliest settlements, our population has never been monochrome, never been from a single immigrant source, has rarely had a universal language, and has always featured a wide range of loyalties and origins. Indeed, for almost a quarter of a millennium, we have had state and other institutions operating in two official languages, French and English. Most of you are specialists in Canadian issues, learned in our history, and need no lessons on our triumphs and our tragedies.

This diversity in our population continues to grow. In 2001, almost half of Canadians reported having origins other than British, French or Canadian.[1] In our 3 largest cities of Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver, persons reporting other than British, French or Canadian only make up between 34% and 72% of the population.[2] Moreover, diversity has now become a part of many medium and smaller centres throughout Canada, and cities such as Ottawa, Lethbridge and Chicoutimi are now grappling with challenges of integration which had hitherto been the exclusive property of Vancouver, Montréal and Toronto.

Our religious fabric has also changed. Islam is now one of our fastest-growing religions; Canadian Jewish life is now transformed by a substantial cohort of French-speaking and Arabic-speaking Jews from Morocco, Africa and the Near East. Roman Catholic, Anglican and Baptist congregations are, quite literally, changing complexion and language.

It has been suggested that Canadians, faced with the reality of diversity, turned the necessity of living together into a virtue. In Canada, we believe diversity is a strength, but we also acknowledge that difference can lead to disadvantage, and our policies and programs address this in several ways.

In some cases, such as the Multiculturalism programs, the focus of government funding is specifically directed toward providing minority communities with opportunities to become full participants in Canadian society. This includes the provision of funds for projects which eliminate systemic barriers and improve public awareness and education.

Linguistic diversity, for its part, has been an overarching theme in our national narrative from pre-contact, through British and French settlement and exploration, to today. This is another of our essential characteristics, inseparable from cultural diversity and based on our linguistic duality in English and French. As well as diversity in our official languages, we are learning how to work with and preserve the languages of the First Peoples, and the many other languages with which Canadians speak of their lives and hopes.

Also of note is that, outside Québec, minority official-language communities are being reinforced by an influx of French-speaking immigrants, primarily from Africa and the Middle East, but also from South-East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, for whom French is their first official language.

The second challenge, that of generations, is connected with the rapid increase in Canada's growth and diversity. A post-World War II focus on building up our population through the encouragement of immigration not only led to more open immigration policies, but also encouraged diversity.

In our national discourse, we see the interplay of generations, as individual Canadians work to construct and explore their identities from among many intersecting factors of culture, language, origin and colour of skin. Indeed, this discourse is played out in all aspects of Canadian society, noticeably in Canadian art and literature.

As Ann Shin writes:

my mother and father
took their first breaths in a country I've never lived –
where she and her sister culled seaweed from the shore,
where his whole family worked together on open rice fields.[3]

An ethnically diverse younger population now exists alongside an older, more homogeneous population. We need to ensure that the needs and expectations of older Canadians are met at the same time as we ensure that younger Canadians have jobs, educational opportunities and the health and social benefits which have done so much to define Canada's social policy.

An area of great concern to policy-makers is how to ensure that this young and restless generation build an attachment to their country. One very real challenge is a lower level of participation in the political process: for example, roughly only 30% of eligible Canadians under 30 voted in the 2000 general election.[4] While many young people are involved in political, social, environmental and cultural activist movements, a great number are disaffected from the formal process. We need to ensure that our institutions are relevant for young people and can face the challenge of engaging the next generation of decision makers in a way that meets their needs. Another task that must be undertaken is how to increase participation from a young, mobile Aboriginal population.

These dissatisfactions bring me to another point on 'haves and have nots.' The 2001 Census brought to us a realization that the place of the First Peoples in our society is also rapidly changing. Half of the Aboriginal population now lives in cities – the urban rez, once only a metaphor for our poets and playwrights, is now a term which reflects a reality, moving and transforming itself so quickly that our traditional programs and governance structure are sorely challenged to keep up. Half of the population of Nunavut is under 22 years old and Aboriginal Canadians in our western cities now form approximately 25% of the population of major centres, concentrated in the younger cohorts of the population.

All of these elements interact with each other, and are rendered more complex by regional disparities and growing urban/rural differences, as geographical and cultural influences have developed the unique character of our cities, towns and people.

Governor General Adrienne Clarkson, who came to Canada as a refugee child and now holds our highest office under the Crown, put it well in a speech earlier this year in Ottawa:

> *We come from all over the place, morally, intellectually, spiritually, physically. But if we understand each other's reality, we will be able to continue to create our society in Canada.*
> *We want the immigrant and refugee welcoming groups to tell us more about what they do; the city people to hear about the aboriginal healing groups and the people of the outports and of the north, the prairie farms, the old communities of the St. Lawrence and Saguenay; the people who are greening their communities, reclaiming their habitat, to talk with those who are trapped by pollution, disappearing livelihoods and declining populations.*[5]

We face real challenges in dealing with diversity and equity. And we all have different but vital roles to play.

As public servants, our job is to plan for the future. I believe that the creativity of public servants, parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations has achieved solid results in devising and delivering social programs. Reduced resources have made us learn how to build successful partnerships and more effectively engage the skills and gifts of scholars, publishers, artists, volunteers, activists, producers and business people.

All of government is responsible for conducting business in a way inclusive of all Canadians, but the Department of Canadian Heritage has a particular mandate for national policies and programs that promote Canadian content, foster cultural participation, active citizenship and participation in Canada's civic life, and strengthen connections among Canadians.[6]

In my area of responsibility, the Citizenship and Heritage Sector of the Department of Canadian Heritage, a range of programs and initiatives focus on this goal. This sector was created to deepen our understanding of our shared citizenship and strengthen it. To do this, we integrate program and policy in the areas of heritage, multiculturalism, official languages, Canadian Studies, Aboriginal culture, exchanges, and citizen participation.

The work of the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch encourages harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence. These programs help to recognize the potential of all Canadians, encouraging

them to integrate into our society and take an active part in our social, cultural, economic and political life.

The Aboriginal Affairs Branch, for its part, supports structures that facilitate participation of the First Peoples living off reserve in resolving issues that affect the quality of their lives.

Official Languages works on the complex and ever-evolving details of sharing two official languages, an essential part of our national identity, furthering the development of official-language minority communities and promoting the use of French and English in our society.

Further, the Heritage Branch, with its focus on promoting the awareness and protection of our diverse cultural heritage through heritage programs and policy, the Canadian Conservation Institute and the Canadian Heritage Information Network also have key roles to play in terms preserving diverse Canadian content, art and heritage.

Finally, the Citizenship Participation and Promotion Branch encompasses programs like Exchanges Canada, which brings young people to learn about different parts of their country, Community Partnerships which aims at increasing volunteerism in Canadian communities by enhancing the capacity of the Voluntary Sector, and the Canadian Studies Program which promotes diversity by funding the development of learning materials about Canada. Some of you will know this last program from its historical role in helping to launch the discipline of Canadian Studies, as well as by its work in sustaining and furthering the efforts of the Association for Canadian Studies.

The efforts of the whole department play an integral part in fostering the Canadian story. We help young people to experience our geographically large land, we try to learn about and celebrate each other in all our diversity, and we promote sharing and understanding of our narratives as a people.

Engaging diversity and working toward equity is a continuing project; we are working very hard to help Canadians on this extraordinary journey. ■

NOTES

[1] Ravi Pendakur, Jaime Hedges, Emily King, *Canada: A Demographic Overview 2001* (Ottawa: Strategic Research and Analysis, Canadian Heritage, 2003), pp 22-23. Available in French as *Canada: Un aperçu démographique 2001* (Ottawa : Direction de recherche et analyse stratégiques, Patrimoine canadien, 2003).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp 28-29. For Halifax, those reporting origins other than only British, French, or Canadian constituted 29%, Montréal 34%, and Toronto 72%.

[3] How To Breathe the Air of Our Ancestors, from *The Last Thing Standing*, by Ann Shin (Toronto, 2000)

[4] John H. Pammet (Carleton University) and Lawrence LeDuc (University of Toronto), Elections Canada: *Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: a New Survey of Non-Voters*, www.elections.ca/loi/TurnoutDecline.pdf

[5] Her Excellency the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson *Address to the Canadian Club of Ottawa – A Vision of the Imagination*, Ottawa, Wednesday, January 29, 2003

[6] The departmental website, www.pch.gc.ca, can provide further detail.

Canadian Studies Youth Forum

Forum de la Jeunesse en Études Canadiennes

University College, University of Toronto
November 28-30 novembre 2003

The Association for Canadian Studies, in partnership with the Canadian Studies Program at University College, University of Toronto, is hosting a National Forum for Canadian Studies students from across Canada. The Youth Forum will address the challenges & strengths of the interdisciplinary fields of Canadian Studies. It will give students the opportunity to network with each other and also to hear from Canadian Studies graduate students and alumnus about post-graduation options.

Themes

- Interdisciplinary Nature of Canadian Studies
- Issues on the Future of Canadian Studies
- New Directions / New Curriculum
- Upcoming Issues / Trends in Canadian Studies Research
- Local/Regional/National Canadian Studies
- Demographics of Canadian Studies Students
- Presentation of Current Research
- Student Panel - needs, interests, concerns...
- Canadian Studies Network
- Alumnus Panel
- Career Speakers (government, media/journalism, academia, polling firm, private industry and cultural industry)

Registration	
ACS Student Member	15$
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Non-member	75$

Please visit the ACS web site at
www.acs-aec.ca
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L'Association d'études canadiennes, en partenariat avec le programme d'études canadiennes du University College, Université de Toronto, est fière d'organiser un forum national pour les étudiants des programmes d'études canadiennes à travers le Canada. Le forum de la jeunesse se propose d'explorer les gains et défis des champs interdisciplinaires des études canadiennes. Il donnera l'occasion aux étudiants et étudiantes du premier cycle de se rencontrer et d'entrer en relation avec des individus du deuxième et troisième cycle, de même qu'avec des bacheliers. Les étudiants pourront ainsi explorer les avenues possibles après l'obtention de leur diplôme.

Thèmes

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- Sujets concernant l'avenir des études canadiennes
- Nouvelles directions / Nouveaux programmes
- Thèmes à venir / Tendances de recherche en études canadiennes
- Études canadiennes au niveau local, régional et national
- Étude démographique des étudiants et étudiantes en études canadiennes
- Présentation des recherches en cours
- Séance plénière avec des étudiants : besoins, intérêts, préoccupations...
- Réseau d'études canadiennes
- Séance plénière avec des bacheliers
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THE POLICY CHALLENGES OF AMERICAN ETHNIC AND RACIAL DIVERSITY

John Harles

John Harles is Professor of Politics at Messiah College, Grantham, Pennsylvania. During the 1994-95 academic year he was a Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto. He holds the D.Phil. in Politics from Oxford University. The author of *Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrants and the American Democratic Order* (Westview Press, 1993) as well as articles in various journals, including the *Canadian Political Science Review* and the *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, he writes on immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic and racial politics in North America.

ABSTRACT

This essay considers the impact of immigration on American racial and ethic relations. The author contemplates possible ways to speed up and ameliorate the process of social justice in an increasingly heterogeneous society. He suggests that a rethinking of affirmative action policies, namely its redistribution based on class rather than on ethnic and racial criteria, may better serve not only African Americans, but other disadvantaged immigrant and ethic communities.

The promise of equality embedded in a liberal political culture; the reality of inequality based on race. Such is the central irony of the United States as related by the Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, in his magisterial *An American Dilemma* (1944).[1] Myrdal's analysis – his understanding of the integrative challenges that diversity brings, his guarded optimism that the United States might successfully meet those challenges – is as apposite today as it was sixty years ago. Contemporary assessments of American diversity must consider what Myrdal could not: the impact of immigration in the late twentieth century, unprecedented in terms of the aggregate number of newcomers to the U.S. as well as the variety of sending countries represented. Yet integration continues to be the primary political question raised by American ethnic and racial heterogeneity. And now as ever, the prospects for integration are mixed.

For students of politics, two standards of integration are especially relevant. Institutionally, integration aspires to the full and equal participation of racial and ethnic minorities in the associational life of a polity – its social, economic, and civic organizations. Psychologically, integration indicates deep feelings of belonging to those fellow citizens with whom one shares a common political fate. In both cases, integration is essential to the well-being of a democratic state. The democratic measure of that state, its commitment to political and socio-economic equality, requires institutional integration; affective solidarity with one's compatriots, particularly a willingness to sacrifice on their behalf and to trust in their intentions, is crucial to achieving the collective goals defining a good life in any political community.

Because the integration of African-Americans has been more halting than for other minorities, without doubt Black-white race relations remain the most difficult of all U.S. diversity issues. In American public discourse the word "race" connotes the status of African-Americans far more than that of any other minority group. Conflict over the condition of African-Americans was, of course, the principal cause of the greatest cataclysm in American political history – the Civil War. The symbols of that war and the racial divisions it exposed continue to plague the U.S. Recent controversies about flying the Confederate flag over state capitols in South Carolina and Georgia, and putting it on public display elsewhere, are cases in point. Race has had an enormous impact on the operation of American political institutions – on federalism, on the Supreme Court, on partisan alignment and electoral politics. Race infuses American social policy. Scratch beneath the surface of debates about crime, housing, welfare reform, education, employment, and political representation, and the racial component of the issue is most often revealed.

But race is not the whole of America's diversity story; immigration raises independent questions of social and economic accommodation. Over nine million immigrants arrived in the U.S. during the 1990s, more than in any decade in American history. At 11.5% of the total U.S. population, the current foreign-born cohort is proportionately larger than it has been at any time since the

1930s. Individuals not of European lineage constitute the larger part of the immigrant stream. More than half of the foreign-born in the U.S. are from Latin America – 30% from Mexico alone – and over one-quarter from Asia. The geographic impact of this population influx is not uniform. Due to modern communication and transportation networks as well as the relatively high socio-economic status of certain immigrant groups, newcomers to the U.S. are more widely dispersed than ever. That said, seven of ten newcomers reside in six states, and half live in just five metropolitan areas.[2] Beyond the raw data is an extraordinary demographic development: the rapid growth of the Hispanic population. Due to high levels of immigration from Spanish speaking countries – especially Mexico, which during the 1990s accounted for 43% of the growth in America's foreign-born residents – as well as high birth rates, Hispanics (12.5% of the total) have surpassed African-Americans (12.1%) to become America's largest minority group.[3] As is the case for immigrants as a whole, the Hispanic population is regionally focused – half live in the American west, a further third in the south. Within those regions Hispanics are more residentially concentrated than any other ethno-racial group; Miami, San Antonio, and Los Angeles either have or will soon have Hispanic majorities.

Nowhere has the Hispanic presence been more controversial than California, a "majority-minority state" in which Hispanics represent the largest portion (32%) of the minority population.[4] It is no surprise, then, that the debate over Hispanic immigration in California has been especially heated. Within the last ten years, citizen propositions have passed into California law barring illegal immigrants, largely Hispanic, from all public services (subsequently struck down as unconstitutional) and severely limiting bilingual instruction in the public schools.

How well are the challenges of American diversity being met? With respect to psychological integration, the wealth of data needed to answer that question cannot be marshaled here, but a few impressionistic observations can be made. Qualitative research based on oral histories and open-ended interviews suggests that Americans of various ethnic and racial backgrounds display strong sentiments of political belonging;[5] quantitative evidence tends to confirm those insights. A 2002 survey by Public Agenda, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public opinion research organization, relates that more than three-quarters of immigrant respondents consider themselves to have assumed an American identity. Large majorities say they are disposed to demonstrate civic propriety by becoming citizens, learning English, respecting people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds, refusing to accept welfare if able-bodied, keeping fully informed about public issues, and serving in the military if drafted.[6] The Latino National Political Survey of the early 1990s, the largest poll to date of Hispanics in the U.S., affirms the same sense of national pride and civic responsibility – commitments frequently more profound than those reported by Anglo-American citizens.[7] Conversely, white Americans are coming to terms with the multicultural realities of the U.S. It may be telling that the 2002 English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act, part of the Bush administration's No Child Left Behind educational initiative, lists "multicultural understanding" as a primary educational objective. From elementary school through university, academic curricula have been made sensitive to the contributions of racial and ethnic minorities, an emphasis supported in surveys of American public opinion.[8] Black-white relations, though strained, are improving. In a series of polls taken for the *New York Times* in 2000, 57% of Blacks and whites attest that race relations in the U.S. are generally good (versus 41% who said so in 1990) and 78% of whites and 58% of Blacks think they have gotten better over time (versus 53% and 33% respectively in 1992).[9] Blacks remain overwhelmingly supportive of the fundamental value system of the U.S. As Myrdal long ago observed, the African-American challenge to the racial status quo typically has been stated in terms of insisting that whites abide by American constitutional imperatives of equality. Black separatist movements have had little purchase across U.S. political history.

As to the institutional integration of ethnic and racial minorities, there is reason for both pessimism and optimism. Socio-economic well-being varies between and within ethno-racial groups. Asian-Americans have the highest household income of any ethnic or racial group recognized by the U.S. Census, including whites, though individuals of South Asian and East Asian origin tend to be better situated than those of Southeast Asian descent. Similar distinctions must be drawn for the Hispanic community. Cubans and individuals from the more developed economies of Latin America tend to do better than co-ethnics from Mexico. Blacks and Hispanics, however, lag behind whites on virtually all major aggregate indicators of socio-economic welfare. Infant mortality and poverty rates are three times higher for Blacks than whites, unemployment two times higher, average household income (around $33,000 for Black households, $45,000 for whites) and life expectancy (66 years for Black men 72 years for white men) considerably lower.[10] In some respects the Hispanic population is worse off still – average Hispanic household income ($30,000) is lower and its poverty rate (22%) higher than that of any other ethno-racial group.[11] Yet the picture is not as bleak as it was a generation ago. Across ethno-racial groups household income is up, unemployment and poverty are down. Indeed, a notable development over the last generation is the emergence of a robust African-American middle class – approximately one-third of the total Black American population.

Evidence is similarly mixed with respect to social incorporation. For Blacks and Hispanics residential segregation from whites is fairly durable.[12] Consequently, one-fifth of Black and Latino students attend schools in urban districts though only two percent of white students do–data that speaks to the overwhelming suburbanization of the white population. On the other hand, when it comes to ethnically- and racially-mixed marriages, perhaps the strongest of all signs of social integration, over the last generation such unions have increased from three to five percent of the total. At present, approximately four of every ten Asians and Hispanics have married outside their ethno-racial group. Less than one percent of

African-Americans have done likewise, though over the past twenty years the number of Black-white marriages has almost tripled.[13] Americans express greater acceptance of interracial marriage than ever before. In a 2001 *Washington Post* poll, 60% of all respondents and 54% of whites said they had no problem with such marriages – a considerable improvement on the 40% of whites who said so a generation ago.[14]

Politically, too, one can point to hopeful signs of institutional integration. It is true that ethnic and racial minorities are under-represented in federal political institutions when compared to their share of the general population. Nevertheless, the present situation is far better than it used to be. In 2002, there were thirty-six Blacks, nineteen Hispanics, and six Asians in the U.S. Congress; in 1965, the year of the watershed Voting Rights Act, five Blacks, four Hispanics, and four Asians served in the federal legislature. To be sure, because the Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations tend to be concentrated in states with large numbers of electoral votes – California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey – their votes are actively courted. Turnout in federal elections among Hispanics and Asians is depressed, in part because of significant numbers of non-naturalized individuals ineligible to vote within these populations. But among African-Americans turnout has increased – from 51%-54% – over the last five election cycles. (Over the same period, white turnout actually decreased – from 67% to 60%). There have been advances at sub-central levels of government as well: Blacks hold more than nine thousand elective offices nationwide, including 478 mayoralties in twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia; Hispanics hold 762 elective offices in California alone, major city mayoralties in San Antonio and San Jose as well as the governorship of New Mexico; Asians hold 321 state and local elective offices as well as the governorships of Hawaii and Washington state.[15]

It is arguable whether such integrative progress will be sustained. Certain considerations are group specific: socio-economic status, organization, and culture all bear on a minority community's political clout. More than this, the structures of contemporary American politics are not completely accommodating to ethnic and racial minority group uplift. Comparatively weak national political parties, in which the significance of individual candidate resources – especially personal wealth – are magnified, are a barrier for many prospective minority candidates. And urban politics has changed in such a way to make difficult the chances that a robust local party might advance minorities. Big city political machines were ambiguously democratic, but on occasion they used their hold over local electorates to promote minority candidates. Machine politics has increasingly given way to a reformed model of local government, one featuring non-partisan elections, at-large city councils, executive power in the hands of city managers, and an independent civil service. This alternative model is especially prominent in "new" cities of the south and west, places where Hispanic citizens are numerous but where white middle class political elites frequently dominate. Cities where minority candidates do come to power are often plagued by weak tax bases, decaying municipal services and strained social services. In such instances the emphasis is on pursuing entrepreneurial policies designed to attract and keep business and middle/upper class residents within the city limits; building a cohesive political base to promote minority ethnic and racial group interests is not primary on the agenda. In some U.S. cities, the scale of ethno-racial diversity itself has become an obstacle to minority coalition building. When Fiorello LaGuardia became the first Italian-American mayor of New York City in 1933, he did so on the strength of an Italian and Jewish electoral coalition representing one-third of New York's population base; presently, the largest immigrant group in New York is the Dominican community, representing around six percent of the total population. And although animosity between various ethnic and racial groups is nothing new, the mutual political suspicions of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians further complicate efforts at minority coalition politics.

Minorities gain when the national economy is buoyant. Accounting for periodic troughs in productivity, in the U.S. that has been the case for the last twenty years or so. The immediate economic situation is not so hospitable. For the last two years the U.S. has been in a recession. Recovery, such as there is, has not been accompanied by an upswing in employment. Per capita income levels have been flat and poverty rates, especially for Blacks, have risen. Government remedies to take the sting out of economic hardship are no longer so readily available. Of special note is the devolution of responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to the states by virtue of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (1996). Because that legislation limits the federal government's financial commitment by capping block grant public assistance transfer payments to the states, in periods of economic downturn states are likely to find themselves with less money for pressing material needs. Welfare rolls have been reduced, but not the number of families in distress.

Proactive policies to redress ethnic and racial inequality have narrowed. Affirmative action programs in employment and university admissions have been vitiated in the U.S. courts. Provisions for accommodating minorities in legislative redistricting are still appropriate (Miller v. Johnson [1995], Hunt v. Cromartie [2001]), though not to the extent of racial gerrymandering (Shaw v. Reno 1993). Courts have been less than strict in their expectations about the integration of schools, being willing to remove desegregation orders under certain conditions (Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell [1991], Freeman v. PADS [1992]). Language policy has been transformed as well. Federal and state governments are pushing the use of English in the classroom as hard and as quickly as possible. The symbolism behind the Bush administration's recasting of the former Bilingual Education Act – now the English Language Acquisition Act (2002) – is unmistakable.

What is to be done? If the big question is how to maintain a cohesive, prosperous, and stable democratic state in conditions of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, the big answer is social justice through democratic means.

Part of any response to the challenge of diversity requires an equitable distribution of social goods, resources, and opportunities. Rather than targeting discrete ethnic and racial minority groups, the most fruitful way to achieve such equity is through social policies from which all disadvantaged individuals can win. To use a concrete example, the under-achievement of Hispanic and Black students is at least partly a function of the way in which educational funding tends to reflect the property tax base of local jurisdictions. Urban districts, where a disproportionate number of Hispanic and Black students live, are often at disadvantage in providing the money necessary to secure the resources necessary to a well-functioning school. If the funding formula for education were to be drawn more broadly to encompass a regional or state centered tax base (as is the practice in several American states), it would not only be to the advantage of many minority children but to all children of modest means and modest neighborhoods. Programs of affirmative action in the U.S. are not dead but they are dying. Given firm American convictions about equality of opportunity, it is difficult to argue for the fairness of such initiatives – that public compensation in the form of positive discrimination for historically aggrieved minority groups is endlessly insufficient, that job searches or university admissions should privilege middle class ethnic and racial minorities irrespective of socio-economic status. In the present U.S. political climate, redistribution based on class is more politically promising than that based on ethnic and racial criteria.

Concerted efforts must also be made to encourage the assumption of a common national identity, one constitutive of the value commitments of the American political community. Given the significance of immigration to the U.S., especially from source countries without solidly liberal-democratic political credentials, this socialization project is especially salient. Its importance is not confined to immigrants, however. Because national ideals provide the intellectual capital of the democratic process, furnishing a touchstone for political dialogue, they are crucial to the achievement of the collective projects that social justice demands. To be an effective participant in the policy process, in order to convince fellow citizens of the rightness of what one is proposing, one must appeal to commonly held values. Such norms must be free of elements repugnant to the self-understanding of minorities. Maximum room should be left for the expression of cultural diversity in private relations and public spaces. And it should not be assumed that the national ideals at stake are static or immune to being shaped by newcomers to the political process. But neither are such principles infinitely variable. A practical move in the right direction: increased attention to civic education in the classroom. As poll evidence consistently relates, there is much that can be done to improve American political literacy.[16] Thirty U.S. states do not require even one course in American government from kindergarten through grade twelve. It is not simply a matter of teaching about how to participate in the political process. Rather, students must be immersed in the shared political history and substantive civic principles characterizing the American republic. Surely the cohesion of an ethnically and racially heterogeneous polity is advanced by the wide dissemination of such knowledge. Insofar as knowledge is power, so are its democratic credentials. ■

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DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF CENTURY 21

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ABSTRACT

Through a statistical analysis of census information, Jack Jedwab investigates the dominant markers of identity – such as language, religion, relevance of ancestry and ethnic identification, attachment to countries of origin, etc. – through which Canadians and Americans define their ethnic and/or national identities. Despite interesting similarities between Canada and the U.S., differing immigration trends suggest that the patterns of identity formation of these two countries will, in the future, more likely diverge than converge.

The relationship between demography and identity has had a profound impact on public policy in both Canada and in the United States. What has the rapidly evolving composition of the population in the two countries implied for the respective manner in which issues of identity are addressed? Which markers or expressions of identity are dominant in the two countries? Much has been written about identity in the two societies – while most literature on the subject has traditionally regarded Canada as a multicultural mosaic that fosters the integration of immigrants, it considers the United States as a melting pot that favors newcomer assimilation. But this persistent dichotomy comes under increasing scrutiny when subjected to a closer examination of the growingly complex nature of identity.

While government intervention in Canada in the area of immigrant adaptation and identity formation is, to use the discourse of Charles Taylor, 'deeper' than is the case in the United States, there are important demographic and regional differences within these respective countries that render generalization in this area problematic. Indeed, in both countries there are similarities in the process of immigrant adaptation that may very well outweigh the differences. There are spheres of the life of immigrant and ethnic communities upon which the influence of government is limited. Thus, when it comes to identity formation much of the adaptation process is neither significantly enhanced nor undercut by the degree of government intervention. Powerful changes in the composition of the population of both countries and a change in our understanding of the many things that respectively define us make this an interesting time to examine the demographic impact on identity. A pre-requisite to cross-national comparisons of pluralistic societies is knowledge of the historic and demographic evolution of the societies involved. The objective here is confined to the demographic realities in the United States and Canada as revealed in their respective 2000 and 2001 censuses and how the results may help shape identity needs in the two countries.

Nations of Immigrants

It is increasingly common to hear Canada and the United States describe themselves as nations of immigrants. Immigration has had and continues to have a profound impact on the evolving population of the two countries. As seen below, the 1990s witnessed the highest numbers of immigrations in both countries for any ten-year period during the 20th century. Clearly, Canada's per capita immigrant intake is greater than the United States'. While the population of the United States is more than nine times the size of that of Canada's, it receives just less than five times more immigrants. While

the term 'nation of immigrants' seems to have first been coined in the United States, if the respective share of the two countries' population is the main test for this qualification, Canada is better defined by that label than its southern neighbor. By the year 2000, some 10.4 percent or over 28 million people in the United States were foreign-born – an increase from 1990 when it was 7.9 percent and from 1970 when it was 4.7 percent. In Canada, in 2001, there were 5.4 million people who were not born in the country, or approximately 18 percent.

Table 1

Numbers of immigrants by ten-year periods in Canada and the United States during the twentieth century

Period	United States	Canada
1996-00	3,865,150	1,032,636
1991-95	5,230,267	1,170,000
1981-90	7,338,062	1,866,000
1971-80	4,493,314	1,824,000
1961-70	3,321,677	1,429,000
1951-60	2,515,479	1,543,000
1941-50	1,035,039	548,000
1931-40	528,431	149,000
1921-30	4,107,209	1,200,000
1911-20	5,795,811	1,400,000
1901-11	8,795,386	1,550,000

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Services of the United States, Historical Data, 2000 Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Statistics Canada and Roderic Beaujot, "*Immigration and Canadian Demographics*", 1998.

Regional patterns of immigrant settlement in both countries need to be considered in making any such comparison. On the basis of the states and provinces that received the largest number of immigrants, California retained the lead and in fact widened it over the province of Ontario so that the difference was now more than double. Quebec moved from the tenth to the ninth spot, ahead of British Columbia. In the case of BC and Ontario, both were affected in terms of real numbers by the drop in immigration from China.

Table 2

Immigrants admitted by State or Province of intended residence, 2000-2002

State or Province	*2002*	2001	2000
United States	*1,063,732*	1,064,318	849,807
California	*291,216*	282,957	217,753
Ontario	*133,641*	148,425	133,464
New York	*114,827*	114,116	106,061
Florida	*90,819*	104,715	98,931
Texas	*88,365*	86,315	63,840
New Jersey	*57,721*	59,920	40,013
British Columbia	*34,000*	38,266	37,426
Illinois	*47,235*	48,296	36,180
Quebec	*37,627*	37,428	32,502
Massachusetts	*31,615*	28,956	23,483

Source: Statistical Yearbook, United States Immigration and Naturalization Services, 2002 and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002

For the fourth consecutive year, Toronto remained the principal location for immigrants settling in North America's metropolises. However, its lead over Los Angeles was cut significantly. Montreal moved into second spot amongst Canadian cities ahead of Vancouver and thus occupied the seventh spot on the continent.

Table 3

Immigrants admitted by Metropolitan Area of intended residence, 1999-2002

	2002	2001	2000	1999
Toronto	111,580	125,061	108,034	84,445
New York	91,275	92,361	85,867	80,893
Los Angeles	108,613	98,997	70,644	55,236
Miami	40,832	48,797	47,404	30,179
Vancouver	29,922	34,165	33,084	32,335
Chicago	43,810	44,888	32,300	33,754
Washington	38,468	39,815	29,394	23,976
Montreal	33,004	32,366	28,085	24,925
San Jose	27,431	28,715	16,874	10,252
Orange County	25,806	23,506	20,859	14,423
Houston	28,255	26,687	17,429	14,662

Source: Statistical Yearbook, United States Immigration and Naturalization Services, 2002 and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002

As indicated previously, while the magnitude of immigration to North America in the 1990s reached new heights, this decade of immigration will likely best be remembered for its impact on the shifting composition of the North American population. In the case of the United States, the Census Bureau showed that in 2003, the number of people of Hispanic origin now exceeded the number of American Blacks. These continuing migration patterns from immigrants from Latin American in the United States (in particular Mexico), and from Asia in the case of Canada, may ultimately have an impact on the cultural affinities between the two countries. Below, one observes that in the year 2002, some 45% of all immigrants to the U.S. hailed from South and Central America, while in Canada the majority of immigrants were from Asia.

Table 4

Immigration by Source Area in percentage, Canada and the United States, 2000-2002

	2002	2002	2001	2001	2000	2000
	USA	CAN	USA	CAN	USA	CAN
Africa	5.7	20.1	5.1	19.2	5.3	18.0
Asia and Pacific	32.7	51.9	33.5	53.01	31.8	53.0
South and Central America	43.2	8.48	42.7	8.04	45.3	7.46
United States/ Canada	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.3	1.9	2.5
Europe and the United Kingdom	16.4	16.9	16.5	17.2	15.6	18.8

Race and Visible Minority

When in 2001 the United Nations held an International Conference on Racism and Racial Discrimination the Canadian delegation was torn between the United States' desire to employ he term 'race' in policy recommendations and the rejection by the European countries of the use of that term. For historic and demographic reasons race is a far more powerful marker of identity in the United States than it is in Canada. In part, this is due to the history of slavery in the United States and the extent to which this has remained an important element in America's national narrative. Moreover, the African origin population is far more rooted in the United States with some 90% born in that country than in Canada where only less than half of the group is non-immigrant (exceptionally, the province of Nova Scotia has an African origin population with a similar degree of rootedness as that of the United States). Over ten percent of the United States' population is of African decent, whereas in Canada this group represents just over two percent of the population. While the United States debates the use of the term 'race,' it has fallen into virtual disuse in Canada amongst most scholars and policy-makers. Given the socially-constructed nature of race, scholars and policy-makers have increasingly used the term 'racialised' to describe what we officially describe in Canada as visible minority. Indeed in 1996, for the stated purpose of assessing employment equity programs, Canada introduced a question on visible minorities in its 1996 Census so as to evaluate the social and economic condition of Black, Asian and other populations. Canada's visible minority classification is in some ways broader than the racial categories employed in the U.S. census as it includes 'Arab,' a population that is part of the ancestry and ethnic origin responses in the census conducted south of the border. Public opinion surveys in the United States that probe identity issues tend to divide the respondents according to whether they are White, Black or Hispanic and make generalizations on that basis. Conversely, in Canada, national pollsters tend to explore patterns of opinion in terms of whether the respondent is English or French-speaking. For historic and demographic reasons it is language that is the stronger marker of identity in Canada.

Table 5

Difference in population of ethnic origin and race in the United States, 1990 and 2000, and visible minorities in Canada, 1996 and 2001 (in thousands)

(000's)	2000	1990	2001	1996
	USA	USA	CAN	CAN
US White Non-Hispanic or Latino Canada-not visible minority	194,552 (70.0)	188,128 (75.6)	25,655 (86.6)	25,330 (86.0)
Black or African descent	33,947 (12.1)	29,216 (11.7)	662 (2.2)	573 (2.0)
Asian	10,123 (3.6)	6,642 (2.7)	2,428 (8.2)	2,000 (7.5)
Hispanic or Latino	35,305 (12.6)	22,354 (9.0)	216 (0.7)	177 (0.6)

Source: Profile of selected social characteristics, American Fact Finder, United States Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 and Statistics Canada, Census of Canada 1996 and 2001

The Continued Relevance of Ethnicity as a Marker of Identity

Both in Canada and the United States, there is much debate about the relevance of ancestry and ethnic identification. According to the US Census Bureau, ancestry refers to a person's ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage, or the place of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. Census Bureau documents explicitly state that the intent of the ancestry question is not to measure the degree of attachment the respondent had to a particular ethnicity. One often hears the complaint that unlike the United States, Canada lacks strong patriotic sentiment. In Canada, in the 2001 census, over a quarter of all single responses to the census question on ethnic origins gave 'Canadian only' as an answer. In comparison, when asked about their ancestry, 7.3% of respondents (in the year 2000) indicated they were 'United States of American' – up 5% from 1990 (United States Bureau of the Census, Supplementary Survey, 2000). Some observers believe that the greater the degree of 'Canadian' responses to the ethnic origin question, the stronger the country's national identity. But most Canadians believe that ethnic attachments are not an obstacle to strong national identity, hence the substantial support for the philosophy of multiculturalism.

Table 6

Declarations of Ethnic Origin and Ancestry by top ten groups in the United States and Canada in censuses of 2000 and 2001

	United States	Canada-Single Origin Only
Total	273,643,273	18,307,345
German	46,428,321	705,600
Irish	33,048,744	496,805
English	28,223,890	1,479,525
United States of American	20,092,896	–
Canadian	–	6,748,335
Italian	15,916,396	726,275
French	9,794,218	1,082,700
Polish	9,029,440	–
Scottish	5,406,421	607,235
Scottish-Irish	5,205,335	–
Dutch (Netherlands)	5,203,974	–
Chinese	–	936,210
East Indian	–	581,665
North American Indian	–	455,803

Source: Ethnic Origins and Ancestry, US Census Bureau, 2000 and Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

The United States Census Bureau promotes self-identification so as to recognize that: "…strong ethnic identity is not limited to just first- and second-generation

immigrants" (United States Bureau of the Census, 2000). Its 2000 census suggested that those with ancestors having been in United States for several generations are more likely to give the 'American' response than people who do not identify with any particular group because of their mixed backgrounds. Census bureau officials add that: "some foreign born or children of the foreign born may report American to show that they are part of American society" (United States Bureau of the Census, 2000).

Recent surveys in the United States by Zogby (2002) reveal that a robust attachment to countries of origin, while strongest amongst foreign born, also has some resonance amongst the children of American immigrants. While some three-quarters of Hispanic immigrants regard their ethnic heritage as important, this sentiment is held by 53.5% of U.S. born Hispanics; the same sentiment is held by 73% of Arab immigrants as opposed to 41% of those born in the U.S.; by 59% of Asian immigrants, versus 41.5% of U.S. born; and 47% of Italian born, in contrast to 29.5% of those born in the United States. Gans contends that ethnic attachments diminish considerably over time and what remains is often merely symbolic or lacking in substance. Paradoxically, those groups who tend to experience the weakest degrees of attachment to their ethnic background seem more inclined to believe that it is easy to hold on to one's culture and traditions in the United States. Some 65% of European immigrants strongly agree with this, compared to 53% of non-European immigrants, who believe it is easy to hold on to one's culture and traditions in America.

A major study of ethnic identification in Canada reveals that more recently arrived immigrants were likely to indicate that ethnic or cultural ancestry was important to them (Statistics Canada and Canadian Heritage, 2003). Nearly three-quarters (71%) of immigrants who arrived in Canada from 1991 to 2001 rated at least one of their ancestral origins as important, compared with 65% of immigrants who came prior to 1991, 57% of the second generation in Canada (those born in Canada with at least one foreign-born parent) and 44% of those who were in Canada three generations or more (people born in Canada to two Canadian-born parents).

Sense of belonging generally varied according to the length of time the group has been established in the country. Some 78% of those with Filipino ancestry reported a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group, as did 65% of East Indians and 65% of Portuguese. By comparison, 36% of Dutch, 33% of Germans and 33% of Ukrainians reported a strong sense of belonging.

Generational difference also had an important impact on the strength of ethnic attachment. Nearly 60% of Chinese immigrants reported a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group, compared to 52% of those who had been in Canada for two or more generations. Of those reporting German ancestry, 39% of the first generation reported a strong sense of belonging, compared with 33% of those in Canada for two or more generations. Among Italians, 62% of the first generation, compared with 54% of those in Canada for two or more generations, had a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group.

Religion

In 1867, under Canada's Confederation arrangements, people of the Catholic and Protestant faiths were guaranteed educational rights reflecting the country's dominant religious identification. After the Second World War, religious attachments diminished considerably in Canada, notably amongst the native-born population. Although separation of church and state is a founding principle in the United States, there is much greater talk of religion in the political realm in the U.S than in Canada. References to God appear on U.S. currency; President Bush talks openly about his faith and punctuates his speeches with "God Bless America." Yet in Canada, religious symbols in public places generate much less controversy than they do south of the border.

Religious identity in Canada is considered somewhat subdued by comparison with the United States. According to a July 2003 Gallup survey, when asked about the importance of religion in their own lives, 83% of Americans said it is either "very important" (60%) or "fairly important" (23%). In Canada, 62% said religion is very important (28%) or fairly important (34%) to them. While 57% of Americans agree that it is necessary to believe in God to be moral and have good values, that view is shared by only 30% of the Canadian population (Pew Research, 2002). Still, unlike the United States, religious guarantees for Catholics and Protestants are enshrined in Canada's constitution, reflecting the historic importance of confessional identification. Moreover the Canadian state is more interventionist in the area of religion – several provinces fund religious schools, something that would violate the principle of church-state separation. Every ten years, the census of Canada inquires into the religious identification of the population, something that would be considered anathema by America's national statistical agency (though this practice is the envy of those Americans who study the sociology of religion). Paradoxically, some 71% of Canadians completely agree that "…religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy" as opposed to 55% of Americans (Pew Research, 2002).

According to Gallup's analysis, "the historical separation of church and state in the United States may help religion flourish by creating a marketplace of faith and in so doing promote religiosity in the United States within the culture."

While most Americans say that religion is important in their lives, not all regularly attend religious services. Still, self-reported church attendance is significantly higher in America than in Canada. Nearly forty percent of Americans said they had attended a church or a synagogue in the last week, while just over one-quarter of Canadians reported doing so.

Worship service attendance in the United States has remained fairly constant since the 1950s, but it has dramatically declined in Canada. In 1955, 58% of Canadians said they had attended a church or a synagogue in the past week. Since 1991, the percentage had been stable at 31%, before dropping to its current level of 26%.

Along with religious importance, age is a key factor in worship service attendance in the United States and Canada. Differences between the percentages of men and

women in each country who reported attending services are slight. The largest difference occurs between age categories, with attendance much higher among older people than among the young. According to a Pew Research study, Latinos (68%) and African Americans (74%) are more likely than whites (61%) to indicate that religion is important in their everyday life. Latinos (45%) are more likely to report attending religious services 'once a week or more' than are whites (40%) but less so than African Americans (54%).

Language

As noted earlier, from a policy standpoint, Canada's principal marker of identity appears to be language. Though historically the protection of religious attachments – such as Catholic and Protestant – have assumed a significant role in the institutional and political life, such recognition was closely connected to language identities – Catholic in the case of the French language and English in the case of the Protestants. For many, if faith was the guardian of the language, clearly the language was not always seen as the guardian of the faith, at least where Canada's Catholic population was concerned.

When asked what was the most important part of their identity and culture, some one-third of Canadians gave language as their reply, while one-quarter chose ancestry and ethnic origin (Association for Canadian Studies-Environics, 2003). The most obvious divide on the identity question arises between language communities. While French speakers cite language as most important to their identity and culture, English Canadians refer to ancestry and ethnic origin as somewhat more important than language.

Table 7

Which is the most important part of your identity and culture?

English spoken at home (First Mention and All Mentions)

	First Mention	All Mentions
Language	24	39
Ancestry and ethnic origin	29	51
Religion	12	23
Political ideology/ orientation	12	22
Gender	11	21
Social class	7	17

Source: Environics Research Group for the Association for Canadian Studies, Survey on Markers of Identity, March 2003

Amongst Canada's francophone population, language is by far the principal marker of identity when evaluated against others with some 61% giving it as their first response and 14% choosing ethnic origin and ancestry. Eight percent gave religion as their first response and another 20 as the second most important part of their identity and culture (Association for Canadian Studies-Environics, 2003).

But the importance attributed to language and linguistic identification may be shifting in the two countries as expressed by a variety of indicators including the growing share of minority language speakers in the United States, converging patterns of linguistic adaptation and evolving realities of bilingualism in the two countries, with Canada losing ground to its neighbour in this regard.

In Canada, when asked whether it is important for the population to learn a second language other than English, some three-quarters of English-speakers described it as important (33% very important and 41% somewhat important). In the United States some 70% believe that it is important for Americans to learn a second language (19% believe that it is essential and 50% regard it as important). It is worth noting that amongst Canada's francophone population, some 84% of respondents consider the acquisition of a second language other than English as very important and another 12% as somewhat important.

An even greater percentage (96%) believes that it is important for immigrants to know the English language (77% say it is essential and 19% important). Whereas some 31% of Americans completely agree with the view that children need to learn English to succeed in the world today, this opinion is held by 44% of Canadians. In both Canada and the United States immigrants acknowledge the importance of adopting the dominant language (in Quebec they consider it important to know both English and French).

Not unexpectedly, the perceived importance of being bilingual rates highest amongst minority language groups or those individuals of the dominant language who live in proximity to large numbers of speakers of minority languages. Americans living in the western United States are somewhat more likely than those living in other regions to stress the importance of speaking a second language. Also, the younger segment of the North-American population are more likely to be bilingual and hence tend to agree more that it is essential to possess conversational ability in a foreign language.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an important increase in the overall percentage of Canadian population able to speak both English and French. By the year 2000, the rates of English-Spanish bilingualism amongst the U.S. population were not very different from the percentage of English-French bilingualism amongst the Canadian population. Nearly one out of six Americans are able to speak both English and Spanish, slightly less than the 17% of Canadians who, in 2001, reported an ability to speak both English and French. The edge held by Canada in this regard is largely attributable to the near parity in the percentage of the country's francophone bilinguals with the Americans' 'primary Spanish' speakers ability to speak English. But the non-Hispanic population reported a slightly higher ability to speak Spanish (at 9.8%) than the English-Canadian population in terms of its knowledge of French (at 9.5% in the year 2001).

Table 8

English-French Bilingualism by Mother Tongue, Canada, Quebec and Canada Less Quebec, 1981, 1991, 1996 and 2001

	1981	1991	1996	2001
	%	%	%	%
Canada	15.3	16.3	17.0	17.6
Anglophones	7.6	8.5	9.0	9.5
Francophones	36.2	38.9	41.1	43.4
Allophones	–	11.3	11.3	11.5
Quebec	32.4	35.4	37.8	40.9
Anglophones	53.2	59.4	62.9	66.1
Francophones	28.7	31.5	34.0	36.9
Allophones	–	46.6	46.8	51.0
Canada less Quebec	9.1	9.8	10.2	10.5
Anglophones	5.3	6.4	7.0	7.1
Francophones	79.0	81.1	83.6	85.0
Allophones	–	5.3	5.4	5.7

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

As observed above, the increase in English-French bilingualism during the 1990s is largely attributable to the progress made in Quebec in that regard. For its part, the most important share of bilingual Americans resides in the western United States due mainly to the concentration of the Hispanic population in that part of the country. Indeed, the western United States compares favorably to Quebec in terms of its overall rate of bilingualism. Still, Montreal stands out within North America in terms of the degree of bilingualism across the metropolis' language groups. But despite the similar rates of bilingualism in Canada and the United States, both Britain and France have percentages of second language knowledge amongst their respective populations that rival that of their former colonies. While just fewer than ten percent of Canada's mother tongue English speakers declare knowledge of French, some 14% of the British population declare an ability to speak the French language. In France's case, 32% of the population report an ability to speak the English language at a rate just below the percentage of Quebec's francophone population.

In Canada, the term most often used to refer to languages other than English or French is 'non-official languages,' or 'heritage language,' which is employed in connection with Canada's Multicultural Policy. The emphasis on heritage appears as an appropriation of such languages within the nation's pluralistic ethos. In the United States, languages other than English are referred to as foreign languages. Beyond the 'heritage versus foreign' rhetoric, the persistence of such languages as Greek, Italian and Portuguese is indeed somewhat greater in Canada than in the United States. But such retention is stronger amongst Quebecers – whose principal language is neither English nor French – than it is for non-official language groups in other provinces. It is not the result of multicultural policies. Rather, such persistence is connected to higher rates of residential concentration amongst ethnic groups, a lesser degree of mixing on the part of these groups and a higher ratio of seniors in such communities within Quebec.

Apart from knowledge of the French language, in 2001 the most widely-known languages were Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), German, Italian and Spanish with Polish a distant fifth. Spanish is the most widely-known second language, with some 300,000 people of English and French mother tongue declaring such knowledge. Italian, a language that is spoken by approximately 186,000 persons of English and French mother tongue, follows.

Table 9

Knowledge of non-official languages in Canada and the extent to which they are known by persons of English and French mother tongue, 2001

	Knowledge	MT-English	MT-French
Spanish	610,575	154,285	148,520
Italian	680,970	145,125	40,825
German	635,515	133,425	24,305
Chinese	1,028,450	78,680	4,700
Polish	249,695	22,875	2,275
Arabic	290,280	33,380	33,100

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2001

The pattern above contrasts somewhat with the situation in the United States. A 2001 Gallup poll reveals that when analysis is limited to just those people who are non-Hispanic, the percentage of people who speak a second language is 22%. Spanish remains the most frequently-spoken second language among non-Hispanics (the proportion of those who speak it is at 43%). French is the next most common second language at 23%, with German behind it at 13%. When the numbers are recast, the percentage of Spanish speakers who are not Hispanic is at 9.8%. This is slightly above the 9.5% of non-French mother tongue in Canada who report an ability to speak the French language.

As observed below, four states in the United States have significantly higher percentages of people who speak a language other than the dominant language (usually Spanish) than is the case for the most ethnically diverse provinces of Canada.

Table 10

Real numbers and Percentage of persons speaking a language other than English in their homes in the United States and Canada and in selected states and provinces (in Quebec other than French), 2001 and 1991:

	2000/2001	2000/2001	1990/1991	1990/1991
	Nb.	%	Nb.	%
United States	46,951,595	17.9	31,844,979	13.8
Canada	3,179,685 (6,620,465)	10.7 (22.3)	2,562,300	8.4
California	12,401,756	39.4	8,619,334	31.5
Texas	6,010,753	31.3	3,970,304	25.4
New Brunswick	6,145 (220,505)	1.0 (30.6)	–	(31.2)
New York	4,962,901	28.0	3,980,720	23.3
Quebec	470,290	6.6 (11.1)	396,700	4.7
Ontario	1,733,485 (326,030)	15.4 (2.9)	1,158,800	11.6
British Columbia	601,535 (20,000)	15.5 (0.5)	323,000	9.9

Source: United States Bureau of the Census, 2000 and 1990 and Statistics Canada, Census of 2001 and 1991

In Canada's case, there are some 6.6 million people who speak French at home. In 2001, in Quebec, 796,855 people spoke English at home, representing another 11.1% of the province's population. In Ontario 326,030 spoke French at home, representing another 2.9%. In New Brunswick, the number of people speaking a language other than English and French at home is low but the share of francophones rates this province amongst the highest of any place in North America not speaking the dominant language. Actually, Ontario has become the province with the highest percentage of people not speaking the dominant language at home, placing Quebec second in this regard.

Already, in the states of Texas and California, the percentage of people who speak Spanish at home exceeds the percentage of people who speak French in their homes in Canada. While the share of home language francophones in New Brunswick remains superior to the share of the Spanish group in any other province or state, the share of home language Spanish speakers in Florida, New York and Nevada, exceeds the percentage of the Quebec's official language English-speaking minority.

In 2000, in the United States, amongst the population five years old and above, over 26 million spoke Spanish in their homes, representing more than one out of ten Americans. Should the phenomenal rise in Spanish continue unabated, in a few decades the percentage of such persons speaking the language in their homes in the United States may reach levels similar to those who speak the French language in their homes in Canada.

Conclusion

Demographic realities help explain differences in identity formation in Canada and the United States. In order to gain a fuller understanding of what makes certain expressions of identity more salient in either country we need to know under what conditions such identities are manifested. A variety of historical and social considerations need to be examined, in concert with the demographics, to further explore the distinctions. Clearly, the patterns described above may result in further divergence between Canada and the United States in the future. The significant influx of immigrants from Latin America to the United States and notably in the western part of that country may imply stronger cultural ties with Mexico. In Canada's case, substantial immigration from Asia may mean increased cultural ties with that part of the world. These trends may imply change in the relative importance accorded to dominant expressions of identity in the decades ahead. ▪

THREE KEY REMARKS ON RACE AND ETHNICITY

Sarah Daynes

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ABSTRACT

If, scientifically, race is a social construction, socially, and for a lot of people, race is indeed very real. Furthermore, the concept of race, as well as its social manifestations, should not be understood as fixed – race as an identity category is fluid and changes over time and space. And finally, although race seems to be an easily definable term, in reality it is one of the trickiest concepts in social sciences. Sarah Daynes succinctly addresses all three of these issues about race in the U.S.

Originally, I had been asked to paint a picture of race and ethnicity in the United-States, and ideally this picture should take the form of a fresco rather than that of a miniature. Instead of a limited and incomplete sketch of this fresco, I will concentrate on three points which, in my opinion, are essential to a sociological point of view on the question of race and ethnicity: first, the paradox of reality and unreality; second, the apprehension of race as a discourse; and third, the distinction between 'race' and 'ethnicity' and the dialectic between categorization and identification.

Biologically speaking, race does not exist: indeed, there is no biological fact that allows the distinction of races within humankind. Therefore, race possesses an unreal character, which shall be taken as a basic point of departure. However, socially speaking, individuals and groups use the notion of race in the way they define themselves, and they also use it in order to act and think in their everyday life; and, as we all know, race also has very concrete and acute consequences on peoples' lives. One could say, then, that race becomes socially real, even if scientifically unreal: in a way, race is brought to life by the meanings associated with it. And this paradox implies that race is a socially and historically determined construct, dependent on the context in which it emerges. The fact that *people use race* is what we work on from a sociological standpoint. How do they use it, for what, and why, are the kind of questions we look at. From a strict sociological point of view, what matters is not that race does not exist, but that people *feel* that it does exist. This is what makes race real in society.

Since race is not a "scientific reality" and is socially constructed, it is not objectively defined. Therefore, racial categories are not fixed; they change over time and space. For instance, different definitions of "who is black" and "who is white" can be found, both diachronically and synchronically. The United States is a good example of this variation: in the 19th century, the legal definition of the 'black' category varied across the country; and this definition has also changed in the period between the 17th century and the 21st century.

Because race is socially real but scientifically unreal, it can be considered as a discourse, as a *system of representation*. In other words, we can look at the fluctuating meanings associated with race, and at the more or less hegemonic character of one definition of race at any given moment. American society lives within a system of representation that organizes the "racial action" and "racial thinking" of individuals and groups. This system of representation fixes difference, e.g. racializes it, and tends to organize it within a binary opposition between "whites" and "blacks." This binary opposition, however, has been contested by many scholars, who pointed out the appearance of a "third pole" with the growth of the Hispanic population (which would contain both 'races') or of the Asian-American group.

I would argue that the apprehension of race as a system of representation is the only way to explain *the persistence of race as an organizing feature of society*: without it, it becomes impossible

to understand why people would hold on to something they know does not exist. The analysis of race and ethnicity, and of their persistence in society, has to imply the changing meaning that systems of representation convey and the discursive space they define; it also has to look at the possible functioning of these systems as regimes of truth and the symbolic power that they hold. By evacuating the issue of meaning, an analysis of race cannot give account of the difficulties faced by, precisely, the attempts of exiting the discourse of race (this is a crucial issue when analyzing anti-racism, for instance).

Race always appears to be very easy to define – after all, everybody knows what race is – and still it is one of the trickiest concepts in social sciences: it seems that the more one examines the concept of race, the less evident it becomes. This is especially true if one considers the conventional distinction made between race and ethnicity, which is neither clear nor obvious.

First, a common view associates ethnicity with culture and race with phenotype. In the United States for instance, a distinction is made between the 'Italian' ethnic group and the 'African-American' racial group, the former referring primarily to culture and the latter to skin color and other physical attributes. However, such a view poses a double problem, conceptually speaking. The perception of phenotypical differences itself varies, as well as the meanings associated with them: we do not perceive differences the same way everywhere and all the time. In the United States for instance, the 'Irish' have not always been considered 'white.' Moreover, the ethnic process has to be considered as a social process: it uses culture, but as a marker, not as essential content. In other words, ethnicity is not about cultural difference, but about the use of culture within the process of social differentiation.

A second common assumption concerns the distinction made between a "chosen ethnicity" and an "imposed race." Ethnicity is usually associated with identification (therefore with the individuals' active and voluntary behavior) while race is connected to categorization (therefore to a passive imposition, exerted by society onto individuals or groups). Ethnicity then becomes a sort of "positive race," often claimed and with which individuals actively identify. However, we should keep in mind that identification and categorization are two elements of the same process of group formation and social identity, and therefore cannot be analyzed in complete independence of each other. The way in which individuals or groups self-identify, the way in which they categorize others (which is, moreover, always a way to categorize oneself), as well as the consequences of social categorization, are all of equal importance. Race is not entirely imposed, nor is it entirely chosen, and the same holds true for ethnicity. What matters here is the *dialectical relationship* between choice and imposition, between identification and categorization.

These three key points should serve as a conceptual basis for the analysis of race and ethnicity. As well, they allow a series of starting remarks for a sociological apprehension of the processes. Race is a social construct that must be analyzed within its context of emergence. It can be defined as the naturalization of physical differences – and the set of meanings associated with them. Difference becomes racialized when it is fixed and made absolute. Ethnicity necessarily implies an identification process, whether individual or collective. We can discuss here whether ethnicity is a "nice" or "politically correct" way to talk about race. Some social scientists would consider ethnicity to be nothing but social identity, and race as one of the modalities that ethnicity can take. Both are fundamentally relational processes: they are not the property of the group, but exist only within the relationship between one or more groups: they exist in between the groups and not within them – which implies that we understand them as social processes that engage the "cultural stuff." Neither process is absolute, but rather they are culturally variable; the ethnic or racial character of a social relationship again depends on the context in which it emerges and grows. In fact, both race and ethnicity have to be understood as part of a dialectic made between identification and categorization. ■

FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF A RELIGIOUS IDENTITY FOR AMERICAN JEWRY[1]

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ABSTRACT

As a result of its encounter with American society, Judaism in the U.S. is no longer governed by traditional knowledge. Rather, "it reflects the American values of voluntary choice, pluralism, and diversity." The integration of Jews within the American cultural landscape results in the fragmentation of the Jewish community into three distinct sub-groups, weakening the connection between its members and perhaps even threatening the survival of Jews as a strong religious minority.

Being Jewish is a composite identity that includes religious, national, ethnic, and cultural components. Studies of American Jews find that people with a strong religious identity have the strongest connections to other aspects of Jewish life. This would suggest that the religious component is the central identity from which other dimensions of Jewishness emerge. Indeed, within traditional religious communities, the institutions, organizations, formal and informal relationships and interactions comprise a culture that is expressive of religious laws, rituals, customs, and teachings. These are thought to provide the blueprint for how to live a religiously observant Jewish life.

Historically, this model that intertwines religion, culture, and way of life proved problematic in America where Jews were expected, along with other immigrants, to shed their distinctive cultural and communal norms in their process of Americanization. What was acceptable to retain and even expected, was their religious identification. Thus, Jews in America are a religious group: it is their religious identity that defines their distinctiveness. Today the largest percentage of American Jews, those who are affiliated with the Reform and Conservative denominations, have adopted a form of Judaism that reflects the values of choice, pluralism, and egalitarianism prevalent in American society. This form of Judaism contrasts sharply with the more particularistic and traditional Judaism of the Orthodox, Hasidic, and ultra-Orthodox denominations. These differences emerged as a consequence of the encounter between Jewish immigrants, their descendants and American social-political history.[2]

The Jewish population in America consists primarily of descendants of Jews who emigrated from Eastern Europe and arrived during the Great Migration of 1880-1924. During these years, the Jewish population grew from 250,000 in 1880 to 4.2 million people in 1924 (Faber 1992; Feingold 1992; Goren 1980; Waxman 1983). The Eastern European Jewish population, in other words, completely overwhelmed the far smaller Sephardic and German Jewish populations.

At the time, the image of the melting pot provided the guiding image of how millions of immigrants flocking to America's shores at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century could become Americans and be integrated into American life. In accordance with this vision, immigrants were expected to shed ethnic differences but retain their religious faith. Religious belief, any religious belief, was regarded as essential to an American identity. Because of the multi-dimensional and highly integrated quality to being Jewish, however, over time this approach proved problematic. Although the Eastern European Jewish immigrants rapidly assimilated, achieving middle-class status in approximately one generation, to abstract out and retain only the religious

dimension of being Jewish fractured and attenuated its meaning for Jews as individuals and as a community. This attenuation of meaning was somewhat thwarted by patterns of discrimination against Jews and other minority groups.

In part because of the discrimination, and in part because they preferred to live with others who shared their religiously-based culture, during the first half of the twentieth century Jews tended to live in residentially homogeneous neighborhoods. By the third generation (counting the immigrant population as the first generation) major barriers to residential integration collapsed and Jews began to live in residentially heterogeneous neighborhoods. Suburban developments were constructed and opened to the middle classes, including Jews. The Conservative branch of Judaism permitted congregants to drive to synagogue on the Sabbath,[3] a ruling that enabled Conservative Jews to live further apart from one another and still retain their religious affiliation. The culmination of these developments led to Jews living in mixed residential neighborhoods, thus eliminating the geographical proximity that integrated and transformed interpersonal, religious, ethnic, and cultural experiences into a strong personal and communal Jewish identity (Farber 1995; Farber and Waxman 1999).

Two additional events occurred during the third generation leading to a further disintegration of what was a strongly integrated cultural-religious Jewish identity. At this time, Jewish group self-definition shifted from an ethnic to a religious one. This was consistent with the expectation of immigrant groups mentioned earlier and also a reflection of the upsurge in religious affiliation during the fifties. While this shift would appear to reestablish the religious basis of a Jewish identity, the second event thwarted this development. This was a shift in the conceptualization of religion from a communal or shared activity to a primarily personal belief system.[4]

The confluence of these two changes had a significant impact on Jewish identity: group self-definition shifted from an all-encompassing ethno-religious identity to a segmented religious one; religious identity shifted from a communal to a primarily personal experience. Thus, the change experienced by the Jewish population was a shift from a communally integrated set of shared meanings to an understanding of religion as a personal belief system. It is important to recognize that these shifts occurred when Jews were generally living in mixed residential settings and not the homogeneous communities of the first two generations.

In general, less and less of what it meant to be Jewish was being transferred to each generation.[5] During these years, the Orthodox denomination was shrinking, and the Conservative and Reform denominations were growing. More and more American beliefs, ideologies, and understandings were integrated into the American Jewish identity.[6] By the fourth generation, most descendants of the immigrants who arrived during the Great Migration had relatively few if any reference points, either for an individual or a communal Jewish identity, that did not significantly overlap and intertwine with American culture. Aside from the Orthodox who retained a religiously-based community, many American Jews had little or no sense of what it meant to be Jewish. For most Jews, in other words, few characteristics, qualities, norms, or expectations differentiated being Jewish from being an American.

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The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s noted the failure of American society to include African Americans in the melting pot vision. Soon, other groups recognized that they too were excluded, being neither white, Anglo-Saxon nor Protestant (WASP). In response, the integrating image of America shifted from the melting pot to images that celebrated diversity, such as the rainbow and a mosaic. The change was significant for immigrants and their descendants: they were now expected to retain the ethnic characteristics of their home countries. The approach was intended as a way to strengthen minority racial and ethnic groups. Pluralism was the goal, defined by Random House Webster's Dictionary as "a condition in which minority groups participate fully in the dominant society, yet maintain their cultural differences" (Braham, ed. 1996:507).

For fourth-generation American Jews these movements, which overlapped with the Six-Day War in Israel, led to a redefinition of their place in America and their relationship with Israel: it led to an assertion of ethnic pride. For descendants of Eastern European Jews who had remained religiously observant, there was a greater willingness to publicly display and proclaim religious adherence. For members of the Reform and Conservative denominations, the celebration of diversity led to increased enrollment in religious schools and a greater interest and practice of religious ritual observance. However, regarding the actions of these latter groups a caveat must be added.

Many of these descendants lacked a tradition of Jewish family observance, formal Jewish education and, in general, were unaware of what it means to be Jewish from a traditional perspective. Thus, the move to increase ritual practice and education did not reflect the Orthodox or traditional model of religion which has implications for all of life. Traditional Judaism is not primarily a belief system as religion is typically defined in America but rather, a way of life. The Judaism that emerged from its

encounter with American society is not governed by traditional knowledge nor is it premised on the concept of commandment. Instead, it reflects the American values of voluntary choice, pluralism, and diversity.[7]

This alternative model of how to be Jewish in a postmodern world is intended to be inclusive, imaginative and inventive (Blanchard 2003; Cohen 2000; Farber and Waxman 1999). Often referred to as 'salad bar' or 'smorgasbord' Judaism, it advocates mixing and matching religious ritual behaviors, beliefs, and ideas in a way that satisfies personal individual needs, whether for comfort, security, spirituality, and/or community. The approach essentially inverts traditional Jewish practice, which places a high value on community and is based on commanded (as opposed to voluntary) actions. Whereas traditional religions, not only Judaism, generally imply group membership and require the individual and the group to serve God, contemporary models understand religion as a means to serve individual, personal needs.

A radically different scenario unfolded for descendents of Jews whose families remained traditionally observant (mentioned above).[8] In part this is due to the extensive educational and ritual observance infrastructures that developed before diversity was accepted as an ideal in America and in part, it is due to the ultra-Orthodox groups who arrived as refugees of World War II and had no desire to assimilate. Although adherence to Jewish law has always required traditionally observant Jews to retain geographically based communities. the refugees from World War II and in particular the Hasidic groups formed what have come to be called 'enclave communities.' These communities constitute an almost parallel universe to the services and organizations that exist within American society.[9] The American embrace of pluralism and diversity provided a culture in which religiously observant groups could retain their distinctive identity without severe social and or economic costs, an experience in sharp contrast to earlier generations of Jews who needed to find a new job every Monday because they refused to work on the Jewish Sabbath (Saturday).

The American embrace of pluralism and diversity provided a culture in which religiously observant groups could retain their distinctive identity without severe social and or economic costs, an experience in sharp contrast to earlier generations of Jews who needed to find a new job every Monday because they refused to work on the Jewish Sabbath (Saturday).

This latter group, which during most of the twentieth century was declining, began to increase at the end of the twentieth century. Recent findings from the 2001 National Jewish Population Survey are not yet available, but the 2002 New York Jewish Population Survey finds that the Orthodox population grew from thirteen percent in 1990 to nineteen percent, in New York City.[10]

Overall, Jews in America are moving in three directions (Farber & Waxman 1999). One group is moving further and further away from their Jewish heritage. They are intermarrying, converting, and becoming secular Jews, which means they do not identify with any of the Jewish religious denominations and have few affiliations or associations with Jewish organizations and institutions.

A second group, the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sectors mentioned above, is becoming more and more religiously observant and separating from the larger American culture even while they are involved educationally and professionally. This group is the most Jewishly committed of all Jews. Survey data find that those who identify with the Orthodox denomination have the greatest number of Jewish affiliations, perform the greatest number of Jewish behaviors, and have the strongest commitment to the State of Israel.

A third group, and this is numerically the largest group, is in the middle. They are primarily affiliated with the Conservative and Reform denominations. In general, they are affiliated with Jewish religious, secular, and philanthropic organizations and institutions, practice Jewish customs and religious rituals and their Jewish group identity is a religious one. As a group they are Jewishly committed but far less so than the second group mentioned above; they have fewer Jewish affiliations and practices and less of a connection with the state of Israel. Perhaps the most significant difference however, is in the nature of their commitment, which more strongly reflects and integrates American values like freedom of choice, self-autonomy, egalitarianism, and pluralism into their Jewish practices than does the Orthodox groups (Cohen and Eisen 2000).

These qualities provide a greater mesh with American culture and values. But they do not provide the distinctiveness nor the geographical rootedness Kosmin and Lachman identify as essential for the survival of religious minorities: "It is only by having a critical mass in any one area that most small groups can maintain their viability over the generations. Unless there is geographical rootedness, the prospects for long-term survival of these small minority groups are dim" (Kosmin and Lachman 1993:67).[11]

The role and place of Jews in different countries and societies have varied throughout the ages. Inevitably, however, there is always a process of assimilation; Jews tend to adopt certain qualities and characteristics of their host country even when they remain a people apart (Soloveitchik 1994). The pluralistic political and cultural systems of America have enabled Jews to be full participants in American society. This has greatly benefited

the economic and professional well-being of Jews as individuals. But it has also led to greater assimilation, fragmentation, and tension among different groups of Jews.

When the concepts of choice, pluralism, and diversity are substituted for distinctive characteristics, group definitiveness disappears and members lack a cohesive unifying framework. While seeming to provide an all-inclusive umbrella, the diversity model gives strong cultural support and legitimacy to such a wide array of ways to be Jewish that group boundaries disappear and threaten the unity of the group (Wertheimer 1993).

If group belonging is to have life significance and contribute to personal identity, there must be more that is shared than a name. There must be agreed-upon norms, values, and practices, along with the other components that comprise a worldview. This leads to a set of expectations for behaviors and relationships. For this to occur, socialization and education within the group is necessary. Without it, assimilation of the values, norms, and beliefs of the host country is inevitable. The pluralistic challenge is to encourage group distinctiveness while providing the mediating structures that enable communication and engender respect between significantly different groups. ▪

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NOTES

[1] This article is based on a presentation given at the Diversity Symposium at Ellis Island Museum – September 10, 2003, sponsored by the Association for Canadian Studies together with the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States.

[2] The Reform movement was introduced to America in the early 1800s. However, it wasn't a successful movement until it was accepted by the descendents of the Eastern European immigrants by which time their platform had already undergone major changes. For a brief but good overview of this development within the context of American Jewish history see Waxman 1983, especially chapter 1.

[3] According to Jewish law, Jews are not permitted to travel on the Sabbath and holidays. This requires them to live within walking distance of a synagogue, thus forming geographically based communities. Orthodox Jews continue to adhere to this law and thus, tend to live in relatively homogeneous neighborhoods.

[4] This shift is discussed by Herberg (1960). This also Bellah et. al. (1985), Roof (1999), and Cohen (2000) for more recent implications of this shift.

[5] Chiswick (1999) notes that given their limited resources, a consequence of the actions of the first and second generations of Eastern European Jews was to invest in economic security rather than religious continuity.

[6] Fishman (2000) calls this process 'coalescence.'

[7] See Liebman 1990 for a discussion of the difference between ritual and ceremony. See also Bellah et. al. 1985, especially the religious phenomenon of 'Sheilaism'.

[8] In this designation I include the full range of Jewish groups from traditional Conservative to the many groups that comprise the Orthodox continuum – from Modern Orthodox to *haredi* or ultra-Orthodox. See Fishman (2000) for an insightful analysis of what differentiates one group from the other, not only between the Orthodox but also between all the Jewish denominations.

[9] Such communities have also formed around Yeshivas, religious seminaries. Lakewood, New Jersey is an example of such a community.

[10] See UJA-Federation of New York web site (www.ujafedny.org) for survey results.

[11] See also Horowitz and Solomon 1992 for discussion of the importance of a critical mass with respect to Jews in New York City. Farber 1995 also discusses the case of Jews in New York City.

"NO LANGUAGE OR CULTURE LEFT BEHIND": LANGUAGES AND LANGUAGE EDUCATION IN THE U.S.[1]

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ABSTRACT

While statistics document a surge in interest for second or foreign language learning in the U.S., paradoxically, the education system shows that enrollment in post-secondary foreign language courses is declining. This decline, according to the author, is due to a lack of resources made available to potential students of languages by the educational system. However, certain initiatives, like the Drake University Language Acquisition Program (DULAP) and the Binghamton's LxC Program, are attempting to reverse this lack of resources.

The aftershocks of "9/11" in the United States have underscored not only the long-lamented lack of awareness of other cultures prevalent in the U.S. general population (double-entendre intended) but also the long-standing foreign language crisis in American intelligence agencies where experts in many language areas have been and remain in short supply. Paradoxically, this state of affairs is accompanied both by an ever-growing interest among Americans in the languages and cultures of their heritages and by increased incidences of discrimination against several ethnic groups. Thus, there is now an urgent need – perceived as clearly in the U.S. national interest – to create an educational environment where, to echo the recent national legislation in education ("No Child Left Behind"), no language or culture will be left behind.

American universities have, for some time now, in response to the realities and pressures of globalization, stressed the need to "internationalize" the curriculum. This "internationalization" (multi-nationalization) movement is somewhat in contrast, however, to "multiculturalism," which has acquired a more restrictive connotation in the American context, often limited to a superficial form of recognition of the cultures of dominant minorities within the country. Both "internationalization" and "multiculturalism" in American higher education have involved languages only in a relatively minor fashion, with the notable exception of the perceived explosion (often "capped") of student interest in learning Spanish as a language of choice to fulfill general education requirements in colleges and universities. The American populace and the entertainment media, however, have begun to notice that "the monolingual American" as a speaker of English is more myth than "mythic": Nielsen ratings have had to confront the enormous popularity of "Sabado Gigante," Univision's Spanish-language Saturday evening program, in the context of New York City where well over one-third of the population is foreign-born; this year's televised programming for the Super Bowl included a beer advertisement in Spanish; recently, PBS and Univision collaborated to present a debate among the presidential candidates of the Democratic Party where the use of some Spanish by the politicians was *de rigueur* and questions in Spanish were presented, then translated for the candidates.

Concurrently, the time-honored concept of the "native speaker" has come into question inasmuch as the "natives" of many lands are speakers of many languages (sometimes of "official" national languages, sometimes of "heritage" languages from their ethnic groups) with varying proficiencies in speaking, writing, reading, and listening skills. Most "world" languages (e.g. English, Spanish, French, and Chinese) are not fixed monoliths crossing national or geographic boundaries; "native speakers" from various countries/areas may have difficulty understanding each other, not only due to variations in pronunciation but also lexico-semantic and syntactic variation. It has now become

common practice in American media news broadcasts to sub-title speakers of non-U.S. English in an attempt to ensure comprehension.

The Saussurian distinction between synchronic linguistics (a snapshot of a language as a system at a moment in time, e.g. a grammar) and diachronic linguistics (language as a system evolving over time), graphically presented as a vertical and a horizontal axis on a chart, seems insufficient to describe these phenomena. Languages named for their colonizing powers (e.g. English, French, and Spanish) are probably better conceptualized as "Bucky balls" (multi-faceted geodesic-dome-like structures, as in "buckminsterfullerenes") soaring through space, where each triangular facet represents a particular systemic manifestation of a linguistically tangent language community (e.g. for French: Canadian, Haitian, Togolese, etc.) with the whole rotating and changing as it encounters the frictions of time (as well as other language "Bucky balls"). "Global English," if it exists, will thus most likely evolve as a common denominator of rather limited, basic communication strategies (greetings, etc.) shared among all of the manifest variations of the English languages rather than as a distinct systemic variety to learn and use.

In these evolving national and global contexts, how are American universities responding to the needs of "the national interest" and of both "internationalization" and "heritage language" learners? What are the expectations of a high school senior anticipating entry as a freshman at an American college or university with respect to language and culture learning? A survey conducted by studentPOLL in cooperation with the American Council on Education in the fall of 2000[2] found that:

- *Almost nine in ten students said they were interested in gaining exposure to another culture.*
- *Almost two-thirds of respondents said they were interested in learning another language.*
- *Just over 60 percent said they were interested in international education to acquire career-related experiences.*

Yet, the ACE/Ford "Preliminary Status Report 2000: Internationalization of U.S. Higher Education"[3] indicates that post-secondary foreign language course enrollments are declining and that the percentage of American college students studying abroad is under three percent. What is the cause of this "disconnect"?

American language departments, both English and Foreign Languages, generally have a two-tiered system of organization for delivery of instruction: advanced courses for the majors in literature (generally taught by the professoriate) and lower-level courses in language skills for general education (often taught by temporary, part-time faculty or graduate students in large universities). In the case of languages other than English, the textbooks for the lower-levels of instruction are virtually the same textbooks as those used in secondary (high school) instruction; they are often published by the same mass-market publishers and are usually by the same authors with different arrangements of identical or similar materials packaged with a different cover and title. Lower-level instruction is primarily dedicated to basic communication skills predominantly situated in the context of tourism, which provides the opportunity for the discussion of culture. Students who enter college with advanced foreign language skills are offered choices primarily among literature courses designed for students majoring in that language and literature. Study abroad options are usually also designed for the student majoring in literature. While market forces from globalization have spurred many language departments to offer an occasional course in business use of the foreign language, or courses (usually conducted in English) on the culture and civilization of the country which bears the name of the language, and while some hybrid majors have evolved (e.g. language and international business), there are typically very few opportunities for a student to take courses in which the use of a foreign language is centered on or applied to another discipline. Additionally, "heritage language" learners only occasionally find that courses have been developed to assist them to expand the language skills learned in their home environments.

In short, the undergraduate experience of foreign language instruction is generally either (1) a repetition of lower-level high school instruction (most frequently offered in Spanish due to the constraints of budget and/or of foreign language teacher shortages at the secondary level in much of the country) or (2) an imitation of the graduate school curriculum consisting of the literature of the foreign language designed to prepare students to become literary scholars and critics. The failure of the American college student to pursue advanced language study is thus in large part in response to a curricular system of education which has been by and large unresponsive to the student's or the nation's needs and interests.

The one bright spot in this rather bleak picture has been the American Languages Across the Curriculum movement (LAC or, sometimes, FLAC, Foreign Languages Across the Curriculum) which has experimented with the inclusion of the subject matter of other disciplines in courses of the foreign language curriculum and the use of foreign languages in the curricula of other disciplines. Most of the incarnations of this movement have been rather expensive: the development of add-on or "trailer" course sections which accompany the course offerings of another discipline, or the team-teaching of a course in another discipline by both a foreign language instructor and the other discipline instructor. The one model which has proven the most cost-effective and the most "popular" in the sense of having attracted the most students is that of Binghamton University-SUNY[4] where foreign graduate students enrolled in departments across the curriculum lead non-credit study groups discussing alternate reading assignments (in a foreign language) for selected courses in their disciplines. Known by the acronym 'LxC,' Binghamton's method has been most successful in attracting large numbers of students in courses like American immigration history (where students have often explored the language of their heritage) or in courses involving international issues (e.g. business, environmental studies, etc.). While the number of language study groups for a given course has sometimes been varied and numerous (including French, German, Spanish, Hindi, Chinese, Korean, etc.), the levels of courses participating in the

program have primarily been those of first- and second-year instruction, i.e. the less specialized courses in the disciplines. Nonetheless, while other institutions can boast of enrollments in LAC courses of, at most, dozens of students in any given semester, at Binghamton University the semester enrollments are well over one hundred, with annual totals that have exceeded three hundred. Student response to the program has been enthusiastic and students often initiate the request for a study group, thus recruiting their professors in the disciplines to an internationalization of their course offerings. However, the traditional language and literature departments remain, for the most part, uninvolved in the endeavor, although supportive of its mission.

Of course, the post-"9/11" imperative to internationalize education and to educate American students for global citizenship is simultaneously challenged and enabled by the "digital age." The use of technologies in foreign language education has been a time-honored tradition as educators have attempted to bring "realia" from target countries and the sounds of languages into their classrooms. The tape recorder and the video cassette recorder have been the mainstays of the traditional "language laboratory." Today, with electronically distributed learning and the wide availability of sophisticated language software, each student's desktop can be a virtual language laboratory. Further, with Internet technologies and the World Wide Web, students can enter into synchronous and asynchronous dialogue with speakers and learners from around the world. American education has scarcely begun to realize the economies of learning and of fiscal support that new technologies can offer. Schools, colleges, and universities overwhelmingly continue to conduct foreign language instruction with face-to-face, "seat-time," and "credit- hour" structures whose efficacy is undermined by the shortage of qualified teachers in less-commonly taught languages and the tyranny of budget allocation processes dominated by FTE (full-time equivalent student) enrollments. As a result, schools, colleges, and universities have been engaged in dramatic reductions in language offerings at all levels, leading even to the wholesale elimination of foreign language departments and requirements in many institutions.

There is, however, one university in the United States to watch closely. Drake University eliminated its expensive, traditional foreign language department and replaced it with the Drake University Language Acquisition Program (DULAP), a personalized instruction program, inspired in part by Binghamton's LxC Program, but grounded in electronic portfolio assessment and offering the potential for individual student study and use of many languages in many disciplinary contexts, integrating electronic resources with human resources, simultaneously challenging and enabling each student to excel.[5] The model is student-centered yet also faculty-enriching because the quality of contact with the student rises; the prognosis for the model's success appears high indeed.

In conclusion, by their very nature, the products and processes of the "digital age" encourage the use and study of foreign languages across the curriculum and across the globe, while simultaneously challenging educational institutions to realign the deployment of their resources and personnel to the realities and opportunities of the new communication modalities. The types of collaborative restructuring for the advancement of student learning discussed by such innovative groups as the Project for the Future of Higher Education[6] offer potentially effective solutions to the American foreign language and culture knowledge crisis and are already a hallmark of Drake's DULAP. The number of speakers of the world's top one hundred languages is increasing at a rate higher than that of the world population in general; multilingualism is and has always been part of *la condition humaine*. The "brave new world" of the digital age now extends the reach of languages and cultures across disciplinary and national boundaries into our daily lives as individuals. Indeed, today, as perhaps never before in human history, "no language or culture" need be "left behind." ■

NOTES

[1] Lors du colloque à Ellis Island cette communication a été faite en anglais américain, précédée d'un préambule en français dans lequel l'auteure américaine s'est excusée de son accent (qui n'avait rien du canadien) car elle a été éduquée dans le français du colonisateur, de l'ancien régime…

[2] www.acenet.edu/programs/international/mapping/seniors_survey.cfm

[3] www.acenet.edu/bookstore/pdf/2000-intl-report.pdf

[4] see http://lxc.binghamton.edu

[5] see www.drake.edu/dulap

[6] www.pfhe.org

RELIGION IN CANADA: FACTS, FIGURES, AND FUTURES[1]

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ABSTRACT

Canada, unlike the U.S., did not experience a formal separation of church and state. Nonetheless, religion, especially Christianity, has been barred from the Canadian public policy arena. Rather than to deal with the sensitive nature of religion and risk firing up heated debates, we choose to avoid the issue altogether, dismissing in the process the fact that religion is an important element of personal identification, social life, and international politics. This decision, the author warns, fosters the cultivation of religious illiteracy.

In this paper, I want to address the issue of religion in Canadian society. First, I will highlight the main points of the recently released Statistics Canada Census data on religion in Canada. I will then move away from numbers to talk more broadly about religion in Canadian life, especially its history, and some of the reasons why we are becoming more and more religiously illiterate. Finally, I will conclude by talking about some of the promising changes I see taking place in Canadian public discourse on religion

Let us begin with the numbers. Most American scholars of Canadian studies will know that Statistics Canada asks Canadians questions about religion in every second national census, that is, every 10 years. Following are some of the highlights from the 2001 Census, from which the religion data was released in May of this year.

- Roughly 76% of Canadians identified themselves as Christians in the 2001 census, down from 82% in 1991.
- Roughly 43% of Canadians are Roman Catholics and 29% are Protestants.
- Overall, the number of Protestants has declined from 35% in 1991; losses were most significant in the mainline Protestant traditions, while a number of certain smaller (or non-mainline) groups of evangelical Protestants (Baptists, Adventists, Evangelical Missionary Church, etc.) have increased their numbers slightly or significantly; the number of Catholics has remained fairly stable.
- There has been growth in the Eastern Orthodox traditions; they represent 1.6% of the Canadian population.
- There has been significant growth in the unaffiliated conservative Protestant traditions (e.g., those who simply said they were evangelicals, fundamentalists, non-denomination, or unaffiliated Christians); they represent 2.6% of the population.
- Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists have almost all roughly doubled in real numbers in the past 10 years.
- The Jewish population has grown roughly 4%.
- The non-Christian segment of the Canadian population is a real growth area, and the area most likely to influence Canadian society in the future, if current trends continue.
- Although non-Christians represent about 6% of our total population, if they keep doubling each decade, they may actually outnumber Protestants in roughly 20 years.
- Religious nones, those indicating that they have no religion, have also increased significantly, from 12% to 16% in the last decade; it is very difficult to tell what to make of these people: some are transients, some are true non-believers, and some opt for this choice to dodge the question entirely out of concern for the way the government might interpret their answers or out of a sense that religion is a private matter.

One problematic feature of this census is the fact that there was no opportunity for Canada's roughly 1.2 million Chinese participants to check off "Chinese Religion" as an option. Traditionally, scholars have spoken of Chinese Religion as combining Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and folk religion. However, the Chinese combine these forces in innovative and sometimes unintentional ways. For this reason, many religious studies scholars in Canada simply refer to Chinese Religion rather than Chinese *Religions*. Apparently, many Chinese will say that they have no religion even though they have statues of various Buddhas in their homes, practice ancestor worship, celebrate Chinese religious festivals, organize their homes according to Feng Shui principles, and endorse familial structures that come out of the Confucian tradition. This is a complex issue (especially since it brings into the foreground the problematic definition of the term "religion"), but my point is that many scholars now believe that a large portion of the Chinese people in the "no religion" category, as well as some of those in the Buddhism, Christianity, and Confucianism categories may have put themselves in these categories because Statistics Canada did not offer them a broader and more accurate definition, namely, Chinese Religion. This is not to invalidate the self-definitions of Chinese participants; rather, it is meant to suggest that the growth in the "no religion" category, from 12% to 16% in 10 years, may reflect certain limitations in the design of the survey itself

Moreover, other surveys (especially Bibby 2002, and the General Social Survey) reveal that the most dramatic changes in the religious landscape of Canada relate to religious participation, not religious identification. The evidence here suggests that roughly 20% of Canadians attend places of worship regularly, down from 28% in 1986 (and we should remember that studies confirm that many people stretch the truth when answering questions about participation). Therefore, Canadians are less and less committed to traditional religious institutions (the sample size of non-Christian religions would be so small that this generalization really refers only to Christian groups). The overall story for established mainline Christians in Canada looks fairly discouraging, though it is still far and away the majority tradition, with over three-quarters of Canadians claiming to identify with the tradition. As well, of course, what seems to be the end of a particular kind of institutional form of Christian life may very well be the beginning of other more innovative forms.

Now, let me address the question of the general place of religion in Canadian society. To get a clear sense of this phenomenon, one first has to identify and challenge what a friend of mine calls the "Law and Order Effect," named after the popular one-hour police and lawyer program on American prime time television. This effect refers to the tendency among Canadians and Canada-watchers to assume that Canadian society is just like American society; for this reason, many Canadians wrongly assume that we have "Miranda rights," "DA's," and the unfettered right to free speech.

The most stubborn of these Law and Order Effects regards the question of the so-called separation of church and state in Canada. Although I do not have the time to elaborate on this subject, I can simply say that there has never been a *de jure* separation of church and state in Canada. There is, in fact, a long history of formal and informal Christian privilege woven throughout our history. Not only has our calendar reflected the ritual life of the Christian majority population, but the educational systems in most of our provinces have been heavily influenced or even run by Christian organizations. In Quebec, until the 1960s, hospitals, social services, and education were under the influence of the churches. Of course, most regrettably, when the Canadian government needed to find a way to assimilate the First Nations population, they essentially "contracted out" or "outsourced" the job to various Christian denominations. This is just one more piece of evidence demonstrating that being Canadian and being Christian were understood to be identical by the governing powers.

Yet, although there is no formal separation of church and state, at least not like there is in the United States, through our Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and other legislation, discrimination against non-Christians is illegal, and the government has worked fairly hard in the last fifty years to eradicate the kinds of informal and formal privileges Christian groups have enjoyed for most of Canadian history. In fact, it now appears that the ideology of secularism and the profound sense of regret over the imperious role of Christianity in our country's historical record have become so deeply woven into Canadian society, and especially Canadian government, that religion as such, especially Christianity, has been virtually barred from the Canadian public policy arena.

Nonetheless, religion does barge in from the margins, and when it does, we are all reminded of how poorly we are prepared as a society to deal with it. Several examples may be provided here: when our Prime Minister presided over a public ceremony of remembrance for the victims of September 11th, there was no mention of God, unlike the analogous ceremony in the United States; in the mourning services for Swiss Air Flight 111 that crashed off the coast of Nova Scotia, references to Jesus were explicitly forbidden by senior Canadian officials, whereas speakers from other religious groups were not restrained in what deities they could mention; on the website of the CBC, in their section called *forum*, essentially a very large "chat room," one can find a list of over 100 topics about which people can "chat": not a single one is devoted to religion (you can learn a great deal about beer, cosmetic surgery, gas prices, and guns, though); and when a colleague of mine explained with some excitement the new academic program he and some peers were launching in migration studies in the Toronto area, he said, "And from geography, we have (so and so), and from anthropology, we have (so and so), and from political science we have (so and so)." He said they had a group of over 20 faculty members from many different departments participating in this innovative program to help teach students about the many facets of the experience of migration. "And who is going to cover religion?" I asked. The answer was, *no one*.

The point is that while religion remains a major component of national and especially international social changes, Canadian society seems determined to ensure

that this particular aspect of personal identification, social life, and international politics, is shrouded in mystery. Since religion did not go away, as secularization theorists promised it would; and since religion continues to play a crucial role in so many of the major events in our world – including, of course, the tragedy that befell New York two years ago, and the sort-of electoral victory of George Bush; and since religion continues to play a role in the ways individuals and groups construct and maintain their identities, it seems to make sense to try to ensure that our society does not cultivate religious illiteracy. Yet as a society, we seem to be doing exactly that.

In Canada at least, this gaping hole in our educational systems and our public discourse is left gaping for two reasons: first, some of our leaders seem to think religion will eventually go away. The secularization hypothesis is alive and well in the Canadian corridors of power. Second, those who are not advocates of this kind of naïve secularization hypothesis are afraid that people will not appreciate the difference between teaching people about religion and imposing a particular religion on a person. The tacit decision seems to be that it is most prudent, politically speaking, to avoid the issue altogether.

The publicly-funded efforts to educate people about religion are based mainly in our schools, and in Canada, education is a provincial responsibility. Recent research demonstrates that no province in Canada has a mandatory class in religious studies for high school students; some provincial education systems do offer optional courses, but these are few and far between, often ill-conceived, and rarely promoted. So, we are left with a populace that is more and more unaware of the religious dimensions of human life, and a government that is often determined to treat religion as a private issue, like sex or salaries. In fact, we do spend public money on sex; there are a plethora of websites, hotlines, public health projects, etc. to teach us, in an ostensibly neutral and objective manner, about oral sex, condoms, and bi-sexuality to name but a few issues on which Canadian public funds are spent.

So, why do we spend public money to educate ourselves about sex, but not about religion? The answer we will hear is that many of these websites and hotlines and health projects were launched to promote safe, or safer, sex in the 1980s when we decided, as a society, that with the emergence of AIDS, people were all of a sudden dying of their unsafe sexual and drug habits. So, it made sense to think of sex as a kind of public health issue. This seems quite reasonable to me. However, it seems plausible that religion is also a public health issue, as many New Yorkers, Israelis, Palestinians, Irish, Indians, Pakistanis and Saudi Arabians will agree. That is, people are dying, and have been dying for a long time, due to convictions that are at least partly, if not entirely, rooted in religion. It is time we addressed this urgent issue, since it is not going to fade away as the western form of modernity reaches the far corners of the globe, as modernists and intellectuals have vainly hoped for two centuries.

Of course, there is another reason to pay attention to religion: while the destructive capacity of religion is itself a sufficient reason to promote public education about religion, religion is also one of the most important contexts within which one might witness and cultivate the positive forms of social capital Robert Putnam mentioned in *Bowling Alone*. In Canada, religious groups serve as both a means of maintaining a particular, one might say tribal, identity, and as the sites in which one might negotiate a new way of being Canadian. Many people assume that mosques and Muslim associations, for example, perform only the first task of making sure the newcomers and their children remain good Muslims or good Pakistanis. However, it also appears clear that in addition to promoting traditional religious and cultural identities, mosques, temples, churches, and other religious organizations provide people with a safe place where they can meet friends and family members, get jobs, meet marriage partners, and talk about how to navigate the outside world. So, as Canadians, we need to pay more attention to religion not just because we are living, with our American cousins, in the shadow of the so-called war on terrorism, but because religious groups represent an enormous source of social capital that might benefit all of us.

Fortunately, our government is like the American government in that it is not a monolith; among a small but committed group of senior government officials, there have been moves in the past few years to introduce discussions about religion into the broader conversations about public policy in Canada. Often, of course, religious issues had already been involved in such conversations, especially around the issues of gender equality, abortion, immigration, fundamentalisms, and restrictions on certain forms of clothing. However, the hope is that, with more energy devoted to public education and the education of policy makers, we will be able to deal more intelligently and compassionately with these issues when they do arise. As we would expect, there has been resistance to the inclusion of religion in these conversations, especially from those who believe religion should be an entirely private matter. However, the events of September 11th, the on-going tensions in Kashmir and the Punjab, proposed changes that would allow Canadian gays and lesbians to get legally married, episodic conflicts in Canadian schools over kirpans and hijabs, to name but a few issues, have shown many people in Canada and elsewhere that we need to be able to think more carefully about the role of religion in the world. Those tragic events allowed advocates of the critical inclusion of religious themes in public discourse to make their case much more forcefully to their respective government and academic bodies, and many of us are working hard to make the most of the opening of this particular window of opportunity. ■

NOTES

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TRANSNATIONAL ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION AMONG POST-1965 CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S.

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary immigration patterns show that members of ethnic groups now settle into broader residential areas. What ensues is a dissolution of ethnic enclaves that may very well result in a decrease of transnational linkages, for these enclaves often stand as the locus of the creation and transmission of transnational consciousness. Indeed, as the author argues in this paper, "the pressures of acculturation in the U.S. can often work against the establishment of transnational ties later in life."

In order to understand the dynamics of transnational ethnic identity formation in the U.S., scholars must take into consideration several countervailing forces that both promote and impede on the development of consciousness beyond the nation. In particular, several attributes may place the nation in a peculiar position with respect to transnationalist communities. On one hand, the United States has been historically valued for its reputation as a sanctuary for all immigrants, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, religion or political creed, and has built its nation on foundations of racial diversity, open tolerance and multiculturalism. On the other hand, the nation has struggled through centuries of hegemonic policies, internal hierarchies and nationalistic and racial ideologies that belie its professed roots in equity and diversity. With this in mind, this article considers several key variables that may help to explain the differential manifestations of transnationalist identities among post-1965[1] Asian immigrant children in the U.S., based on field research within the Korean American community of Los Angeles and South Asians in New York. In contrast to the racial and socioeconomic homogeneity of European immigrants to the U.S. in the early 20th century, today's immigration has been characterized by its internal racial and socioeconomic heterogeneity, which has completely transformed the cultural landscapes of the U.S.

I begin with one of the more heated debates within the new transnationalist literature, which centers on the continuing significance of local community empowerment in the new global order. On one side are those proponents who argue that migrants are able to create new social communities through transmigratory social, economic and political activities that in many ways supercede communities geographically bounded by the locality and the nation-state. On the other side, scholars have maintained the continuing significance of local and nation-based structures in the global era. So how is transnational consciousness created and sustained for those immigrant children not already predisposed to such linkages through their parents or by mere physical proximity to the ancestral land? I propose that in the United States, geographically bounded racial/ ethnic social structures can potentially serve as conduits for the development of transnational consciousness among foreign-born and native-born children of Asian immigrants. This would mean that the declining significance of ethnicity may help to diminish the influence of transnational forces in the lives of many immigrant children. Conversely, ethnic solidarity may work to strengthen transnational consciousness *vis-à-vis* local and national cultures and structures.

Variables Dissonant With Transnationalism

The first factor that may act as a possible deterrent to transnational identity formation relates to the spatial context within which ethnic attachments and institutional structures are cultivated and maintained. As will be described, ethnic enclaves in the U.S. have traditionally been some of the most vibrant areas where transnational linkages have been maintained. However, as contemporary immigration scholars have noted, growing up American occurs in different residential contexts for children of immigrants in America, including white-dominated neighborhoods, multi-racial neighborhoods, inner-city ghettoes or ethnic enclaves (Chung Forthcoming; Horton 1995; Portes and Zhou 1993). Part of this stems from

the heterogeneous characteristics of today's immigrants, some of whom are able to outpace other immigrants in terms of mobility or are even able to bypass the ethnic enclave altogether because of capital and educational skills they bring over with them from the homeland. Within this context, transnational identity formation may assume very different guises depending through which residential lens one's experiences are refracted. Although ethnic groups can and have re-created transnational linkages through dispersed networks, such identification is no longer guaranteed without the day-to-day experiences of living next door to other co-ethnics. Particularly in the case of Asian Americans, physical distance from the parents' homeland means that one of the few ways they can feel a sense of kinship with the ancestral country is through proximity to new immigrants and immigrant children, exposure to the cultural lifestyles of the homeland, and immersion in the institutional structures of the ethnic enclave.

The significance of geographical propinquity assumes greater meaning when one takes into account the dissonant forces of acculturation in American society. Despite its multicultural population, the forces of Anglo-conformity are relatively strong in the case of the United States, where monolingualism has long been the official norm. Legislative efforts to impose English-only policies in California, one of the most racially diverse immigration states in the U.S., attest to the continuing influence of Anglo-based nationalism. Nationalistic sentiments may be further nurtured by the nation's financial and military supremacy within the post-Cold War global order, which some argue has earned the U.S. an image of "arrogance" in the global order, as demonstrated by recent events in the post-9-11 era. Scholars in race and ethnic studies have long proclaimed a strong correlation between White U.S. nationalism and its imperialistic policies and actions abroad (Glenn 2002). In more recent years, the passage of the USA Patriot Act[2] reveals how political activism on the international forefront as well as uncontested status as a global power may help to galvanize governmental efforts to restrict domestic civil liberties and bring the nation's population together under one banner. Whether or not this label is justified, the relationship between U.S. global supremacy and nationalistic elements of its domestic culture is worth exploring further.

The pressure to conform to the dominant (White) American culture is inculcated early on in the stages of childhood development. Even when native-born children are able to overcome shame of their ethnic heritage and begin to build roots in homeland countries, they still have difficulties negotiating their Americanized outlook with their newly-found identities. For example, some of my interviewees related experiences in Korea where they were castigated and teased because of their poor English ability. Or in the case of female respondents, several interviewees noted how feelings of gender inequality, as measured by American standards, made them feel a sense of distance from their parents' patriarchal homeland culture. By disconnecting the next generation from a sense of co-ethnic affinity, the pressures of acculturation in the U.S. can often work against the establishment of transnational ties later in life.

Class status is also a subject of interest in transnationalist studies. For one, an individual's ability to maintain transnational linkages to distant lands is in many ways facilitated by financial wherewithal. This of course may not be an issue for groups whose homelands are fairly close and relatively affordable – such as Mexican Americans – but regular travel to Asia for example may be more difficult for those without the funds. In addition, some studies have shown that education plays a huge role in heightening the ethnic political consciousness of immigrant children through ethnic cliques, organizations and political education, which later leads to interest in learning about their ancestral heritage. Conversely, traditional assimilationists would argue that class divisions may undermine any sort of ethnic attachments, especially among upwardly mobile children of immigrants who may no longer need these ties to get ahead. This line of argument presumes that over time, most ethnic groups are incorporated into the core culture and social structures of mainstream society on an equal basis. Regardless, these alternative viewpoints underscore the need to explore further the relationship between class status and transnational identification (vis-à-vis ethnic solidarity).

Variables Consonant with Transnationalism

Two examples may cause us to reconsider the importance of ethnic locality in the construction of transnational identities. George Sanchez (Sanchez 1997) once proposed that America has entered a new stage in race relations that confounds citizenship with racial status. Speaking particularly to Asian and Latinos in the U.S., he remarks, "Traditional hostility towards new immigrants has taken on a new meaning when those immigrants are racially identifiable and fit established racial categories in the American psyche. With the increase of immigration from Asia and Latin America, a new American racism has emerged which has no political boundaries or ethnic categorizations" (1013). Although racism is very much alive for both groups, the specific construction of race among African Americans has taken a divergent path from that of Asians and Latinos – primarily because the former group's subjugation has come to rest heavily on the color of their skin, whereas the latter has become increasingly centered on the foreignness of their physical features but their supposedly different cultures and political loyalties. Recent events since 9-11 have merely reaffirmed, not created, this legacy of racialized citizenship. In so doing, the historical legacy of racialized citizenship may give substance to minority groups' feelings of affinity with countries abroad at the very minimum. It is this notion of race – the idea that Asian and Latino Americans are not full-bred citizens within the U.S. – that peaks the curiosity of immigrant children in understanding their parents' homeland culture and maintaining ties with co-ethnics in the U.S. as well as in the other country. As an example, one native-born interviewee recalled growing up in a white-dominated neighborhood where she was repeatedly told to "Go Back to India." She was able to find sanctuary with other foreign- and native-born Indians in her parents' homeland ethnic organization, where she established contacts to co-ethnics abroad.

Transnationalism may also be facilitated by the "institutional completeness" of ethnic communities – a term coined by Raymond Breton (Breton 1964). Internet and telecommunications make both culture and networks palpable, but

it is the visible presence of local ethnic institutional structures that have allowed some children of immigrants to experience and want to explore their parents' homeland heritage. For instance, the development of the Pacific Rim economy in Los Angeles in recent decades has contributed to the rise of ethnic enclaves like Koreatown and hence transported cultures, corporations and communities that take shape in local neighborhood structures. Koreatown, Los Angeles, is a great example of an institutionally-rich transnational space in which everything from Korean after-school programs to Korean nightclubs help to reproduce the homeland experience and provide a breeding ground for transnational networks. Furthermore, the means by which immigrant parents maintain transnational linkages for their children may oftentimes be made available through various ethnic associations in these local communities. For example, the local Korean church was one way that one of my younger interviewees became interested in and eventually established contacts with constituents in Korea through missionaries. As the migration flows of various immigrant communities continue to grow, the "institutional completeness" of capital-rich communities may become important factors in the cultivation of transnational linkages for both lower-class and middle-class ethnic groups.

Community-based ethnic organizations may also be important institutions for the development of transnational consciousness through ethnic political solidarity. Although many forcefully argue that their organizations must focus on the domestic problems of their ethnic communities instead of homeland politics, organizational leaders are keenly aware that the political mobilization of Asian American communities oftentimes relies on the political strength and stature of homeland nations in the global order. Moreover, political organizations that are unable to garner enough support in local ethnic-based support structures – although clearly mobilizing on issues within the neighborhood/ national context – may also establish transnational linkages and shape the consciousness of their otherwise non-transnational-minded members in this manner (Chung Forthcoming). So in the Korean American community, young community-based organizations have begun to maintain contact with constituencies in South Korea and to shape the awareness of new recruits through the guise of local community work.

In conclusion, my argument has been that transnationalist communities have not necessarily transcended and supplanted local and national ethnic community structures but that they may work through these localized conduits by solidifying ethnic identity formation among children of immigrants. In their study on transnationalism among children of immigrants, Kasinitz and his associates (Kasinitz et al. 2002) remind us that we must take caution in confusing ethnic identification with transnational identification since domestic constructions of transnationalism (e.g. panethnicity) can only make sense within the domestic framework. However, this does not eliminate the possibility that local and nationalistic structures of ethnicity may provide the initial setting for the development of future transnationalist consciousness. Nor is this a claim that transnationalism can not exist without localized experiences and social structures but that still, it may be very much inter-related in the case of some post-1965 immigrants and their children. ■

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NOTES

1 1965 is the year when the U.S. first passed the Harts-Celler Act, which opened the doors to massive immigration from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbeans.

2 The USA Patriot Act refers to controversial legislation instituted in October 2001 that broadened the federal government's powers of detention and surveillance in the war against terrorism.

FROM TOLERANCE TO RELIGIOUS ACCEPTANCE[1]

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with two aspects of religious diversity. First, it explores the way in which tolerance was gradually put in place in Canada by making a few comparisons with the United States (U.S.). Then, it addresses how Canada regulates demands relating to freedom of conscience and religion so as to preserve, simultaneously, freedom of religious conviction and common norms.

The Historical Origins of Religious Tolerance

After the British Conquest of New France in 1759, the relationship between the political and religious spheres was one of *tolerance of coexistence*, in spite of the upheavals that follow any armed conflict. Very likely the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke were not unknown to Governors Murray and Carleton who governed in the name of the British Crown. Tolerance was a political stratagem recognized by these philosophers as promoting peaceful coexistence and, as a consequence, the loyalty of the Kingdom's subjects as well as prosperity. The governors gave no philosophical justification for their application of the principles of tolerance. No document was drafted to justify freedom of religion or the separation of church and state, such as Thomas Jefferson's *Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom* (1777).

Nonetheless, there was a quick transition from simple tolerance to law. Thus it was that freedom of religion was recognized for Catholics in the Treaty of Paris in 1763 and then stated in the first constitutional text of 1774: *The Act of Quebec*. It was never put into question afterwards and was even extended to include all other religions. The *Religious Test* (the abjuration of loyalty to the Pope, a declaration against the dogma of transubstantiaton and against the worship of the Virgin Mary) required (for Catholics) to hold public office was abolished by Article VII of the *Act*, that is to say thirteen years before Article 6 of the American Constitution of 1787 did the same at the federal level (but not at the state level as the oath continued to be required in several states, such as in Massachusetts where it was required until 1821). The Anglican Church, the official Church of England, never played an official political role in Canada, even though for several decades it was afforded many economic privileges. As for the Catholic Church, it stood no chance of ever establishing the official state religion because the territory was under British jurisdiction. It did, however, benefit from a freedom that would only come much later to the Catholics of Ireland and England.

A potentially explosive situation, which might well have given rise to recurring conflicts, found itself contained by a social and political construct and resulted in what I have described as a relative "non-event" in Canada: no political and religious conflicts like in England, no anticlerical revolution such as in France, no laws of separation like in the U.S. However, it cannot be said that the governing powers were indifferent to the religious question. Even if, above all else, political pragmatism was at the root of this recognition, it remains that freedom of religion was no longer subject to the whims of the state, but became a recognized right.

But why not have constitutionally defined a political regime that is based on neutrality? Several explanations are possible. The first is that Canada, created by the British North America Act (BBNA, 1867), stayed dependent on Great Britain where such a regime of separation didn't exist. It must also be said that "separation" was associated at the time with the French and American political regimes, and that those republican models, while they attracted a few liberal minds, did not appear to be the

ideal political model to Canadian democrats. With the absence of designation it was possible to avoid affronting ideological susceptibilities. We can also put forward the theory that, contrary to post-revolutionary France, the Canadian state did not have to "correct" a pre-existing historical situation by a designation that would signify a change in the formerly prevalent regime of church-state relations. In Canada there was also no political dynamic such as the one that existed during the writing of the American Constitution, in which the Founding Fathers wanted explicitly to protect religious groups from the ever-possible tyranny of the state. The BNAA's silence on the status of church-state relations is likely also due in part to the general circumstances surrounding Catholicism. Three years prior, the Pope Pius IX published the encyclical letter *Quanta Cura* and the *Syllabus* denouncing the principal "mistakes" of modernity, and condemning the separation of church and state. A constitutional text that formally proclaimed the principle of separation might have been unpopular with Catholic voters, especially since federal elections were about to take place: since Catholics were the majority in Quebec, they represented a non-negligible electoral force, and the clergy continually tried to influence them during elections.

Overall, the regime seems to have had positive social effects. The fact that there were no constitutional restrictions on religious activities and no official regime of separation most likely helped avoid the radicalization and the offensive initiative of religious organizations, while promoting a certain amount of internal liberalization of the Churches, especially in the case of Protestant denominations.

Canada and the United States have several common elements that promoted the tolerance, and later acceptance, of religious pluralism. Firstly, there existed a *de facto* diversity in the New World which considered itself to be beginning anew. No one wanted to experience the inter-religious violence through which they had already lived in Europe. The vast territories also facilitated the dispersion of groups whose dogmas were radically divergent, thus diminishing the daily irritants caused by proximity.

Secondly, the collaboration of religious groups played an important part in insuring that no particular group imposed itself on the others. In Canada, the two most prominent churches, both of which had known a tradition of being established as the official state religion, saw to it to somewhat curb their political aspirations. In the U.S., a multitude of Protestant denominations proved extremely refractory in the face of any state intervention in religious affairs.

Thirdly, the religious groups' civic and political loyalty towards legitimate authority was of capital importance. In Canada, it even resulted in the Catholics' joining the troops mounting an opposition to southern invasion forces. This promoted, simultaneously, the distancing and the collaboration between church and state.

Fourthly, the politicians of the time deliberately distanced themselves from the thinking and influence of the French Enlightenment. In both countries tolerance was deployed more pragmatically than ideologically. This explains, in part, why the separation of church and state, *explicit* in the U.S. and implicit in Canada, was put into place without violence or revolution. At the same time, it must be remembered that there were violent struggles against religion taking place in France. The French Revolution of 1789 did not mark the triumph of tolerance. The instauration of revolutionary cults after the autumn of 1793 gave rise to violence not only against Catholicism, but against Protestantism and Judaism as well.

Tolerance did not spread in the United States in the same way as it did in Canada. In the U.S., there was a social demand for the separation of powers which came from the "base," in other words from the Protestant sects. In Canada the initiative came from the "political," seeking to gradually put in place a regime of tolerance and state neutrality with regards to religious issues.

However, several important differences must be noted. Tolerance did not spread in the United States in the same way as it did in Canada. In the U.S., there was a social demand for the separation of powers which came from the "base," in other words from the Protestant sects. In Canada the initiative came from the "political," seeking to gradually put in place a regime of tolerance and state neutrality with regards to religious issues. The British governors preferred to win over the Catholic majority of the population of Quebec rather than to deal with the political consequences of recognizing the superiority of one religious dogma over another.

In the U.S. the government officially introduced the principles of tolerance in political institutions in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights passed in 1791, prohibiting congress from passing any law with the aim of establishing a religion or of prohibiting its free practice. This clause, formulated negatively, may have been adopted because the members of the different denominations present in the various states wanted to guarantee that the central State would never interfere in the religious affairs of the states of the union. This did not mean that the intolerance between the various groups disappeared – to the contrary. Moreover, the principles of tolerance and religious freedom were implemented in very different ways in each state. Virginia, for example, adopted a law in 1786 for the establishment of freedom of religion (a law

proposed by Thomas Jefferson), but only after seven years of controversy.

Another difference resided in the fact that religions in Canada were less divided along territorial lines. Religious freedoms, which were necessary to ensure social order, needed to be defined earlier there.

In Canada, the Constitutional texts written since the 18th century make no mention of the separation of Church and state as is the case in the U.S. However, state neutrality was sanctioned as of the 19th century by jurisprudence, and the fact that there was no state religion in Canada was confirmed in the verdicts of several courts over the course of those two centuries.

Finally, we can also point out that many elements of "institutional deism" persisted in the U.S. in spite of the conception of a wall separating Church and state, which was not found in Canada: for example the invoking of God on certain national holidays (*Thanksgiving*), on bank notes (*In God We Trust*) and in some instances of school pledges of allegiance (*One nation under God*). The solemn speeches of presidents generally refer to God. In fact, the American population of today is much less secularized than its Canadian counterpart.

This brief historical recapitulation of the origins of tolerance in Canada and the U.S. allow us to understand why pluralism was less "worrisome" here than in other occidental democracies; political unity never felt compromised by the fragmentation of religious beliefs. It is, however, important to recognize that diversity was established exclusively based on the Christian and Jewish religions. This historical circumstance favored a more or less implicit conception of "normal" or socially acceptable religion, modeled on the Judeo-Christian conception of religion.

But religious diversity is spreading and is taking on new and heretofore unseen forms (worrisome to many, as they are a far cry from traditional models). This raises crucial questions concerning freedom of religion and the values that are supposed to preserve social ties. How should the balance be maintained between recognizing the individual right to lead a "good life" in accordance with particular beliefs, and preventing this individual right from harming the collective as a whole? This question becomes all the more acutely important when we come to realize that today, real equality among citizens has become a priority for them in relation to the formal equality that the democratic states claimed they would afford them. Moreover, some religious groups are bringing the foundations of democracy itself into question, which generates anxiety about religious diversity. This brings me to my second point.

The Regulation of Religious Diversity in Canada

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Liberties forms the first part of the Canadian Constitution. In the event of conflicting interpretations of the dispositions of the charters and the laws or even the internal norms specific to a particular institution, the courts must make a decision in order to make the dispositions of the Charter prevail.

In democratic societies, national constitutions and ordinary laws rarely contain dispositions that are openly discriminatory, either in favor of or against any religious group. Nonetheless, the unequal treatment of religious groups and beliefs exists. A neutral law or rule, which applies to all equally, can unintentionally have a discriminatory effect on one group of people, by imposing obligations or restrictive conditions on them which are not imposed on other members of the population. This is considered indirect discrimination.

In Canada, reasonable accommodation is a legal obligation which is there to redress the effects of indirect discrimination. It allows for individual religious particularities to be established in society (it doesn't apply to groups) while still preserving common norms.

This principle obliges the state (in certain cases), public institutions and private individuals and companies to modify or adapt general norms that are legitimate and justified in order to take into account the specific needs of those who belong to minorities. This type of accommodation does in theory exist in the U.S. where the courts acknowledge the possibility of particular arrangements (like authorizing student absences from school for religious reasons, etc.), but to my knowledge there exist no prescriptive legal dispositions for private as well as public institutions, nor any explicit procedural framework in that regard.

Reasonable accommodation is a mandatory corollary and a constituent element of the freedom of religion. The rights afforded to individuals are not simply rights of "resistance" to the State, but also "required rights"[2] with regards to the government. In other words, the state has the duty to actively watch that no discriminatory measures are taken against individuals.[3]

Two conditions are necessary to request accommodation by modifying general norms: an objective criterion, that is the existence of moral or religious precepts (ideally recognized by a group) to which the contested norm is an obstacle, and a subjective criterion, that is to say the person's sincerity.

The Canadian legislature has formulated no objective definition of religion or belief, but the judges subscribe to a broad acceptation of what constitutes the domain of religion: it is the intimate and profound beliefs that regulate the perception of self, of humanity, of nature, and in certain cases of a superior or different Being. These beliefs, in turn, regulate behavior and social practices.

The subjective criterion ends up having the most weight for three reasons: a) the difficulty of objectively proving the existence of a precept that is the object of consensus in a group or denomination; it works in the favor of accepting the basis of good faith of the request of the individual who is acting according to his or her own conscience, which is presumed to be just; b) also, it is not the role of the state or a court to determine what is a recognized dogma and what is acceptable within a particular religious group; c) finally, freedom of conscience and religion are interpreted as consisting of the freedom to think differently than one's own group, thus giving priority to freedom of conscience.

Even though these reasons are jurisprudential, there are clear references to guide the application of reasonable accommodation. Firstly, the reasonable nature of the

norm or rule. If the law or rule at the root of the discrimination is neither justified nor reasonable in terms of the proper functioning of the company or institution in question, then it must be nullified or reformulated. If, to the contrary, the rule that caused discrimination is justified and reasonable, then it should not be nullified; but, in this case, there is a legal obligation to find a suitable accommodation for the individual who made the request.

Secondly, the effort deployed to find an arrangement is also taken into consideration. The burden of proof of this effort rests on the employer or the directors of the institution or on the person who provides goods and services. The duty of accommodation, in this respect, is a case of "means" rather than results. It must be proven that all necessary efforts were made in good faith to find an arrangement. This obligation to negotiate is reciprocal, and implies the cooperation of the person who made the request.

Thirdly, the excessive nature of the constraint that the accommodation imposes on the employer or institution is taken into consideration: the cost and hindrance to the proper functioning of the company. We can see that the courts rejected the *de minimis* criterion (when there is any cost, however minimal, to the company) that was retained by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Hardison vs. Trans World Airlines* in 1977. On the contrary, in Canada, the employer or institution must furnish proof that the proposed measures would represent a "significant" economic or administrative burden which would threaten the financial health of the company.

The evaluation of the excessive nature of the constraint imposed cannot only be based upon a hypothesis, such as the fear of an effect of contagion and the multiplication of requests anticipated in future. The courts reject such argumentation because it is based on abstract speculation.

Fourthly, the effect on the rights of others: the arrangement made with an employee should not incur an undue surcharge of work for the other employees. In a situation other than that of the workplace, then the rights of the others, such as the right to physical integrity, to life and to health, clearly take priority over religious beliefs.

Contrary to what one might think at first, there is no excessive amount of requests for accommodation, and few cases make it all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The clear references which should guide the parties, the social assimilation of cultural pluralism, and pragmatism in affiliation with British tradition and a certain social recognition of minority groups very likely prevent the worst tensions due to cultural identity and definitely serve to temper the more militant forms of religions.

One might be tempted to view the practice of accommodation as encouraging "communitarism" and social fragmentation. These fears are not ungrounded, as some of the groups whose members benefit from these arrangements could interpret the actions taken by the state and public institutions in that way. In this case, however, it is about individual rights and not collective rights. This being said, several liberal thinkers favor the extension of the recognition of particularities to the point of defining collective rights.

Without radically promoting the recognition of collective rights, I believe nonetheless that a nation is no longer defined by the creation of a universal citizenry above social and cultural diversity. On the contrary, it is defined by the search for intercultural communication and social solidarity.[4] It no longer suffices to "proclaim" the right to cultural identity; liberal democracies must be able to offer new spaces for freedom "through policies of cultural democracy."[5] The latter must, however, comprise three conditions: that individuals not be assigned to a particular cultural identity, that the content of particular cultures not contradict basic human rights, and finally, that cultural rights be tied to *the individual* and not to groups (either religious or ethnic).

It seems to me that the state should not feel threatened by the varying degrees of adhesion by its citizens to the political community. It is simply a question of conceiving national unity as a state of relative fragmentation, which puts to the test the most radical premises of democracy itself.

It seems to me that the state should not feel threatened by the varying degrees of adhesion by its citizens to the political community. It is simply a question of conceiving national unity as a state of relative fragmentation, which puts to the test the most radical premises of democracy itself. ■

NOTES

[1] I owe many thanks to Daphné Brunelle, who was responsible for the translation into English of this paper.

[2] This expression was coined by J. Mourgeon, *Les droits de l'homme*, Paris, PUF, coll. « Que sais-je ? », 1978, p. 10.

[3] I am indebted here to the in-depth studies of Canadian jurists such as José Woehrling. J. Woehrling, « L'obligation d'accommodement raisonnable et l'adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse », *Revue de droit de McGill / McGill Law Journal*, 1998, vol. 43, p. 325-401.

[4] A. Touraine, *Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble ? Égaux et différents*, Paris, Fayard, 1997, p. 279.

[5] A. Renaut et S. Mesure *Alter Ego. Les paradoxes de l'identité démocratique*, Paris, Flammarion, 1999, p. 283.

TRANSNATIONALISM & CIVIC PARTICIPATION: HONG KONG MIGRATION TO CANADA

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ABSTRACT

Canada's immigration policies have been instrumental in shaping the transnational behaviours of Hong Kong migrants and in determining the socioeconomic composition of the Canadian Hong Kong communities. This essay pays particular attention to the interplay between transnationalism and an important aspect of citizenship, namely civic participation, as it operates within Toronto's Honk Kong female community. Although the media have raise concerns about the commitment of Hong Kong immigrants to their host countries, the author's findings reveal that these Chinese migrants are indeed settlers who are committed to active involvement in political communities and to civil participation.

Transnationalism, the "sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders of multiple nation-states" (Faist 1999: 2), is now challenging and redefining citizenship (Massey 1999, Castles 2000). In the Canadian context, transnational migration challenges multiculturalism and citizenship policies that are still based on the notion that migrants forsake their ties to other nation-states when settling in Canada. Inevitably the 'sustained ties' that are maintained by transnational migrants take on political significance – intersecting with, expanding and potentially interfering with received norms and traditions of citizenship, particularly rights and obligations regarding civic participation.

The experience of Hong Kong migrants to Canada is a particularly instructive case study of transnationalism's impact on citizenship. In several respects, recent migrants from Hong Kong are pioneering transnationals. Transnational migration has a long history in Hong Kong beginning with Chinese who migrated as contract or indentured labour on railways, mines and plantations stretching from North America to the Caribbean, South America and Australia (Gungwu 1999; Pan 1999). Most migrants regarded themselves as temporarily absent from their places of birth. Sojourning came to define and sustain the economic status of millions of residents within China. As a British colony, Hong Kong's major source of population was migrants from China striving to improve their economic well-being by relocating to the booming mercantile entrepôt of Asia (Meyer 2000). Migration accelerated after World War II with a large influx of people fleeing the Communist Mainland. By the early 1990s, some forty percent of the colony's population had been born outside Hong Kong – mostly in China. The uncertainty over Hong Kong's reunification with China stimulated a rapid exodus of some 600,000 residents between 1985 and 1997 (Meyer 2000). However, the immigration policies of receiving countries such as Canada determined the socioeconomic composition of the Hong Kong migration.

Canadian immigration and citizenship policies have been pivotal in framing the transnational behaviours of Hong Kong migrants. Hong Kong migrants were aggressively recruited by a highly instrumental Canadian immigration strategy that offered an open door and citizenship in exchange for promises of investment. Hong Kong was the greatest source of entrants to Canada under business class criteria between 1986 and 1996. The terms of the business immigrant program promoted strong transnational ties. To satisfy the program's requirements, many immigrants had to present large sums of capital upon entry. For many newcomer families, the only way to sustain the required payments was by extended family separations that often involved the male head of household returning to Hong Kong leaving female-led households to settle in Canada.

The affluence of Hong Kong immigrants and their high levels of education also promote transnational migration. Many members of the Hong Kong population resident in Canada are able

to maintain their ties to Hong Kong through travel, regular telephone and email communication, and access to Hong Kong media. The connections are also facilitated by the size and spatial concentration of the Hong Kong population in Canada. Between 1987 and 1997 some 325,000 immigrants from Hong Kong entered Canada, accounting for one of every seven newcomers to this country in the period. By 2001, Hong Kong immigrants were concentrated in the Toronto and Vancouver metropolitan areas, home to 47.0 percent and 36.5 percent of all Hong Kong immigrants, respectively. In each metropolitan area, the Hong Kong population is large enough to support two Chinese-language dailies, Chinese-language radio stations, and regularly scheduled television programming in Cantonese. These media provide regular information about Hong Kong that helps immigrants stay connected with their country of origin.

This paper explores the interplay between transnationalism and one aspect of citizenship, namely civic participation, in Toronto's Hong Kong community. Civic participation is considered in its broadest sense, ranging from formal to informal involvement. We will look at these interactions from two perspectives: the experiences of women as expressed in focus group discussions are contrasted with what was deemed newsworthy in the community, as reflected in the city's largest circulation English and Chinese language press. We examine the views of thirty women who participated in focus groups in Toronto. We concentrate on women for two reasons. As already mentioned, spatial separation of family members, with some in Canada and some in Hong Kong, is a fairly common transnational strategy among Hong Kong immigrants who arrived in the 1990s. In many cases, the wife stays in Canada with the children while their partners return to Hong Kong to work and maintain the family income (Preston and Man 1999, Waters 2001). As a result, women have more direct experience of settlement in Canada than many of the men who have immigrated from Hong Kong. Secondly, substantive citizenship is influenced by many aspects of people's identities. Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that claims to citizenship rights and the ability to exercise them are influenced by gender, class, and many social characteristics other than nationality. Our analysis of the views of female migrants from Hong Kong enables us to take account explicitly of gender effects on citizenship.

The media analysis derives from readings of the English language press and the largest circulation Chinese language newspaper in Toronto. The sources reveal the extent to which articles in the mainstream media emphasized problems concerning the citizenship orientation of Hong Kong migrants and the images of engaged transnational citizenship that are portrayed in the pages of the Chinese language press. A portrait of a newcomer community avidly reading about its own identity and the political environment(s) to which it belongs results.

Citizenship and Transnationalism in Toronto's Hong Kong Community – Women's Perspectives

The women who participated in the Toronto focus groups are typical Hong Kong immigrants (Preston and Man 1999). Better educated than many immigrant women (Chard, Howatson and Badets 2000), more than half of the women have some postsecondary education. The majority are married even though they are drawn from two different age groups, women in their forties and women in their twenties. All of the women have settled in Toronto suburbs, with many living in Scarborough and Markham, suburbs where there are large numbers of Hong Kong immigrants (Lo and Wang 1997).

The women who have emigrated from Hong Kong are very involved in family networks and relationships. Their immigration histories reveal that all of them migrated with other family members. Not one of them migrated alone. Compared with the men who participated in focus groups, many more of the women were also sponsored family immigrants, approximately 41 percent. The women's reasons for leaving Hong Kong and coming to Canada emphasize family relationships. Nina is typical. She summarizes the reasons for leaving Hong Kong and coming to Canada succinctly:

> "I immigrated for two reasons. First and foremost, China was going to reclaim the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Second, it was for my children's education. Canada's education system is better than Hong Kong's. It would be good for my children." (N2, TNF1, 8)

Nina emphasizes that the impending takeover of Hong Kong by China was sufficiently threatening for her to want to leave Hong Kong and Canada was attractive because of its good education system for her children. Many other women shared her opinion that China's takeover posed a threat.

Canada was also attractive because of its benefits for family members. Women mentioned several different attractions in Canada; the education system, the local way of life, and the environment that they viewed as cleaner and less crowded than Hong Kong with many recreational amenities. The attractions mentioned by women in the Toronto focus groups echo those heard in earlier interviews in Vancouver (Ley 2000). It is noteworthy that the women emphasized the benefits of Canadian life for other family members. Few mentioned personal benefits for themselves. The women's migration histories underscore the instrumental role of family relationships in their decisions to leave Hong Kong and to come to Canada. They understand their migration decisions as integrally linked to the well being of the family, usually defined as a nuclear family consisting of themselves, their partners and their children.

Transnational family ties are a significant aspect of each woman's daily life. Almost three-quarters have an immediate family member, usually the husband, living in Hong Kong and 77 percent have extended family still living in Hong Kong. Social ties outnumber all other types of transnational links. Contrary to popular stereotypes, less than one third of the women reported continuing economic activities in Hong Kong. Half the women are still members of Hong Kong organizations, but few vote in Hong Kong and even fewer have studied there since emigrating. These women from Hong Kong are still

embedded in family networks that span borders, but they are much less involved in economic relationships and other types of links.

Nevertheless, the women reported that they maintain their knowledge of Hong Kong affairs through the media, particularly television, radio, and newspapers. Several women emphasized that they watch Hong Kong television and movies and listen to Hong Kong radio because of their family ties to Hong Kong, ties that are reinforced by regular telephone calls. Other women emphasize that they are Chinese, no matter where they live and what citizenship they hold, so they want to keep abreast of news and culture in Hong Kong. More active and expensive forms of contact with Hong Kong are much less frequent. Among this middle-class group of women, only 43 percent travel to Hong Kong at least once a year and 27 percent reported that they had never returned to Hong Kong since emigrating. Their knowledge of Hong Kong is gained indirectly through the media and from family members living in Hong Kong.

Explaining their limited involvement in Hong Kong, several women argued that it was appropriate to maintain knowledge of Hong Kong affairs, but inappropriate to try to be involved in Hong Kong politics and, by implication, civil society. Lucy summarizes these views:

> "We don't need to be involved in it since we have already moved to Canada. It doesn't hurt to know Hong Kong affairs, but there's no need to be involved in it. We hope that Hong Kong will be better." (N5, TNF1, 310)

Settlement Experiences in Canada

Despite their education and the ease with which they migrated, the women reported the same difficulties settling in Canada as earlier Hong Kong migrants (Preston and Man 1999, Ley 2000, Li 1998, 2003). Close to half the women had withdrawn from the labour market. Unable to find work commensurate with their skills and experience and able to live on their partners' incomes or the income from family assets, 46 percent of the women had stopped looking for work. Of those who were working, about one-fifth worked part-time and another 14 percent were self-employed, common responses to barriers in the labour market (Li 2000). The women's abilities to withdraw from the labour market were confirmed by their reported household incomes that were moderate but well above the low-income cutoffs often used to measure poverty in Canada.

Settlement was made more difficult by some women's experiences of exclusion. Participants reported experiencing various forms of discrimination in Canada. Discrimination was experienced most often as a consumer, when about one quarter of the women felt that retail clerks and shopkeepers had treated them badly on the basis of their accent, appearance or behaviour. It is difficult to evaluate the information about discriminatory experiences since there is little comparable information. However, the rates of discriminatory experiences are lower than those reported by Jamaican-Canadians in an earlier survey in Toronto (Carey 1999). Nevertheless, the number of exclusionary experiences is high for a group of well educated and fairly affluent women who speak English.

Exclusionary experiences likely contribute to the low levels of civic participation among the women from Hong Kong. About a third reported donating to Canadian charities and a few votes in Canadian elections, but none participates in Canadian political parties. The low levels of participation are similar to those of many Canadian-born residents whose formal participation in Canadian politics has been declining for decades (Stasiulis1997). Women explain their low levels of participation by limited familiarity with the Canadian political system and its lack of relevance to them. Lucy summarizes the views of many women.

> "Rather, familiarity with the local political system is the issue. How many years have we been here? To what extent do we understand it? We don't know who's who." (N1, TNF3, 288)

The lack of involvement in Canadian politics also reflects lack of political experience in Hong Kong. Many women were involved more in civil society in Hong Kong, but entirely in non-governmental organizations. Half of the women had been volunteers and more than one quarter had been involved in women's organizations in Hong Kong, while none reported participation in political parties in Hong Kong. Mary points out the impact of living in a colony with a limited representative government:

> "Since we came from Hong Kong, we are more likely to be apathetic toward politics. We were rarely involved in politics in Hong Kong. One reason for it is that Hong Kong was a colony. The other reason is that we didn't learn to participate in social affairs at school." (N6, TNF2, 214)

Notice that none of the women points to their continuing ties to Hong Kong as a reason for not participating in Canadian civil society. Rather, they emphasize lack of experience and lack of information about Canadian politics and the Canadian political system.

Views of Citizenship

Women who have emigrated from Hong Kong are committed to permanent residency in Canada. The majority of participants are already Canadian citizens. Eighty-six percent of the women hold Canadian citizenship. One third of the women also hold citizenship elsewhere. The levels of dual citizenship seem low given that most of the women have been in Canada less than a decade, but Hong Kong immigrants come to Canada without clearly defined citizenship. Their status as residents of Hong Kong is not equivalent to Chinese citizenship or British citizenship (Skeldon 1994).

The women value Canadian citizenship for instrumental reasons that largely benefit other family members. Many women pointed to the advantages of a Canadian passport for travelling. It is much more convenient for them, their children and their husbands to travel on Canadian passports, particularly when returning to Canada from Hong Kong.[1] Citizenship also enables children to pay lower tuition for university. Several women also noted that as citizens, their children and husbands will enjoy better job opportunities, a belief that contradicts guarantees under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that insure all legal permanent residents similar treatment in the labour market.

Citizenship is also associated with a sense of belonging in Canadian society. Many women emphasize the importance of becoming a citizen so that they belong in Canada and so that they can participate in Canadian society. Canadian citizenship is highly symbolic as well as having instrumental value enabling them to vote. Mary and Nora represent these views well:

> "I think having citizenship is very important to me. It gives me a sense of belonging. As a citizen, I'm eligible to vote for the candidates I prefer." (N6, TNF2, 48)

> "It gives me a sense of belonging. I'm a citizen. I want to vote as well." (N3, TNF2, 50)

Of course, some of the women disagree with the importance placed on symbolic aspects of citizenship. They have little interest in citizenship outside the benefits to other family members. Lucy expresses these opinions bluntly:

> "It doesn't matter to me. I have not obtained citizenship yet. I'm quite happy about my present status. ...I'll apply for one. It's for my husband's convenience because he is an astronaut. ... It's only good for my husband's travelling in and out of the country."[2] (N1, TNF3, 64)

The citizenship narratives underscore the importance of family relationships for the women who emigrated from Hong Kong to Toronto. For the most part, their decisions to leave Hong Kong, to keep in touch with Hong Kong events and culture, to maintain social connections to Hong Kong, and to become Canadian citizens are explained in terms of family concerns. The narratives confirm previous findings that transnational migration is a family strategy. However, gender likely contributes to the overwhelming emphasis on family revealed in the focus group transcripts (Waters 2001). Only when the women discuss taking Canadian citizenship do they speak directly about benefits for themselves.

The narratives reveal sophisticated views of Canadian citizenship. While all of the women recognize the instrumental benefits of citizenship, particularly for children and husbands, many also yearned for the sense of belonging that they associate with citizenship and the ability to vote. For the most part, the transnational ties with family and friends in Hong Kong have not reduced the desire of these immigrant women from Hong Kong to participate in Canadian society or to feel full members of Canadian society. We find little evidence that the women are ambivalent about their commitment to residency in Canada and participation in Canadian affairs. Indeed, the majority of women are anxious to become citizens so that they may feel a sense of belonging. The experiences of exclusion render their eagerness to participate in the Canadian political system even more unexpected.

Media Representation

News media contribute to framing how society sees itself. "Simply put", Minelle Mahtani has observed, "the media is responsible for the ways that Canadian society is interpreted, considered and evaluated" (Mahtani 2001: 2). Hong Kong immigrants' experiences of transnationalism and citizenship may be explored through both mass/external media and 'ethnic'/internal media representation. Interestingly, a different picture of the relationship between transnationalism and citizenship emerges from each source. The English-language Canadian press has tended to emphasize the problematic nature of transnationalism among Hong Kong immigrants, while the leading Chinese-language newspaper presents a far more nuanced perspective. As part of our research we analyzed press coverage in *The Globe and Mail*, *The National Post*, *The Toronto Star*, and *Ming Pao*, the Chinese language newspaper with the largest daily circulation.

A content analysis of press coverage regarding Hong Kong migration to Canada in the three daily papers reveals a negative assessment of Hong Kong transnationalism. Stories portraying Hong Kong migrants as wealthy globetrotters, absentee parents, participants in criminal activity and abusers of Canadian citizenship were frequent; so too, perhaps in the name of 'journalistic balance,' were stories emphasizing the economic benefits to Canada derived from Hong Kong migration (Siemiatycki 2002: 20-22).

On one point, the press coverage was consistent across the English-language press. None addressed the diversity within Hong Kong's community. Issues of gender and class received no attention, giving way to a monolithic representation of a super-wealthy hyper-mobile migrant community taking advantage of Canadian citizenship. A prime exemplar was a *Toronto Star* column on June 14th 1996, written by John Crispo. He contended that Hong Kong migrants did not sufficiently value their attachment to Canada, and were not making "meaningful contribution to real Canadian citizenship." Elaborating the point, Crispo articulated what became the classic critique of Hong Kong migration in Canada. He wrote:

> "...we are allowing too many wealthy people in on an expedited basis, provided they commit to a given level of investment here. The trouble with many immigrants in the latter category is that they are buying their way into Canada as a hedge against uncertainty in their countries of origin. Many in this category come from Hong Kong, where they continue to work while moving their families here. This is hardly what I would call making a meaningful commitment to real Canadian citizenship" (The *Toronto Star*, 14 June 1996: A13).

Is it Hong Kong migrants or John Crispo who need to re-think notions of citizenship in a transnational age? To begin, of course, it was the Canadian state which had set the terms of business class priority entry into the country. Those admitted under these terms were now being levied both a *monetary* and *moral* obligation. Canada, it seemed, could be instrumental and choose immigrants based on financial criteria. But these newcomers, it appears, would not be well regarded for making their own choices based on their economic self-interest. More important, a closer 'read' of the Hong Kong community in

Canada would go a long way to assuaging fears of its "meaningful commitment to real Canadian citizenship".

Representation in the Chinese Press

The Hong Kong community is served by a particularly vibrant 'ethnic press'. *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao* are Canadian editions of Hong Kong's leading – and competing – daily papers. Both regard Hong Kong-origin Chinese in Canada as their primary market. Accordingly, both papers are published in the 'traditional' Chinese character text adopted in Hong Kong, rather than the 'simplified' Chinese character system in use in Mainland China. *Ming Pao* served as our case study of Chinese press coverage of the Hong Kong migration in Canada. The paper was chosen due to its stature as the largest circulation Chinese daily in Canada, and pragmatically, because of the generous access we were given to its library of back copies. The daily newspaper is clearly published *by* Hong Kong-based media, primarily *for* a Hong Kong-origin population in Canada. *Ming Pao* began publishing in Canada in 1993, producing separate editions in Toronto and Vancouver, under local editorial control. Our research here is based solely on the Toronto edition.

Our analysis of *Ming Pao* proceeded in two directions: analysis of its coverage of issues pertaining to transnationalism[3] and its op-ed page. Between 1993 and 1999, 110 stories related to transnationalism appeared in the newspaper and 71 of the 110 stories were on the front page. Transnational issues received considerable – and prominent coverage in the paper. An initial review of these stories reveals a candour one might not have expected. *Ming Pao's* treatment of these issues did not always cast the Hong Kong community in the best light. Stories about business class immigration refer to the bribing of Canadian immigration officers, and non-compliance with the terms of admission to Canada (*Ming Pao*, 19 August 1996; 21 September 1997; 13 December 1999.) Stories about citizenship quote newcomers referring to the three-year residency requirement as 'immigration prison' (*Ming Pao*, 30 June 1996; 14 July 1997). Such unfettered reporting reflects well on the civic integrity of both the paper and the community it serves. Moreover, articles submitted to *Ming Pao* by its readers, reveal a community very much committed to full civic engagement in Canada.

Once a week, *Ming Pao* publishes a full page of invited 'op-ed' commentary from its readership on a designated 'Forum' page. Typically two opinion/editorial style articles are published each week, appearing in both the Chinese and English language. These articles are the sole English language content appearing in the paper. The published pieces come from a broad cross-section of non-journalists, typically academics and professionals. An analysis of these published pieces indicates the events to which 'transnational migrants and refugees pay attention' (Smith 2001: 155). The 'Forum' page of *Ming Pao* affords a glimpse of the issues that pre-occupy the Hong Kong community in Canada. For its part, operating in a highly competitive market, *Ming Pao* will clearly want to assure that the articles it is publishing in 'Forum' are of particular interest to its Chinese readership. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that the topics emphasized in the pages of 'Forum' are one measure of the interests and attachments of the Hong Kong community in Canada. What stands out sharply is the strength of the community's commitment – and sense of belonging – to Canada!

Analysis of the articles in 'Forum' reveals that the Hong Kong community is both strongly grounded in the Canadian body politic, and interested in global affairs. The single largest category of 'Forum' articles dealt with international politics. Significantly, the vast majority dealt not with Hong Kong or China, but with crises in global politics including Northern Ireland, East, Timor, Yugoslavia, Israel and Iran.

Canadian elections were the second most frequently discussed subject in 'Forum' submissions, with regular appeals to readers to be sure to vote. As Julie Lin wrote before the 2000 federal election, in an article titled, 'Cast your vote to decide your future':

> "In huge numbers and high percentages, ethnic Chinese have a strong presence and their voice counts. But if they keep silent, they not only lose their chances, they also stand to lose they (sic) respect. In Canada, a person is respected for taking care of his or her own destiny. Everyone is expected to take part in running his or her own community, city/town and the country… You have power to make changes. Don't waste it. Make a wise choice." (*Ming Pao*, 11 November 2000)

In a similar vein, Ambrose Lau wrote in an article titled, 'Chinese influence not to be dismissed': "we need to tell national parties that that we are not to be taken lightly for being a minority" (*Ming Pao*, 10 June 1997). Indeed, evidence suggests that faster than most newcomer groups, Hong Kong Canadians are actively engaging in Canada's political system. While it is typically the second generation of immigrants who run for political office, members of the Hong Kong community have stood for office much sooner after settling in Canada. In the Toronto area, three Hong Kong-born politicians currently sit on local municipal councils.

The third most frequently addressed issue was education and schooling, reflecting the great value the community placed on their children's education. Next was commentary on Ontario provincial politics – particularly the policies of the Mike Harris Conservative government. Rounding out the 'top five' list were articles related to controversial comments made by Town of Markham Deputy Mayor Carol Bell regarding the recent settlement of Chinese residents in the municipality. A scan of remaining topics reveals an interest, of course, in issues related to China and Hong Kong, but issues pertaining to Canada are of primary concern.

Conclusion

Among the many streams of migrants that have settled in Toronto in recent decades, the Hong Kong community is significant and distinctive for several reasons. It has been the largest newcomer community to arrive during the past fifteen years. Canadian immigration policy assured that this newcomer community would be

disproportionately affluent, differentiating it from economically disadvantaged newcomer communities. Political, economic and familial dynamics have encouraged this community to maintain transnational ties. The experience of transnationalism in the community was sharply defined and differentiated by gender. By developing a highly instrumental immigrant selection strategy favouring the entry of investors, Canada promoted a form of transnationalism characterized by significant numbers of absentee – mostly male – immigrants. Among migrating Hong Kong families, mothers have typically been more rooted in Canada than fathers. Women from Hong Kong display both an instrumental and a civic orientation to the formal acquisition of Canadian citizenship. At this early stage in the settlement process, several factors including lack of familiarity with Canadian institutions and politics discourage high levels of civic participation on their part.

Media representations have raised suspicions about the citizenship inclinations of Hong Kong newcomers in Canada that are not warranted on the basis of our analysis. Early on, the English language media seized on the image of Hong Kong migrants to Canada as citizens of convenience, rather than 'settlers.' However, the Chinese language press in Toronto emphasizes that the Hong Kong community is a newcomer community that is actively interested in the political community to which it has migrated.

In sum, the findings from the focus groups and the content analysis of newspapers underscore that Hong Kong migrants are settlers, even though they are not the white settlers whom selection and settlement policies in Canada have favoured historically (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995). As settlers, Hong Kong immigrants are transforming Canadian society. Their impact is greatest in Toronto where they are a major force in reconstituting the city as a site of 'transnational urbanism': "a crossroads of social relations constituted by the interactions of local, national, and transnational actors and the networks through which they operate." (Smith 2001: 184) ■

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NOTES

1 As Canadian citizens, 'astronaut' husbands who work in Hong Kong can come and go without risk of losing permanent residency in Canada.

2 Lucy's lack of interest in Canadian citizenship is consistent with her migration history. She commented that she didn't know why she had come to Canada, her brother was here, so she followed him. Lucy's migration history is represented as a series of unexamined decisions in which she passively complied with family wishes.

3 Since *Ming Pao* is not available on-line, retrieving stories is far more labour intensive and prone to inadvertent oversight than computer searches of electronic databases. Retrieval of news stories from *Ming Pao* was done by a Chinese-reading student who selected and provided summary translations of stories related to 4 themes of Hong Kong-Canadian transnationalism: business class immigration, citizenship, returnees and 'astronaut families'.

*DE*CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL IDENTITI*ES* IN THE CANADIAN AND U.S. CENSUSES

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ABSTRACT

After clearly defining such terms as race and ethnicity, and pointing out the problematic ways in which they are used as systems of classification, Rummens proceeds to analyse their applications as tools for identity markers in Canadian and U.S census' questions. These preset identity categories are designed to map out the ethnic or racial compositions of Canadian and U.S. societies. Yet, the author argues that they also perform another function; they help construct or, in other words, they influence the ways in which Canadians and Americans identify themselves.

An *ethnic group* consists of a set of individuals bound by an identifiable shared *culture* (values, beliefs, lifeways and traditions) transmitted from one generation to the next that serves to distinguish it as a *cultural minority within a given societal context*. It is a population category and/or group that exhibits, or is thought to display, a unique set of cultural traits that sets it apart from other such groupings as well as from the dominant society itself. Some scholars use the term to refer specifically to a culturally distinct collectivity of people that exists as a minority group within the hierarchical power structures of a larger society. Others place greater emphasis on the cultural distinctiveness itself than on the regulation of respective access to important social resources and rewards, and consequently include dominant majority group(s) in their usage of the term. Ethnicity thus refers to cultural difference, and often minority status, within the framework of a larger society.

In contrast, '*race*' refers to *biological phenotype* as it is perceived and deemed salient by the identifier and/or the individual so identified. The term refers to social classifications of human populations using observable physical traits and/or genetic indicators such as colour of skin, hair texture, facial characteristics and body stature. Ensuing 'racial' designations reflect social categories – rather than social groups per se – based on perceived biological difference between human populations. That such classification of individuals and/or human populations according to perceived phenotype occurs in many societies is a demonstrable social fact. However, modern genetics has demonstrated that the resulting racial categories themselves have no scientific basis since the amount of genetic information within a particular racial category is much greater than genetic variation across perceived racial groupings. 'Race' thus refers to *an arbitrary system of visual classification* using physical criteria that are deemed socially relevant.

Ethnic group designations focus on lived cultural differences and claim no biological referent or indeed precision. 'Racial' designations in turn reflect social classification schemes that make explicit reference to biological differences and none to cultural ones. Both entail *identifications* of self and of other, each by self and by other, using socially relevant identity criteria. Both require reference to the particular cognitive *classification scheme(s)* operative in the specific historical, societal, and situational context in question. As concepts, both exist as important *analytic constructs* developed by researchers and scholars interested in better describing and understanding key identification processes.

In *actual lay use* there is, however, considerable slippage between these two analytic constructs. There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, specific ethnic and racial identities often *overlap*: Irish Americans are for the most part 'White;' Jamaican Canadians predominantly 'Black;' Chinese Americans overwhelmingly 'Asian;' while Cree and Hopi are 'Native' aboriginal Canadian and 'American Indian' respectively. Second, many ethnic and racial identities *intersect* with minority status. Both ethnic groupings and 'racial' designations can entail differential access to social, economic or political power; the latter is, moreover, often regulated according to a combination of cultural (behavioural) and biological (phenotypical) criteria. Third, a conflation of the two constructs and/or concomitant specific

identifications can also serve to downplay existing disparities between groups by lumping dissimilar groupings together for political benefit in key identity negotiation processes.

It is critically important to distinguish between 'ethnicity' and 'race' as analytic constructs and as lay terms. This helps to ensure that scientific investigation remains free from a politicized agenda and, more importantly from a research perspective, actually makes possible the identification and examination of the latter. Significant discrepancies between analytic and lay usage of ethnic and 'racial' designations are often helpful in pointing to existing social tensions and social contradictions. Consistent distinction between analytic construct and lay usage is also a pre-requisite for meaningful comparisons across societal contexts. In brief, the observation that identification processes and outcomes are social constructivist in nature does not mean that analytic categories descriptors used by researchers and scholars need also be so. Rather they should meet the need to accurately describe the observed as a first step towards better understanding the social processes involved in identity construction and negotiation.

A comparative analysis of Canadian and American conceptualizations of 'ethnicity' and 'race' as articulated in federal census questions is instructive in demonstrating the importance of clearly distinguishing between analytic constructs and lay usage of concepts. Census question formulations are both reflective of, and responsive to, socially salient classification systems operative within a given societal context at any given point in time; they also both reflect and inform the social placing and positioning of their respective citizens. What is critical to note in examining *official constructions of cultural and physical difference* respectively is what kind of identifications are validated and how they are presented. The flip-side of this is, of course, a consideration of what is left out, downplayed, re-positioned or reinterpreted.

The *'Ethnic Origin' question* on the long form of *the 2001 Canadian Census* asks respondents: "To which ethnic or cultural group(s) do your ancestors belong?" The question is preceded by an explanatory preamble: "While most people in Canada view themselves as Canadians, information on their ancestral origins has been collected since the 1901 Census to capture the changing composition of Canada's diverse population. Therefore this question refers to the origins of the person's ancestors." Sample responses are also provided – "For example, *Canadian*, French, English, Chinese, Italian, German, Scottish, Irish, *Cree*, *Micmac*, *Métis*, *Inuit (Eskimo)*, East Indian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, Filipino, *Jewish*, Greek, Jamaican, Vietnamese, Lebanese, Chilean, Somali, etc" – with instructions given to "Specify as many groups as applicable:" The question's formulation makes it clear that reference is being made to the *ethnic or cultural group(s)* to which the respondent's *ancestors* belong. The response categories themselves are open-ended; this is noteworthy since it allows for self-identification by the respondents rather than binding them to an existing check-off categorization scheme. Important to note is that the sample responses provided reflect *countries* of origin, with some references to nations, 'races' or religions as well (see italicized sample responses). Some of these different types of identifications overlap; there are, however, important conceptual differences between them. What is analytically interesting is that the listing itself is conceptually mixed and thus implies an equating of these different types of identifications. Also important to consider is that respondent answers are likely largely driven by the examples provided and therefore better reflect respondent response to an existing classification scheme reflecting salient existing social identifications than truly emergent personal ancestral identifications. 'Ethnicity' in the Canadian Census is thus conceptualized in terms of ethnic and cultural ancestry based primarily on country or nation of origin. A final tally of the ensuing data yields a total of 249 unique 'ethnic/cultural' origins.

Question 5 in the 2000 U.S. Census asks of all respondents "Are you Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?" Respondents are then instructed to mark the 'No' box if they are. If the answer is 'Yes' they need to specify whether they are: a) Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano; b) Puerto Rican; c) Cuban; or d) other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino (in which case they need to identify the group). The question formulation makes it clear that the primary focus is on the respondent's language, followed by geographical origin. The response categories follow a closed response format that forces the respondent's response into one of two mutually exclusive categories - Not Hispanic or Latino versus Hispanic or Latino. It then requests a subdivision according to original/existing territorial affiliation for the one category only. The resulting data for the latter is then split out into: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican Republic; Central American; South American; and Other Hispanic or Latino, for a final total of 28 Hispanic or Latino categories. 'Ethnicity' in this census question is thus conceptualized as being based primarily on the *language and geographical affiliation of the respondent*. The 2000 U.S. Census also contains a question regarding respondent ancestry. *Question 10* asks of all respondents: "What is your ancestry or ethnic origin?" Sample responses include: "… Italian, Jamaican, *African American*, Cambodian, Cape Verdean, Norwegian, Dominican, *French Canadian*, Haitian, Korean, Lebanese, Polish, Nigerian, Mexican, Taiwanese, Ukrainian, and so on." Here 'ethnicity' is understood to refer primarily to *country of origin*. The listing of sample responses however also includes one 'racial' identification and one 'linguistic/cultural/national minority' identification (see italicized sample responses).

Whereas the Ethnic Origin question in the 2001 Canadian Census focuses on the respondent's ancestors and is only asked on the long census form provided to 20% of the population, Question 5 in the 2000 U.S. Census clearly refers to the respondent himself and is asked of all respondents. In the former 'ethnicity' is conceptualized in terms of cultural difference according to country/nation/region of origin; in the latter language and original national/regional territorial affiliation appear paramount. The Canadian census question permits multiple referent points; the U.S. questions in sharp contrast permit only a single primary reference point. The Canadian question has an open response format that focuses on self-identification and permits multiple responses; the U.S. question employs a closed response format that forces a differentiation into two mutually-exclusive, and permits single responses only. The former yielded 249 ethno-cultural identifications, the latter 28 distinct population categories. In contrast, the Canadian Ethnic Origin

question and Question 10 of the 2000 U.S. Census appear at first glance more similar in their formulation: both conceptualize 'ethnicity' in terms of country of origin, have an open response format, and are asked only on the long census form. However, whereas the focus in the former is on the respondent's ancestors and permits multiple responses, the latter uses the respondent as reference point and appears to expect a single response.

As for the official construction of physical difference, Question 18, the '*Aboriginal Status*' question in the *2001 Canadian Census*, asks: "Are you an Aboriginal person, that is, North American Indian, Métis or Inuit (Eskimo)?" If the response is 'No' the respondent is asked to skip to the "Visible Minority Status Question" in Question 19. If the answer is 'Yes' s/he is requested to specify in three ensuing questions whether the applicable designation is North American Indian, Métis or Inuit (Eskimo), whether she is "a member of an Indian Band/First Nation?" (and if so to write of which), and whether s/he is "a Treaty Indian or Registered Indian as defined by the Indian Act of Canada?" Respondents who skip to the *Visible Minority Status* question are asked to check off one or more of the following 'racial' designations: "Are you: White; Chinese; South Asian (eg. East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc); Black; Filipino; Latin American; Southeast Asian (eg. Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian, Vietnamese, etc.); Arab; West Asian (eg. Afghan, Iranian, etc.); Japanese; Korean; Other – Specify ? Accompanying text explains that 'this information is collected to support programs that promote equal opportunity for everyone to share in the social, cultural and economic life of Canada."

The 2001 Canadian Census thus uses two separate questions in order to first determine aboriginal versus non-aboriginal status, and then subsequently which (other) visible minority status may be applicable for non-aboriginal respondents. Both questions employ a closed response format with one notable exception, namely the "other" response category in the Visible Minority Status question. The Aboriginal Status question includes a "mixed" response category (ie. Métis); since the Visible Minority Status question allows for more than one designation, it makes possible a "multiple heritage" designation. Important to note is that the response categories provided in the latter question contain a veritable mixture of 'racial,' (cultural) national, and regional identifications. In brief, the Canadian Census conceptualizes socially salient physical difference in terms of an initial forced non-aboriginal versus aboriginal distinction, followed by a non-visible/visible minority classification that collapses 'race' and colour and furthermore confounds most of the ensuing visible minority status designations with national and regional identifications. The word 'race' is not used at all; instead the exact referent is left implicit. The Aboriginal Status response categories are seen as mutually exclusive. Multiple responses are, however, permitted for the Visible Minority Status question; these may or may not reflect mixed 'racial' heritage depending on the interpretation of the response categories by the respondent. In both questions the emphasis is clearly on *social status*.

Question 20 in the 2000 U.S. Census asks: "What is your race?" Respondents are then instructed to "mark one or more races to indicate what you consider yourself to be" and provided with the following check-list of 'racial' designations, some of which also require more specific write-in responses: "White; Black, African American, or Negro; American Indian or Alaska Native [Print name of enrolled or principal tribe]; Asian Indian; Chinese; Filipino; Japanese; Korean; Vietnamese; Other Asian [Print race]; Native Hawaiian; Guamanian or Chamorro; Other Pacific Islander [Print race]; Some other race [Print race]." The question formulation uses the word 'race' with no explanatory introduction or definition, and requires self-identification according to a predetermined classification scheme. The response format is essentially a closed one that permits greater specificity only in certain instances and for the final "other race" designation. Aboriginal status is included among all other 'racial' categories. Also interesting to note is the apparent existence of 'races within races' (eg. Other Pacific Islander => specify). Multiple responses are explicitly permitted. The final "Some Other Race" response category also allows for an explicit "mixed race" identification; however, the question format may discourage this particular option.

The term 'race' is used explicitly in the 2000 U.S. Census and refers to socially recognized/relevant *phenotype*. The classification scheme provided collapses non/aboriginal, 'racial=colour,' national and regional identifications. Existing categories are no longer seen as essentially mutually exclusive categories, as was very much the case in earlier censuses. Instead, multiple responses are permitted; these may or may not reflect 'mixed racial heritage' designations. The ensuing data is divided into: 5 Minimum Categories; 6 mutually exclusive 'Race Alone' categories; plus 1 'Two or More Races' category. This yields a total of 63 Race categories.

The 2001 Canadian Census makes no reference to 'race' and emphasises instead minority status. Aboriginal status is clearly separated from other non/Visible Minority designations via the use of two separate questions; both are only asked on the long form of the census provided to only 20% of the population. The census format forces an initial non/aboriginal distinction, then collapses 'racial=colour,' national and regional identifications within a subsequent Visible Minority question. Multiple responses are permitted, while mixed responses are discouraged. The emphasis in both questions is on social status. In sharp contrast the 2000 U.S. Census asks a single question that makes direct reference to race. It is asked on the short census form, and thus of all respondents. Aboriginal identifications are included in a response check-off list that collapses non/aboriginal, 'racial,' national and regional identifications. Multiple responses are permitted, and mixed responses discouraged. The emphasis in the Race question is on phenotype as socially recognized and deemed relevant.

The *social constructivist nature of ethnic and racial identifications* is very much evident in this brief examination of cross-national differences in conceptualizations and usage of terms. Ethnic and racial identifications are contextual, relational, situational, and socially constructed. Like other identities they are flexible, fluid, and often overlap and intersect. They may be multiple even on a single identity criteria, and may even be mixed. The key analytic question remains – as always – which type of identities are deemed salient in which historical, cultural, societal or situational contexts? By whom? Why? ▪

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Latin Vibes Television	Spanish	4:00 PM – 5:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Leben Malti	Maltese	10:00 AM – 10:30 AM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Macedonian Heritage Hour	Macedonian	5:00 PM – 6:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Magyar Kepek TV	Hungarian	12:30 PM – 1:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Morning Waves	Russian	7:00 AM – 8:00 AM (Sunday)	– OMNI.1
Noi Romanii	Romanian	12:00 PM – 12:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Pasqyra Shqiptare	Albanian	2:00 PM – 2:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
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