

CARS

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Building on the success of the 2003 event, a third symposium, entitled *Constructing National Identities in Canada and the U.S.*, was held in New York City on September 9-10, 2004 at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum. The objectives of the symposium include:

- to encourage Canadian and American specialists on various policy themes to share current research and ideas
- to foster new and innovative forms of exchange and collaboration, and
- to create a policy forum dedicated to introducing a comparative perspective into the Canadian policy debate.

Étant donné le grand succès de l'édition SCAR 2003, l'AEC a organisé de nouveau, les 9 et 10 septembre 2004, un symposium intitulé: *Construire l'identité nationale au Canada et aux États-Unis*. En général, les objectifs du symposium incluent :

- la promotion d'échanges de résultats de recherche entre les spécialistes canadiens et américains dans les divers domaines touchant la politique publique
- l'innovation en termes de communication et de collaboration ainsi que
- l'implantation d'une méthode comparative dans le débat politique canadien.

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CELEBRATING THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH SETTLEMENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CANADIAN IDENTITY

Ronald Rudin

Ronald Rudin is Professor in the Department of History at Concordia University, Montreal.

ABSTRACT

This essay tells the story of two very different commemorations of the 1604 landing of 79 Frenchmen at Île Ste-Croix. In 1904, an English Protestant celebration marked the tercentenary of the first “European” settlement; one hundred years later, the Acadian and First Nations people celebrate the founding of French Canada, albeit without representation from Quebec. The author makes clear that the crucial moments in the history of a nation may be interpreted in a great many ways.

During the summer of 2004, considerable amounts of time, energy, and money were invested to mark an event that took place 400 years earlier, when 79 Frenchmen spent a single winter on a small island that lies on what is today the border between Maine and New Brunswick. In 1603, Pierre Dugua de Mons was named by the king of France as Lieutenant-General (effectively the viceroy) of “La Cadie”, an immense expanse of land that extended between the 40th and 46th parallels, or from present day Philadelphia to Labrador. The following spring, he led an expedition that resulted in the first effort to create a permanent French settlement in the New World, and the only settlement north of the Spanish settlements far to the south. Three years before the founding of Jamestown and four before that of Quebec City, Dugua and his colleagues, among whose number was the cartographer, Samuel de Champlain, established themselves on Île Ste-Croix, spending a single disastrous winter, which resulted in the death of roughly half the expedition. In 1605, the survivors transported the colony to Port-Royal, in present day Nova Scotia. Accordingly, while the settlement on Île Ste-Croix was supposed to have been permanent, its existence was rather short-lived.

In spite of the ephemeral nature of the Île Ste-Croix settlement, it inspired both tercentenary and quadricentenary celebrations. However, the messages communicated in 2004 were quite different from those of 1904, as the leaders who staged the events on each occasion were interested in telling different stories. Comparing these stories (and the people eager to tell them) provides an ideal opportunity to consider how leaders attempt to construct national identity by recourse to founding myths. There is nothing natural or inevitable about the choices made as to defining when a particular people was founded, any more than there is something natural or inevitable about how nations are defined. As the title of this conference suggests, national identities are constructed. Rare are those scholars who still talk about an American or Canadian (or even French-Canadian) nation that inevitably had to be created at some particular moment because of certain shared characteristics. Rather, over the past twenty years, there has been an emphasis on the processes or circumstances that allow the creation of a sense of identity among a group of people. It may be the case (as with French-speaking Canadians, to name only one example) that there are groups with certain common characteristics, but binding them into a “nation” with a particular sense of both its boundaries and its destiny requires the efforts of leaders with the means to mould individuals into something larger.¹

Commemorative celebrations, particularly those that point to founding moments, form a particularly powerful tool in the arsenal of leaders trying to construct a sense of identity. Accordingly, a comparison of how that tool was used in 1904 and 2004 in telling the story of what happened on Île Ste-Croix provides an opportunity to see how changing circumstances resulted in leaders providing different versions of the past in order to construct nations that were defined very differently.²

The Story of 1904, or How English-Speakers Stole the Show

During the summer of 1904, a group of dignitaries travelled between three of the sites that had been visited by Dugua and Champlain in the early 17th century, first visiting Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia (at roughly the site of Port-Royal), before going on to Saint John, the largest city in New Brunswick, whose name came from the passage of Dugua and Champlain upon the feast day of St John the Baptist. The tour ended with an event at Île Ste-Croix. The individual most responsible for setting the tone for the memory tour was the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, J.W. Longley. As his name suggests, Longley was not of French origins, and in that regard was representative of those who inhabited the parts of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia that the French had visited 300 years earlier; few Acadians (as the French speakers of that region are known) lived there, in part because of their deportation by the British in the mid-18th century. Accordingly, when Longley and his colleagues thought of the events of 1604 as having marked a founding moment, they did not view them as marking the start of the French experience in North America; rather, they focused attention upon “the first [settlement] by Europeans on the soil of North America resulting in a permanent settlement.”³

In assembling dignitaries who might travel from site to site, Longley invited leaders from France because de Mons had sailed under the French flag, Britain because of its ultimate assumption of control over the region, and the United States because “it was the English colonists of Massachusetts, who finally wrested from the French this Port Royal.”⁴ In the end, however, the most conspicuous dignitaries were the ones who were invisible, or at the margins of the celebrations. It was probably not much of a surprise that First Nations people played no role in an event that had had a devastating impact upon their existence. At Saint John, New Brunswick, in the most elaborately choreographed event of 1904, there was a re-enactment of the landing by the French. However, awaiting the Frenchmen (played by the local yacht club in period costume) were the natives, in this case the local rowing club in disguise.

While not entirely absent, French-speaking Canadians were allowed no more than bit roles in Longley’s celebration. Most conspicuous (at least from a 2004 perspective) by their absence were the Acadians, whose existence as the French-speaking occupants of this part of the world could be traced back to 1604. While the Acadians no longer lived in large numbers in the areas that had been visited by the French in the 17th century, their population in other parts of New Brunswick had increased rapidly in the late 19th century, a period that also saw the emergence of a certain sense of Acadian nationalism, symbolized by

such manifestations of national identity as a flag (the tricolour with a yellow star in the blue) and a national holiday (the Feast of the Assumption). Although Acadian leaders may have been in the process of constructing an identity that might allow them to stand apart from the much more numerous French-speakers in Quebec, they lacked the power to occupy a central place in any of the commemorative events of 1904.

With the Acadians largely silenced, the responsibility for trying to turn the tercentenary into an event that marked the start of a French civilization in North America fell to the two representatives from Quebec, home to the vast majority of French Canadians, who spoke at Annapolis

Royal, the first stop along the commemorative tour. Adelard Turgeon (the Quebec Minister of Colonization) and Charles Langelier (the representative of the Institut Canadien, a literary organization in Quebec City) saw the events of 1604 as having marked the founding of a Canadian nation based upon a partnership between French and English-speakers. From this perspective, Turgeon remarked that he stood with those who had “seen in the maintenance of the French element a token of greatness, of progress and even of security for our Confederation... National dualism is not a bar to the growth of a young nation...”⁵ In a slightly different context, Canadian dualism was also reflected by the fact that Dugua had been a Protestant and Champlain, a Catholic. As Langelier put it, such “diversity of worship is not a necessary cause of weakness of national sentiments... If the celebration of today was only to remind us of those things, it would be sufficient to greet it with joy as a national festival.”⁶

For their efforts, Turgeon and Langelier did not continue on for the rest of the commemorative journey.

While the dignitaries were supposed to have stayed on the tour from its beginning (at Annapolis Royal) to its end (at Île Ste-Croix), the pair from Quebec inexplicably left the scene, perhaps because their comments had been unwelcome. Be that as it may, with their departure there was no one left to soften the message of the tercentenary which focused upon the founding of European settlement, in the process marginalizing the French element in this enterprise. Moreover, to the extent that there was a single “founder” who occupied pride of place, it was the Protestant Dugua, largely to the exclusion (or at least the marginalizing) of Champlain. At Annapolis Royal, the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, A.G. Jones, placed Dugua in the company of “other illustrious men” such as Columbus and Pizzaro, not giving Champlain as much as a mention in passing. It was more difficult to ignore Champlain at Saint John since he had been responsible for giving the town its name. Nevertheless, Attorney General Longley managed to avoid mentioning Champlain

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by name, referring instead to “De Monts’ land[ing] at St. John.”⁷

The marginalizing of Champlain, who had hero status to French-speaking Catholics in both Acadie and Quebec at the turn of the century, only reinforced the sense that the 1904 tercentenary had been constructed with an eye to promoting a Protestant and English-speaking nation. Given this orientation, the most powerful French Canadian of the time, the Canadian prime minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, chose not to attend, employing the need to attend to business in Ottawa as his excuse. Even the Governor-General (the King’s representative in Canada), Lord Minto was reluctant to dignify an event that had defined the origins of Canada with little regard for its French or Catholic heritage.

The Story of 2004, or How the Acadians and the First Nations Took Centre Stage

Over the summer of 2004, the story of Dugua and Champlain was told once again, but in such a manner that it would have been incomprehensible to someone such as J.W. Longley had he returned to life. While the tercentenary events had marginalized both Acadians and First Nations People, the one that was presented to tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people upon the quadricentenary squarely focused upon the birth of the Acadian people. In the process, attention was drawn to the Acadians’ close collaboration 400 years earlier with First Nations people, who were also given a central place on the stage. In this regard, a ceremony of thanks was held on 8 May to mark the date upon which the Dugua expedition first dropped anchor in what would become Acadie and made its first contact with the Mi’kmaq people. On this occasion, the Société nationale de l’Acadie, the official body representing Acadian interests, provided its highest honour to the Mi’kmaq for the aid they had given the French in the early 17th century.

The theme of Acadian-First Nations collaboration was also at the centre of the “official” commemorative event, staged by the federal government on 26 June to mark the precise date that the French reached Île Ste-Croix in 1604. The event was billed in a rather cumbersome formulation as “Acadie: First Dialogues – The Meeting of Two Worlds: Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of Acadie and the First French Settlement in North America.” The event was carefully choreographed so that it began with a word of welcome from a Passamaquoddy chief, who was self-consciously repeating the welcome that had been provided by his ancestors 400 years earlier. Throughout the ceremony, the dominant languages were Passamaquoddy and French, and the musical interludes, interspersed among the speeches of political leaders, included a joint effort by First Nations and Acadian musicians. The theme of Acadian-First Nations collaboration was further underscored by the unveiling at the end of the formal ceremony of three pieces of sculpture, a triptych, commissioned by the federal government and created by French, Acadian and First Nations artists. In the end, this spirit of good-will encouraged the participation of the Prime Minister, Paul Martin, who in contrast with Laurier 100 years earlier, calculated in the midst of an electoral cam-

paign that there was some political gain, or at least no political downside, in celebrating the founding story that was being told.

The central role played by those who had been marginalized upon the tercentenary was no accident. Since 1904 there has been a renaissance within Acadian society that has resulted in a population with control over a wide array of its own institutions and which is no longer prepared to wait quietly in the wings for its chance to tell its story. In this context, the quadricentenary saw the emergence as Dugua as the hero of the moment, but one who was shorn of his religious identity, given the secularization of Acadian society, and who now was the symbol of the start of Acadie; this in contrast with Champlain who stood (and still stands) as the symbol of the founding of Québécois civilization. Accordingly, the advertising of the 400th anniversary across New Brunswick, the province with the bulk of the Acadian population, featured an actor portraying Dugua, with no Champlain in sight.

No less dramatic has been the change in the political sensibilities of First Nations people who, not unlike the Acadians, have insisted that they be reckoned with in any telling of the story of the “founding” of Canada. While there were those in the aboriginal communities who argued against participating in someone else’s founding story, by and large First Nations leaders recognized an opportunity to tell a story which could build upon the 400-year old relationship with the Acadians. The possibility of turning this story to their advantage came across most clearly by means of the involvement of the Passamaquoddy as central players in the events focused upon Île Ste-Croix. While the Passamaquoddy are recognized as an “official” native American tribe in the United States, they have no such recognition in Canada. On more than one occasion, the Passamaquoddy expressed from commemorative stages the hope that the help provided to the Acadians 400 years earlier might be returned in terms of their battle for recognition.

Missing from this equation were the English-speaking people of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in a sense Longley’s successors, who were frequently made to feel marginalized since they had no story to tell that extended back to 1604. In constructing the celebrations in the vicinity of Île Ste-Croix, there was a committee of English-speakers which had been trying since the late 1990s to secure financing for an event of significant dimensions, but to no avail until, at the eleventh hour, the federal government, responding to the lobbying from the Acadian community, chose to invest in a fête which spoke to the founding of French Canada, but without reference to Quebec. In contrast with the situation in 1904, there were no representatives from Quebec on the stage for the official events of 2004. If anything, Québécois leaders responded to the events of 2004 somewhat defensively, questioning their importance when compared to those planned for 2008 to mark the quadricentenary of the founding of Quebec City.

Constructing National Identities: Then and Now

The organizers of the commemoration focused upon the events of 1604 told different stories in 2004 from those that had been presented 100 years earlier. The leaders of

the tercentenary celebrations had a rather uncomplicated view of Canada as a country that was essentially English-speaking and Protestant. That they were telling this story from a founding moment that had a crucial French-Catholic element did not trouble them, although their exclusion of crucial elements of the story meant that their efforts at constructing a particular vision of Canada would receive a hearing from a rather limited audience, one that would not even include the Prime Minister.


Under different circumstances, a different story was told in 2004 that was grounded in the collaboration between Acadians and First Nations people. On this occasion, there was little effort to see the beginnings of a single Canadian experience; rather there was a focus upon a much more limited sense of identity. The much more limited pretensions evident upon the quadricentenary reflected the general recognition that Canada was ultimately a country composed of various nations. In this regard, it is perhaps not surprising that the celebrations at Île Ste-Croix in June 2004 made few waves beyond Atlantic Canada, earning not so much as a mention in the *Globe and Mail*, Canada's "national" newspaper.

In the end, a careful reading of such efforts to remember the past does not necessarily improve our understanding of the founding moments of a nation. However, such commemorative celebrations do tell us much about societies in which certain types of stories could be told, and others could not. The nation under construction in 1904 was not the same as that in 2004, and

the stories presented to the public reflected the very different visions of those with the power to occupy the stage. ■


NOTES

- 1 In this regard, such works as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983) or *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), edited by Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, have had a considerable influence because of their focus upon the means available to leaders to promote a sense of national identity. I have written in this regard in *Founding Fathers: Champlain and Laval in the Streets of Quebec, 1878-1908* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003)
- 2 The research described here forms part of a project supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for whose help I am grateful. A fuller analysis of the 1904 commemorative events can be found in my article, "The Champlain-De Monts Tercentenary: Voices from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Maine, June 1904," to appear in the forthcoming issue of *Acadiensis*.
- 3 Longley, "Demonts Tercentenary at Annapolis, 1604-1904," *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society*, XIV (1910), 107-8.
- 4 National Archives of Canada, Laurier Papers, Longley to Laurier, 11 April 1903, pp 72108-9.
- 5 *Halifax Morning Chronicle*, 22 June 1904.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 *St. John Daily Telegraph*, 24 June 1904.



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PAST IMAGININGS: REFLECTIONS ON NATION, REGION, AND CULTURE IN CANADA

Margaret Conrad

Margaret Conrad is a Canada Research Chair at the University of New Brunswick. She has published widely in the fields of Atlantic Canada and Women's history. In 1995, she was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and was made an Officer of the Order of Canada in 2004.

ABSTRACT

In this article, Professor Margaret Conrad speaks to the importance of regional narratives in the debate over nation-building. With examples rooted in her own Maritime experience, she maintains that individual identities are formed with the help of ongoing historical knowledge and understanding.

Historical experience, as Canadian geographer Cole Harris reminds us, is what makes Canadians distinct from Americans.¹ Even if Canada were annexed to the United States tomorrow, understandings of the past would continue to identify us as a region of North America, just as the American South continues to exist as an imaginative and functional entity, if not entirely a formal one.² The history that Canadians would carry into our imagined North American union would perhaps consist of narratives of nation-building gone awry, but would also include memories rooted in what some scholars in Canada call “limited identities,”³ and what I consider to be the most persistent sites for identity formation: class, culture, gender, race, and region. At once both larger and smaller than the nation-states in which they reside, these identities evolve over time and are rarely experienced at the individual level as mutually exclusive. Individuals are more complicated than groups. While a group may focus on a single marker of identity, an individual embodies multiple identities that can be drawn upon as required.

I am intrigued by the conditions that cause people to foreground one identity over another.⁴ When do I, for example, identify as a child of a working class family, as a woman, as a white person, as a history professor, as a citizen of the Maritimes, of Atlantica, of Canada, of North America, of the western world, or of the global village? I am also interested in the conditions that cause identities and their historical underpinnings to change. Under what circumstances might my concept of Atlantic Canada, to which I am deeply attached emotionally and intellectually, no longer be of much use? What could render irrelevant my feminist sensibilities that I share with many other women around the world? Is the growing divergence in the values held by Americans and Canadians, as outlined by Michael Adams in his book *Fire and Ice*, a cause for celebration or concern, and what would it take to cause our values to converge?⁵

Imagining Identities

In the wake of 9/11, individuals in both Canada and the United States are struggling to adjust their identities to fit the rapidly evolving geo-political scene. History plays a significant role in this adjustment process. In their ground-breaking study, the *Presence of the Past* (1998), Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen offer empirical evidence that most Americans want their history to address fundamental questions about personal identity, morality, and agency rather than to chronicle national progress.⁶ Canadians, I suspect, are not that much different from their southern neighbours in this respect. With the Internet, television, movies, galleries, and the print media awash with representations of the past, and heritage the subject of seemingly endless commemoration,⁷ history has become a ready resource that we draw upon to help make sense of the present. References to historical events are frequent in the run-up to the November 2004 election in the United States, John Kerry's arrival in Boston harbour with his Vietnam comrades being the most dramatic exemplar. Lacking a compelling master narrative to exploit, candidates in Canada's recent federal election were, for the most part, content to focus on less heroic aspects of the nation's past: patronage scandals, conflicting social values, and regional grievances.

From its beginnings in the 1860s, the Canadian nation-state has been constructed around regional and cultural differences that inspire conflict, negotiation, and compromise. Regions identified as the Upper provinces (Ontario and Quebec), Lower provinces (the Maritimes), and the Northwest, as well as cultural identities derived from Aboriginal, French, and British populations, had been articulated by 1867 and were reflected in the British North America Act. The structure of the appointed senate, regulations with respect to language and schooling, the federal assumption of powers over Aboriginal affairs – indeed the federal system itself – were designed to address thorny issues of territory and identity that made national cohesion elusive.

Canadian patriotism is complemented and sometimes blunted by strong allegiances to provinces and regions. Despite his contention that region is losing some of its relevance, historian Gerald Friesen has suggested that the entire history of Canadian politics could be interpreted as a “wellspring of regional sentiment.”⁸ Political economist Donald Savoie stated unequivocally in 2000 that “All things Canadian are now regional.”⁹ The June election seemed to confirm Savoie’s claim. Quebec voters favoured the Bloc Québécois, a party dedicated to seeking national independence for their province, while the four Western provinces awarded most of their seats to a re-invented Conservative Party that combines a strong rhetoric of western alienation with a neo-liberal economic agenda and a neo-conservative social policy. The majority of voters in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces opted to stay the course with the Liberal Party, whose leaders manoeuvred clumsily from the centre right to the centre left in time to sustain a minority government. Elections, it seems, foreground our regional identities. Whether the current retreat into our regional shells is a harbinger of the devolution of federal powers, a realignment of power among the various regions, or just another swing of the federal-provincial pendulum will depend on how Canadians respond to the current uncertainties. History is made, not written in the stars.

Although Canada’s physical boundaries have remained more or less firmly fixed, the contours of its regions have shifted over time. The geographically-defined Prairie Provinces have recently been incorporated into a politically-defined West that includes British Columbia. When Newfoundland and Labrador joined Confederation in 1949, the Maritimes morphed into Atlantic Canada. The empire provinces, Ontario and Quebec, differ greatly in history and culture and each operates as a region in its own right, but together they constitute the imagined region of “Central Canada” that since 1867 has dominated the development of the nation-state. Now the largest provinces in Canada, Ontario and Quebec achieved their current boundaries only in 1912 when they incorporated large areas of the Northwest Territories. The territorial North, meanwhile, was significantly reorganized with the creation of Nunavut in 1999. Rather than calling into question the notion of region as a functional and imaginative entity, these transitions underscore the resilience of region as a bracketed and playful space between the bounded nation and the unbounded individual. Without a shifting regional

stage on which to play out dreams and frustrations, to forge alliances, and to plot strategies, Canada’s constitutional structures would almost surely burst asunder.

Whether partially imagined, fully functioning, or somewhere in between, regions are complex, edgy, risky, and indeterminate, the subject of endless revision. They can be as narrowly defined as a metropolis and its immediate hinterland (“economic corridors” are now all the rage) or as broadly defined as Atlantica, the name given to the imaginary space occupied by the New England states and the Atlantic provinces. In the literature on globalizing capital, the emergence of transnational economic regions, including the one created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are the subject of much discussion. Canada’s northern territories – Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut – have as much, perhaps more, in common with their circumpolar neighbours, with whom they sometimes meet to discuss common issues, as they do with Canadians in the south. Clearly, regions are much more fun to play with than nation-states that have a tendency to insist that we stay in our own small sandbox.

In Canada, region and culture often reinforce each other. Quebec offers one of the best examples of the two working in tandem, albeit somewhat awkwardly for the province’s cultural minorities. In Atlantic Canada, there is no longer much talk of secession, but the sense of past and place runs deep and nowhere more so than in Newfoundland and Labrador, where the fisheries has long been a mainstay of the economy.¹⁰ According to a recent opinion survey, 72% of those polled considered themselves Newfoundlanders and Labradorians first, Canadians second. They told pollsters that what they *most* valued about being Newfoundlanders and Labradorians was the culture, music, and arts that they shared (25%), along with the safe environment (20%) and sense of community (14%). This response contrasted dramatically with a national poll. When asked to identify the greatest contribution of Newfoundland and Labrador to Canada, 34% of respondents could think of nothing to say. The most commonly held impression (21%) of the province’s inhabitants by other Canadians is that they are “uneducated/stupid/unskilled/unsophisticated.”¹¹

Regional in their sensibilities and increasingly urban-based, the majority of Canadians have no historical memory of a time and place in which people made a living from the sea. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, however, nurture their sea-bound heritage in story and song, the very coin of cultural currency. One such song, “Let me Fish off Cape St. Mary’s,” has attained near anthem status in the province. Written in 1947 by Otto Kelland after being told of a homesick sailor who yearned to fish in the waters near his southeastern Newfoundland home, its haunting lyrics strike a cord in many people.¹² From another perspective, the song could be perceived as so much sentimental nonsense or even as a clever means by which elites trap ordinary people in nets of their own nostalgia.¹³ I confess that this song moves me, perhaps because of my Maritime roots and working class background, but also because of its rich vocabulary that is unique to Newfoundland and Labrador.¹⁴

Take me back to my western boat
 Let me fish off Cape St. Mary's
 Where the hog-down sail
 And the fog horns wail
 With my friends the Browns and the Cleary's
 Let me fish off Cape St. Mary's
 Let me feel my dory lift
 To the broad Atlantic combers
 Where the rip tide swirls
 And the wild ducks whirl
 And Old Neptune calls the numbers
 'Neath the wild Atlantic combers
 Let me sail up Golden Bay
 With my oilskins all a-steaming
 From the thunder squalls when I hauled my trawls
 And my old Cape Ann a-gleaming
 With oil-skins all a-steaming.
 And let me view that ragged shore
 With the beaches all a-glisten
 With the caplin spawn
 Where from dusk till dawn
 You bait your trawl, and you listen
 To the undertow a-hissen'
 And when you reach that last big shoal
 Where the groundswells break asunder,
 Where the wild sands roll to the surge's toll
 Let me be a man and take it
 When my dory fails to make it
 Oh take me back to that snug green cove
 Where the seas toll up their thunder
 There let me rest in the Earth's cool breast
 Where the stars shine out their wonder
 And the seas roll up their thunder.

The past and its specific cultural landscapes have a way of catching us unawares, and offer evidence for Joy Parr's contention that we "know more than we can say." Instead of being constrained by language as the post-modernists would have it, Parr maintains that the linguistic does not limit what the body can know. She urges scholars to claim "... the historical body, which *remembers*, years later, how to ride a bicycle, which *recognizes* through the tiller the pull of a particular river eddy, *pauses* with alarm at the absence of a particular sound, and *knows* from a change in the breeze that a storm is coming down the valley."¹⁵ Like Parr, Friesen, commenting on Arjun Appadurai's assertion that territorial identity must now be seen as primarily relational and contextual rather than spatial,¹⁶ argues for the addition of "commonsense notions of political space – usually territorial in definition – and, among some citizens at least, an intimate knowledge of physical location – the angle of the light or the touch of the air or the sound in the background hum or the particular quality of silence – that seems like an epiphany when it strikes."¹⁷

One of my own epiphanies on the power of place serves to underscore this point. For more than 30 years I lived only a few kilometres from Grand Pré, one of the communities from which French settlers in the region, known as Acadians, were expelled in 1755. *Le grand dérangement* was a defining moment in the history of

Maritime Canada, which this year is celebrating the 400th anniversary of French settlement in North America.¹⁸ We know some of the details of the expulsion from the diary John Winslow, a New England soldier who participated in the military operations at Grand Pré. In his diary, Winslow described the pitiful scene as men "went off Praying, Singing & Crying, being Met by the women & Children all the way... with Great Lamentations upon their Knees praying, etc." For Winslow, who had seen much during his military career, it was "the worst peace[sic] of Service that Ever I was in."¹⁹ The emotional impact of the tragedy was underscored by another New Englander, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, who in 1847 published *Evangeline*, a poem about young lovers who were separated during the deportation.

Two decades ago, I accompanied an Acadian friend on his first visit Grand Pré National Park, created in the 1920s to commemorate the Acadian experience of the expulsion. As I chatted knowledgeably about developments on this emotionally-charged landscape, tears began spilling from my friend's eyes, cutting short my learned discourse. Silence seemed the only reasonable response to such vivid imaginings of the past. Other Canadians – for example, Aboriginal peoples, refugees, and war veterans – often share with Acadians the gut-wrenching impact of their imaginings sparked by specific cultural landscapes.

Because of the regional silos that characterize our nation, the Acadians' expulsion may be better known in the United States than in many parts of Canada. Longfellow's *Evangeline* was anthologized in American textbooks and the descendants of Acadians who sought refuge in Louisiana have developed their own Cajun identity, widely recognized through the popularity of zydeco and a distinctive cuisine. Acadians have close ties with their cousins in Louisiana as well as with francophones in Quebec, but, in other regions of Canada, they sometimes scarcely register.

Only a few intrepid scholars have attempted to chart how Canadians develop their distinctive regional conceptions of the past. Recently Jocelyn Létourneau and Sabrina Moisan have raised interesting questions about what students in secondary school, college, and university classrooms in Quebec know about the past by asking them to write for 45 minutes on the history of Quebec from the beginning: ("Présentez ou racontez comme vous la percevez, la savez ou vous vous en souvenez, l'histoire du Québec depuis le début.") Their findings indicate that students have absorbed a narrative sense of the past by the time that they reach secondary school.²⁰ Some scholars go so far as to claim that societies have narrative templates that are remarkably persistent, despite major social transformations.²¹ Over the past century, countries such as Germany, Japan, Russia, and South Africa have been forced to reconstruct their pasts, at least as they are presented in schools and public commemorations. Canada and the United States have thus far been spared this difficult process, but the time may have come for us to imagine our pasts differently if we are to achieve truth and reconciliation in our own time, in a world much altered from the one that inspired our current territorial and cultural templates.

Conclusion

The horrors of 9/11 and its fallout have caused scholars, policy makers, and citizens in North America and around the world to re-evaluate the local, regional, national, and transnational spaces that communication technologies and our imaginations make possible. John Ralston Saul's clever attack on the prophets of economic globalism in the pages of *Harper's* sparked spirited responses, and served as a timely reminder that the nation-state still has power to shape a world increasingly populated by transnational institutions.²² Canada's regional and cultural identities – especially if they are fluid, flexible, and life-affirming – are also essential tools for our kitbag as we attempt to respond to the many challenges that face us as a species on this planet. As historians know well, and post-modernist theorists never tire of reminding us, none of these concepts are fixed; rather, they represent centuries of accumulated knowledge gained by trial and error, and if they are to be useful in any way they must continually adapt to changing conditions.

Regions and cultures remind us, perhaps more than nation-states do, that we have agency, but that our agency functions in a historical context. In her book *Dark Age Ahead*, Jane Jacobs argues that “Any culture that jettisons the values that have given it competence, adaptability, and identity becomes weak and hollow.” She maintains that “A culture can avoid that hazard only by tenaciously retaining the underlying values responsible for the culture's nature and success. That is the framework into which adaptations must be assimilated.”²³ Although Canada's record of competence and adaptability has sometimes been disappointing – the treatment of Aboriginal peoples comes immediately to mind – the loose-jointed nature of the federal system offers spaces where imagined pasts and troubled presents can sometimes be negotiated into better futures. It is to these imagined better futures that Canadians and all the citizens of the world must be encouraged to bring their historical memories and time-tested values. ■

NOTES

- ¹ Cole Harris, “Postmodern Patriotism: Canadian Reflections,” *Canadian Geographer* 45, 1 (Spring 2001): 193-208.
- ² Janine Brodie makes the distinction among formal, functional, and imagined regions in *The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990). Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991) has enormously influenced our thinking on the role of imagination and communications in constructing national, and by implication, other identities. Charles Taylor uses the term “social imaginaries” to help us reflect on our understanding of modernity. Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Historical treatments of identity in the American South include John McCardell, *The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830-1860* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979) and C. Van Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971).
- ³ This concept was developed in J.M.S Careless, “Limited Identities in Canada,” *Canadian Historical Review* 50, 1 (March 1969): 1-10.
- ⁴ Joy Parr, “Gender History and Historical Practice,” *Canadian Historical Review* 76, 3 (September 1995): 354-376, especially 361.
- ⁵ Michael Adams, *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values* (Toronto: Penguin, 2003).
- ⁶ Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, *The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
- ⁷ David Lowenthal, *Possessed by the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (New York: Free Press, 1996).
- ⁸ Gerald Friesen, “The Evolving Meaning of Region in Canada,” *Canadian Historical Review* 82, 3 (September 2001): 534.
- ⁹ Donald J. Savoie, “All Things Canadian Are Now Regional,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 35, 1 (Spring 2000): 203-217.
- ¹⁰ Margaret R. Conrad and James K. Hiller, *Atlantic Canada: A Region in the Making* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- ¹¹ Ryan Research and Communication, *Provincial Opinion Survey*, April 2003 (Saint John's, NL: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, 2004), 390-391. Retrieved electronically at: <http://www.gov.nf.ca/royalcomm/research/pdf/ryan.pdf> (3 August 2004).
- ¹² *Globe and Mail*, 23 July 2004, R5
- ¹³ Patrick O'Flaherty, “Looking Backward: The Old Newfoundland Outports,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 10, 1 (February 1975): 3-9; James Overton, *Making a World of Difference: Essays on Tourism, Culture and Development in Newfoundland* (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1996).
- ¹⁴ G.M. Story, W.J. Kirwin, and J.D.A. Widdowson, eds., *Dictionary of Newfoundland English* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
- ¹⁵ Joy Parr, “Notes for a More Sensuous History of the Twentieth-Century Canada: The Timely, the Tacit, and the Material Body,” *Canadian Historical Review* 82, 4 (December 2001): 729.
- ¹⁶ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
- ¹⁷ Friesen, 544.
- ¹⁸ Newfoundland Labrador have an even longer history of the French presence. See “500 Candles! A Celebration Year of Francophones in Newfoundland and Labrador,” *Newfoundland Quarterly* 97,1 (Spring 2004): 18-25.
- ¹⁹ “John Winslow's Journal,” cited in Cornelius Jaenen and Cecilia Morgan, *Material Memory: Documents in Pre-Confederation History* (Don Mills, ON: Addison Wesley, 1998), 69.
- ²⁰ Jocelyn Létourneau et Sabrina Moisan, “Mémoire et récit de l'aventure historique du Québec chez les jeunes québécois de l'héritage canadien-français: coup de sonde, amorce d'analyse de résultats, questionnements,” *Canadian Historical Review* 85, 2 (June 2004): 325-356.
- ²¹ James Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- ²² John Ralston Saul, “The Collapse of Globalism and the Rebirth of Nationalism,” *Harper's Magazine* (March 2004): 33-44. For a Canadian critique see, William Watson, “Globalization: Resting, But Not Dead,” *Literary Review of Canada* 12, 5 (June 2004): 10-13.
- ²³ Jane Jacobs, *Dark Age Ahead* (New York: Random House, 2004), 176.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION: THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Nancy Foner

Nancy Foner is Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. She is the author of many books on immigration, including most recently *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States* (2004).

ABSTRACT

The author compares and contrasts the experience of immigrants in the United States and Canada. What are the pros and cons of residential segregation in New York? How does racial profiling affect West Indians in Toronto? What are the prospects for assimilation? Dr. Foner asks and answers these important questions, and points to the need for more comparative work between the two countries.

The comparative study of immigration to Canada and the United States is rich with possibilities. Both countries have a long history (and identity) as immigration societies. In the past few decades, both have been experiencing a massive new wave of immigration, this time from new countries and regions – an immigration that has been transforming the two nations in dramatic ways. In both Canada and the United States, the proportion of foreign-born is at its highest in 70 years; in Canada, 18% of the population is foreign-born, in the United States, it is now nearly 12%. And, of course, the proportions are much higher in the gateway regions. In 2001, 44% of metropolitan Toronto's population was foreign born, in 2000, 24% of the New York metropolitan area was foreign-born (and in New York City itself, the figure was 36%).

I have long been interested and involved in comparative studies of migration, and believe that comparisons – in this case, across nations and cities – can enrich our study of migration in a number of ways. For one thing, they jolt us out of customary ways of thinking about our original area of interest and enable us to look at the familiar in a new way. For another, by acquainting U.S. with what goes on elsewhere, a comparative approach may inspire a critical awareness of what is taken for granted in one's own country or city. Also, cross-national comparisons are a way to isolate the critical factors that account for national differences. As the historian George Fredrickson has put it, a comparative framework can illuminate the particularities or special features of individual societies being examined – each may look different in light of the other or others – and is also useful in enlarging our theoretical understanding of the kinds of institutions and processes being compared.¹

So much for general statements about comparisons. Now to the actual comparisons, with a spotlight on some of the differences in the experiences of immigrants in the United States and Canada (mainly due to the distinctive features of the U.S. and Canadian contexts). I am most intrigued by the possibility of Toronto-New York comparisons. One reason is that I have done extensive work on immigration to New York. Both cities have high proportions of the foreign-born, and they also have highly heterogeneous immigrant populations, with significant numbers from a large number of groups. And two of the largest groups in Toronto, Chinese and Afro-Caribbeans, are also well represented in New York.

Yet there are also many contrasts. For one thing, the cities have very different immigration histories. Prior to World War II, Toronto, in the words of the Canadian historian Harold Troper, was a parochial Protestant town – the Ulster of the North.² New York, by contrast, was a multicultural city way before the recent immigration. In 1961, when New York was nearly a quarter black and Puerto Rican – after a huge influx of Puerto Ricans and African Americans from the South in the mid twentieth century – people in Toronto were predominantly of British (61%) and European (35%) origin. Toronto did not even receive large numbers of Italians until the 1950s and 1960s. In the 50s, the Toronto police were picking on Italian immigrants for having a glass of wine in a public park; in the 60s, Italians were stereotyped in Toronto as a cheap labor supply; and in the 70s, Toronto's Italians complained of second-class treatment in the Catholic Church. All this is reminiscent of early twentieth century New York. By the 1960s and 1970s, New York's second and third generation Italians were making their way upwards and becoming part of

the Euroamerican mainstream and had long been replaced – on the bottom of the ethnoracial hierarchy – by the enormous waves of Puerto Rican and African American migrants.

This leads to another very significant difference: the fact that New York has a large native African American population, while Toronto does not. This is particularly relevant for Afro-Caribbeans, who are a very large component of the immigrant population in both cities. In New York, the presence of a huge African American community has had a complicated impact – bringing advantages and disadvantages for West Indian immigrants. On the negative side, Afro-Caribbeans, like African Americans, are confined to highly residentially segregated neighbourhoods and to virtually all-black schools in ghetto areas – and they suffer much the same kind of stigma as African Americans on the basis of being labeled “black.”

At the same time there are benefits to being part of the larger black population. West Indians have benefited from political initiatives put in place as a result of the gains that African Americans won in the civil rights movement – affirmative action being one of them. Moreover, for aspiring West Indian Americans, incorporation into the African American middle class “minority culture of mobility” has offered strategies for economic mobility, including black professional and fraternal associations and organizations of black students in racially integrated high schools and universities.

Paradoxically, however, residential segregation has helped give West Indians power at the ballot box. And because, racially speaking, New York has a critical mass, West Indians have lived from the very start in districts where black voters predominated and where they were represented in city, state, and federal legislative bodies by black politicians who spoke for black interests.

Although Caribbeans in Toronto are heavily concentrated in certain sections of the metropolitan area, none of these areas, as one account notes, can be described as a ghetto in the sense of the large-scale ghettos characteristic of American cities. This is a good thing. Yet, by the same token, Afro-Caribbeans in Toronto cannot profit from alliances with a larger native black community or piggyback on gains won by African Americans. Whereas West Indians in New York often claim superiority by differentiating themselves from native blacks – and believe they receive preferable treatment from whites – in Toronto, West Indians (along with African immigrants) are *the* blacks, and reports indicate that blacks (both Caribbean and African) feel they are more discriminated against than any other group in the city. When black motorists in Toronto have complained of being charged with DWBB – Driving While Being Black – to explain why they are stopped so often by the police, by black, they mean Caribbean or African.³ Racial profiling is an issue in New York as well, but there black mainly means African American – and certainly not just immigrant blacks.

The lack of a large native black community in Toronto (and Canada more generally) also has implications for the second generation – and for views of the way that assimilation will proceed. Whether the predictions are optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects for assimilation, the important point is that the fates of the children of black immigrants in the United States are seen as heavily influenced by their being part of the larger black community. The pessimists talk about segmented assimilation for the children of black immigrants who lack access to parental or community resources, are exposed

to the oppositional outlooks of inner city native minorities in schools and neighborhoods, and, as a result, are seen as likely to suffer downward assimilation. The optimists point out that, by and large, the children of immigrants in the United States, including those of Afro-Caribbean origin, are doing better than their parents. And they note that becoming part of the black community can have benefits, as I mentioned, in providing resources through an African-American middle class culture of mobility and contacts to gain entry into mainstream and minority-run institutions.

In Canada, no large native black population acts as a reference group for the children of immigrants, or as an explanation when Canadian scholars try to understand the experiences of the second generation. To the extent that the West Indian second-generation faces difficulties in moving ahead, there is – in the absence of a large native black population – a greater tendency in Canada than in the U.S. to put the blame on patterns brought over from the sending society, including family patterns and high rates of single parent families. In contrast, in the United States, there has been a tendency in the scholarly and popular literature to extol the virtues of Caribbean cultures as opposed to those of native blacks – and to put the blame on attitudes and behavior acquired from native blacks.

In looking more generally at differences in the immigrant experience in Canada and the United States – and not just at West Indians – there is the question of national policies concerning immigrants or minorities, including the official policy of multiculturalism in Canada which stresses the distinctiveness of, and goal of preserving, ethnic identities and cultures. One question is just how this policy translates into action, and whether, in fact, it leads to different results south of the border, where there is, at least at the official level, more pressure to assimilate into the dominant culture and “become American.” One study of the Canadian experience concludes that in terms of cultural retention by immigration groups, the United States and Canada are more similar than different and that pressures to assimilate are powerful in both countries.⁴

Another recent study suggests that Canadian policies and programs for immigrants may actually lead to greater incorporation into mainstream society, at least when it comes to naturalization and political participation. Overall, naturalization rates are much higher now in Canada than in the United States, even when you control for country of birth – what the sociologist Irene Bloomraad has called a North American naturalization gap.⁵

Bloomraad argues that this has to do with the Canadian immigrant settlement industry, a sector composed of government agencies and nonprofit organizations that cater to immigrant settlement needs such as English language training, job counseling, and interpreting services. In Canada, settlement and multicultural programs that are funded and in many cases organized by the federal government represent much more than what is offered by the U.S. federal government. These programs have led more people to naturalize than in the U.S. – with implications for political participation, since in both countries, voting and running for office is restricted to citizens.⁶

There are obviously many more areas that would reveal significant differences between Canada and the United States. I have only discussed one group – West Indians – and

very briefly at that. New York-Toronto comparisons of other groups, for example, South Asians and Chinese, groups that are sizable in both cities, would also reveal effects of the different national and urban contexts. It would also be interesting to look at the terms used to describe immigrants in the two countries – visible minority, being a common (and official) term in Canada since the 1980s and 1990s, but not used in the United States.

One other point before I conclude, and this has to do with the fact that immigrants in the two countries are often linked in many ways through transnational ties across borders. Studies of transnationalism are a hot topic in the social sciences these days, but the emphasis is nearly always on the ties that immigrants maintain to their home countries and communities. Yet it is important to note that transnational ties also extend to other receiving societies. In fact, the New York-Toronto axis may well represent an important transnational connection for many groups. To come back again to West Indians, this is certainly the case for them. Many West Indian New Yorkers, for example, have relatives in Toronto, and we need to better understand the nature and impact of contacts between them – including trips and visits back and forth.

These comments have only scratched the surface, but I think they have given a sense of the many possibilities for research on Canada and U.S. immigration. Given the huge immigrations that both countries have experienced – and that they are such close neighbors – it is surprising that so little comparative work has been done on immigration in

the two countries. Comparisons, as I have shown, can shed light on how social scientists understand and conceptualize immigration as well as help planners and policy makers as they work to design and improve policies and programs to assist immigrants. And comparisons of immigration in the United States and Canada can, it is hoped, lead to new collaborations that bring together academics, planners, and policy makers across the U.S.-Canada border.

NOTES

- ¹ George Fredrickson. *The Comparative Imagination*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- ² Harold Troper. "Becoming an Immigrant City: A History of Immigration into Toronto since the Second World War." *Integrating Diversity: Settlement and Integration of Immigrants in the Greater Toronto Metropolitan Area*. Ed. Paul Anisef & Michael Lanphier. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
- ³ See Myer Siemiaktyck, Tim Rees, Roxana Ng & Khan Rahi. "Integrating Community Diversity in Toronto: On Whose Terms?" *Integrating Diversity*. Ed. Anisef & Lanphier.
- ⁴ Jeffrey Reitz & Raymond Breton. *The IllUSion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the United States*. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994. Cited in Richard Alba & Victor Nee. *Remaking the American Mainstream*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 240.
- ⁵ Irene Bloomraad. "Institutions, Ethnic Leaders, and the Political Incorporation of Immigrants: A Comparison of Canada and the United States." *Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants*. Ed. Jeffrey G. Reitz. San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2003.



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COMPETING OR COMPLIMENTARY IDENTIFICATION: CONTRASTING ATTACHMENT TO CANADA, PROVINCE AND COMMUNITY

Jack Jedwab

Jack Jedwab is Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies

ABSTRACT

What makes for strong national identification and an even stronger national fabric? Undoubtedly, linguistic background has an important bearing on one's own sense of belonging – but what does this mean for Canada? Through a statistical analysis of census information, Jack Jedwab investigates various degrees of 'attachment', including language and age.

Many analysts contend that being rooted in one's society is essential to strong national identification. Moreover, the presence of a critical mass of rooted individuals is believed to make for a stronger national fabric. In the case of Canada, where a substantial share of the population is foreign-born, some observers insist that identification with Canada is fragile. However, historic language and aboriginal conflicts have frequently resulted in weaker attachment to the country amongst those who are *more* rooted than those who are less so. Mounting evidence from two major post-censal studies conducted by Statistics Canada in 2002 and 2003 respectively suggests that age and language are the principal factors that influence the construction of national identity, rather than period of immigration or minority ethnic identification.

According to the data, concerns over the attachment to Canada of newer Canadians are often misplaced as immigrants tend to rather rapidly develop bonds with their adopted country. There has been a tradition in Canada of studying identity through surveys or questionnaires that require respondents to choose between national and communal attachments, even though many individuals do not always see these as competing identities. In Quebec, however, given the debates over the sovereignty issue and the two referendums to which they have given rise, the identity issue has been framed as a choice between dueling – as opposed to intersecting – national identities. A previous essay explored the relationship between ethnic origins and national identity and revealed that persons of neither Canadian, British, nor French descent have rates of belonging to Canada that are as strong as those who are more rooted in the country. Groups of European and non-European origins alike demonstrate higher degrees of attachment to Canada than to the ethnic dimension of their identities, though the strength of community attachments is not to be underestimated. In short, contrary to widely held opinion, large-scale inquiries provide no evidence for a significant contradiction between attachment to minority ethnic cultures and national attachments.

Both in Canada and abroad, conclusions over identity choices are very often a function of the manner in which questions have been put to respondents. There is usually an assumption about the nature of identity that is built into an inquiry. For example, the questions asked in the Statistics Canada General Social Survey (hereafter referred to as the GSS) employ the term 'belonging to Canada' and emphasize that the respondent defines the word *belonging* as he or she deems fit. Similarly, questionnaires that use the word *integration* also leave the definition of that notion to the discretion of the respondent. By consequence, numerous studies of immigrant attachment to community may respond to the criteria often established by the author(s).

Attachments

Data from Statistics Canada's Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) confirm that with the exception of those arriving in Canada between 1991 and 2001 there is little difference in the degree of attachment

	Very Strong Sense of Attachment			Strong Sense of Attachment to Canada		
	Canada	Province	Local Community	Canada	Province	Local Community
1 st Generation-Born Outside of Canada	65	44	39	20	23	24
Arrived between 1991 and 2001	53	39	35	21	26	28
Arrived in Canada before 1991	70	47	41	26	22	23
2 nd Generation	65	34	32	20	22	24
3 rd Generation	65	34	28	19	25	25
4 th Generation	72	40	24	21	26	24

to Canada across the generations. According to the study, the immigrant generation tends to have stronger sense of attachment to province of residence than do persons belonging to other generations with the exception of the fourth generation with a significant proportion of rooted Quebecers with strong attachments to province. Still, the gap in attachment to Canada and provinces for those immigrants arriving in Canada between 1991 and 2001 is somewhat narrower than is the case for other cohorts.

The findings of the 2003 GSS confirm those of the Ethnic Diversity Survey as regards the sense of belonging to Canada on the part of immigrants (the EDS employed the term *attachment*). Clearly, the longer that an immigrant is established in Canada, the stronger the sense of attachment to the country. The same is true for attachment to province, though on a lesser scale, as demonstrated below. Underlying this strong sense of attachment to Canada amongst those immigrants having arrived before 1980 may be a sense of satisfaction with the immigrant experience in the country. This is an issue that merits further examination.

How would you describe your sense of belonging to your local community? Would you say it is very strong, somewhat strong, somewhat weak or very weak? What about your sense of belonging to your province? What about your sense of belonging to Canada?

Language Ties

When it comes to having a very strong sense of attachment to Canada, Quebec Anglophones are the language group with the highest sense of belonging, followed by the province's allophone population and francophones elsewhere in the country. The strength of feeling amongst Quebec Anglophones may be enhanced by the fact that their province has undergone important tests over its attachment to the country. When evaluated on the basis of very strong feeling, the strength of attachment to province is lowest amongst Quebec Anglophones, thus making for what is by far the widest gap in attachment between

Canada and province of any of the language groups identified below. It is also worth noting that Quebec allophones have a stronger sense of attachment to Canada than do allophones in the rest of the country.

For their part, when assessed on the basis of very strong sentiment, Quebec francophones have the lowest degree of attachment to Canada and indeed possess stronger identification with their province. And the gap (when softer attachment is included) with some 70% of Quebec Francophones reporting either very strong or somewhat strong sense of attachment to Canada, compared to nearly 85% indicating similar degrees of attachment to their province. These results are reasonably consistent with the findings of previous studies that generally put attachment to Quebec ahead of attachment to Canada and when a choice is forced between the two tend to offer results that are more favorable to Quebec. As to attachment to local communities, one notes that the depth of feeling is not as great, though it tends to be somewhat higher for minority francophones than it is for other language groups.

As for attachment to Canada on the basis of province of residence, it is unsurprisingly lowest in Quebec and highest in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. However, Quebec is not alone in possessing a higher proportion of respondents that have stronger attachment to province (36,8%) than to Canada (34,8%). Newfoundlanders exhibit a similar pattern, though their respective attachment to Canada (51,2%) and to their (52,8%) province is higher than is the case for Quebec.

Gender, education and income differences tend to be far less relevant when it comes to attachments to Canada, provinces and local communities. As mentioned earlier, however, differences in age are quite significant in determining such degrees of attachment. As observed below, on the basis of very strong sentiment there is a substantial gap in rates of attachment to Canada, province, and to a lesser extent local communities, for persons below the age of 30 versus those over the age of 65. On the basis of the data, it is fair to argue that national and regional identification strengthens over time. In examining the relatively lower

Language Spoken at Home	Very Strong Sense			Somewhat Strong Sense		
	Canada	Province	Local Community	Canada	Province	Local Community
Anglophones-ROC	57.1	31.5	18.5	31.0	45.2	49.3
Francophones-ROC	58.2	31.3	23.2	34.0	48.9	51.0
Allophones-ROC	49.8	27.1	18.0	36.6	48.7	48.5
Anglophones-Quebec	66.3	25.0	16.4	29.2	44.6	50.9
Francophones-Quebec	29.0	38.2	20.7	40.8	45.9	48.3
Allophones-Quebec	60.8	36.4	23.2	30.3	38.5	43.0

degree of attachment to Canada amongst the population below the age of 30 one needs to take into account that Quebecers in that age cohort lower the overall average considerably. When asked about their sense of belonging to Canada, some 24% of Quebec youth reported a very strong sense of belonging, well below the 41.4% nationally. It is fair to assume that the figure drops further for Quebec Francophones in that age category. As is the case elsewhere in Canada, the sense of belonging to the country increases with age, with nearly 30% of those between 30 and 49 having a very strong sense of belonging, 40% of Quebecers between the age of 50 and 64, and 58% of persons over the age of 65.

Quebec: Province or Nation?

Advocates of Canadian unity and Quebec sovereignty alike have often in the very same survey to support their respective visions. Statistics Canada's 2003 GSS is no exception, as advocates of sovereignty will no doubt point to the fact that Quebecers tend to have stronger attachment to their province than to Canada, while supporters of federalism will refer to the continued attachment to Canada of an important percentage of Quebecers. Such polling results provide insight into the strategies respectively employed by federalists and sovereignists in defending their option. Ironically, in each instance they are guided by the view that one can preserve both Canadian and Quebec expressions of their persona. Federalists contend that there is no contradiction between being a Quebecer and a Canadian, and sovereignists insist that you can endorse separation without entirely abandoning the attachment to Canada. Hence in the 1980 and 1995 referendums, an association or partnership with Canada was proposed, with the idea that certain common institutions be retained in the aftermath of an outcome favorable to Quebec sovereignty.

It has been nearly a decade since the last referendum and the debate over the recognition of Quebec within Canada has evolved away from the desire that the province be recognized as a distinct society. Instead, in recent years, opinion leaders have proclaimed that Quebec is a nation, and in 2004 the Quebec national assembly unanimously adopted a resolution to that effect. This came after the House of Commons rejected a resolution proposed by the Bloc Québécois that called for such recognition. In the case of the National Assembly's resolution, Quebec Premier Jean Charest was careful to point out that he believed Quebec was a nation within Canada, as opposed to the opposition Parti Québécois, which saw it as a nation separate from, or alongside, the Canadian nation. Underlying such distinctions is a debate over the definition of nationhood and/or the kind of nation that Quebec constitutes. Several opinion leaders suggest that Quebec is a sociological nation rather than a political nation, the latter status being

something that it would attain through majority support in a referendum on Quebec sovereignty.

To what extent has repeating the idea that Quebec is a nation resulted in its acceptance by the population both within the province and across Canada? In a July 2004 survey conducted by the firm Environics for the Association for Canadian Studies, some 1 in 5 Canadians agreed that Quebec is a nation. Some 8% contended that it was a nation alongside the Canadian nation, while 13% felt that it was a nation within the Canadian nation. Some 42% of Canadians view Quebec as one of ten equal provinces, while 34% see Quebec as a province that is a distinct society within Canada.

Not surprisingly there is an important difference of opinion between Quebecers and other Canadians over the degree to which they respectively regard Quebec as a nation. Outside of Quebec some 17% describe Quebec as a nation (5% alongside Canada and 12% within). Approximately half of those residing elsewhere in Canada see Quebec as one of ten equal provinces while just under one-third view it as a distinct society within Canada. For their part, one-third of Quebecers describe Quebec as a nation and are more or less evenly divided over the degree to which they believe that it is alongside (16%) or within the Canadian nation. Most Quebecers respond best to the view that it the province is a distinct society within Canada (42%). Finally, about one in five Quebecers regard Quebec as one of ten equal provinces. Perhaps the most significant difference of opinion over the idea that Quebec is a nation was from supporters of the Bloc Québécois, with some 40% in agreement (29% alongside the Canadian nation and 11% within). Still, most Bloc supporters (45%) feel that the province is a distinct society within Canada.

Conclusion

Do the diverging degrees of belonging or attachment to Canada imply that competing interests are perpetually at work in the ongoing construction of the nation(s)? Clearly there remain important competing visions over the future of the federation and there persists an important segment of the Quebec population with a weaker degree of attachment to Canada. When asked, however, whether the interests of Quebecers and other Canadians were compatible, some 52% of the population reported favorably to their compatibility. Interestingly, more Quebecers (59%) saw their interests as compatible with those of other Canadians (50%) than did other Canadians see such compatibility with Quebec. Perhaps greater clarity is needed when it comes to understanding the diversity of opinion and degree of ambiguity regarding national attachments as well as the behavioural manifestations to which these give rise. ■

Age	Very Strong Sense			Somewhat Strong Sense		
	Canada	Province	Local Community	Canada	Province	Local Community
Less than 30	41.4	24.1	15.1	38.9	47.8	49.0
30 to 49	48.6	28.5	16.8	36.2	47.9	49.8
50 to 64	57.6	38.4	21.3	29.7	43.8	49.2
65 or older	68.7	47.3	27.9	23.0	38.6	46.3

THE IMPORTANCE OF MUSEUMS TO NATIONAL IDENTITY

Brent D. Glass

Brent D. Glass is the Director of the National Museum of American History (Behring Center)

ABSTRACT

Museums are crucial to the formation of national identity. They allow us to experience first hand the physical reminders of our nation's story and to learn about the past in an engaging and inspiring way. In this article, Brent Glass of the Smithsonian Institute describes the mission of the National Museum of American History, and presents the various challenges it faces in trying to make history come alive through its many collections and programs.

In the month of September, America will observe two important anniversaries, one very recent and one dating back almost two centuries. The first of these anniversaries is, of course, the observance of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The other is the Battle of Baltimore on September 13-14, 1814. This battle, and the survival of Ft. McHenry, inspired Francis Scott Key to write the poem that would later become our national anthem.

The events of September 11 generated a period of intense introspection and discussion about the value and meaning of the American experience. For historians and for history museums, placing 9-11 in historical context has been a challenging task. One year after the attacks, the National Museum of American History (NMAH) opened an exhibition called *September 11: Bearing Witness to History* that provided visitors with a three dimensional documentary of how Americans experienced that tragic day. The following year, we began a national tour of the exhibition that has included stops at Ft. Worth, Texas; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Los Angeles. This weekend, the exhibit will open in Pittsburgh at the Heinz History Center.

Over one million visitors have seen the September 11 exhibit in Washington and at the other venues. At each location, visitors are given an opportunity to write comments on the impact of 9-11 on their lives. Invariably, they mention the importance of living each day and not taking for granted their families, friends, and communities. They also mention the value of living in a democracy and the importance of freedom, toleration, and peaceful dissent. Although the exhibition does not address these issues directly, it does create a context for thoughtful reflection on the central values of American life.

The National Anthem is of particular interest to the National Museum of American History because the museum is the home of the Star-Spangled Banner, the flag that inspired Key to write his poem. This flag, currently undergoing a major conservation effort, is a physical and symbolic touchstone that represents the history of the United States. It is the central iconic object in a vast and diverse collection that supports the mission of the NMAH to preserve and present American history to an equally diverse audience that numbers in the millions both on-site and on-line.

Memories of visits to the National Museum of American History invariably are memories of collections, especially the icons of American history – the flag; the lap desk of Thomas Jefferson on which he wrote the Declaration of Independence; the massive John Bull locomotive that evokes the wonder of technology; the chairs and table from Appomattox Court House where Grant and Lee signed the surrender that ended the Civil War; and the lunch counter from Greensboro, North Carolina that recalls the courageous struggles of the civil rights movement.

When the stories of these objects are woven together, they become the story of American identity – that complex and somewhat elusive concept that defines us as a nation. In the four decades since the National Museum of American History opened on the National Mall, we have shared this story with the public. For millions of people, a visit to the museum has been an engaging, educational, and memorable experience.

Since I became director in January 2003, I have proposed that to understand American history and American identity, we must understand the American Dream – the values, ideals, and traditions that are associated with freedom, opportunity, progress, justice, and security. The challenge for the NMAH

is to introduce visitors to the idea that the American Dream is not a finished product, but a work in progress. The museum must, on the one hand, affirm the American Dream as represented in such icons as the Star-Spangled Banner, and also present the ways in which Americans have overcome barriers of inequality and discrimination to achieve political freedom, social justice, and economic opportunity.

The cultural historian Jim Cullen has written a book, published in 2003, that traces the evolution of the American Dream, including the Puritan's "City on a Hill"; the founding documents of the American Revolution; the rise of the common man – Jackson and Lincoln – in the 19th century; the Statue of Liberty and the role of immigration; Levittown and the rise of home ownership; Hollywood and the California dream; the dream of Martin Luther King at the Lincoln Memorial. Cullen cautions that while embracing this hopeful concept, we should not allow it to obscure issues that challenge our society. He suggests that we focus on the Dream as a "rigorous standard that we can use to ask a series of searching questions."

The complex idea of the American Dream – filled with hope and with imperfection – offers some guiding principles for the National Museum of American History as we enter the 21st century. It can lead us as a museum to pose searching questions and to encourage visitors to do the same. This introspective journey is critical because I am convinced that there is a connection between the knowledge and understanding of history, and the preservation of democratic institutions.

Museums have a unique opportunity to make these connections because of the credibility that they enjoy with the general public. Historians Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen reported in *The Presence of the Past* (1998) that museums are places where people feel connected to the past. People trust museums as sources of information about history – even more than they rely on the firsthand stories told by close relatives or television or textbooks. A survey conducted for the American Association of Museums in 2001 confirmed that nearly 9 in 10 Americans trust museums most among information sources – with books a distant second.

At the National Museum of American History we are building on that public confidence by paying greater attention to our visitors and their experiences in the museum. We are interested in how people learn about history, how they develop visual literacy, and how they learn in a museum setting. We need to remember that a museum exhibition is primarily a visual experience. We must avoid the "book on the wall" syndrome. We must also remember that a museum visit is usually a social experience. We must promote learning about history among different groups – intergenerational learning among adults and children who visit the museum together; classroom learning using museum resources; lifelong learning that continues long after the museum visit and inspires the visitor to return.

A visit to the National Museum of American History can also stimulate dialogue about challenging issues. Since the end of the cold war and the rise of the war on terror, the debate about the meaning and value of American history has become contested ground. We must do this in a comprehensive, balanced, and intellectually engaging way. We also need to pay attention to the needs of contemporary museum audiences to experience history and to identify with people – famous and anonymous – who have shaped

our nation's heritage.

For the first time in its forty-year history, the NMAH is implementing an ambitious plan for a new, comprehensive narrative of American history that will inspire, teach, and challenge our visitors. Over the next five years, a reinvigorated museum will emerge, with innovative exhibitions and programs that provide a context for our collections and for the complex stories they tell about American identity.

The museum is fortunate to be building on significant strengths. We are America's only national history museum, and we are the largest history museum in the country. We attract as many as 3 million visitors each year, 10 percent of them from other countries. Our popular Web site draws more than 7 million visits a year. We have a collection that is unparalleled in size and diversity, covering American political, military, cultural, and social history. Our outstanding staff of curators, educators, and exhibition specialists brings these objects to life through exhibitions and programs.

As the museum's narrative of American history is unveiled, the memorable objects in our collections will be presented in a new context that incorporates historic events, significant ideas, and everyday lives. We have identified four major themes of national history including: 1) the story of political freedom; 2) the development of a national economy; 3) the impact of military conflicts; and 4) the heritage of diverse cultural traditions. Some of the exhibitions that support these themes include:

- *America on the Move*, a permanent exhibition about the social history of transportation, that opened in November 2003
- *Separate Is Not Equal*, an exhibition honoring the 50th anniversary of Brown vs. Board of Education, that opened in May, 2004 for one year
- *The Price of Freedom: Americans at War* a permanent exhibition on military history from the French and Indian Wars to September 11, 2001, and its aftermath, opening in November 2004
- *The Dawn's Early Light*, which will return the Star-Spangled Banner to public view as the centerpiece of the museum in June 2007
- *America's Stories*, an introductory overview of the people and events of American history, now in the planning stage.

We are also redesigning our museum web site to emphasize greater access to collections, time lines, and research. We are developing new exhibits on economic history and cultural history (entertainment, sports, and popular culture) and we are updating older exhibitions such as the Hall of Maritime History; The American Presidency; First Ladies; A More Perfect Union (about the WWII internment of Japanese Americans); the Gunboat *Philadelphia*; and Information Age.

Museums play a critical role in the formation of national identity. We can enhance that role through collaborations with colleges, universities, archives, libraries and historic sites, and also with the performing arts. The public continues to be engaged in encounters with the past, especially those that maintain authenticity and integrity. Sustaining those qualities within the context of a master narrative that both affirms and raises questions about the meaning of history remains the great challenges for the future. ■

RECOGNITION AND RIGHTS: SHIFTING VISIONS OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE

Joe W. Trotter

Joe W. Trotter is Mellon Professor of History and Chairman of the Department of History at Carnegie Mellon University.

ABSTRACT

Drawing upon research for two recent essays on late 20th century African American life,¹ this article explores the changing socioeconomic and political context of the black freedom struggle and the emergence of new African American perspectives on rights and recognition by the turn of the 21st century. With the help of numerous concrete examples, the author addresses the effects of deindustrialization and globalization as well as the revival of conservatism in the United States.

The struggle for human recognition and rights has been a recurring theme in African American history, but African American definitions of this struggle have changed tremendously over time. The first generation of Africans shared an unequal status with European indentured servants and Native Americans. They joined their counterparts in multi-racial resistance movements against the unjust authority of colonial elites. Unlike their white and Native American counterparts, however, the African American vision of freedom emphasized escape and return to a West African homeland, rather than the attainment of rights and privileges within the context of an emerging slave society.

Under the impact of the American Revolution, African Americans reoriented their vision of freedom from Africa to a primary focus on American soil. The abolitionist movement (i.e., the struggle to regain ownership of their own bodies and labor power) animated the African American fight for freedom through the late antebellum years. During and after the Civil War, however, the quest for landownership took center stage. Newly emancipated African Americans repeatedly equated landlessness with enslavement; they envisioned landownership as the indispensable foundation upon which they would build their freedom and gain an equal footing in the democratic republic.

After years of frustration in their search for land, African Americans shifted their attention from landownership to wage labor in the expanding urban-industrial economy of the early 20th century. In their view, the Great Migration represented a second emancipation – this time from the exploitative southern sharecropping system and the rigors of life under Jim Crow. Indeed, the Great Migration established the demographic and economic foundation for the emergence of the modern Civil Rights and Black Power movements, which resulted in the emergence of a second reconstruction and a greater measure of economic and political democracy for blacks since the early years of the first reconstruction.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a variety of new social forces undercut the gains of the second emancipation and precipitated a search for new modes of social struggle, recognition, and rights among African Americans. Deindustrialization and globalization stimulated the increasing movement of jobs from inner city locations to the suburbs, the Sunbelt, South America, and other parts of the world. The U.S. lost nearly 10 million jobs through movement of production overseas, plant closings, and the adoption of new laborsaving technologies during the 1980s. The percentage of the U.S. labor force working in manufacturing jobs declined from nearly 33% during the 1960s to 20% in 1980; 10-14% in 1990; and to an estimated 5% by the turn of the century.²

Although some African Americans gained access to jobs in the new information producing and service economy, such jobs were insufficient to offset their loss of manufacturing employment. Consequently, black urban communities faced disproportionately high rates of joblessness, poverty, homelessness, single-parent households, violent crime, drug addiction, and deteriorating health and living conditions.³ The number of blacks moving from the inner cities to suburbs nearly doubled

during the 1980s (rising from about 10 to 23% of all black urbanites), but this population shift failed to reverse the historic pattern of black-white segregation in the urban housing market. At the same time, the end of the great southern migration to northern and western cities and the gradual movement of African American back South did little to alleviate suffering in the frost belt.⁴

At the local level, deindustrialization took a huge toll on the lives of black women and young men across urban America. Take the city of Milwaukee, for example. The percentage of black female-headed families increased to 50% in 1980 compared to about 16% for whites and 27% for Hispanics. In a particular neighborhood, Halyard Park, the percentage of households headed by women rose from under 30% in 1960 to over 60% in 1985. At the same time, rising levels of black on black crime (primarily among young men) increased social pressures, pain, and conflict within the black community. In June 1991, *Newsweek* carried a story listing Milwaukee “first among America’s new murder capitals – among cities with populations under one million.” The homicide rate, involving mostly young black men, had increased by 126% between 1985 and 1990.⁵

During the 1980s, when street-level cocaine dealers transformed the more expensive white powder cocaine into cheap “crack cocaine,” competition for the large urban market touched off violent turf wars among drug dealers in Milwaukee and other major metropolitan areas of the country. Within a six-year period (1984-1990) drug-related conflicts resulted in a 253% increase in Milwaukee’s homicide rate. Stiff drug sentences for the possession and distribution of illicit drugs also underlay a rising incarceration rate for young black men. In the entire state of Wisconsin, blacks made up only 4% of the total population, but made up over 40% of the prison population by the early 1990s. As drugs and violence changed the life chances of young black men on the streets of Milwaukee, they also undercut their access to education. In 1989-90, black males made up only 27.6% of all students in the Milwaukee public schools but they made up 50% of all suspended students. In the school system as a whole, between 1978 and 1985, Milwaukee ranked third in the nation in the ratio of black to white student suspensions; nearly 95% of all students expelled from the Milwaukee Public Schools were African Americans.⁶

Rising numbers of immigrants – primarily Asian, Latino/Latina, and Caribbean – settled in neighborhoods within or adjacent to predominantly black areas and fueled the emergence of new patterns of ethnic and racial conflict, particularly between blacks and Korean merchants.⁷ In 1992, when a jury of ten whites, one Asian American, and one Latino American acquitted all of the police officers of wrongdoing in the Rodney King police brutality case, violence erupted. Unlike the outbreak of urban violence in the past, however, the L.A. conflict was in effect a “multi-cultural” revolt. African Americans and large numbers of Latino residents poured into the streets of South Central Los Angeles, looting and burning buildings as well as attacking white passengers of automobiles trapped in the riot zone. Some observers suggested that 60% of the participants were Latino; 25% black; and 13% white. Moreover, both Latino and African American participants targeted community-based Korean grocers for destruction.⁸ Still, despite the emergence

of multiple lines of ethnic and racial conflict and cooperation, the black-white divide continued to define race and ethnic relations by the early 21st century.

The resurgence of the Republican Party in national, state, and local politics reinforced the deleterious impact of deindustrialization and global social change on the black community. Calling themselves “new conservatives,” Republicans launched a concerted campaign to dismantle the social welfare and affirmative action gains of the modern civil rights movement; they proposed to “get tough” on crime and return the country to an earlier presumed era of “hard work,” “personal responsibility,” and “family values.” Both Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, Sr. helped to popularize the notion of “welfare queen” as an undeserving black woman receiving state aid.¹⁰ Although federal courts, states, and municipalities sanctioned affirmative action programs through the 1980s, Republican presidential regimes used executive authority to reduce the enforcement powers of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), and the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC).¹¹

The “get tough” criminal justice policies of Republicans and Democrats exacerbated the problems of violence, drug use, and incarceration for the black community. In 1988, the Reagan administration enacted the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which required a mandatory sentence for anyone possessing five grams of crack-cocaine. Compared to the possession of five grams of crack-cocaine, the law allowed users of the more expensive powder cocaine to escape any minimum sentence for possession of five grams and often permitted offenders to go free on probation when caught and convicted. Moreover, the law required the possession of 500 grams of cocaine powder before a sentence of five years incarceration could be imposed.¹² The U.S. Sentencing Commission showed that expensive cocaine powder users exceeded crack cocaine users, but the latter accounted for the bulk of arrests, convictions, and incarceration. In 1992, African Americans, mainly young men, accounted for over 90% of all federal crack cocaine offenders. Critics of the new approach to criminal justice increasingly complained that the new trend emphasized “warehousing and punishment” rather than “rehabilitation.”¹³

By the early 1990s, popular white support for affirmative action and social welfare programs nearly disappeared. Not surprisingly, then, in their 1992 presidential bid, William Jefferson Clinton and his running mate Al Gore pledged to avoid racial “quotas”; “get tough” on crime; and “end welfare as we know it.”¹⁴ Following his election, Clinton proposed to congress his “Work and Responsibility Act of 1994.” Although some Democratic supporters criticized the plan as too severe on poor recipients, congressional Republicans killed the measure and substituted their own even harsher, “Personal Responsibility Act of 1995.”¹⁵ Nonetheless, Clinton signed the Republican measure into law in August 1996 and brought a principal component of the Democratic New Deal social welfare state to an end.

Under the impact of deindustrialization and the resurgence of conservatism in American politics, the African American community fragmented along class, gender, and political lines and influenced efforts to redefine the black freedom struggle for the emerging postindustrial era. Most

blacks supported the ongoing civil rights activities of the NAACP, National Urban League, and Rev. Jesse Jackson's People United to Serve Humanity (PUSH). In the presidential elections of 1984 and 1988, Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition underscored the efforts of African Americans to forge multi-racial alliances and resist assaults on the civil rights agenda.¹⁶ Nonetheless, by the late 20th century, established civil rights organizations proved insufficient to meet the needs of the expanding numbers of poor and working class blacks.

In cities across the country, poor and working class blacks, particularly women, took the lead in forming their own grassroots political organizations to preserve social welfare benefits, improve education, and protect their children from drugs and street violence. These organizations included the Coalition for Basic Human Need in Boston; Empower in Rochester; Women for Economic Security in Chicago; the Women's Economic Agenda in Oakland; and SOSAD (Save Our Sons and Daughters) in Detroit.¹⁷ In the city of Milwaukee, as conditions deteriorated for poor and working class blacks, Councilman Michael McGhee spearheaded the formation of the Black Panther Militia and demanded new job and social service programs for the city's black population. If such programs were not forthcoming by a target date, McGhee threatened to launch a campaign of urban guerilla warfare against the city's downtown establishment.¹⁸ Moreover, increasing numbers of black activists and their white allies challenged what they called "environmental racism." In Louisiana, for example, they formed Citizens Against Nuclear Trash (CANT) and prevented the Louisiana Energy Services from building the nation's first privately owned uranium plant in a predominantly poor and black area of Claiborne County.¹⁹

In the wake of the modern civil rights and Black Power movements, public schools in the nation's largest metropolises became institutions for predominantly black, Latino, Asian, and poor residents of inner cities. The percentage of whites in central city schools in 19 of the largest urban areas dropped from 44% in 1971 to 22% in 1986.²⁰ Milwaukee offers an illustration of how this process played out in one city. On the one hand, some African Americans (particularly middle class blacks) and their white allies escalated demands for integration at virtually any cost. After leading and losing a vigorous movement to preserve one inner city school in a mixed-race but middle class neighborhood (Washington High School), integrationist leaders advanced proposals for metropolitan-wide integration during the 1980s. As one local leader put it, "I don't care how we accomplish [integration]... as long as we receive the same type of education the whites receive."²¹ On the other hand, growing numbers of black Milwaukeeans questioned the utility of what they called "one-way integration" and reaffirmed black nationalist ideology and self-help ideas. When the city proposed to close one popular but predominantly poor and working class black high school (North Division), the community mobilized its resources and forced the school to remain open to black children within the neighborhood.²²

As conservatism gained ascendancy in Wisconsin state and local politics, some black Democrats sought to turn Republican support of private schools vouchers to the benefit of African Americans. Milwaukee's Democratic congresswoman Polly Williams, for example, supported the school voucher program for use of public money to fund private

education for black residents. Similarly, Howard Fuller, the black nationalist leader of the movement to save North Division High School, entered the state's Democratic party administration and supported Polly Williams's campaign for private school vouchers. Fuller also became superintendent of the Milwaukee public schools in 1991 and approved the opening of two African American immersion schools, designed to teach African American children from a pedagogical foundation rooted in African American history and culture. Under principal Josephine Mosley, Victor Berger Elementary School became the first of Milwaukee's African American immersion schools. It opened with an equal number of males and females and a faculty that was two-thirds white and one-third black. Still, despite his success in responding to community-based demands for black education, Fuller resigned from the superintendent's post four years later, citing the white school board majority and the predominantly white Milwaukee Teachers Association as major obstacles to school reform in the interest of the city's poorest communities.²³

By the early 1990s, in Milwaukee and elsewhere the struggle for rights and recognition also reflected a quest for gender unity and new definitions of manhood and womanhood, as reflected in their active participation in the Million Man March (1996), the Million Woman March (1997), and revival of the reparations movement.²⁴ Coordinated by the Nation of Islam, the Million Man March galvanized African American men across class, status, and regional lines and brought them to the nation's capitol for a symbolic moment of unity, and pledges to take personal and collective responsibility for the future of the black community. In addition to well-known figures like Howard Fuller, Michael McGhee, and Jerrel Jones, the owner of Milwaukee's black radio station WNOV, hundreds of Milwaukee sons, fathers, and grandfathers attended the march. The Million Man March also inspired black women. One Milwaukee woman declared that, "despite the tough times, I am very hopeful. The Million Man March was a wonderful, powerful statement, all those black men saying, 'We're fine, and we're going to survive, and we've got some work to do'... I'm not giving up on my future."²⁵

Despite pride in the solidarity of black men, a year later Milwaukee's black women participated in the Million Woman March. In Philadelphia, black women "put aside religious and political differences to join together as one."²⁶ They endorsed the notion that women would play a central rather than peripheral or supportive role in rebuilding the black community in the wake of global economic change. Karen Murphy-Smith traveled from Milwaukee to Philadelphia with other local women. In an interview with reporters for *The Militant*, Murphy-Smith emphasized the black woman's resistance to welfare reform as a new form of racial inequality that disproportionately affected black women. In her view, the civil rights movement addressed racial and to some extent class inequality, but now "we have to fight again, against a new form of enslavement they call welfare reform."²⁷

By the turn of the 21st century, the African American fight for social justice not only entailed a quest for new definitions of gender roles; it also involved an ongoing search for race and class solidarity. Embedded in both the Million Man and Million Woman marches were efforts to reframe notions of race and class solidarity,²⁸ but these dimensions of the African

American agenda gained increasing expression in the reparations movement. An earlier reparations movement had declined with the violent reaction against black nationalist and radical ideas during the 1970s and early 1980s. By the early 1990s, however, African Americans had formed a new organization, the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA). The organization filed lawsuits on behalf of the descendants of enslaved African people and launched a vigorous campaign for a federal reparations commission to study the issue.²⁹

Designed to compensate African American people for the historic exploitation of their labor, the reparations movement promised to bridge the gender and to some extent the class divide in late 20th century black politics by underscoring the racial injustices of enslavement and the reign of Jim Crow during most of the industrial era. In his popular book, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*, Randall Robinson clearly articulated the emerging case for reparations. "The appeal here," he says, "is not for affirmative action but, rather, for just compensation as an entitlement for the many years of heinous U.S. government-embraced wrongs and the stolen labor of our forebears [first during enslavement and later during the era of Jim Crow]."³⁰ As the new century got underway, Alderman Fred Gordon introduced a reparations measure into the Milwaukee common council, arguing that the city's own "history certainly is replete with the vestiges of slavery."³¹

Before the new reparations movement could gain full momentum, the context of the African American freedom struggle changed again with the events of 9-11 and the emergence of the war against terrorism. The outcome of the African American struggle for recognition and rights in the 21st century is yet to be determined, but the socio-economic and political changes of the late 20th century suggests that black people will continue to build upon their history of struggle and forge new and more effective strategies for social change in the years ahead. ■

NOTES

To view Dr. Trotter's full notes, please visit the ACS website at www.acs-aec.com.

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- 8 Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, ed., *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999) for the notion of "segmented assimilation," suggesting that some of the new immigrants integrated into African American communities and culture, see the essay by Min Zhou. See also Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., *Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Edward T. Chang and Russell C. Leong, ed., *Los Angeles - Struggles Toward a Multiethnic Community: Asian American, and Latino Perspectives* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993).
- 9 Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 182-86, 210, 307.
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- 11 Hugh Davis Graham, "Race, History, and Policy: African Americans and Civil Rights Since 1964," in Graham, ed., *Civil Rights in the United States* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 24-39; Genna Rae McNeil, "Mary Frances Berry (1938-)," in Darlene Clark Hine, Elsa Barkley Brown, and Rosalyn Terborg Penn, ed., *Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 110-113. See also J. Harvie Wilkerson III, *From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954-1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Donald G. Nieman, *Promises to Keep: African Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 189-227.
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RETHINKING THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE AND NATION-BUILDING: HYPOTHESES FROM 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY CANADA

Chad Gaffield

Chad Gaffield holds a University Research Chair as Professor of History at the University of Ottawa where he served as founding Director of the Institute of Canadian Studies from 1997 to 2003. The Royal Society of Canada has just awarded him the J.B. Tyrrell Medal for his achievements in advancing the study of Canada.

ABSTRACT

Preliminary results of a major research project focussed on census enumerations suggest the need to rethink the ways in which scholars have analysed questions of language and identity in the making of modern Canada. These results point to a profound transformation in attitudes, assumptions and experience that was related to a changing international context.

The point of departure for this paper is what may be considered a surprising question: how did language of expression become a key dynamic in the construction of identity in Canada? This question appears surprising since the topic of language is often assumed to have always been at the heart of the Canadian distinctiveness. Has not a central drama of Canadian history involved the complex ways in which Francophones and Anglophones have perceived each other and interacted at least since the 18th century?

While considerable evidence can, indeed, be presented to emphasize the importance of language throughout the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions of Canadian history, it remains puzzling that only in the later 20th century did formal legislation define language as a cornerstone of identity in Canada. In the British North America Act, for example, very little is said about language of expression; in fact, more is said about religion. It was one hundred years later that political debate focused on language as a key component, most notably in the federal Official Languages Act of 1969.

The need to explain the changing role of language in the construction of identity in Canada first came to my attention during research on the language-of-instruction controversy in late 19th century Ontario when legislative changes moved toward an English-only policy.¹ At that time, I focused on the question of language as a way to explore how an understanding of the lives of “ordinary” individuals and families could enhance our analyses of the so-called major events of history. First conceptualised in the era of the “new social history” during the 1970s, this study used the language controversy as an illustration of what was generally considered the central theme of Canadian history, the relations between British-origin and French-origin populations. Was it sufficient to study these relations by examining the thoughts and behaviour of political, religious, economic and social leaders? Or could the new social history’s attention to the “anonymous” contribute better interpretations of key features of Canadian history?

The language-of-instruction controversy in Ontario had already been thoroughly examined at the level of provincial and federal politics, as well as Catholic Church leadership. Previous studies had shown that, beginning in 1883, the Ontario government increasingly gave in to Opposition demands that French be eliminated as a language of instruction in the Ontario school system. The increasing elimination of French-language instruction after the mid-1880s occurred despite the fact that it had been accepted for decades in keeping with the arrival of French-language settlers, especially in the province’s easternmost counties such as Prescott and Russell. My research probed the extent to which the perspectives and actions of famous leaders were interrelated with those of the historically anonymous,

the largely rural individuals and families whose children were at the heart of the controversy but who did not appear in any previous study.

My research results revealed that, at least in this case, the histories of the famous and the anonymous were closely intertwined, but in quite unexpected ways. The language of instruction controversy in Ontario certainly involved elite ambitions and actions but, more importantly, also reflected complex social, cultural, economic, demographic, and political changes that resonated across rural townships and villages as well as urban centres. In the context of these changes, the question of language became a question of personal and collective identity in unprecedented ways, both officially and unofficially. The result was that schools became a battleground for parents, teachers, trustees, school inspectors, and parish priests as well as politicians and bishops. More language controversies followed the Ontario experience of 1880s including those in Manitoba and New Brunswick. While the details of these various controversies reflected the differences of their settings, their general trajectory was similar; English increasingly became the *de facto* official language in Canada outside Quebec in the decades after Confederation.

In researching the Ontario experience, I noticed but did not fully appreciate what I now think is a fundamental feature of the changing relationship between language and identity in Canada. Specifically, I am now convinced that, in order to understand attitudes, events, and policies in Canada, we need to situate them in a rapidly changing international context involving both scientific debate and government action, especially in Great Britain, the United States, and other European countries. This international context attracted my attention as a member of the Canadian Families Project that created an individual-level database of the 1901 Canadian census as way to probe key features of the making of modern Canada. For my contribution to this effort, I began examining the three language questions that were included for the first time in this enumeration: “Can speak French”; “Can speak English”; “Mother tongue (if still spoken).”

My initial research focused on trying to understand why no language questions were included in previous census enumerations and why they were introduced in 1901. Their absence seemed truly puzzling in light of how important the census had become over the course of Canadian history. Building on a tradition of enumeration begun in the mid-17th century, the census became a regular feature of colonial governments with an increasing number of questions touching diverse aspects of everyday life during the earlier nineteenth century. Its formal role in deciding population distributions for electoral purposes was confirmed in the British North America Act that extended the practice of conducting an enumeration

every ten years. By the later 19th century, hundreds of questions were asked in each enumeration including those dealing with each individual’s birthplace, religion, marital status, and occupation. Among all the questions, none dealt with language.

As I was attempting to understand the absence of language questions on the Canadian census as well as their introduction in 1901, I became equally puzzled by the fact that the only studies of actual language patterns before the later 20th century were the largely-forgotten efforts undertaken years ago by analysts at the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Despite the availability of published reports after each enumeration as well as some special in-depth tabulations, my bibliographic search in 1998 did not reveal a single research article dealing with the language questions posed in censuses between 1901 and 1951. The importance of language in Canadian history before the mid-20th century seems to be simply taken for granted by historians. Indeed, the standard histories of Canada do not offer more than a mention of the language-of-instruction controversies and few even remark on the only well-known features of Canada’s language history before Confederation, that of the British acceptance of the use of French in 1774 and the short-lived imposition of English in the creation of the Province of Canada. Despite the absence of research, these histories of Canada have been characteristically written in terms of two linguistic communities (variously labelled depending on the period of their writing) until recent decades when more scholarly attention began to be paid to aboriginal peoples and minority-language groups.

My research effort is now part of the Canadian Century Research Infrastructure project that is building on the Canadian Families Project by constructing databases of census enumerations for the 1911-1951 years as well as of related documentary and newspapers sources. Our goal is to enable interpretations of the making of modern Canada in terms of the changing patterns of social, demographic, cultural, economic and political thought and behaviour across the country and in an international context thanks to our partnership with others, especially colleagues at the Minnesota Population Center and fellow members of the North Atlantic Population Project.² While research on the language questions is still at an early stage, the results thus far suggest a series of hypotheses that not only appear to help explain the introduction of language questions into the 1901 census but also other key features of the international context of nation-building in Canada.

My current hypotheses have emerged from initial efforts to build a made-in-Canada explanation for the history of the language questions on the Canadian census. In 1901, the three questions were positioned on the enumeration form next to the well-established questions on school attendance under the heading “Education and Language”. In keeping with this positioning, the census

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officials explained that the focus of the questions was on the learning of languages. Two groups were particularly targeted, those immigrants who were “foreign elements” and those residents of Canada who were “citizens of French origin.” Census officials explained that, “In a country peopled with so many foreign elements as Canada, it is desirable to know if they are being absorbed and unified, as may appear by their acquirement of one or the other of the official languages. And as English is now in a very large degree the language of commerce throughout the world, it is also desirable to ascertain to what extent citizens of French origin are able to speak it in addition to their own.”

For its part, the mother tongue question was designed to help identify the “race” to which individuals belonged. By examining the emerging field of linguistics during the late 19th century, I discovered that the expression “mother tongue” was not used at this time in the sense of the first language learned by an individual, but rather in a more collective sense. The census officials defined mother tongue as “one’s native language, the language of his race; but not necessarily the language in which he thinks, or which he speaks most fluently, or uses chiefly in conversation. Whatever it may be, whether English, French, Gaelic, Irish, German, Swedish, Russian or any other, it should be entered by name in column 33 if the person speaks the language, but not otherwise.” The specification that if an individual did not speak “the language of his race,” it should not be listed as his or her “mother tongue” emphasized the focus of the language questions on “absorption” and “unity” especially as indicated by the learning of English, which was not only an official language but also the “language of commerce.”

In this way, the 1901 census reflected the changing role that language was seen to be playing in nation-building. The census officials described the ability to speak a particular language as a good indicator of processes of cultural integration as well as of the potential for economic participation. In the case of Canada, the ability to speak French or English was connected to their roles as official languages, while the ability to speak English was linked to its perceived international role in commerce.

At the same time, however, the census evidence both from 1901 and later enumerations makes clear that the introduction and continued inclusion of language questions in the Canadian census occurred in a complex and changing international context. After the mid-19th century and increasingly during the 20th century, language questions slowly became a common feature of census enumerations around the world. In 1851, the census in Ireland first asked about the ability of residents to speak Irish and English. Similar questions about Gaelic followed in the 1881 census in Scotland. Language questions were introduced in the United States in the 1890 census that asked for the first time about the ability to speak English. Documentary and newspaper evidence suggests that

politicians, census officials and journalists in Canada were well aware of developments elsewhere, and both the rationales and formulations of the language questions on the Canadian census were clearly related to the changing international discussions about the meaning of language. In this sense, the history of language in Canada requires more than a made-in-Canada explanation.⁴

Taken together, the research results thus far suggest that at the heart of the Canadian experience is a fundamental transformation in the presuppositions about language and thus in the focus of debate about questions of identity and policy. In stylized terms, this transformation now appears to have included eight interrelated changes in

official and unofficial perspectives about language between the later nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.

1) As a characteristic of individual and collective identity, the question of language moved from being a moderately important issue in Canada at Confederation to one of unparalleled preeminence in public debate by the time of the Centennial celebrations. Until well into the 20th century, identity was not primarily defined politically, socially or culturally in terms of which language was used; rather, language was generally seen as epiphenomenal, that is arising out of other attributes. By the mid-20th century,

however, mother tongue had come to be seen (especially in government circles and statistical agencies but elsewhere as well) as the key characteristic by which individual and therefore group identity could be determined. In this way, Canada came to be seen as composed of linguistic communities defined in the new vocabulary of Anglophones, Francophones and Allophones. No one had thought about Canadian society in this way in 1867.

- 2) Along with the increasing importance attributed to language was a revised rationale for its importance. Throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries, the rationale used in public debate focussed on two concerns: national unity and economic progress. However, the relative importance of these two concerns shifted significantly over the years. In the decades after Confederation, both concerns were emphasized to a roughly similar extent by politicians and journalists. By the mid-20th century, however, the relationship of language to economic progress was subsumed within a much greater preoccupation with its role in determining national unity.
- 3) In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, government officials and other leaders portrayed language as a way of measuring the progress of assimilation into a desired homogenous society. By the mid-20th century, in contrast, language had begun to be seen as the key index of movement toward a bilingual and multicultural Canada.
- 4) The central concern of the later 19th and earlier 20th centuries was on the extent to which English was being used across Canadian society whether or not

In this way, Canada came to be seen as composed of linguistic communities defined in the new vocabulary of Anglophones, Francophones and Allophones.

- other languages (including French) were also spoken or understood. During this period, “progress” was seen in terms of the proportion of Canadians able to speak English. In later decades, however, the most important political question involved use of the French language. In this context, “progress” was defined in terms of the proportion of officially bilingual, English-mother-tongue residents and the continued viability of French-language communities both within and outside Quebec.
- 5) In the initial debates in late 19th century Canada, the language question was seen to be relevant to specific groups within Canada (particularly those who could not use English such as settlers who had moved from Quebec to easternmost Ontario). In contrast, the debates of the mid-20th century assumed that language was a key concern for all residents in Canada (whether or not they could use English). In this sense, the question of language became a Canada-wide policy issue with implications for individuals and groups in all provinces and territories.
 - 6) One constant feature of the language debate since Confederation has been a concern with immigrants. However, the nature of this concern has changed dramatically. Throughout the later 19th and earlier 20th centuries, the key question in this debate was the extent to which immigrants were learning English. Subsequently, the focus shifted almost completely to a concern about the learning of French by immigrants to Canada.
 - 7) For those born in Canada, the question of language in the decades after Confederation characteristically focused on the learning of English by those who spoke French. In contrast, this question came to be posed by the mid-20th century almost exclusively in terms of the learning of French by those who spoke English or of the continued use of French by those seen as having French as a mother tongue.
 - 8) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the question of language came to be posed in a new paradigm of multiple identities during the closing decades of the 20th century. Earlier, this question had been addressed in a context within which individuals and groups were defined in terms of singular identities, mutually exclusive categories that assumed that each person had one and only one identity. The language questions were added in the 1901 census as a way to specify “origin” more clearly. In recent decades, these questions have become seen as part of a constellation of markers that do not simplify individual identity but rather indicate the extent of its multiplicity. Accordingly, an insistence on one and only one response for each census question has been replaced in recent enumerations by an acceptance of multiple answers.

Taken together, these hypotheses make more understandable the brief mention of language in the BNA Act and the absence of language questions in the census before 1901 as well as the royal commissions, legislative changes, and new policies on language that characterize the second

half of the 20th century. In the same way, the trajectory and timing of the apparent transformation in the ways in which language was viewed in Canada corresponds well with recent developments outside Canada including, for example, the passing of the Welsh Language Act in 1967 and Ireland’s first Official Languages Act in 2003. At the same time, it is clear that much more research is needed to understand the meaning of language during the course of Canadian history. In order to understand the transformation of attitudes and assumptions, we need to situate this transformation in the context of changing language use among both the “famous” and “anonymous.” For 20th century Canada, the language questions and responses in census enumerations offer one way of probing the complex and changing character of the interrelationships of language policy and practice.⁵ Based on the current hypotheses, it seems unlikely that future national histories will continue to examine Canada’s past in the static and mutually-exclusive terms of Anglophones, Francophones and Allophones.

Who are you? Who am I? Who are we? The current hypotheses about 19th and 20th century Canada suggest that how we address these questions will continue to include considerations of language but in ways that reflect an unprecedented appreciation of individual complexity and diversity. The developing paradigm of multiple identities suggests that definitions of identity based primarily on a single language will only have limited use as we move forward in the 21st century. While debate about identity in recent decades has tended to focus on Canada’s collective complexity and diversity, it is the increasing recognition of individual multiple identities that may increasingly affect the meaning of geo-political boundaries. ■

NOTES

- 1 Chad Gaffield, *Language, Schooling and Cultural Conflict: The Origins of the French-language controversy in Ontario*, Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987.
- 2 For further information about these projects, consult www.canada.uottawa.ca/ccri.
- 3 Chad Gaffield, “Linearity, Nonlinearity, and the Competing Constructions of Social Hierarchy in Early Twentieth-Century Canada: The Question of Language in 1901,” *Historical Methods* Fall 2000, vol. 33, No. 4: 255-260.
- 4 T. Ricento and B. Burnaby, eds., *Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998.
- 5 For comparative perspectives, see David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, eds., *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.

CANADIAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Desmond Morton

Desmond Morton is Hiram Mills Professor of History at McGill University, professor emeritus of history at the University of Toronto, a former director of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, honorary colonel of 8 Wing, Canadian Air Force, and author of 36 books, including *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo* (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1999, 4th ed.) and *Understanding Canadian Defence* (Toronto: Penguin, 2003).

ABSTRACT

Most of Canada's active military history occurred during the first half of the 20th century. In South Africa, South Korea and in the two World Wars, Canadians enlisted out of colonial and allied loyalty and found themselves developing a national identity. Canada's wars of independence were waged in alliance with its imperial power, but they turned out to be processes of national maturation.

Canadians in the 21st century profess to live in a "peaceable kingdom." My mentor as a military historian, the late George Stanley, qualified us as "an unmilitary people." Briefing an American ambassador in the spring before 9/11 involved a colleague, Joel Sokolsky, in explaining that Canada's military problem was that it has had no military problem.

Fifty years earlier, it was a little different. Two world wars had shaped the national sensibility of three successive generations of Canadians. The First World War undermined widespread sympathy, at least among elites, for any form of British imperial federation. Going to war as a proud imperial duty left Canada bitterly divided between French and English, close to bankruptcy and with one young man in ten dead or maimed. Being a small North American power no longer seemed so shameful. Still, in 1939, the constituency for isolation faded fast, but in 1940 and our peace-loving prime minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, went to war out of powerful and instinctive Anglo-Saxon solidarity. However, his government was committed to a limited-liability war and, on those grounds, won a one-sided electoral majority in 1940, just before the Blitzkrieg burst on Western Europe. Save in that desperate summer of 1940, Canada's commitments were as prudently measured in the national self-interest. If Canada's warriors against Nazidom had no such limited liability, virtually all of them had volunteered. When conscripts finally went overseas, it was so late in 1944 that few of them had to risk their lives.

The victory in 1945 was not the same as in 1918. Canada emerged as the world's second richest nation, intimately allied to the richest. War had ended the Great Depression; it left Canada a self-styled "middle power" with world-shaping influence if it used it prudently. Canadians were prepared to endure the huge burdens imposed by the Cold War because, however horrible for some, for many more the 1939-45 war had been an almost benign experience. During the 1950s, half of federal spending was devoted to Cold War defence, precisely delaying the social programs like universal health insurance promised by King's government in 1945. The Cold War took priority over policies later defined as part of the national identity. Playing such a role in the world struck most Canadians as appropriate and necessary after 1945.

The world wars touched most Canadians, often painfully. About 1,743,000 Canadians served in Canada's wars, roughly 200,000 of them as conscripts, and 103,257 died.ⁱ Many others came home permanently maimed in mind or body; even more if we had ever calculated the traumatic stress of combat. Wives were widowed, children orphaned and parents left bereft. No one will ever know what life-enhancing talent was lost or how family life was disrupted by the psychological victims of combat. War was not the sole cause, but Canada's national debt quadrupled between 1914 and 1919 and, despite a pay-as-you-go policy, grew three-fold between 1939 and 1945.ⁱⁱ The wars left cruel memories. In crises majorities felt entitled to impose their will; minorities felt helpless and betrayed. Conscription twice broke previous political pledges and profoundly deepened the fissure between English-speaking Canadians and francophone Québec originally opened by the execution of Riel in

1885 and widened by Canada's commitment to the Boer War in 1899-1900.ⁱⁱⁱ Wartime paranoia scarred Ukrainian Canadians in the First World War and Japanese-Canadians in the Second.^{iv}

Perhaps the divisions were deeper because Canada's commitment to its wars was a matter of political choice. In 1899 and 1914, Canada went to war because the British Empire was at war. Yet, as much as in 1939, Canadians themselves decided how deeply to commit themselves to the struggle. They were no more endangered by the Boer republics than by North Korea in 1950 or Osama bin Laden in 2002. Canada was at the outer limit of even German geopolitics. Unlike many belligerents, Canadians exercised a choice to become engaged. Why?

Until the 1950s, Canada was virtually invulnerable on three sides and, as its Confederation-era leaders recognized, indefensible on the fourth. On either coast, the world's two greatest navies, the British and subsequently the American, guaranteed that, if an invasion came, it could not come by sea. Nor could any attacking force cross the Polar icecap.^v If Canada was so immune from invasion, why did its people have to fight? Why did a country with so many conflicting allegiances embrace the divisive atmosphere of war, not once, but repeatedly? Most other states in the western hemisphere states avoided more than a brief, nominal engagement in the world wars. Why did Canadians, after so many centuries of alliance warfare, feel obliged to engage? Relieved from consuming security, why did Canadians become providers?

Part of the answer grew from Canada's real vulnerability. To the south, Canada was as open to attack as Poland. Abenaki, Iroquois, Saukteaux, Sioux, English colonists, British regulars, and soldiers of the United States had flowed over the frontier to kill, pillage and conquer. The long border between Canada and the United States had ranked with India's North-West Frontier as the great defence problem of Queen Victoria's empire. Britain's treasury poured out millions in strategic works to solve it. In 1865, the British Colonial Secretary, Edward Cardwell, told Canada that, if it was "ready to devote all her resources, both in men and money to the maintenance of her connection with the Mother Country, the Imperial Government fully acknowledged the reciprocal obligation of defending every portion of the Empire with all the resources at its command."^{vi} This and a guarantee for a \$2 million fortification loan added to the arguments for Confederation in 1867.

The Civil War also made clear that there would never be a successful rematch of the War of 1812. After fending off Fenians and ensuring an orderly transfer of the Red River to Canada, British troops quit Quebec on November 11th, 1871. Cardwell had made a commitment but as Gladstone's Secretary of State for War, he left no hostages to guarantee it. In 1871, the British took Canada's prime minister to Washington and "wiped the slate" of outstanding Anglo-American issues, chiefly at Canada's expense. The lesson was obvious: keeping peace with the Americans might be painful, but the alternatives were worse. Canada could keep the peace, not by preparedness, as the British urged, but by being no threat at all. Ottawa used Britain's fortification loan to link Rivière-du-Loup and Halifax by

rail. When a disorderly prairie frontier threatened to bring U.S. cavalry north, Canada created a police force and sent it west, literally to keep the peace.^{vii} For a million dollars a year, Canada established a voluntary militia sufficient to keep domestic order. American visitors could easily see that it posed no threat and, except in election years, with Irish votes to harvest, Americans forgot their own threats.

Canadians have never sufficiently appreciated Sir John A. Macdonald's unheroic wisdom. The British abandoned a hopeless military commitment. Free to conquer Canada if they chose, Americans chose not to. Apart from a few warhawks, Canadians chose not to provoke them. Spared a home defence burden, Canada could build railways and industries. It could even exhaust itself militarily in two world wars with minimal attention to home defence. In the 1890s, a clever British officer, Major-General Ivor Herbert, established two framework principles for Canada's defence forces. First, he warned us to conduct our military affairs in both languages, though it took Canadians eighty painful years to do so.^{viii} Second, Herbert created a tiny, efficient, permanent force that in 1899 and 1950 and subsequently met modest expeditionary commitments. Reserves provided a framework to recruit and train forces for world wars. One might even claim that the inefficiency of reserve-based forces spared Canada from the dangerous, even disastrous engagements inevitable in the first phases of most wars. Two disasters, Second Ypres in 1915 and Hong Kong in 1941, are the revealing exceptions. Canadians did not make war because of restless militarism; instead we knew so little of war that we could pretend to ourselves that it was easy. Brilliant news management by Canada's smartest media mogul, Max Aitken, even persuaded Canadians to this day that Ypres was an emblematic national triumph.

Throughout the 20th century, some Canadians – most eloquently but not exclusively Henri Bourassa, a pan-Canadian nationalist – insisted that Canada had no duty to send soldiers, sailors or even bomber pilots to fight in foreign wars. National self-interest, more obvious in Quebec than elsewhere, might have kept Canada from more than symbolic participation in either world war. People whose misfortunes Canadians left home to avenge might have been more cheaply comforted by humanitarian aid and a judicious welcome for refugees, as happened to Hungarians after 1956.

Did we fight to change world history? Except for Canadians, chroniclers of the great wars notoriously ignore Canada's contribution. Someone else might have captured Vimy Ridge in 1917 or flattened Hamburg in 1944.^x Without Canadians, Hong Kong would as certainly have fallen, though the disastrous Dieppe Raid eight months later might have been scrubbed. Britain and the United States would have pursued their bomber offensive against Germany without the RCAF's 6 Group and its 8,200 aircrew deaths.^{xi} Canadian naval escorts were so marginal at the climax of the Battle of the Atlantic that they were withdrawn for badly-needed refits and training.^{xii} Canadians believe that they mattered in the war. Others generally don't.

Canada went to war for reasons that seemed indisputable to most Canadians at the time. Feeble and disorganized at the outset, Canada's contributions were substantial.

By 1919, eight million Canadians had enlisted the 630,000 men needed to keep 100,000 soldiers on the Western Front for as long as it took to win. Despite widespread belief that Canada must never do such a thing again, most Canadians were ready again in 1939. By the summer of 1945, Canada had created the world's third largest navy, the fourth largest air force and a field army more powerful than in the previous war.^{xiii} Once again, why?

First, there was a worm in the apple of Canada's security. However remote the risk, Americans had attacked before. Endowed with a general staff by Elihu Root, the U.S. War Department developed "color plans" for possible wars. Canada was part of "Red" – war with Britain. James Eayrs shocked readers in by revealing that a Canadian staff officer had developed a similar plan between the world wars, though the last was burned in 1928. "Red" survived.^{xiv} Few Canadians knew about such plans; fewer took them very seriously. Still, a country that often defined itself as *not* American was attentive to threats. Canadians buy more insurance than most people – and we found insurance in alliances.

More important in shaping Canada's warlike responses than fading fears of American invasion were Canada's multiple loyalties. Canada was not formed by revolution or civil war. After 1763, Canada's formal allegiance was directed to Great Britain. After the 1770s, and particularly after 1815, Britain became the emotional homeland or birthplace of a rising number of Canadians. Explaining Boer War passions, Montreal's *La Presse*, had acknowledged that some Canadians were different. "We French Canadians belong to one country, Canada. Canada is for us the whole world; but the English Canadians have two countries, one here and one across the sea."^{xv} In 1911, British-Canadians formed 56 per cent of the population. In 1941, British- and French-Canadians together still formed an overwhelming 80 per cent of the population. Ten per cent were "Other Europeans". Canadians, effectively, were multinational as most of them still are. Undivided loyalty to Canada was controversial among British-Canadians well past the mid-century.^{xvi}

George Washington warned his countrymen against "entangling alliances." Napoleon concluded that he would rather fight allies than have them. Canada's military commanders learned to serve in alliances and even to exploit them. Unable to make a peacetime case for the defence of Canada and dependent, even in wartime, on alliance roles, admirals, generals and air marshals welcomed British and, after 1940, American pressure on Ottawa. In 1949, *NATO* was as providential for senior officers as it was for officials in the Department of External Affairs. Alliance commitments opened federal coffers and, in wartime, gave Canada's armed forces almost anything except sufficient manpower. Like modern European powers, Canadians discovered earlier that an all-volunteer force absorbs a huge share of any defence budget. Giving Canadians a pleasing sense of their own importance was a collateral but costly alliance benefit.

In both world wars, Canadians ultimately did more than grumble and conform. They demanded control. As R.A. Preston pointed out, Lord Minto had to persuade his prime minister in 1899 that Canada had to send a formed

national contingent to South Africa. Laurier would have preferred a loose cluster of volunteers, to leave no trace for his critics.^{xvii} Minto's precedents prevailed in 1914 and 1939. While Canada's sailors and pilots might often disappear into the Royal Navy and Air Force, our soldiers served in Canadian units and formations, under Canadian commanders. In the First World War even more than the Second, continuing experience forged competence and, later, impressive skill in the operational art.^{xviii} The Canadian Corps became a proud national institution, albeit imperfectly representative of Canadian linguistic duality. The reputation of its commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, still grows in retrospect after a war which left few generals' reputations unscarred.

Currie's greatest victory, however, may have been his triumph over the insane nationalism of Canada's wartime defence minister, Sir Sam Hughes, and his instinct for appointing inept toadies who echoed his devotion to the defective but Canadian-made Ross Rifle, the McAdam shovel or the Bain wagon. Among Currie's divisional commanders, the best was conspicuously Major-General L.J. Lipsett, removed from his command near the war's end simply because he *was* British.^{xix} In the Second World War, with hardly more fighting troops than in 1918, Canada insisted on an Army, rather than an army corps, and ultimately secured its own corner of the North Atlantic and a specific RCAF bomber group, though far most of its flyers served in British squadrons. Military alliances depend on large supplies of praise and publicity, and Canadians were no pikers in demanding their share.^{xx} Visiting Dieppe last summer, I was reminded that Paul Martin Senior, musing in a cemetery for his dead constituents, persuaded himself to campaign for a then-non-existent Canadian citizenship. Out of a war and bitter controversy came a common identifier for the French, Italian, Ukrainian, Greek, Jewish and Irish names on the grave markers. I was also reminded that Canadians assign blame for the Dieppe fiasco to their British allies, ignoring their own defects in training, equipment and leadership. Despite the accident of Sir Arthur Currie, Canada failed to find many inspired or even competent field commanders from its stunted interwar army.^{xxi}

A feature of Canada's continuous experience of peacetime military alliances was their value for military leaders and their allies in making a domestic case for added resources. In Canada, Colonel Chauvin had no claim to be a military stereotype. If the price was submission to British and American military authority, Canadian admirals and generals grumbled and paid. Being part of British wars gave Canada's militia its sole claim to prepare for "real" wars before 1914 or 1939, much as *NATO* and *NORAD* would give Canada's armed forces a continuing claim on the hugely expensive resources necessary to play in the world's top military league. After 1945, Canadian sailors and airmen reflected on wartime experience with British technology and embraced American models. Did memory of the inflammable and vulnerable Sherman tank make our soldiers more cautious?^{xxii}

Between 1949 and 1952, when Cold War rearmament hit its peak, annual Canadian defence spending quintupled to \$1.972 million, slid down to \$1.536 million by 1959, and then maintained a steady state as inflation took over.^{xxiii}



The money was not always carefully spent. Huge sums were devoted to designing a Canada-specific supersonic jet fighter, the Avro Arrow, until it was cancelled in 1958, creating a crisis in national self-esteem that still echoes.^{xxiv} Faced with recession or seeking other priorities, post-1950s governments wrestled with service rivalries fed by alliance ambitions.

In the first half of the 20th century, Canada's military, naval and air forces defended Canada at a distance, usually at the behest of others. Ottawa learned that interference could lead to responsibility, as when Sir Robert Borden's strategic initiatives stranded Canadians in Archangel and Vladivostok in 1919. W.L. Mackenzie King avoided any such traps in 1939-45. At the two Quebec conferences where Churchill and Roosevelt plotted strategy, King was content to provide the whiskey and share in a photo opportunity.

King's reward was to be the most durable and respected of Canadian prime ministers, while Canadians emerged from the 20th century with generally benign memories of war. We recall wordy conflicts over conscription, internment and historians focus on a few acknowledged defeats – Dieppe and Hong Kong, but never Second Ypres. Canadians suffered no counterpart to Pearl Harbour, Oslo Fiord, Rotterdam, or Stalingrad. Nor could they match Australian memories of Gallipoli or Singapore. Canada's defence policies may have been ambivalent, colonial-minded, pusillanimous and short-sighted, but, measured by immunity from

foreign invasion, devastation and imperial domination, they succeeded brilliantly. If the 20th never quite seemed to be Laurier's "Century of Canada," it was a much safer century for Canadians than its predecessors. Secure at home, Canadians fought almost unconsciously for influence in the wider world. Perhaps only nationalism could legitimate such un-Canadian self-confidence. ■

NOTES

To view Dr. Morton's full notes, please visit the ACS website at www.acs-aec.ca.

- i. The 1951 census found 1,227,945 veterans of the world wars, ranging from 4.4 per cent of Quebecers to 14 per cent of British Columbians. Census of Canada, 1951, Table 64; *Historical Statistics of Canada* (Ottawa: Supply and Services 1983, 2nd edition), A-2, 7, 12. On other casualties, see Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1990), 3rd ed., 117, 163, 235; Desmond Morton and J.L. Granatstein, *Victory 1945: Canadians From War to Peace* (Toronto: HarperCollins 1995), 19.
- ii. *Historical Statistics*, H-50
- iii. Elizabeth Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1974); J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford 1977); Jean-Yves Gravel, *Le Québec et la guerre* (Montréal: Boréal Express 1974); Paul-André Comeau, "Conscription, 1942", *Cap-aux-Diamants* XXIX, printemps, 1992, 10-13.
- iv. On internment in the First World War, see Desmond Morton, "Sir William Otter and Internment Operations in Canada during the First World War", *Canadian Historical Review*, LV, 1, March, 1974, pp. 32-58, and *Silent Battle: Canadian Prisoners of War in Germany, 1914-1919* (Toronto: Lester Publishing 1992). On the Ukrainians: Frances Swyrypa and John Thompson, (eds.) *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press 1983); and on Japanese-Canadians: Patricia Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Masako Iino and Hiroku Takamura, *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990); Peter Ward, "British Columbia and the Japanese Evacuation", *Canadian Historical Review*, LVII, 3, September, 1976.
- v. Though Arctic overflight was discussed in *Popular Mechanics* and kindred magazines in the 1930s, the region is not mentioned in the relevant volume of the official history of the RCAF, W.A.B. Douglas, *The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force*, vol. II (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1986). See also, however, the same author's "The Air Defence Dilemma in Canada, 1939-1943", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, XIV, 2, autumn, 1984, 33-38.

CANADIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD

Mildred A. Schwartz

Mildred A. Schwartz is Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Chicago and Visiting Scholar in the Department of Sociology at New York University. Her recent work deals with the organization of political movements and parties.

ABSTRACT

The author describes her early work on Canada and reveals how a nation's political past shapes its present in both expected and unexpected ways. With reference to many well-known Canadian academics, she identifies the various dimensions of the collective Canadian identity.

When I first wrote about Canadian national identity four decades ago, I struggled to find a definition that best captured its ambiguities. On the one hand, national identity is an aspect of the self as an individual and as a member of a collectivity. It answers questions of: Who am I? Where do I belong? Who are others like me? On the other hand, it is both a metaphor for personal identities writ large and a reality describing the distinctive character of a nation. In other words, national identity is a shorthand way for describing: What kind of country is this? What distinguishes its residents from others? My focus was on the special character of Canada, how it evolved, and how it connected to the collective identities of Canadians. I was comfortable putting aside issues relating to individual subjective identifications.

I saw national identity as an intrinsically political phenomenon, arising from the preconditions, uses, and consequences of power and the institutions that shape and express power relations. The content of national identity emerges through responses to general problems that are common across national settings and likely to be the basis of how residents define their country.¹

These basic political problems are of three types: external, internal, and symbolic. The external problems are those of maintaining national integrity – militarily, economically, and politically. Internal problems concern the maintenance of order as this involves regulating the allocation of resources and reward of both a political and more general nature. Symbolic problems imply the provision of unifying, emotion-laden ideas and object which can serve as a focus for group loyalty (Schwartz 1967, p12).

Problems alter in significance, as do responses to them, in the face of changing conditions and changing power relations among those who define what is important. Smith (2004, p309) summarizes these processes by stressing how they affect identity formation: “political societies are always composed through the compromised, aggregated results of contests among proponents of different societal visions... in ways that are always contested and changed.”

Looking back at that work is a reminder both of how the past shapes the present and how inevitable changes can disrupt complacent expectations about the future. To illustrate, I highlight some themes that remain germane today, though not necessarily in the ways they appeared at the time of my writing.

External problems mainly hinged on relations with Britain and the United States – hardly a surprise. Attachment to the British connection declined modestly in the twenty years I surveyed. Today, it is probably even more attenuated, the result both of a changing world where Britain is no longer a major player and no longer the final arbiter of Canada's constitution, and a changing population, where British origin is no longer the major entry pass into Canada. But important residues remain to shape how Canadians see themselves. For example, Kaufmann (1997) argues that those of English origin never felt pressure to identify themselves as anything more than English and hence never developed an ethnic self-conception that could root them in a distinctly Canadian milieu. To put it differently, no need was felt to distinguish ethnic from national identity, because to be of British origin was the sole avenue to be truly Canadian. Only in the 1960s did we begin to hear of co-equal “charter

groups” and it took until at least the 1970s before British origin no longer guaranteed economic, cultural and political dominance. It is not the actual connection with Britain but the legacy of its settlers in Canada that contributed to the persisting absence of a positive Canadian identity available to all citizens.

Ties with the United States have their own ambivalence, even if my work happened to pick up at a time of relatively positive assessments. Attitudes toward the United States have fluctuated between approval and disapproval since the beginning of that country’s break with Britain. Anti-Americanism generally has been a stance with a long historical pedigree among cultural elites (see, for example, Berger 1966, p14). Along with popular views, though not necessarily in step with them, governments with different partisan affiliations have offered policies intended to either curtail American influences or increase relationships. According to Kymlicka (2003, p363), even today, “what defines being Canadian, perhaps above all else, is precisely not being an American.” My own sense is that there is comparatively less of this essentially negative self-definition now, as more Canadians are prepared to describe who they are, rather than who they *are not*.

Selected internal problems with the capacity to define the nature of Canada then included, as they do now, relations between the French and the English, relations between provinces and the federal government, and the impact from greater numbers of immigrants.² I was able to detect increasing support for bilingualism and general approval of federalism, but declining support for enlarging the country through immigration. This was all before the landmark Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the patriation of the constitution, and the multiple efforts to solve Canada’s problems through constitutional means (Russell 1993).

The difficulty lies in translating benign sentiments, like those favoring bilingualism or federalism, into policies. This because virtually all the views surveyed were not the result of overwhelming consensus, but expressions of deep-rooted social cleavages, stemming from the unequal geographic distribution of people and resources and the uneven regional distribution of ethnic and religious groups. Later, official bilingualism under Prime Minister Trudeau would become paired with multiculturalism in ways that enhanced some grievances and added new ones. For Francophones in Quebec, language was the core of identity and it should have led to defining the society as binational or bicultural (Taylor 1993, p103). Multiculturalism then could be perceived as a policy for undermining the unique status of Quebec society. At the same time, instead of giving new credibility to Canada’s

ethnic diversity, some saw in multicultural policies a way of relegating “the role of ethnic groups to that of contributors of quaint cultural practices and upholders of individual identities, while at the same time it denies them a political and economic reality in Canadian life” (Peter 1981, p57).

I attributed special potency to political symbols as emotionally-charged communicative devices, rooted in tradition, and with the potential to be highly unifying or divisive expressions of collective experience (Schwartz 1967, p40-45). Although there was a singular absence of clear and broadly accepted symbols during the period I studied, when the national anthem was still God Save the

Queen and the flag was, with some ambiguity, either the Union Jack or the Red Ensign containing the Canadian coat-of-arms (Schwartz 1967, p42), there was growing popular approval for intrinsically Canadian symbols. Yet soon after, when the government moved to adopt a uniquely Canadian flag, it immediately confronted opposing sensibilities. This was not because I was mistaken about the readiness of Canadians to adopt new symbols. Rather, the symbol first chosen was itself mired in differing conceptions of how Canada should be represented, a problem that might have been avoided if the symbol had been the national anthem.

In the early 1960s I found a Canada strongly divided over its self-conception. If differences in outlook between English and French speakers, or between Quebec and the rest of Canada, were what one might have expected, there was also less recognized evidence of a more general regional divisiveness. There were, in effect, many collective identities and no single image of Canada. Some historians found a positive message in describing Canadians as having “limited identities,” circumscribed by region, ethnicity, and social class (for example, Cook 1969; Careless 1969; Careless 1980).

It might just be that it is in these limited identities that “Canadianism” is found, and that except for our over-heated nationalist intellectuals, Canadians find this situation quite satisfactory. Certainly Professor Schwartz’s analysis of public opinion polls suggests this conclusion. And there is some reason for hope in her observation that twenty years of public opinion polls suggest that “the legitimacy of federalism and biculturalism is increasingly recognized” by Canadians (Cook 1969, p663).

Subsequently, more careful thinking has elaborated on the need to accept such limited identities if Québécois and Aboriginal peoples are to remain part of Canada. So Taylor (1993, p182) distinguishes between what he calls first and second-level diversity. In the former, “There are

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and political
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great differences in culture and outlook and background in a population that nevertheless shares the same idea of what it is to belong to Canada.” But, according to Taylor, this level of acceptance of diversity is not enough. “To build a country for everyone, Canada would have to allow for a second-level or ‘deep’ diversity, in which a plurality of ways of belonging would also be acknowledged and accepted.” Even first-order diversity may not be sufficient to accommodate the remainder of the population, leading Wong (2002) to advocate a “thin but strong” conception of citizenship that reinforces multicultural identities, premised on human rights, civic participation, and respect for difference.

My own reactions to studying Canadian identity left me diffident about making policy suggestions or even implying that I had developed a comprehensive theory. Instead, I was moved to examine more closely the phenomenon of regionalism because I felt that distinctions based on French or English speakers, or on Quebec in contrast to the rest of Canada did not adequately capture the complexity of Canadian existence (Schwartz 1974). It was not, I should say, a view shared by some prominent scholars. The reality of regionalism was denigrated by those who wanted to buttress provinces as the only essential units of analysis. Others dismissed regionalism by assuming a limited definition that relied solely on self-identifications, which they then presumed to be absent (e.g., Smiley 1987, p23; Porter 1977; Cook 1977, p110). Regionalism was also perceived to slight class divisions at a time when these were the favored approach to analyzing Canada, whether from a classical economic or Marxist perspective³. Today, however, there is little doubt that regionalism is a continuing presence in the political life of Canada, fundamentally affecting how its institutions work and now officially recognized in Cabinet responsibilities (Taylor 1993, p104-6; Young and Archer 2002). This makes regionalism, in all its complexity, an inevitable component of national identity.

When I first began looking at Canadian identity it was possible to avoid larger questions about why its contours matter. Too much has happened since, both in Canada and in the world around it, to sustain such scholarly detachment. For one thing, I am made uncomfortable by evidence of historical amnesia and the self-righteousness that follows; the positive qualities of Canadian society and what it stands for today should not be viewed without reference to what has gone before. Only when people remember past disregard for the rights of Aboriginal peoples, for French-speakers, Asians, Jews, and Catholics, for the poor and downtrodden generally, and for the regions that harbor them, can they look, with appropriate humility, at what has been accomplished and appreciate the difficulties in creating a just society.

It is equally important to recognize that national identity, however it is defined, has consequences for the behavior of political actors, whether they be individual voters or governments. National identity is intrinsically linked to the demographic makeup of the society, both as it once was, and as it is becoming.

It is equally important to recognize that national identity, however it is defined, has consequences for the behavior of political actors, whether they be individual voters or governments. National identity is intrinsically linked to the demographic makeup of the society, both as it once was, and as it is becoming. Institutions and identities, like federalism, ethnicity, and citizenship itself, are agencies for shaping and being shaped by it. For example, Pal (1989) traces efforts by the federal government to structure the place of immigrant ethnicities within the fabric of society as early 1941, before the passage of the first Canada Citizenship Act.⁴ In addition, national identity affects the ability of collective actors, like ethnic groups and provinces, to make legitimate claims on the polity. With all the tensions these competing claims bring, they also put in perspective the limits on a consensual or strong national identity. Kymlicka (2003, p385) concludes that Canada reveals the potential for identity politics to become “routinized and domesticated as part of everyday processes of democratic deliberation and negotiation.” In this respect, he feels Canada will be like other multiethnic states that have found ways to adapt to diversity.

Perhaps we can continue to have peaceful societies that provide government services fairly even without a single national identity, but that does not absolve the need for some identity of interests. In this connection I can conclude, as I did in 1967, with a quotation from Ortega (1937, p.44). “It is neither important nor necessary that the component parts of a society coincide in their ideas and their desires; the important, the essential thing is that each should know, and to a certain extent incorporate into his own life, the ideas and desires of the others.”■

NOTES

To view Dr. Schwartz's references, please visit the ACS website at www.acs-aec.ca.

1. Smith's (2004, p309) three kinds of stories that inspire national identification, based on economic, political, and ethically constitutive visions, cross-cut my problem types. Elsewhere (Smith 2003, p54-5) he makes clear that those stories also respond to external factors. I am grateful to Rogers Smith for bringing this to my attention.
2. Another important component, dealt with in my book but omitted here, deals with class relations.
3. See the explanations for downplaying regionalism by Marshak (1980) and Brodie (1989).
4. Coincidentally, before going to graduate school, I worked in the Research Division of the Canadian Citizenship Branch during an active phase of this policy to integrate immigrants by reaching out to and promoting ethnic communities.

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