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Insights on Diasporas and Global Citizenship

Réflexions sur la citoyenneté mondiale et la diaspora

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From the Atlantic to the Pacific: the Implications of Immigration and Multiculturalism for Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945 [1]

Hector Mackenzie is the Senior Departmental Historian of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada (a position he has held since 1991). Educated at the University of Toronto and Oxford University (from which he received his doctorate), he taught at the University of Toronto and the University of Western Ontario before joining the Department of External Affairs as a historian in 1989. He has edited two volumes in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations* and he has published numerous articles and reviews on the history of Canada's international relations. Dr. Mackenzie is an Adjunct Research Professor in the Department of History of Carleton University, where he has taught courses on the history of Canada and its international relations.

• **Hector Mackenzie** est historien senior au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international du Canada (un poste qu'il occupe depuis 1991). Formé à l'Université de Toronto et à l'Université d'Oxford (d'où il a reçu son doctorat), il a enseigné à l'Université de Toronto et l'Université Western Ontario avant de se joindre au ministère des Affaires extérieures en tant qu'historien en 1989. Il a édité deux volumes de la série *Documents on Canadian External Relations* et a publié de nombreux articles et commentaires sur l'histoire des relations internationales du Canada. Dr Mackenzie est professeur auxiliaire au Département d'Histoire de l'Université Carleton, où il a enseigné des cours sur l'histoire du Canada et ses relations internationales.

ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ

With the recent geopolitical developments and with the periodic reassessment of Canadian foreign policy over the years is the increasing attention to Asia and the Pacific in Canada's outlook since the end of the Second World War. In order to trace that aspect of Canada's global policies and actions, this paper will view developments through the imperfect lens of major speeches and formal reviews of Canada's international relations.[2] Other factors undoubtedly influenced the greater awareness of Asia and the Pacific in Canadian reckoning, but this brief account will pay particular heed to the implications for Canada's foreign policy of the patterns of immigration since the Second World War and the emphasis in the past half-century on the projection abroad of Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country.

• Aux côtés des récents développements géopolitiques et de la réévaluation périodique de la politique étrangère canadienne au fil des ans, on trouve, dans les perspectives du Canada, une attention croissante pour l'Asie et le Pacifique depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Afin de cerner cet aspect des politiques et des actions globales du Canada, le présent texte examine ces développements à travers la lentille imparfaite des grands discours et des revues officielles des relations internationales du Canada.[2] D'autres facteurs ont sans aucun doute influencé une plus grande prise de conscience de l'Asie et du Pacifique dans le contexte canadien, mais ce bref compte rendu sera particulièrement attentif aux conséquences, pour la politique étrangère du Canada, des tendances de l'immigration depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et de l'accent mis dans le dernier demi-siècle sur la projection à l'étranger du Canada en tant que pays bilingue et multiculturel.

In January 1947, Louis St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs and within two years Canada's Prime Minister, addressed an audience at the University of Toronto about "The Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy."[3] When he spoke, recent experience in the Second World War and the evident breakdown of the victorious wartime alliance – with indications already of the onset of the global ideological, diplomatic, strategic and economic confrontation between "East" and "West" that would come to be known as the Cold War – prompted a reflection about the assumptions upon which wartime policies and plans for the post-war world had been based. Fifty years later, one of his successors as foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, addressed similar themes after the end of the Cold War – another period of transformation of the context in which Canada determined its approach to international relations.[4] More recently still, the Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird, have affirmed that the Canadian government pursues a "principled foreign policy" with a keen commitment to upholding Canada's values and interests in international affairs, even as the world undergoes another major shift, with "global re-balancing."[5] One theme that is interwoven with these geopolitical developments and with the periodic reassessment of Canadian foreign policy over the years is the increasing attention to Asia and the Pacific in Canada's outlook since the end of the Second World War. In order to trace that aspect of Canada's global policies and actions, this overview will view developments through the imperfect lens of major speeches and formal reviews of Canada's international relations.[6] Other factors undoubtedly influenced the greater awareness of Asia and the Pacific in Canadian reckoning, but this brief account will pay particular heed to the implications for Canada's foreign policy of the patterns of immigration since the Second World War and the emphasis in the past half-century on the projection abroad of Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country.

St. Laurent's speech was noteworthy not only for its content but also as a departure from the more cautious and usually silent approach of his predecessor as external affairs minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, whose wary influence on foreign policy was still felt from the office of prime minister. According to St. Laurent, there were five "basic principles" which governed "the conduct of our relations abroad." These included the maintenance of Canadian unity, support for political liberty, respect for the rule of law in national and international affairs, the influence of "conceptions of good and evil which emerged from Hebrew and Greek civilisation and which have been transformed and transmitted through the Christian traditions of the Western world," and the acceptance of international responsibility. The minister then went on to depict the "practical application" of these tenets in five areas: the Commonwealth, relations with the United States, relations with France, support for agencies and activities associated with "constructive international organisation," and expansion of the foreign service.

In light of the theme of this paper, what is noteworthy about St. Laurent's discussion of Canada's international relations is the dearth of references to Asia in the text. Though Western Europe was frequently mentioned, and Canada's world-wide interests were stressed, China was identified only in the context of export credits for reconstruction and India featured simply as the destination for the most recent of Canada's diplomatic appointments.[7] That comparative inattention to Asia would not last, but it would neither have surprised nor disappointed those who heard or read the speech. On the contrary, that aspect was consistent with how Canadians perceived their relationship to the rest of the world in early 1947. Not without reason did policy-makers and the public regard economic assistance from North America to Western Europe and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty as the principal assurances of Canada's vital interests in international affairs.[8] During the Second World War, with the conspicuous exception of the controversial and ill-fated reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison, the Canadian government had focussed its contribution to the allied war effort almost exclusively on the conflict in Europe and on the North Atlantic. Canadians were obviously aware of the defeat and occupation of Japan, but there was considerably greater interest in the

European settlement. That attitude was not fundamentally altered with the onset of the Cold War.[9]

The announcement that Canada would appoint a high commissioner to India notwithstanding, Canada was under-represented in Asia and the Pacific in 1947. The only embassy, an itinerant one to China, was then between moves prompted by internal strife in the host country. In fact, the mission, by then in Nanking, would be terminated in 1950, while the consulate in Shanghai shut its doors one year later. The oldest diplomatic post in the area, formerly a legation in Tokyo, had been closed while Canada and Japan were at war, then reopened in peacetime as a liaison mission to the American occupation authorities. Apart from a few trade offices and a Consulate-General in Manila, Canada's diplomatic profile in the region was dominated by the high commissions in Canberra and Wellington.[10] Indeed, its missionary presence in Asia was more obvious and arguably a greater source of concern for most Canadians.[11] It was also difficult for Canada to supplement its diplomatic contacts at the General Assembly of the United Nations, as only nine Asian states were members by 1950.[12]

Nor was there likely to be a challenge to this North Atlantic bias for reasons of demography or cultural influences. On the contrary, Canada's immigration policy and its reaction to refugee crises simply confirmed this orientation. In the wake of the devastation and dislocation of the Second World War, the Canadian government employed emergency measures to open Canada's doors to refugees and displaced persons from Europe. In addition, there were three extraordinary flows of immigrants, consisting of Polish ex-servicemen, Dutch farm workers and Maltese immigrants. However, no such concession was made to Asian immigration. On 1 May 1947, Prime Minister King reaffirmed the "White Canada" policy that had prevailed between the wars. His carefully drafted statement was followed almost immediately by the introduction of legislation to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923. That change was not a concession, however, as it simply added the Chinese to other Asian groups severely restricted under P. C. 2115 of March 1931.[13] For diplomatic reasons, largely symbolic quotas were granted in 1951 to immigrants originating from India (150), Pakistan (100), and Ceylon (50), but these concessions to fellow members of the Commonwealth were limited exceptions which simply proved the rule.[14] By then, immigration from Asia represented no more than 2 per cent of the annual total, compared to over 88 per cent from Europe. In the 1951 census, about one-half of one per cent of Canada's population identified its origins as Asian.[15] In other words, ties of ethnicity were not significant factors in Canada's relations with Asia. Though geography, and opinion in British Columbia, asserted that Canada was a "Pacific power," substantive links to the region were still limited and that province had been a bastion of anti-Asian sentiment.[16]

Certainly, there were developments in the Far East after the war that necessitated some response from Canada, particularly when it was a member of the Security Council of the United Nations in 1948-49.[17] Burma's departure from the Commonwealth was definitely not as momentous as the redefinition of that institution to retain the membership of republican India, which Canada supported.[18] But the struggles against the colonial rule of the Netherlands in Indonesia and of France in Indochina reminded policy-makers in Ottawa that the rise of nationalism in Asia and the challenge to European domination of that region would have implications for countries beyond those directly involved. Those distant conflicts also brought out in full relief the inadequacy of Canada's diplomatic representation in that part of the world and consequently its dependence on others, including its allies among the imperial powers, for information and analysis.[19]

When his subordinates involved Canada on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), at American behest rather than out of any fundamental worry about the fate of Korea, King, who had been absent when the decision was taken, was livid. To justify his determination to extricate Canada from what he regarded as an ill-advised and dangerous commitment, the prime minister cited Canada's ignorance and neglect of the Pacific. Once again, King viewed that complication principally from the perspective of the Cold War and he was keen to avoid an entanglement which could be a flashpoint for war between the United States and the Soviet Union. That he was eventually obliged to compromise on Canadian participation in UNTCOK arose from the need to keep his Cabinet united, not an enhanced appreciation of the importance of Pacific affairs to Canada.[20] When UNTCOK dropped "temporary" from its title and amended its mandate, Canada eased its way off the commission.[21]

However, it was more difficult for Canada to avoid involvement when the United States decided to respond, within the framework of the United Nations, to the invasion of South Korea from the North. The St. Laurent government's initial emphasis was on diplomacy, not on a contribution from Canada's armed forces, though it eventually relented under pressure from the American government and from Canadian public opinion. Naval and military support was later given to the American-led assistance to South Korea, but Canadian concern, shared by its allies, rose when the American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, embarked on a crusade to liberate the North and unify the peninsula, thereby drawing the North's immediate neighbour and ally, the People's Republic of China (PRC), directly into the conflict. There is no need here to go over ground that has been thoroughly examined by other scholars.[22] However, it is worth recalling two points that accentuate the priorities in Canada's international relations.

Though the location of this clash, and therefore the destination for Canada's military commitments, was in Asia, Canadian officials viewed the outbreak of the Korean War as a challenge to Western interests associated with the United States and to the United Nations as an institution, rather than as a matter of regional interest to another Pacific nation. Even before the conflict escalated, there was anxiety in Ottawa and other North Atlantic capitals that the invasion of South Korea was a "feint" designed to distract the West from the principal target for Communist expansion, Western Europe.[23] The Korean War provided the occasion for a significant increase in Canada's defence budget, but Asia was not the principal regional focus for subsequent expenditures. Canadian efforts to negotiate an armistice were arguably intended more to limit the overall impact of the war than to secure the fate of Korea.[24] Perhaps appropriately, when Pearson warned against simplistic equation of Asian nationalism with the threat posed by Communism, he entitled his article "Don't Let Asia Split the West."[25] Canada's contribution to development assistance via the Colombo Plan, in close association with Western allies, was likewise linked to the need to safeguard vulnerable countries against Communist influence.[26]

A similar cautionary note should be sounded about Canada's other major involvement in international diplomacy associated with Asia, its participation as one of three delegations in the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) established under the Geneva Agreements on Indochina. Though Canada had participated in the Geneva Conference, its nomination to the ICSC, along with India and Poland, came as an unwelcome "shock" to its delegates and the Canadian government. Privately, Pearson expressed his fear to British foreign secretary Anthony Eden that this "responsibility" might "turn out to be as onerous as it was unsought."[27] Though the familiar mantle of the United Nations was missing from this engagement, the basis for Canada's decision to participate in the ICSC was a sense of international responsibility and support for its allies rather than regional interest. Canada was seen as a comparatively disinterested representative of the West – simply put, one with little or nothing at stake in Southeast Asia – on a panel that was designed to reflect the differing perspectives on the future of Asia within the context of the Cold War.[28]

However unwelcome the distinction may have been, the often frustrating task was likely a net benefit, as it helped Canada to resist greater entanglement militarily or otherwise in Indochina.[29] For new recruits to Canada's foreign service, a tour of duty as a junior officer with the ICSC represented a rare opportunity for a posting in Asia and the senior appointments as well were important diplomatic assignments.[30] That experience may also have undermined the "special relationship" between India and Canada which had flourished earlier in the decade. Nehru had visited

Ottawa in the autumn of 1949, while New Delhi had featured prominently, along with other Commonwealth Asian destinations, in St. Laurent's "world tour" in early 1954.[31] Certainly, optimism about India's value as a "bridge" for the Commonwealth, and especially for Canada, between East and West was dissipated by the obvious clash of perspectives on the ICSC in Indochina, as well as during the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.[32]

For the government of John Diefenbaker, trade remained at the top of the agenda in Canada's trans-Pacific relations.[33] Canada had earlier agreed to most-favoured-nation treatment for Japan and the post-war revival of the Japanese economy was a subject of considerable interest and occasional anxiety for Canadians in the 1950s.[34] By 1955, Japan was already Canada's third largest trading partner and in the following decade trade between the two countries more than quadrupled. Though there was no advance in diplomatic relations with the PRC, and no sign that the Diefenbaker government regarded that issue as a priority, the Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, was able to trumpet grain sales to China, culminating in a long-term agreement for shipments of Canadian wheat, barley and flour.[35] Yet Diefenbaker's first and foremost venture as Prime Minister had been to try to increase trade with Britain and worries about the implications for Canada of that country's relationship with Europe still eclipsed trans-Pacific economic questions in importance. When he embarked on a "Commonwealth Tour" in late 1958, however, his itinerary was dominated by Asian capitals.[36]

Canada's diplomatic representation in Asia and the Pacific had increased during the 1950s, but the pace of expansion lagged behind that in Latin America and it would be overshadowed again in the 1960s by the impact of decolonization in Africa.[37] By then, there was much less attention to a distinctive Asian dimension in Canada's international relations than to the escalation of American involvement in Indochina, to the association of some Asian states with the non-aligned movement, and to the issues of development in the emerging "Third World," as well as concern about the overall impact of these trends on the United Nations. Those currents and cross-currents would buffet the first major public review of Canada's external affairs, which was published in 1970 by the government of Pierre Trudeau as *Foreign Policy for Canadians*.

The announcement of that comprehensive reappraisal of Canadian policies in international affairs came during the 1968 election campaign in a statement by Trudeau in which he also declared his government's intention to recognise the PRC. Trudeau prefaced the latter pledge by referring to "a new interest in Pacific affairs generally" in Canada. "Because of past preoccupations with Atlantic and European affairs," he opined, "we have tended to overlook the reality that Canada is a Pacific country too."[38] *Foreign Policy for Canadians* attracted more critical comment for its repudiation of Pearsonian internationalism, for its disparagement of the United Nations, for its neglect of Canadian-American relations and for its speculation about Canada's commitment to the Atlantic alliance than for what it had to say about relations with countries across the Pacific. But the fact that one of the six booklets was devoted to *Pacific* suggests that the region was assuming a greater importance in Ottawa's reckoning than before.

By 1970, one of the critical barriers to understanding and co-operation between Canada and Asia had been removed. Canada's immigration and refugee policy had been altered to meet the nation's economic requirements and the social reality of international migration, as well as to remove the stigma of racism. In 1962, the "White Canada" policy had been repudiated and, five years later, a "points system" for prospective immigrants had been inaugurated. At first, the impact on migration had been slight. Nonetheless, during the 1960s, the proportion of the Canadian population affirming Asian origins nearly doubled (to about 1.3%, or 285,540 individuals), primarily as a result of the new policies, and a significant upward trend was discernible as *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published.[39] By then, "national identity, bilingualism and *multicultural expression*" had been identified as among "the main preoccupations of Canadians today," which necessarily influenced any determination of Canada's interests and objectives in international affairs.[40]

After a sketch of the region which emphasised political instability fostered by great power rivalries in the context of the Cold War, the booklet on the *Pacific* went on to describe the growing awareness of Asia, particularly in Western Canada. That had been nurtured by commercial, religious and academic links as well as by the flow of people. "By virtue of geography, history and present interest," the booklet declared, "Canada is a Pacific power," albeit "not a great power." To differentiate its interests and approach from the pervasive influence of the United States in the region was one of Canada's principal challenges. To that end, *Pacific* stressed the value of its membership in the Commonwealth and its involvement in the nascent association of francophone countries. That made particular sense to those aware of the importance of bilingualism as a national policy and how it applied to Canada's international affairs.[41]

When it came to recommendations for Canadian policy, however, the overwhelming emphasis was still on economic relations and development aid. The markets of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and China were identified as important destinations for Canadian exports, despite restrictions on access to the Japanese market for manufactured goods and the extent that wheat dominated Sino-Canadian trade. Japan was seen as the key, as it "may well become Canada's second most important one-country market" and Japanese investment in Canada "seems likely to expand." These interests and expectations prompted the Trudeau government to raise Canada's diplomatic profile in the region, with the projected establishment of an embassy in Beijing depicted as part of that process. For Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the most propitious links would likely be provided by development assistance. But it would be difficult to address those needs and to assure vital stability and security in the area without an end to the war in Indochina.[42]

These various elements anticipated the dominant trends and events in Canada's relations with the Pacific over the next decade. Already, even before the exodus of "boat people" from Indochina, there had been a marked rise in the flow of immigrants from Asian countries to Canada. By 1976, more than 44,000 individuals annually, or nearly 30% of total immigrants to Canada, originated in Asia.[43]. Immigration and population policies, which were increasingly subjects of national and international scrutiny, had been the topics of a general review, followed by a green paper on immigration policy tabled in February 1975, a report by a special parliamentary committee in October 1975 and a major revision of the Immigration Act in 1976. Together, the fundamental thrust of these reappraisals and the predominant international flows of refugees and immigrants bolstered the tendency to higher admissions to Canada from Asian origins.[44]

Increased awareness of the value of trade and economic connections with Japan and the rest of Asia reinforced the traditional Canadian desire for "counterweights" to the preponderant sway of the United States over Canada's international relations. Though the principal focus for the "third option" articulated by Mitchell Sharp was still on relations with Europe – where the reception to Canadian overtures was complicated by the controversial decision to reduce Canada's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – the country's interest in the North Pacific was formally acknowledged by a contractual link with Japan.[45] As for the PRC, its significance to Canada was accentuated not only by the exchange of ambassadors but also by Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to China in October 1973 and by the priority assigned to good relations with the PRC in the dispute with the International Olympic Committee over participation by Taiwan in the 1976 Olympics in Montreal.[46]

The government of Joe Clark did not last long, but it left two legacies which are relevant to the theme of this paper. The exceptional and generous response to the plight of the "boat people" who had fled Indochina was a significant advance on Canadian reactions to earlier refugee crises. That initiative by the Progressive Conservative government was sustained when the Liberals returned to power. Ultimately, the scale of admissions from Indochina – over 80,000 by the end of June 1982 – far exceeded the totals admitted previously after political upheavals in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Uganda, Chile and Lebanon.[47]

Flora MacDonald, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Clark government, initiated a further review of Canadian foreign policy, entitled "Canada in a Changing World," but it was not finished before the government was defeated. Eventually, the completed sections – an overview of "The Global Framework" and a study of "Canadian Aid Policy" – were tabled as discussion papers by MacDonald's successor, Mark MacGuigan, in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons in June 1980. The overall context for the review was still the familiar one of the Cold War, with recurrent anxieties about "Soviet military strength in the Pacific," the imbalance between Japanese economic power and its military capacity, the recent emergence of China from years of isolation, and the clash of interests in Southeast Asia. In that setting, Canada's political, security and economic interests complemented one another. "Canada is a Western country with western values," the text declared. Regional relationships, such as the Pacific Rim, which was mentioned in passing, were less important in the reckoning than the overall global threats posed by East-West and North-South tensions, dramatic increases in costs for energy and other resources, arms proliferation, international terrorism and environmental degradation.[48] The spine was broken on the cover of *Canada in a Changing World*, but it was promptly put back on the shelf.

The next major appraisal of Canadian foreign policy came soon after Brian Mulroney led the Progressive Conservatives back to power. In 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Clark, issued a green paper, *Competitiveness and Security*, to stimulate discussion. The introduction to that document, which described Canada's "national attributes," merits a brief glance. After two short paragraphs about Canada's peoples, regions, and governments, the text predictably and deliberately distinguished Canada from its southern neighbour, while acknowledging the importance of continental co-operation. When it looked overseas, it affirmed first that "we are an Atlantic nation," before hastily adding that "we are a Pacific nation as well" and further that "we are an Arctic nation." As in previous assessments of Canadian interests and responsibilities, *Competitiveness and Security* stressed that Canada's "growing trade and immigration across the Pacific underline the increasing importance of our relations with countries in Asia."[49]

In its own report, *Independence and Internationalism*, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations acknowledged that changes in Canada's population had had an impact on Canadian foreign policy. "New waves of immigration during the past 20 years from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean," the report noted, "have led to the establishment in Canada of communities with deep personal concerns about problems in parts of the world that previous governments paid little attention to." While arguing that "Canada's bilingual and multicultural heritage represents an asset," the committee stressed "that it is definitely not in the national interest to allow ethnic communities to draw Canada into taking sides on rivalries and disputes in their countries of origin." Left unsaid was the extent to which, in the past, the sentimental ties of the Canadian people to the United Kingdom, France and the rest of western Europe had inspired commitments well beyond a narrow definition of Canada's national interest. Generally speaking, the committee paid more attention to the Atlantic and the Arctic than the Pacific, though it did note in passing that Canada's trans-Pacific trade had overtaken its trans-Atlantic trade for the first time in 1982.[50]

In its response to *Independence and Internationalism*, the government acknowledged that "we must seek to intensify our links with an economically vibrant but diverse" Asia and the Pacific and "to play a more active consultative role on regional security issues." What that meant so far as priorities were concerned was a "special focus" on "the giants of Asia" – Japan, China and India.[51] Unquestionably, the foreign minister paid greater attention to the region than his predecessors, whether or not the approach differed in substance from earlier actions. Key speeches by Clark affirmed that "Canada is a Pacific Rim country," with flows of trade, investment, immigration and tourism all reflecting that position, and sketched government initiatives to strengthen and multiply these connections.[52]

Within a few years, the global context that had framed this evaluation would be dramatically altered, as anxiety about threats in the Cold War was displaced by confusion about how to deal with the end of the bipolar era. However, the factors which had contributed to a greater awareness of Canada's interests in Asia and the Pacific had been augmented by subsequent developments. In the 1970s and 1980s, Asia had been the fastest-growing source of immigrants to Canada, so that, by 1990, the region accounted for more than half of Canada's new arrivals. According to the national census of 1991, nearly 6 per cent of Canada's population traced their origins to Asia, more than ten times the proportion who had done so in 1951.[53] That direction has been reinforced by the longer-term tendency to look to immigration to sustain Canada's population growth and its economic performance, with the introduction of higher immigration targets for those purposes. In 1996, the seven leading places of origin for immigrants to Canada had all been in Asia.[54]

The trend toward higher trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, which was noted in *Independence and Internationalism*, became even more pronounced afterward. Canada's reliance on trade for prosperity, already high, soared still higher, reaching levels unknown since the end of the Second World War – and these heights were scaled quickly. Exports of goods and services, which had accounted for less than 30 per cent of Canada's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993, approached 40 per cent by the end of 1996. By then, nearly 9 per cent of Canada's exports went to Asia-Pacific countries, compared to less than 7% to European trading partners (including the United Kingdom). Of course, those tallies still did not rival the 81 per cent which flowed south to the United States, but there was in those figures some manifestation of the importance of trade with Asia-Pacific to Canadian prosperity. Before the end of the century, that value has been spotlighted by Team Canada economic missions to the region.[55]

These influences or trends clearly had an impact on a sequence of reviews of Canadian foreign policy associated with the Liberal Party and the government of Jean Chrétien. When in opposition, the Liberals had issued a position paper in May 1992 on Canada's nternational relations which was co-signed by Lloyd Axworthy, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Christine Stewart, later Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa. While acknowledging the continuing importance of immigration, trade and investment in Canada's trans-Pacific relations, that document argued distinctly that more could be done to make Canada "a true partner of the Pacific states" and that previous policy had neglected the "security challenges" there, consequently ignoring Canada's "strategic interests" in the region.[56] The Liberal Party's "Red Book," which detailed its platform for the 1993 general election campaign, restored the emphasis to economic issues. "Expanding trade and investment with the Pacific Rim is crucial to our economic future," it asserted. "Asia has the fastest-growing economies in the world today, and Canada should take advantage of its growing markets for Canadian exports, including food, telecommunications software, environmental and other technology, housing components, and complete homes." The chapter on "An Independent Foreign Policy" focussed more on relations with the United States, items on the multilateral agenda and the "democratization" of Canadian foreign policy than on the directions for Canadian interests and policies.[57]

After the 1993 election, there were inter-related and comprehensive parliamentary reviews of Canada's defence and foreign policies. In its report, *Security in a Changing World*, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy reiterated that "Canada is a Pacific country as well as an Atlantic one," with vital concerns in both areas. "If Canadians want to be able to influence events in the Asia-Pacific region," it observed, "we must show that we have a stake in the region, that we see a Canadian security interest and we are prepared to invest resources in protecting that interest." The recommendations were rather vague, however, more closely approximating exhortations than specific commitments. The committee favoured "a more visible Canadian presence in Pacific waters," near and far, as well as greater capacity to "patrol and protect our coastal waters," without over-reliance on American help. As well, "we need to engage our Pacific neighbours in a continuing dialogue on security issues, if only in recognition that regional problems eventually may affect us directly."[58]

The report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, supported a broadening and deepening of Canada's engagement in Asia-Pacific. "Canada's interest in the region" had been defined as "primarily economic (trade and aid) and political," it noted. "With the end of the Cold War the situation has changed considerably." The committee urged the government to continue and even to enlarge its participation in regional discussions of security, though it doubted that "any regional security body will develop in the near future." Not surprisingly, though, the discussion of Canada's international trade and investment placed still more emphasis on "the rise of Asia" as "without doubt the most momentous event of the latter part of the 20th century." That posed challenges as well as opportunities for Canada. But the prescription was familiar. "Success will depend," the committee advised, "upon Canada's ability to achieve greater market access and to develop initiatives that result in the greatest comparative advantage to Canadian exporters."[59] A position paper prepared for the committee advised that "conditions are not really ripe for the construction of truly effective security institutions on a multilateral basis in the North Pacific region" and that "Canada should have modest expectations and not set our aspirations too high" in that realm of policy.[60] The advice on the global economic situation was more blunt about international circumstances and arguably more ambitious about Canadian policies and prospects. "Globalization is as much a story of the success of Japan and East Asia as the rise of a global economy." Thus, it was in the interest of the public and private sectors, as well as the academic community, "to create the opportunities for Canada to play a more meaningful role in Asia."[61] Responding to the recommendations in the foreign policy report, the government committed itself to "take measures to demonstrate our commitment to the creation of an inclusive, co-operative security dialogue in the Pacific," noting particularly its support of the work of the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] Regional Forum. With respect to trade policy, the government stressed its "Team Canada" missions to the region, as well as high-level engagement (including the prime minister) in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, all with the aim or promoting trans-Pacific economic activity.[62]

On the same day as it responded to the parliamentary committee's recommendations, the government issued a statement entitled *Canada in the World*. In the introduction, it noted that "Canada's geographical location gives it an important advantage as new poles of political power emerge in the Pacific and Latin America." That magnified its other assets in support of "an active Canadian foreign policy" which would "protect and promote Canada's values and interests in the world." As a confirmation of the importance of Asia-Pacific to Canada, the region featured in the elaboration of each of three "key objectives" of Canadian foreign policy: "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and, the projection of Canadian values and culture." The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), which Canada was scheduled to host, was highlighted as a focus of Canadian economic attention and engagement, while concerns about security were more closely linked to discussions with ASEAN.[63] The evident integration of the Asia-Pacific region with the foremost purposes and priorities for Canada in its international relations may not seem as surprising now as it was then, but it certainly distinguished the perception and evaluation of its position and interests in the 1990s from the situation when Louis St. Laurent delivered the Gray Lecture five decades earlier.

The earlier trends in terms of greater flows of investment and trade between Canada and Asia-Pacific, as well as the reliance on the region as a source of immigration for Canada, were sustained as the twentieth century came to a close. Policy pronouncements underlined this reorientation of Canada's global outlook, but the reports on Canada's international relations and their proposed emphases and commitments were, perhaps predictably, overtaken by events, as so often happens with such endeavours. Domestic challenges – the government's fiscal situation and the challenge to national unity associated with the referendum on sovereignty-association in Quebec in 1995 – trumped any international priorities. To deal with chronic deficits and accumulated federal debt, the government instituted two phases of what it called "Program Review" to trim the budgets of departments and agencies. This exercise soon redefined the proposals of the earlier reports as "wishful thinking." Meanwhile, what was left from those plans was often viewed through the lens of relations between Canada and Quebec. In that context, the "Team Canada" trade missions led by the prime minister – which included major ones to Asia Pacific in 1996 and 1997 – fared better than most notions, as these engagements not only furthered the country's economic interests but also demonstrated federal leadership and provincial collaboration.[64] The declaration of 1997 as "Canada's Year of Asia Pacific" came in the wake of budget cuts that called into question the government's capacity to match its lofty words with deeds. The APEC summit in Vancouver, which capped that year, tends to be remembered more for the public demonstrations surrounding it than for the private deliberations and accomplishments of the assembled leaders.[65]

Perhaps the most spectacular example of an assessment or review overtaken by events, however, is one less well known. During the summer of 2001, members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with input from colleagues in other departments, were preparing an "Update" of Canada's international policies. Sometimes fraught discussions on specific commitments and relative budget allocations eventually led to a draft presentation, which was scheduled to be put before a Cabinet sub-committee for discussion on 17 September 2001. However, terrorist actions less than a week before that meeting rendered the text and the recommendations obsolete.

Not surprisingly – especially given the singular importance of the United States to the security and prosperity of Canada – the events of 911 and the American response to that threat prompted a series of efforts to address the shared challenges for the North American neighbours. The continental relationship and the imperative need for effective collaboration between Canada and the United States (and often Mexico as well) were examined under the successive labels of "Smart Borders," the "Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America," and, most recently, the "Beyond the Border" initiative. While a close examination of these initiatives and their implications is beyond the scope of this paper, it is vital to bear in mind this understandable Canadian priority and preoccupation with continental concerns when considering what has happened lately in Canada's relations with Asia-Pacific.

Even with that shift in immediate focus for the Canadian government, the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a continuation of those trends that had been especially pronounced since *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published. Indeed, the impact and implications of such developments were obvious in the pages of the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt yet to guide Canada's external relations, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, which was issued by the government of Paul Martin Jr. in 2005. Although that document, which consisted of an overview and specific papers on foreign policy, international trade, development assistance and defence, would be overtaken by political events – the defeat of the Liberal government one year later – its contents merit a brief glance to show how circumstances and perceptions had changed since St. Laurent delivered the Gray Lecture. In contrast to that speech, the *IPS* included references to the Asia-Pacific region – or individual countries within it – throughout, especially in the volumes on *Diplomacy* and *Commerce*. Moreover, the worry about the impact of diasporas from two decades earlier was now replaced by a hope that Canadians with international connections, whether resident in Canada or abroad, could be enlisted to further "the creation and renewal of bilateral and regional relationships" around the world.[66]

There was no chance to test the validity of this analysis or of the effectiveness of the government's proposals, as Stephen Harper led the Conservatives to victory in the 2006 election, albeit with only a plurality of seats in the House of Commons. In a Policy Declaration in March 2005 and then in its platform for the subsequent election, the Conservative Party had pilloried successive Liberal governments for their approach to Canada's international relations, especially their neglect of the continental partnership. Consequently, initial expectations for the Harper Government centred on a renewed focus on North America. Those documents had pledged party support for "a foreign policy that protects Canada's sovereignty and independence, promotes our national interests (political, economic and strategic), contributes to collective security and defence, promotes democratic principles and human rights, and assists in international development." The hallmark of a Conservative Government, it contended, would be its commitment to principles and its partnership with longstanding allies to advance Canadian values and interests.[67] In keeping with that stance, the new government's first Speech from the Throne highlighted the need to refurbish the relationship with the United States and to restore Canada's international credibility as a contributor and partner.[68]

The Conservative government professed a broad world view and a distinct approach to global affairs, but it had no interest in yet another review of foreign policy, whether as part of a more comprehensive appraisal of Canada's international relations or not. Thus, the *IPS* was shelved and it was not replaced. That did not mean that the government did not have views on foreign and trade policies or defence commitments. Instead of grandiose projections in elaborate documents, however, it made its priorities and plans clear in speeches and statements by the Prime Minister and the responsible ministers, as well as in periodic parliamentary pronouncements such as the Speech from the Throne and reports on the estimates of the respective departments. As these various declarations underlined, the absence of a major review of Canada's international policies did not betoken simply a continuation of past stances and commitments. On the contrary, there was a deliberate effort, especially after the Conservatives formed a majority government following the election of 2 May 2010, to differentiate the government's approach from that of its predecessors and to herald a "principled foreign policy" for Canada. The government pledged to promote "freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world," to help others in need and to safeguard the security and prosperity of Canadians through collaboration with "our friends and allies." Both in tone and content, there was a partisan edge to speeches by Harper and especially those of his fifth foreign minister, John Baird, even as they affirmed that the "values and interests" that they upheld were shared by most Canadians.

Though better relations with the United States had been stressed in the political rhetoric, the comparative attention to Asia-Pacific in government policies and actions was not diminished. On the contrary, the Harper government demonstrated an acute awareness of the implications for Canada's economic prospects of "global re-balancing" – particularly the rise of Asia-Pacific in the world's economy. That was evident not only in speeches and policy statements but also in the travels of the prime minister and senior members of the cabinet. The global economic crisis and the comparatively robust performance of the Canadian economy were often trumpeted, both in Canada and abroad. That attention to what was happening in the wider economic world necessarily meant greater awareness of potential trading and investment partners in Asia-Pacific, notably China and India, as well as other countries in the region.[69] As for immigration, the dominance of Asia-Pacific countries as sources of new arrivals to Canada was still pronounced.[70] Moreover, the responsible minister, Jason Kenney, was certainly a more important minister politically than most of the holders of that portfolio had been in past Canadian governments.

Evidently, since the Gray Lecture and throughout the various reviews of Canadian foreign policy, there have been certain recurring motifs which are especially relevant to the theme of this article. First, and this is especially marked in the later reviews, speeches and policy statements, there has been a recognition of the profound impact of "globalization" on Canada, through flows of trade and investment, sharing of technology, knowledge and information. Thus far, Canada has responded well to this challenge, perhaps because so many aspects of its society and economy have been "international" for so long. Secondly, and often linked to the impact of "globalization" through associated concerns about "competitiveness," both the fiscal realities and the shifting agenda in domestic and international affairs have necessitated frequent reassessments of Canada's priorities and engagements. Even so, the overall framework and the fundamental priorities have remained remarkably stable. On the other hand, it has been a greater challenge to sustain the flexibility to respond effectively to national and international demands – to address what St. Laurent identified as the "applications" of Canada's key principles in foreign policy. To some extent, that need to consider how best to deploy limited resources reinforces the Canadian aptitude and preference–born of necessity, in view of Canada's relative power–for alliance-building and partnerships. The conduct of Canada's international relations already involves significant collaboration, not only with other governments in multilateral settings, but also with non-governmental organisations and the private sector. For reasons both political and practical that trend will likely continue as well.

As successive prime ministers and foreign ministers have stressed, there has not been a "crude choice" or a "zero sum game" involved when Canada has paid more attention to Asia and the Pacific. It should not be assumed that this has meant downgrading or ignoring Canada's historic and continuing European or trans-Atlantic connections, or any other relationships. Moreover, "diversification" in Canada's international relations may be important and beneficial, but Canada still shares a vast continent – and so much more – with a great power which, whatever its relative decline globally, remains, for Canada and Canadians, a vital and formidable neighbour and partner, in North America and around the world. In their evaluations and conduct, both countries must take into account the rise of Asia-Pacific. For Canada especially, non-governmental ties to the region are increasingly vital. That obvious change, however, masks significant elements of continuity in Canada's foreign policy specifically and its international relations more generally.

"A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective," St. Laurent asserted 66 years ago, "must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups in the population."[71] Though the articulation and application of those principles, and the context for decision-making, may have changed over the years, the values identified by St. Laurent then remain vital to Canadians and thus to Canada's foreign policy today. That consistency and continuity suggests that there is a greater consensus on the fundamental purposes and objectives of this country in international affairs than the rhetoric surrounding disagreements over priorities and/or methods sometimes conveys. That interpretation is fortified by a close reading of the successive reviews of Canadian foreign policy – which should never be equated with the broader range of Canada's international engagements – as well as key speeches and policy declarations.

NOTES

1. This text is a major revision and update of a presentation made to the Thirteenth Annual Political Studies Students' Conference at the University of Manitoba on 31 January 1997. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, not the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

2. As in the case with any country, Canada's "international relations" (that is, its varied involvement in international affairs) do not always correspond to the professed objectives or priorities of its "foreign policy" - that distinction must be borne in mind, particularly when considering the reviews of foreign policy as inexact measures of Canada's international relations. Moreover, there has always been a relationship between domestic and foreign policy (that was the case even before Canada had something approximating a "foreign policy" of its own). The maintenance of national unity – the reconciliation of diverse points of view, especially but not only differences between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians – has been an objective in the determination of Canadian foreign policy throughout the post-war era (and, indeed, well before it).

3. Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs," an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto, 13 January 1947, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 47/2. The text is reprinted in R. A. Mackay, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 388-99. Hector Mackenzie, "Shades of Gray? 'The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs' in Context," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, XXXVII, 4 (Winter 2007), 459-73.

4. Notes for an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 13th Annual Conference of Political Studies Students, University of Manitoba, 30 January 1997 (podium version).

5. Perhaps the most indicative recent speeches were: Stephen Harper, "Recovery and New Beginnings," Speech to World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 28 January 2010 (posted on www.pm.gc.ca) and John Baird, "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly," [Speech 2011/30: posted by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada on its website, www.international.gc.ca)].

6. As in the case with any country, Canada's "international relations" (that is, its varied involvement in international affairs) do not always correspond to the professed objectives or priorities of its "foreign policy" - that distinction must be borne in mind, particularly when considering the reviews of foreign policy as inexact measures of Canada's international relations. Moreover, there has always been a relationship between domestic and foreign policy (that was the case even before Canada had something approximating a "foreign policy" of its own). The maintenance of national unity – the reconciliation of diverse points of view, especially but not only differences between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians – has been an objective in the determination of Canadian foreign policy throughout the post-war era (and, indeed, well before it).

7. St. Laurent, "Foundations of Canadian Policy." See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Business as Usual: Relations with China in the 1940s," in Kim Richard Nossal, ed., *An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honour of John W. Holmes* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), 39-55.

8. Hector Mackenzie, "The White Paper on Reconstruction and Canada's Post-War Trade Policy," in Greg Donaghy, ed., *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and their World in 1945* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1997), 167-88; Hector Mackenzie, "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty," in John Hilliker and Mary Halloran, eds., *Diplomatic Documents and their Users* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995), 145-73. Though the Colombo Plan would later provide a framework for development assistance in Asia, its scale was comparatively modest and the initial Canadian contribution was controversial in Cabinet.

9. For a contemporary analysis of Canadian policy, see: H. F. Angus, *Canada and the Far East 1940-1953* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953). For an excellent review of Canada's international relations in the early post-war years, see: Robert A. Spencer, *Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959). Geoffrey Pearson gives considerable attention to the Asian dimensions of his father's diplomacy in his fine study, *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993). See also: Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), chapter 7; Nobuya Bamba and Tadayuki Okuma, "The Postwar Years," in John Schultz and Kimitada Miwi, eds., *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), 125-36; Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion, Canada and the World, 1945-1984* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 73-88; Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy, eds., *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).

10. For information on Canada's diplomatic posts, see: *Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1981), 95-105; J. E. Thibault and Cheryl Moreau, *Canadian Heads of Post Abroad 1880-1989* (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991); John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946-68* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), especially 12-14.

11. Alvyn Austin, *Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 1888-1959* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Peter M. Mitchell, "The Missionary Connection," in Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, eds., *Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China 1949-1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 17-40; A. Hamish Ion, "Ambassadors of the Cross: Canadian Missionaries in Japan," in Schultz and Miwa, *Canada and Japan*, 29-47; Patricia Roy, "Has Canada Made a Difference? North Pacific Connections: Canada, China, and Japan," in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order* (Toronto: Lester, 1992), 125-62.

12. Australia, China, India, New Zealand and the Philippines were founding members of the United Nations. Thailand (1946), Pakistan (1947), Burma (1948) and Indonesia (1950) joined later. Other Asian states were not able to join until the General Assembly resolved the deadlock over new membership whereby the principal adversaries in the Cold War vetoed (in the Security Council) applications by states considered sympathetic to the other side in the conflict.

13. Freda Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," in Paul Painchaud, ed., *From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of Canadian Diplomacy 1945-1985* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1989), 632-36.

14. For the origins of the concession on immigration and the decision to enter into an agreement with India, Pakistan and Ceylon, see: Hector Mackenzie, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations [DCER], Volume 14, 1948* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994), 1316-29; Hector Mackenzie, ed., *DCER, Volume 15, 1949* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995), 1275-78; Greg Donaghy, ed., *DCER, Volume 16, 1950* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996); Greg Donaghy, ed., *DCER, Volume 17, 1951* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997), 1140-42.

15. The estimates for immigration are based on figures for 1956 reproduced in F. H. Leacy, M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley, eds., *Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983), Series A386-416. The census figures for 1951 are from the same source, Series A125-163.

16. John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), chapter 9. John Price, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

17. Hector Mackenzie, "Knight Errant, Cold Warrior or Cautious Ally? Canada on the United Nations Security Council, 1948-49," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, VII, 4 (December 2009), 453-75.

18. Hector Mackenzie, "An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on the Question of India's Membership, 1947-49," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (September 1999), 89-112

19. See, for example, the selection of documents on the question of Indonesia in *DCER 14*, 201-32, as well as Australian cables in Philip Dorling and David Lee, eds., *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949, Volume XIII: Indonesia 1948* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996) and David Lee, ed., *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949, Volume XV: Indonesia 1949* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998). Mackenzie, "Knight Errant," 463-8.

20. C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 414-15; J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, eds., *The Mackenzie King Record, Volume IV, 1947-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 133-53.

21. *DCER 14*, 196-201

22. For analyses of Canadian policy in relation to the Korean War, see especially: Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); and, Steven Hugh Lee, *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).

23. See the discussion of the impact of the Korean War on Canadian (and allied) defence expenditures in David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 19501954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not for Very Long)," in English and Hillmer, *Making a Difference*, 103-24.

24. See Stairs *Diplomacy of Constraint* and Lee, *Outposts of Empire.*

25. The article was published in the American magazine World as a riposte to speculation by American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles about the consequences of direct intervention by China in Indochina. Douglas Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 54-5.

26. Douglas LePan, *Bright Glass of Memory, memoirs by Douglas LePan* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), 145-226.

27. Pearson to Eden, 22 July 1954, quoted in Ross, *Interests of Peace*, 88.

28. For Canadian policy in Indochina in this period, see especially: Lee, *Outposts of Empire*; Ross, *Interests of Peace*; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Indochina: Roots of Complicity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

29. John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," in J. L. Granatstein and R. D. Cuff, eds., *War and Society in North America* (Toronto: Nelson, 1971), 184-99.

30. J. H. Taylor to J. W. Holmes, 22 December 1955, reprinted in bout de papier, XIV, 1, 39-40. See also Hilliker and Barry, *Coming of Age*, 115-21.

31. On Nehru's visit to North America, see: W. E. C. Harrison, *Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957), 217-20. On St. Laurent's world tour, see: John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal & Kingston:

McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 122-3.

32. The theme of a "special relationship" between Canada and India in the early 1950s is presented in two books of recollections by Escott Reid: *Envoy to Nehru* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981) and *Hungary and Suez 1956: A View from New Delhi* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1986). Geoffrey Pearson notes that Lester Pearson believed that the retention of India in the Commonwealth kept a "firm bridge, through that association, between the east and the west." Seize the Day, 25. In *Outposts of Empire* (56, 90-92), Lee sounds a cautionary note about the relative importance of Nehru and India in Pearson's reckoning.

33. For assessments of the foreign policy of the Diefenbaker government, see: H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); J. L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: the Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), especially chapter 3; Denis Smith, *Rogue Tory: the Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter & Ross, 1995); John F. Hilliker, "Diefenbaker and Canadian External Relations," in J. L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), 183-97.

34. Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations 1870-1982* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1983), 113-36.

35. Patrick Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations," in Evans and Frolic, *Reluctant Adversaries, 168-86*; Arthur Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 316-34.

36. Trevor Lloyd, *Canada in World Affairs*, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 201-5.

37. Hilliker and Barry, *Coming of Age*, 318-21.

38. Extracts from statement by the Prime Minister, 29 May 1968, reprinted in Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1980), 335-41. See also the discussion of Trudeau's approach in J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), especially chapter one. On the specific question of recognition of the PRC, see: B. Michael Frolic, "The Trudeau Initiative," Janet Lum, "Recognition and the Toronto Chinese Community," and Arthur Andrew, "'A Reasonable Period of Time': Canada's De-recognition of Nationalist China," all in Evans and Frolic, *Reluctant Adversaries*, 189-252; Maureen Appel Molot, "Canada's Relations with China since 1968," in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., *Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 230-67; John D. Harbron, "Recognizing China, 1970," in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 227-36.

39. Ellen Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 1958 to 1962, had been instrumental in eliminating the "White Canada" policy, a move which was followed by the other principal countries of immigration, the United States (1965) and Australia (1973). Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," 639-43. Ellen Fairclough (ed. Margaret Conrad), *Saturday's Child: Memoirs of Canada's first female cabinet minister* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). The "points system" was introduced in the Immigration Regulations of 1967. It is reproduced in Appendix 2 of Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988 [revised edition]). The figures for origins of population are taken from the 1971 census (reproduced in *Historical Statistics*, Series A125-163. The booklet Pacific in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* refers (10-11) to 120,000 immigrants from the Pacific since 1946 and 19,500 in 1969 alone (the highest single tally for any year until then).

40. Emphasis added to original. The quotation is from page 11 of the first booklet of *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (which bears the same title as the collection). There had been an adverse reaction from those with neither British nor French origins to the seemingly exclusive attention to bilingualism and biculturalism as national policy in Canada. The policy of multiculturalism was adopted in October 1971. A Multiculturalism Act was eventually passed in 1988, though the concept had been endorsed 17 years earlier and then acknowledged in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. See: Mary Halloran, "Multiculturalism and External Policy in the Trudeau Era, 1968-1984," an unpublished paper presented to the meeting of the Canadian Studies Association at Brock University, St. Catharines, in June 1996.

41. Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette; Peter C. Dobell, *Canada in World Affairs, Volume XVII, 1971-1973* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), chapters 9 and 11; Gilles Lalande, *The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism* [Study for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism] (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

42. *Foreign Policy for Canadians: Pacific* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970). The Secretary of State, Mitchell Sharp, announced mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China in the House of Commons on 13 October 1970. The statement is reprinted in Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976*, 143-5. For critical appraisals of Canada's policy at the time of the review, see the article on "Canada and the Pacific" reprinted in John W. Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 161-74; Gilles Lalande, "Les relations avec les pays du Pacific: constantes et perspectives," *International Journal*, XXVI, 1 (Winter 1970-71), 151-77; Peter C. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 103-15.

43. *Historical Statistics*, Series A385-416.

44. Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," 648-57. The Immigration Act was introduced in 1976, passed in 1977 and proclaimed in 1978. It provided statutory recognition of refugees for the first time, in part as an acknowledgement of Canada's obligations under the international Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (which Canada had signed in 1969). Gerald E. Dirks, *Controversy and Complexity: Canadian Immigration Policy during the 1980s* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 24.

45. The "third option" was seen in part as a response to critics of the silence about the United States in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* though it was more precisely a reaction to the economic measures introduced by the Nixon Administration to curb its deficit in international transactions. For the text, see: Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976*, 106-111. The "Framework for Economic Cooperation" between Canada and Japan was signed by prime ministers Trudeau and Miki in Tokyo in October 1976. Its provisions resembled those in the Contractual Link with the European Community. Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 83-85; Bothwell and Granatstein, *Pirouette*, 172-77. For all the attention to "counterweights," Canada's international finance and trade remained dominated by the continental relationship with the United States.

46. On the dispute over representation of China at the Olympics, see: Donald Macintosh and Michael Hawes, *Sport and Canadian Diplomacy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), chapter 3; "Competitive Boycotts: An Olympic Event," *bout de papier*, XIII, 4, 41-2.

47. Totals for the principal refugee flows: Hungary (37,566), Czechoslovakia (11,153), Uganda [Asian origins] (7,000), Chile (6,500), Lebanon (10,800), Haiti (4,500), Portuguese Angolans (2,000), Indochina (81,000). For a review of Canadian policy, see: Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977). The same author has a shorter account, "World Refugees: the Canadian Response," in J. L. Granatstein, ed., *Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), 244-61.

48. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. Appendix EAND-5. Discussion Paper: "Canada in a Changing World – Part I: The Global Framework," 30 November 1979 (tabled June 1980). The study of "Canadian Aid Policy" was tabled as Appendix EAND-6.

49. *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations, presented by Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985). The paper was designed not as "a traditional foreign policy review" but as a stimulus for the parliamentary review to follow (that is, it was a "green paper" rather than a "white paper").50.

50. *Independence and Internationalism. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations* (June 1986). There is a brief analysis of the influence of ethnic groups on Canadian foreign policy in Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, *The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 45-47.

51. *Canada's International Relations – Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons* (December 1986).

52. Speech by SSEA Joe Clark to Asia Pacific Foundation, 22 October 1988; Speech by SSEA Joe Clark to the Corporate Higher Education Forum, Edmonton, 16 May 1989, in Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000*, 146-8.

53. The total who identified their origins as Asian in 1951 was 72,827 out of a national population of 14,009,429 (0.52%). By 1971, the population of Asian origin had risen to 285,400 out of 21,568,310 (1.3%). In the 1981 census, there was no equivalent question about origins. In the 1991 census, the total for Asian origins was 1,607,230 or 5.95% of the Canadian population (26,994,045).

54. In order, with the number of immigrants supplied in 1996 in parentheses, the places of origin were: Hong Kong (29,676), India (20,986), China (17,403), Taiwan (12,031), the Philippines (12,686), Pakistan (7,649) and Sri Lanka (6,044). Also in the top twenty then were South Korea (3,129), which ranked 15th, and Vietnam (2,460), which ranked 19th. Total immigration to Canada in 1996 was 221,184. The practice of projecting desired levels of immigration began in 1980 (when figures were tabled for the following 3 years), as an elaboration of the annual targets required under the Immigration Act of 1976. Actual arrivals did not necessarily correspond to these projections.

55. Statistics from tables prepared by the Trade and Economic Analysis Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the basis of figures supplied by Statistics Canada. The growth of non-governmental activity has been an important barometer of Canada's interest in Asia-Pacific. Lawrence T. Woods, *Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Non-governmental Organizations and International Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993).

56. The covering letter by the Chair (Axworthy) and Vice-Chair (Stewart) of the Liberal Caucus Committee on External Affairs and National Defence described the document as offering highlights of the Liberal Party's "foreign policy platform."

57. Liberal Party of Canada, *Creating Opportunity: the Liberal Plan for Canada* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993).

58. *Security in a Changing World. The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), 9, 11. This theme was emphasized as one of the "key recommendations" in the Summary Report.

59. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, November 1994), 23-4, 28, 35, 79-80.

60. Denis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues," in *Ibid., The Position Papers*, 1-20 [quotation: 17].

61. Sylvia Ostry and Alan Alexandroff, "The Challenge of Global

Trade, Investment and Finance for Canada," in *Ibid., The Position Papers*, 21-62 [quotations: 25, 40].

62. *Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995), 18 [2.8], 34-5 [3.5].

63. *Canada in the World. Government Statement* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995), 9-10. The description of Canada's location and the inventory of objectives were highlighted in the introductory summary (i) as well as the body of the statement.

64. Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2009), 211, 299, 302; Brian W. Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Osler Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11.

65. Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot and Martin Rudner, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1997, Asia Pacific Face-Off* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), especially the chapter by Molot and Hampson, "Asia Pacific Face-Off," 1-20.

66. Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview; Diplomacy; Defence; Commerce; Development* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005).

67. Conservative Party of Canada, Policy Declaration, 19 March 2005; Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada* (2006).

68. Speech from the Throne, 4 April 2006.

69. Wendy Dobson, "Wanted: A Canadian Asia Strategy;" Robin V. Sears, "Catching Asia Fever: Better Late Than Never," *Policy Options*, XXXIII, 4 (April 2012), 25-30; 37-42.

70. In 2010 and 2011, the Philippines overtook the PRC as Canada's single greatest source of immigrants, with India in third place. Pakistan had slipped to eighth in the ranking (it had been consistently fourth from 2002 to 2006), while three Middle Eastern countries (Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq) were also in the top eleven countries. The Republic of Korea, most recently in twelfth place, had often been in the top six before. Figures from the website of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (www.cic.gc.ca), consulted on 26 February 2013.

71. St. Laurent, "Foundations of Canadian Policy," 389. For a later, and more sceptical, assessment of "democratization" and foreign policy, see Peyton V. Lyon, *The Policy Question: A Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 9-10, 12. This theme has been explored critically by Kim Richard Nossal, among others: Kim Richard Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: the Elusive Ideal," in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., *Democracy and Foreign Policy, Canada Among Nations 1995* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 29-43.

Multi-stream Flows Reshape Chinese Communities in Canada: A Human Capital Perspective[1]

Kenny Zhang is a Senior Research Analyst at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada specializing in areas related to Canada-China business and immigration. Mr. Zhang was born in Shanghai, and received his B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from Fudan University, China and the Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands, respectively. He moved to Vancouver in 2000, and joined the Foundation in January 2003. His main research interests include Canada-China trade and investment relations, economics of immigration of Canada with focus on the Canadians abroad. Prior to joining the Foundation, he worked as associate research professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and senior researcher at the Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. Mr. Zhang has been a member of Vancouver Mayor's Working Group on Immigration since 2005. He is also on the Joint Federal Provincial Immigration Advisory Council and the Board Directors of Canada China Business Council (BC Chapter). In January 2012, He was appointed Research Fellow at the Jack Austin Centre for Asia-Pacific Business Studies, Beedie School of Business at Simon Fraser University.

• **Kenny Zhang** est analyste de recherche principal à la Fondation Asie Pacifique du Canada qui se spécialise dans les domaines liés aux affaires Canada-Chine et à l'immigration. M. Zhang est né à Shanghai, et a reçu son BA et une maîtrise, toutes deux en économie, respectivement de l'Université de Fudan en Chine, et de l'Institut d'études sociales aux Pays-Bas. Il a déménagé à Vancouver en 2000, et s'est joint à la Fondation en janvier 2003. Ses principaux intérêts de recherche comprennent les relations de commerce et d'investissement entre le Canada et la Chine et les questions économiques liées l'immigration du Canada mettant l'accent sur les Canadiens à l'étranger. Avant de se joindre à la Fondation, il a travaillé comme professeur agrégé de recherche à la Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences et chercheur principal au Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies à Simon Fraser University, à Vancouver. M. Zhang est membre du Groupe de travail du maire de Vancouver sur l'immigration depuis 2005. Il siège également au Conseil conjoint fédérale-provinciale sur l'immigration et il est membre du Conseil d'administration du Canada China Business Council (section de la C.-B.). En janvier 2012, il a été nommé chargé de recherche au Jack Austin Centre for Asia-Pacific Business Studies, Beedie School of Business à Simon Fraser University.

ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ

China became a major source of immigrants, international students and visitors to Canada at the turn of the 21st century. The human capital exchanges through the multi-stream flows have the potential to affect Canada-China relations in ways that generally are not well understood. This paper provides an overview of the multi-stream flows of people between China and Canada and illustrates how Chinese communities in Canada have been reshaped as a result. Looking through the lens of the human capital exchange, this study will examine some of the key policy implications of this migration in the shaping of Canada-China relations this century.

- La Chine est devenue source majeure d'immigrants, d'étudiants étrangers et de visiteurs au Canada au tournant du 21e siècle. Les échanges de capital humain à travers de multiples avenues ont le potentiel d'affecter les relations Canada-Chine d'une manière qui n'est généralement pas bien comprise. Ce texte donne un aperçu des flux de personnes entre la Chine et le Canada et illustre comment les communautés chinoises au Canada ont été remodelées ce faisant. En regardant à travers une lentille d'échange de capital humain, cette étude permettra d'examiner certaines des conséquences politiques principales de cette migration dans le façonnage des relations actuelles entre le Canada et la Chine.

The contemporary movement of people from China to Canada has a variety of implications for transforming the Chinese communities in Canada. The importance of Chinese communities in Canada has been underestimated for a long time. Chinese immigrants, like all immigrants, have traditionally been seen as suppliers of needed manpower. Too often when people try to measure the contribution of Chinese communities to Canada, they will talk about their higher unemployment numbers, lower earnings and lower tax contributions. Grubel and Grady (2012), for example, point out that immigrants (including Chinese and all others) who arrived in Canada between 1987 and 2004 received about $6,000 more in government services per immigrant in 2005 than they paid in taxes. They conclude these immigrants impose a huge fiscal burden on Canadian taxpayers of between $16 billion and $23 billion annually.[2] Reitz (2011), however, describes the problem of "brain waste" of immigrants in Canada, which costs Canada at least $3 billion a year, not to mention the ruined dreams of the immigrants themselves.[3] Many also talk about the concentration of Chinese communities in cities like Vancouver and Toronto, or about the perception that they may not integrate fully into Canadian society.[4] In fact, the image of Chinese Canadians today is vastly different than it was in the last two centuries when Chinese immigrants were stereotyped as railway coolies, laundrymen and waiters. What the Chinese Canadian community looks like today is as diversified as Canadian society is as a whole.

The current movement of people from China to Canada has also significant implications for bilateral relations between the two countries. Woo and Wang (2009) argue the flow of people between the two countries will be increasingly characterized by two-way movements and by transnational citizens with business, personal, and emotional attachments on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. They further suggest that this nexus of human capital is a unique focal point in relations between Ottawa and Beijing.[5] Zhang (2011a) illustrates some of the trends that have emerged in the flow of people between the two countries and discusses its impact on bilateral relations.[6] Zhang (2011b) suggests that the Chinese communities in Canada and Canadians in China can form the basis for building stronger relations between Canada and China.[7] Li (2011) examines the supply of human capital from China to Canada since the 1990s and discovers that Canada saved about $2.2 billion in education-related expenses by accepting immigrations from China with university degrees between 1991 and 2000. Li further points out that the Canada's gain in human capital from China is discounted because a university degree held by men and women born in the PRC is not regarded as highly as a degree held by other Canadians.[8]

China became a major source of immigrants, international students and visitors to Canada at the turn of the 21st century. The human capital exchanges through the multi-stream flows have the potential to affect Canada-China relations in ways that generally are not well understood.

This paper provides an overview of the multi-stream flows of people between China and Canada and illustrates how Chinese communities in Canada have been reshaped as a result. Looking through the lens of the human capital exchange, this study will examine some of the key policy implications of this migration in the shaping of Canada-China relations this century.

Overview of Multi-stream Flows

Under Canada's current visa provisions, Chinese nationals may come to Canada either as permanent immigrants or temporary residents/visitors. Although the two groups are mutually exclusive at the time they first enter Canada, the two categories often become blurred later on, as some of the temporary entrants switch to become permanent residents.

1. Immigrants

Since 2002, Canada's immigration program has been based on regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The IRPA defines three basic categories of permanent residents: reuniting families, contributing to economic development and protecting refugees.[9] Each of the categories corresponds to major program objectives.

In the first decade of the 21st century, Canada welcomed nearly 2.5 million immigrants from around the world. During this period China was the leading source country, with 337,317 immigrants or 14 percent of the total, followed by India with 11 percent and the Philippines with 8 percent.[10]

Historically, Chinese immigration to Canada dates to 1788 when the first Chinese settled in Canada.[11] But their number declined precipitously under the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited Chinese citizens from immigrating to Canada. In this way, the Chinese were the only ethnic group discriminated against in Canadian history. It was not until 1947 that Canada repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act. And it took another twenty years after that — with the adoption of a points system — that the Chinese were admitted under the same criteria used to accept international applicants from all nations.[12]

It was not until the 1980s, however, that the number of Chinese immigrants to Canada started to grow significantly. Since 1989, the number of new immigrants each year from the People's Republic of China (PRC) has nearly tripled, growing from less than 10,000 a year to a peak of over 40,000 in 2005. That pace slowed to 30,000 a year from 2006-2011, but overall, the PRC has been the top source country of immigrants to Canada between 1998 and 2009 and is currently the third-largest source country of immigrants to Canada overall (see Figure 1).[13]

Figure 1

Immigrants from China to Canada: 2000-2010



Source: CIC, 2010.

2. International Students

The number of Chinese students coming to Canada has grown significantly from just a few hundred a year in the mid-1990s to close to 10,000 a year in the early 2000s. By December 2010, 56,906 Chinese students were studying in Canada, up from just a couple of thousand in the mid-1990s. Today Chinese students make up 19 percent of Canada's annual intake of international students, up from 10 percent in 2000, making China the largest source of international students in Canada. Currently nearly one in four foreign students in Canada is from China.

Figure 2

Students from China to Canada: 2000-2010



Figure 3

Stock of Students from China to Canada: 2000-2010



3. Foreign Workers

Canada established the *Temporary Foreign Worker* (TFW) program in January 1973, which was initially targeted at specific groups such as academics, business executives and engineers — in other words, people with highly specialized skills that were not available in Canada.[15] Historically, Canada has brought in temporary foreign workers from countries ranging from the United States and the Philippines to France, Australia and the United Kingdom. China has not been on the list of major source countries for a long time but their numbers have been rising steadily over the last decade, doubling from 1,166 to 2,393. This trend was driven not only by the needs of Canada's labour market, but also due to the growing number of Chinese investments in Canada and an emerging group of Chinese expats who work for Chinese multinational corporations.[16] The exact number of Chinese expatriates in Canada remains unknown, but the total stock of temporary workers from the PRC dramatically increased from 1,338 to 12,063 over the same decade, putting China in eighth place today. Temporary workers from China represent nearly four percent of the total number of foreign workers in Canada.

Figure 4

Foreign Workers from China to Canada: 2000-2010



4. Tourists

Trips to Canada from the PRC grew at an average rate of 12.2 percent year-over-year between 2000 and 2011, rising from a total of 78,000 to 248,000. (The exception was in 2003, when the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS curtailed much international travel.) The Chinese tourism market holds tremendous growth potential for Canada's economy under the Approved Destination Status (ADS).[17] Canada is now welcoming group tours from China along with business and individual travelers. In the first 12 months after China implemented ADS for Canada, or from June 2010 to May 2011, tourist arrivals from China increased by 25.8 percent on a year-over-year basis. Arrivals from China over the first 11 months of 2011 were 50 percent higher than the same pre-ADS period in 2009. China is currently the fourth biggest contributor of tourists in Canada, up from sixth place in 2010.[18]

Figure 5

Stock of Foreign Workers from China: 2000-2010



Figure 6

Tourists from China to Canada: 2000-2010



Table 1

The flow of people from China to Canada at the turn of the 21st century

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Immigrants											
Arrival	36,750	40,365	33,304	36,251	36,429	42,292	33,078	27,013	29,337	29,051	30,197
Share (%)	16.2	16.1	14.5	16.4	15.5	16.1	13.1	11.4	11.9	11.5	10.8
Rank	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
International Students											
Annual Entry	6,687	11,446		10,140	7,458	7,432	8,988	10,037	13,685	16,401	17,934
Share (%)	9.7	14.2	15.4	14.6	11.3	11.0	12.5	13.6	17.2	19.3	18.7
Rank	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Stock	11,055	20,372	29,744	36,544	39,215	39,502	39,775	41,044	42,124	49,907	56,906
Share (%)	11,055	20,372	29,744	36,544	39,215	39,502	23.4	23.4	23.7	25.5	26.1
Rank	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Foreign Workers											
Annual Entry	1,166	1,193	1,314	1,128	1,289	1,406	1,698	2,657	2,321	2,271	2,393
Share (%)	1	1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.3
Rank	12	13	12	13	14	15	14	12	15	15	14
Stock	1,338	1,574	1,801	1,927	2,393	3,048	4,182	6,618	8,518	10,629	12,063
Share (%)	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.6	3.3	3.4	3.8	4.3
Rank	14	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	9	8	8
Tourists											
Visit (1,000)	74	82	95	77	95	113	139	151	159	160	193
Share of top 15 origins (%)	74	82	95	77	95	113	0.8	0.9	1	1.1	1.3
Rank	74	82	95	77	95	113	9	9	9	8	7

Source:

CIC, Facts and Figures 2008; 2010. Statistics Canada, Travelers to Canada by country of origin, top 15 countries of origin (2000-2010). Statistics Canada, Tourism and the Centre for Education Statistics.

5. Transition from Temporary to Permanent Residents

Canada's immigration system is shifting towards encouraging immigration by young, bilingual, highly skilled immigrants that can help the country replace its aging labour force. In order to attract migrants with the right skills, Canada is opening its doors to more and more temporary workers. The federal government has granted exclusive eligibility to 29 different occupations under the federal skilled worker program and devolved responsibility for immigrant selection to the provinces.[19] In 1998, the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced to give provinces a mechanism with which to respond to economic development needs at the local level. PNP has grown a great deal since then, and in 2010 represented 20 percent of the total economic class of immigrants, up from 0.8 percent in 2001.[20] In September 2008, Canada introduced a new Canadian Experience Class (CEC),[21] which aims to make Canada more competitive in attracting and retaining individuals with the skills the country needs. A total of 6,462 immigrants were selected under the CEC designation during the first two years of the program, making up 1.9 percent of all economic related immigration during the same period.

These programs have paved the way for some immigrants initially classified as temporary to shift their status to permanent residents.[22] From 2001 to 2010, Canada welcomed over 768,000 international students from around the world, of whom over 114,000 were from China (see Table 2). During the same period, more than 83,000 international students made the transition to permanent resident status and 14,000 Chinese students became permanent residents of Canada. The probability of making the leap to permanent resident during that time period was 11 percent for all international student groups and 12 percent for those from the PRC. The majority of 70 percent Chinese students succeeded to permanent residents were gone through the economic classes, including the skilled workers program (41 percent). Chinese students made up 58% of all CEC participants during the first two years of the program.

Similarly, the probability of Chinese temporary workers making the transition to permanent residents is also high. Of the 1.4 million foreign workers entering Canada between 2001 and 2010, 17,000 were from China. During the same period, of the 186,000 foreign workers who became permanent residents in Canada, more than 13,000 were from China. Indeed, nearly 79 percent of the temporary workers from China were granted permanent residency during that period, compared with just 13 percent for workers of other nationalities. And 90 percent of the Chinese workers who were admitted as permanent residents were gone through the economic classes, dominantly by the skilled workers program (36 percent). Finally, Chinese workers made up one-third of all the immigrants who entered Canada under the CEC program.

Table 2

Transition from Temporary to Permanent Resident Status (2001-2010 Aggregated)

	Entry as Foreign Students			Entry as Temporary Foreign Workers		
	From China	From all Sources	Share of Chinese	From China	From all Sources	Share of Chinese
Total Entries as Temporary Residents	114,275	768,218	15	17,480	1,425,330	1
Total Transitions to Permanent Residents	14,240	83,674	17	13,845	186,635	7
Probability of Transition	12%	11%		79%	13%	
Immigration Category						
Economic Immigrants	9,985	63,327	16	12,310	138,811	9
Skilled Workers (PA)	5,770	29,989	19	4,980	47,257	11
Provincial/Territorial Nominees (PA)	185	745	25	2,940	23,566	12
Canadian Experience Class (PA)**	110	191	58	1,435	3,774	38
Other Economic Immigrants*	3,875	32,315	12	2,885	64,214	4
Family Class	3,665	17,298	21	1,470	46,186	3
Refugees and Others	605	3,049	20	55	1,638	3

Note:

PA - Principal applicants. Due to privacy considerations, the figures in this table have been subjected to random rounding. As a result of random rounding, data may not add up to the totals indicated.

* Includes spouses and dependants. ** Aggregate data from 2009 and 2010.

Source:

CIC, RDM, Facts and Figures 2010. Data request tracking number: RE-12.0382.

Re-Shaping Chinese Communities

Accelerated globalization and international migration have reshaped diaspora communities in many host countries. In Canada, the multi-stream flows from China are re-shaping the diversity of Chinese communities in the same way as it does for the entire Canadian society.

1. Diversified Chinese Communities

The Canadian Census (2006) reported that over 1.3 million people in Canada claim their ethnic origin as Chinese.[23] This makes the Chinese community the eighth-largest ethnic group in Canada and the largest of Asian origin. However, the Chinese community in Canada has changed, is changing, and will continue to change in many ways that will ultimately have an impact on Canada-China relations.

There is no longer a homogenous Chinese community in Canada. Differences in demographic background, human capital endowment, and migration experience have all contributed to the diversity of Canada's Chinese communities. People of Chinese ethnic origin are not necessarily newcomers to Canada. Some of them were born in Canada and their families may have lived in Canada for more than two generations. And within the Chinese community, Canada-born Chinese (CBC) has become a significant group. The 2006 Canadian Census reported that 27.4 percent of respondents who claimed they were ethnic Chinese were born in Canada. It also found that 14.3 percent were second generation and 2.3 percent were third generation or more, even if the majority, or 83.4 percent, were first-generation Canadians.[24] In addition, 77 percent of the Chinese population holds Canadian citizenship only. Five percent possess both Canadian and at least one other citizenship, and another 18 percent had not yet become Canadian citizens.

Ethnic Chinese groups also may have achieved different levels of fluency in Canada's two official languages. The census found that nearly 86 percent had some knowledge of English, French or both. Only 14 percent claimed they had no knowledge of English or French. Nearly one in five ethnic Chinese reported English or French as their mother tongue. Seventy-nine percent indicated neither English nor French was their mother tongue. One third reported they spoke English or French most often at home, with about 60 percent saying they spoke other languages most often at home. The number of respondents with a Chinese language as their mother tongue grew from less than 100,000 in 1971 to nearly 900,000 in 2001 and over one million in 2006. However, the respondents who reported a Chinese language as their mother tongue may actually speak different dialects. In the 2006 census, Chinese languages were broken down into seven major languages: Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka, Taiwanese, Chaochow (Teochow), Fukien and Shanghainese, as well as a residual category (Chinese languages not otherwise specified).

Chinese immigrants may also be admitted to Canada under three streams: an economic one, based on human capital facts; a kinship one, the "family reunification" program; and a humanitarian one, the refugee acceptance program. Currently, 73 percent of immigrants to Canada from the PRC are admitted as economic immigrants, including skilled workers, professionals, investors and entrepreneurs. Nearly one in five immigrants from China is gaining entry as a relative of family members who already live in Canada. By contrast, only a small margin is being admitted to Canada on humanitarian grounds. Less than 30 years ago, immigrants from the PRC were mainly relatives of people who had already emigrated to Canada, or over 90 percent of the total (see Figure 3). Recently, a growing number of international students and temporary workers from China to Canada have added to the diversity of local Chinese communities.

Figure 7

Chinese Immigrants to Canada by Category, 1980-2010



Sources: Wang and Lo, 2005; CIC, Facts and Figures, 2001; 2002; 2010.
* Includes all residual categories.

Chinese are most visible in the provinces of British Columbia (10 percent), Ontario (5 percent) and Alberta (4 percent). In other parts of Canada, the odds of seeing a Chinese person are close to or less than one in a hundred. Chinese are concentrated in major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and more recently, Calgary.

To sum up, the image of Chinese Canadians today is vastly different than it was in the last two centuries when Chinese immigrants were stereotyped as railway coolies, laundrymen and waiters. Hollywood exaggerated the stereotype with movies about opium dens, celestials in pig-tails with knives hidden up their silk sleeves, slant-eyed beauties with bound feet and ancient love potions.[25] What the Chinese Canadian community looks like today is as diversified as Canadian society is as a whole.

2. Human Capital Exchange

By 2010, the number of permanent and temporary international migrants worldwide reached an estimated 215 million. Of those, a significant number were highly skilled people including university students, nurses, IT specialists, researchers, executives, managers, and intra-company transferees. In OECD countries alone, there are more than 20 million highly skilled immigrants in 2010.[26] Nowadays, the highly skilled are more likely than the less skilled to move across national borders. Docquier and Rapoport (2005) have estimated that the worldwide average emigration rates amounted to 1.1 percent for the low skilled, 1.8 percent for the medium skilled and 5.4 percent for the high skilled workers in 2000. Between 1990 and 2000 they estimated that the worldwide average rate of emigration of skilled and medium-skilled workers had risen by 0.4 percentage points, against decrease of 0.1 percentage points for low-skilled workers.[27]

Today, the flow of people between China and Canada has become varied and complex, reflecting the changing economic and social circumstances of the two economies, the evolving relationship between Beijing and Ottawa, and priorities in immigration and visa policies in each country. China's development strategy is undergoing major changes, shifting from low-end manufacturing towards greater investment in education, science and technology, and research and development. In line with the Chinese government's objective to transform its economic growth model, the National Medium and Long-term Talent Development Plan was developed to create a highly skilled national workforce by 2020. Programs such as the Thousand Talents Program, will help China become one of the magnets attracting international talent including Canadians. Canada is changing too. The Canadian economy and its international competitiveness increasingly rely on the country's capacity for innovation. The Canadian population is aging and immigration is increasingly becoming a major source of labour in the workforce growth. Shifts in Canada's immigration policy have been made to attract top talent from around the world, allowing foreigners to study, visit, work and immigrate to Canada.

In the contexts of human flows between China and Canada, Li's (2011) finding that Canada saved about $2.2 billion in education-related expenses by accepting immigrations from China with university degrees between 1991 and 2000, is a classic example of the kinds of human capital links that exist between countries sending and accepting immigrants. Nevertheless, the multi-stream flows have painted more complicated pictures of human capital linkages between the two countries. China constitutes an important source of international brain flow to meet Canada's human resource needs. Between 2001 and 2010, China supplied a total of 5,470 PhDs, 34,760 people with Masters degrees and nearly 100,000 university graduates to Canada.[28] Chinese immigrants have dominated the increase of foreign-born PhDs in Canada, outnumbering the U.S. and U.K., the two dominant sources prior to 1981. The U.S. share went from a high of 24% during the 1971-1980 period to a low of 6% over the 1991-2000 period, while China's share went up from a low of 2% to a high of 25%.[29] In the past decade, China supplied nearly 70,000 professionals from all occupations; 25,000 managers including 2,400 senior ones; and 14,000 skilled workers and technicians.[30]

Diversified Chinese communities play a crucial role in the accumulation of human capital for Canada and will continue to do so for many future generations. This is particularly true in terms of teachers at Canadian schools and universities. On the one hand, staff of Chinese origin represented the largest minority group, 28.2 percent of all minority faculty or 4.2 percent of the total Canadian university staff as of 2006.[31] And as of September 2010, of the 1,845 Canada Research Chair positions, nearly 100 or 5 percent identified as Chinese, including those from the PRC, HKSAR and Taiwan.[32] On the other hand, children from Chinese families have the highest university completion rate (62 percent) among 25-to-34-year-olds in 2006, compared to 24 percent of children of Canadian born families.[33] Like other Canadians, Chinese children typically select four areas as their major fields of study in post-secondary education: business, management and public administration; architecture, engineering and related technologies; health, parks, recreation and fitness; social and behavioral sciences, and law.[34]

The various skills that Chinese immigrants, students and temporary workers contribute to Canadian economy are well documented. For example, the 2006 census reported that Chinese are more likely to work in occupations related to applied sciences and business, such as natural and applied sciences and related occupations; processing, manufacturing and utilities; business, finance and administrative occupations and sales and service. Perhaps not surprisingly, Chinese are more visible than average Canadians in accommodation and food services (restaurant jobs); professional, scientific and technical services (accountants and lawyers); finance and insurance (bank jobs); manufacturing (general labour) and wholesale trade (import and export). However, Chinese are less likely than average Canadians to work in construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; health care, social assistance, and public administration. Similarly, it is often reported in the Chinese media that Chinese immigrant communities have experienced significate upward skill mobility from traditional Three Knives (A kitchen knife, Tailor scissors, Shaving knife) to the more modern professions of (lawyers, engineers, doctors, accountants, senior technicians and university professors).[35]

There are many other contributions that Chinese communities make, however, that are less well-known. Despite financial funds that business immigrants contribute upon admission to Canada,[36] their entrepreneurship and international business skills are less appreciated. From 2001 to 2010, over 52,000 business immigrants arrived from China to Canada but it has been difficult for many of them to figure out how to connect with local business partners, *vice versa*.

The business benefits of diaspora networks have been observed by many.[37] The transnational networks can have the same effects for the host societies. As an essay in The Economist (2010) pointed out, in the case of the U.S., immigration provides legions of unofficial ambassadors, deal-brokers, recruiters and boosters. Immigrants not only bring the best ideas from around the world to North American shores; but they are also a conduit for spreading American ideas and ideals in their homelands, thus increasing the "soft power" of their adoptive country.[38] The same holds true for Canada.

Transnational links also take place in knowledge sharing and innovation. As *The Economist* also pointed out that in Silicon Valley, more than half of all Chinese and Indian scientists and engineers reported having shared information about technology and business opportunities with people in their native countries. At the same time, as people in emerging markets continue to innovate, North America will find it ever more useful to have so many citizens who can tap into the latest information from cities like Mumbai and Shanghai.[39] In Lin, Guan and Nicholson's study (2008), the authors identify specific roles of internationally educated Chinese transnational entrepreneurs in linking Canada and China in innovation activities. Their study finds that the innovation links established and maintained by Chinese transnational entrepreneurs who concurrently engage in business in Canada and China, but keep Canada as home base.[40] Furthermore, the local knowledge immigrants have of their home countries reduces the cost of doing business for the U.S. and Canadian firms.[41]

Conclusion: Changing Games in the 21st Century

The turn of the 21st century witnessed an increasing flow of people moving from China to Canada. Greater freedom of movement in and out of China and the growing affluence of Chinese citizens is rapidly changing the pattern of people flows and broadening them to include tourists, students and professional workers. These game-changing dynamics have transformed the Chinese communities in Canada and broadened public policy implications. What the Chinese Canadian community looks like today is as diversified as Canadian society is as a whole.

Despite its visibility and diversity, the majority of Canadians of Chinese origin feel a strong sense of belonging to Canada. In 2002, 76 percent of those who reported Chinese origins said they had a strong sense of belonging to Canada. At the same time, 58 percent said they had a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. Canadians of Chinese origin also actively participate in Canadian society. For example, 64 percent of those who were eligible to vote reported doing so in the 2000 federal election, while 60 percent said they voted in the last provincial election. In addition, about 35 percent reported that they had participated in an organization such as a sports team or community association.[42] Major-General Victor G. Odlum (1880-1971), who during his career served as Canada's ambassador to China, once called for the day when Chinese Canadians would "not be distinguished from other Canadians." That wish remains as relevant today as it was during Odlum's lifetime.[43]

While the scale of the people flow is growing, the real focal point is the exchange of human capital. It is likely to continue to be a central part of policy discussion in the future. One layer of the policy issue is obviously related to visa and immigration programs. However the exchange of human capital between the two countries requires more policy thinking than that.

Canada needs a smarter, more proactive and collaborative approach in addressing this exchange of human capital in the 21st century. A smarter policy will ensure that Canada brings in international talent of all kinds for the benefit of all Canadians.[44] A more proactive approach would help Canada be prepared for broader human capital issues. For instance, when Canada welcomes newcomers, it should also embrace its own diaspora, especially when they return.[45] There is a need for a welcome package designed for returning Canadians, including things such as re-settlement services and international credential recognition.[46]

The most challenging area perhaps is collaborating with Chinese counterparts. There is notable friction in a wide range of issues related to human capital exchange between the two countries. Canada recognizes dual citizenship, but China doesn't, which has already caused tensions in the implementation of the Consular Agreement.[47] There is a tax treaty between Ottawa and Beijing for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.[48] However, bilateral agreements on social security (especial the employment insurance and pension arrangements)[49] and health care have not yet been achieved, both of which are critical. In China, the internationalization of skills and experiences is highly valued, while Canadian employers only look at Canadian credentials and experience. As a result, it is no wonder that there are many agreements or MOUs in science and education collaboration at various levels and fields, while Canada has only one MRA with China for accountants and one with HKSAR for engineers.[50]

Of all the reasons for Canada to have a robust and forward-looking China policy, people-to-people linkages is arguably the most fundamental. Seen in this light, the nexus of Canada-China human capital is a unique focal point for developing relations between Ottawa and Beijing. While other countries are lining up to sign trade and investment deals with China, Canada can go a step further and investigate the possibility of an agreement on human capital. Such an agreement could encompass issues such as citizenship, visas, education and training, professional accreditation, social security, healthcare, taxation and even extradition. Given the large number of Canadians and Chinese with deep connections across the Pacific, it is a certainty that these bilateral issues will become bigger policy challenges for Beijing and Ottawa in the years ahead. There is an opportunity now to address these issues in a comprehensive way and to turn potential problems into a competitive advantage.

NOTES

1. This work was carried out with the aid of grants from the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, and the Province of British Columbia, Victoria, under the auspices of the Canada-China Human Capital Dialogue.

2. Grubel and Grady, 2012.

3. Reitz, 2011.

4. Examples refer to works by Johnson, 1979; Guo and DeVoretz, 2006.

5. Woo and Wang, 2009.

6. Zhang, 2011a.

7. Zhang, 2011b.

8. Li, 2011.

9. CIC, 2011.

10. CIC, 2011.

11. CBC News Online, June 10, 2004.

12. UBC Library, Online; Lee, 1984; CCNC Toronto, Online; Li, 1998; 2005.

13. CIC, various years.

14. CIC, 2011.

15. Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010. In addition to the TFW program, there are other provisions including multilateral arrangement such as GATS and NAFTA, which allow foreign workers to enter Canada on a temporary basis.

16. The Economist, 2010.

17. The ADS scheme is a bilateral tourism arrangement that facilitates travel by Chinese tour groups to other countries. The ADS was granted to Canada in June 2010 and the first flights from China to Canada started arriving in August 2010. To date, China has granted 135 countries and regions ADS.

18. CTC, 2012.

19. Reitmmigrating to Canada. (CIC, 2008)

22. For more details about these programs, please refer to CIC, 2010; CIC, 2011b.

23. Statistics Canada, 2006 Census data products. Ethnic origin refers to the ethnic or cultural origin of a respondent's ancestors, as defined by the 2006 census. The 2006 census also reported 17,705 Taiwanese and 4,275 Tibetans. The 2011 census results related to this breakdown were not available at the time this paper was prepared.

24. Ibid. First generation refers to persons born outside of Canada. Second generation refers to persons born inside Canada with at least one parent born outside of Canada. Third generation refers to persons born inside Canada with both parents born inside Canada.

25. Lee, 1984:178.

26. The World Bank, 2010; Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2005; University of Sussex, 2007.

27. Docquier and Marfouk, 2005.

28. CIC, 2011.

29. Gluszynski and Peters, 2005.

30. CIC, 2011.

31. CAUT, 2011.

32. Zha, 2012

33. Garnett and Hou, 2011.

34. Statistics Canada, 2006 Census.

35. Xinhua News, 2007; Iask.com, 2012.

36. About 120,000 business immigrants landed in Greater Vancouver from 1980- 2001. These immigrants brought to Vancouver total funds of $35-40 billion (Ley, 2011).

37. The Economist, Nov 19th 2011.

38. The Economist, Apr 22nd 2010.

39. Ibid, Apr 22nd 2010.

40. Lin, Guan, and Nicholson, 2008.

41. Ibid, Apr 22nd 2010.

42. Lindsay, 2001.

43. Lee, 1984:169.

44. Papademetriou, 2003; Kuptsch and Pang, 2006.

45. Zhang, 2006; 2007.

46. There was a 'Brain Gain' pilot project launched in Ontario in Jan 2011. It is a joint effort by the federal and provincial governments to reverse the brain drain. It is aimed at making it easier for Canadians abroad to bring their skills home and contribute to the Canada of tomorrow (CIC, 2011c).

47. DFAIT, 2007.

48. Department of Finance Canada, Online.

49. Canada has signed social security agreement with 54 countries, but China is not included. Service Canada, Online.

50. CIC, 2012.

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Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora Politics in Canada: A Thirty-Year Retrospective

Amarnath Amarasingam is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University. He is the author of *Pain, Pride, and Politics: Sri Lankan Tamil Activism in Canada* (under contract with The University of Georgia Press) as well as several academic articles and book chapters. His research interests are in diaspora politics, social movements, radicalization and terrorism, media studies, and the sociology of religion.

• **Amarnath Amarasingam** est chercheur post-doctoral au Centre for Refugee Studies de York University. Il est l'auteur de *Pain, Pride, and Politics: Sri Lankan Tamil Activism in Canada* (sous contrat avec University of Georgia Press), ainsi que plusieurs articles scientifiques et chapitres de livres. Ses intérêts de recherche portent sur la politique des diasporas, les mouvements sociaux, la radicalisation et le terrorisme, les études de médias, et la sociologie de la religion.

ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ

The year 2013 marks the thirtieth anniversary of what became known as Black July. Most Tamils in Canada have a story to tell about Black July, from hiding in fear from Sinhalese mobs to stories of shelter provided by Sinhalese strangers they would never have the chance to thank. This short paper seeks to provide a fairly descriptive exploration of Tamil diaspora politics in Canada, a thirty-year retrospective, examining how the community slowly transformed itself from one focused on settlement issues to issues of mobilization. I briefly examine below the Canadian immigration context during the 1980s that "facilitated" the arrival of Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada before moving on to an exploration of organizational dynamics from the late 1970s to 2009.

• L'année 2013 marque le trentième anniversaire de ce qui est maintenant connu sous le nom de « Juillet noir ». La plupart des Tamouls au Canada ont une histoire à raconter sur cet événement, des histoires de gens devant se cacher dans la crainte des masses cinghalaises aux histoires d'abris fournis par des étrangers cinghalais qu'ils n'auront jamais eu la chance de remercier. Ce bref texte vise à fournir une exploration assez descriptive de la politique entourant la diaspora tamoule au Canada, une rétrospective de trente ans, en examinant comment la communauté s'est peu à peu transformée, étant axée au départ sur les questions d'établissement jusqu'aux questions plus récentes de mobilisation. J'examine brièvement ci-dessous le contexte de l'immigration canadienne au cours des années 1980 qui a « facilité » l'arrivée des Tamouls du Sri Lanka au Canada, avant de passer à une exploration de la dynamique organisationnelle à partir des années 1970 à 2009.

"Shoot! I am telling you, shoot! Shoot and run!" Seelan bellowed. Seelan was demanding that his childhood friend Aruna kill him and escape. Aruna saw tears in Seelan's eyes as Aruna pointed the gun and fired. Seelan collapsed dead (Swamy 1994, 88). A sudden death in the small village of Messalai in northern Sri Lanka would be the catalyst for what was to become one of the most damaging periods in Sri Lankan history. Seelan and Aruna were both Tamil Tiger cadres, and were being pursued by government forces when Seelan demanded that he be sacrificed. Seelan was one of Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's closest friends, and his death would kick-start a series of events culminating in a week of violence in July 1983 that would forever change the course of ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. The year 2013 marks the thirtieth anniversary of what became known as Black July. Following the violence of July 1983, ethnic tensions in the country would evolve from non-violent approaches to militant ones and give rise to a protracted civil war that would not end until May 2009. The war would lead to the movement of Tamils out of Sri Lanka and into countries like Canada in increasingly dramatic numbers. As such, 2013 is also significant for Canadian Tamils. "Shoot! I am telling you, shoot! Shoot and run!" Seelan bellowed. Seelan was demanding that his childhood friend Aruna kill him and escape. Aruna saw tears in Seelan's eyes as Aruna pointed the gun and fired. Seelan collapsed dead (Swamy 1994, 88). A sudden death in the small village of Messalai in northern Sri Lanka would be the catalyst for what was to become one of the most damaging periods in Sri Lankan history. Seelan and Aruna were both Tamil Tiger cadres, and were being pursued by government forces when Seelan demanded that he be sacrificed. Seelan was one of Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's closest friends, and his death would kick-start a series of events culminating in a week of violence in July 1983 that would forever change the course of ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. The year 2013 marks the thirtieth anniversary of what became known as Black July. Following the violence of July 1983, ethnic tensions in the country would evolve from non-violent approaches to militant ones and give rise to a protracted civil war that would not end until May 2009. The war would lead to the movement of Tamils out of Sri Lanka and into countries like Canada in increasingly dramatic numbers. As such, 2013 is also significant for Canadian Tamils.

When Prabhakaran received the news of Seelan's death, he went silent and plotted vengeance. A plan was hatched to ambush a military convoy on a narrow road in Tinneveli. On the night of July 23, a 15-man army patrol codenamed Four Four Bravo left camp and approached Tinneveli. Mines had been laid and the Tigers were putting the final touches on the detonators when the army patrol neared the site. As they drew nearer to the ambush, a heavy explosion sent the jeep flying into the air and the Tiger cadres opened fire, killing thirteen of the fifteen soldiers as they scrambled out of the truck. Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene tried to keep the funeral for the dead soldiers from turning into a political demonstration. However, plans would not go smoothly. The arrival of the bodies from Jaffna to Colombo on July 24 was delayed by several hours, and the funeral had to be cancelled. In the meantime, a large group of people had gathered at the cemetery. As hours passed, the crowd grew more agitated. Around 10 p.m., violence erupted.

The rioting on this night continued for another week. Hundreds of Tamil and Indian businesses were burned, homes were destroyed, and many were beaten, shot, or burned alive in their houses or vehicles. Many women were raped or forced to exhibit themselves in front of heckling crowds of people (Richardson 2005, 524; Tambiah 1986; Piyadasa 1984). Perhaps the most famous incident occurred at the Welikade maximum-security prison, about four miles north of Colombo. On the afternoon of July 25, Sinhalese prisoners gained entry into the wing of the prison holding Tamil political detainees, and killed thirty-five of them with knives and clubs while guards stood by. Two days later, another eighteen were killed at the prison (Hoole et al 1990, 64-65). Estimates of the number of people killed range from two hundred to two thousand, mostly Tamil. In addition to lives lost, the events of July 1983 also forced some 100,000 Tamils into refugee camps when their homes, vehicles, shops and belongings were destroyed. Around 30,000 people also became unemployed due to work sites being destroyed (Bandarage 2009, 105). A key element of many survivor stories is the random act of kindness provided by some in the Sinhalese community. As one Sinhalese individual recalled to me recently: "I was completely shattered for months (I was actually hospitalized for exhaustion) after running around transporting my friends and unknown Tamil-speaking families to safe places. We had nearly 15 people in our house."

Prior to Black July, many Tamils sympathized with the idea of separatism, but were wary of an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan government. Most militant movements in the early 1980s were small and fledgling organizations. In the early days, the Tamil Tigers were quite selective in their recruitment of cadres. A former LTTE cadre I spoke with in Toronto told me that at the time, the "LTTE was very careful in taking people. They didn't just take a bunch of people. They had studied the people, looked at their background...they would give a person the run-around and then only take him in." After Black July, there was a marked increase in membership among all of the Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government's response to Black July was dismal. As A.J. Wilson (2000, 113-114) has argued, "President Jayewardene was unequal to the task. At first he seemed numbed and unable to confront the crisis, but he then proceeded from blunder to blunder. He appeared on television on 26 July 1983 with the purpose of assuaging the fears and hysteria of the Sinhalese people, but he did not utter a word of regret to the large number of Tamils who had suffered from Sinhalese thuggery masked by nationalist zeal." What Wilson calls Jayewardene's "ultimate blunder," however, was the passing of the Sixth Amendment in August 1983. The Amendment outlawed support for a separate state within Sri Lanka, and required all Members of Parliament to take an oath of allegiance "to the unitary state of Sri Lanka."

The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a separatist political party, refused to take the oath. As Asoka Bandarage (2009, 110-111) points out, "The TULF was committed to separatism, but it was also the main opposition party in parliament and the only democratic political voice of the Tamils." Refusing to take the oath abjuring separatism, the TULF leadership left for Tamil Nadu. With the TULF gone, armed Tamil militant groups began to fill the vacuum. Over the next several decades, Sri Lanka would descend into a protracted civil war -- one of the bloodiest in recent memory. As noted, the story of Black July also runs as an important thread through Canadian Tamil history. The Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) has done an admirable job in collecting some personal testimonies from survivors now living in Canada. Their website, Black July 83: Remembering Silenced Voices, was founded on the 25th anniversary of Black July in 2008. As one CTC member told me, "We wanted it to become an online Black July museum of sorts accumulating these testimonials over the years into the future. We knew these testimonials were an integral part of Tamil Canadian history as this incident triggered a large number of Tamils to flee to countries like Canada."

Most Tamils in Canada have a story to tell about Black July, from hiding in fear from Sinhalese mobs to stories of shelter provided by Sinhalese strangers they would never have the chance to thank. Three decades later, the memory of Black July continues to serve as a reminder of Tamil grievances and a potent symbol for political mobilization. This short paper seeks to provide a fairly descriptive exploration of Tamil diaspora politics in Canada, a thirty-year retrospective, examining how the community slowly transformed itself from one focused on settlement issues to issues of mobilization. I briefly examine below the Canadian immigration context during the 1980s that "facilitated" the arrival of Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada before moving on to an exploration of organizational dynamics from the late 1970s to 2009. After the civil war in Sri Lanka came to an end in May 2009, a variety of different organizations have arisen to continue the fight to rectify the difficulties experienced by the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. However, due to space constraints, the complexities of the post-war period cannot be examined here.

The Canadian Immigration Context and Early Organizational Dynamics

The fact that Canada is host to the largest population of Sri Lankan Tamils outside of Sri Lanka itself was not a matter of sheer chance, but a result of shifts in Canadian immigration and refugee policy, as well as lobbying efforts by early members of the Tamil community in Canada. The earliest Sri Lankan migrants to Canada were Burghers, and it is estimated that between 1946 and 1955, about 27 individuals migrated to Canada (Chandrasekere 2008, 11). Sinhalese and Tamils started arriving after 1956, but the numbers remained fairly small, with the total number of immigrants not exceeding 5,000 by 1970. As Chandrasekere (2008, 12-13) points out, these early migrants represented "only one segment of the Sri Lankan society – the Westernized middle class," most of whom came with enough money to support themselves and their families, as well as with a high level of education.

In the late 1960s, according to members of the early Sri Lankan Tamil community in Canada, most Tamils were part of a South Indian/Sri Lankan Tamil cultural organization called Bharathi Kala Manram, which remains active to this day. Most of the Tamil cultural events, for both South Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils, took place as part of this organization. As the Sri Lankan Tamil population increased in Canada, and as ethnic tensions heightened in Sri Lanka, the community conceived of a separate organization for themselves, focused on more socio-political issues.[1] This group, known as the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada (TESOC), was registered as a non-profit organization in 1978 with the late Nagaratnam Sivalingam serving as the first president.[2]

Following the violence of July 1983 in Sri Lanka that heightened the ethnic conflict on the island, militancy would soon come to replace parliamentary politics, and tens of thousands of people, mostly Tamil, would leave the country over the next three decades. Many of them would arrive in Canada. The post-1983 migration of Sri Lankan Tamils to Canada, composed primarily of individual fleeing an increasingly brutal civil war, was distinct from the waves of Sri Lankans who had arrived in Canada prior to Black July. In the immediate aftermath of Black July, TESOC sprung into action and organized a meeting to discuss what could be done to help those suffering in Sri Lanka. The organization approached the Canadian government and was instrumental in bringing about a Special Measures Program for Sri Lanka beginning September 1, 1983 (Aruliah 1994; Adelman 1991).

In Canadian immigration policy, a special measures program, generally used in cases of war rather than persecution, indicates that when people in Canada make family sponsorship claims for their first and second-degree relatives, they will be considered by the Visa officers in a more sympathetic way than would normally be the case. Going by the points system, a major shift in immigration policy instituted in 1967 that awards specific points to would-be applicants on the basis of various criteria such as age, education, occupation, and whether or not the applicant has a kinship network already settled in Canada, those who are being sponsored generally received 'bonus' points for having a relative in Canada, but still had to achieve the minimum number of points in order to be admitted. When a Special Measures program is in place for a particular country, points become less relevant.

In its initial wording, the Special Measures Program dealt with the entire Sri Lankan population. As one of the early members of TESOC told me, "one day, somebody called me and blasted me over the phone. He asked, 'what the hell have you guys done with this Special program? I went there to see a family member, and there were mostly Sinhalese there'. So, we knew we had to improve the program. We talked to the immigration people in government and it was changed to 'affected people' from Sri Lanka. Not Sri Lankans in general, but only affected people. It has to be non-discriminatory. You cannot say 'Tamil'." While a Special Measures program was put in place for Sri Lanka in September 1983, leading to about 1,873 people arriving through the program, it was coupled with a new Visa requirement for the country on 8 September 1983 (Adelman 1991, 183, 214; see also Girard 1990, 115; Matas 1989, 73-76).

Until 1983, individuals travelling from Sri Lanka to Canada did not need a Visa. As Dirks (1995, 51) notes, "From time to time Canada has linked a visa requirement to its special humanitarian programs. When a refugee-producing situation arises in a particular country, like the ones that occurred in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Sri Lanka during the early and mid-1980s, Canada has promptly instituted a visa requirement for the nationals of that state in an attempt to prevent a self-selected movement of refugees from reaching this country."

Prior to the Special Measures program, Canadian immigration policy had already gone through significant changes. Until the mid-1960s, Canada received people from its traditional source regions – mostly Europe and the United States. Pressure to modify such policies had been building inside and outside the country from the late 1950s. As Dirks (1995, 10) has pointed out, the world was changing: "European empires had dissolved, giving rise to dozens of newly independent states in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. Canada endeavored to establish and maintain good relations with these new governments. Having an immigration policy that in practice excluded nonwhites substantially impeded these efforts." Within Canada, interest groups ranging from churches to community organizations had also been criticizing the policy for its discriminatory elements.

In fact, from the end of World War II until 1962, immigration to Canada was mostly a matter of ministerial instruction and discretion. The "policy" at the time was largely based on Prime Minister Mackenzie King's 1947 speech in the House of Commons, during which he argued that while Canada would encourage immigration, it would be careful to ensure that it did not change the "fundamental composition" of the country. As Michael Molloy, a former official with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, told me:

> *That was sort of the fundamental thing. I've got a copy of an old immigration manual that was issued in the mid-1950s, and that letter from Mackenzie King is right there, front and center. That's the basic policy that there was. Immigration ministers would open the door or shut the door on the basis of whatever moved them, whether there were labor shortages or there was unemployment. There was no real structure. Visa officers were sent abroad and told to select people who made good immigrants or who have family here.*

As international criticism over discriminatory aspects of Canadian immigration policies increased, particularly at the United Nations and within the Commonwealth, decisions were made to change the "White Canada immigration policy" (Knowles 2007, 187). On 19 January 1962, Ellen Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, tabled new regulations in the House of Commons that eliminated "racial discrimination as a major feature of Canada's immigration policy" (Knowles 2007, 187). According to Molloy, even though the racially discriminatory policy was removed, it was not necessarily replaced with anything. Moving away, then, from an almost exclusive focus on the United States and Europe, the Canadian government began speaking of a "universal" immigration policy, an objective standard by which immigration from all parts of the world could be facilitated.

In 1967, the government instituted the points system, part of a policy whereby the eligibility of applicants for landed immigrant status (called permanent residency after 1976) would be decided according to a new set of criteria. The points system effectively erased any formal discrimination embedded in the country's immigration policies. That same year, the Immigration department was separated from Citizenship and fused with the Manpower department to form the Department of Manpower and Immigration. The move was indicative of the way in which immigration was now being conceived – as inextricably tied to the labour market and the needs of the Canadian economy (Dirks 1995, 11). Such large-scale changes would produce a radical redrawing of the demographic map of Canada, so that by 1981, one-third of Canadians were neither of British nor French origin (Dirks 1995, 11).

In 1970, members of the government discussed the pressing issue of refugee selection criteria—by then Canada had developed a more universal immigration policy and had also signed the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees as well as the 1967 Protocol. Out of these extended discussions arose what was known as Operational Memorandum 17, communicated to immigration officials around the world in January 1971. "When you are dealing with a person claiming to be a refugee, you have to first determine whether they meet the definition of a refugee according to the universal definition," Molloy explained when describing the content of the Memorandum, "and, second, determine whether they are admissible – in other words, can you imagine them being successfully established in Canada." The Memorandum was the basis on which refugee selection for resettlement in Canada was determined from 1971 to 1978.

With these policies in place, the landscape of Canada began to change. To help deal more systematically with these shifting demographics, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau appointed Robert Andras as the Minister of Manpower and Immigration in November 1972. Andras got to work on developing a new Canadian immigration policy, and after some years of public debate and drafting, the 1976 Immigration Act was born. The changes outlined in the Act were so sweeping that it took the government two years to implement them. The Act provided for four classes of admissible immigrants: family class, assisted relatives, independent immigrants, and refugees. Throughout the 1980s, the family class—generally defined as members of the nuclear family—has accounted for most of the immigration into Canada, including from Sri Lanka. The fact that the category did not accommodate distant relatives, who would otherwise be forced to qualify to enter the country based on more rigorous criteria, was a point of contention for many ethnic groups in Canada who lobbied policy makers to extend the definition of family.

Unlike family reunification, which had been a part of Canadian immigration policy since World War II, refugees had not been given firm statutory recognition prior to the 1976 Act. With the act, refugees could effectively bypass the points system so long as they passed other mandatory health and criminal tests. Canada's changing refugee policies paralleled the rising tide of global refugees fleeing civil wars, as well as religious, ethnic, or political persecution. Between 1970 and 1993, the global refugee population increased from 2.5 million people to over 18 million, and the number of refugees selected for admission to Canada similarly rose from 7,300 in 1977 to 52,300 in 1991 (23 percent of the total immigrant intake) (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 381; see also DeVoretz et al. 2004). What was more controversial perhaps was the rise in 'spontaneous arrivals' claiming asylum at Canadian borders or from within the country. This number reached a previously unprecedented high of 37,000 in 1992, increasing from a few hundred in the 1970s and a few thousand in the 1980s (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 381; see also Creese 1992).

With the 1976 Immigration Act, along with the refugee admission provisions, immigration officials were being pushed to reconsider the rigid parameters of what it means to qualify as a refugee as established in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Dirks 1995, 24; Creese 1992, 127; Lanphier 1990). Scott Heatherington, a retired diplomat and former head of Refugee Affairs for the Immigration Department, explained to me how at the time there was a "recognition that that there were special classes of people who were in circumstances where the refugee definition didn't help them. They were in refugee-like situations, but would not meet the definition of a refugee." Shortly after the Special Measures program was instituted for Sri Lanka, TESOC continued to lobby the Canadian government to include Sri Lanka in the "designated class" category, one that allowed people in "refugee-like situations" to gain entry into Canada. As one former member of TESOC recalled, "We were still not satisfied. We were pestering the government to include Sri Lanka as part of the designated class. You know that they are affected people, and there is a problem in Sri Lanka. We encountered very sympathetic departmental members in External Affairs as well as in Immigration, but they wouldn't accept Sri Lankans as part of the designated class." When asked why TESOC's request was denied, Raphael Girard noted that, "there was no standing population of Sri Lankans outside of the country that we felt had to be resettled in Canada. Sri Lankans were all over Western Europe, the United States, and Australia. This wasn't a resettlement movement that needed a Designated Class. Besides, we were getting a much bigger number than one would think our share would be from Sri Lanka, with which we really had very limited ties up until then." However, Tamils from Sri Lanka continued to arrive in Canada, in large numbers, throughout the 1980s.

While the Special Measures Program was integral in facilitating such an influx, the Tamil community also benefited from what scholars have called the "turbulent" 1980s in Canada, during which the refugee determination system underwent a period of instability set off in large part by the Supreme Court's Singh decision in April 1985. The case involved seven individuals who were attempting to claim convention refugee status based upon fear of persecution in their countries of origin. Denied their claims, an appeal was brought to the Supreme Court. The Court's decision altered the way refugee status is determined by granting those claiming refugee status nearly the same rights given to citizens, established in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Knowles 2007, 226). The most significant of these was the right to an oral hearing before the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB).

The previous system had allowed people to appeal the decision on their refugee status, but did not offer the option of an oral hearing. With the Singh decision's mandate for oral hearings for refugee claimants, the Immigration Appeal Board, which had a statutory limit of ten members, quickly became overwhelmed. As Raphael Girard told me, "Through the period of 1983 to 1989, the government was preoccupied with the breakdown of the refugee determination system. With the Singh decision in 1985, what had been a backlog of perhaps manageable proportion of claims quickly became totally unmanageable." Following the Singh decision, the government concluded that, with around 63,000 refugee claimants in the system, it would simply be impossible to provide each of them with an oral hearing. In an attempt to rectify the situation, officials held an administrative review in 1986 from which refugee claimants who had arrived in the country before May 21, 1986 were allowed permanent residency after having passed a medical examination and a criminal background check. The 1986 administrative review (or ADR) was not popular with everyone at the time. As Girard lamented:

> *The Singh decision effectively brought removals to a halt from Canada. Anybody who would say, 'I'm a Convention refugee' could not be removed. You had a situation of the country being unable to remove anybody who didn't want to go. So, the ADR came into effect. Stupid move. A blind, doctrinaire response from a Minister who didn't understand the world of spontaneous migration, and for three years, we continued to accumulate cases of claims we couldn't process. The ADR solved some 20,000 cases, but it didn't solve the problem. The problem was only tackled front on when the new refugee determination system came into effect in 1989 (see also Anderson 2010, 953).*

Girard went on to explain that it was likely that "the most numerous beneficiaries of the ADR were Sri Lankans because they were one of the bigger populations in the backlog. But, it wasn't for them. It was simply to clear out the backlog of cases that we would never have time to deal with" (see also Aruliah 1994).

Even with the 1986 ADR helping to clear up some of the accumulating backlog of cases, the claims continued, and between 1986 and 1989, there were over 120,000 new claims, with a very high percentage of them from Sri Lanka. On 28 December 1988, Barbara McDougall, the Minister of Immigration, announced the Backlog Clearance Program, just before the revised refugee determination system was put into place in 1 January 1989, so that, as Girard tells me, "the new system didn't start with a backlog of 125,000 claims." In 1988, there were 11,045 claimants from Sri Lanka in the backlog, making up about nine percent of the total number (Mangat 1995, 41).

In other words, while most policies were not put into place to directly address the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers from Sri Lanka, Tamil migrants nevertheless benefited from the period of 'turbulence' that marked Canadian immigration and refugee determination in the 1980s. While Tamils arrived in Canada through all the classes of admissibility outlined in the 1976 Immigration Act, the family class and the convention refugee categories accounted for 56 percent of arrivals (around 27,000 people) between 1980 and 1993 – benefiting greatly from the Special Measures Program as well as the 1986 and 1988 backlog clearance programs (Aruliah 1994, 13). In 1989 the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board was created as part of the revised refugee determination system. From that year to 1998, the percentage of Tamil refugee claimants had a success rate of 80 percent, while the average remained between 60 and70 percent (Wayland 2003, 69).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, tens of thousands of Tamils arrived in Canada and settled in large metropolitan cities like Toronto and Montreal. Growing up in the early 1990s, the "Tamil character" of municipalities like Scarborough was not readily apparent to me. However, by the late 1990s, the density of the Tamil population in Scarborough became a running joke among friends. Dozens of weekly newspapers, television programs, businesses, restaurants, theatres, temples and churches, Tamil language classes for the youth, as well as violent gangs became increasingly prevalent. The concentration of the Tamil population in Toronto, as well as the broader transnational character of the city, is itself an important aspect of the political context that allows not only for diasporic identity formation, but also political mobilization. It is to an examination of diaspora mobilization, around issues of settlement as well as transnational politics, that we now turn.

The Canadian Immigration Context and Early Organizational Dynamics

The Sri Lankan Tamil community in Canada was organizing itself as early as the late 1960s, well before waves of Tamils arrived following Black July. But it wasn't until the establishment of TESOC in the late 1970s that organizing took a turn from cultural concerns to socio-political ones. Since then, the Tamil diaspora has been consistently active in creating lobby groups designed to influence Canadian foreign policy, as well as service-oriented organizations which seek to aid the Tamil community in Canada. Discussions about the creation of TESOC started shortly after the 1977 elections in Sri Lanka and the riots that occurred thereafter. The Sri Lankan government's dismal response to the rioting and the death of hundreds of Tamils on the island made clear to many in the diaspora community that they had to form an organization in Canada to lobby on their behalf. Shortly after the elections, the Sri Lankan Minister of Justice Kanapathipillai William Devanayagam was visiting Canada and held a meeting organized by former Supreme Court Judge, and the then Sri Lankan High Commissioner in Ottawa, H.W. Thambiah. According to an early member of TESOC, "I was not at that meeting, but I understood from people who spoke to me afterwards that it was not a good one, and that the High Commissioner in particular and Minister Devanayagam had hinted at consequences to people's families – people who had asked hard questions. This frankly outraged the community here."

Within a week or two, a town hall meeting was called and it was decided that an organization should be created in Canada that could provide support for the notion of "Tamil Eelam" as well as the Vaddukoddai Resolution, with its separatist platform. TESOC functioned throughout the late 1970s, and gradually developed a very strong relationship with the Canadian government. Not only was TESOC instrumental in helping to institute the Special Measures Program for Sri Lanka in 1983, but when a Tamil migrant ship unexpectedly arrived on the coast of Newfoundland in 1986, TESOC worked closely with the government in helping them to get settled. As one early member described of the episode, "Our relationship with the government at that time was so good. We made one or two phone calls and we were on a plane to Newfoundland to bring them to Montreal and Toronto. Imagine, the government quickly facilitating this, giving us two planes, to bring all the people out of Newfoundland because there's no way they can sustain themselves there."

There was some controversy at the time with a number of community members, euphemistically identified as "Colombo Tamils", who were reluctant to join an organization which contained "Tamil Eelam" as part of its name, assuming that this reflected an expressed sympathy for separatism as well as Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. A parallel organization that arose in part to differentiate themselves from TESOC was the Society for the Aid of Ceylon Minorities (SACEM), formally incorporated on 25 November 1983. According to many respondents, a point on which TESOC and SACEM differed was whether to provide support to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and its 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution. The use of the term "Ceylon Minorities" also caused backlash from some members of the Tamil community who argued that Sri Lankan Tamils were not a minority, but a nation unto themselves. As one early member of SACEM pointed out, "we didn't choose the name from that perspective. We chose it because at that time, we wanted to include Muslims from Sri Lanka also." While TESOC and SACEM engaged in similar projects, there was very little inclination from both parties to work together. In an attempt to account for the hostility, a former member of SACEM pointed out that there was a sense of "elitism" among some members of SACEM that precluded any joint initiatives with TESOC. As he recalled:

> *The thing is, SACEM included a number of the individuals who came in the 1970s and while they were willing to help the newcomers, they were not particularly fond of them [laughs]. They thought of them as interlopers and saw themselves as the elite, ignoring the rather limited evidence that substantiated this perception. They also had this particular mindset and looked down on the new crowd. They didn't much like the independence struggle back home. These are people who came in the 1970s when the situation was much better in Sri Lanka, and they sort of viewed the struggle through that particular lens… I remember having a spirited discussion with one of these people who arrived earlier, and he was railing against the crime in the community, and pointing out that before 'these refugees came', there was no crime [laughs] completely oblivious to the fact that he was comparing the incidence of crime in a community that was previously composed of approximately 400 families against a current strength of 50,000 to 100,000 people. So, that's the kind of attitude we were dealing with [laughs].*

SACEM, while failing to develop as strong a relationship with the Canadian government as TESOC, succeeded in providing some much-needed help to the early Tamil immigrants that arrived in Canada. Both organizations would begin to focus much of their efforts on settlement issues as the immigrant and refugee influx increased. As an early member of SACEM recalled, "After the 1983 riots, people started coming here, and those days the main problem was there was no shelter where they could stay. Nowadays, when anybody comes, there are already family members here to help them. But, in 1983, very few Tamils were here." One of their major projects in the early 1980s was the building of what came to be known as the Tamil Co-op Homes, currently located in the west-end of Toronto. With the completion of this cooperative housing project in 1984, a grant application was submitted to the City of Toronto, in order to have one of the units within the co-op allocated for new arrivals. As one former member of SACEM pointed out:

> *With that grant, we rented an apartment within the Tamil Co-op Homes, and had refugees from Sri Lanka stay in it for three or four months until they found their feet. And they basically stayed there free of charge, until they got their Social Insurance Number, their work permit, etc. And then we also helped them, once they started earning some money, moving them out and finding them other accommodations so that they could move on with their lives… SACEM in later years failed to submit a valid proposal to the City and lost the grant as well as the apartment.*

A third organization, created in 1986, was the World Tamil Movement (WTM). Very little of any substance is written about the organization, and many members were reluctant to talk on the record about what exactly the group set out to do (see Bell 2004). According to most respondents, however, the WTM was the "Canadian arm" of the LTTE, and was tasked with not only raising money for the Tigers, but also keeping alive the sentiment of Tamil nationalism in the diaspora. In interviews with members of TESOC, SACEM, and almost all other Tamil organizations in the diaspora, it became clear that WTM, right from its founding, attempted to make inroads into these groups, or at least dictate the parameters of the conversation taking place in diaspora organizations with respect to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Indeed, the LTTE seems to have realized fairly early that the diaspora community around the world would be an invaluable resource not only for financial assistance, but also for organizing demonstrations and lobbying for international intervention when needed. Even in the early 1990s, the Tamil community in Canada held conferences, organized protests attended by thousands, and engaged in lobbying efforts on behalf of the LTTE and the social movement it represented (Wayland 2003, 71; see also Chalk 1999; Levy 1995). When I asked a former member of TESOC about the influence of WTM on the organization, he responded, "WTM was in the background. We never knew their role, or what they were doing or anything like that. We didn't know what they were doing. Whether they were in the money-collection business or what." Another early member of TESOC told me:

> *We began confronting after a while the inroads of the World Tamil Movement, who began to even infiltrate the Tamil Eelam Society, and got people elected or appointed, who began to dominate the organization. Now, this is not a very good experience for a democratic organization. I understand their motivations, which is that they thought we were not doing enough to advocate for Tamil Eelam. From my perspective, it was more that they wanted to control the community. The takeover of the organization was pretty successfully done.*

Even with WTM encroachment, both TESOC and SACEM continued with much of their activities. Following the 1988 backlog clearance program, TESOC approached the Canadian government and, as one former member explained it, "told them that we wanted to provide the settlement services ourselves." In 1990, TESOC was formally converted from a socio-cultural and advocacy group into a settlement organization, and began to receive funding from the Canadian government. The organization began focusing much of its efforts on running computer training sessions as well as language classes for new arrivals. As government funding arrived, according to some respondents, there was also increased interest from WTM. As one of the early members of TESOC lamented, "I regret converting TESOC into a settlement organization. I regret it now, looking back. Because it's an advocacy group… When the money came into it, then there was severe interest from WTM. That's when I left." TESOC's reputation would also be detrimentally affected by events in Sri Lanka. Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, international opinion changed with respect to the LTTE. "Everything changed after the murder," one former member of TESOC recalled, "The External Affairs office basically locked the door and threw away the key for the Tamil community."

SACEM was also undergoing similar changes in the mid-1990s. The organization's focus had shifted from providing shelter for new arrivals to issues of settlement and integration. As one member pointed out, "The need is no longer shelter, but health, youth education, and integration with the mainstream. Those are the issues we face. So, we had many seminars. One of the seminars was on volunteerism, and was done in conjunction with five Tamil organizations in Canada. We organized other seminars on addiction, internet and computer skills, youth violence, and career issues for youth, and so on." In 1991, one of the seminars organized by SACEM was to help foster small businesses in the Tamil community. At that seminar, a special committee to deal solely with businesses, entrepreneurship, and volunteerism was established. This special committee went on to function independently as the Canadian Tamil

Chamber of Commerce (CTCC), largely under the leadership and guidance of the late Joseph Augustine Jeyanathan. The CTCC is currently one of the premier organizations dedicated to fostering entrepreneurship and volunteerism in the Canadian Tamil community. SACEM, especially in the 2000s, rarely engaged in diaspora politics or political lobbying, and continues its mandate as a service-oriented organization. In 2008, SACEM, while preserving the acronym, officially changed its name to Society for the Aid of Community Empowerment.

Another organization that formed in the late 1980s was the Tamil Resource Centre (TRC), a small leftist group, made up largely of former militants who were expelled from groups like the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) by the LTTE. Started in Canada in 1989, the TRC to this day functions rather independently from other diaspora organizations, and is highly critical of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. As one of the founding members told me, when the group started "the LTTE front organizations were forcing people to give them money, and forcing them to adopt their views. So, we didn't accept that and said we were fighting for the alternative views for the people. Also, we are based on human rights, and we criticized any militant movement which turned against the people. And we were also criticizing the government." The purpose of the organization was to bring about an "alternative voice," and while many members of the TRC were part of militant movements in Sri Lanka, they forcefully denounced the human rights violations of the LTTE. As such, they soon received threats from LTTE supporters in the diaspora. Their offices and their library were twice – in 1989 and in 1994 – targeted by arsonists.

In 1994, the TRC publicly mourned the death of Sabaratnam Sabalingam, a journalist killed by LTTE supporters in Paris for writing an "exposé" about Prabhakaran (Sivaram 1994). A few weeks after the TRC event, their library in Toronto, containing some 3000 rare manuscripts, was burned to the ground. While they are deeply critical of the LTTE, the TRC has attempted to highlight the pluralism of the Tamil community through its Thedaham library, Thedal journal, Thavani theatre, as well as study circles and seminars. When the Canadian government banned the LTTE in 2006, the TRC perhaps counter intuitively organized a meeting criticizing the ban. They argued that the Canadian government was wrong to take sides. As one member of the TRC told me, "Canada should remain neutral, or ban both sides, since the Sri Lankan government is practicing state terrorism against the people as well." TRC no longer has an office, and their membership today stands at about twenty people. Current members have argued that since they are highly critical of the LTTE, widespread support has been out of reach. They point out that in order to become leaders in the Tamil diaspora in Canada, you have to be selectively critical of human rights violations, and manipulate public opinion. "We are not willing to do that just to achieve a leadership position," one member said.

With the number of Tamil diaspora organizations steadily increasing, an effort was made in the early 1990s to form an umbrella organization. In 1992, TESOC, SACEM, WTM, and seven other organizations came together to form the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT)[3t]. The president of FACT would be chosen, every six months, from one of the constituent organizations. While each group maintained its own identity, they worked together whenever there was a common cause. The main goal of FACT was to have an organization that could presumably speak on behalf of the whole Tamil community in Canada. As one of the former leaders of FACT told me in his Toronto home, "We were involved in lobbying and trying to put across to the Canadian government the fact that the people in Tamil Eelam were being oppressed, and undergoing persecution at the hands of the Sri Lankan government."

According to many respondents, by the early 1990s, both TESOC and SACEM had many members who were sympathetic to WTM as well as the notion of a separate Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. When asked why SACEM joined FACT, one former member of SACEM told me:

> *At that time, essentially SACEM's board had been taken over by the recent arrivals, and there was only one or two left of the old guard. So, the recent arrivals were either Tiger-supporters or those who, while against the tactics of the Tigers, accepted them as the only saviors of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Or they recognized that FACT was basically a mouthpiece of the Tigers. And people liked that, and they felt like that under the circumstances it was the way to go... showing a united front to the Canadian government would have considerable benefits for the struggle over there. They all believed that. And even if some of them had misgivings over some of the tactics of the Tigers, they swallowed those misgivings feeling that a united front would give us considerable political benefits.*

In 1990, the Tigers sent one of its veteran operatives, Manickavasagam Suresh, to Toronto (Bell 2004, 37). "He was the man responsible for the entire running of the World Tamil Movement," a former leader of FACT recalled. "He's the key man. He came as a refugee, and his appointment was probably made by the Tigers." Suresh was arrested on 18 October 1995 on charges of being a member of an organization which engages in terrorism. After his arrest, FACT and WTM started a Free Suresh campaign that portrayed him as a political prisoner, and a human rights activist (Bell 2004, 55). At the time, the LTTE was not classified as a terrorist organization in Canada, but according to one respondent who was heavily involved in the Free Suresh campaign, "the Canadian government had unofficially declared the LTTE as a terrorist organization, which we were not aware of at the time."

After a heated legal battle, Suresh was declared a danger to Canadian security and a deportation order was issued in 1997 (Bell 2004, 56). After appealing his case all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, it was ruled on 11 January 2002 that "the appellant Suresh made a prima facie case showing a substantial risk of torture if deported to Sri Lanka, and that his hearing did not provide the procedural safeguards required to protect his right not to be expelled to a risk of torture or death. This means that the case must be remanded to the Minister for reconsideration. The immediate result is that Suresh will remain in Canada until his new hearing is complete" (Suresh v. Canada 2002). As of this writing, more than a full decade after the Supreme Court decision, Suresh is still in Canada, and by most accounts, his status in the country will remain in limbo for the foreseeable future.

Although the Canadian government's stance on the LTTE had already begun to change following the decision by the Tigers, in April 1995, to withdraw from peace talks, it wasn't until April 2006 that the LTTE was officially proscribed as a terrorist organization in Canada. One year later, in April 2007, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) raided the offices of WTM and hauled away several boxes filled with documents. The RCMP investigation, known as Project Osaluki, was one of numerous similar probes launched in the United States, France, and Great Britain to weaken diaspora networks engaged in fundraising for the LTTE. Investigative journalist Stewart Bell (2007), reporting on the incident, discovering that following their raid on WTM offices,

> *Police found Tamil Tiger flags, manuals on missile guidance systems, books encouraging suicide bombings and paperwork they claim is evidence of terrorist fundraising. Also seized were 'comprehensive lists' of ethnic Tamils living in Canada that showed the amount of money each had donated. Lists of business donors and cancelled cheques to the WTM were found as well, many of them in excess of $10,000.*

Following the raid and the ensuing investigation, the World Tamil Movement was also banned as a terrorist organization in June 2008 for its role as a "known and leading front organization for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam." The Canadian government concluded that, "WTM representatives canvas for donations amongst the Canadian Tamil population, and have been involved in acts of intimidation and extortion to secure funds" (Public Safety Canada 2008).

As the World Tamil Movement increasingly came under the scrutiny of the Canadian government, FACT and its constituent organizations also experienced heightened attention. The United States State Department had identified both organizations as "front groups" for the LTTE, which it had designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. While FACT spokespersons are quoted in newspapers throughout the 1990s as representatives of the Tamil community in Canada, the organization underwent a public beating following its annual fundraising dinner on 6 May 2000. The dinner, organized yearly to raise funds for the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in Sri Lanka, was attended by federal Finance Minister Paul Martin and Maria Minna, the Minister for International Cooperation. Following the dinner, both Martin and Minna were heavily criticized in the media for attending an event hosted by a terrorist "front" organization. John Thompson, the director of the Mackenzie Institute, published an article in *The Ottawa Citizen* titled, "Dining with Tamil Terrorists", in which he asked "Would Paul Martin and Maria Minna accept a dinner invite from the IRA or the Mafia?" (Thompson 2000).

With negative attention on the rise, a meeting was convened in late 2000 to discuss the future of FACT. As one member who was present at the meeting recalled, an announcement was made that "the activities of FACT had been interdicted/stayed. When I asked for the reasons I was told that it was on the advice of some Liberal Members of Parliament who were of the opinion that FACT is considered a front organization of the LTTE by governments, including the U.S. State Department. This was of course true. That was the last time anything was heard about FACT." What precisely occurred after FACT was "put on hold" seems to be a matter of some debate. According to former members of FACT, the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) was created as a replacement in October of that year, and initially envisioned as a broader umbrella organization in the diaspora community. Most early members of CTC, however, vehemently disagree with the characterization that CTC was created to replace FACT. They note, for example, that planning with respect to CTC had begun months prior to the decline of FACT and that this planning took place without any communication or consultation with members of FACT. Many of those I spoke with explained that while the timing of the collapse of FACT and the birth of CTC do indeed coincide, it would be grossly inaccurate to then conclude that one was created to replace the other. The birth of CTC, they insist, has its roots not in FACT, but in the Canadian Tamil Youth Development Centre (CanTYD), an organization that arose as a response to a period of heightened gang violence in the Tamil community in Toronto in the late 1990s.

A bloody war between rival gangs – AK Kannan in the east-end of Toronto and the VVT (named for the Sri Lankan town of Valvettithurai) in the west-end – had led to the deaths of dozens of Tamil youth that decade. As one of the founders of CanTYD told me later, "Basically, we didn't want any more shooting in the community. We didn't want youth, especially, to spoil their future…as recent graduates, we felt that we were able to provide the leadership to the youth at that point in time and then take initiative." On 27 December 1997, Kapilan Palasanthiran, a first-year physics major at the University of Waterloo, was shot dead in the crossfire between the rival gangs at a doughnut shop in Toronto that was known as a hangout for AK Kannan. Palasanthiran's death became a rallying cry for the community and according to one of the founders of CanTYD, was very much in the media and "gave us the initial push to do something urgently and immediately" to address the issue (Edwards and Yum 1997). As such, CanTYD was founded in February 1998 by around seventeen Tamil youth in Toronto. Tamil gang violence began to decline in Toronto in the early 2000s following the arrest and subsequent deportation orders of several gang leaders as part of 'Project 1050,' a joint police and immigration investigation in Toronto. A reporter at the *Toronto Star* noted that the investigation "ended with the arrest of close to 51 alleged gang members on October 18, 2001. The majority of the accused were charged under a section of the immigration act that prohibits involvement in a criminal organization, marking the first time street gangs were classified as 'organized crime' under immigration laws" (Shephard 2006).

While CanTYD was successful in addressing many of the issues that Tamil youth were facing at the time, the community as a whole had many other concerns as well. The founders of CTC felt that the Tamil community lacked a strong organization that could advocate, from a rights-based approach, on behalf of the Tamil community in Canada, and that organizations like FACT did not have the tools to perform this much-needed role. As one respondent noted:

> *The youth issue was a smaller issue and the community issues were bigger issues but by the time that we had formed CanTYD and then had rallied a lot of youth together to get involved, we had enough resources within the community and we had identified enough resources to say that we could actually try and tackle some of the other bigger issues that we as a community were facing. So, most of the people that were initially part of CanTYD also became co-founders of CTC.*

While it was created in 2000, the CTC did not receive widespread support from the Tamil community in Canada at the time, and went through a period of dormancy between 2004 and 2005. Explaining why CTC was initially unpopular, one recent member pointed out, "I guess at that point the community was so focused on just pumping all of their energy and resources into the homeland struggle alone. So I'm not sure if the community was ready for a concept like CTC." In 2005, under the leadership of Danton Thurairajah, Piragal Thiru and others, CTC experienced a kind of rebirth, and by many accounts functions today as the leading mainstream organization advocating for the Tamil community in Canada. However, the accusation that CTC was once closely associated with FACT and WTM has often "tainted" the organization, and some in the diaspora as well as in Sri Lanka continue to argue that CTC is an LTTE "front organization." Following CTC's annual charity Walk-a-Thon in 2011, for instance, the Sunday Observer in Sri Lanka lambasted Amnesty International (AI) for accepting donations from an LTTE front group. Amnesty International issued a statement stating that the CTC's donations "in no way impair the independence of Amnesty International – which is nonpartisan and works on human rights issues around the globe" (Amnesty International 2012).

The CTC would continue to have a strong influence on diaspora politics in the post-war period, as would the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO), a transnational group that seems to have arisen following visits made by Tamil youth from around the world to the Vanni region during the 2002 peace process. These youth met with the leadership of the LTTE and returned to their respective countries with the expressed purpose of mobilizing young Tamils, and keeping nationalist sentiment alive in the diaspora. TYO Canada was started in 2003, and recruits members from Tamil Student Associations (TSAs) in universities around Ontario, at times influencing TSAs' agendas in the process. Leading up to May 2009, TSAs around Ontario held fasts, awareness campaigns, and mini-demonstrations at their respective campuses. While many in the community accuse TYO of "radicalizing the youth," they simultaneously openly express a commitment to Canadian society, and Canadian values. They also feel that they have a duty to ensure that Tamil youth do not forget their past, particularly the many sacrifices made throughout the war. This sentiment can be traced to Prabhakaran's 27 November 2008 Heroes Day speech, during which he states, "I would also take this opportunity to express my affection and my praise to our Tamil youth living outside our homeland for the prominent and committed role they play in actively contributing towards the liberation of our nation" (TamilNet 2008). Many youth in the diaspora believe that Prabhakaran foresaw the imminent defeat of the LTTE, or at least an admission that the armed conflict phase of the movement had done everything possible, and "passed the torch" of the liberation struggle to them during this speech.

With the bloody defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, this "passing of the torch" to the Tamil diaspora around the world has resulted in continued mobilization, leadership struggles, as well as a kind of "soul searching" among many Tamil youth in the diaspora as they think more deeply about events in Sri Lanka and their role in positively impacting the lives of Tamils and other minorities in the country. What has been quite evident over the last several years following the end of the war is that diaspora politics is not dying down. Indeed, it is evolving into something more permanent and sustained, characterized by, among other things, continued community mobilization and the bureaucratization of post-war organizations, designed to maintain consistent and long-term pressure on the ruling parties in Sri Lanka. However, as this article has shown, it is important to recognize the diversity that exists within the diaspora community, and even with respect to diaspora *politics*. While this has been a characteristic of diaspora politics all along – in its evolution from settlement to mobilization – it is even more prevalent in the post-war period. This is significant as the Tamil diaspora around the world has often been derided as the "pro-Tiger diaspora" or as blind followers of Tiger propaganda. While these terms would certainly be accurate in describing some individuals in the diaspora, including many of my respondents, such a homogenous grouping of individuals residing in various countries and differing political contexts around the world would be deeply inaccurate.

While most commentators acknowledge that there is no such thing as *the* Tamil diaspora – identifying the diversity that exists in the community – such recognition usually does not go far enough. In other words, acknowledging this diversity has often been confined to dividing the community into, on the one hand, a 'moderate majority' and, on the other hand, a 'pro-Tiger' bloc. This article attempted to show that such divisions are largely meaningless. In the post-war period, many Tamil youth I spoke with appreciate the diversity of opinions that have prevailed after May 2009, and believe that it will only strengthen the diaspora's ability to tackle problems affecting the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Others in the community, including many post-war Tamil organizations, lament that what seems like diversity is, in fact, the diaspora's continued inability to present itself as a unified bloc to adequately address issues on the island. These conversations will likely continue for some time, but what is perhaps important to note is that the persistence of this debate is itself a noteworthy, and perhaps even unique, characteristic of post-war diaspora politics.

These changing notions of diaspora involvement in the politics of Sri Lanka have only heightened in breadth and intensity since I completed my fieldwork. During my ongoing participant observation and subsequent follow up interviews, it is clear that the commitment of the Tamil diaspora in Canada to continue the push for war crimes investigations, post-war demilitarization, and devolution of powers or self-determination continues unabated. A significant element of much of this activism is a need to peg the Tamil fight for equitable treatment in Sri Lanka to broader mainstream concerns. While mainstream society may value minority concerns, human rights, or the rule of law, the success or failure of a particular social movement depends on how well they link their demands to these broader social values. It is no surprise, then, as Snow and colleagues (1986, 469) have pointed out, that in social movements, "Fundamental values such as justice, cooperation, perseverance, and the sanctity of human life were repeatedly embellished." Tamil diaspora politics, as a social movement, is and will be little different. Only time will tell, however, whether the diaspora, in Canada and around the world, will be a significant force moving Sri Lanka from a post-war scenario to a post-conflict one.

NOTES

1. The Sri Lankan Tamil community in Canada and the South Indian community would further drift apart during the war between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the late 1980s. According to some sources, another point of contention was the attempt by the World Tamil Movement (WTM) to make inroads into South Indian organizations.

2. Sivalingam was an admired and important member of the Tamil community in Canada. Arriving in Canada in 1966, he would be credited with being one of the "founders" of the Tamil community in Canada. He died in 2010. As one of the obituaries written about him noted, after arriving in Canada, he "would go on to build a community, the Tamil community, so that all of us can embrace the great things about Canada, while, proudly, holding on to our roots and values. He was not just a pioneer; he was a community builder. Over the course of these four and a half decades, he built one institution after another, most of them standing tall today as the servants of this community and as monuments to the enduring work of Mr. Sivalingam and his peers." (Tamil Canadian 2010).

3. The ten organizations that came together under the banner of FACT were: the World Tamil Movement (WTM), Society for the Aid of Ceylon Minorities (SACEM), Tamil Eelam Society (TESOC), Eelam Tamil Association of British Colombia, Eelam Tamil Association of Quebec, Tamil Coordinating Committee of Ottawa, Thamilar Oli Association Incorporated, Canadian Foundation For Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation (CAFTARR), World Tamil Movement of Canada (Quebec), and the Senior Tamils' Centre (STC).

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“My Career Chose Me. I Didn’t Choose It”: Factors Impacting Career Orientations of Lebanese Muslim Girls

Mrs. **Jihan Rabah** is the Judy & Morris Fish Graduate Scholar in Education and a doctoral student specializing in Educational Studies at Concordia University. She received her M.A., B.A. and postgraduate Teaching Diploma from the American University of Beirut. Her research interests include the theoretical as well as the practical processes impacting on the development of educational curricula, specifically gendered citizenships and the integration of computer technologies therein.

Dr. **Vivek Venkatesh** is Associate Dean, Academic Programs and Development at the School of Graduate Studies and Assistant Professor in the Educational Technology program. His research publications traverse the areas of learning sciences, the impact of social media on online learning, and the integration of information and communication technologies in university settings.

• Mme **Jihan Rabah** est chercheure diplômée Judy & Morris Fish en éducation et étudiante au doctorat spécialisée en sciences de l’éducation à l’Université Concordia. Elle a obtenu sa maîtrise, son baccalauréat et un diplôme de troisième cycle en enseignement de l’Université américaine de Beyrouth. Ses intérêts de recherche portent sur les processus théoriques et pratiques ayant un impact sur le développement des programmes d’enseignement, surtout dans le cadre des citoyennetés sexuées et de l’intégration des technologies informatiques.

Dr **Vivek Venkatesh** est doyen associé, Programmes de formation universitaire et du développement à l’École des études supérieures et professeur adjoint dans le programme de technologie de l’éducation. Ses publications de recherche touchent aux domaines des sciences de l’apprentissage, à l’impact des médias sociaux sur l’apprentissage en ligne et à l’intégration des technologies de l’information et de la communication dans les milieux universitaires.

ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ The purpose of this study is to explore factors affecting career orientation for post-secondary Lebanese Muslim girls. A mixed methodology using both surveys (n=34) and focus group interviews (n=22) was used. Data analyses involved the compilation of descriptive statistics from the survey results and inductive coding of thematic representations from the semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Findings indicate that young Lebanese girls have the desire to achieve personal autonomy and financial security through the acquisition of university degrees and career planning. Nevertheless, factors such as parental control and gendered roles affect their labor market participation. Results are discussed in light of recent empirical research on the career orientations of Muslim girls. Implications are drawn for the Canadian context.

• Le but de cette étude est de discerner les facteurs ayant une influence sur le choix de carrière des jeunes filles musulmanes libanaises après le secondaire. Une méthodologie mixte comprenant des sondages (n = 34) et des entrevues de groupe (n = 22) a été utilisée. L'analyse des données a été réalisée par la compilation des statistiques descriptives provenant des résultats de sondage et le codage des représentations thématiques provenant des entretiens semi-structurés et des groupes de discussion. Les résultats indiquent que les jeunes filles libanaises ont la volonté de parvenir à une autonomie personnelle et à la sécurité financière grâce à l'acquisition de diplômes universitaires et par la planification de leur carrière. Néanmoins, des facteurs tels que le contrôle parental et les rôles sociaux associés au genre ont une influence sur leur participation au marché du travail. Les résultats sont discutés à la lumière des recherches empiriques récentes menées sur le choix de carrière des filles musulmanes. Les résultats sont également considérés par rapport au contexte canadien.

Initiatives by the Canadian government to guarantee a continuous flow of immigrants have been devised to spur the nation's population and economic growth (Citizenship & Immigration Canada, 2012). According to Statistics Canada (2012), approximately 259,000 immigrants landed in Canada between the months of July 2011 and June 2012, a majority of which come from Asia and the Middle East. Canada counts almost 150,000 people of Lebanese origin (Linday, 2007). Around thirty percent of these Lebanese immigrants are Muslims. Lebanese people started immigrating to Canada in small numbers in the early twentieth century, but violence and political upheavals in Lebanon have caused this number to soar. For example, due to armed conflicts and political crises in Lebanon during 1989 and 1990, Lebanese immigration to Canada grew exponentially: 12,224 Lebanese immigrants came to the country in 2001 (Milan, 2011). Given the scarcity of research on Lebanese immigrants in Canada, this study aims to investigate how Lebanese cultural norms may shape Lebanese Muslim women's educational and career aspirations and overall decision-making processes by exploring gender roles, as well as cultural and familial influences. This study thus aims to contribute knowledge on young Muslim women's decision-making processes and career aspirations which in turn should be taken into account within the Canadian educational system and society in order to promote a supportive and inclusive learning environment.

Findings from a large-scale survey conducted in Lebanon by Theodory (1982) on the career maturity of Lebanese citizens suggest that Lebanese students are not provided with the proper career orientation planning in order for them to become productive citizens after obtaining their diplomas. In addition, findings from Vlaardingerbroek, Dallal, Rizkallah and Rabah (2007) longitudinal study regarding the transition of Lebanese post-secondary students to the workplace indicated that Lebanese students generally have a poor knowledge of their career options and tend to opt for a very limited number of traditional occupations. They also generally have a very poor understanding of the connection between school and higher education. Through several interviews, Vlaardigerbroek et al. found that Grade 10 and 11 students repeatedly inquired about the requirements necessary for admission into university programs such as engineering and architecture. In another study, Vlaardingerbroek, Jaber and Masri (2008) investigated the structure and role of the *Brevet Professionnel* (a lower secondary level vocational diploma) in the context of the Lebanese education system and recommended that further research be done on the role of gender on the career orientation of students of Lebanese origins.

As such, the focus of this study's theoretical framework is to address cultural factors impacting the career orientations of Muslim Lebanese girls. Lebanon is an Arab country, built on patriarchal values. The male is considered to be the head of the family, its protector and its main provider, whereas the primary responsibility of Lebanese women is to manage the household and raise children. At the same time, Lebanon is not a typical Arab country. It does not run under Islamic law even though Muslims account for almost fifty percent of the population. That being said, the Lebanese government does transfer authority on all personal and family matters to religious courts (Shehadeh, 1998). Therefore, confessional status is an identity symbol and implies a gendered citizenship for women (Keddie & Beck, 1978). As such, religion plays a major role in the formation of personal identities (Bellah, 1968; Mol, 1976). Berger (1967) described religion as the force that grants people their most important marker of identity their relationship to God.

Several researchers, such as Mol (1978), Weigert, Teitge and Teitge (1986), who investigated the relationship identity and religion has in some societies, support the assertion that religion's role in any society is to maintain a balance between personal identities. This seems to be accurately the case with Lebanon's Muslim population. According to Ayyash-Abdo (2007), "... [religion] is one of the most enduring aspects of the social structures in [Lebanon]" (p.267). In Lebanon, civil laws are dictated by the religious communities operating in the country (Joseph, 2000; Joseph & Slyomovics, 2001). Understanding Islamic religion, which is firmly rooted in Lebanese civil society, helps in turn in understanding Lebanese society and its operating mechanisms.

Islam is a monotheistic religion based on five pillars: worshipping God, praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, providing to the poor and needy, and making a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Islam is not only a religion; it also dictates a way of life (Nasir, 1990). Marriage is regarded as a central aspect of the religion because of its capabilities to strengthen family ties. And indeed, family is one of the most important features of the Islamic religion (Doi, 1984): a healthy Islamic society is ensured by healthy Islamic families. Kinship and family ties are the most important sources of support for Muslims. In Islam, there are fundamental differences between the social roles assigned to women and men. Islamic sacred texts do not assign women to a subordinate role, but one that is complementary to men (Macleod, 1991). However, one of the prevailing traditional practices is the idea that married women must remain in their "place" (at home): submitting to their husbands' demands and making their family and children their foremost priority. In addition, the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women usually reinforces the symbolic barrier that separates them from the public sphere and enhances the gender role dichotomy. Islamic feminists such as Fatima Mernissi (1987) have argued that Muslim women currently occupy a subordinate role "neither because of the Quran nor the prophet nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the interests of a male elite". (p. ix). Hence, what it means to be a Muslim Lebanese female is not only shaped by the Islamic religion, but also by the social and cultural backgrounds receiving and understanding these notions.

Over the last twenty five years, considerable research has been conducted on Muslim girls. Many studies have considered both culture and religion in looking at the educational and career aspirations of Muslim girls and how these aspirations are shaped when they live in a Western country (Afshar, 1989; Archer, 2002; Basit, 1996, 1997; Brah & Shaw, 1992; Parker-Jenkins, Hartas, Irving and Barker, 1999; Parker-Jerkins, Haw, Irving, and Khan, 1997; Siann & Knox, 1992; Siann, Knox, Thornley and Evans, 1990). The present article uses analytical frameworks to examine minority groups in Western society, but also considers this group in a majority situation in its homeland. In light of that, this exploratory study's main objective is to gain insight into the choices made by post-secondary Lebanese Muslim girls regarding their career destinations. It is hoped that this study will make a contribution to the Canadian educational system and society by providing practical implications for faculty and campus services, as they work towards ensuring that students experience a learning environment that is supportive and inclusive.

This study attempts to answer two primary research questions:

1. What are the factors impacting Lebanese Muslim girls' decisions with regards to higher education and career expectations?

2. How do family and gender roles, as well as cultural influences, intersect and affect Lebanese Muslim girls' post-secondary experiences and career expectations?

The study was conducted following a mixed methodology that includes a survey and focus group interviews. This non-experimental descriptive design (Fink & Kosecoff, 1998; Babbie, 1990) investigates girls' career choices and the factors impacting on those choices. Focus groups were held, thus allowing participants to open up about their experiences, beliefs and values, and the social meaning they attach to career orientation, in a comfortable and casual environment. Copies of the questionnaires and focus group questions are provided in Appendices A and B respectively.

Given the research subject and the fact that it investigated Muslim girls who are currently enrolled in a post-secondary Islamic institution, purposive sampling methodology was used; this is a non-probability sampling technique in which participants included in the study are recruited by the researcher based upon their willingness to participate (Creswell, 2009). The chosen establishment is categorized as semi-private and draws students from all socioeconomic backgrounds. In that respect, the researchers assumed that their sample was representative of the entire spectrum of Muslims living in Lebanon. Thirty-four post-secondary level female students volunteered and it is assumed that they "represent a crystallization of the values inculcated by the school and end product of the educative process" (cf. Hargreaves, 1967: x-xi). That selection was made on the assumption that because the participants were enrolled in post-secondary education, they would be able to articulate the perceptions they have surrounding their career options.

A questionnaire was developed by the first author. It contains core questions that elicit data on how girls choose their careers and the factors that influence their decision: the reasons behind attending higher education, the careers they intend to pursue, the people who may have had an influence on their choices. In addition, focus group meetings were created to provide participants with an environment enabling them to open up about their familial and cultural identities and to discuss how those have shaped their academic and career choices. Table 1 summarizes the relationship between the questionnaire items, the focus group questions and the two research questions.

Table 1
Relationship Between Questionnaire Item(s), Focus Group Question(s) & Corresponding Research Question

RQ[a]	Data Collection Tool[b]	Items in Questionnaire & Focus Groups
1	Q	3-14, 17-19
	FG	1, 3, 4, 10
2	Q	15, 16, 20, 21
	FG	15, 16, 20, 21

[a] Research Question 1. What are the factors impacting on Lebanese Muslim girls' decisions in higher education destinations and career expectations? Research Question 2. How do family and gender roles, as well as cultural influences, intersect and affect their upper secondary experiences and their career expectations?

[b] Questionnaire (Q) or Focus Group (FG) Data Collection Tool

Data Collection

Data was collected during the month of July 2012. After selecting a Muslim educational institution, the first author contacted the director of the institution asking if they were interested in participating in the research. A formal letter was then sent to the director explaining the purpose of the research, indicating that a formal approval letter needed to be obtained before proceeding to the collection of any data. After that letter was secured, arrangements were made with the contact person designated by the director in charge of the research instrument and the organization of focus group meetings. At the appointed dates, the first author met with the thirty-four female volunteer participants. The researcher explained the purpose of the study and stressed the voluntary and anonymous nature of their participation. All willing participants filled out and signed consent forms before any data was collected. Thereafter, participants completed their surveys which the researcher collected immediately afterwards. Focus group interviews followed with twenty-two willing participants.
Table 2 summarizes the composition of the sample.

Table 2
Participants Demographics

Attribute	Categories	n	%[a]
Gender	female	34	100
Age in years	18-21	23	68
	22-25	10	29
	n/a	1	3
Undergraduate Level	Year 1	17	50
	Year 2	17	50

[a] Percentages rounded to nearest whole numbers

Data analysis

Descriptive statistics were used as a quantitative means for analyzing the data collected from closed questions. Responses to open-ended and focus groups questions were analyzed thematically using an inductive coding method. As for analytical procedures, thematic interpretations were used by identifying, recording and collating all emergent themes.

Survey Results Pertaining to Research Question 1: *What are the factors impacting on Lebanese Muslim girls' decisions in higher education destinations and career expectations?*

On the whole, sixty-two percent of the participants attend their current higher education institution because of its good reputation in the community. One participant offered further explanation by saying: "This institution offers professions that later can let us live a good life." Almost forty percent of the students attend the selected higher education institution because their parents wanted them to. Twenty-nine percent of them attend the establishment because of its proximity and/or limited financial capabilities. Interestingly, the current higher education institution was the students' first choice for only seven out of thirty-four participants. Three girls wrote that they just loved what they chose, while others conceded that they ended up pursuing their second choice because "This career is one of the rare jobs [nursing] that I [a girl] can do and have equal rights in doing it." Another stated: "I loved it, once I started studying about it."

When asked why they liked the courses they were currently (at the time) enrolled in, twelve participants explained that it was because their courses were relevant to their daily life, that they helped them figure out what to do in case of emergency and because they gave them the possibility of being more open, more educated, and better prepared to deal with everyday problems.

Around forty percent of participants have the intention of completing all the requirements and obtaining their degrees. Almost half of the students indicated that they would repeat the year again if they failed the first time. Not one student had the intention of transferring to vocational education, and when asked about their intentions in the event of failure, participants' responses were as such: "I don't intend to fail," "I will change my major," or "I will transfer to another university". Table 3 shows the responses to questionnaire items related to Research Question 1.

Table 3
Responses to Items Related to Research Question 1 *(N=34)*

Item	Item Content	Response	n	%[a]
8	What is the reason you decided to attend this institution?	Proximity	10	29
		Financial	10	29
		Family	13	38
		Reputation	21	62
		1st Choice	7	21
		2nd Choice	3	9
11	What is your intention should you succeed in your class?	Finish	13	38
		University		
		Get a job	21	62
		Transfer to	0	0
		Vocational		
12	What is your intention should you fail in your class?	Repeat the year	16	47
		Transfer to	0	0
		Vocational		
		Get a job	2	6
		Other Responses	16	47
3	What grades (%) are you getting?	90s	1	3
		80s	17	50
		70s	15	44
		60s	1	3
		50s	n/a	
4	What is the highest level of education that your father has completed?	Below Baccalaureat	11	32
		Baccalaureat	9	26
		Diploma	5	15
		University Degree	6	18
		Masters or PhD	3	9
18	Please rate how important you consider the following on your career-related decisions:			
	Parents	Very Important	19	56
		Quite Important	14	41
		A little bit Important	1	3
		Not Important	n/a	
	Other family members	Very Important	6	18
		Quite Important	14	41
		A little bit Important	10	30
		Not Important	4	12
	Teachers	Very Important	4	12
		Quite Important	10	29
		A little bit Important	9	26
		Not Important	11	32
	Family Friends	Very Important	n/a	
		Quite Important	8	24
		A little bit Important	9	26
		Not Important	17	50
	Friends	Very Important	3	9
		Quite Important	15	44
		A little bit Important	14	41
		Not Important	2	6

Item	Item Content	Response	n	%[a]
18	Please rate how important you consider the following when evaluating the desirability of a career:			
	Salary/income	Very Important	22	65
		Quite Important	12	35
		A little bit Important	n/a	
		Not Important	n/a	
	Social Status	Very Important	17	50
		Quite Important	13	38
		A little bit Important	4	12
		Not Important	n/a	
	Job Satisfaction/Enjoyment	Very Important	15	44
		Quite Important	7	21
		A little bit Important	2	6
		Not Important	n/a	

[a] Percentages rounded to nearest whole number

With regards to academic performance, fifty percent of students had grade averages in the 80s (or B range) while around forty-five percent hovered around the 70s (or C range). Only one participant recorded a grade average in the 90s (or A range). As for the education level of their parents, around thirty percent of the participants' parents had high school degrees. Eighteen percent said their parents had diplomas. Around thirty percent reported that their mothers had university degrees, whereas only eighteen percent reported that their fathers had a university degree. Only three out of the whole sample had fathers with Masters or doctoral degrees. When it came to occupational status, only one out of thirty-four participants mentioned that her father was currently unemployed. Conversely, twenty-seven out of thirty-four participants indicated that their mothers were unemployed.

When asked about what was the most important factor that influenced their career choice, fifty-six percent of the girls first identified their parents. Around forty percent added that their parents' opinion was quite important. Thirteen participants explained their choice by saying " Actually, it was my parents' pressure more than my choice, but I agreed with them". Others wrote comments such as "It was partially my parents and partially my choice because I wanted to choose a career that is applicable to a female Muslim to work in". Eighteen out of thirty-four participants reported that the input of other family members was very important. Fifteen participants were advised by their brothers, cousins, aunts or even sister-in-laws and state that their influence was quite significant. As for teachers and family friends, they seemed to have the least impact on the participants' career-related decisions.

Sixty-five percent of respondents mentioned the importance of financial security as a key factor for choosing to pursue a career. Participants wrote comments such as "I wanted to choose a career that lets me gain a lot of money," or "Good income should come of it, that is why". Fifty percent of the participants thought social status was very important in their choice of career. Some students repeated adjectives such as "honorable professions" or "good positions". That being said, job satisfaction and enjoyment were chosen by less than half of the girls as factors impacting their career decisions. Table 4 presents responses to questionnaire items related to Research Question 2.

Focus Groups Results Pertaining to Research Question 1: *What are the factors impacting on Lebanese Muslim girls' decisions in higher education destinations and career expectations?*

Participants believed that the Lebanese educational system treats girls and boys equally when it comes to the information provided about higher education and career planning. They believed the message they received from schools is handled the same way for both genders and that there is no gender differentiation. That being said, participants elaborated on this statement by saying: "The differentiation lies between literature and scientific sections. [School officials and teachers] think only the stupid ones go to the literature section and all geniuses to the scientific one". Another student added:

> *"That is true. I for example, had to leave my school because I insisted that I wanted to go literature and not scientific like all my friends. Everybody was surprised and tried to talk me out of it even though I could go scientific because my grades were good".*

One participant said that this differentiation applies to polytechnic schools as well. She said:

> *"Even people who go to polytechnic schools suffer the same things. They were told maybe you went there because you failed your academic school!"*

Many respondents agreed that the current economic situation pushes girls to seek work. Statements such as "It is the number one reason why women work!" or "It is tiring to work but if she needs it financially, she needs to work" were noted. Only one participant said: "I will work for my own self and my own development. I do not work because my family cannot provide me with food".

Survey Results Pertaining to Research Question 2: *How do family and gender roles, as well as cultural influences, intersect and affect Lebanese Muslim girls' post-secondary experiences and their career expectations?*

When asked about their level of confidence in achieving their career goals, only twelve girls out of thirty-four responded with "very confident". All twelve participants explained their choices by adding statements such as "Everyone looks forward to getting a job in their domain, so I think it is fair enough to have that level of confidence" or "because I aspire for this dream and I know that my parents support it too and help me realize it". Five students chose to report that they are quite confident in achieving their career ambitions but the circumstances that may interfere with their aspirations cannot all be predicted (The 'circumstances' in the aforementioned statement might relate to the girls' eventual marriage, but we cannot confirm that). One participant wrote that she was not that confident because "I am partially able to take my own decisions". Four girls even noted they couldn't be confident due to some obstacles they may encounter in the future, such as family, marriage, children, and economics. Table 4 presents responses to questionnaire items related to Research Question 2.

Focus Groups Results Pertaining to Research Question 2: *How do family and gender roles, as well as cultural influences, intersect and affect Lebanese Muslim girls' post-secondary experiences and their career expectations?*

With regards to equality of opportunities in the choice of a career, four participants explained how their parents interfere in their career choices:

> *"They tell [me] you have to listen to us, you have no choice. You cannot do this or that… or that major is not for girls…that this thing is not for you. Like for example even nursing, some friends' parents did not accept. Her parents told her: What nursing? No way because you have night duties for nurses…we do not [want our daughter] to do night duty. So she ended up doing something that she did not like!"*

Three of the girls noted that usually the brothers in the family get what they want even if it means attending expensive institutions. One of these girls said:

> *"When my father had the means to send one of his kids to a good university, he chose my brother, because he said, if anything happens to all of us, it is your brother that can take responsibility and can provide for the family. You [The girl] will get married and that is it."*

Two girls pinpointed that the situation changes when the girl gets married. One participant said, "After getting married, everything changes. A girl might work and she might stop working". Seven participants tcomplained about the inability to get the jobs they want because of their headscarves. Comments were noted such as:

> *"Some employers prefer girls with beautiful bodies and beautiful faces over girls with high level of education…They want "hot" girls and they choose her over another girl with brains because they want her to attract [be attractive]. You feel it."*

and:

> *"As for me, because I wear a veil, I thought of not doing business, because I cannot work at a bank. They would say: You are veiled. No, you cannot. Even if I wanted to join the military, I cannot. There are a lot of majors that I cannot do simply because to start with, I am not allowed to work because of my veil. They don't even have a reason. Once, I asked them, what is the reason? They don't tell me. They don't have a reason. So in this way, we are restricted in some careers too and we cannot work for example in the career that we like just because we are veiled. Or they tell me, you have to remove the veil and show your hair. As if I am going to work with my hair!"*

When asked if they chose their careers because they were suitable for girls, all participants responded positively. One comment from a girl stood out; she said: "Nursing chose me. I did not choose it. It was the only thing that was suitable for a girl and I got accepted".

Most of the participants agreed with the statement that family comes before career, adding that when girls get married, their first choice is to stay at home if they can afford it because the priority is to raise children and it is hard to juggle both.

The respondents agreed:

> *"I think a woman should not really overwork herself forever. When she gets married and has children and she's tired. She just quits. She does not need to work forever. If her husband is providing for her adequately, then she does not need to work".*

Other girls mentioned that even though they like the idea of working after getting married, they wouldn't do it unless their husband agrees to it. As one participant explained: "I personally want to work. But if my husband says I will forbid you to work, then I will not work of course. I will not jeopardize my marriage for work". Some participants declared that having a career determines their future security stating that "Even if you get married, maybe you get divorced and then only your career can save you!"

Discussion of Results

There is considerable agreement among the participants and their parents on the importance of obtaining higher education degrees. Our results indicate that Lebanese Muslim girls think that their parents want the best for their daughters and they know that education is good for their daughter's future financial security and autonomy. These findings resonate with Siann, Knowx, Thornley and Evans (1990) who surveyed Muslim females in the United Kingdom to investigate their career orientation choices. Siann et al. findings indicate that parents of Muslim females support their daughters in their search for the right career by encouraging them to attend university.
As noted by Parker-Jenkins, Haw, Irving, and Khan (1997) who conducted a tracer study looking at the career orientations and goals of a group of post-secondary British Muslim girls, this is strengthened by "a realization [of parents] that education capital is necessary for survival in a modern, rapidly changing society" (p.10). In fact, participants in our study noted that they are ready to repeat their academic year should they fail because they have no intention to transition to vocational education. A Lebanese girl's academic degree may be a guarantee of her personal well-being in the absence of governmental security and because of gender-based inequalities in Lebanese laws.

However, Muslim girls' career aspirations and their choices of majors and place of employment are affected by parental control. This reality needs to be taken into account in a Canadian context. As Joseph (2000) explains " The [family] has been seen as the primary identity and loyalty for any Lebanese – superseding national identity and loyalty to the state…To a question of 'who' you are, Lebanese typically respond with the name of the kin group to which they belong" (p.117). The close relationship that Lebanese Muslim girls have with their parents and family members make it impossible for them to choose a career without securing their parents' approval. Shah (1998) notes that the generational gap between girls and their parents (who have been raised in an even stricter patriarchal society) proves to be a real challenge when young girls are faced with choosing their career paths.

Another important factor that we need to look at in a Canadian context is the practice of gendered citizenship roles that limit the career choices of Lebanese Muslim girls. Our findings indicate that Muslim girls tend to choose careers that are ‘suitable’ for girls. This may be linked to the notion of “patriarchal connectivity” (Joseph, 2000) in the Lebanese culture that produces “[female] selves with fluid boundaries organized for gendered …domination in a culture valorizing kin structures and morality” (p.24). In that respect, patriarchy contributes in producing female citizens that are ready to respond to the needs of the male elite (Suad, 2000).

Furthermore, female students feel that their headscarves restrict their eventual choices of employment. They perceive that they are discriminated against because they chose to wear the veil. That choice denies them equal opportunity in the work force. This observation can be traced back to the explanation provided by Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ and the long history of prejudice against people of Islamic descent (Said, 1978). Women with headscarves are clearly identified as Muslims and cornered into an “othered” discourse. Our participants feel that most employers are prejudiced against them thinking that they might be oppressed and not really free to work. As one participant explained further:

> *“A woman who is veiled does not have equality of opportunity. We don’t have the same opportunities. This society thinks that if a woman is veiled that she should be banned from seeing anyone and she should sit at home. This is not religion. It is not wrong for a girl to go out and work and help her family financially. But society thinks if women are religious then they need to sit at home. That’s why we have less and less opportunities to work”.*

Nevertheless, the necessity to work sometimes supersedes all other factors and interferes with cultural and familial restrictions. This could be related to difficult economic situations implicating that women need to work to make ends meet and help their families and their husbands to pay the bills. Brah and Shaw (1992) conducted a longitudinal study on the factors hindering British Muslim girls from entering the work force and found that economic necessity may actually be one of the most important reasons interfering with cultural restrictions.

In light of the results of this exploratory study, we believe that there is a pressing need for future research investigating Lebanese Muslim communities in the Canadian context in order to enhance our understanding of immigrants in Canada and of the factors that may impede their full labor market participation.

Table 4
Responses to Items Related to Research Question 2 *(N=34)*

Item	Item Content	Response Options	n[b]	%[a]
15	How confident are you about realizing your aspirations?	Very confident	12	35
		Quite confident	17	50
		A bit confident	4	12
		Not at all confident	1	3

[a] Percentages rounded to nearest whole numbers

APPENDIX A:
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. There are no right or wrong answers. All responses will be anonymous. Please do not put your name on the survey.

Section I
Demographic data

1. What is your age (in years and months)?
____

2. What year of study/major are you enrolled in?
Please indicate year of study: ________________
Please indicate major: ________________

3. What is your current Grade Point Average (GPA)?
☐ 90s
☐ 80s
☐ 70s
☐ 60s
☐ 50s

4. What is the highest level of education that your father has completed?
☐ Below Baccalauréat
☐ Baccalauréat
☐ Diploma from a technical institute
☐ College/ University degree (College Diploma, B.A, B.S., B.B.A)
☐ Master’s or Doctorate degree
☐ Other: ________________

5. What is the highest level of education that your mother has completed?
☐ Below Baccalauréat
☐ Baccalauréat
☐ Diploma from a technical institute
☐ College/ University degree (College Diploma, B.A, B.S., B.B.A)
☐ Master’s or Doctorate degree
☐ Other: ________________

6. What is the occupation of your father?
____

7. What is the occupation of your mother?
____

Section 2
Educational and Career Aspirations

8. What is the reason you decided to attend this institution?
☐ Proximity (close to where you live)
☐ Financial Reasons
☐ Family (Your parents chose it)
☐ Reputation (One of the best schools)
☐ First Choice (You always wanted to attend this institution)
☐ Second Choice (You did not get accepted where you applied/wanted to go first)
☐ Other: ________________

9. What subject(s) do you like in your class?
____

10. Why do you like these subjects?
____

11. What is your intention should you succeed in your class?
☐ Finish university
☐ Get a job
☐ Transfer to vocational education
☐ Other: ________________

12. What is your intention should you fail your class?
☐ Repeat the year
☐ Transfer to vocational education
☐ Get a job
☐ Other: ________________

13. Do you plan to pursue education beyond your current degree?
    - ☐ No
    - ☐ M.A.
    - ☐ PhD
    - ☐ Professional Degree/Specialization such as:
    - ☐ Other:

14. What career(s) are you thinking about following when you finish your studies?

15. How confident are you about realizing your aspirations?
    - ☐ Very confident
    - ☐ Quite confident
    - ☐ A bit confident
    - ☐ Not at all confident

16. Why did you choose that level of confidence?

17. Could you tell me where you got the idea (of your career choice) from?

18. Please rate how important you consider the following of the following on your career-related decisions:

	Very Important	Quite Important	A little bit Important	Not Important
Parents				
Other family members				
Teacher				
Family Friends				
Friends				

19. Please rate how important you consider the following when evaluating the desirability of a career:

	Very Important	Quite Important	A little bit Important	Not Important
Salary/income				
Social status				
Job satisfaction/ enjoyment				
Others:				

20. Are there any questions that you did not understand or you thought were not clear?

21. Given that the purpose of the research is to investigate the choices that Lebanese Muslim girls make regarding their post-school career destinations and that it aims to highlight the factors that affect the students' choices regarding future career and their aspirations towards future occupation status, do you think the researcher should ask any additional question(s) when investigating career orientations of Muslim girls in Lebanon?

APPENDIX B: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion, how well does the Lebanese school system serve girls with respect to information about higher education and career development?

2. What do you think about equality of opportunities and freedom of choice for your generation in Lebanon?

3. The track you are in during Grade 12 largely determines the options you have at university. Do you think the track system affects boys and girls the same way?

4. How do you feel about your current program in relation to your career aspirations?

5. What do you think of the typical attitudes to work such as " Engineering is for boys"and "Teaching is for girls"?

6. Do you feel your cultural identity as a Lebanese girl contributes to or shapes your academic and/or career choices? If so, how? and if no, why not?

7. Do you feel your religious identity contributes to or shapes your academic and/or career choices? If so, how? and if not, why not?

8. Do family, friends, colleagues and/or teachers play a role in your academic and career decision making?

9. What about when you get married and have children? Do you intend to work after you get married and have children? Does family come before career?

10. What about the current economic necessitating girls to work?

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Creating Caring and Critically Thinking Citizens: Making a Case for an Education That Combines the Humanistic and the Critical Approaches to Diversity

Vilelmini Tsagkaraki is a doctoral student in the Department of Integrated Studies in Education at McGill University. She is the recipient of the Onassis Foundation Scholarship and WYNG fellowship. Her research interests include history textbooks, multicultural education, comparative and international education. Professionally, she has worked as a teacher in Greece, USA, and Canada.

• **Vilelmini Tsagkaraki** est étudiante au doctorat au Département d'études intégrées en éducation de l'Université McGill. Elle est récipiendaire des bourses de la Fondation Onassis et WYNG. Ses intérêts de recherche comprennent les manuels d'histoire, l'éducation multiculturelle, et l'éducation internationale et comparative. Professionnellement, elle a travaillé comme enseignante en Grèce, aux Etats-Unis et au Canada.

ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ

In this paper I make a case for an education founded on the principles of the humanistic and the critical approaches to diversity. By broadening an ethnically and racially centered perception of diversity, I support the idea that schooling based on these two approaches fosters an environment that encourages the development of caring and critically thinking citizens. Ultimately, I argue that schooling on these premises will prepare young people to deal more effectively with the challenges of today's interconnected and globalized world.

• Dans cet article, j'argumente en faveur d'une éducation fondée sur les principes de l'humanisme et les approches critiques de la diversité. En élargissant la perception de la diversité centrée sur l'ethnicité et la race, je soutiens l'idée que la scolarisation à partir de ces deux approches favorise un environnement qui favorise le développement de citoyens qui pensent de façon critique et qui se soucient des autres. En fin de compte, je soutiens que la scolarisation selon ces deux approches saura préparer les jeunes à faire face plus efficacement aux défis d'aujourd'hui dans un monde interconnecté et globalisé.

The new millennium began with dramatic and at times violent changes that have affected humanity in profound ways: globalization, the rise of new economies, the development of information technology, geo-political changes, new and diversified migration flows, and increasingly multicultural societies. As a consequence, individuals often face difficulties when trying to cope with the risks and opportunities that accompany these changes (Portera, 2008). Taking into consideration the importance of education, it is my stance that schooling plays an integral part in preparing young people to deal effectively with these challenging developments. However, I support the idea that education should not seek to prepare them solely for economic success, but most importantly it should equip the new generation with those tools that will allow them to navigate through everyday life in a caring and critically mindful manner.

In what follows I make a case for an education that draws from the principles of a combined humanistic and critical approach to diversity. Initially, by examining relevant literature I give a brief overview of the various approaches to diversity. In the next section I discuss in more detail the humanistic and critical approaches to diversity, and in the final part of the paper, I present my arguments as to why these two approaches, despite their differences, are able to set the foundations for an education that allows the development of caring and critically thinking citizens.

Approaches to diversity: Historical background

In the reality of today's globalized world, people are forced to directly or indirectly coexist with other diverse cultures and live in new and challenging environments. Educational research and practice has recognized the fact that how one deals with these dynamics may determine, often to a great extent, one's personal, social, and professional development, but also the overall progress of the society (Ghosh, 2002; Johnson, 2009). Although theorists and practitioners have identified education's pivotal role in successfully assisting students through this process, we do not find one common educational strategy, nor do these strategies remain the same throughout time. By examining the relevant literature, we can identify a wide range of perspectives, each differing in their assumptions and practices, but almost all addressing one reoccurring buzzword: Diversity (Johnson, 2009).

The Oxford English dictionary defines the term diversity as follows: "The condition or quality of being diverse, different, or varied; difference, unlikeness" (Diversity, 2012). In the field of educational research and practice, particularly in the North American context, the discussion on diversity is strongly tied to the concept of multiculturalism, or, in the case of Quebec, to the concept of interculturalism. In the USA, 'multicultural' education became a topical issue in the early 1970s, largely as a response to the African American movement toward liberation, which pressed public education to change its pedagogy, its curriculum, and its organization (Apple, 2004). Likewise, curricula on multicultural education were introduced in Canada in the 1970s, after the official recognition of Canada's diverse social reality that was sealed by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's announcement in 1971 of the policy of "Bilingualism within a multicultural framework" (Ghosh, 2002).

An overview

Within the field of education, actors, practitioners, and scholars use different terms to describe policies and practices that address issues of diversity: multicultural education, transcultural education, multiethnic education, ethnic studies, intercultural education, bilingual/bicultural education etc. (Portera, 2008; Sleeter & Grant 2003). The differences however go well beyond the choice of terms. A critical analysis of the discourse on diversity indicates that, throughout time, multi/intercultural education[1] has meant different things to different people (Grant & Sleeter, 1985; Ghosh, 2002). In reviewing the literature, mainly coming from the North American context, we see that scholars have identified several approaches to diversity within the field of education (Ghosh, 2002; Gibson 1976; Harper, 1997; Naseem, 2011; Pratte, 1983; Sleeter and Grant's 2003; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2009). Many have developed their own typologies to categorize the various approaches, however, despite their differences, all typologies seem to be talking mainly about the same trends within multi/intercultural education.

In the following paragraphs I will present the various approaches to multi/intercultural education, informed by the most prominent typologies in the literature. For each category, I begin with a discussion of their underlying ideas and then I present how they are translated within the curriculum. In concluding each category, I discuss some of the critiques coming from opposing approaches.

I begin my discussion with a category I term *Monocultural approach to diversity.* This category, that Steinberg & Kincheloe, (2009), Ghosh (2002), and Naseem (2011) identify as conservative, emphasizes the supremacy of the European/North American culture (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2009, Ghosh, 2002) and advocates that social and economic growth can occur when diverse cultural groups accept and conform to the social and political values of the dominant culture (Harper, 1997; Naseem, 2011;). In education, this monocultural approach to diversity focuses on culturally diverse students and supports a homogeneous educational program, which is based on the dominant epistemology, ethics and value system (Naseem, 2011). The standardized educational model advocated by this perspective (Hirsch, Kett & Trefil, 1987) is often critiqued for seeing lower-socioeconomic class and non-white children as culturally deprived and for promoting an objectively and universally accepted western ideal (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2009). Other critics argue that this line of reasoning, by aligning everyone to an ‘ objective' standard and by suppressing the subordinate groups' cultures and/or languages (Gerin-Lajoie, 2012), fails to recognize the value of differences and the competing power relations and attempts to assimilate diverse groups to the dominant culture.

Another conceptual framework often critiqued for abiding with the assimilationist goals of conservative multi/interculturalism is what Steinberg & Kincheloe (2009) call liberal multiculturalism and that I will refer to as *Equality-focused approach to diversity*. This approach emphasizes the natural equality and the sameness of individuals from different ethnic, socio/economic and gender groups (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2009; Gerin-Lajoie, 2012). Building on this premise, equality-focused multiculturalists view inequality between diverse groups as stemming from the lack of social, economic and educational opportunities (Pallas, Natriello & McDill, 1989). By placing immense trust on the power of the state to provide equal opportunities to all, the underlying assumption is that these inequalities will vanish once the system is reformed (Naseem, 2011). In education this translates to curricula that aim to help students fit into the mainstream social structure, by building bridges between the students' experiential background, their learning styles and the demands of the school (Sleeter & Grant, 2003). This approach has been critiqued for ignoring differences and for limiting multicultural practices in the study of “exotic” cultures, in celebratory multicultural days, and in compensatory programs such as language learning (Ghosh , 2002; Ruittenberg, 2011).

Moving on to another perspective, the *Group-focused approach*, Sleeter and Grant (2003)) identify in the 1960s the emergence of more assertive approaches to diversity, such as ethnic studies, African studies (Giles, 1974), women's studies (Rutenberg, 1983l; Schmitz, 1985), Asian American studies, Native studies, etc. This approach—which Sleeter and Grant (2003) term Single group studies—aims to bring attention to one specific group at a time, in order to raise conscious of their oppression, to empower its members, and to encourage political action and liberation. Unlike the two previous approaches, the group-focused approach views school knowledge as political rather than neutral and provides alternatives to the Anglo-Saxon culture and Western ideals (Grant & Sleeter, 2004; Sleeter and Grant, 2003). This “response is premised on the notion that difference is natural, predetermined, and unassailable. As such, it requires accommodation rather than elimination” (Harper, 1997, p.194). The insistence on difference is observed in multiple scenarios, such as the segregation of girls with separate and distinct schooling in the 19th century, Afrocentric schools (Giles, 1974), and separate schools for the physically and mentally disabled (Grant & Sleeter, 2004; Harper, 1997). Critics from a conservative perspective, highlight the fact that the group-focused approach keeps diverse groups out of the mainstream and thus promotes cultural and social separatism. Additionally, they fear that if students spend too much time focusing on their culture, they will fail to acquire the necessary knowledge to succeed in the mainstream curriculum (Hirsch, Kett & Trefil, 1987). Other critics, from a more humanistic perspective, express the fear that the study of oppression is counterproductive, as it will probably exacerbate tension and hostility, rather than promote unity (Sleeter and Grant, 2003). Finally, even those who support the intent of this approach argue that the main limitation is that it leaves the regular curriculum in place, uncontested, and unreformed (Connell, 1993).

Another approach, which emerged during the early 1970s, is the *Pluralistic approach to diversity* (Grant & Sleeter, 2004). This approach takes into account culture, ethnicity, language, gender, disabilities, and socio/economic class in developing educational programs, which aim to celebrate differences, respect alternative lifestyles, and provide equal opportunities among groups (Hernández, 1989; Sleeter & Grant, 2003). To a greater extent than the previous three approaches, this pluralistic perspective promotes total school reform in order to make schools reflect diversity (Grant & Sleeter, 2004). In the classroom, content is organized around the contributions and perspectives of several different groups, so that it is relevant to students' personal experiences (Sleeter and Grant, 2003). Instruction emphasizes critical thinking skills, while language learning, multiple strategies, and cooperative learning are very prominent (Hernández, 1989). Some critics of this approach, coming from the humanistic perspective, argue that knowledge and celebration of cultural differences will not necessarily ease intergroup relations, as it will not automatically lead to more acceptance and it will not necessarily change behaviors and attitudes (Sleeter and Grant, 2003). Other critics, coming from the critical perspective camp, argue that the celebration of diversity tends to make all differences relative. Consequently they find that such a response gives too much attention to cultural issues and thus it often ignores issues of power and social structural inequalities (Ogbu, 1978; Sleeter and Grant, 2003; Suzuki, 1984).

While the previously mentioned approaches depend heavily on cognitive skills and knowledge, this next approach that I term the *Humanistic approach to diversity* focuses more on the attitudes and feelings students have about themselves and each other (Grant & Sleeter, 2004). This approach—that Sleeter and Grant label the Human relations—aims to reduce intergroup conflict and stereotyping, promote acceptance, and foster positive interaction among students who differ (Calabrese, 2002; Girard & Koch, 1996; Hernández, 1989; Watson, 2002). The curriculum of this approach addresses both differences and similarities. As such, it includes information regarding the contributions of groups of which students are members, but it also provides accurate information about various other ethnic, racial, disability etc. groups, about whom students may hold stereotypes (Grant & Sleeter, 2004). The humanistic approach to diversity seems to be particularly popular with teachers since not many can dispute with what it aims to do. However, those who adopt a more critical approach to multicultural education do not prefer this approach. For example, advocates of anti-racist education oppose what it does not aim to do, as they find that this approach fails to analyze discrimination, structural inequalities and power relations (Dei, 2011). By merely teaching students to get along and to value diversity, they argue that school implicitly urges them to accept the status quo. For this reason, they contend that school should not only aim to resolve intergroup relations, but most importantly it should educate students to challenge the status quo and to address the social problems stemming from structural inequalities and uncontested power relations (Sleeter and Grant, 2003).

This last stance is indicative of the final category that I term the *Critical approach to diversity*. This perspective argues that schools should prepare future citizens to reconstruct society so that it serves the interest of all groups, especially of those who are underprivileged (Grant & Sleeter, 2004). As such, this approach stresses that multi/intercultural education is not only for the culturally different students, but rather for all students, belonging both in dominant and minority groups (Ghosh, 2002). In the literature, this approach is referred to as critical multiculturalism (Naseem, 2011; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2009). Although some scholars distinguish critical multiculturalism from anti-racist education (Dei, 2011) and anti-oppressive education (Kumashiro & Ngo, 2007), I choose to include these two within this category as they are both critical to power relations, they politicize education, and they are both action-orientated (Naseem, 2011; Dei, 2011). Overall, advocates of the critical approach to diversity argue that students should learn to work collectively in order to bring about social change (Giroux, 1992; McLaren, 1989, 1997a; Sleeter & Grant, 2003). This line of reasoning suggests that only by encouraging students to critically examine power relations and social inequalities, can we provide them with an insight on how to address issues of diversity in society (Naseem, 2011). Compared with the other two approaches, critical perspectives to diversity incorporate a much greater curricular emphasis on active student involvement, on problem-solving, cooperative learning, and democratic decision making skills (Hernández, 1989). The curriculum content is organized around current social issues involving racism, classism, sexism, sexuality, disability etc. However, one of the questions that critics have raised regarding this approach is whether the school is able to undertake such an important task, which is to build a 'new social order.' Another major critique against this approach refers to its implementation. Many worry that teachers may sensitize students on social issues and then leave them feeling hopeless and frustrated about what they can do to change the situation. Those adopting a more humanistic approach are also worried that by discussing injustices they will aggravate conflict and tension among people, rather than solve problems (Sleeter and Grant, 2003).

Out of the six aforementioned approaches, it is my stance that first four approaches are quite narrow in their outlook and in what they deem important. By focusing too much on ethnicity, by attempting to assimilate those who are different to the mainstream or by separating students into groups, I believe that schooling adopting these principles is far from being inclusive. In what follows, I have chosen to focus on the humanistic and the critical approaches, in order to explain why these two approaches are the most suitable in setting the foundations for an education that aims at the development of caring and critically thinking citizens.

Humanistic Approach to Diversity

In this section I will attempt to widen the humanistic approach to diversity by arguing that in addition to the promotion of acceptance and positive interaction among people, a humanistic multi/intercultural education should also encourage inward/reflective learning and caring for others.

As mentioned in the first section of my paper, Sleeter and Grant (2003) define the humanistic outlook on diversity—or as they call it the Human Relations approach—as that approach, which teaches students to respect others regardless of race, class, gender, or other personal characteristics and encourages them to live harmoniously with one another (Grant and Sleeter, 2004). Its main goal is to reduce intergroup conflict and stereotyping, to promote acceptance, and to foster positive interaction among students who differ (Hernández, 1989). Although these intentions are valuable, in this section I elaborate in more detail on some aspects that I consider important in the humanistic approach to diversity. In order to ground my argument, I draw from the principles of transpersonal education and Noddings' theory of care.

Starting off with the concept of humanism, we must note that it is a philosophical term that is defined and realized in more than one ways. Although most nations and communities accept humanism—at least in principle—as the desirable ethical code for handling political, social, and educational issues, there is little consensus to its meaning or implications (Aloni, 1997; Barton & Levstik, 2004). However, within education, Aloni (1997) argues that there is a commonality and it is mainly found in schooling's "commitment to humanize people: to provide a kind of education that all human beings [...] deserve and ought to receive, so that they can actualize their human potentialities and lead full, worthy, and fulfilling human lives" (p.88).

Extending Aloni's quote, it is my stance that one fundamental element in humanizing people is inward and reflective thinking, which as a pedagogic strategy is very prominent in the principles of transpersonal education. Deriving its assumptions from transpersonal psychology—a perspective in psychology that is concerned with the integration of physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual development—transpersonal education is an inclusive approach that emphasizes and values the continued growth and transformation of the whole person (Braud, 2006; Roberts & Clark, 1976). Within this pedagogic tradition, Walsh and Vaughan (1993) emphasize that a transpersonal approach aims to extend the self beyond the individual or personal in order to encompass wider aspects of humankind. As such, this approach starts off with the personal and then places it within a larger context, acknowledging this way the great importance of looking first within the self, before attempting to examine and understand the outside world and others. Indian writer Jiddu Krishnamurti (1976), one of the thinkers whose writings have influenced the principles of transpersonal education, emphasized the importance of an education that helps students learn first of all about themselves. According to his writings, "there is [...] confusion in the world, and it has arisen because the individual has not been educated to understand himself" (p.42). In order to combat the growing challenges of life, Krishnamurti argues that serenity and freedom will come only when one understands the ways of the self. Hence for him, the right kind of education is one that places great importance to the inward nature of freedom, and helps each individual student to observe and understand himself in relation to the world around him/her.

In agreement with this line of thought, I believe that learning about the self is crucial to and an integral part of understanding and accepting the other. Therefore, I argue that a humanistic educational approach to diversity should promote—in addition to acceptance and a deep understanding and connectedness with others—also an inward and reflective investigation of the self. Only when we are reflective and observe and understand our own values and weaknesses, then can we truly approach and possibly fruitfully interact with the other. This serves as a supplementary idea to the Humanistic approach described by Sleeter and Grant (2003). The two scholars advocate an approach to diversity that aims to develop open-mindedness, understanding of diverse worldviews and practices, cooperation and participation, acceptance of and respect for the others. However, what Krishnamurti adds to this perspective is the way to achieve it: Only when our point of departure is the self will we be able to fully understand and connect with the other.

In addition to this inward look of the self, I also argue that a humanistic educational approach to diversity is one that is concerned with how schooling encourages students to respond to others. As previously mentioned, transpersonal education's whole-person approach includes ways of learning characterized, among others, by feeling, receptivity, and connectedness. One scholar who has emphasized this type of learning is Nell Noddings. Rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness, her theory of care is a feminist approach based on the assumption that as human beings we have the natural tendency and the need to care and to be cared-for (Noddings, 1984; 2002). For this reason she argues education's main goal should be to encourage the growth of competent, caring, loving and lovable people (Noddings, 1992). Supporting feeling rather than reasoning (1984), she envisions an education that goes beyond the preparation of students for economic life and citizenship. Ideally, education drawing from Noddings' ethics of care guides students in caring for self, intimate others, global others, nature, the environment, objects and instruments, and ultimately, ideas (Noddings 1999; 2002).

Walsh (2011), a scholar within the transpersonal tradition, recently wrote an article in which she argued that caring is very central to the definition of wisdom. As such, "wisdom is a function of deep insight into, and mature understanding of, the central existential issues of life, together with a practical skill to responding to these issues in ways that enhance the deep wellbeing of all those who the response affect" (p.110). According to this definition, it is evident that wisdom is measured not only by the amount of knowledge a person possesses, but additionally by the individual's response towards others. From a humanistic perspective, this response ideally aims at the wellbeing of others. Furthermore, in their book "Teaching history for the common good," Barton and Levstik (2004) also emphasize the importance of teaching students to empathize. If students are not encouraged to be empathetic towards themselves and others, the two scholars argue that it will be extremely difficult for these young people to make thoughtful judgments or deliberate for the common good. Additionally, research has shown that often negatively formed attitudes, which are either reinforced or that go unchallenged during the school years, are very difficult to alter in adulthood.

For all these reasons, it is my stance that a humanistic approach centering on inward/reflective thinking and caring holds a pivotal role in establishing an education that encourages students to become thoughtful citizens who care not only about their intimate but also about their distant others. Of course, education's mission is not limited to merely encouraging caring. I argue that in order to care, individuals need to know about one another, to question and contemplate on their own and others' life conditions. In what follows, I highlight those elements of critical multi/interculturalism that set the foundations for an education that also fosters critical thinking and questioning.

Critical Approach to Diversity

The critical approach to diversity is mainly founded on Freire's (1970) critical pedagogy. However, in reviewing relevant literature, we find a wide range of perspectives. Some scholars (Ghosh, 2002; Ghosh & Abdi, 2004) operate from a clearly defined Freirean base, seeking to challenge the hegemonic, white, Anglo-American worldview. Others (Giroux, 1990a&b, 1992; McLaren, 1989, 1997a), drawing from Foucauldian perspectives in addition to Freire, focus on the unequal power relations in the society and aim to develop school as a site that challenges the dominant, mono-cultural conceptions of history and society (Naseem, 2011). In this paper, it is not my intention to exhaustively present all the perspectives within critical multiculturalism, but rather to highlight the main principles of this tradition. Before discussing these issues, I will briefly present the central principles of critical pedagogy, the founding theory behind most critical approaches to diversity.

Critical pedagogy is an educational theory and practice that has emerged over the past few decades and is based on the teachings of Paolo Freire (1970), but also on principles coming from Foucault's sociology of knowledge, the Frankfurt school of critical theory, feminist theory, and neo-Marxist cultural criticism (McLaren, 1997b). By recognizing the inextricable link between education and politics, this pedagogical theory is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between power and knowledge (Giroux & Giroux, 2000). Viewing knowledge as historically and socially constructed, critical theorists argue that knowledge is not neutral or objective, but rather it is constructed through social interaction with others and is heavily dependent on culture, context, custom, and historical specificity (Giroux & Giroux, 2006; McLaren, 1989). Departing from this assumption, critical theorists reject the idea that school is the 'great equalizer' that assists the less advantaged, and that bridges the gap between students of different socio-economic background. On the contrary they view school as an institution that maintains the status quo, that reproduces the values and privileges of existing elites, and that favors select groups of students on the basis of race, class and gender. At the same time, and contrary to this reproductive view of schooling, they acknowledge and also promote school's potential to challenge the already established social structures and to function as an agency for self and social empowerment.In this respect critical pedagogic theorists view schools as a site for both domination and liberation (McLaren, 1989).

In my discussion on the humanistic approach to diversity, I underlined the importance of an education that promotes knowledge of the 'self.' I argued that when school encourages students to reflect on their own values and predispositions, only then would it assist them to fully understand and connect with the 'others.' One very important component of this interaction is, of course, the 'other.' But within a critical framework, what do we mean by 'other?' Who is the 'other?' Although more conservative views on diversity often limit the discussion of the 'other' to racially and ethnically 'others,' scholars from a critical perspective go beyond this outlook and make their definition of the other multidimensional. In this respect, they draw our attention to additional human characteristics such as socioeconomic class, gender, sexual preference, religion, lifestyle, political views, age, physical abilities, to name a few. They argue that by bringing such individual characteristics into the discussion about diversity we attain a more comprehensive viewing of the 'other' (Connor, & Baglieri; McLaren, 1989; Ghosh, 2002). I believe that this argument is very important and that it could be extended to how we perceive the 'self' as well. In this respect, not only the 'other' but also the 'self' is a multi-dimensional entity that has several roles, attitudes, values, behaviors and therefore multiple identities. The use of identity in plural is intentional, because, as Ghosh (2002) argues, people do not have one identity. Identities are dynamic constructions, fluid and they are always in the making. Furthermore, no group is a homogenous whole. We often perceive ourselves or 'others' as a homogenized group, as a collective 'we' or 'they', with common and unchangeable characteristics (Ghosh & Abdi, 2004). However, this is an oversimplification that fails to treat the complexities and contradictions that are a result of a person's identities (Fine, 2000). For example, an eleventh grade student can be a white individual, but she is also a teenage woman, a Polish immigrant, an atheist, a football player who loves math and so on. If school does not acknowledge all these identities, then it may fail to address the possible contributions and/or tensions deriving from their differences. By teaching students that "there is as much variation within groups as between them" (Ghosh, 2002, p.2), school will be able to promote a broadened view of the 'self' and the 'other' and encourage students to become more open to their own and others differences. Such a view ideally will reveal the complexities and contradictions inherent in our various identities, and ultimately it will open the way for a more inclusive approach to multi/intercultural education.

From a critical perspective, another concept very central to the discussion of the 'self' and the 'other' is difference. Taylor (1994) and Ghosh and Abdi (2004) have elaborated extensively on the construction of difference and its political implications. They argue that differences conceived on the basis of physical characteristics (race and ethnicity), biological characteristics (gender) or other social differences (i.e. class, economic status) appear to be natural and often they divide people into uncontested groupings (Ghosh & Abdi, 2004). Rothenberg (1990) argues that the problem with these categories is that they are often difficult to dispute because they are presented as value-free descriptions. For example, within the western world, a white, heterosexual, middle-class male, is considered the norm and anything other than that is considered deviant or deficient. For critical theorists, the problem with such an assumption is that it disregards issues of domination and exclusion and it ignores the underlying power struggles inherent in these 'natural' categorizations (Goldberg, 1992). A further result of this misrecognition is that it sustains prejudices and discriminatory views of the 'other,' and as a result perpetuates segregation within society and promotes racism, sexism, and other oppressive ideologies (Ghosh & Abdi, 2004; Giroux, 1993; Rothenberg, 1990; Sleeter, & McLaren, 1995). In order to counterbalance the effects of this misrecognition, critical theorists argue that school should help students recognize that differences are socially and politically constructed and that these constructions serve to separate certain groups from others and to safeguard the position and the privileges of the dominant group. In this respect, critical theorists see school as that agent which should encourage students to reveal the veiled power hierarchies that constitute the status quo and which should provide them with the opportunities to challenge and to change the uncontested and unequal structures (Ghosh, 2002).

Furthermore, while most multi/intercultural approaches to diversity focus on minority groups—'those different people'— critical theorists have greatly emphasized the fact that an inclusive education is one that addresses all students. This means that, within a critical approach, policies and practices include, in addition and alongside the minority/subordinate groups, the groups which possess the power within society, whose characteristics define the norm and represent the model of rationality and morality: the dominant group. If unequal structures are to be challenged, then critical theorists argue that the dominant group needs to be an active member of the multi/intercultural dialogue: Within a critically orientated education, all groups need to look at differences, question their politics and how they are created, and all groups need to contribute to the deconstruction of the unquestioned status quo (Ghosh & Abdi, 2004; Ghosh, 2002). Several scholars have made the analysis of a dominant category the focal point of their work. For example, some of them center their work on whiteness. Such discussions have served as an effective platform for raising questions on privilege, on uncontested categorizations and on discriminatory processes within the society. They therefore provide additional arguments for the necessity to make the dominant group a part of multi/intercultural education (Carr & Lund, 2009, McIntosh, 1990).

In order to accomplish all the aforementioned goals, critical approaches to diversity place at the center of their pedagogy the cultivation of critical thinking: a thinking strategy, which involves questioning the legitimacy of the given knowledge (Brookfield, 2012). Opposing the 'banking system,' (Freire, 1970) critical theorists advocate a type of critical thinking that is political. In other words they support a type of thinking with which students are able to discover the underlying values and assumptions of knowledge creation; evaluate, and reconceptualize school content; understand the dynamic and changing nature of knowledge; question power relations within society; identify and confront prejudices and hierarchies; and eventually create their own knowledge. Ultimately, within a critical educational framework, critical thinking should aim to assist students to move away from a narrow to a more inclusive outlook of people and the issues (Ghosh, 2002).

In what preceded I mentioned the main principles of the critical approach to diversity. In short this approach advocates an educational environment that recognizes the other and the self as a multi-dimensional entity, which sees difference as socially and politically constructed, and that is for all students. Drawing from these main principles, it is my stance that such an approach is very central in setting the foundation of an education that aims at developing critically thinking citizens.

Combining the Humanistic and the Critical Approaches to Diversity for the Creation of Caring and Critically Thinking Citizens

At a first glance, one could argue that the humanistic and the critical approaches to diversity are at opposing sides of the multi/intercultural spectrum. The former aims to foster an open dialogue and to promote understanding and peaceful coexistence between people, whereas the latter's primary goal is to challenge existing societal structures and bring about revolutionary change. The humanistic perspective is founded mainly on theories coming from general and social psychology (Allport, 1954; Pate, 1981; Walsh & Vaughan, 1993) and theories on empathy and care (Noddings, 1984), while the critical approach draws from various versions of conflict theory (Marx, Engels, & Moore,1955; Weber, 1968) and from pedagogies advocating questioning of and resistance against the status quo (Freire, 1970, 1985; Giroux, 1992; McLaren, 1989,1997a). One perspective seems to be more peacefully orientated and soft in its approach, while the other appears to be more oppositional and forceful. However, I believe that these two perspectives have commonalities.

First of all, they both aim to reduce prejudices, stereotyping, and discrimination. Their approach is different, but their goal is the same. The humanistic perspective aims to eliminate discrimination by promoting a feeling of care, unity, and acceptance of other people, whereas the critical perspective aims to reach this goal by focusing on the political aspect of differences and on the injustices stemming from unequal power relations. In my opinion, one approach does not exclude the other: they are two sides of the same coin. Accepting and caring for other people does not prevent us from questioning the conditions of our lives, and at the same time, questioning societal structures does not prohibit us from aiming for unity and personal and social well-being. After all, no one would want to change the conditions of his/her life and society if they have no care or concern for the lives and experiences of others, and vice versa. In this respect, we need to know in order to care, but we also need to care in order to want to know, to want to change the society and ourselves.

Another concept that intertwines both approaches is inward/ reflective thinking. Despite the fact that I presented this concept within the humanistic framework, literature shows that it is not limited to this approach. In fact, McLaren (1998) argues that critical reflection (i.e. self-questioning) is crucial in critical pedagogy because it enables us to understand our limitations and to grasp the occult character of what seems evident. Additionally, McIntosh (1990) also highlights the importance of reflective thinking as she argues that those belonging to the norm should be constantly reflecting on their unquestioned privileges, as a way of recognizing the possible consequences of their 'natural' advantages.

Of course one can also distinguish several differences between the two approaches. For example, one tension comes from the critical perspective camp, where one of the critiques is that many problems are not resolved by simply teaching individuals to love each other and to get along well. In addition, by failing to address social problems and inequalities, critical multiculturalists accuse the humanistic approach for uncritically accepting differences and the status quo. They argue that the caring-centered approach simply encourages people to live harmoniously within the status quo, and it does not encourage them to change it (Sleeter & Grant, 2003). Although this may be true to some extent, Krishnamurti's (1976) ideas point towards the opposite. Specifically, in his teachings, which bear some resemblance to Rousseau's way of looking at the child and who talks about caring and reflective thinking, Krishnamurti disregards conformity. For him a caring education does not mean that the teacher implants existing values in the mind of the child nor does it mean that s/he forces the child to conform to preexisting ideals. On the contrary, Krishnamurti argues that education should be geared towards creating new values. Imposing ideas is to condition the child without awakening his/her intelligence. He insists that the right kind of educator is the one who assists the student to alter present values, not out of reaction against them, but through critically examining and understanding the self and the world around her/him. In this respect, this point of view encourages students to question and transform values and ideas, demonstrating that a humanistic approach to education does not exclude questioning and critical thinking. This is also true for the reverse position: thinking critically does not imply aggressiveness (Lau & Wiley, 2011). On the contrary, critical thinking implies that we contemplate and we discuss the political and social norms of a society and that we recognize the complexities of human identities. Critical thinking requires that we are skeptical of and that we challenge the uncontested categorizations, the discriminatory processes and the veiled power relations within society. It is my stance that school has the responsibility to create an environment that cultivates such thinking, and to do so by guiding students to discuss and question in a caring and mindful manner.

Overall, despite the possible tensions between the two aforementioned perspectives, I believe that both approaches complement each other and combined, they can contribute to the creation of a school environment conducive to attitudes of caring and critical thinking.

Conclusion

In this paper I made a case for an education that is founded on the humanistic and the critical approaches to diversity. My argument was centered on the idea that, despite their differences, a combination of these two approaches can set the foundations for an education that is effective in developing caring and critically thinking citizens. I perceive these two approaches to be complementary and not contradictory.

As Aloni (1997) states: "Truth and edification are not to be found wholly and only in one educational ideology." [...] It is "more constructive and fruitful to constitute in good will an open discourse with diverse and conflicting voices rather than to dogmatically demonize and delegitimize the other, as is often done between ideological enemies" (p.89). It is my stance that one cannot draw solely from one theory, from one idea. Each perspective has its own value. As academics and most importantly as educators we should abstain from being dogmatic. We need to acknowledge each theory's contribution to the field and extract from it those elements that can contribute to an education appropriate for today's young generation.

NOTES

1. Throughout the paper, I will be using the term "multi/intercultural education" to refer to those educational approaches related to diversity

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