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Migrating Identities

Identités en mouvement

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Récits collectifs, cultures plurielles et nouvelles écritures visuelles

Colloque du Centre interuniversitaire d'études sur les lettres, les arts et les traditions (CELAT), en collaboration avec l'Association d'études canadiennes (ACS/AEC), organisé par Francine Saillant (directrice du CELAT, UL), Michael LaChance (directeur du site du CELAT à l'UQAC) et Daniel Arsenault (directeur du site du CELAT à l'UQAM).

Ce colloque se tiendra dans le cadre du Congrès 2010 de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines, les 2 et 3 juin 2010, Université Concordia, Montréal.

Pour toute information, vous pouvez rejoindre Gervais Carpin, coordonnateur du CELAT, 418-656-2131, poste 3588 ou gervais.carpin@celat.ulaval.ca

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Les récits collectifs qui sont sous-jacents à la formation des cultures et des identités sont sans cesse remodelés et reformulés par divers acteurs. Ces récits sont extrêmement importants car ils jouent le rôle des mythes dans les sociétés anciennes : ils racontent l'origine, les trajectoires, les valeurs, ils relient les références centrales, ils nomment les acteurs principaux et leurs relations, ils projettent le passé dans le présent et ils fournissent les clefs de la compréhension de l'identité collective et ils encouragent son prolongement dans le futur. Le pluralisme croissant des sociétés contemporaines, et avec lui celui des représentations qu'elles se font de leur présent et de leur passé, influe fortement sur la manière de raconter et de traduire les identités collectives, que celles-ci se ramènent à une formation, une association, un parti politique, ou à une entité beaucoup plus vaste, comme la nation. Ainsi, la vision pluraliste du monde contemporain a obligé le Canada et le Québec à revoir leurs récits collectifs ; divers mouvements sociaux de justice et de reconnaissance ont obligé aussi une telle révision, par exemple le féminisme en ce qui concerne les rapports entre les hommes et les femmes, le mouvement noir en ce qui concerne le racisme, etc. Ces récits collectifs, ou récits du vivre-ensemble, sans cesse remodelés et refigurés, influent aussi sur les pratiques scientifiques qui doivent tenir compte du caractère pluriel des sociétés, les anciennes comme les contemporaines, et souvent revisiter leurs propres récits, comme cela s'est traduit dans des disciplines comme l'anthropologie, l'histoire, l'archéologie, la littérature, et d'autres. C'est dans les sillons de ce pluralisme que sont nés des courants scientifiques et des paradigmes comme ceux du métissage, du postcolonialisme ou du queer. De même, l'accessibilité des technologies visuelles permet à de nombreux acteurs, dont les scientifiques eux-mêmes, non seulement de raconter mais aussi de représenter les récits collectifs, leur donnant du coup des formes inédites ; ils contribuent du coup au renouvellement des récits, et viennent complexifier l'ensemble des questions qui seront au cœur de ce colloque interdisciplinaire : Comment penser la relation entre récits et images dans les sociétés contemporaines, marquées par le pluralisme et les difficultés que le pluralisme représente ? Comment les sociétés négocient-elles avec leurs récits renouvelés sous la pression du pluralisme ? Quelles sont les formes privilégiées de narrations du vivre-ensemble dans les sociétés pluralistes ? De quelle façon les pratiques scientifiques en sciences humaines et sociales ont-elles été renouvelées sous la pression des nouveaux récits collectifs ? De quelles façons les technologies visuelles et avec elles les nouveaux médias impriment-elles les récits collectifs, incluant ceux que produisent les scientifiques eux-mêmes ? Et comment ces propositions de nouveaux « régimes de vérité » en viennent-elles à modifier les représentations matérielles et symboliques dont on se dotent aujourd'hui ?

CITIZENSHIP AND BELONGING TO CANADA: RELIGIOUS AND GENERATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

Lloyd L. Wong is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Calgary. He is also a research affiliate and domain leader of the *Citizenship and Social, Cultural and Civic Integration* domain at the Prairie Metropolis Centre.

Roland R. Simon is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology, University of Calgary.

ABSTRACT

For active citizenship to occur amongst immigrant, ethnic, and religious groups in Canada there needs to be a strong sense of belonging to Canada for people in these communities. In the post 9-11 era there has been a growing literature on the challenges of multiculturalism with respect to ethnic and religious diversity. As a consequence, this paper investigates the effects of religion and generation on sense of belonging to Canada. The authors utilize the Ethnic Diversity Survey to empirically delineate how religious and generational differences affect sense of belonging while controlling for typical demographic variables and discrimination. Whereas generally the native-born have a greater likelihood for a very strong sense of belonging—when compared to the foreign-born—this finding masks very important religious differences. What stands out when the interaction effects of religion and nativity are examined, is the paucity of a strong sense of belonging amongst 2nd + generation Muslims. This finding begs for more research to explain why this is the case.

INTRODUCTION

One of the central concerns in the citizenship literature in Canada is how legal citizenship is transcended by a normative citizenship that is active and shared. This normative citizenship includes a sense of citizenship where people have a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada, and think of themselves as being Canadian. Moreover, this central concern is considered particularly important for new Canadians who are immigrants and more recently also to their children.

Integrally related to how citizenship is manifest for the immigrant and second generation is multiculturalism in Canada, both as a corporate state policy, and the reality of how it is practiced on Canadian streets in terms of social milieu. At the policy level, Canadian multiculturalism has been the subject of much debate over the past four decades. Policy-making discourse on multiculturalism has evolved over the past several decades in Canada. In the post 9/11 era, wherein terrorist or alleged terrorist events have also occurred (2004 Madrid train bombings, 2005 London bombings, 2006 Toronto 18), these serve as reminders of a new era where multiculturalism is being questioned and in some cases, under attack. This is occurring not only in many European states, but also to some extent in Canada. Subsequently an "anti" or "post" multiculturalism discourse has become much more prevalent in the post-9/11 era and in the academic literature, the contested nature of state multiculturalism policy is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. One particular argument contained in the "anti" or "post" multiculturalism literature is that multiculturalism is not working, or has not worked, in the sense that it is claimed to be segregating (rather than integrating) diverse 'racial', ethnic, and religious groups. In other words, the policy and practice of multiculturalism contributes to a fragmentation of society and makes social cohesion difficult.

The challenges of religious pluralism in Canada are linked to the challenges of ethnic pluralism or multicul-

turalism. Theoretically and conceptually, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate religious pluralism and ethnic or cultural pluralism. As Rummens points out, there are overlapping and intersecting identities and that in actual practice, people's identities readily overlap for individuals and groups (2004, p. 6, figure 4). She notes that the dimensions of this intersectionality include cultural identity, racial identity, linguistic identity and religious identity. So there is multiplicity and intersectionality of the dimensions of ethnicity and religion. This is evident in the sociological literature where the hyphenated terms of "ethno-religious" or "religio-ethnic" have been utilized in the literature. Moreover, recent prominent Canadian scholars of religion, such as Bramadat and Seljat (2008a, p. xii; 2008b, p. 18), point to the interaction effect of ethnicity and religion in that there is a dialectical relationship between the religious mode and the ethnic mode of identity in Canada's six major minority traditions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, Islam, and Chinese religion), and that clear distinctions between religious and ethnic identities are problematic. This observation corroborates Rummen's point about the overlap and intersection of cultural/ethnic and religious identity.

It should be noted that in the sociological literature, religious differentiation, prejudice, and discrimination are all part of the well established substantive area of the sociology of religion. In Canada, for example, there is the early general work by Reginald Bibby (1987) and the more specific work of Brinkerhoff and Mackie (1986), who examined religious differentiation in terms of social distance. They showed that there was clear evidence that religious social distance by university students was greatest towards people whose religions were dissimilar and "new" to the Canadian religious landscape (1986). However, the sociology of religion in Canada was relatively dormant throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and it was certainly not connected prominently to issues of multiculturalism or immigration.

However in the post 9-11 era, religion is no longer bracketed in the academic literature on migration, pluralism, and integration (Bramadat & Biles, 2005). The 2005 special issue of the *Journal of International Migration and Integration* on "The Re-emergence of Religion in International Public Discourse" edited by Paul Bramadat and John Biles is illustrative of the rise of this important area of research. Bramadat and Biles (2005) point out that far from a clash of values within religious pluralism, as suggested by much of the public discourse, "pluralistic societies can and do host successful negotiations among citizens and groups associated with a variety of religious backgrounds" (2005, p. 175). This notion of the clash of values will be discussed in greater detail later. This special issue examines religious diversity in Canada and Quebec as well as internationally in U.K, France, Germany and the European Union. The recent 2008 issue of *Canadian Diversity* entitled "Religious Diversity and Canada's Future" edited by Jack Jedwab is also illustrative of the rise of this important research area of religious diversity in Canada and covers a breadth of topics including church and state, youth radicalization, Muslims in Canada, 'culture wars' in Quebec, and the sacred public sphere. Canadian social policy is now being challenged by the rise of religion in public discourse (Bramadat, 2005a) and the rise of scholarly work on religion. Almost overnight in the post 9/11 era, religion has moved to the secular public sphere in Canada and thus has important implications for public and social policy (Lefebvre, 2005; Elgazzar, 2008).

In the late 1980s, Bibby (1987, p. 4) situated religion within immigration by stating that it (religion):

> "…has been an important traveling companion of virtually every other newly arriving group. Its presence has been physically acknowledged in the myriad churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples that dot the urban and rural landscapes of the nation to this day."

The rise of transnationalism and diaspora research has contextualized research on religions and religious practices as one of its principal domains, along with political, economic, social, and cultural domains. One of the major challenges to Canadian social life is that diasporic religions in Canada receive meaningful and authentic recognition in the sense that they are recognized as having the potential to contribute to community life and be part of its consensus making, rather than being excluded (Bowlby, 2003). At the individual level, Karim and Hiriji (2008) suggest that regardless of what religious identity people have, there are fundamental human rights and freedoms that should guarantee their ability to participate in public life and civil society. At the collective group level, it becomes more complicated in terms of how active and shared citizenship can be achieved. Recent research has shown, for example, the important link of religion to social capital (Jedwab, 2008a; McClelland & White, 2005; Bramadat, 2005b; Weller, 2005) as has been the case with ethnicity and social capital.

What is also important for citizenship research is how matters of identity, belonging, and civic participation manifest with the children of immigrants. Over the past decade, there has been a noticeable increase in research on the second generation as some scholars shift away from a primary focus on the immigrant or first genera-

tion. This accrual of scholarly work on the second generation in Canada has been very recent and the 2008 issue of *Canadian Diversity* on "The Experiences of Second Generation Canadians" provides a good overview of much of this work. It is interesting to note that along with academic researchers, there is a significant contribution by policy makers and policy analysts in this issue (Jantzen, McDonald & Quell, and Boyd). Moreover, in 2008, the Government of Canada's Policy Research Initiative published a series of three major reports on the second generation in Canada (Sykes, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) and the Institute for Research on Public Policy also conducted a major study in 2008 on the education and earnings mobility of the second generation in Canada (Corak, 2008).

LITERATURE REVIEW

SENSE OF BELONGING

The term "belonging" is often used in the migration literature in reference to the politics of belonging or the "politics of identity". This review will not cover this dimension of "belonging", since the analysis here considers belonging at a more social-psychological level of self-identity or sense of attachment. In the Canadian literature, the notion of 'belonging' to Canada has primarily been examined in terms of the recognition and accommodation of diversity (Banting, Courchene & Seidle, 2007). Structural barriers and their impact on inequality and ethnocultural community participation have been the focus of most of the studies over the past two decades and more recently, this focus has included the concept of social cohesion (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007; Eliadis, 2007; Soroka, Johnston & Banting, 2007; and Erickson, 2007). In terms of the work on the social-psychological dimension of a 'sense of belonging' there has been little work aside from Kazemipur's (2006) work on social trust, Wong's work (2008) on transnationals and their sense of belonging to Canada and Jedwab's work (2008b) on the second generation. Since there is very little literature that examines this social-psychological dimension, the work here will assess how sense of belonging to Canada varies in terms of generational and religious differences.

The expression or term 'sense of belonging' in Canada was developed by policy makers in the Canadian government. In the mid-1990s, shortly after the Department of Canadian Heritage was created in 1993, the Government of Canada partnered with the private research firm EKOS to create the *Rethinking Government* project. This project was part of the Department's operating environment and included, among many others, the key research issue of social cohesion which included the variable of "sense of belonging" to Canada (Canadian Heritage 1999). In 2002, EKOS reported that approximately 80% of Canadians have a strong[1] sense of belonging to Canada and that there has been little change in the proportion of Canadians who feel this way since 1994 (Jenkins 2002). The EKOS findings were corroborated by Statistics Canada's 2003 General Social Survey (GSS) which indicated that 85% of Canadians have a strong[2] sense of belonging to Canada (Schellenberg, 2004, p. 17). In addition, the 2003 GSS provided evidence on the variation of "sense of belonging" by other socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, education, income, and the like. What is of interest here, are the findings for province of residence and immigration status. Only 74% of Quebecers have a strong sense of belonging to Canada and only 70% of those who use the French language at home have a strong sense of belonging to Canada. By contrast, the percentages for all the other provinces are in the high 80 and low 90 percentage range. With respect to immigration status, 85% of the Canadian-born had a strong sense of belonging to Canada while 91% of immigrants who came before 1980 had a strong sense of belonging. Further, 88% of the immigrants who came between 1980 and 1990 had a strong sense of belonging. It was only the more recent immigrants, from 1990 to 2003, who had a similar strength of sense of belonging to Canada (84%) with those who were Canadian-born.

At about the same time as the 2003 GSS, Canadian Heritage and Statistics Canada conducted the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* (EDS) in Canada that included approximately 40,000 respondents. Some of the EDS findings that have reported on "sense of belonging" to Canada include: a) 80% of respondents have a strong sense of belonging to Canada[3] (Paquette 2004) and b) those who perceive discrimination were slightly less likely to have a strong sense of belonging to Canada than those who perceive no discrimination (Derouin 2003). In addition to the EDS data on "sense of belonging", there has been other scholarly work that includes individual case studies of North African migrants in Montreal (Fortin 2002) and Hong Kong adolescent immigrants (Chow 2007). In 2007, Ipsos Reid, a private polling firm in Canada, was commissioned by the Dominion Institute to conduct a national on-line survey on social engagement and attachment to Canada using similar questions to the EDS. The results are, not surprisingly, similar to earlier studies, 79% of the general Canadian population have a strong sense of belonging to Canada and this is compared to 81% for first-generation (immigrants) and 88% for second-generation (Ipsos Reid, 2007). The most recent survey, commissioned by the Association for Canadian Studies, is of immigrants residing in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, which are Canada's three largest cities. The results here indicate that

87% of these immigrants in all three cities had a strong sense of belonging to Canada. The city breakdown indicates that the largest proportion of immigrants with a strong sense of belonging is in Toronto (91%) followed by Vancouver (84%) and Montreal (80%).

RELIGION AND SENSE OF BELONGING

Does one's religious affiliation affect one's sense of belonging to Canada? Recent research done in Canada hints at religious differentiation in terms of sense of belonging. For example, Jedwab (2008a, p. 42) presents data from the Ethnic Diversity Survey that shows considerable differences in levels of trust in terms of religious affiliation with Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims having lower proportions who feel that people can be trusted when compared to Catholics and Protestants. However, the gap between Muslims and Catholics is not large but the gap between all three (Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims) and Protestants is much larger. Further, Jedwab (2008a, p. 44) points out that the empirical evidence from the EDS shows that religious engagement fosters a greater sense of belonging to Canada rather than undercutting it. However, there undoubtedly will be differentiation in terms of sense of belonging based on particular religious affiliations. The empirical analysis to be presented later will directly examine religious affiliation and its relationship to sense of belonging to Canada.

Not that long ago, Bibby (2000, p. 239) argued, using Canadian census data up to 1991, that "From the standpoint of numbers, the heralded emerging religious mosaic, so far at least, is largely a myth." More recently, Bramadat (2005a) and Seljak et al. (2008, p.10) have presented evidence, using census data comparing 1991 to 2001, that religious diversity in Canada is indeed increasing. They note that Canadians who identified themselves as Christians decreased from 82% to 76%, which primarily reflects a decline of 8.2% who are Protestants. In contrast, they note that Hindu and Sikhs each have increased by 89%, Muslims have increased by 129%, and Buddhists by 84%. It should be noted that the use of these nation-wide census data masks the fact that the religious pluralism exists much more extensively in Canada's larger major metropolitan areas and to that extent, it certainly is not a myth.

An analysis of the fragmentation critique of multiculturalism (Wong, forthcoming), reveals that one of the sub-themes is that multiculturalism's emphasis on cultural relativism potentially leads to clash of cultures in Canada. This critique is a reflection of the global level assessment that there is a "clash of civilizations". This theme is similar to that found by Prins and Slijper (2002) in their summary of the themes in the public debates on multiculturalism and can be characterized more specifically as a domestic "clash of civilizations". In the early- and mid-1990s, the "clash of civilization" or "cultural contestation" thesis and its concomitant discourse had emerged (Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1993, 1996) with the main premise of a fundamental conflict between the Islamic world and the West. Huntington had suggested that the fundamental source of conflict in global politics would no longer be primarily ideological or economic. While this thesis has strong overtones of Orientalism and was considered by many scholars in the mid- to late-1990s as simplistic and racist, it gained more acceptance and popularity after 9/11.

In Canada, Islamophobia has become part of the public discourse on religion and immigration (Bramadat, 2005a). The incorporation of Muslim migrants in some Western European countries has resulted in policy changes that recognize religious identity as a legitimate form in the public sphere (Koenig, 2005). In contrast, some scholars argue that Muslims in Canada have greater opportunities, compared to those in Europe, for maintaining their religious practices due to the context of multiculturalism and the possibilities of constructive integration (Delic, 2008). However, as Karim and Hiriji (2008) point out, there is still a considerable challenge to policies in Canada, given debates about what is reasonable accommodation, concerns of gender equality, public security, and the tendency for the production of moral panics by the media. Undeniably there has been, in Canada, in the post 9/11 era, a greater suspicion of and discrimination towards Muslims (Khan & Saloojee, 2003; Arat-Koc, 2006).

Even prior to 9/11, research in the area of education had demonstrated some of the barriers and challenges for Muslim students. For example, Zine (2001) demonstrated how being Muslim connected students to other forms of social difference and that they faced challenges of peer-pressure assimilation, racism and Islamophobia. Subsequent work by McAndrew (2003) argued that while cultural diversity had made headway in the Quebec education system, religious diversity had been more difficult to negotiate, and especially so for Islam, where there is more ambiguity between the private and public spheres compared to other great religions. Other research by Beyer (2005, p. 157) argued that despite these barriers and challenges, religion was not a factor in terms of educational attainment amongst the second generation. However, it is a different story in terms of the income returns of education for second generation where Muslims have the lowest return amongst all groups (Beyer, 2005, p. 194). The challenges of religious pluralism for Canadian society have been clearly delineated in the literature in the post-9-11 era. In this time period, there

has been a discursive construction of transnational non-Christian religions as a social problem or issue as it relates to aspects of immigrant incorporation or integration.

SECOND GENERATION AND SENSE OF BELONGING

Undoubtedly the events in Toronto in 2006 and the arrests and trial of the "Toronto 18", an alleged terrorist plot involving several second generation youth, has spurred recent Canadian interest on the subject of the radicalization of Canadian youth and home-grown terrorism. However, the terms "home-grown terrorism" and "home-grown extremism" became major parts of international public discourse a year earlier, immediately following the July 2005 London bombings, where the perpetrators were young and held EU citizenship. In the United States, a major response to what was perceived as the rise of home-grown terrorism entailed the proposal of the *Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act* of 2007 (US Congress, 2007), which was passed in the House but never voted on in the Senate. This *Act* defined homegrown terrorism as:

> …the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (US Congress, 2007).

Thus the term "home-grown" in this proposed legislation has a nativity and generational component, in that it refers to individuals born in the United States. In Canada the term "home-grown terrorism" has been widely used in the media, and also by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), since the arrest of the Toronto 18 (for example see: "Homegrown extremism", 2006; Macleod, 2008). In CSIS's 2007-2008 public annual report, homegrown radical extremism, and more specifically homegrown Islamist extremism, was a highlighted area of concern as the following excerpt illustrates:

> The development of what has been referred to as "homegrown Islamist extremism" also continued to be a concern in 2007-08, a threat which refers to the sometimes rapid indoctrination and radicalization of young Canadians into the violent ideology espoused and inspired by Al Qaeda. Canada is home to certain individuals and groups that support the use of violence to achieve domestic political goals. These individuals and groups work outside the legitimate lawful, political and democratic system. (CSIS, 2008, p. 13)

Thus CSIS contextualized the notion of home-grown extremism to that of young Canadians, particularly those from immigrant backgrounds, and who develop a radicalization that undoubtedly diminishes any sense of identity and belonging to Canada.

Apropos to the notion of a sense of belonging to Canada McDonald & Quell (2008, p. 35) argue that the focus on identity is equally important to the focus on socioeconomic inclusion in terms of the integration of the second generation. Audrey Kobayashi, the guest editor of the *Canadian Diversity* mentions in the Introduction of that issue, that one of the recurring themes on research on the second generation is that:

> Members of the second generation see themselves and are seen by others as a cultural bridge between their parents' ways of living and a new way of living that is thought of as Canadian. They (second generation) are agents of socio-cultural change, therefore, and a prime locus for understanding the complexities of multicultural society. (Kobayashi, 2008, p. 3)

She goes on to suggest that the issues of the second generation essentially pertain to the success or failure of the dominant society in achieving the aims of multiculturalism policy.

The application of the American straight-line theory of more complete assimilation with each successive generation (Gans, 1979), might be appropriate here. It predicts that the second generation in Canada would be more likely to have a stronger sense of belonging to Canada would be more likely to have a strong sense of belonging to Canada than the immigrant or first generation. This study will directly compare the second generation's sense of belonging to that of the immigrant generation. However, the background literature is conflicted in terms of being able to hypothesize what the outcome will be. Challenging the straight-line theory is the fact that racism exists for many racialized second generation members (Ali, 2008; Arthur et al. 2008; Brooks, 2008; Potvin, 2008) and some researchers, such as Reitz and Banerjee (2007, p. 10), have shown that perceived discrimination and racism is higher amongst visible minority second generation, than it is for the visible minority immigrant generation.

Therefore, it follows that they would also find that the racialized second generation would also have less of a sense of belonging to Canada than their parents (2007, p. 25). Overall, Reitz and Banerjee argue that the racialized second generation's degrees of social integration are some of the lowest amongst youth in Canada. Thus, one would also expect this to be the case with certain religious minority groups whose members are also racialized, such as Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, and that their sense of belonging to Canada would be weaker than other religious groups.

Jedwab's ground-breaking work in this area examines sense of belonging by selecting out those with a strong sense of belonging (4 & 5 on a five point scale) and then observes differences amongst specific variables such as ethnicity, visible minority status, and age (2008b, pp. 32-33). He argues that the work of Reitz and Banerjee does not "offer any proof that ethnic persistence is the cause of a weaker sense of belonging to Canada amongst any particular second generation group exhibiting such a pattern". The work here does not enter this debate about ethnic persistence (aka multiculturalism) but rather explores, in terms of religious groups, which one might exhibit a particularly stronger or weaker sense of belonging to Canada. However, in contrast to Jedwab's methodology, which does not treat sense of belonging as a variable itself, this research will treat sense of belonging as a dependent variable in regression analysis and assess the effect of generational status (nativity) and religious affiliation amongst other independent variables.

It should be recognized that the second generation are heterogeneous and that their social mobility takes on segmented pathways and thus there are variations in their socioeconomic outcomes (Zhou & Lee, 2008; Boyd, 2008). To that extent, there are also variations in their sense of belonging to Canada. Berry (2008, p. 51), refers to a recent international study that sampled more than 5,000 immigrant youth in 13 countries. He delineates four types of acculturation attitudes: integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. He notes that while integration (36%) was the most preferred and assimilation (19%) was the least preferred, the two middle categories of separation (23%) and marginalization (22%) constituted significant proportions. These two would certainly have implications for their sense of identity and belonging to their new country of residence.

Using a qualitative approach, Brooks (2008, p. 78) found from focus group discussions with racialized second generation Canadians that racism has a generally neutral or slightly negative effect on their sense of belonging in Canada. Also, using the same qualitative type method, Gallant (2008, p. 49) argues that sense of belonging to Canada and Quebec was very much present in her interviews of 28 second generation youth. Using a quantitative approach,

Jedwab (2008a, p. 40) finds from analysis of tabular data from the EDS that second or more generation Muslims and Hindu's are less likely to believe that people can be trusted compared to those who are immigrant or first generation (born outside of Canada) while in the case of Sikhs, it is the reverse. Jedwab (2008a, p. 44) also argues that there is no evidence that faith-based organizations contribute to the estrangement of their members, especially youth, from mainstream society. Bramadat & Wortley (2008) refer to the work of Peek (2005) on Muslim university students in the aftermath of 9-11, wherein the Islamic dimension of their identity became increasingly significant. In their work on the study of websites of five religious traditions they conclude that content, which could be deemed as encouraging religious youth radicalization, has only a marginal presence. Further, they point out that public discourse and policy-making discourse is clouded by religious illiteracy. In a recent study of second generation Muslim women, Sayed (2006) also found through interviews the saliency of the Islamic dimension to their identity much of which was assigned identity by others rather than asserted by the interviewees. Nevertheless, Ramji (2008, p. 108) found through interviews with a large number (N=92) of second generation Muslims in Canada that the construction of their identities generally, and their religious identities particularly, occurs in diverse and highly original ways and without apparent fear of marginalization. Thus feelings of disempowerment and disadvantage were not present and their attitude toward discrimination, which many had experienced, was to largely ignore it. With this backdrop and varied findings in the qualitative literature, the fundamental research questions for this study emerge.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Given the relatively sparse literature on how citizenship, in terms of sense of belonging to Canada, is related to religious differences and to generational differences, the research questions for this work are exploratory. The existing literature is not sufficiently developed to allow for specific hypotheses to be tested although, at a very general level, the expectation is that one would expect religious differences to exist and that a strong sense of belonging to Canada would be more likely with Christians and less likely amongst non-Christians. Because Canada has experienced increased religious diversity over the past two decades, one research question is: What is the nature of religious differences in terms of sense of belonging to Canada? Further, given Canada's immigration patterns of

dramatic increases in non-European and non-U.S. source countries in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, the children of these immigrants are now looked upon in terms of the success of integration and citizenship policies. Thus, another research question that emerges is: What is the generational difference between immigrant and second or more generations, in terms of sense of belonging to Canada? If one were to adopt an assimilationist straight-line theory from the United States, then one would expect the second or more generations to have a greater likelihood of a strong sense of belonging to Canada, having been born and raised in Canada. In the recent Ipsos Reid report mentioned earlier, a national on-line survey found that 81% of the first-generation (immigrants), compared to 88% for second-generation, had a strong sense of belonging to Canada (Ipsos Reid, 2007). This finding however did not take into account that many of the second generation are racialized and would likely have a weaker sense of belonging according to previous research.

METHODOLOGY

The research methodology employed was secondary data analysis of the Ethnic Diversity Survey, developed by Statistics Canada and Heritage Canada. This survey consisted of telephone interviews with over 42,000 Canadians, ages 15 and over, living in private residences, from all ten provinces. Respondents were selected, using a cross-sectional design, from the ones who answered the long form questionnaire of the 2001 Census which was distributed to one out of five households in Canada. Data collection involved telephone interviews that were conducted in English and French along with seven other non-official languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish) and occurred from April to August in 2002 with a response rate of 75.6%. The analyses were performed in Stata version 9.0, and bootstrapping weights were applied in all analyses.

VARIABLE MEASUREMENT

The following describes how each of the dependent variable and the control and independent variables were measured. For the measure of the dependent variable "very strong sense of belonging to Canada", respondents were asked the question "Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than to others. Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all, and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to Canada?" To maintain a focus on the factors leading to a strong sense of belonging to Canada, this variable was dichotomized, so that 1 represented those individuals reporting a very strong sense of belonging, with all others coded 0. The resulting variable was used as the dependent variable in the model. Some amount of recoding was necessary for a number of the control variables. Gender was dummy-coded, retaining female respondents as 1, with male coded 0. Age is measured in whole years in the Ethic Diversity Survey, and thus is a continuous variable in the model. Income was measured in groups, in $20,000 increments, and kept as a continuous variable here as well. The variable experienced discrimination asked individuals if they felt that they had been treated unfairly based on their ethnicity, culture, skin colour, language, accent, or religion, in the past five years. Individuals responding "yes" are coded 1, no is coded 0. Level of education was dummy-coded, with less than high school education as the referent category.

For the independent variables, nativity was coded such that individuals born in Canada were coded 1, those born outside Canada coded 0. Similarly the particular religious groups were also dummy-coded. The category "Other Christian" includes fundamentalist Christian and Latter-Day Saints, while the broader "other" category includes any religion that did not fall into the given groups.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION

As mentioned above, the dependent variable (very strong sense of belonging to Canada) was dichotomized thus logistic regression is appropriate for modeling. Logistic regression is basically more robust than OLS regression in terms of not making assumptions of what the distributions or variances are of the independent variables. In this work and in Table 1 below, the odds ratios in the logistic regression are reported. As Frideres (2004) points out, utilizing multivariate regression allows for a way of sorting out the problem of intersections of variables, while statistically controlling for the impact of other variables, and that this fills the gaps to the qualitative work that has contributed to the theorization of intersections. In this case, the variables of nativity (foreign-born/Canadian born) and religion (various groups), are assessed through multivariate regression to get a sense of their relative impact, individually and combined, on sense of belonging to Canada. In this regression, as noted above, the variables of gender, age, income, discrimination and education are controlled.

FINDINGS

Model 1 (see Table 1) examines the control variables, independent variables, and some interaction effects. An assessment of the control variables in the initial model yielded some interesting results. Women were slightly more likely than men to report a very strong sense of belonging to Canada, with an odds ratio of 1.16. Although

the effect of increasing age is statistically significant, the increase is negligible. Unsurprisingly, having experienced discrimination leads to a 9% reduction in the likelihood of having a very strong sense of belonging. Furthermore, there is a steady decline in the odds ratio as one moves up in the level of education, from a statistically insignificant level at high school and some post secondary education, to a significant 16% percent reduction with a college diploma. The trend continues with a Bachelor's degree, where there is a 20% reduction, and with a post-graduate education individuals are 33% less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada. Thus the higher the education the less the likelihood that one has a very strong sense of belonging to Canada.

Of the independent variables, nativity (born in Canada) leads to quite a substantial increase in the likelihood of having very strong sense of belonging; 1.5 times more likely. This finding certainly supports straight-line theory in terms of identification assimilation and integration. Further, religious affiliation also has considerable variation where the statistically significant findings indicate that (in decreasing order) Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Sikhs, Hindu, Protestants and Catholics all are more likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada. While it was expected that there would be religious differences, it was unexpected that the probability odds ratios would be so high for Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. In the case of Muslims, they are almost 4 times more likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada than non-Muslims while Protestants are only 26% more likely than non-Protestants and Catholics are only 75% more likely than non-Catholics.

At a theoretical level, we suspected there may be interaction effects between the two independent variables of nativity and religious affiliation. Thus, in the initial model, these interaction terms were included. There were statistically significant interactions with a number of the religions. Catholics were 63% less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada, when the combined effect with nativity was included, than were those with non-Catholics. Similarly, Protestants were 25% less likely, Hindus were 57% less likely, and Sikhs were 64% less likely. However, Muslim respondents were by far the least likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada, when nativity is included, with an 83% percent or less likelihood. Although there was a massive reduction for those declaring "Other" as their religion, and smaller reductions for Orthodox and Other Christians, these values were not statistically significant.

With the presence of several statistically significant interaction terms, the initial Model 1 was then split in two, in other words, Models 2 and 3, to get a clearer picture of the interaction effects. Model 2 retained those individuals born outside of Canada, or foreign-born (coded 0 in the nativity variable), and Model 3 retained those born in Canada, or native-born (coded 1 in the nativity variable). Nativity was, by necessity, dropped from the Models 2 and 3.

For the control variables, the results in Models 2 and 3 generally held to the patterns seen in the original model. In Model 2 for the foreign born, most religious groups retained a similar likelihood of having a very strong sense of belonging to Canada as in Model 1. However, upon comparing Model 2 to Model 3 we see that there is a general decline in likelihood of a very strong sense of belonging to Canada for the native-born across most of the religious groups when compared to the foreign-born. While many of these coefficients are not statistically significant, several others are. In other words, the second-plus generation in most religious groups have a lesser likelihood of a very strong sense of belonging to Canada, while the foreign born have a greater likelihood. This finding demonstrates that the initial finding in Model 1, where generally the native-born had a greater likelihood of a very strong sense of belonging, is masking very important religious differences. What stands out in these results are the figures for Catholics and Muslims since they are statistically significant.

Native-born Catholics are 33% less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada. Although this result may seem counter-intuitive in this case, it is due to the high proportion of native-born Catholics in Quebec[4] and the historical experience of French nationalism within Canada. With a history of sovereignty movements and distinct society status amongst the Quebecois population, it is not surprising that the native-born are much less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada while the foreign born are 72% more likely to. Similar to native-born Catholics, native-born Muslims are 39% less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging, while foreign-born Muslims are four times more likely. Native-born Hindus and Sikhs have reductions in their likelihood, although their values are not statistically significant while for foreign-born Hindus and Sikhs, they are 2.5 and 3 times respectively more likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada. Unlike the Catholic finding, this finding for Muslims is extremely difficult to interpret and no attempt will be made here. Given recency of immigration, it is safe to assume that most of these native-born Muslims are second generation rather than third or beyond. The fact that there is this dramatic drop indicates that there are other important social factors in play beyond those controlled for in the models. While the model did control for the experience of discrimination and it should only be cautiously ruled out as an explanation because the existence of racism and Islamophobia, as

TABLE 1: Odds Ratios of Very Strong Sense of Belonging to Canada on Nativity, Religious Group and Various Socio-Demographic Variables[1]

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 1: VERY STRONG SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA	MODEL 2: VERY STRONG SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA FOREIGN-BORN	MODEL 3: VERY STRONG SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA NATIVE BORN
Control Variables			
Gender (female=1)	1.160***	1.059	1.192***
Age	1.028***	1.035***	1.026***
Income	1.016	1.010	1.018
Experienced discrimination	.911*	.780***	.993***
Level of Education			
High School	.997	1.273*	.942
Some Post Sec	.924	.867	.936
College	.842**	.919	.812**
Bachelor's	.800**	.761**	.816**
Post-graduate	.676**	.689**	.670***
Nativity (2nd+ generation or Can. born = 1)	1.552***	---	---
Religious Group			
Catholic	1.751***	1.725***	.667***
Protestant	1.760***	1.669***	1.341***
Orth. Christian	3.033***	3.194***	2.135***
Other Christian	1.255	1.284	.972
Muslim	3.842***	4.119***	.613*
Jewish	.889	.874	.939
Hindu	2.373***	2.504***	.979
Sikh	2.935***	3.048***	.996
Buddhist	1.022	1.021	1.108
Other Eastern	.712	.731	1.131
Other Religion	15.975	17.499	2.029
Interaction Effects			
Catholic x Nativity	.376***		
Protestant x Nativity	.752*		
Orth. Christian x Nativity	.708		
Other Christian x Nativity	.778		
Muslim x Nativity	.168***		
Jewish x Nativity	1.077		
Hindu x Nativity	.434***		
Sikh x Nativity	.360***		
Buddhist x Nativity	1.103		
Other Eastern x Nativity	1.602		
Other Religion x Nativity	.133		
N	34140		

[1]2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey—Bootstrapped: *=p>.05, ** = p>.01, *** = p>.001

noted in the literature, may operate at levels beyond just the experience of discrimination. Nevertheless, this finding begs the question of whether this lack of a very strong sense of belonging to Canada is a factor that contributes to, or sets the stage for, a radicalization of Muslim youth who are second generation?

CONCLUSION

One major significant and expected finding of this research is that religious affiliation is a major contributor to the likelihood of whether a group has a very strong sense of belonging to Canada or not. However, unexpectedly, this differentiation has Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus with higher probabilities than Catholics and Protestants. Also unexpectedly, the findings are that the likelihood of a very strong sense of belonging to Canada generally diminishes with the second-plus generation in most religious groups. There is no clear explanation for this and this is part of the murky picture that is created by the lack of understanding of the social milieu for the second generation as reported in the Policy Research Initiative's recent report (Sykes, 2008a, pp. 21-23). It is a murky picture primarily because of the sparse research that exists. Much more research is needed here such as qualitative analysis to aid in the theory building. Perhaps the explanation for second generation Muslims, having a lesser likelihood for a strong sense of belonging, may be found in bumpy-line theory, which tries to account for the unexpected movements that the assimilation process may take, sometimes reverting to a more expressive ethnic identity for a particular generation. The direction of movement—toward more thorough assimilation—however does not change over successive generations (Gans, 1992).

These findings have implications for multiculturalism policy in Canada. Kobayashi (2008) suggests that research on the second generation, by necessity, broaches the topic of the success or failure of Canadian multiculturalism policy. Canadian policy-makers certainly have been attuned to this issue. For example, it was recently reported that the Canadian Government's Heritage Department was going to take aim at religious radicals. The Globe and Mail stated that Andrew Griffiths, Canadian Heritage's Director-General of Multiculturalism and Human Rights, in addressing a federal national security advisory board, discussed the topic of how to counter religious radicalization (Freeze, 2008, p. A1). He was quoted as asking: "Are traditional government objectives [civic participation, anti-racism/cross-cultural understanding, and inclusive institutions] enough to address radicalization or are radicalization-specific initiatives required?" Moreover, it was also reported that Griffiths had no concrete answers, but that shifting demographics mean that government must "adjust multiculturalism programming" in order to "advance core Canadian values" (2008, p. A1). He is suggesting here that Canadian multiculturalism policy is under scrutiny. So do we have a failure here—wherein the sense of belonging to Canada of the second generation is less than that of the immigrant generation for certain religious groups? Some Muslim leaders agree that special programming is needed, thus implying failure of current policies and programs. Imam Delic (2008, p. 101), National Executive Director of the Canadian Islamic Congress, recommends that Muslim and non-Muslim organizations and leaders create programs that engage and integrate Muslim youth into the activities of the mainstream so as to diminish the potential of alienation. At the same time, some research suggests that, in terms of educational attainment, religion is no longer a factor for the Canadian born or second or more generations (Beyer, 2005).

In conclusion, a fundamental question emerges from this research: Why are second generation Muslims less likely to have a very strong sense of belonging to Canada than other second generation religious groups, even when gender, age, income, experience of discrimination, and education are controlled for? Research now has to concentrate on other aspects of the social milieu for second generation Muslims in order to try to clear up the murky picture.

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NOTES

[1] Measured as "somewhat to intense sense of belonging (5, 6, 7 on a 7-point scale)

[2] Measured as "somewhat strong or very strong sense of belonging"

[3] Measured as "4, 5 on a 5-point scale".

[4] http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/rel/qc.cfm Retrieved 8 December 2008.

WE NEEDED TO PROVE WE WERE GOOD CANADIANS: CONTRASTING PARADIGMS FOR SUSPECT MINORITIES

Evelyne Massa is a second-year D.Phil. student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation explores the themes of protest, resistance and agency among immigration detainees in the United Kingdom. Her academic interests include multiculturalism, social and ethnic identity, and the relationship between minority integration and political engagement. She is particularly interested in how non-status migrants organize and engage in political life. She obtained her B.A. from McGill University, and her master's from the University of Cambridge, both in sociology.

Morton Weinfeld is Chair of the Sociology Department at McGill University, where he holds the Chair in Canadian Ethnic Studies. He has done extensive research and consulting in areas of ethnicity, immigration, and multiculturalism. Among his books are "Like Everyone else but Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian Jews" (2001); "Ethnicity, Politics and Public Policy", with Harold Troper (1999); "Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians, and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada", with Harold Troper (1988). He is currently researching issues of competing identities and loyalties among Jews in Canada and Great Britain.

ABSTRACT

Issues of competing or dual loyalties have re-emerged in importance in increasingly diverse western societies, including Canada, following the 9-11 attacks and the steady increase in diasporic-homeland transnational ties. This paper offers a re-examination and re-interpretation of the historical experience of Canadian Italians, Germans and Japanese before, during and after World War Two. That experience foreshadows current dilemmas. It confirms that two paradigms shaped their communal responses to their suspect status and victimization in Canada, and their eventually successful efforts at full re-integration and rehabilitation. The first is a tolerance paradigm which draws on an older tradition of minorities as unequal citizens, and is generally discredited today. The second, more prominent post-war and after the introduction of the Charter, can be called a rights paradigm and emphasizes a clear assertion of equality for minority citizens. It is suggested that *both* these paradigms in fact contributed to the difficult task of re-integration facing these three minority groups, during and after the War, and *both* may also have value for vulnerable or suspect Canadian minorities affected by international conflict today.

CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: THEMES AND PARADIGMS

The horror of 9-11 and its aftermath, including various actual and attempted terror attacks in the West, have raised both national security concerns and concerns by civil libertarians at aspects of the "war on terror", including the cloud of suspicion over Islam, Arabs, and Arab/Muslim Canadians (Arat-Koc, 2006;Youssif, 2008). These groups are now "suspect minorities." These concerns are exacerbated by an increased linkage of immigrants with homelands and diasporas, enhanced by the forces of transnationalism and globalization (Frideres, 2008; Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004).

Most times these kinds of linkages: dual identities, loyalties, and even citizenships, are non-problematic. They are exotic, make Canada a post-modern multicultural mosaic and create interesting hybrid identities. But there are times when they can pose difficulties. Consider the case of dual citizenships, which can be linked, rightly or wrongly, to issues of loyalty or attachment to Canada

(Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Jedwab, 2007/08). Problems arose for both Canadian Liberal party leader Stephane Dion and Governor General Michaëlle Jean, who both held French citizenship at the time of their selection to their leadership posts (Mills, 2005; Rubec, 2005; Thompson, 2006). Some countries, like Italy, have reserved seats in their Parliament for those—dual citizens—who represent Italian diasporic communities, which include Canadian citizens (Frideres, 2008, p. 85). More difficult questions of conflicting loyalties can arise for sharp disputes in the areas of foreign policy, where minority groups and their lobby organizations may defend viewpoints which differ from current Canadian policy (Bercuson & Carment, 2008; Granatstein, 2008). In Canada, the Middle East conflict has been a focal point and perhaps best case study of ethnic lobbying in the foreign policy field (Aoun, 2008; Taras & Goldberg, 1989).

For example, some Jewish communal organizations in Canada have lobbied to defend the security and welfare of Israel as part of a general policy agenda (Taras, 1989). This has been done largely through specific organizations such as the Canada Israel Committee, and the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA). The haunting possibility that Canadian Jewish leaders were insufficiently militant in pressuring the Canadian government to open its doors to Jewish refugees before and during World War Two, may be stoking the current commitments to defend Israel's security (Abella and Troper, 1982). More recently, organizations such as the Canadian Arab Federation, the Canadian Islamic Congress, and CAIR-Canada have begun to develop a lobbying capacity regarding Middle Eastern issues, and a comparable engagement with Canadian electoral politics (Aoun, 2008; Arat-Koc, 2006; Hamdani, Bhatti, & Munawar, 2005; Khan & Saloojee, 2003). In the United States, this advocacy, at least on the pro-Israeli side, has been more active and effective than in Canada, amidst controversial allegations that it has unduly influenced American policy (Dershowitz, 2006; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007; Taras & Weinfeld, 1993). Far more serious than routine foreign policy lobbying are cases where a major conflict or actual war breaks out involving Canada and home countries. In these cases, minorities with immigrant origins in countries at war or in serious conflict with Canada can become suspect. In the worst case they could be considered as a fifth column, and a national security threat (Iacovetta & Ventresca, 2000; Roy, 2007; Thompson, 1991).

What options are available to minority groups in democratic societies who find themselves under threat or suspicion in times of conflict or war, and in the post-conflict period? Two paradigms reflecting different strategies, present themselves. The first is one where minorities conform and (re)prove that they are deserving of common citizenship and social acceptance, and deny possible suggestions of disloyalty. It has historically reflected minority weakness, and is generally discredited as unacceptable in the modern and egalitarian era. It flows from a sense of immigrant minorities as less than full citizens, whose main concern is full social acceptance and approbation. Its sensibility is sociological. We can call it a "tolerance" paradigm. Its European intellectual roots lie in late pre-Emancipation Christendom, beginning with John Locke. More recently it reflects strong currents of assimilationist and even integrationist thought (Gordon,1964; Park 1950).

The second paradigm emerged later and is dominant today, and consists of more recent notions of equal citizenship and uncompromising commitment to equal rights under the law. This paradigm was a product of several post-war events and trends which have strengthened minority rights: the impact of the Holocaust; the emergence of successful anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements; the intellectual triumph of cultural relativism; the American civil rights movement; the emergence of identity politics and a politics of recognition (Taylor & Gutmann, 1992). Its sensibility is legal. We can call this a "rights" paradigm.

In contemporary Canada, all ethno-racial minorities have embraced the rights paradigm. Accordingly, diasporic minorities, even during homeland conflict, have nothing to prove. Indeed, it is the law of the land, under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. More recently, religio-cultural groups have been involved with courts and the polity in seeking "reasonable accommodation" of religious and cultural commitments, most visibly perhaps in Quebec but in general across the country (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008). Yet some analysts have suggested that the apparent rights paradigm associated with Canadian multiculturalism is in fact a mask for a deep rooted racism, typical of liberal societies. In this view, purported human rights abuses like the Maher Arar case in fact reflect the use of inflated security concerns as a rationale for ongoing racialization and oppression of minority groups (Abu-Laban and Nath, 2007; Agamben, 2005). This may or may not be true. But our view is that these two paradigms do describe sharply contrasting options. Under the new post-Charter rights paradigm in Canada, all groups are prepared to defend vigorously their rights in the public square (Morton, 1987; Schneiderman & Sutherland, 1997). A good recent example was the debate over Bill C-36, the Canadian government's post 9-11 anti-terrorism legislation. Islamic/Arab groups, among others, opposed many of the bill's provisions as violating civil rights and promoting profiling, while Jewish groups defended the bill as an important element in the fight against terror (Roach, 2003).

The issue of allegedly conflicting loyalties was acute during World War One, when many Ukrainian Canadians and some other eastern European groups, among others, were interned (Luciuk, 2001). This paper will focus more narrowly and recently on similar travails facing three groups before, during and after World War Two: all Japanese Canadians, and selected hundreds of Italian and German Canadians. These three communities, before, during and after World War Two, faced significant degrees of popular prejudice and discrimination. There seems to be a progressive consensus about the lessons of this past which is, the superiority of the rights paradigm. Majority groups, accordingly, ought not repeat these errors of profiling and violations of civil liberties of minorities. And minority groups must be vigilant and prepared to oppose any diminution of their rights and equal status as Canadian citizens. This position is concretized in the recommended response to alleged anti-Arab and anti-Muslim Canadian trends in the post 9-11 environment.

> "As Canadian Muslims look to their near past, they discover that many ethnic groups have gone through similar trials: Ukrainians and Poles during the First World War; Germans, Italians, and Japanese during the Second World War, and Jews during the first half of the past century. By fighting discrimination, each group emerged stronger, with its role further entrenched in the Canadian mosaic" (Khan & Saloojee, 2003, p. 54).

In this paper, we re-examine the histories of Italian, Japanese, and German Canadians before, during, and after World War Two, as they were in varying degrees, victimized, stigmatized, and then rehabilitated within the Canadian body politic. The actual extent to which they did, or could, overtly "fight discrimination" is minimal. We rely on the historical record in secondary sources, but re-frame the evidence from the perspective of a concern for dual or competing loyalties and identities. The argument we shall develop is more nuanced than the generally consensual embrace of the rights paradigm as the optimal or only option for minority groups to overcome situations of marginality and suspicion. We suggest, rather, that *both* paradigms, sequentially and concurrently, helped achieve the required objectives of equality and respect in varying degrees for these three groups. Conflicting loyalties before and during the war for some in these groups were realities that had to be negotiated, and then transformed into a unified and helpful post-war identity. And they were.

THE ITALIAN CASE

Between 1880 and 1915, tens of thousands of Italian migrants, men for the most part, made their way to Canada. In time, a local elite and an active organizational life emerged in the Italian "colonies" (as they would be called), so that by the time World War One broke out, the institutional base of an Italian community, especially in Toronto and Montreal, had been solidly established (Zucchi, 1988). Indeed, for many in this wave of emigration, Italian nationalist sentiment developed not in Italy but in Canada (Ramirez, 1989, p. 16). *Italianità* was further stoked, and communal bonds made stronger, with Italy's participation in World War One. Because Italy and Canada had been allies, Italian patriotism was seen as linked to Canadian nationalism (Principe, 1999, p. 63 Ramirez, 1989, p. 17). Throughout the war years, more than 8,000 Italians returned to their homeland to fight. Moreover, almost 2,000 Italian-Canadians volunteered to serve overseas in the Canadian army (Sturino, 1999, p. 819).

In time, new political developments in Italy re-shaped Italian-Canadian communities. Mussolini's fascists aimed to link all segments of the Italian diaspora to the new Italy.[1] From 1929 to 1940, alliances were forged between local elites and fascist officials at Italian Consulates. This led to the establishment of *Case d'Italia*—all purpose community centers that had as their underlying purpose, the propagation of the fascist agenda and the cultivation of local support for it. This relationship between immigrants from Italy in Canada, promulgated fierce pride in the homeland. This was facilitated by the creation of local branches of the national party known as *fasci*, beginning as early as 1922.

Fascist officials proclaimed there was no tension between loyalty to Italy and Mussolini's fascist ideals, and loyalty to Canada. Officials encouraged emigrants to "be good citizens, respecting local laws, loyal to their country of adoption, but ideally united to their country of origin," as was stated in a speech by Consul General Luigi Petrucci at a 1933 banquet in Toronto (quoted in Pennacchio, 2000, p. 53). Ironically, the Canadian government in no way condemned these dual loyalties among its Italian minority: Italian supporters of fascism could do so with the full approval of their fellow Canadians (Harney, 1979, p. 229; Principe, 1999, p. 23; Bertonha, 2002, p. 18).

During the late 1920s and the 1930s, Canadian political and intellectual elites tended to see fascism as a sign of Italian stability (in spite of mistrust and conflict resulting from fascist foreign policies) and so they supported the regime at least until the second half of the 1930s. Before the war and internments, mayors, members of Parliament, and even the chief of police often spent time at the Casa d'Italia in Toronto fraternizing with

Italians (Cumbo, 2000). Fascism only became objectionable in Canada (English-Canada, at least) once Mussolini undertook his expansionist campaign of Ethiopia in 1935. In French-Canada on the other hand, issues of Latinness, Catholicism, anti-Bolshevism, and opposition to English colonialism led to "an even more marked support of the Ethiopian War" and of Mussolini's fascist regime, an enthusiasm which lasted practically until Italy joined the Axis (Bertonha, 2002, p. 181). The problem of 'opposing' or 'competing' loyalties simply did not exist for Italian Canadians before the war (Principe, 1999, p. 19-22).

The emerging fascist sentiments among Italian-Canadians were less about politics, and much more about patriotism, respectability, and the building a sense of collective self-worth (see Salvatore, 1997; Principe, 2000). Many Italian-Canadians paid no attention to the politics of the homeland, a lack of political sophistication that aided the fascist regime's effort to indoctrinate them (Harney, 1979, p. 229). Conflating Italian culture with political propaganda in the way it did, this new ideology was especially appealing to foreign immigrants who were accustomed to being ignored by Italy, and made to feel like foreigners in their adopted land (Pennachio, 2000, p. 53).[2]

But not all Italian Canadians were fascist. There were deep divisions within the community throughout the inter-war period (Bertonha, 2002, p. 172). Though numerically outnumbered—in the 1930s the *fasci* in Canada had a following of around 3,500, whereas the left-wing groups measured theirs in the hundreds—the latter counted amongst their ranks small but active groups of Italian communists, social democrats and anarchists[3] (Sturino, 1999, p. 819). Though highly critical of the "social illness" that was fascism, even Antonio Spada, a famous antifascist could not accuse the fascist regime of directly fomenting dissent or disloyalty (Salvatore, 1997, p. 211). One pro-fascist community leader interviewed in the 1930's, did not see "anything wrong with swearing allegiance to the King of England and to Mussolini" (Ramirez, 1988, p. 79).

This soon changed. On June 10, 1940, Italy entered the war on the Axis side, and that very afternoon the provisions of the Defense of Canada Regulations came into effect. That afternoon, Italian consular and embassy officials were given notice to leave the country "as soon as they can arrange it" (Wood, 2002, p. 51). Organizations that were openly fascist in nature were declared illegal, and in some cases, their properties were confiscated. RCMP officials proceeded to arrest individuals whose names figured on a list they had compiled of alleged political subversives in the Italian communities across the country. Throughout the country, but mainly from Montreal and the Toronto areas, several hundred men were arrested without any warrants and were placed in receiving stations where they awaited transport to the two internment camps already established for the Germans (Wood, 2002, p. 52).

In the wake of the internments, an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust descended upon the entire community, and resulted in "the breakdown of infrastructures and *ambiente*" (Ramirez, 1988, p. 74). This derailed the community-building that had been in progress for over fifty years, and resulted in the rapid atrophy of the community's major institutions. Many community leaders were interned, and *italianità* now became a mark of condemnation rather than of celebration. Far from drawing the Italian community together, the events surrounding the internments divided it, and while practically all were ready to proclaim their undying loyalty to Canada, "few spoke in defense of those interned" (Sturino, 1999, p. 802). So despite renewed prejudice against Italian Canadians during the war, and despite internments, Italian Canadians set out to prove their loyalty to their new home. Members of the community contributed significantly to the war effort, by enrolling in the Canadian Armed Forces, by raising donations, by working with great efficiency in the factories and shipyards that kept the war effort running. In Toronto, construction magnate James Franceschini opened shipyards and built minesweepers for the government at probably the lowest cost in Canada[4] (Sturino, 1999, p. 824). In British Columbia, explicit steps were taken by the community's leadership in the build-up to the war to demonstrate Italians' loyalty to Canada in the form of a pledge of loyalty signed by all community-members, and the founding of an association to back the Canadian war effort (Bagnell, 1989, p. 133). In-depth interviews with Italians who lived through the war in Canada reveal humiliation, and mixed feelings about Italian compatriots fighting against Canada, as well as difficulty dealing with dual identities (if not necessarily dual loyalties) coming into conflict while Canada was at war (Battaglini, 2002, p. 53). Yet despite these emotional difficulties, their contribution to the war effort was notable, and their loyalty, manifest.

Throughout the war, and in the years following it, observers describe a community over which a "dark cloud" was cast, and in which humiliation far outweighed anger or rage (Bagnell, 1989, p. 97; Sturino, 1999). Interestingly, Italians, especially younger ones, tended not to blame the people they might have—Canadian politicians and the police—but in a sense "blamed the victim." They fingered their own community leaders, deepening the fractures within the community. There was little interest in reviving the "Sons of Italy" and other national Italian associations (Zucchi, 1988, p. 197). Canadian-Italians,

after the war, sought to integrate quietly into mainstream Canadian society, within the norms of the tolerance paradigm. In Toronto, scores of Italians changed their names: Rossini became Ross, Riccioni became Richards, and Giaccomo became Jackson (Bagnell, 1989, p. 101). Post war exogamy increased from a low of 23% in 1961 (with the arrival of the large post-war wave of immigrants) steadily upwards. By 1996, 34% of Italian husbands had wives of a different ethnic group (Kalbach, 2002). In Toronto by 1980, in-marriage had decreased from 91 percent among Italian immigrants to 64 percent for the second generation and 29 percent for the third (Sturino, 1999, p. 802, 807). Italians strove to once again prove their goal was "good and responsible citizenship" (Harney, 1996, p. 78).

This zeal was displayed through projects like community centers and other institutions. One man actively involved in the construction of Villa Colombo, an Old Age home for elderly Italians, stated bluntly:

> I felt we needed to prove we were good and hardworking Canadians, but of Italian extraction. What better way to do it than to show some sort of civic responsibility, taking care of your own, building an old age home. Sure some of us were poor, but we worked hard and did well. It was time to give back (Harney, 1996, p. 71).

A general discourse emphasized "giving back to Canada," and aimed to demonstrate or prove to Canadians at large that Italians were a loyal, responsible and united community (Iacovetta, 1992, p. 126-7). The loyalty of Canadian-Italians during World War Two and Italy's emergence as an ally within NATO, did much to erase the stigma of fascism from the community and to increase participation in political life (Sturino, 1999, p. 820).

Between 1951 and 1978, roughly 479,000 Italians immigrated to Canada mainly to Toronto and Montreal (Bagnell. 1989, 129; Ramirez, 1989, p. 7). There was in fact an immense cultural and historical distance between the two groups: new arrivals had little notion of the structure or history of the societies they were joining (Zucchi, 1988). Italians began to negotiate a Canadian identity based on their own experiences of Canadian nationalism from its margins. From that location, they came to contest English-Canadian hegemony, and even began developing their own regional and provincial conceptions of Italian-Canadian identity (Wood, 2002, p. 79-98). It was a stronger and more assertive approach than before, complete with a well-organized national polity. The National Congress of Italian Canadians (NCIC) was founded in 1974, to represent the interests of all who fell within the loosely bounded "Italian community" of Canada.

Beginning in the 1980s, a marked paradigmatic shift began, even as the steady educational, economic, political, social and cultural integration continued apace. In 1987, in an innovative step for the Italian community, the NCIC presented a brief on the Meech Lake accord, designed to win Quebec's acceptance of the 1982 constitution. Following Meech Lake, the NCIC started to lobby the Canadian government to obtain a parliamentary apology for the wrongs it asserts were committed against the entire community during World War II, as well as making claims for monetary compensation on behalf of surviving victims. The entire campaign, as well as the publication *A National Shame*, was couched in the language of human rights and of civil liberties. In using the rights paradigm, the redress campaign could be seen not as purely an "ethnic" issue, but one that touches all citizens, "one that vote-conscious politicians and Canadians could embrace as a national one" (Iacovetta and Ventresca, 2000, p. 386, p. 392). In 1984, the NCIC officially requested compensation from the Canadian government for the breaches of human rights during the war.[5] In 1990, it submitted a brief to the Prime Minister outlining the redress grievances, and received an official apology from the Prime Minister and a promise to redress the damages suffered by the community (Iacovetta and Vetntresca, 2000; Sturino, 1999). The debate on the precise nature of the redress, and amounts and recipients of compensation has continued for years. At times, Italian Canadians wondered why their case received less support than that of the Japanese (for example, the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation in 1996 was part of the redress settlement with the Japanese). Amounts ranging from $2.5 million to $12.5 million for Italians were bandied about, by both the Liberal and Conservative parties, often before federal elections, right through 2008 (Grasser, 2008). But the main point is that by this time, the Italian Canadian community had long since been fully reintegrated in the Canadian community, the wartime travails and suspicions a long forgotten memory.

THE GERMAN CANADIAN CASE

Early German-speaking immigrants to Canada displayed a multiplicity of divergent and intersecting identities, coming from such varied areas as Russia, Ukraine, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the United States and the former Yugoslavia (Lorenzowski, 1998, p. 168; Bassler, 1999, p. 600). For the most part, these new German-Canadians assimilated well: "although the hearts of Germans in Canada may have been in Germany, their hands were

for Canada" (Grams, 2001, p. 45). World War One would be the end of the age of innocence for the German minority in Canada, and prefigured similar events a generation later. Negative attitudes were "not just against Germany, but against "Germanness", and it was no longer thought possible to be both German and Canadian (McLaughlin, 1985, p. 12). During the course of the First World War, Germano-phobia escalated into acts of violence, the destruction of property, and the vilification of German people and culture. Workers were laid off, and courts laid charges of treason and sedition, though no accusation was ever proven (Grams, 2001, p. 46; Bassler, 1999, p. 607; Grenke, 1991, p. 156). During the course of World War One, Canada interned a total of 8,750 foreign nationals.[6] Of the interned, 2,009 were Germans and 5,954 were Austro-Hungarian, largely of Ukrainian origin.[7]

Authorities confiscated some German property and assets for fear of the possessions being liquidated by their owners and the money being sent back to Germany. At the end of the war, the Weimar government, along with many Germans, insisted on compensation for their forced imprisonment and lost possessions. The Canadian government sluggishly and half-heartedly complied; for the most part, it reserved compensation for Canadian nationals whose possessions were confiscated within enemy states (Grams, 2001, p. 47-51). At this time, notions of equal rights for suspect minorities in Canada were premature.

During the war, German-Canadians chose to make themselves invisible, rather than go out of their way to manifest any kind of loyalty to Canada. They were unsure and divided over how to prove their Canadian loyalty (Bassler, 1999, p. 608). Until their publication was prohibited in 1917, the German-language papers attempted to act in a conciliatory fashion and advised compliance with Canadian laws (Bassler, 1999, p. 608). Winnipeg's *Der Nordwestern* is a prime example: in order to discourage the outbreak of violence towards German-Canadians, the paper advised readers "not to act in a manner which would offend the English-speaking majority and not to place themselves in positions where their behavior might become suspect" (Grenke, 1991, p. 156). Enlistment in the Canadian Army was also very limited as both the German community and Army officials discouraged it (Grenke, 1991, p. 159; Grams, 2001, p. 46).

The trauma of World War One taught German-Canadians the expediency of camouflaging their ethnic identity and reinforced their already-marked tendency to assimilate rapidly (Bassler, 1999, p. 608). Like the Italians, many Germans changed their names after the war: Schmidt became Smith, Braun became Brown, and Biehn became Bean (McLaughlin, 1985, p. 19). Cultural life as it existed before the war was also suppressed, as German newspapers were replaced by English dailies, and German clubs (those that survived the war) avoided all discussion of politics or European affairs[8] (McLaughlin, 1985, p. 14). Despite this tendency to outwardly suppress German culture, some feelings of resentment and betrayal did simmer beneath the surface, as expressed in first-hand and personal accounts of the time (Grams, 2004, p. 48). But at the time, neither Germans nor the more numerous Ukrainians who had been interned, had a realistic option of redress.

Things changed slowly in the 1930s. In contrast to the Italian case, the German fascist movement in Canada was decidedly unsuccessful and did not attract the same numbers as it did in other countries such as Argentina or Romania. This was due in part to the fact that Germans adapted very well to life in Canada, and the traumas of World War One were quickly forgotten; many were rather out of touch with the political happenings in Nazi Germany (Lorenzowski, 1998, p. 174). The Nazi party recruited only 170 members, and its affiliated German Labour Front, an estimated 300. The *Deutscher Bund Canada* (or Canadian Society for German Culture), founded in 1934, attracted the most members with a national membership of around 2,000 at its height between 1937-8. This was partly because it pursued cultural, rather than political aims (Bassler, 1999, p. 602). The *Bund* did not feel secure enough to wander beyond propaganda dissemination into the riskier realm of violence or intimidation (Wagner, 1981, p. 186).

Many German Canadians saw Nazism as a way of boosting national self-esteem and of celebrating the mythical *Volksgemeinschaft*[9] with which they identified (Werner, 1998, p. 209). In any case, it appears to have been the cultural component of Nazi ideology, rather than the political side, which gained the support of certain German Canadians (Lorenzowski, 1998, p. 171).[10] But by far, the greater majority of Germans identified themselves as German-Canadians, whose fate was tied to that of Canada (McLaughlin, 1985, p. 14). Even German-Canadians who were members of pro-Nazi organizations, protested their loyalty to Canada (Keyserlingk, 1993, p. 249).

During World War Two, German ethnicity was singled out as suspect for the second time within the lifespan of some members of the community (Bassler, 1999, p. 608; (Lorenzowski, 1998, p. 171). This time, 800 Germans were interned and all German Canadians who had entered Canada after 1922—whether Canadian citizens or not—were forced to register as enemy aliens. Still, the level of anti-German hostility in Canada never reached the heights it did during the First World War mostly because German-Canadians set out to demonstrate their loyalty soon thereafter. Because of the fear of provoking resentment and reprisals, and with the

humiliation of the last war still relatively fresh, German-Canadian cultural activities ceased almost completely during the War (Bassler, 1999, p. 608). Recruits joined the Canadian Armed Forces, and financial support was rarely surpassed in Anglo-Saxon communities. German clubs, quickly and voluntarily, suspended their activities "in an ironic show of support for Canadian democracy" (McLaughlin, 1985, p. 16). Even the German speaking Mennonites participated in the war effort despite their strict pacifist belief system (Fransen, 1988). German cooperativeness, along with the paucity of evidence for any Nazi threat in Canada, led the government to release the great majority of German internees by 1941.

After 1945, the recovery of ethnic confidence would have been difficult enough (as the Italian case demonstrates) without discovery of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. These revelations, from the Nuremberg trials and the Eichmann trial, perpetuated the stigmatization of Germans everywhere, regardless of how they related to Nazi party activities (Bassler, 1999, p. 609). Ironically, the experience also imposed a new, more unified "German" identity, helping to forge new communal bonds related to the common experience in Canada and elsewhere of being stigmatized as a Nazi (Bassler, 1998, p. 92).

Between 1946 and 1960, approximately 270,000 German immigrants left Europe to come to Canada. They rushed to escape any wartime legacy and further European dislocation and integrate into Canadian culture(Werner, 1998). This may help to explain the integrationist tendencies of the post-war German community in Canada, described by *Maclean's* in 1964 as "untroublesome" and "almost painfully unassertive." By the 1960's, "Germans were among the best integrated, least vocal, and least politically active ethnic groups in Canada." (MacLaughlin, 1985, p. 20). In 1960s West German society, there was an open and vibrant social discourse that confronted the legacy of the Holocaust, and indeed which continues in Germany today. But post-war immigrants to Canada, however, were cut off from this discourse[11] (Werner, 2006, p. 138; Zimmer, 1998, p. 28). It was hard for both earlier Canadian born German-Canadians and immediate post-war immigrants to cope with the past, and this led the community to descend into a culture of victimhood and invisibility (Bassler, 1999, p. 610; Freund, 2006, p. 138; Sauer, 1998, p. 237). The desire to counteract negative stereotypes and navigate the ambiguities of their identity encouraged immigrants to make an impression as "good Germans" by being, in the very words of an immigrant from the time, "hard-working, friendly and helpful." This voluntary integration also included voting in elections and broadening social networks (Freund, 2006, p. 141; Zimmer, 1998, p. 24).

New German immigrants moved to cities and the expanding suburbs, where they demonstrated the lowest degree of residential clustering of all major immigrant groups, and as well, a significant educational and occupational mobility along with a decreased retention of mother tongue and preservation of ethnic traditions (Bassler 1990; 999, p. 610). German Canadians had high and increasing exogamy rates, with 59.9% of German husbands being married to wives of a different ethnic origin in 1996 (Kalbach, 2002).[12] By the 1980s, many German Canadians considered themselves, and were considered by the Anglo-Saxon majority, to be Canadians (MacLaughlin, 1985, p. 20). They "chose to assimilate—and be successful" (Sauer, 1998: 237). The shame brought about by World War Two, and the emergence of issues like the Holocaust and war criminals on the West's cultural and political agenda, delayed the restoration of respect for German identity (Bassler, 1999, p. 609). The reintegration process was aided by the role of West Germany as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and was complete by the 1980s. The German-Canadian Congress (GCC), a national umbrella organization that represents German academic and civil society in Canada, was founded in 1984 and could immediately begin to assert more vigorously, elements of the rights paradigm into German Canadian self-identity and discourse. (Bassler, 1998, p. 91)

Rather than focus on redress for internments, German Canadian activists challenged the government's revocation of Canadian citizenship from individuals suspected of being Nazi war criminals. The GCC focused on the case of, Helmut Oberlander, accused by the Canadian government of having taken part in war crimes in his role as an interpreter for the German military police at the age of 17 (and whose citizenship was revoked in 2007).The GCC has denounced this revocation as incongruent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as Article 15 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The organization has posted on its website a petition to the Canadian government demanding that all citizenship revocations in this country remain in keeping with the Charter (GCC, http://www.dkk-ont.net/pertition.htm). Nowhere in the GCC's arguments is explicit mention made of German-Canadians' unfair experiences at the hands of the government during the two World Wars. This more assertive language of human rights and state obligations is presented as the way forward, but interestingly, is not applied to the past, as was the case of Italian and Japanese Canadians.

THE JAPANESE-CANADIAN CASE

By 1931, there were 23,342 Japanese-Canadians living in Canada—a mere 0.2% of Canada's population.

The history of the first generation to arrive, the Issei, is in the words of Joy Kogawa "above all, a story of a racial minority struggling to survive in a hostile land" (Oiwa, 1994, p. 9). The Japanese Canadian community became reliant on the social and cultural resources it could generate itself, becoming self-sufficient—and rather isolated from the rest of Canadian society (Ayukawa and Roy, 1999, p. 849). The isolation of the Issei in Western Canada is further explained by the individual and institutional racism they faced. Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry were barred from the franchise in British Columbia. Except for a few Japanese-Canadians who were military veterans, and given the vote after World War One, "all Japanese who were Canadian citizens were denied this fundamental right of citizenship" (Ward, 1982, p. 10). Unsurprisingly, there were race riots in 1907, where limits on employment, immigration, and biased housing covenants were protested.

The second generation of Japanese-Canadians, the Nisei, would prove quite different from most of their parents. The Nisei knew little about Japan, and were in most ways as "Canadian" as other youngsters: they spoke English, enjoyed the same popular games and pastimes, and shared much of the outlook of their white contemporaries (Ward, 1982, p. 11). By the 1930's, the Nisei had become increasingly conscious of themselves as a separate social group having limited, if any, links to Japan (Sugiman, 2006, p. 62). In the words of Muriel Kitagawa, an outspoken Nisei writer in *The New Canadian*, "Our first loyalties belong to our homes here in Canada, to the land of our birth, our future. It goes against the grain to be disloyal" (Miki, 1985, p. 179). As the Nisei came of age, the intellectual elite among them would seek enfranchisement and fair treatment, the central goal of the community's activism until after the Second World War.[13] In 1936, the Japanese Canadian Citizens League (JCCL) sent four enthusiastic Nisei members to argue, unsuccessfully, for the enfranchisement of the Canadian-born before a special committee of the House of Commons. As one member explained to the committee, "the process of Canadianization is extraordinarily complete, considering the wide gulf that exists between the first and second generation" (Miki, 2004, p. 32).

Generational tensions began to emerge as the articulate minority of Nisei activists tacitly challenged the leadership of the older generation through their outspokenness and through the establishment of their own Nisei newspapers and organizations (Ward, 1982, p. 12). These attitudes were seen as naïve and *namaiki* (impertinent) to the older Issei, for whom democratic principles and notions of equal rights simply did not resonate to the same extent (Ayukawa and Roy, 1999, p. 849). However, for many Issei "national fidelity was inspired by their Canadian-born children. Canada became home to them because Canada was home to their kin" (Sugiman, 2006, p. 66). During World War One, Japanese Canadians had made an effort to demonstrate their loyalty by contributing to disaster relief funds and participating in civic celebrations (Ayukawa and Roy, 1999, p. 856). The community even formed and funded their own Corps of military volunteers (Ito, 1984, p. 30). But these men were "not only soldiers to fight in the Canadian war. They go to sacrifice themselves in the battle to achieve rights here at home. The question of the franchise in British Columbia is not settled. The sacrifice of these men is to break this barrier" (quoted in Miki, 2004, p. 28). They hoped that as war veterans[14] they would be granted the vote; but it took another decade of lobbying before the BC legislature finally granted even this limited claim (Miki, 2004, p. 28-9).

Compared to the German and Italian cases, relatively little research has been done on Japanese—Canadian attitudes before and during the World War Two. But as in the Italian and German cases, pre-war demonstrations of Canadian loyalty did not rule out strong homeland attachments. Daily Japanese language Canadian papers "tended to preserve nationalistic feeling for Japan, especially in the 1930s when the fortunes of Japan and her military venture in China were the most important item on the front page". Japanese supplementary or language schools were seen by anti-Japanese agitators as dangerous, but the schools were not "subversive," nor were they effective nurturers of Japanese nationalism or popular with the children (Adachi,1991, p. 127-28).

Some historians claim that Tokyo did intend to gather intelligence from the Nisei in North-America (Granatstein and Johnson, 1988). The Consulate's success in carrying out these orders is unknown. However, throughout the 1930s, and especially after 1937, Japanese in Canada also contributed money, goods, medical supplies and tin foil for Japanese soldiers in the Sino-Japanese conflict. This in itself was not unknown at the time: some Italian Canadian supported Italy during the Ethiopian campaign, and some Canadian Jews supported Zionist efforts in Palestine. The mainly Issei Canadian Japanese Association, which had over 3,000 members, also distributed pro-Japanese pamphlets on the Sino-Japanese conflict (Granatstein and Johnson, 1988, p. 108-9).

Very early during the war, and despite the second class citizenship status of Japanese-Canadians at this time, about thirty Nisei enlisted in the Canadian armed forces—before the government stopped accepting Asians in 1940 (Ito, 1984, p. 302). Nisei spokesmen agreed at the time to waive their claim to the franchise until after the war to avoid complications (Roy, 1978, p. 345). There were

no major loyalty conflicts. However, a few months after Pearl Harbor, the Canadian government deprived all ethnic Japanese in Canada—Japanese nationals, naturalized British subjects and Canadian-born citizens—of their property and civil rights. Of the approximately 20,000 Japanese-Canadians in B.C., 12,000 were sent to "interior housing centers", or what the National Association of Japanese Canadians (NAJC) called "internment camps"; 750 were interned in P.O.W. camps in Northern Ontario; 2,150 men were sent to work camps in British Columbia and Ontario; and 4,500 persons were assigned to sugar beet farmers in Alberta and Manitoba (Daniels, 1993, p. 223).

The Japanese response to these massive violations was framed by a tolerance paradigm writ large. Ken Adachi states that "most Japanese did not resist evacuation but co-operated with a docility that was almost wholly in line with their background and their particular development as a minority group." Indeed, most Japanese had accepted the fact that certain restrictions and interferences with civil rights had to be assumed "as willingly and cheerfully as possible." Indeed the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League (JCCL) pledged its support in carrying out government measures, in a telegram to the Prime Minister. The Issei, perhaps surprisingly, took part in the second Victory Loan Drive and raised, in three weeks, 313,700$ from 1,584 subscribers (Adachi, 1991, p. 225-231). One Issei woman who lived through the events of the war, when asked in retrospect how the attacks on Pearl Harbor made her feel:

> Well, it definitely didn't feel good. We were Canadian citizens, so I couldn't understand why we were being so badly treated. But Japanese Canadians didn't retaliate. I'm proud of that (Kobayashi, 1998, p. 80).

The only documented concerted movement to resist the wartime measures was by the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group who protested specifically the government's policy of breaking up the family unit in a written appeal to the B.C. Security Commission. Despite their appeal to British "fair play," the BCSC was not swayed. In April 1942, right after 103 men were sent to an interment camp, 66 more Nisei voluntarily gave themselves up as a form of protest. Though their activism was ultimately unsuccessful, they did leave a legacy of a form of protest behind (Miki, 2004, p. 68, 85).

At the war's end 4,000 people—Issei and young children—did repatriate to Japan, amounting to 17 percent of the pre-war population. Japanese people would be banned from the BC coast until 1949. This dramatically altered the character of the Japanese-Canadian community, and played an important part in the subsequent assimilation process (Ward, 1982, p. 16).

Assimilation or integration was further hastened by Nisei upward mobility, the birth of the Sansei (the third generation), who by now had very few ties to Japanese culture, and decreasing racism in Canada as a whole. All this operated in addition to individuals' conscious efforts to keep a low profile and avoid attracting attention (Roy, 2007). Ironically, the first organized attempt by Japanese-Canadians to seek compensation for their wartime treatment was actually launched immediately after the war's end by the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy, which had been formed during the war. Its long-term goal was the ever-elusive franchise; but the short-term aim was to press for compensation through the government's proposed Royal Commission, formed to investigate losses suffered by the community during the war (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 56). When the report came out in 1950, the amounts granted as compensation fell far short of the material losses actually sustained (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 58-9). More importantly, however, the Commission did not challenge clearly the basic curtailments of human rights, which added to the stigmatization and shame experienced by many Japanese Canadians, and the desire to "lie low" (Kobayashi, 1992, p. 2-3). Discouraged and bitterly disappointed with the methods and results of the Bird Commission, a precursor of activism based on a nascent rights paradigm, "a cloak of silence fell on the Japanese Canadian community in the 1950s" (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 59). In a pattern by-now familiar, during the1950s and 1960s, most Japanese Canadians were preoccupied with trying to rebuild their lives and kept a very low profile. In keeping with the official policy of the time, they wished their children to "merge into the Canadian mosaic as easily as possible "(Taylor, 2004, p. 184).

This denial took a toll on some. Several Japanese-Canadians living in other provinces still refused to visit British Columbia, and there were a few reports of "mental illness resulting from the uprooting" (Ayukawa and Roy, 1999, p. 849). Japanese-Canadians were warned by their own leadership that they should avoid congregating in the same area and creating ghettos in cities such as Toronto and Montreal, since it was the concentration of Japanese-Canadians in the towns of British Columbia that had supposedly inflamed the prejudice against them" (Taylor, 2004, p. 177). Few Nisei parents encouraged their Sansei (third-generation) children to speak Japanese and the rate of interethnic marriage within the community climbed sharply and now hovers at close to 100 percent (Sugiman, 2006, p. 66). Indeed, the drive for post-war re-integration and re-acceptance was so successful that some fear that the Japanese in Canada are demographically and

culturally doomed to "fade away like a sinking ship" (Makabe, 2005, p. 124).

In the midst of this ongoing process of assimilation/integration, in 1980, the national executive of the Japanese Canadian Citizens' Association appointed a Committee to consider the question of redress (Taylor, 2004, p. 186). At first nothing much happened. The issue was revived when the United States announced a proposal to set up a commission to study the "Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians." The centennial year of the first Japanese immigration (1977) also saw the rebirth of a sense of community for the younger Canadian-born members as well as new Japanese immigrants, who had not been touched by wartime events. The debates about what form the redress campaign would take initially led to conflict within the community. Some reflected the tolerance paradigm which meshed well with Japanese culture; some Issei probably still believed the Japanese proverb that "the nail that sticks out gets hammered down" (Taylor, 2004, p.187). By contrast, a Nisei was asked how he felt about the redress movement: "When it first started, I was sort of hesitant about it. Maybe some of the old Issei had rubbed off on me. You know, 'Let things lie, don't stir up the giant again.' But as things rolled along, I figured why not. Japanese Canadians had been deprived of their rights—somebody should be reprimanded and we should be compensated for it" (Kobayashi, 1998, p.167). A transition from a tolerance to a human rights paradigm was underway, but this followed a successful socio-demographic reintegration. Issei resistance was overcome. In the words of Ayukawa and Roy "the enthusiasm and deep-seated belief in human rights displayed by the younger people eventually won them over" (1999, p. 856).

The case for redress was put in writing to the government in 1984 in the form of a brief entitled *Democracy Betrayed: The Case for Redress*. Its very subtitle reflects the triumph of the rights paradigm over the supplication associated with classic minority status: A Submission to the Government of Canada on the Violation of Rights and Freedoms of Japanese Canadians during and After World War II. The Introduction states:

> It is as an act of citizenship and because we refuse to see democracy betrayed that we seek an honourable resolution to the injustices of the war years. In calling for redress, we affirm our pride in our country and our faith in the principles which determine this nation as a democracy (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 79).

In 1986, the NAJC proposed an initial redress settlement proposal but negotiations stalled.[15] The NAJC then decided to use its dwindling reserves of funds to seek support from other groups and individuals who supported the redress campaign. It received support from some fifteen national ethnic organizations, as well as numerous scholars, unions and labor organizations, community leaders, and regular citizens (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 108). The redress agreement was settled finally in 1988. As "symbolic redress" for these injustices, the government allotted $21,000 to all living survivors of the events of the war, $12 million to the Japanese community through the NAJC to undertake educational, social and cultural activities and programs "that contribute to the well-being of the community or that promote human rights." The compensation package also included $12 million from the government of Canada for the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, intended to foster racial harmony and cross-cultural understanding and help to eliminate racism (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, p. 138-9).

CONCLUSION

The three cases reviewed here are all ones where conflict and war with homelands created suspect minorities, with perceived dual and competing loyalties. The fears ultimately proved groundless. Canadians from these three groups committed no acts of sabotage, treason, or terror. In these three cases, stigma and victimization were eventually overcome, through a dual process involving integration and rehabilitation over time, followed by later attempts by group leaders to secure redress (although certain earlier and unsuccessful efforts at redress were tried in the German and Japanese cases). The degree and timing of mobilization and political tactics differed somewhat among the groups. But our review of these three cases reveals a sequential process. First, group responses were framed within a tolerance paradigm, marked by public docility and acquiescence. Then came a focused process of social integration. This was followed by redress efforts or other legal interventions by group organizations, framed by a rights paradigm. At the end of the day, all three of these groups were (re)integrated fully into Canadian society as full and equal citizens, with upward economic mobility, increasing exogamy, and political and cultural participation. In this effort, they were aided significantly by the exigencies of the Cold War and the clear embrace by the three homelands of Western democratic principles, and their commitment to the West.

Historian Jack Granatstein has suggested that minorities at the outbreak of the War had not been sufficiently Canadianized, and thus did not share sufficiently the broader Canadian (largely Anglo) support for the war against fascism. Disapproval of the conscription referendum of 1942 was not found only in Quebec, but in other

areas of Canada with large German and Ukrainian concentrations. And in his view, contemporary multiculturalism threatens to continue this policy of weakening commitments to broad national foreign policy goals, with the government hamstrung by concern for the sensibilities of the various ethnic groups now mobilized politically in post-Charter Canada (Granatstein, 2008).

While we share some of Granatstein's concerns, we draw a more nuanced lesson from these case studies. We are struck by a seemingly rapid embrace by the three groups of the Canadian national cause once the war began and expressed a minimal resentment at mistreatment during the war. Anger was often internalized, directed at other segments of the ethnic group. And after the war, energies were focused on reacceptance, not on seeking justice. In fact, there was no real choice. During and right after World War II, there was no entrenched rights paradigm, in law or in social mores, to condition minority responses. They had no other option when overcoming the burdens and victimization imposed by recent Canadian history but to "lay low" and seek to re-establish their bona fides as valued Canadian citizens. Quite possibly, had the rights paradigm been operative, the communal leaders and organizations of these three groups would have been less concerned about re-earning trust before demanding justice.

Contemporary discourse and law clearly privilege the rights paradigm, and the assumption of equal citizenship, and the maximal pursuit of rights and freedoms as envisioned by the Canadian Charter, including the right to dissent from Canadian foreign policy. The tolerance paradigm carries with it the stigma of inferiority and weakness. But following the experiences of these three groups during and after the war, the early adherence to the accommodating and assimilationist elements of the tolerance paradigm, especially in the post-war period, need not be completely condemned or lamented. While it did not prevent abuses during wartime, it served as a guide to dealing with those abuses and with restoring status after the war.

Cases of current international conflict involving diasporic Canadian communities demand balancing of differing perspectives. The government must learn to balance requirements of national security with respect for the rights of dissent, civil liberties, avoidance of profiling and any corresponding stigmatization of law-abiding Canadian citizens. But suspect minorities placed in uncomfortable situations by homeland developments might also draw lessons from these cases. These groups are in a difficult situation, requiring a balancing of competing perspectives. An assertive defence of the rights of minority group members is perhaps most effective when balanced, assuming there is that common ground, with clear expressions of solidarity with a national consensus, assuming such a consensus exists. Majority groups might welcome the reassurance. During times of conflict or war, such differences can be more acute. An optimal minority strategy in these delicate cases might require, where feasible, a synthesizing of the more accommodationist elements of the tolerance paradigm with the more egalitarian and multicultural aspects of the rights paradigm.

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NOTES

[1] Angelo Principe's (1999) research shows that efforts to rally Italian Canadians to the fascist cause fell quite flat throughout the 1920s. This is in part because the editors of fascist newspapers in the 1920s attempted to introduce into the mostly Canadianized community issues which stirred the emotions of fascists in Italy, but which left Italians in Canada, many long time residents, rather indifferent.

[2] Some observers, however, are not ready to write off fascist involvement in Canada in the years leading up to the Second World War as politically neutral or harmless. Perin claims that the consul's efforts in the province of Quebec were aimed specifically at stimulating Quebec nationalism in order to impede a divided Canada from eventually joining the war effort on England's side (Perin, 1982: 88-90).

[3] In addition to leftist resistance, there was also opposition by committed liberals and Protestant, anti-papal Italian Canadians, and those who simply resented the influence of the Italian government in the affairs of Canadian Italians (Sturino, 1999: 819).

[4] However, when Italy entered the war, he too was interned for a time at Camp Petawawa and his businesses were confiscated by the government (Sturino, 1999: 824)

[5] These include a monument dedicated to the internees, a mural celebrating the contribution of Italian Canadians to the war effort situated in the Museum of Civilization in Ottawa, and the inclusion of the internments in educational curricula.

[6] What's more, some 2,000 ethnic Germans were kept interned until 1919-20, well after the armistice (Bassler, 1999: 608)

[7] The rest were Turks (205), Bulgarians (99), as well as 312 individuals classified as "other" (Grams, 2001: 41). .

[8] The overwhelmingly agrarian nature of German settlement, for example, also discouraged political mobilization. In addition, it was difficult to attract German intellectuals to advance the nationalist discourse and teach in schools, and parents, for their part, tended to choose religion over language when selecting schools for their children.

[9] The *Volsksdeutsche* refers to the German-speaking peoples who have historically been scattered across Europe; this is distinguished from the *Reichdeutsche*, or those of German nationality.

[10] Like the Italian-Canadians, German-Canadians were not unified in their ideological beliefs. There existed a German-Canadian Left. This was clear to Canadian officials, who monitored *Volkstimme*, a German-language paper that was the organ of the anti-Nazi German Canadian Federation. In the late 1930's Bauer (1998) asserts, the anti-fascist League had as many supporters as the nationalistic *Bund* movement. Besides the inter-ethnic tensions that are so often the focus of analysis, there were also significant intra-ethnic conflicts, with many of the interned Bund members having been reported by anti-fascists within the German-Canadian community (Bauer, 1998: 236).

[11] Freund (2006) conducted interviews with post-WWI German immigrants; his work explores the way these attitudes of victimhood and belonging, identity and shame were negotiated at the micro-level, be it in everyday interaction with native Canadians, with media portrayals of Germans in the war, or through first-hand interactions with Jews in Canada. One interviewee born in 1924 and immigrated in 1953 recalls that: "[L]ots of Canadians…did not really like the Germans, as a people, as a country. But in my personal experience that was not really true. I cannot recall that anybody said something negative to me, because I was German. But I know on the TV or when you listened to sometimes people talk: 'Oh those Germans, they caused the war. And I almost felt guilty that I was German (Freund, 2006: 140)."

[12] However, these rates are lower in rural areas, which remain to this day quite ethnically homogeneous.

[13] The first instance of Japanese-Canadians making use of a rights paradigm to actively challenge unfair treatment actually predates the coming-of-age democratic impulses of the Nisei generation—occurring in1900. Tomekichi (Tomey) Homma applied for his name to be placed on the British Columbia voter's list. As predicted, he was denied in accordance with section 8 of the Provincial Election Act. He took the BC government to court—and won—by claiming that as a naturalized British subject, he was no longer the "person of Japanese race" forbidden from voting provincially, and that the authority regarding naturalization and its rights and obligations rested at the federal level. The decision was appealed and, surprisingly for its time, was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada,, which agreed that the Election Act of BC was outside the provincial government's authority. However, when the B.C. government sought and obtained permission to appeal to the Privy Council in London, what was then the ultimate authority, the judicial committee overturned the judgment (Miki, 2004: 26-7).

[14] A total of 196 volunteers fought overseas, of which 54 died in war.

[15] The full proposal may be found on the NAJC website at: http://www.najc.ca/thenandnow/renewal5d.php.

NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION POLICY IN BELGIUM AND FLANDERS

Patrick Loobuyck (°Bruges, 1974) is Professor of Ethics and Philosophy at the University of Antwerp and guest Professor at Ghent University. His research focuses on multiculturalism, active pluralism, immigration and minority policies, and the relation between religion and morality. Loobuyck has published several articles on these topics in national and international journals.

Dirk Jacobs (°Bruges, 1971) is Professor of Sociology at the *Université Libre de Bruxelles*, the Francophone Free University of Brussels (ULB). Jacobs is member of the research center METICES *(Migrations, Espaces, Travail, Institutions, Citoyenneté, Epistémologie, Santé)* of the *Institut de Sociologie* at the *Université Libre de Bruxelles* (ULB). He is visiting professor at FUSL (Brussels). Jacobs teaches and publishes in Dutch, French and English.

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyse the relationship between (sub-state) nationalism on the one hand, and multiculturalism (as represented by integration policy) on the other hand, in Flanders and Belgium. The authors contend that nationalism has an agenda setting function, but it can also influence the content and substance of migration and integration policies. Hence, in this paper, it is argued that the difference between Flemish and Walloon nationalism can explain the differences in migrant policies between the two regions. However, the influence of Flemish nationalism is less univocal than many hypotheses suggest. So the conclusion we reach is that, in line with the national history and sensitivities of the region, the Flemish government sees no contradiction in terms of combining a more assimilationist, with a more multicultural approach.

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism and multiculturalism are central concepts in the debates on immigration and integration. Often, one of the assumptions is that nationalism results in a more defensive and restrictive reaction against migration. Another assumption suggests that nationalists are not in favour of multicultural policies and will insist on (cultural) assimilation. These assumptions are common, especially in Belgium, because one of the most radical nationalist political formations Vlaams Belang (before November 2004—*Vlaams Blok*, from here VB) is also the most extreme-right, ethnocentric and anti-immigration party. Like most other extreme-right parties in Europe, the ideological core of VB is formed by nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism and 'law and order' (Mudde, 2000: 177).

It is common to use the difference between Flemish and Walloon nationalism to explain the difference in migrant policy between the two communities in Belgium (cf. Martiniello, 1995). The idea is that Wallonia is inspired by 'civic nationalism', while the Flemish approach is built on 'cultural nationalism'. Two different conceptions of nations, invoked by many recent authors on nationalism, are at stake here (Brown, 1999: 282-4; Guibernau, 1996: 51-7). The German historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954) made the distinction between *Staatsnation* (a nation based on civic ties) and *Kulturnation* (a nation based on cultural ties). Wallonia uses the idea of the *Staatsnation* as formed by a voluntary union of

individuals. It is focused upon the belief that involvement in, and loyalty to, a common land and its institutions generate a distinctive civic culture, such that all citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community in progress, with a common destiny. This results in a (French) republican approach wherein the nation is defined as a *political* community, based on a constitution, laws and citizenship, with the possibility of admitting newcomers to the community providing they adhere to the political rules, and are willing to adopt the civic and rather sparse national culture. This explains why the cultural and ethnic dimensions of immigration are almost neglected in the francophone academic and political debates in Belgium. Any approach in terms of ethnicity and culture, and thus specific policies for immigrants are almost automatically rejected (Martiniello, 1995: 143).

In Flanders, on the contrary, the national identity would be much more influenced by the (Romantic, German) idea of the nation conceived as a *Volk*, that is, an entity with an organic character that pre-exist and transcends the life of its members (Mény & Surel, 2000: 206-7). The national identity is the result of cultural nationalism wherein myths of common ancestry and a common heritage, language, religion and history are central elements (Alter, 1989: 14-5; Morelli, 1995). It follows that Flanders, as a *cultural* community, would not be very open for newcomers because only those who belong to this distinctive cultural and national identity can attain citizenship. Quite often, (Flemish) cultural nationalism is depicted as a form of xenophobic and exclusivist ethnic nationalism, while civic nationalism is considered enlightened, liberal and much more open for the contribution of newcomers because it does not have an ethnical basis.

Based on this background, this article examines the relationship between (sub-state) nationalism(s) on the one hand and migration and integration policy in Belgium, especially in Flanders, on the other hand. It makes clear that the influence of Flemish nationalism is less univocal than the hypotheses and presuppositions mentioned above suggest.

1. SEVERAL KINDS OF FLEMISH NATIONALISM

The approach of the extreme rightwing VB is strongly influenced by the ideas of the *Kulturnation* and there are good reasons to conclude that the VB advocates a sort of rigid ethnic nationalism (Martiniello, 1995: 136; Hossay, 1996). This conservative, ethnocentric wing of Flemish nationalism is a legacy of what transpired during the Second World War and the 'Flemish collaboration' with the Nazis marked a dramatic change for the Flemish movement. Even decades later, in its political rhetoric, the VB steered increasingly towards overt (cultural neo-) racism and xenophobia, so it was not surprising that in November 2004, the party was juridically condemned by the Court of Cassation for racism. In fact, that is the reason why *Vlaams Blok* changed into *Vlaams Belang* and since this judgement, the party focuses more on anti-Islamic stances.

However, apart from the VB, there are also other forms of nationalism in Flanders which are less extreme, more open and democratic. Flemish nationalism was in the beginning, essentially a movement for Flemish cultural and linguistic emancipation in the context of a state dominated by Francophones. It was a struggle for cultural autonomy and for the affirmation of a denied Flemish identity (Farrell, 2005; Murphy, 1988; Zolberg, 1974). With the independence of Belgium in 1830, French was established as the state's only official language. While the constitution of 1831 guaranteed linguistic liberty, the Flemings were denied any cultural or linguistic rights for a long time. Speaking French was the key for upward mobility and a part of the upper class in Flanders became necessarily francophone (McRae, 1986: 276-85). Several series of language laws (adopted in the late 19th century, the 1930s and the 1960s) gave the Flemish people adequate language rights and transformed the Flemish society into a unilingual Dutch-speaking community. Since the language law of 1963, Belgium is divided into four language areas: unilingually Dutch-speaking (Flanders), unilingually French-speaking (Wallonia), unilingually German speaking areas, and the bilingual area of Brussels (although some regional municipalities retain limited bilingual facilities). The increasing influence of the Francophones (so-called *verfransing*) in these areas and in Brussels itself, is nowadays almost the only linguistic problem on the agenda of the Flemish nationalists. Currently, Flemish nationalism is much more involved in discussions about political autonomy, state-reform and territorial questions. So while Flemish nationalism grew from linguistic roots, gradually the language grievances reached out to broader aspects of political and social life (Hooghe, 1993).

This kind of Flemish nationalism is also a form of 'cultural' nationalism. It defines the nation in terms of a common culture and language, and the aim of the nationalist movement was to protect the survival of that culture. This sort of concern is also the basis of the Catalan, Scottish and Québécois nationalist movements. However, this nationalism is open to diversity and immigration and has nothing to do with xenophobia. Many authors equate 'ethnic' nationalism with 'cultural' nationalism, but this equation is incorrect. Flanders, Québec and Catalonia

'accept immigrants as full members of the nation, as long as they learn the language and history of the society. They define membership in terms of participation in a common culture, open to all, rather than on grounds of ethnic descent' (Kymlicka, 2001: 243-4).

This kind of democratic cultural nationalism is to be found now in almost all the Flemish political parties (there are no Belgium-wide parties anymore). All the Flemish parties, and thus not only the explicit nationalist parties, are in favour of more political autonomy and use arguments from a nationalist discourse to protect the Flemish identity, language, territory and culture—especially against the Francophones. One of the problems for the more left-wing oriented and progressive Flemish nationalists is that, since the Second World War, the negative, ethnocentric connotations unjustly overshadow the whole Flemish movement. Other than Québécois nationalism (cf. Kymlicka, 2001: ch. 15), Flemish cultural nationalism is indeed not associated with progressive multiculturalism. However, if we look at the Flemish minority policy and the way Flanders copes with ethnic diversity, the resemblances with Québec are greater than one should expect. Of course, there are illiberal, xenophobic strands within the Flemish nationalist movement (the same is true in the Scottish, Catalan and Québécois movements), but there is also a very powerful liberal, democratic strand which is committed to the creation of modern and multicultural societies of free and equal citizens.

2. POLITICS OF AUTONOMY AND POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Nationalism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that takes different forms in different societies, areas and periods. Craig Calhoun (2007: 86) suggests treating nationalism as a 'discursive formation', rather than searching for an essentialist definition of nationalism and in this sense, it seems better to see nationalism in terms of (Wittgensteinian) family resemblances.

Two elements play an important role in defining nationalism (Béland, 2005: 678). The first is an identity derived from common markers such as language, religion, history, or ethnic origins. Indeed, nationalism insists on a form of identity politics. This identity element also accounts for the more emotional aspects of many discussions about nationalism (Smith, 1998: 146-99). The second element is the politics of autonomy or independence. Nationalism seeks to gain or maintain for a group—the nation—a measure of self-government. Therefore, nationalism's existence is inseparable from the existence of political power and from the power struggles in which its claims are grounded. Both elements usually define an "enemy" or "other" that is said to threaten the cultural identity and/or the political autonomy of the group. In Flanders, this enemy has multiple forms: in some discussions, immigrants, especially Muslims, are the enemy; in other discussions, all the Francophones, especially those living in Brussels and its periphery, are evil; in another debate, the enemy tag is applied to the Belgian central government system and by extension, the royal house as one of the most important symbols of Belgium. The 'hard core' Flemish nationalists fight all these enemies at the same time.

As we will see, both elements of nationalism (identity and autonomy) have their influence on the integration policy in both Belgium and Flanders. After several state reforms, the Flemish community has much greater autonomy concerning integration policy and the struggle with matters of identity and language was an important element in the development of the Flemish approach on migration policy. Moreover, since both elements are intertwined, and due in part to the political autonomy of Flanders, the Flemish community could develop a minority policy with special attention to language and identity.

3. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN BELGIUM

After several years of state reforms, Belgium has a peculiar and complex system of federalism (explaining the complex Belgian political system in all its details would take far too long, but we recommend Witte, 2001 & 1992 and Fitzmaurice, 1996 for a good background). The important issue related to our discussion is that the system in Belgium is the result of an ongoing process of state reform, based on regionalism and federalism, since 1970 (Hooghe, 1993). Since the state reform of 1988-89, Belgium was built out of three communities (Dutch, French and German speaking) and three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital). The *De facto* government of the Flemish community, and of Flanders as a region, are one and the same, and in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, both the Flemish and the French Community have jurisdiction. The Belgian system reflects a mix of territorial and cultural autonomy, combining both territorial (regions) and non-territorial (communities) at the sub-state level in a unique way (Farrell & van Langenhove, 2005: 229). The regions have jurisdiction over 'space-bounded' matters, such as regional economy, agriculture, environment, infrastructure and transport. The communities have jurisdiction over 'person-related' matters, such as health care, social policy, culture, education and the use of language.

In this complex and multinational state, jurisdiction over migration and integration policy is divided among

different departments of the federal government, and among different departments of the communities and the regions. Federalism and state reform have resulted in a situation whereby the migration policy is mainly a competence of the Belgian government within an international (European Union) legal framework, and migrant policy is mainly a local competence of the communities, regions and cities. Education, integration, language, housing, and matters pertaining to the religion of migrants, are all competences handled at the level of the regions and/or communities. This division of labour is also clear when we look at the list of ministers on the different political levels: on the national Belgian level, there is since 2008, a coordinating minister of migration, while in the Flemish government (2004-9 & 2009-2014), there is a minister of 'civic integration' *(inburgering)* who has the central and final responsibility for the entire minority policy.

4. MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICY OF THE FEDERAL BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

4.1. DISCUSSIONS ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES

Border entry and deportation is still within the jurisdiction of the Belgian government. Until 2008, the federal Ministry of the Interior had many responsibilities concerning asylum seekers, regularisation, visa-policy, family and marriage migration and the control of illegal migration. Since March 2008, however, Belgium has instituted a coordinating minister of migration for the first time. Since July 2009, this portfolio has been handled by the prime minister himself. However, the several responsibilities are still spread over a number of ministers and departments: social integration and housing of asylum seekers is still within the jurisdiction of the federal minister of social integration; labour policy (including economic migration) is a competence of the federal minister of labour; and the governments of regional levels are responsible for the implementation of the labour policy and the issue of work permits for foreigners. Also, the federal ministry of the interior still has some responsibilities concerning immigration and security. In 2007, the government launched a new immigration law with a mind to reform the asylum seeking procedure and more conditions for family migration (e.g. the age limit for family reunion with non-EU husband or partner increased to 21). In 2008-09, the discussion concerning immigration on the Belgian level was dominated by the 'hot' issue of regularisation of undocumented migrants. Despite many actions of the *sans-papiers* and the pressure of many different societal organisations, there was for more than two years, no consensus for a governmental initiative (as promised in the autumn of 2007). Ostensibly, the gap between the French and Flemish political parties in the Belgian government was too deep. The Flemish politicians were much more restrictive on this issue than most of their French speaking colleagues. Finally, in July 2009, there was an agreement for a new regularizations campaign between September 15 and December 15, 2009 for undocumented people who have been in Belgium for more than 5 years, and are socially integrated into the Belgian society. The Belgian government policy statement of 2008 also shows the intention to facilitate economic immigration. This was mainly asked for by the Flemish parties in the government. In 2008-09, there was also some discussion about the housing of asylum seekers since there was a lack of free places in designated relief centres.

4.2. THE BELGIAN INTEGRATION CONCEPT

After the local elections of 1988 saw the first electoral breakthrough of the extreme right VB party, the Belgian government decided to create a national advisory institution to study the problem of integrating immigrants and developing a coherent federal policy with regard to immigrant incorporation and called it the *Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policy* (RCMP). In line with other European countries, the notion 'integration' was the pivotal concept in the reports of the Commissariat. Integration is seen as the insertion of migrants into Belgian society according to three guiding principles: (a) assimilation where the public order demands this; (b) consistent promotion of the best possible fit in accordance with the orienting social principles which support the culture of the host country and which are related to 'modernity', 'emancipation' and 'true pluralism'—as understood by a modern western state, and (c) unambiguous respect for the cultural-diversity-as-mutual-enrichment in all other areas. Furthermore, integration also entails promotion of structural involvement of minorities in the activities and aims of government.

The content and doubtful validity of this rather abstract concept of integration has been discussed by several politicians, academics and field workers. Official authorities and defenders of the Belgian policy consider the Belgian option as a multicultural one with a lot of space for diversity and pluralism. Some critics argue that the concept is one-sided and too much in line with the prevailing Flemish orthodoxy concerning multiculturalism (Martiniello, 1995: 140). Other critics argue that the Belgian policy and integration discourse is ethnocentric and results in assimilation and 'homogeneism'—a fundamental non-acceptance of diversity (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1991, 1994, 1998).

In 1993, the RCMP was replaced by the *Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism.* This

agency is under the responsibility of the Prime Minister of Belgium and its principal tasks are fighting racism, discrimination, human trafficking and poverty, studying recent immigration, the screening of foreigners' rights and organizing information campaigns and training.

4.3. NATIONALITY LEGISLATION

Beside anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies, another tool for integration in the hands of the Belgian government is the nationality legislation. The nationality legislation has been considered as an essential instrument to stimulate integration and political participation. The Belgian Nationality Law from 1984 changed several times (1991, 1995, 1999 and 2000) and the idea of *ius soli* determines Belgian citizenship now. Between 1985 and 2008 more than 600,000 foreign residents changed their nationality and became Belgian citizens.

Since 2000, Belgium has one of the most liberal and open nationalization legislations in the world. Every child born on Belgian soil from a parent also born in the territory ('third generation immigrants'), automatically acquires Belgian nationality. There is, however, a 'residence' condition for the parent(s): he or she has to have been living in Belgium for at least five years of the ten years preceding the birth of the child. Furthermore, 'second generation immigrants', born on Belgian soil, can fairly easily become citizens. Indeed, the Belgian nationality can be acquired for a child born on Belgian soil by simple declaration made by the parent(s) on behalf of the child before the age of 12. There is also an optional procedure for second generation migrants and certain groups of first generation migrants. Adults born in Belgium or who have been living in Belgium for seven years and have a permanent resident status can simply opt for the Belgian nationality. Access to citizenship through option is a simple right, if one has not been convicted for severe crimes and is not being considered as a threat to national security.

In addition, Belgium has a system of discretionary naturalisation. Loss of the old nationality is in principle not a condition to acquire Belgian nationality through naturalisation. Everyone residing legally in Belgium since three years (and two years for refugees) can request naturalisation. In contrast to the optional procedure, naturalisation is a favour, not a right. This is also expressed by the fact that parliament decides on naturalisation.

Hidden behind an apparent uniform vision on the federal level, there are important divergences between Flemish and Francophones with regard to their vision on citizenship. During the parliamentary debates on the liberalisation of the nationality legislation in the nineties, these differences have particularly come to the fore. Paradoxically, there is currently no language requirement to obtain citizenship in a country which is obsessed by the issue of language use. The reason is simple, albeit somewhat peculiar: although most politicians agreed language knowledge is a normal condition for obtaining citizenship, no agreement could be found on how to impose a language requirement for nationality acquisition. A majority of Flemish politicians wanted to maintain a number of more 'subjective' criteria (as the degree of cultural integration or the loyalty to the receiving society) and language related criteria (such as knowledge of Dutch when living on Flemish territory) for the acquisition of citizenship. A majority of Francophone politicians, on the other hand, preferred to retain only 'objective' criteria such as the length of legal stay on the territory. Furthermore, knowledge of one of the national languages was deemed to be sufficient, no matter where in the country one would live, if a language requirement were to be upheld. In taking this position, they wanted to reaffirm their commitment to defend the interests of Francophone inhabitants of Flanders. The Flemish think this is unacceptable since the language border was the result of a negotiated compromise in the sixties. Since the Flemish and Francophones could not reach an agreement on modalities, there was in the end, simply no language or integration condition for obtaining Belgian nationality.

In the campaign for the federal elections in 2007, it seemed that many political parties—especially the Flemish parties—agreed that this legislation must change to give more "dignity" (sic) to the Belgian nationality. In October 2009, the Belgian government reached an agreement that naturalisation is only possible after five years of legal residence in Belgium. Moreover, naturalization is no longer possible without "evidence of integration". This evidence also implies knowledge of one of the official national languages in Belgium and this knowledge must be affirmed by the (French-, German- or Flemish-speaking) Community officials.

4.4. ENFRANCHISEMENT OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS

For a long time, this liberal nationality legislation was at the concession of those political parties that opposed the right to vote for foreign residents in formal elections. Belgian politicians have been remarkably reluctant in enfranchising foreign residents (Jacobs, 1999; 2000). They argue that voting rights for foreign residents are superfluous, since it is easy to acquire Belgian nationality and all the political rights associated with it. It took until early 1999 before Belgium finally enfranchised EU-citizens in compliance with the Maastricht Treaty and the derived European directive. The Belgian government has even been urged to make legislation by a judgment of the European Court of Justice in

1998. The delay was the result of a sub-nationalist electoral rationality: the Flemish politicians were afraid that the enfranchisement of EU citizens in Brussels and its periphery would result in electoral advantage for the Francophone political parties.

For non-EU citizens, the electoral law was modified in 2004, following heated political debates. The opposition and delay was organised by the Flemish political parties (especially by the right-liberals *VLD* and by VB), while there existed a consensus about local enfranchisement between most of the Francophone parties. This language cleavage has two reasons, apart from the fact that VB, as an anti-immigrant party, is logically against enfranchisement (Jacobs, 2002). Firstly, Flemish democratic parties were more reluctant than their Francophone colleagues because they feared a white backlash and growing success of the extreme right. Secondly, the Flemish parties were afraid that the foreign vote would immediately benefit French speaking politicians, thus weakening the electoral position of Flemish politicians in Brussels and its periphery - a reason already invoked when talking about EU-nationals. On October 8, 2006, third country nationals could participate in local elections for the first time, albeit only as voters and not as candidates. The participation is voluntary, while for Belgians voting is compulsory.

4.5. TWO CULTURES

The debates on immigration and integration on the Belgian national level, make clear that Flanders has a different public and political opinion other than the French speaking part of Belgium. In Wallonia and Brussels, there is less reluctance against regularisation of undocumented migrants. And other than the Flemish politicians, French speaking politicians were not against voting rights for foreign residents and the revision of the open nationality law is not a priority for them. The presence of nationalist parties on the Flemish side can explain this difference. Especially since the most radical and popular nationalist Flemish political formation—VB, which always argues and, without nuance, against regularisation, voting rights, etc. Moreover, most of the democratic Flemish parties are afraid of the growing success of the extreme right, if they appear too positive and open on migration issues. But the direct and indirect influence of extreme right and nationalist parties is not the only issue. Almost all the Flemish parties use mixed ‘nationalist’ arguments (concerning autonomy and identity) to defend their position. They want more economic migration because the Flemish economy needs a more open labour market; they also want naturalization to require language acquisition because language is an important part of the Flemish identity; and finally, they were against the enfranchisement of foreigners because foreign votes could be dangerous in giving more power to French speaking politicians.

5. THE FLEMISH INTEGRATION POLICY

5.1. THE FLEMISH MINORITY POLICY

Since the state reform of 1980, the Flemish Community has jurisdiction over the reception and integration policies of migrants. In addition to the blueprints developed by the Belgian RCMP, the Flemish government has developed its own policy plans. The first policy note on migrant policy was accepted by the Flemish government in March 1989. The document acknowledged the permanent presence of immigrants in Flanders and stated that there is a need for a specific policy approach with a double focus: attention for the lack of equal opportunities in different areas *and* attention to emancipation through recognition of cultural identity. In the 1990’s there was a shift toward more ‘inclusive’ and ‘co-ordinated’ policy: every minister and administration official had to take its responsibility concerning minority policy in their own policy field (education, employment, welfare, media, etc). In the “strategic plan for ethno-cultural minorities” (1996), and the “minorities’ decree” (1998), the Flemish government opted for inclusive measures as much as possible. Special categorical measures only for minorities were thus, temporary.

Today, the Flemish minority policy is a mix of categorical (1980s) and inclusive (1990s) elements (Loobuyck, 2003). In 2004, the Flemish government accepted an updated and ambitious ‘strategic plan for minority policy’, called ‘living together in diversity’. A wide variety of operational goals and policy measures to be taken in the period 2004-2010 are listed. In April 2009, the Flemish parliament accepted a new decree on integration. The key concepts are: emancipation and equal participation of certain target groups, accessibility of regular services, and living together in diversity. It is striking that the decree has not only the equal participation and emancipation of the immigrant population as subject, but also the whole society. One of the main aims for the near future is to promote the coexistence in diversity by all citizens and to further the intercultural competence of political and social institutions. As per this policy document, living together in a diversified society is every citizen’s responsibility.

5.2. CIVIC INTEGRATION OF NEWCOMERS *(INBURGERING)* IN FLANDERS

One of the central components of the strategic plan of 1996 and the decree of 1998, was the integration of

newcomers. Since the end of the 1990s, there were various local experiments and projects related to reception policy for newcomers. However, only in February 2003 was the official legislation about the so-called citizenship trajectories *(inburgeringstrajecten)* officially accepted. The development of a policy for newcomers is clearly a sign of public recognition that Flanders is a society open to immigration.

The citizenship trajectories comprise a training programme and one-on-one help (study path guidance) for newcomers. The training programme contains Dutch as a second language, lessons of introduction to Flemish/Belgian society and democratic values, and some help for access to the labour market. The idea of 'citizenisation' *(inburgering)* is copied from the Netherlands and has provoked a lot of discussion. Most of the time, the political discussion was about the compulsory character of the trajectories. Right-liberals, nationalists and conservatives stressed the importance of 'obligation' and 'sanctions', while more progressive politicians said that obligation is only fair when there is sufficient availability of tutoring and the waiting lists for lessons have been eliminated. The idea of *inburgering* is controversial in migrant communities because people usually discuss the policy in terms of 'assimilation' and 'obligations', while the policy could actually be legitimised in terms of qualification, empowerment, emancipation and capabilities.

Although much has been said about the obligation, it is worth mentioning that the target group is much larger that the group that is obliged to undertake tuition. From April 2004 onwards, the trajectories have become compulsory in Flanders for asylum seekers whose application have been declared admissible and for non-EU newcomers who marry with a non-EU citizen. On the basis of international regulations and European legislation, citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), their spouses, their children aged under 21 and their parents are not compelled, but entitled, to go through a civic integration process. Newcomers aged 65 and older or newcomers who are seriously ill or disabled are also exempt from this requirement. Also, all the newcomers who register in one of the 19 Brussels municipalities are not subject to this obligation and for them, the course is optional.

In 2006 and 2008, the Flemish parliament adopted amendments to the decree to broaden the priority groups of the civic integration policy. Since 2007, the ministers of recognised religions from non-EU countries (especially imams) are obliged to participate in a citizenship trajectory and also non-EU partners of established and naturalised Belgians of non-EU origin belong to the target group with obligations. Before 2007, a citizenship trajectory was optional for a Turkish man who married a naturalised Turkish woman, now it is compulsory. The decree of 2006 also mentions that established non-EU origin immigrants insufficiently mastering the Dutch language can be obliged to do so, even when holding Belgian nationality, when they are unemployed, have children at school, or want to make use of social housing facilities (not yet into operation; only priority group since 2007). It is unclear to what extent this is a breach of European non-discrimination directives. The decree of 2006 also puts more emphasis on sanctions—and since September 2008, non-compliance can lead to fines ranging from €50 to €5,000. There is, for the moment, only an obligation to participate in citizenship trajectories, not to achieve a certain knowledge level, but the Flemish decree of 2006 does foresee that at some point actual tests could be introduced. Since March 2008, some 'Belgian newcomers' are also obliged to participate in a civic integration trajectory.

5.3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FLANDERS AND FRANCOPHONE BELGIUM

The political autonomy of Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia makes it possible that their minority policy is in line with the national history and sensitivities of the region. It is not by accident that the Francophone approach of immigrant integration is inspired by the model developed and used in France, just as it is not by accident that in Flanders there is a lot of emphasis on language competence and the importance of ethnic cultural identities—two issues which have had a prominent role in the history of the Flemish nationalist movement. In the overarching policy framework in Flanders, the recognition of ethno-cultural groups and group-based multicultural policies play an important role. The Flemish approach is based on the belief that preservation and development of cultural heritage and identity can also stimulate and promote emancipation and participation within the host society. The Francophone governments on the contrary, have been unwilling to recognise ethic-cultural groups as specific entities in its policies.

There are many examples that can illustrate the difference between the Flemish and Francophone policies. Whereas headscarves were actively discouraged or forbidden in the Francophone education system, the Flemish schools have taken a much more pragmatic attitude (Verlot, 2001). However, this Flemish attitude changed dramatically after 2000 and resulted in a ban on all religious symbols in all public schools of the Flemish community on September 11, 2009 Contrary to Wallonia, in Flanders and in Brussels, there have been experiments with education in the language and culture of the immigrants. The Flemish policy has also had a clear preference for supporting self-organisations of migrants, and

consultation of immigrant organisation representatives has become good practice in several political domains, while this is much less the case on the Francophone side. In Wallonia, there is no specific policy for addressing the problems of immigrants and neither are these formulated in cultural terms, but in the more general terms of economic marginalisation, social ex/inclusion and citizenship (Martiniello, 1995:142-3; 2007). Typical for the Flemish approach is the special programme for newcomers and the language courses, compulsory for a part of the target group. This kind of reception policy is absent in Wallonia. The policy statement of the French speaking Community of 2009 shows the intention to organise some reception policies, but this is still in the initial stages of planning.

5.4. THE FLEMISH COMBINATION MODEL

In general, we could say that the Flemish government has clearly adopted a target approach towards immigrants, while the Francophone government has deliberately opted not to develop any categorical policy towards immigrant groups—at least not officially. It has been argued that while the Francophone policy toward immigrants leaned towards the French republican model, Flanders' approach was for a long time inspired by the Anglo-Saxon and (former) Dutch multicultural model (Rea, 2000; Verlot, 2001). But, these distinctions are too generalised and not up to date anymore. The different regions and communities in Belgium use elements of both models. Today Flanders, like the Netherlands (cf. Entzinger 2003), has a hybrid policy towards immigrant incorporation, combining both more assimilationist and more multiculturalist stances. Although Flanders has moderate assimilationist ambitions with its citizenship trajectories, the overall picture still fairly justifies labelling Flemish policy as oriented towards multiculturalism (Jacobs, 2004).

The Flemish government sees no contradiction in combining a (more multicultural) targeted ethnic minorities policy with a (more assimilationist) programme for citizenship trajectories (Jacobs and Rea, 2007: 268). To become a new Flemish citizen, immigrants must learn the language and agree with the 'Flemish' values of pluralism, democracy, the rule of law, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect and citizenship (cf. Bossuyt, 2006). Cultural distinctiveness, in a particular language, serves as a relatively straightforward criterion for defining the Flemish national community, that is, for specifying who should be included and excluded. However, the Flemish government keeps insisting that its civic integration policy is open to diversity and is not aimed at "assimilation":

> We want to achieve social cohesion in which everyone's particularity and cultural identity can prosper, but in which the current values, norms and rules of our democratic state and the rule of law, remain the corner stone of Flemish society. The Flemish government judges it to be important that allochtonous Flemings do not give up their cultural and religious values, but rather integrate these as added values to Flemish society. Respect for diversity is one of the fundamental values of Flemish society: just like the equality of all humans, the separation of church and state and the freedom of expression. (Flemish government 2004: 5)

The division of tasks related to immigration as sketched above, offers some opportunities, but it has also some disadvantages and incoherencies (Loobuyck & Jacobs, 2006; 2009). The federal system gives Flanders the opportunity to develop its own approach, but this approach conflicts not only with the approach of other communities, but also with the approach on the Belgian national level. The latter is especially clear when we confront the present Belgian nationality legislation with the Flemish idea of 'citizenisation' *(inburgering).* The idea behind the citizenship trajectories is that people can only reach full membership of the Flemish society on the condition that they learn the language, organization, and some basic values of the guest society. The idea behind the nationality legislation is completely different. Foreigners can easily get the Belgian nationality (some of them after two or three years), without any language test or requirement of integration. Many politicians are aware of this contradiction between the Belgian and Flemish approach and there is a political consensus now that the nationalization law needs to be reviewed.

6. THE INFLUENCE OF FLEMISH NATIONALISM ON MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES

Sub-state nationalism can affect migrant policy making in two specific ways: by reshaping the policy agenda at both the state and the sub-state levels and by reinforcing regional political autonomy. These two phenomena are often related, but it is possible to distinguish them analytically (cf. Béland, 2005: 681-2).

6.1. NATIONALISM AS AGENDA SETTER

First, there is the influence of nationalist parties on the political *agenda*. The concept of political agenda setting refers to that cluster of issues considered as the

'pressing problems of the moment'. The term *agenda* points to 'the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention to at any given time'. Consequently, agenda setting is the process that narrows the 'set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention' (Kingdon, 1995: 3-4).

We can say that in Belgium, the discussion on integration and immigration was not on the agenda until the end of the 1980s. Belgium has been an immigration society since the 1950s but was quite late in developing a coherent integration policy. It is clear that the extreme nationalist party VB is responsible for a reshaping of the policy agenda on this issue and functions as an agenda setter. This party has become increasingly important since 1988 and is apparently well-known and attractive to many people because of their anti-immigrant stance. It is 'unquestionable that the VB has played an important role in the politicisation of immigrant and ethnic issues in Belgium' (Martiniello, 1995: 141). In fact, it was only after the electoral success of this party that the debate about an integration policy emerged. This electoral success was also an important reason to install the *Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policy*. This initiative was clearly an attempt to respond to the growing influence of the VB. However, in this respect it failed. The electoral importance of the VB increased at all the elections since 1989. In the elections for the Flemish Parliament, the party was in 2004 (with 24.2%) as well as in 2009 (with 15.3%), the second largest political party in Flanders.

In fact, the core business of the party is Flemish nationalism and separatism, but gradually, the VB gave more space to the struggle against immigration and multiculturalism. Since 1984, these themes have become its favoured topics and the VB owes them a large part of its growing electoral success. In 1989, the VB officer for immigration, Filip Dewinter, presented his ideas in a book with the explicit title *Eigen volk eerst* (Our people first) and in 1991, the VB published its highly contested 70 points programme to 'solve' the 'immigration problem'. The programme called for a watertight end to immigration and the immediate expulsion of all undocumented, criminal or unemployed migrants. Migrants for the VB face the issue of 'genuine assimilation or return'. However they suggest that migrants from Turkish and Moroccan origin (e.g. Muslims) cannot be integrated in Western societies (see Dewinter, *Immigratie: De Tijdbom tikt!* 1996; *Baas in Eigen Land* 2000). In this ideological construction of cultural incompatibility and the emphasis on zero migration and the escorted repatriation of 'the masses of non-European foreigners', VB is clearly influenced by Le Pen's French Front National.

In the eyes of many people, VB is a one-issue party because its nationalism and anti-migrant stance are not separable. Nationalism, according to the VB, concerns not only the defence of the Flemish community of language, customs and historical traditions, but also the defence of an ethnically pure Flemish State. 'How can a party resist the Francification of Brussels without resisting its Moroccanisation?', asked party leader Filip Dewinter (Hossay, 1996: 354).

It is not an exaggeration to say that the presence of this extreme-right party in Flanders is still felt and always quasi-palpable in the political and public discussions about integration and immigration. The role of this party is two-fold. On the one hand, it puts these issues on the political agenda, again and again. In every campaign for elections and in every meeting and programme of the party, migration and its (negative) consequences are important topics. Consequently, because of the electoral success of this party, it was not possible to keep these themes from the political agenda. Moreover, some of the ideas defended by the VB and some parts of their anti-immigrant discourse are also penetrating the traditional parties.

On the other hand, the presence of this xenophobic nationalist party is also the reason why other politicians shun the public debate about immigration and integration. They don't want to communicate and to debate these issues in an open way because they are afraid to lose voters to the extreme-right party. Many politicians thought that they could never win any debate on migration and integration. Every discussion of these issues was perceived as grist to the mill of conservative populists and extreme-right political formations. Again it is the presence of the extreme nationalist party who decides (indirectly) how other political parties think and communicate (or not) about this theme.

Apart from the VB, there are also other forms of nationalism in Flanders which are less extremist, more democratic and more open on the issues of immigration and integration. Since there are no Belgian political parties anymore, all the Flemish parties—from the liberals to the socialists—use nationalist elements in their discourse especially about state reform. But until 2001, the most explicit nationalist democratic party was the *Volksunie* (after 2001: N-VA and Spirit) and we must say that this democratic nationalist party had a function of agenda setter, especially in the debate of civic integration in Flanders. These nationalists supported the idea of encouraging the integration of immigrants through language. Together with the Flemish liberals (VLD) they argued several times during the 1990s in favour of a compelling policy of citizenisation with compulsory language education. In a city (Bilzen) where the national-

ists of the *Volksunie* delivered the mayor, they have organized compulsory civic integration trajectories since 1998- long before there was a coherent legal framework to do so.

Of course, all this does not mean that nationalist forces have full control over the integration agenda but rather that they can successfully pressure regional and national policy makers to address specific issues that are essential to them. Moreover, nationalist forces are not only agenda setters, they also stipulate in what kind of terms and concepts these issues can be discussed.

6.2. NATIONALISM AS A MOVEMENT TOWARDS MORE AUTONOMY

A second related point is that nationalist parties and mobilization can strengthen the legislative and administrative autonomy of territorial entities. This is what happened in Belgium. The Belgian process of state reform was clearly inspired by the nationalist idea to get more political autonomy for the regions and communities. Sub-state nationalism was also an important dimension that played a role in the struggle for more autonomy and responsibility for the regions and communities concerning integration policies for newcomers and migrants. The argumentation for more institutional and political autonomy was nevertheless not always framed in terms of pure nationalism; there were also arguments of efficiency and good governance. After all, there are a lot of elements in the integration policy (like language, education, employment) which might be better served with local governance, so subsidiarity and regionalisation are said to be 'inherently logical' here.

If the (autonomy) logic of nationalism proceeds, we could also expect that claims for more autonomy concerning immigration policy will arise, especially where immigration, integration and labour policy are closely entwined. Indeed, that would fit the nation-building model adopted by the Flemish government. For the moment, the only immigration responsibility of the regions has to do with labour migration and the margins for interpretation and autonomous decision making are very modest. The legislative framework is made by the Belgian government, only the implementation of the legislation is the competence of the regions.

There were already some particular, non-binding initiatives (like conferences and papers) to explore the possibilities and the advantages of more autonomy in migration policy—especially concerning additional economic migration, family migration and migration based on special ties. It is argued then that it may be legitimate to give the regions some autonomous discretion over certain parts of the immigration policy (like in Québec), because different local elements play a major role (for example, rate of unemployment and the economic conjuncture, public opinion, the protection of the native language and culture, the presence of other migrant communities, etc). However, most of the parties still agree that, for the moment, a genuine transfer of competencies about immigration towards local governments seems both impossible and undesirable. As such, the regionalisation of immigration policy is not in the near future. At the moment, besides the radical nationalist party of VB, only the Flemish nationalist party N-VA, has this autonomy claim in its programme. Rather than regionalisation, we can expect more internationalisation and Europeanization of policy-making concerning migration (Tholen, 2005). We can witness that European legal guarantees have increasingly constrained national policy-making, and that states in Europe, in several configurations have started to work together in co-ordinating national policies in the field of migration (Geddes, 2003; Sassen, 1999; Soysal, 1993).

Of course, all the Flemish political parties insist on consultation and good communication between the Communities, Regions, Belgium and the EU. They want to avoid overarching immigration regulations that conflict with sub-state policy objectives. The local government and parties want at least to be a partner in the (national and international) dialogue about immigration policy.

7. CONCLUSION

Without the peculiar notion of Flemish nationalism, it would be impossible to understand the process of policy making of the last decennia concerning immigration and integration in Belgium and Flanders. There is not only the undeniable influence of the extreme-right nationalist party VB since almost all the Flemish parties make use of nationalist elements, arguments and reflections. This is probably the reason why in recent years the debate on 'integration' has been focusing increasingly on Flanders (and Brussels,) even though the percentage of immigrants and foreigners in Wallonia is higher than in Flanders.

However, the relationship between Flemish nationalism and the Flemish approach to newcomers and migrants is Janus-faced. On the one side, the Flemish history of nationalism and the struggle for autonomy, language rights and cultural emancipation, are used to accept that newcomers are bound to their own language, culture, etc. It supports the idea of 'emancipation without loss of cultural identity'. On the other hand, the Flemish history of nationalism is used as an argument for 'assimilation' and against multiculturalism. The languages, cultures and religions of the newcomers are conceived as a (new) threat for the Flemish culture. As the Belgian anthropologist Eugeen Roosens (1994: 269)

notes, 'natives, who closely associate language, territory, and culture, view it as somewhat ironic that after winning their long battle against the Walloons, they are now in danger of forfeiting their cultural rights to foreigners on their own soil'.

However, the conclusion that Flanders is unlikely to adopt the perspective of multiculturalism because of their long struggle for linguistic rights and cultural autonomy is not correct. Here, the distinction between the Flemish and Walloon approach to diversity and integration is instructive. The idea of ethnic-minorities and group-based multicultural policies is much more present in Flemish policy documents than is the case in Wallonia. One could say that, through structural homology, the Flemish elite now do not want to impose on its ethnic minorities what it had lived itself as a formerly discriminated group. At the same time, there is a strong language policy and for many newcomers the 'citizenisation' *(inburgering)* trajectories have become compulsory. In essence, the Flemish situation can be qualified as being one of 'inegalitarian multiculturalism': the cultural identity of minorities is important, but the Flemish culture always had to take precedence (Martiniello, 1997).

It seems that the Flemish struggle for cultural autonomy, language rights and emancipation resulted in a nuanced, yet precarious, approach toward newcomers, immigrants and their (cultural) integration and emancipation. As we have seen, the Flemish government sees no contradiction in combining a more multicultural, with a more assimilationist approach. It sees no contradiction in combining the idea of obligatory civic integration with the explicit acceptance of cultural differences and the formation and support of ethnic communities and associations. Perhaps, this unique combination is the real heritage of Flemish nationalism.

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NOUVEAUX ARRIVANTS HUMANITAIRES ET ÉCONOMIQUES AU MANITOBA FRANCOPHONE : ENTRE DÉFIS ET SUCCÈS SOCIAL

Nathalie Piquemal est professeure-agrégée en éducation interculturelle à l'Université du Manitoba. Nathalie a obtenu son Doctorat en Anthropologie de l'Éducation à l'Université d'Alberta en 2000. Elle est spécialisée dans la recherche sur les phénomènes de discontinuité culturelle et d'acculturation pour les élèves autochtones et pour les élèves immigrants.

Boniface Bahi, est chercheur associé au Collège Universitaire de Saint-Boniface (University of Manitoba), ainsi que chercheur associé et partenaire de recherche à l'Institut Canadien de Recherche sur les Minorités Linguistiques (ICRML) de l'Université de Moncton au Nouveau-Bronswick. Il est titulaire du Ph.D en anthropologie médicale, 2001 et du D.E.S.S en Bioéthique, de l'Université de Montréal.

Bathélemy Bolivar est étudiant de Doctorat en Sciences de l'Éducation à l'Université du Manitoba. Sa recherche porte sur la question des conceptions du monde et de la lecture en science. Son domaine de recherche s'étend aussi aux enjeux de l'immigration en contexte scolaire.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article offre une analyse comparative des contextes de migration et vécus d'immigration des nouveaux arrivants économiques avec les nouveaux arrivants humanitaires en tant que francophones minoritaires au Manitoba. Notre problématique s'articule autour de la théorie d'acculturation pour avancer la thèse selon laquelle les dynamiques sociales, identitaires et relationnelles de l'interaction entre le nouvel arrivant et l'hôte sont susceptibles soit de renforcer soit de contrecarrer les inégalités sociales qui défavorisent les uns par rapport aux autres. Les auteurs naviguent à travers les témoignages de 10 immigrants (5 familles de la catégorie humanitaire et 5 familles de la catégorie économique) autour des thématiques suivantes : positionnement social, langue minoritaire, identité culturelle, et affiliation culturelle. Les auteurs proposent une série de recommandations qui tiennent compte des différences et inégalités entre immigrants économiques et immigrants humanitaires.

INTRODUCTION ET PROBLÉMATIQUE

L'évidence de l'immigration comme facteur de renforcement, de maintien et d'entretien de la diversité canadienne s'affirme de plus en plus en ce début du 3e millénaire. Pour les populations francophones en milieux linguistiques minoritaires hors Québec, un renforcement de la dynamique des nouveaux arrivants se constate de plus en plus (Statistiques Canada, 2007). Ce dynamisme reste corrélatif de certains défis, voire d'opportunités, tout en ouvrant sur des approches différenciées dans la quête du positionnement social des individus et des groupes, notamment, pour ce qui est du Manitoba. Cet article repose sur un aspect des données qui résultent de notre projet au Manitoba, « Inclusion des nouveaux arrivants en milieu scolaire », projet subventionné par le Conseil de Recherches en Sciences Humaines dans le cadre du programme d'Alliance de Recherche Université—Communautés.[1]

La déterritorialisation que constitue le fait migratoire, renvoie, avant tout, à une mobilité géographique qui sous-tend une quête de mobilité sociale dans le sens d'une ascension ou de promotion sociale (Bahi, 2007). Sur cet horizon, il semble que la question se pose, quant au comment vivre ensembles à la fois égaux et différents dans

le nouvel environnement. C'est une interrogation qui se fonde sur le fait que les individus et les groupes ont tendance à se réfugier dans leur identité ou dans une communauté homogène, ce qui conduit au rejet de l'Autre dont la différence apparait comme une menace (Touraine 2000). Cet enjeu des univers ethnoculturels de référence des individus et des groupes nous renvoie à la complexité même du fait identitaire dans le rapport à l'autre et à son impact social, en termes de difficultés ou de gratifications sociales. Cependant, nous entendons l'aborder, dans cette analyse, sur ses trois versants de l'origine, de contexte et de citoyenneté pour essayer de comprendre les défis et contrastes qui jalonnent la quotidienneté de certains nouveaux arrivants, dits économiques ou humanitaires dans le cadre de cette étude.

Même si l'immigration francophone hors Québec reste un phénomène limité, il n'en demeure pas moins un facteur dynamisant de la santé économique, culturelle et linguistique du paysage francophone minoritaire de l'Ouest canadien et particulièrement du Manitoba. Cet enjeu migratoire, reste, parfois, tributaire de mutations sociales et culturelles au niveau des individus et des groupes. Dans un tel contexte, des recherches récentes montrent que le processus d'acculturation est vécu avec plus ou moins de difficultés selon le contexte socio-psychologique de l'immigrant (Fantino & Colak, 2001; Paddila & Perez, 2003). Sans vouloir tomber dans le piège de la dichotomie, nous pouvons faire le constat que de l'immigration de type humanitaire[2] (les réfugiés) à l'immigration de type économique[1] (travailleurs qualifiés sélectionnés), les profils et les défis sont susceptibles de changer de façon marquante (Fantino & Colak, 2001). En effet, alors qu'il est synonyme de survie pour les uns, l'exil apparaît synonyme d'aventure bien calculée pour les autres. Spécifiquement, les interruptions scolaires, les tensions politiques et les moments prolongés d'insécurité pour certains génèrent des difficultés, voire des souffrances. Pour d'autres, celles-ci semblent moindres et se mesurent en termes d'opportunités (plus ou moins) bien calculées. Par ailleurs, des recherches montrent que les difficultés liées à l'acculturation sont plus importantes pour les immigrants au profil physionomique et culturel (couleur de la peau et pratiques culturelles et religieuses, par exemple) visiblement différent de celui de la majorité, que pour les immigrants dont les profils sont en relative adéquation avec la culture hôte (Padilla et Perez, 2003, p. 44). À l'analyse, un tel argument suggèrerait que plus l'immigrant est perçu comme un étranger par l'hôte, plus il risque de succomber aux pièges des clichés sociaux avec tous les risques de discrimination que cela peut entrainer (Padilla & Perez, 2003). Si l'on veut mieux répondre aux défis variés des immigrants, il est important de cerner l'impact du positionnement social et de l'identité ethnoculturelle sur le processus d'acculturation. En d'autres termes, la question qui se pose est la suivante : dans quelle mesure les différents contextes de migration, le positionnement socioéconomique et l'appartenance ethnique se traduisent-ils en inégalités susceptibles de perdurer dans la terre d'accueil?

Dans ce qui suit, nous proposons de naviguer à travers les témoignages de 10 immigrants (5 familles de la catégorie humanitaire et 5 familles de la catégorie économique) autour des thématiques suivantes : positionnement social, langue minoritaire, identité culturelle, et affiliation culturelle. Notre problématique s'articule autour de la théorie d'acculturation pour avancer la thèse selon laquelle les dynamiques sociales, identitaires et relationnelles de l'interaction entre le nouvel arrivant et l'hôte sont susceptibles soit de renforcer soit de contrecarrer les inégalités systémiques, à savoir, sociales, économiques et relationnelles, qui défavorisent les uns par rapport aux autres.

CADRE DE RÉFÉRENCE CONCEPTUEL ET CONTEXTE DE L'ÉTUDE

Le concept d'acculturation est utilisé en sciences sociales pour décrire le processus d'accommodation qui a lieu lorsque des individus de cultures différentes entrent en contact continu les uns avec les autres (Redfield, Linton & Herskovits, 1936). Ce processus d'accommodation est interactif (Kim, 1977) dans le sens où l'immigrant adopte des façons d'être et de penser de la culture hôte et construit de nouvelles habitudes sociales empreintes des deux cultures. Cela a un impact en retour (ne serait-ce que minime) sur les perceptions et agissements des membres de la culture hôte. Cela dit, les chercheurs qui se sont penchés sur le phénomène d'acculturation dans les relations interethniques entre groupes majoritaires et groupes minoritaires n'hésitent pas à confier que, bien souvent, au lieu d'un processus d'échange culturel réciproque et équitable, c'est un processus d'assimilation et de dominance sociale qui a lieu (Casmir, 1993). Dans de telles conditions, l'aliénation culturelle guette l'immigrant, surtout s'il appartient à un groupe minoritaire (linguistique, culturel ou autre) minoritaire. La question suivante surgit: Lesquels de ces aspects du vécu et du profil de l'immigrant, en l'occurrence le positionnement social et le rapport à l'autre, la langue, l'identité, et la culture, facilitent, ou le cas échéant entravent, l'acculturation, c'est-à-dire le processus interculturel réciproque et équitable par lequel l'hôte et l'autre apprennent à vivre ensemble?

Notre approche conceptuelle est aussi influencée par les travaux de Bunaby, Bell, Holt, et Belfiore (1985), lesquels perçoivent trois dimensions essentielles dans

le processus d'acculturation des immigrants : les facteurs individuels (langue(s) parlée(s), emploi, niveau d'éducation, capital financier, etc.); les facteurs sociaux (participation à des organismes, emplois, et autres groupes majoritaires); et les barrières institutionnelles qui engendrent certaines réactions sociales à certains facteurs individuels (minorités visibles et discrimination).

Des recherches montrent, en effet, que les minorités visibles, tout particulièrement les Noirs, se heurtent à des barrières qui rendent leur intégration socioprofessionnelle plus difficile que les immigrants d'Europe (Burnanby & al, 1985). Ces barrières institutionnelles s'expriment sous la forme de reconnaissance de diplômes de certains pays au détriment des diplômes d'autres pays (Opoku-Dapaah, 1993), de discrimination sur les lieux de travail (Kasozi, 1986), et d'embauche préférentielle selon le pays d'origine ou le sexe (Elabor-Idemudia, 1999). Ces études concluent qu'il n'est pas suffisant de mesurer la capacité d'adaptation des nouveaux arrivants en fonction de leur seul capital éducatif et professionnel à l'arrivée. Cela tient au fait que des facteurs institutionnels et systémiques sont susceptibles de défavoriser les uns par rapport à d'autres. Des recherches portant sur les circonstances, les inégalités oserons-nous dire, pré migratoires sont à prendre en compte en plus de la dimension systémique post migratoire. Ces circonstances existentielles et structurelles sont de plusieurs ordres, tout en restant principalement liées à trois différents types d'identité de l'immigrant, à savoir, celle de l'origine, celle de contexte, et celle de citoyenneté.

Les sciences sociales établissent, généralement, que les sociétés humaines se définissent non seulement par leurs limites et leur contenu, mais aussi et surtout, par ce qui peut être identifié comme leurs caractéristiques centrales. Celles-ci, à la suite de Roland Barthes, peuvent être considérées comme l'« ensemble des grands référents » pour les individus et les groupes, membres de la société correspondante, dans leur agir social. Ce serait là, la matrice de base, de tout processus de socialisation, au sens où le définit Rocher (1974): « Le processus par lequel la personne humaine apprend et intériorise tout au cours de sa vie les éléments socioculturels de son milieu, les intègre à la structure de sa personnalité sous l'influence d'expérience et d'agents sociaux significatifs et par là s'adapte à l'environnement social où elle vit » (p. 103).

Par cette référence, nous touchons à un investissement (majeur?) des biographies sociales et culturelles en l'individu, constitutives de sa personnalité culturelle, disons, de son identité de l'origine. Celle-ci, égocentrique, pourrait-on mentionner, dans la mesure où elle se structure dans l'espace privé, domestique ou familial, fondamentalement, ne serait pas un invariant. En effet, l'individu, fort de cette affiliation culturelle, et dans son rapport au monde ou à autrui, met en tension ses valeurs avec d'autres, différentes, surtout, dans un contexte migratoire, comme celui qui fait objet de notre étude. Bien sûr, le poids des valeurs de base se renforcent, toujours, de l'impact des conditions pré migratoires (vie dans un camp de réfugiés, par exemple) pour le nouvel arrivant. De cette tension éventuelle, et de certaines qu'elles semblaient paraître, les valeurs de base peuvent être mises en doute par l'individu lui-même et subir, d'une certaine façon, un renouvellement (Malherbe, 1996). Tel semble le cas, dans une quête d'accommodement culturel ou social, en milieu étranger ou immigrant pour le nouvel arrivant « humanitaire » ou « économique » Cet horizon nous inscrit au cœur du possible façonnement des valeurs des individus et des groupes en rapport avec un contexte ou environnement de vie.

En effet, l'identité de contexte, qui se structure relativement aux offres du milieu de vie auxquelles recours l'individu ou le groupe dans sa recherche de satisfaction de son quotidien et de quête de sens (Bahi et Biaya, 1996), se renforce, semble-t-il, des expériences vécues contextuellement. L'environnement migratoire semble s'imposer comme celui du renouvellement, de l'emprunt voire de la dépossession culturelle. Cependant, Rajaonah (1979) avertit :

> « La culture étrangère, ne vaut que si elle nous aide par la distinction et l'efficacité de son apport, à mieux creuser au-dedans de notre conscience et nous incite à davantage apprécier la saveur forte et douce de demeurer nous-mêmes, notre saveur humaine » (p. 29).

Cette idée de demeurer soi-même en mode de mobilité géographique pour l'immigrant permet de jeter un bref regard sur la politique migratoire du Canada. Cette nation apparaît, aujourd'hui, dans la catégorie dite « ethnique » avec l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne par opposition à cette autre indiquée comme « civique » ou républicaine, dont la France, principalement (Campeau et Al., 2009). Le référentiel « ethnique », revêt, pour le Canada, dont le contexte social nous préoccupe dans cette étude, l'idée de sa politique du multiculturalisme initiée depuis 1976. Ce projet de société de l'État politique canadien s'alliant à la diversité culturelle et sociale, n'a toujours pas été comme défini ci-dessus. En réalité, les premières formes de la *Loi sur l'immigration,* celles précédant 1976, comportaient une dimension dite *raciste* au sens où certains groupes sociaux ne pouvaient immigrer au Canada (interdiction faite aux chinois en 1923, par exemple). De ce point de vue, l'immigration européenne fut freinée au lendemain de la guerre mondiale, avec l'intention, pour le Canada, de prévenir

des sources éventuelles de troubles sociaux sur son sol. Cependant, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'immigration européenne est la plus ancienne et la plus dense (Statistiques Canada, 2007).

Le caractère ancien et fort de l'immigration européenne, potentialise, d'une certaine façon, la capacité d'insertion sociale et professionnelle de la plupart des nouveaux arrivants du « vieux continent » en sol canadien. Certes, une certaine proximité sociale, voire biologique avec la majorité des accueillants, semble favoriser leur intégration (comme mentionné plus haut), mais des réseaux sociaux de solidarité préétablis, apparaissent, de même, déterminants dans leur capitalisation sociale. Relevons que cet état de fait nous renvoie à ce qui pourrait être perçu comme la part de l'état social (ce qui émerge du rapport interactif quotidien du nouvel arrivant avec l'accueillant) à côté de l'élan d'égalité et de justice sociale que laissent entrevoir les institutions publiques officielles (état politique) (Bahi, 2008). C'est dans ce sens que l'identité de citoyenneté (l'emphase avec les critères objectifs de détention de la citoyenneté) se pose comme un espace non discriminatoire comparativement aux autres dimensions de l'identité mentionnées en haut.

Dans l'ensemble, même si cet essai d'analyse sur la question toujours très complexe de l'identité se veut tridimensionnelle, nous retenons que dans l'agir social, l'identité reste systémique et intégrée à la manière d'une combinatoire dynamique, chez tout nouvel arrivant. Les biographies sociales et culturelles, en d'autres termes, les dispositifs psychosociaux semblent un lieu de référence comparative entre immigrants humanitaires et ceux dits économiques.

Très peu d'études se sont penchées sur la dimension comparative entre immigrants de la catégorie humanitaire et immigrants de la catégorie économique. Aucune, à notre connaissance, ne se rapporte, pour le moment, au contexte manitobain et/ou francophone minoritaire. Dans le contexte canadien anglophone, l'étude de Fantino et Colak (2001) porte sur le cas de l'intégration des enfants réfugiés au Canada en contraste avec l'intégration des enfants d'immigrants non réfugiés. Cette étude porte essentiellement sur la dimension psychologique de la gestion des traumatismes liés aux guerres dans le pays d'origine, et conclut que la communauté d'accueil doit procéder avec beaucoup de sensibilité culturelle quant à la gestion du passé de ces jeunes. Tout en prenant en compte ces disparités existentielles psychologiques entre réfugiés et immigrants de la catégorie économique, notre étude se lance aussi dans l'exploration des disparités contextuelles plus larges, englobant le contexte de migration, la culture, la langue, l'ethnicité, et l'identité au sens global (tel que défini ci-dessus), de sorte à démontrer que l'amélioration du soutien à l'intégration des immigrants doit passer par la reconnaissance des différences et inégalités de contexte par la communauté d'accueil. Dans le contexte manitobain anglophone, une étude récente (Kanu, 2009) effectuée auprès d'étudiants réfugiés africains révèle que les défis académiques, socioéconomiques et psychologiques influencent négativement leur intégration scolaire, et conséquemment compromettent leurs opportunités socioéconomiques. Si de telles difficultés sont relevées en contexte linguistique majoritaire, il s'ensuit que ces difficultés risquent d'être plus aigues en milieu francophone minoritaire. D'où l'importance de l'objectif visé par notre étude, celui de comparer la situation des immigrants économiques avec celle des immigrants humanitaires dans le contexte francophone minoritaire du Manitoba.

A ce titre, le *Plan stratégique pour favoriser l'immigration au sein des communautés francophones* (CIC, 2006) est perçu comme un catalyseur de la croissance et de la vitalité des minorités francophones à Winnipeg. À ce sujet, le Ministre Allan (2009), du Travail et de l'Immigration Manitoba, affirme : "In the last year, we have made great strides in attracting French-speaking immigrants to ensure the growth and vitality of the Francophone minority communities in the Province." Par ailleurs, dans cette démarche de soutien à l'immigration francophone, la province s'engage à aussi au niveau de la diversité culturelle. En effet, un des buts principaux de l'action Stratégique pour la Croissance Économique (Travail et Immigration Manitoba, 2008) est exprimé ainsi: "To promote and support communities that welcome newcomers and strengthen and celebrate our cultural diversity" (p. 2).

Nos cinq participants de la catégorie humanitaire sont tous originaire de la République Démocratique du Congo. Tous ont transité par des camps de réfugiées avant de trouver asile au Canada. Nos cinq participants de la catégorie économique sont originaires d'Europe (3), du Maghreb (1) et de la Côte d'Ivoire (1) et sont tous arrivés dans le cadre d'un projet de travail. Ces 10 familles ont participé à une entrevue semi structurée d'une heure portant sur leur vécu pré et post migratoire, la perception de leur transition culturelle, de leur intégration sociale et professionnelle, ainsi que des défis liés à la langue, l'identité et la culture. Notre analyse est regroupée autour des quatre thèmes suivants : les différences et inégalités du contexte de migration, le déterminant linguistique, le rôle de l'identité ethnoculturelle, et les choix d'affiliations culturelles et communautaires.

Il nous paraît évident que tout modèle théorique a ses limites et ses avantages. En admettant, généralement, que tout chercheur en sciences sociales ne peut totalement s'abstraire de ses valeurs personnelles (l'idée de personnalité culturelle mise en relief plus haut), alors,

cette sorte de méta-connaissance dont on semble imbibé et le cadre conceptuel, contribuent à imposer une certaine architecture aux données (Bahi, 2007). Celles-ci se retrouvent doublement construites : la compréhension, l'explication et l'interprétation nous situent à un second niveau d'assignation de sens aux données, les nouveaux arrivants interrogés eux-mêmes en étant les premiers auteurs, par leurs témoignages. Leurs discours sont multivoques, cependant, nous les appréhendons selon notre horizon conceptuel. Les personnalités culturelles et expérientielles des individus et des groupes nous situent, d'emblée, à l'interface de deux ordres, celui explicite et l'autre implicite. Arriver à dépasser l'apparent (l'explicite) pour saisir l'arrière-fond des discours ou témoignages, en clair chercher à saisir ce qui serait dernière la textualité dans un élan de violence interprétative (Bibeau et Corin, 1994). De cette façon, nous chercherons à appréhender, à travers les témoignages, ce qui peut sembler instrumental aux plans du positionnement social et du pluralisme causal des inégalités éventuelles.

LE POSITIONNEMENT SOCIAL ET LA DIALECTIQUE DES INÉGALITÉS

Si légalement ou textuellement parlant les immigrants, une fois arrivés au Canada, semblent tous bénéficier des mêmes droits et avantages sociaux, une analyse des trajectoires individuelles exprime des nuances, voire des inégalités, entre les immigrants de la catégorie humanitaire et ceux de la catégorie économique. Le processus de sélection des candidats à l'immigration laisse transparaître des critères élitistes. Au niveau de l'immigration de type économique, l'Immigration et Citoyenneté Canada affiche une préférence pour les candidats qui se trouvent à un certain âge, entre 21 et 49 ans, maîtrisant l'une des langues officielles, le français ou l'anglais, et ayant des diplômes et des expériences professionnelles répondant à un besoin économique du pays (Immigration Manitoba, 2009). Tous nos participants répondent au moins à deux de ces critères. Par exemple, un de nos participants européens explique : « J'avais un emploi qui était en forte demande au Manitoba. Tout s'est passé rapidement. Il y a eu une session de recrutement. De l'immigration canadienne et après on nous a aidés pour toutes les démarches. Tout s'est fait rapidement. J'ai trouvé du travail en quelques jours et ma femme aussi » (Belgique).

Au niveau de l'immigration de type humanitaire, il est évident que ces critères et attentes sont révisés à la baisse de sorte à répondre à des situations dans lesquelles les droits humains sont menacés. Ainsi, à l'arrivée, tandis que certains arrivent avec un capital culturel compatible avec celui du Canada, d'autres se réjouissent d'avoir la vie sauve mais se retrouvent en décalage économique, culturel et social. Un de nos répondants de la République Démocratique du Congo explique: « Le Canada est venu comme Moïse le sauveur ! Pour nous sauver de là. On n'avait pas le choix. Il y avait une insécurité à l'intérieur de pays, donc à chaque fois que les gens manifestaient il y avait des arrestations, des enlèvements, et même on tuait les gens pendant la nuit. Donc c'est à cause de cela que j'ai pris la décision de fuir le pays. Avant d'arriver au Canada, j'ai passé 8 ans à attendre dans un camp de réfugié au Kenya. » Un autre participant explique : « je suis arrivée, nouveau arrivant au Canada… Avec le stress tout ce que j'ai vécu en Afrique du sud, manque de moyens, tout ça. J'ai traversé une période très compliquée à partir du Zaïre, arrivé en Afrique du sud je n'avais pas de moyen, pas d'argent, je n'avais pas de maison, on me chassait d'un endroit à un autre. »

Il s'ensuit que la connaissance des causes qui poussent les gens à quitter leur pays d'origine est nécessaire à la compréhension de la problématique des inégalités pré migratoires. Les lignes de démarcation se répartissent comme suit : le statut socioéconomique du pays d'origine et son degré d'adéquation (ou d'inadéquation) culturelle avec le pays d'accueil, la situation socio-écomomique de l'immigrant à l'arrivée, et la motivation de migration.

Ce qui émerge des commentaires des participants, quant à leur pays d'origine, est symptomatique de l'orientation de leur intégration. Certains, et en particulier les immigrants de la catégorie économique venant d'Europe ou du Maghreb, reconnaissent que leur pays d'origine aide considérablement dans leur intégration. D'ailleurs ils se targuent d'être Belges, Français, ou maghrébins pour évoquer leur familiarité avec le milieu de la terre d'adoption. Notre participant maghrébin déclare : « La Tunisie c'est quand même différent du reste de l'Afrique. Ici c'est un peu comme l'Amérique du Nord. » Par contre, d'autres intervenants, essentiellement des immigrants de la catégorie humanitaire et venant de pays Africains, lient leurs difficultés dans le système aux disparités criantes entre les structures socio-politiques du pays d'origine et celles du Canada. En particulier, les structures familiales par rapport au statut de genres et de l'autorité parentale, ainsi que les structures gouvernementales sont souvent en dissonance par rapport au contexte pré migratoire. Cela dit, on a constaté que ces mêmes immigrants, en dépit des dissonances sociopolitiques entre le pays d'origine et le pays d'accueil, déclarent avoir réussi leur intégration : « On fait un effort, on veut s'adapter, alors on a une devise : on travaille dur. » A ce titre, la réussite scolaire des enfants est souvent ce par quoi les immigrants évaluent le succès de leur intégration (Piquemal & Bolivar, 2009). Ainsi, si le pays d'origine semble jouer un rôle

primordial dans la transition culturelle des immigrants, les facteurs individuels, tels la persévérance dans le cheminement vers les opportunités à venir, ne sont pas moins négligeables dans ce processus.

Un autre facteur qui entre en jeu est la condition socio-économique de l'immigrant au départ. On se demande dans quelle mesure les mieux nantis bénéficient de certains avantages par rapport aux plus pauvres, et cela quel que soit le pays d'origine. Ceux qui ont eu le privilège de compléter des études universitaires, de gagner de meilleurs salaires, d'épargner ou de posséder de l'immobilier sont évidemment plus armés à faire face aux aléas de l'intégration. La famille française déclare : « Nous avons suffisamment d'argent pour vivre bien à quatre pendant au moins deux ans. D'ailleurs avec ce que nous avons pu vendre en France, nous venons d'acheter une maison ici. » En fait, ceux qui débarquent au Canada avec les 10 mille dollars exigés par la CIC (Immigration Manitoba, 2009) sont déjà en mesure de suivre des études, une fois au Canada, et d'intégrer le marché du travail plus vite que les autres : « Comme nous avons suffisamment d'argent de côté, nous pouvons nous permettre de prendre des cours d'anglais pendant quelques temps sans avoir à travailler, » ajoute notre répondant français.

Une question de départ trop souvent négligée dans les analyses des flux migratoires demeure la raison qui pousse les gens à émigrer. Les réponses sont multiples mais se regroupent généralement dans deux catégories principales : le libre choix de quitter le pays d'origine contre l'obligation motivée par la survie de le faire. En termes plus directs : ceux qui viennent pour étudier, travailler, s'aventurer et ceux qui doivent partir pour sauver leur peau. Les réfugiés sont souvent amenés à attendre plusieurs années dans des camps où les conditions de vie sont très précaires, tandis que ceux de la catégorie économique ne passent que quelques mois à attendre leur visa de résident permanent. Ces inégalités de départ viennent amplifier le dur combat de l'intégration d'un pays où la distanciation culturelle en soi est un choc. Les déterminants du projet migratoire, entre quête de survie biologique et sociale, d'un côté, et recherche de promotion, voire de variation professionnelle de l'autre. Ce projet de renouvellement professionnel s'illustre par les deux témoignages suivants :

« Au début je n'avais pas l'intention d'immigrer parce que je vivais bien chez moi…. Et puis, il y a eu des représentants du Canada qui faisaient du recrutement. Ça m'a rendu curieux. C'était une aventure. Et puis mes fils voulaient partir pour avoir de meilleures opportunités d'étude et de travail » (Tunisie).

« J'ai beaucoup voyagé. J'avais l'habitude du changement… J'ai été exposé à différentes cultures. A part le froid, au début la principale difficulté c'étaient les opportunités de travail en français. Il fallait partir dans le côté anglais pour vraiment percer » (Côte d'Ivoire).

MINORITÉ LINGUISTIQUE : UNE LANGUE À DEUX VITESSES

Au-delà de la préséance de l'anglais comme langue majoritaire et dominante (Piquemal & Bolivar, 2009), quelques nuances par rapport au français sont à soulever. Si tous les interviewés reconnaissent la force de l'anglais quant à l'intégration dans le marché du travail, certains font valoir que le français comporte des valeurs relatives. En d'autres termes, des facteurs tels le pays d'origine et les nuances épidermiques ajoutent ou diminuent la portée du français dans la recherche de l'emploi et des opportunités. D'ailleurs des études de Statistique Canada rapportent que des facteurs tels que la capacité linguistique, l'appartenance à une minorité visible, la culture et le pays d'origine ont une forte incidence sur les conditions économique des nouveaux arrivants (Statistique Canada, 2008). Alors que nos participants européens pensent pouvoir trouver (et trouvent rapidement) du travail tout en étant unilingue francophone, nos participants minorités visibles, des catégories économiques et humanitaires, affirment que la seule connaissance du français est insuffisante à l'obtention d'un emploi. Notre participant ivoirien de la catégorie économique explique : « au début la principale difficulté c'étaient les opportunités de travail en français. Il fallait partir dans le côté anglais pour vraiment percer. » Un de nos répondant de République Démocratique du Congo renchérit : « Ce n'est pas seulement le français mais l'emploi en français est aussi minoritaire. »

Compte tenu des inégalités qui départagent les immigrants, si la couleur devient une plus value à la langue française devrait-on devenir perplexe par rapport aux clivages déjà prononcés entre le revenu des Canadiens natifs et celui des immigrants? En effet, une étude de Statistique Canada montre que « les taux de faible revenu des nouveaux immigrants représentaient 1,4 fois ceux des personnes nées au Canada en 1980, 2,7 fois en 1995 et 2,5 fois en 2000 (…) et 2,7 fois en 2004 » (Statistique Canada, 2008). Si les inégalités de départ depuis la sélection des candidats par la CIC continuent de se perpétuer jusque dans la recherche d'emploi dans la même langue, les valeurs promues dans la société hôte doivent être revisités pour cause de dissonance. Alors l'argument de la triple minorité des immigrants francophones qui sont des minorités visibles prend tout son sens : statut minoritaire du français, statut d'immigrant et minorité visible. Il semble que le français crée des opportunités pour certains alors qu'il n'est que faiblement valorisé pour les autres. Peut-on comprendre par là la raison de cette fierté d'être

Francophone par les uns et ce désenchantement du fait francophone par les autres? Notre participant Belge revendique son statut de francophone et fait de la langue un motif de déménagement potentiel : « On envisage d'aller un jour au Québec pour avoir plus de français. » Notre participant français ajoute : « Nous avons choisi d'acheter une maison dans un quartier francophone car pour nous la francophonie c'est important. » Par contre, pour la plupart des réfugiés c'est la langue (souvent l'anglais) qui les choisit en fonction des priorités socioéconomiques, tels le quartier de résidence (loin des agglomérats francophones), des réseaux de soutien immédiats (églises et groupes sociaux), et de la facilité de trouver un emploi rapidement (souvent en anglais). Les commentaires suivants résument cet état de fait : « La religion pour moi c'est important, tant pis si je ne trouve pas d'église francophone dans mon quartier; je vais dans une église anglophone. » (…) « Nous, on n'avait pas le choix, on nous a mis au centre-ville là où personne ne parle français. On nous a amenés dans une maison où il y a des souris, des histoires impossibles, des toilettes, l'eau qui remonte, vraiment des histoires impossibles » Dans des cas extrêmes, certain ne trouvent pas plus de confort ou d'opportunités en anglais qu'en français. Un des intervenants de la République Démocratique du Congo refuse de s'identifier à la francophonie (sa langue maternelle) ou à l'anglophonie. Pour lui le français ou l'anglais revient au même quant à son deuil culturel ou à la mort de son identité : « peu importe la langue que je parle ici au Canada, je me sens toujours déraciné. Ma culture est autant menacée par le français que par l'anglais. »

TENSIONS IDENTITAIRES : ADÉQUATION ET INADÉQUATION

« Le combat identitaire, le deuil culturel », voilà les termes qui décrivent les tensions identitaires vécues par les immigrants d'Afrique, et cela quelle que soit la catégorie d'immigration. Autant la culture d'origine diffère de celle du pays hôte, autant le positionnement identitaire semble se complexifier. Dans cette quête de conserver son identité, ces immigrants se demandent dans quelle mesure ils peuvent être eux-mêmes en gardant des valeurs, des perceptions d'eux-mêmes et une vision du monde qui leur sont particulières, parallèlement à leur désir de se sentir pleinement chez eux dans la terre d'accueil. Les citations suivantes résument le ressenti de nos participants qui sont des minorités visibles : « Souvent les gens me rappellent d'ou je viens et ça fait mal. On me rappelle que je suis étranger. » (Côte d'Ivoire). « Je ne me sens pas moi-même ici. Je vis comme un étranger. C'est une fracture totale, un deuil culturel. On me dépouille de mon identité. On me dépouille de tout. Je me sens étranger. Je ne me reconnais en rien. » (République Démocratique du Congo). « Même après 15 ans, je me considère encore comme un étranger ici. D'ailleurs après 15 ans je n'ai pas d'amis ici en dehors de ma famille. » (République Démocratique du Congo). Seuls quelques uns rapportent se sentir relativement bien dans leur nouveau milieu : « Oui, dans l'ensemble ça va. Notre culture nous manque mais on vit bien ici. » (République Démocratique du Congo).

Les tensions identitaires existent pour les immigrants européens aussi mais elles semblent générer moins de souffrance, dans la mesure où elles sont exprimées en termes de mélancolie passagère, de découvertes, de possibilités et de choix : « Pour moi le français c'est important. D'ailleurs on a constaté qu'on est plus Belge qu'on le croyait. C'est quand on quitte son pays qu'on se rend compte de ce qui nous manque et de nos attaches. De temps en temps on a un petit coup de blues. Mais ça fait partie de cette grande aventure qu'on recherchait. » (Belgique). (…) « On est heureux. De toute façon si on part, on se dit qu'au moins on aura appris l'anglais » (France).

Ces tensions peuvent aboutir à une résolution ou tout au moins à une reconstruction identitaire emprunte des deux cultures. Dans ce nouveau milieu, les immigrants doivent prendre le pouls de la culture ambiante. Le fait qu'ils se trouvent dans une culture autre, il appert qu'ils doivent développer une meilleure acuité de leur propre identité afin de se positionner sciemment dans la nouvelle culture. Cette relativité aiguise le sens de l'identité de l'autre, car il s'agit de prendre conscience de cette altérité, et de se positionner dans ce nouveau contexte culturel : « Mais comment est-ce que quand les autres sont tués ou violés, on peut vivre en paix? Pensez-vous que je puisse vivre en harmonie? Non. C'est une douleur perpétuelle. Mais on se force à aller de l'avant, de prendre ce qu'il y a de bon ici. » (République Démocratique du Congo). Notre participant ivoirien explique : « il faut que j'accepte que je suis rentré dans un nouveau monde et puis j'ai crée un nouveau monde. Et puis ce monde ne doit pas obligatoirement être le monde dans lequel j'ai grandi. » Ces identités se croisent dans leur dimension axiologique, linguistique et culturelle. Dans cette phase de découverte, les intervenants acquièrent une meilleure intuition des membres de la culture hôte. Ces interactions font découvrir d'autres éléments que cachent les stéréotypes culturels; elles permettent aussi de corriger les perceptions premières et mettre les balises pour des relations humaines plus authentiques. En définitive, des corrections ont lieu. Nécessairement les immigrants doivent négocier des éléments de leur identité. Ils consentent à certains changements drastiques quant aux valeurs familiales, la perception du temps et les relations humaines. L'exemple

qui revient souvent est celui de l'émancipation des femmes perçue comme trop abrupte. Ces changements ne se font pas sans peine, d'où la notion de tension qui, si elle n'est pas résolue, débouche sur des crises identitaires,—un phénomène très fréquent mais que nous observons surtout chez les enfants des immigrants. De ce fait, certains parents vont jusqu'à défier les décisions des enseignants pour briser certains stéréotypes : « on leur donne des choses à faire sur la culture noire. Quand il y a des projets, on va leur dire d'amener des chansons, de chanter, de danser, des choses de la culture noire américaine. Les profs leur disent quoi faire. Quand mes enfants me disent qu'ils doivent chercher une chanson, je leur demande ce que font les autres et ils me disent que certains vont étudier Louis Riel, d'autres l'histoire de la province. Là, je ne suis pas d'accord. Si ils sont amenés à parler d'eux, de leur famille, je préfère qu'ils parlent d'eux en tant que canadiens ou canadien et ivoiriens mais pas seulement ivoiriens. Parce que je ne veux pas qu'ils vivent ici en tant qu'étrangers. » (notre répondant de la Côte d'Ivoire). Faudrait-il signaler, du même coup, que nos immigrants européens et maghrébins, en provenance de cultures qu'ils perçoivent comme similaires à celle du Canada, se disent très privilégiés dans cette transition, et pour eux ces tensions sont réduites à leur moindre expression.

CULTURES ET COMMUNAUTÉS RECOMPOSÉES : AFFILIATION ET ALIÉNATION

Si les enjeux identitaires se jouent dans le microscome, ceux de la culture sont de l'ordre du macrocosme. Les premiers sont de l'ordre plus ou moins personnel tandis que les derniers guident les choix de société et les politiques publiques. À côté des tensions identitaires, les immigrants affrontent aussi les problématiques de l'intégration socio-économique. Ils n'ont pas le choix que de comprendre et de vivre dans ce nouveau milieu culturel qui favorise des valeurs, des comportements, des discours, des modes de vie qui sont parfois en dissonance avec leur sens du familier. Bien sûr, ceux qui sont accoutumés à ces orientations culturelles se trouvent privilégiés dans le nouveau cadre de référence. Ainsi que nous l'avons vu précédemment, nos interviewés de la catégorie économique nous confient qu'ils se reconnaissent très bien dans les nouveaux paramètres culturels. Par contre, les réfugiés rapportent qu'ils vivent une aliénation culturelle allant jusqu'à parler de négation totale de leur culture. On comprend bien que dépendamment de la proximité ou de la distanciation des cultures du pays d'origine et de l'hôte, l'intégration dans sa composante culturelle varie de la simple acculturation à l'aliénation. Ainsi, si les études démontrent que les affiliations communautaires des immigrants sont souvent multiples (Fortin, 2002), notre étude montre que les choix d'affiliation communautaire entre immigrants européens et immigrants africains se différencient. Ayant une adaptation culturelle plutôt aisée, les Européens peuvent faire de la langue un choix prioritaire et s'orientent ainsi généralement vers la francophonie: « Notre choix c'est de vivre dans un environnement francophone, même s'il y a beaucoup d'anglophones ici. Je recherche la francophonie, dans mon travail, dans mes relations. » (Belgique). (…) « On a choisi un quartier francophone car on cherche à garder une appartenance à la francophonie. » (France). Nos répondants Africains sont encore dans la résolution des tensions culturelles et s'orientent ainsi vers des foyers en adéquation avec leur culture d'origine, et cela parfois quelle que soit la langue. Par exemple, si la pratique religieuse est considérée comme primordiale, l'immigrant se tournera vers un établissement religieux anglophone de sorte à rester conforme à sa croyance. Ajoutons que les choix d'affiliations communautaires sont sans doute plus nombreux pour les immigrants qui sont financièrement aisés (ils font construire dans un quartier de leur choix) que pour les immigrants qui arrivent sans le sou (ils prennent ce qui leur est proposé,—souvent dans un quartier défavorisé).

Par ailleurs, notre étude montre que la division entre catégories se situe à deux niveaux : le degré d'indépendance financière sépare les catégories économique et humanitaire quant à la possibilité même de choix d'affiliation communautaire, et le degré d'adéquation culturelle sépare les Européens et Maghrébins des Africains quant à la possibilité d'adaptation sans aliénation. Ainsi, pour les réfugiés, les affiliations communautaires ne leur garantissent pas une pleine intégration. Ils sont obligés d'aller au-delà. Ils déconstruisent leur propre culture car ils veulent s'adapter et être fonctionnels dans la culture de l'hôte. Ils abandonnent certaines valeurs, assouplissent certains comportements pour satisfaire les prétendus standards culturels valorisés : « Ce n'est pas que j'ai délaissé quelque chose de ma culture mais il faut que j'accepte que je suis rentré dans un nouveau monde et j'ai créé un nouveau monde, » nous répète notre participant ivoirien. Ces immigrants développent aussi d'autres stratégies pour garder ce qui peut être sauvé de leur culture d'origine. Ils recherchent des foyers culturels nourriciers c'est-à-dire similaires à leur culture originelle (Simich, 2003). Parfois, ce sont des groupes multiethniques qui offrent ces genres de support. Non seulement ces structures promeuvent les valeurs auxquelles ces immigrants s'identifient mais aussi ces derniers se sentent assez engagés pour contribuer au développement de ces

communautés parallèles (par exemple, l'Amicale de la Francophonie). Récemment au Manitoba, des ethnies se regroupent sous diverses formes et l'appellation de regroupement des Maliens, des Congolais, ou des Chinois est assez courante. Une affiliation communautaire est donc possible. S'il arrive que ces foyers nourriciers deviennent parfois des groupes d'appartenance, il n'en reste pas moins que le véritable sentiment d'appartenance semble plus accessible aux immigrants qui sont visiblement majoritaires (Européens et maghrébins) qu'à ceux qui sont visiblement minoritaires (Africains).

CONCLUSION ET IMPLICATIONS

Les immigrants de la catégorie humanitaire et les immigrants de la catégorie économique se rejoignent dans leur vécu du changement, dans le sens où ils traversent tous une période d'ambiguïté culturelle, de négociation identitaire, et de reconstruction d'une nouvelle affiliation communautaire. Tous font l'expérience de sentiments de gain et de perte, et gèrent leur propre intégration en passant par des périodes de loyauté culturelle à des périodes de résistance culturelle. Tous aussi se heurtent aux difficultés liées à la non connaissance de l'Anglais, autrement dit au statut minoritaire du Français. Cependant, des différences sont visibles entre les deux catégories d'immigrants, notamment au niveau des inégalités de départ, de l'appartenance ethnoculturelle et de la relation à (ou réaction de) l'hôte. Tandis que les uns choisissent, calculent et maîtrisent (plus ou moins) l'exil, les autres attendent une chance d'avoir la vie sauve. Tandis que les uns ont généralement un bagage éducatif, culturel et professionnel relativement compatible aux normes locales, les autres ont bien souvent un bagage considérablement affaibli par les guerres et des séjours prolongés dans des camps de réfugiés. Il s'ensuit, par exemple, que même si tous semblent peiner quand à la nécessité de la connaissance de l'Anglais pour l'intégration professionnelle, la possession d'un capital éducatif, culturel et professionnel compatible avec celui de la culture d'accueil accélère l'intégration des uns, alors que l'affaiblissement ou l'incompatibilité de ce capital avec celui de la culture dominante entrave l'intégration des autres. Par ailleurs, tandis que les uns peuvent envisager de retourner dans leur pays d'origine, les autres se voient souvent dans l'obligation d'en faire le deuil (Fantino & Colak, 2001). Enfin, tandis que l'altérité des uns (souvent d'Europe) devient invisible au sein de la culture d'accueil, l'altérité des autres (souvent d'Afrique) reste visiblement « altérisante » dans le rapport à l'hôte. Tous sont minoritaires de part la langue, mais nombre d'entre eux se retrouvent en plus positionnés comme un minorité dans une minorité de part leur appartenance ethnique (Maddibo, 2008) et un capital social et éducatif diminué par les guerres, ajoutant ainsi une couche supplémentaire d'inégalité.

Nos résultats rejoignent certaines études quand à l'importance du soutien social dans le processus d'acculturation. En particulier, Simich (2003) démontre que le soutien social sous la forme de liens culturels, non seulement avec des centres communautaires, mais aussi et surtout avec des individus de l'ordre de la parenté (réelle si possible ou virtuelle le cas échéant) est crucial à une intégration réussie. Ces liens sociaux, ajoute Simich, sont particulièrement importants pour les réfugiés qui se trouvent généralement dans une situation vulnérable de part leur vécu. Notre étude nuance ce propos en démontrant que tel soutien social est important au-delà de la dimension psychologique liée aux guerres; tel soutien social est important pour ceux qui sont dans une distanciation ethnoculturelle prononcée (en l'occurrence, les minorités visibles) et dans une distanciation socio-économique prononcée (en l'occurrence, les réfugiés). Lorsqu'on prend en compte le statut minoritaire du français, l'on se rend compte que certains immigrants se retrouvent dans une situation triplement minoritaire.

Nous concluons, tout comme Simich, que le traitement de l'immigration internationale doit mieux prendre en compte l'importance des facteurs socioculturels, contre la prise en compte privilégiée des facteurs économiques. Cependant, notre étude montre, qu'outre l'importance de faciliter la participation intra-culturelle (au sein de groupes et familles de la même origine), il s'agit aussi de travailler à une meilleure participation interculturelle avec un principe de réciprocité. Dans ce cas, il revient à la communauté d'accueil de penser, de panser, autrement son rapport à l'autre, c'est-à-dire avec la connaissance des inégalités sociales et individuelles qui désavantagent les uns par rapport aux autres, et surtout avec la compréhension de l'altérité de l'autre sans toutefois l'« altériser. » Certes, le respect de l'autre passe par la reconnaissance et l'acceptation que l'autre n'est pas un autre moi (alter ego), mais la relation à l'autre au sein d'une même nation passe aussi par la reconnaissance de l'autre comme un membre de la communauté au même titre que moi.

Avant de formuler des recommandations, prenons le temps de souligner les forces qui caractérisent les initiatives provinciales et communautaires manitobaines à l'égard des nouveaux arrivants francophones. En effet, on peut entre autres citer des démarches provinciales telles le Manitoba Refugee Sponsors et le Manitoba Settlement Group qui apportent un soutien financier pour l'établissement initial des immigrants de toutes catégories. Par ailleurs, le Manitoba possède un ensemble d'organismes francophones qui s'engagent à coordonner des actions communautaires en terme d'intégration. Par exemple,

l'Accueil Francophone, l'Association des Juristes d'Expression Française, L'Amicale de la Francophonie multiculturelle du Manitoba, et le 233-Allo Centre d'information des services francophones au Manitoba constituent autant de points d'ancrage pour les nouveaux arrivants francophones. Enfin, on ne saurait passer sous silence l'élaboration d'un comité d'inclusion des nouveaux arrivants en milieu scolaire, comité mis en place par la Division Scolaire Franco-Manitobaine et qui s'adresse à la formation continue des enseignants. Ainsi, ces organismes s'évertuent aussi à organiser des sessions d'information et de formation qui touchent de près le vécu des nouveaux arrivants, comme le système judiciaire, la sensibilisation à la diversité culturelle, et les responsabilités parentales et scolaires.

Néanmoins, nous proposons les pistes de réflexion suivantes.

Ayant établi l'existence d'une inégalité criante entre immigrants de la catégorie économique et immigrants de la catégorie humanitaire au niveau des temps d'attente, il revient à Immigration Canada d'accélérer le processus de traitement des demandes d'asile des réfugiés. Concrètement, cela signifie augmenter le nombre d'officiers d'immigration sur place (Kanu, 2009), ainsi que les infrastructures technologiques en permettant à ces réfugiés de remplir leur demande en ligne. Par ailleurs, nous suggérons la mise en place d'un fonds d'établissement non remboursable à l'intention de ces réfugiés. Ce fonds répondrait aux difficultés d'établissement liées au logement, à l'apprentissage d'un métier, ou à la remise à niveau du bagage éducatif,—tout un capital humain miné par les guerres et les séjours prolongés dans les camps de réfugiés.

Pour répondre aux dissonances socioculturelles, la province devrait employer davantage d'intervenants en counseling familial de même souche culturelle que les réfugiés. Parallèlement, il faudrait mettre en place un système de parrainage où les familles sont guidées par des familles de même origine et déjà intégrées. Ce système de parrainage peut également aider les nouveaux arrivants des autres catégories d'immigrants (Simich, 2003). L'importance du mentorat se passe d'évidence dans la mesure où les immigrants établis disposent de tout un vécu à partager et dans ce sens, les nouveaux arrivants peuvent en profiter. Ce partage d'expériences peut se révéler enrichissant dans le cadre d'appariement d'étudiants étrangers avec leurs pairs du secondaire issus du même pays. En termes plus concrets, un étudiant du Sénégal peut très bien accompagner des jeunes de son pays nouvellement arrivés dans le système scolaire canadien. Bien sûr, cette aide pourra intégrer des formes de tutorat après l'école ou des modèles à l'instar des « Brothers » et se circonscrira dans des programmes ciblés et adaptés aux réalités des différentes communautés. L'essentiel consiste à créer un réseau de passeurs culturels pour assurer la transition des nouveaux arrivants en milieu scolaire. Donc les rejoindre en utilisant des passeurs qui ont vécu dans les deux cultures apparaît comme un choix très sensé.

Pour répondre aux difficultés liées au statut minoritaire du français, la province devrait encourager les entreprises à embaucher des unilingues francophones pendant leur phase d'acquisition de l'anglais. Cet encouragement peut prendre la forme d'une subvention pour la formation continue en anglais sur le lieu même de travail. Cette recommandation s'avèrera utile pour les immigrants de toutes catégories.

Pour répondre aux difficultés liées au statut de minorités visibles, des campagnes médiatiques devraient sensibiliser les employeurs à des politiques d'embauche et de recrutement plus équitables. De plus, les employeurs devraient initier des journées de sensibilisation aux différentes cultures minoritaires. Le gouvernement devrait subventionner les entreprises qui font montre de sensibilité culturelle, car ces défis requièrent un partenariat public-privé.

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NOTES

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[2] Dans le cadre de cette étude, nous avons choisi deux des quatre catégories d'immigration, telles que *Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada* (CIC) les définit : Économique et humanitaire.

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