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Thirty-five years of Canadian Multiculturalism 1971-2006
ISSUES, IDEAS AND INSIGHTS

Trente-cinq ans de multiculturalism canadien 1971-2006
ESSAIS, IDÉES ET RÉFLEXIONS



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MULTICULTURALISM : DEFINITION AND POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

What is Multiculturalism?

Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence.

Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs.

Canadian Multiculturalism Act

R.S., 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.)

[C-18.7]

An Act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada

[1988, c. 31, assented to 21st July, 1988]

Preamble

WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada provides that every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination and that everyone has the freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada recognizes the importance of preserving and enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canadians;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada recognizes rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada and the *Official Languages Act* provide that English and French are the official languages of Canada and neither abrogates nor derogates from any rights or privileges acquired or enjoyed with respect to any other language;

AND WHEREAS the *Citizenship Act* provides that all Canadians, whether by birth or by choice, enjoy equal status, are entitled to the same rights, powers and privileges and are subject to the same obligations, duties and liabilities;

AND WHEREAS the *Canadian Human Rights Act* provides that every individual should have an equal opportunity with other individuals to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have, consistent with the duties and obligations of that individual as a member of society, and, in order to secure that opportunity, establishes the Canadian Human Rights Commission to redress any proscribed discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin or colour;

AND WHEREAS Canada is a party to the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, which Convention recognizes that all human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination and against any incitement to discrimination, and to the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, which Covenant provides that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language;

AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada;

NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:

MULTICULTURALISM POLICY OF CANADA

3. *Multiculturalism policy*

- (1) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to
- (a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage;
 - (b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future;
 - (c) promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation;
 - (d) recognize the existence of communities whose members share a common origin and their historic contribution to Canadian society, and enhance their development;
 - (e) ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity;
 - (f) encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character;
 - (g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins;
 - (h) foster the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of Canadian society and promote the reflection and the evolving expressions of those cultures;
 - (i) preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French, while strengthening the status and use of the official languages of Canada; and
 - (j) advance multiculturalism throughout Canada in harmony with the national commitment to the official languages of Canada.

Federal institutions

- (2) It is further declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada that all federal institutions shall
- (a) ensure that Canadians of all origins have an equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in those institutions;
 - (b) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the ability of individuals and communities of all origins to contribute to the continuing evolution of Canada;
 - (c) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of and respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian society;
 - (d) collect statistical data in order to enable the development of policies, programs and practices that are sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada;

- (e) make use, as appropriate, of the language skills and cultural understanding of individuals of all origins; and
- (f) generally, carry on their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MULTICULTURALISM POLICY OF CANADA

4. *General responsibility for coordination*

The Minister, in consultation with other ministers of the Crown, shall encourage and promote a coordinated approach to the implementation of the multiculturalism policy of Canada and may provide advice and assistance in the development and implementation of programs and practices in support of the policy.

5. *Specific mandate*

- (1) The Minister shall take such measures as the Minister considers appropriate to implement the multiculturalism policy of Canada and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may
- (a) encourage and assist individuals, organizations and institutions to project the multicultural reality of Canada in their activities in Canada and abroad;
 - (b) undertake and assist research relating to Canadian multiculturalism and foster scholarship in the field;
 - (c) encourage and promote exchanges and cooperation among the diverse communities of Canada;
 - (d) encourage and assist the business community, labour organizations, voluntary and other private organizations, as well as public institutions, in ensuring full participation in Canadian society, including the social and economic aspects, of individuals of all origins and their communities, and in promoting respect and appreciation for the multicultural reality of Canada;
 - (e) encourage the preservation, enhancement, sharing and evolving expression of the multicultural heritage of Canada;
 - (f) facilitate the acquisition, retention and use of all languages that contribute to the multicultural heritage of Canada;
 - (g) assist ethno-cultural minority communities to conduct activities with a view to overcoming any discriminatory barrier and, in particular, discrimination based on race or national or ethnic origin;
 - (h) provide support to individuals, groups or organizations for the purpose of preserving, enhancing and promoting multiculturalism in Canada; and
 - (i) undertake such other projects or programs in respect of multiculturalism, not by law assigned to any other federal institution, as are designed to promote the multiculturalism policy of Canada.

Policy and Legislative Framework

In 1971, Canada became the first country in the world to adopt a Multiculturalism Policy. Canada's approach to diversity has evolved over the years and is embedded within a broad policy and legislative framework.

NATIONAL

| | |
|------|---|
| 1947 | Passage of the first ever <i>Canadian Citizenship Act</i> |
| 1960 | Passage of the <i>Canadian Bill of Rights</i> |
| 1963 | Establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism |
| 1969 | Book IV of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission Report emphasizes the bilingual and multicultural nature of Canada |
| 1969 | Introduction of the <i>Official Languages Act</i> |
| 1971 | Introduction of Canada's Multiculturalism Policy |
| 1977 | Passage of the <i>Canadian Human Rights Act</i> |
| 1982 | Adoption of the <i>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i> |
| 1984 | Special Parliamentary Committee Report, <i>Equality Now</i> , calls for a Multiculturalism Act and establishment of a national research institute on multiculturalism and race relations issues |
| 1986 | Passage by Parliament of the <i>Employment Equity Act</i> |
| 1988 | Passage of the <i>Canadian Multiculturalism Act</i> |
| 1996 | Government establishes the <i>Canadian Race Relations Foundation</i> |
| 1997 | Renewed Multiculturalism Program announced |

INTERNATIONAL

| | |
|------|---|
| 1948 | <i>The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</i> |
| 1948 | <i>The Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i> |
| 1958 | <i>The International Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation</i> |
| 1965 | <i>The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</i> (Canadian ratification in 1969) |
| 1966 | <i>The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights</i> (Canadian ratification in 1976) |
| 1966 | <i>The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</i> (Canadian ratification in 1976) |

MEASURING THE MESSAGE OF CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM

Jack Jedwab

Jack Jedwab is Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies.

ABSTRACT

Survey results are often held up as an indication of widespread endorsement in Canada of the multicultural ideology and the policy arising from it. Since it was introduced in 1971, the multicultural policy and the message conveyed to Canadians around diversity have encountered a persistent group of detractors who blame multiculturalism for societal inequities, weak national identity and problems of cohesion. Evidence in support of such criticism has been very thin and hence it is based primarily on conjecture. Moreover, while critics suggest the object of their preoccupations, rarely is explicit reference made to the policy and rather focus often appears to be on the message or ideology of multiculturalism. While there is a lack of strong empirical evidence to measure the outcomes of multicultural policy, there is much evidence to support the connection between the message of multicultural and principal values and concerns shared by most Canadians. Such evidence is presented here and offered as background for the special edition on thirty-five years of Canadian multiculturalism.

Last year marked 35 years since the introduction of Canada's policy of multiculturalism. As reflected in public opinion polls, multiculturalism has remained popular amongst Canadians both as an ideology and as public policy over much of that period. Continued evidence of this was provided in a survey conducted in the fall of 2006 by the firm Leger Marketing, which revealed that some three-quarters of Canadians agree that multiculturalism supports national identity and citizenship, the identification of common values, equal participation in society, the integration of immigrants and a sense of belonging to Canada. Some two-thirds of Canadians also agree that multiculturalism supports social cohesion and the preservation of the French language in Canada. Younger Canadians react even more favorably when asked to comment on whether multiculturalism supports such objectives, with 80% of persons between the ages of 18 and 24 in agreement (Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, September 2006). Such survey results are fairly consistent with similar inquiries conducted over the last ten years. Indeed, when asked in 2003 what best describes the story of Canada, some 40% of persons between the ages of 18 and 29 said it was increasing multiculturalism. By contrast in the same survey, those over the age of sixty contended that it was "...coming to terms with two languages and two cultures that best describes the story of Canada." (Environics for the Association for Canadian Studies, 2003).

Survey results are often held up as an indication of widespread endorsement in Canada of the multicultural ideology and public policy. Nonetheless, from the very outset multiculturalism has confronted an influential group of detractors who insist that Canadians have serious objections to the ideal of multiculturalism and that the policy has had negative consequences on a variety of fronts. In presenting their respective points of view, it is not always obvious whether supporters and critics are referring to the message conveyed by multiculturalism – the ideology or philosophy behind it – or the policy of multiculturalism as it is reflected in the Act of Multiculturalism of 1988 (see page 3 in this publication – we have provided the official definition offered by the Department of Canadian Heritage and the details of the legislation).

In her text in this publication, Eisenberg makes the important observation that: "the difficulty is less about the actual policy impact of multiculturalism than it is about how Canadians from diverse cultural backgrounds can successfully reflect upon and interpret its meaning."

While the message and policy of multiculturalism are no doubt intertwined, it frequently seems that debate centers on the former as it is understood by the public and/or respectively interpreted for them by its supporters and detractors. Put simply, while some understand the message of multiculturalism as one of respect of difference and openness to others, some believe that instead it incites certain segments of the population to purposely avoid meaningful participation in mainstream Canadian society. There are also related issues about the segments of society at which the message is directed. Hence the challenge has been how researchers and policy-makers go about unpacking and/or measuring the message. Attempts to empirically measure it depend very much on assessing the way the message influences the

attitudes and behavior of the population or selected segments of it (i.e. members of ethnocultural minorities). Yet further underlying such inquiries involves some assessment of the relationship between the identities and values of Canadians, thereby explaining at least in part the heavy use of public opinion surveys in generating “empirical” evidence as to the impact of multiculturalism’s message.

In public opinion surveys that touch on the issue of multiculturalism, the formulation of questions is as important as the results generated. Critics that grudgingly acknowledge the positive survey results often contend that the term multiculturalism is not well understood by respondents. Hence in presenting evidence to critique multiculturalism, they frequently prefer to sets of questions that do not use the term or in some ways qualify multiculturalism. A survey question that some national media recently held up as evidence of opposition to multiculturalism reads as follows: “some immigrant and minority ethnic communities have very traditional practices and beliefs when it comes to the role and rights of women. Some people say Canada should accept and accommodate these traditional beliefs about the rights and role of women. Other people say that immigrants and ethnic minorities should adapt to mainstream Canadian beliefs about the rights and role of women. Which one of these two points of view is closest to your own?” (Environics for the Trudeau Foundation, October 2006). As nearly all Canadians chose the latter, it was interpreted by critics as reflecting the prevalent concern of Canadians over the possible ill effects of multiculturalism. However to the extent that this question bears on multiculturalism (a term it doesn’t mention) requires the acceptance of its suggestion about the message of multiculturalism. In effect, it assumes that certain cultures, or more precisely religions – without mentioning them – explicitly discriminate against women and do so by virtue of the multicultural message. It raises the issue of whether the respect for ethnic and religious difference so fundamental to the message of multiculturalism implies the trumping of respect for difference on the basis of gender. Clearly the message of multiculturalism in Canada is part of a broader ethos that encourages respect for fundamental rights and that prioritizes gender equality. Hence the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians is situated within a Canadian Charter of Rights that prioritizes gender equality.

Most critics opt for a definition of multiculturalism that they feel is designed to better reflect what they believe to be its “true” meaning. For example, in his article in *The Walrus*, pollster Allan Gregg declares that: “...for multiculturalism to work, the native born must accept immigrants as equals, new arrivals must demonstrate a willingness and desire to join mainstream society by adopting the fundamental mores and values of the prevailing culture, and there must be a high degree of cross-fertilization between ethnic groups” (*Walrus Magazine*, March, 2006). In many ways this perspective sounds more like the vision associated with the melting pot model that tends to be more “assimilationist” (immigrants and their descendants must abandon their cultures and take on the characteristics of the dominant culture)

than the multicultural model that is more integrationist (immigrants can retain their cultures while developing a strong sense of attachment to Canada).

One of the questions most commonly employed in debates around the message of Canadian multiculturalism asks whether a higher priority for Canada should be “To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and languages or to encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians?” It can be legitimately argued that the very ethos of multiculturalism suggests that one can be more like most Canadians while maintaining their customs and languages. Leaving that aside however, many analysts refer to this type of question in debate around the message that multiculturalism conveys. In a March-April 2004 Environics survey, some 45% of Canadians said that the priority should be “to encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians”, while 43% preferred that Canadians as a whole be encouraged to accept minority groups and their customs and languages” (see also Jedwab, July 19, 2004). However, a variation of the same question asked by Environics in the fall of 2006 saw the number of respondents supporting the “multicultural” view rise to 49%, while the more “assimilationist” view yielded 41%. What is particularly interesting in both surveys is the substantial gap in the perspective held along generational lines. Over 60% of those Canadians between the ages of 18 and 29 endorse the “multicultural view”, while a majority of those over the age of 60 prefer the “assimilationist” view.


The absence of empirical findings to test the impact of the message of multiculturalism invites analysis that is often rooted in observations about the attitudes and behaviors of those identifying with ethnocultural groups and the overall population. It would be wrong to dismiss these observations, as they help shape the public debate over the message of multiculturalism. Indeed empirical tests are often based on the observations made by analysts around that the impact of the message. That said, while caution needs to be exercised in an approach to the issue that is too empirically based for a set observations to achieve greater legitimacy, it will ultimately require some causal demonstration. For example, the idea that high unemployment and/or income gaps between visible and non-visible minority groups and/or immigrant and non-immigrant demonstrates that the multicultural policy doesn’t work requires some proof that the message, program and/or policies directly contribute to this situation. In the absence of any causal demonstration of this linkage, the credibility of those who make such claims risks being placed on the line. Conversely, those who contend that multicultural policies have resulted in narrowing such gaps without furnishing evidence in support of such affirmations also risk a loss of credibility. Later in this edition of *Canadian Diversity*, David Ley provides thoughtful and constructive commentary on the challenge of measuring the outcomes of multicultural policy.

In this particular case and in various others, it is critical to properly consider vertical and horizontal relationships of multiculturalism to other policies, programs and messages delivered elsewhere within the Canadian federal state

and/or by other levels of government. For example, on the ongoing concern over recognition of foreign credentials, a factor believed to contribute to employment and income inequities for recent immigrants, few if any observers have attributed the problem to multicultural policy. Yet the same logic that contends that income inequities between immigrant and non-immigrant Canadians are the fault of multiculturalism might just as well offer up the same line of reasoning for the credentials issue. Examining the socio-economic challenges confronted by groups of immigrants and their children quite obviously requires looking at several policies amongst them immigration policies, language policies, human resource policies, taxation policies, education policies and others.

The absence of empirical evidence to evaluate the impact of multiculturalism has been an important feature of the debate over its first thirty-five years. Criticisms of multiculturalism that have dominated debate can be summarized as follows: (1) although multiculturalism was situated within the framework of Canada's official language policy, it is said to diminish the position of the French language both outside and within Quebec (McRoberts, 1997). Paradoxically, some ethnocultural group representatives argued that the policy undercuts the preservation of ethnocultural heritage by not providing any meaningful support for non-official languages. In neither instance has any empirical evidence been offered in support of such affirmations. (2) Multiculturalism diminishes attachment to Canada amongst ethnic communities by encouraging them to preserve their cultures of origin and not inducing them to develop a sense of belonging to Canada. Underlying this view is the idea that ethnic attachments by definition contradict national identification. Though one of the objectives of the message and policy of multiculturalism is to reinforce Canadian identity, its detractors insisted that by definition it had the opposite effect. Perhaps the most widely cited critic in this regard is writer Neil Bissoondath (1994), who insists that the message of multiculturalism represents an obstacle to integration into the Canadian mainstream – however defined – and prevents attachment to Canada. Paradoxically, Bissoondath questions whether there is indeed a Canadian culture in which to integrate and blames its purported absence on multiculturalism. Evidence of Bissoondath's principle assertion that strong ethnic minority identification implies weaker attachment to Canada has proven unfounded as over the course of the 1990's, numerous surveys revealed that there was no contraction between the two and that immigrants and their descendants expressed a stronger than average sense of belonging to the country. In March 2007, Ipsos released a study providing yet further confirmation for the notion that immigrant status does not obstruct identification with Canada. The study conducted for the Dominion Institute amongst English speaking Canadians reveals that the sense of belonging to Canada among first generation Canadians is similar to the overall Canadian population. Second generation Canadians expressed a stronger sense of belonging to Canada (88% overall) than immigrants (81%), and the general population (79%).

Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to Canada?



Source: Ipsos Canada for the Dominion Institute, March 2, 2007

(3) Since September 2001, some critics have maintained that the message multiculturalism poses a threat to national security. According to this view, in giving legitimacy to political grievances imported from the host countries of some groups, multiculturalism risks providing certain individuals with justification for acts of violence. Again however the causal evidence for this is shaky at best and its detractors have increasingly referred to incidents in Europe in support of the idea that multiculturalism is at the root of potential intergroup tensions which will inevitably arise here if the message and policy of multiculturalism is not modified. The paradox in this regard is that several of the countries in Europe that are preoccupied with security matters do not disseminate the multiculturally-oriented message.

(4) That multiculturalism is a threat to Canadian values has become perhaps the most oft-repeated mantra of multiculturalism's detractors. Proponents of this view insist that multiculturalism encourages illiberal practices amongst certain religious minorities and more specifically does so in the area of gender inequality. In this case, it would be important to demonstrate that those who embrace the message of multiculturalism also support illiberal practices and related inequalities. However, this demonstration has yet to be made by detractors of multiculturalism. In fact, the reality may be quite the opposite as it may indeed be that those rejecting the message of multiculturalism are more inclined to endorse illiberal practices. In this regard, it is worth correlating the views of those who favor the more multiculturalist message versus those preferring the more "assimilationist" perspective around issues that reflect liberal values. As observed below in a 2006 Environics survey, nearly half of Canadians that favor the latter approach agree that we should be screening the religious beliefs and values of potential immigrants – an idea endorsed by less than one-fifth of respondents that opt for the multicultural message.

Table 1. Which of these points of view is closest to your own? Immigrants should blend into Canadian society or be free to maintain their religious/cultural practices both equally.

| Do you strongly / somewhat agree / disagree that: People who want to immigrate should have their religious beliefs / values screened / approved before they are allowed in? | Blend into Canadian society n=849 | Be free to maintain their religious/ cultural practices n=938 | Both equally n=181 |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|
| Strongly agree | 28.3 | 8.9 | 8.2 |
| Somewhat agree | 20.8 | 10.6 | 13.2 |
| Somewhat disagree | 18.7 | 18.0 | 20.9 |
| Strongly disagree | 29.7 | 60.7 | 54.6 |

Source: Environics for the Trudeau Foundation Conference on Muslims in Western Societies “Special Tabulation” October 2006.

And although the question of immigration levels does not have a direct bearing on liberal values, a clear majority of those favoring the multicultural message disagree that

there is too much immigration to Canada, while a clear majority of those that prefer the assimilationist perspective agree that there is too much immigration to Canada.

Table 2. Which of these points of view is closest to your own? Immigrants should blend into Canadian society or be free to maintain their religious/cultural practices both equally.

| Do you strongly / somewhat agree / disagree that: Overall, there is too much immigration to Canada? | Blend into Canadian society n=849 | Be free to maintain their religious/ cultural practices n=938 | Both equally n=181 |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|
| Strongly agree | 33.6 | 12.1 | 18.2 |
| Somewhat agree | 25.0 | 17.5 | 17.1 |
| Somewhat disagree | 20.9 | 28.1 | 33.1 |
| Strongly disagree | 16.3 | 39.5 | 25.4 |

Source: Environics for the Trudeau Foundation Conference on Muslims in Western Societies “Special Tabulation” October 2006.

Perhaps the broader question raised by the current debates over the message of multiculturalism involves the degree to which the values it reflects are compatible with the values that matter to a majority of Canadians (as opposed to what some refer to as “Canadian values” – an idea that suggests that there is something uniquely Canadian about the values favored by the population). A central question therefore is whether the values arising from the message of multiculturalism and to a significant degree that have been transmitted to the younger generation of Canadians are interconnected with the fundamental values that are essential to the well-being of a pluralist democracy. A survey conducted by the firm EKOS Research for the Government of Canada in 2004 amongst some 2000

respondents age 16-30 provides strong evidence for the idea that instilling adherence to multiculturalism and diversity is closely connected to a series of other values that are widely supported by the broader population. The results also provide insight into how Canadian youth understand and interpret the message of multiculturalism.

The tables below identifies three groups within the National Survey: (1) the High Multiculturalists – for whom Diversity and Multiculturalism are “completely important” to them (432 respondents); (2) Multiculturalists – for whom diversity and multiculturalism are “important” (1155 respondents) and; (3) Non Multiculturalists – for whom diversity and multiculturalism are not that important or unimportant.

Table 3

| % Completely Important and Important Combined | High Multiculturalists - 432 | | Multiculturalists - 1155 | | Not Multiculturalists - 419 | |
|---|------------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| | Completely Important | Important | Completely Important | Important | Completely Important | Important |
| Freedom | 79.0 | 19.2 | 59.4 | 39.1 | 46.7 | 48.9 |
| I will definitely vote in the next federal election if I am old enough to do so | 70.0 | 12.9 | 68.4 | 13.2 | 68.8 | 11.4 |
| Keeping your word | 66.3 | 31.5 | 50.7 | 46.9 | 48.3 | 47.6 |
| I believe Canada has a unique and distinct culture | 63.5 | 23.4 | 54.0 | 2.6 | 38.9 | 33.8 |
| Tolerance | 55.7 | 40.0 | 27.7 | 63.9 | 19.0 | 63.4 |
| Helping others worse off than you | 55.2 | 41.2 | 30.7 | 64.7 | 20.2 | 67.3 |
| Having a sense of belonging to Canada | 39.5 | 46.2 | 20.3 | 62.1 | 11.9 | 57.4 |
| Being patriotic | 29.0 | 48.0 | 13.4 | 57.7 | 10.7 | 46.4 |

EKOS Research, Reconnecting Government with Youth, Special Tabulation, October 2004. See also Jedwab, J. Values of Multiculturalism and Identity, February 12, 2007.

Those respondents that affirm most strongly that they are proud to be Canadian are most likely to declare that diversity and multiculturalism are “Completely Important” (91.3%), compared with those saying that diversity and multiculturalism are unimportant for whom 71.4% agree that they are very proud to be Canadian.

As observed in the table 3, the High Multiculturalists are the most likely to describe as “Completely Important” such things as freedom, keeping your word, “I believe Canada has a unique and distinct culture”, tolerance, “helping others worse off than you”, having a sense of belonging to Canada and being patriotic. Only when it comes to voting intentions does the adherence to diversity and multiculturalism have no apparent impact.

Multiculturalism and Official Languages

Although it might not be described as a “Canadian value”, support for official language minorities, bilingualism and youth exchanges between language communities are strongly supported by Canadians according to various surveys (more recently see CROP for the CBC and Radio-Canada, December 2006). As observed below, it is those who feel that multiculturalism is completely important that are most likely to strongly endorse support for language minorities, to value bilingualism, promote interaction between language communities and learn more about Canada. Hence the survey unequivocally demonstrates the link between attaching importance to the ideal of multiculturalism and support for Canada’s linguistic duality.

| % Completely Important and Important Combined | High Multiculturalists - 432 | | Multiculturalists - 1155 | | Not Multiculturalists - 419 | |
|--|------------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| | Completely Important | Important | Completely Important | Important | Completely Important | Important |
| Anglophones / Franco-phones from other countries are welcome in my linguistic community | 71.6 | 20.8 | 55.8 | 23.3 | 49.8 | 32.8 |
| I think that government services (federal, provincial and municipal) should be available in English and French across the country | 70.0 | 18.3 | 48.0 | 27.6 | 41.0 | 26.6 |
| I think that all high school graduates should have a working knowledge of English and French | 50.2 | 25.1 | 39.1 | 26.2 | 33.7 | 22.4 |
| I would or would have been interested in participating in school-based language exchanges to interact with young people from the other official language communities | 44.7 | 31.3 | 33.3 | 31.6 | 25.8 | 25.6 |
| I am interested in learning more about Canada | 44.5 | 32.3 | 34.9 | 39.6 | 23.7 | 39.6 |
| Canada’s two official languages are an economic asset to Canada | 42.2 | 32.2 | 31.6 | 35.6 | 25.2 | 27.7 |
| Having two official languages (English and French) is important to my sense of what it means to be a Canadian | 41.2 | 24.3 | 27.6 | 30.6 | 17.1 | 16.9 |
| The federal government has an important role to promote and protect the status and use of the French language in Canadian society | 38.4 | 39.3 | 26.5 | 42.2 | 21.2 | 42.2 |

EKOS Research, Reconnecting Government with Youth, Special Tabulation, October 2004. See also Jedwab, J. Values of Multiculturalism and Identity, February 12, 2007.

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THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF CANADIAN MULTICUL- TURALISM 1971-2006 :

Issues, Ideas and Insights : Introduction

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Multiculturalism and Canadian Diversity, 1971-2006

I now turn to this edition of *Canadian Diversity*. Like many other government policies, there is a need to regularly assess their impact and determine what adjustments need to be made to make them more effective in meeting their objectives. Doing this however requires that we properly understand the goals of the policy. It is often necessary to exercise caution when rendering judgments about policies on the basis of a diverse set of expectations and/or varying interpretations about what a policy sets out to achieve. Indeed, it is diverging expectations that are very often at the root of debates over the effectiveness of multicultural policy, which in turn depends on the barometer or criteria against which it is measured. Hence in an era where evidence-based evaluation of policy performance is deemed increasingly critical, it is important to identify those areas where research can help us offer insights in this regard. In her text on avenues for applied policy research (in this edition), Usha George observes that: “As with any policy or program, the outcomes and impacts of the multiculturalism policy have to be assessed through impact assessment and program evaluation. With well defined goals, frameworks and indicators, assessing the success of the multiculturalism policy will be an exciting inquiry of great relevance to Canadian society and polity.”

George lays out what might be regarded as a daunting challenge. This edition of *Canadian Diversity* is modestly devoted to taking up the issue by identifying some of the principal themes and questions that are of ongoing concern to the policy and program of multiculturalism in Canada. A number of Canada’s leading thinkers on issues pertaining to the agenda of multiculturalism have been invited to respond to various questions that currently dominate debate over multiculturalism. Some contributors have chosen to respond directly to the questions, others to write an essay that reflects collectively on the questions and some have chosen to offer more of a commentary on the themes listed below. The net result of the more than 25 contributions to this edition represents one of the most elaborate assessments of Canadian multiculturalism existing to-date. It is hoped that this collection of responses and commentary will stimulate the ongoing debates around multiculturalism. In this regard, we welcome further commentary around the issues raised here and in forthcoming editions of *Canadian Diversity*, we will put several pages aside for purposes of further discussion around the matters raised here.

Social Inclusion/Exclusion: Racism and Racial Discrimination

Research on social inclusion / exclusion has considerable relevance and is central to the Multiculturalism Program at Canadian Heritage. The issues of hate, racism and discriminatory practices in access to public services, employment and civic participation are a priority. The Ethnic Diversity Survey conducted in partnership with Statistics Canada indicates that 35% of visible minority respondents have at some point experienced discrimination or unfair treatment and an important share believe that racism is an ongoing problem in the workplace.

2017 Projections Data

The demographic projections of the visible minority population in Canada in 2017 have been identified as a key research area. The multicultural character of Canada has evolved between 1967 and 2007 (in qualitative and quantitative terms) and the outlook is for yet further change by 2017 (the 150th anniversary of the confederation). Canada needs to think about how to adjust social and economic programs and policies to meet the changing needs of an increasingly diverse population in light of the 2017 projections. This will require that Canadian cities are well equipped to accom-

moderate the rising share of visible minorities Canadians. How will the results in this regard be assessed? What policies and programs are best suited to prevent potential marginalization of visible minorities in major urban centres by 2017?

Applied Policy Research

A central question is how to effectively measure the impact of multiculturalism, both as a policy and in the message it conveys to Canadians. What are the policies and initiatives of other government departments that influence multiculturalism? What type of research is recommended to maximize our understanding of multiculturalism and diversity?

Religion

Religion is increasingly at the center of debates in Canada over multiculturalism and diversity. The wearing of religious symbols and faith-based arbitration has been the object of debates about the accommodation of religious minorities. There are also concerns over the rise of Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Understanding religious pluralism in Canada and devising ways to channel the ethos of volunteerism of faith-based communities would help develop programs and services in line with the spirit of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the *Multiculturalism Act*. Recent developments on the world stage suggest the need for better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public life. Approaches and strategies are needed to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination.

Security in a Pluralistic Society

Several faith-based and visible minority communities feel the strain of efforts to ensure that Canada remains an open society. How is the balance struck between the preservation of civil liberties and human rights, and the imperatives of national security which have risked the singling out of specific racial, ethnic and religious groups?

THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF CANADIAN MULTICUL- TURALISM 1971-2006 :

Research Themes and Questions

1) SOCIAL INCLUSION / EXCLUSION, RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION INCLUSION / EXCLUSION SOCIALE, RACISME ET DISCRIMINATION RACIALE

Questions:

- What should be done to enhance implementation of the *Multiculturalism Act* at the institutional and community levels?
 - Who are the vulnerable groups, individuals and victims of racism and racial discrimination in services, employment and civic participation (e.g., political empowerment)?
 - What strategies can help build capacity including social capital for new and/or vulnerable ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities?
 - What factors contribute to the exclusion of second-generation ethno-cultural and ethno-racial youth in Canada?
 - What are the best approaches to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of racism in Canada?
 - What are the new forms of racism, racial discrimination and what can be done to combat them?
 - What is the cost of racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace such as at federal institutions (e.g. indicators to monitor racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace)?
 - Do you think that we have made progress as a society in fighting racism in Canada?
 - In what way does multiculturalism impact the fight against racism?
-
- Que devrait-on faire pour améliorer la mise en application de la *Loi sur le multiculturalisme* aux niveaux institutionnel et communautaire?
 - Quels sont les groupes et les individus vulnérables et les victimes de racisme et de discrimination raciale dans les services, l'emploi et la participation civique (par exemple, l'autonomisation politique)?
 - Quelles sont les meilleures stratégies sur le plan institutionnel permettant aux communautés vulnérables de s'organiser afin de combattre la discrimination?
 - Quels facteurs contribuent à l'exclusion des secondes générations de la jeunesse ethnoculturelle et ethnoraciale au Canada?
 - Quelles sont les meilleures approches pour améliorer notre compréhension du phénomène du racisme?
 - Quelles sont les nouvelles formes de racisme et de discrimination raciale et que peut-on faire pour les combattre?
 - Quel est le coût du racisme et de la discrimination raciale dans la communauté et en milieu de travail dans des milieux tels que les institutions fédérales (par exemple, indices pour déceler le racisme et la discrimination raciale dans la communauté et en milieu de travail)?
 - Pensez-vous que nous avons progressé en tant que société dans la lutte contre le racisme au Canada?
 - Quel est l'impact du multiculturalisme sur le combat contre le racisme?

2) 2017 PROJECTIONS DATA / PROJECTIONS DÉMOGRAPHIQUES DE 2017

Questions:

- How did the multicultural character of Canada evolve between 1967 and 2007 (in qualitative and quantitative terms) and what would be the outlook for 2017 (the 150th anniversary of the confederation)? What are the social and economic impacts over 1967-2017 (50-year period)? What are the risks and opportunities between now and 2017?
- How would we ensure that our social and economic programs and policies meet the changing needs of an increasingly diverse population in light of the 2017 projections?

- What approaches could be used to ensure that Canadian cities are well prepared to accommodate the rising proportions of visible minorities in their populations and what indicators would measure the results?
- What factors contribute to better labour market outcomes for Canadian-born visible minorities and visible minority immigrants?
- What policies and programs can prevent potential marginalization of visible minorities in major urban centres by 2017?
- What approaches could be used to promote diversity in rural communities in Canada? What indicators could be used to measure this progress?

- Comment le caractère multiculturel du Canada a-t-il évolué entre 1967 et 2007 (en termes qualitatif et quantitatif) et quelles seraient les prédictions pour 2017 (lors du 150^e anniversaire de la Confédération)? Quels sont les impacts sociaux et économiques entre 1967 et 2017 (sur une période de 50 ans)? Quels sont les risques et les opportunités à venir entre aujourd'hui et 2017?
- Comment nous assurerons-nous que nos programmes sociaux et économiques et nos politiques combleront les besoins changeants d'une population de plus en plus diversifiée à la lumière des projections de 2017?
- Quelles approches peuvent être utilisées afin de s'assurer que les villes canadiennes soient prêtes à accueillir les proportions grandissantes de minorités visibles au sein de leur population et avec quels indices mesurerait-on les résultats?
- Quels facteurs contribuent à de meilleurs résultats sur le marché du travail pour les minorités visibles nées au Canada et les minorités visibles immigrantes?
- Quels lois et programmes peuvent prévenir une marginalisation potentielle des minorités visibles dans les centres urbains majeurs d'ici 2017?
- Quelles approches pourraient être utilisées pour promouvoir la diversité dans les communautés rurales au Canada? Quels indices pourraient être utilisés pour mesurer les résultats?

3) APPLIED POLICY RESEARCH RECHERCHE APPLIQUÉE SUR LES POLITIQUES

Questions:

- How can we most effectively measure the impact of multiculturalism, both as a policy and in the message it conveys to Canadians?
- What are the policies and initiatives of other government departments that influence multiculturalism?
- What type of research would you recommend be conducted to enhance our understanding of multiculturalism and diversity the most?
- Comment pouvons-nous efficacement mesurer l'impact du multiculturalisme, en tant que politique et en tant que message véhiculé aux Canadiens?

- Quelles sont les politiques et initiatives des autres ministères gouvernementaux qui influencent le multiculturalisme?
- Quel genre de recherche devrait être effectué pour améliorer notre compréhension du multiculturalisme et de la diversité?
- Quel type de recherche devrait être effectué pour améliorer notre compréhension du multiculturalisme et de la diversité?

4) RELIGION

Questions:

- Developments on the world stage in recent years require better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada. What approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination?
- Demographic projections show noticeable growth in some religions in Canada. What impact could this growth have on economic, social and political integration?
- What are the implications, if any, of religious diversity on policy developments in Canada?
- Is there religious extremism in Canada and what are the manifestations? What is its impact, if any, on the future of Canada?
- What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and religious intolerance in general?
- What is the place of religious issues in education and school curricula, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards?
- Les développements au niveau mondial au cours des dernières années nécessitent une meilleure compréhension du rôle de la religion et des communautés religieuses dans le discours public au Canada. Quelles approches et stratégies pourraient être utilisées pour impliquer les communautés religieuses, sensibiliser le public et combattre la discrimination basée sur la religion?
- Les projections démographiques démontrent une croissance notable de certaines religions au Canada. Quel impact cette croissance peut-elle avoir sur l'intégration économique, sociale et politique?
- Quels sont les implications, si c'est le cas, de la diversité religieuse sur le développement des politiques au Canada?
- Existe-t-il un extrémisme religieux au Canada et sous quelles sont ces manifestations? Quel est son impact sur l'avenir du Canada?
- Quels sont les facteurs qui mènent à l'anti-sémitisme, à l'islamophobie et à l'intolérance religieuse en général?
- Quelle est la place qu'occupent les questions religieuses dans l'éducation et le curriculum scolaire, la couverture médiatique, l'opinion publique et les commissions scolaires?

5) SECURITY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY LA SÉCURITÉ DANS UNE SOCIÉTÉ PLURALISTE

Questions:

- Are there adverse impacts of perceived linkages among religion, ethnicity/race and/or security/policing issues (e.g. racial profiling)?
- What can be done at the federal, provincial and territorial levels to address the issue of racial profiling?
- How can government work with all stakeholders to raise awareness about racial profiling and the impact of the heightened security measures?
- How do we respond to links made by some Canadians between immigrants and security concerns?

- Y a-t-il des impacts négatifs des liens entre la religion, l'ethnicité/race, et/ou la sécurité/questions politiques (par exemple le profil racial)?
- Que peut-on faire au niveau fédéral, provincial et territorial pour aborder la question du profil racial?
- Comment le gouvernement travail-t-il avec tous les parties prenants pour sensibiliser concernant le profilage racial et l'impact de la croissance des mesures de sécurité?
- Comment peut-on répondre aux liens que font certains Canadiens entre les immigrants et les questions de sécurité?

STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR OVERCOMING BARRIERS

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ABSTRACT

The author answers the following question on the topic of Social Inclusion/Exclusion: What strategies can help build capacity including social capital for new and/or vulnerable ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities? (What are the best types of institutional supports that can strengthen the newer community's capacity to adapt and overcome barriers to economic, social and political participation?)

Introduction

A recent headline on the front page of the February 8th, 2007 *Globe and Mail* stated: "Cracks in the mosaic: The number of ethnic enclaves is exploding. Are they an impediment to integration?" This newspaper article follows the current popular theme in public and media discourses that either questions or "attacks" multiculturalism – be it at the policy level or at the street level in terms of how it is practiced in Canadian neighborhoods. In this case, ethnic enclaves are defined as communities with 30 per cent of the population from one visible minority group. These discourses have become quite prevalent in recent years in our post 9/11 era and particularly since the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in the summer of 2005. However, it would be incorrect to attribute all elements of this "anti-multiculturalism" discourse to those events.

The central aspect of this discourse is based on the perception that multiculturalism is not working (or has not worked), and that it is segregating, rather than integrating diverse 'racial', ethnic, and religious groups. In other words, the perception is that the practice of multiculturalism contributes to a fragmentation of society and makes integration difficult if not impossible. Hence the last part of the title of this *Globe and Mail* article: "Are they (ethnic enclaves) an impediment to integration?" While the author of this newspaper article does not directly answer this question, it is answered emphatically here with a direct "no". We argue here that we must think of ethno-cultural and ethno-racial organizations in Canada as integrative in that they contribute to and facilitate the development of "shared citizenship", civic participation, and the bridging of "other" communities. This makes the question of "what strategies can help build capacity including social capital for new and/or vulnerable ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities?" a relevant one. The key to answering this question is knowledge about how social capital works in ethno-cultural communities.

Issues of integration, immigration, civic participation, community, belonging, heritage, and shared citizenship are currently at the heart of a contested re-imagining of Canada. In a panel sponsored by the Metropolis project in 2003, it was noted that two major approaches have framed the debate surrounding integration and citizenship (Metropolis, 2003). One approach posits a strong immutable core, often defined as national identity, as essential to successful integration. This approach is essentially assimilationist toward the host society and suggests that all ethnic minorities must move toward a core and exclusive national identity that is articulated through common values, language, and culture, and at the extreme end of the spectrum, religious homogeneity. The recent publication of "codes of conduct" by the municipalité Hérouxville is a case in point of positing an immutable core.

The second and alternative approach posits a dynamic nucleus. Here there is the belief that the core can and must be mutable and that the process of change must be driven by the participation of immigrant and ethnic communities in a continuing reconstruction of national identity. This approach is pluralistic, where the fostering of shared citizenship and integration emerges from an on-going engagement of all ethno-cultural communities (including the 'host' society), who

are in conversation and negotiation in terms of defining mutual responsibility and shared values.

This second approach of a dynamic nucleus is the one adopted for this analysis of ethno-cultural communities and organizations in Canada. It is critically important to bring together ethno-cultural and ethno-racial groups, broad-based organizations and government to engage in an interactive community building process in order to broaden our understanding of an evolving citizenship in Canada and what integration means. The conceptualization of integration utilized here is one of thinking of it as a form of shared citizenship. Citizenship, a seemingly simple concept, with visionary, idealistic and nationalistic connotations, revolves around notions of identity, rights and entitlements, empowerment, and responsibility. A weakly defined sense of citizenship is associated with collective and individual perceptions of inequality and disengagement from the larger community. Conversely, a strong sense of citizenship is associated with greater civic participation, improved civic literacy, better economic outcomes and safer, healthier, and stronger communities (Budhu, 2001; Schugurensky, 2003; Milner, 2002, p. 1-2). The link between citizenship and preferred social outcomes may be understood in terms of social capital: individuals with higher levels of social capital enjoy a more complete citizenship. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly how social capital works in Canadian ethno-cultural communities, as this has been a neglected and under-funded area of research.

STRATEGIES

Increased Funding for Ethno-Cultural and Ethno-Racial Communities

Canada's ethnic and "racial" landscape continues its rapid transformation, particularly in the larger cities where, over the past 3 decades, the percentage of people of non-European origins has increased significantly. Despite this demographic reality in Canada's larger cities, ethnic minority civic participation in broad-based organizations is low, and participation in formal politics is also limited (Black, 2002, p.360). Furthermore, it has now been established that visible minorities in urban areas have relatively less voting power than non-visible minorities in urban and rural areas (Pal & Choudhry, 2007). These facts point to the need for the development of shared citizenship amongst ethno-cultural communities, whereby the spheres of social capital, civic participation, and bridging to "other" communities may intersect.

Official state multiculturalism policy and funding in Canada began in the 1970s, with a focus on "ethnicity multiculturalism", then shifted to "equity multiculturalism" in the 1980s, and further shifted to "civic multiculturalism" in the 1990s and early 2000s (Fleras & Elliott, 2002, p. 62-68). Civic multiculturalism entails three fundamental goals: 1) identity (sense of belonging and attachment to

Canada); 2) civic participation; and 3) social justice. The shift away from "ethnicity multiculturalism" in the 1980s and 1990s was also accompanied by significant reductions in funding from the state for ethno-cultural organizations in Canada. As a consequence, ethno-cultural organizations have not had the chance to develop the organizational capacity to play a significant role in "civic multiculturalism" during the past 20 years. Thus, an important first-step strategy for building capacity in ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities would be for governments and broad-based organizations to provide these communities with sufficient funding to allow their representative organizations to grow to the point where they can participate fully in the dynamic nucleus.


Formation and Funding of On-Going Alliances

While the funding of ethno-cultural and ethno-racial organizations is an important first-step strategy, what is also needed is the formation of on-going alliances¹ that include ethno-cultural organizations, broad-based (main stream) organizations, and government representatives that would provide a space and forum for the dynamic nucleus to operate and for shared citizenship to evolve. For those in broad-based organizations and political institutions, it is important to develop a deeper understanding of ethno-cultural community issues, and to develop mechanisms and strategies that encourage widespread political and social participation and ultimately, social integration. The formation of such alliances would result in the construction of bridges between ethno-cultural communities and broad-based organizations so that members of ethno-cultural communities are not only "in" but also "of" the wider community.² While the formation of alliances is necessary, it is not sufficient.

Funding for Community-Based Action Research on Social Capital Formation

With limited knowledge of the link between shared citizenship and social capital, these alliances would provide an opportunity for community-based action research that would help facilitate the dynamic nucleus. The inclusion of community and university researchers in these alliances would enable the development of research programs that would involve all stakeholders, working together to identify the correlates of social capital. This understanding would then provide the basis for: 1) the analysis of competing models of civic engagement; 2) the exploration of what constitutes inclusive, active, and shared citizenship; and 3) the investigation of how various programs and policies might facilitate social capital development. This knowledge would then be used to build the capacity of community organizations to both identify, and encourage forms of social capital that lead to an active and shared citizenship.

Canada's ethnic and "racial" landscape continues its rapid transformation, particularly in the larger cities where, over the past 3 decades, the percentage of people of non-European origins has increased significantly.



For researchers, issues of shared citizenship, civic participation, and unity are increasingly important in a society that has great potential for deep fractures (Frideres, 1997; Rummens, 2003). Hence, it is necessary to understand the substantive (non-legal) dimensions of citizenship beyond the rights, duties, and privileges that facilitate participation, inclusion and identity formation. Social capital is a useful organizing concept for doing just this, and is increasingly seen as providing a basis for the development of public policy (Frank, 2003; Judge, 2003; van Kemenade et al., 2003). Increased levels of participation are key to Canada realizing the benefits of its cultural diversity, developing strong and welcoming communities, and tapping the available, but largely untouched, strengths, expertise, and energies of those in ethno-cultural communities (see figure).

While the early work on social capital in the 1980s delineated and defined the concept of social capital, Putnam's work suggests that civic community and social capital help sustain democracy and are the foundations of a healthy civil society (Putnam, 1993; 2000). Putnam's understanding of civic community consists of four elements: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and social structures of cooperation. These elements of a strong civic community are the products of social capital. Forms of social capital are based on trust, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic participation, where for Putnam, the key form of social capital is interpersonal trust. Trust is suggested to be the product of norms and networks (Putnam, 1993, p. 171-2). However, the mechanism by which these forms of social capital – trust, reciprocity and participation – are related to each other is not fully described by Putnam, who has noted that these various components of social capital are 'as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti' (Levi, 1996, p. 52; Putnam, 2000, p. 137). Thus, the untangling of these components and the logic of social networks in particular would be an important community-based action research strategy that would immediately have policy and programmatic implications.

Despite their critical role in building social capital, the character and dynamics of social networks are compli-

cated and are now only slowly being understood. This is particularly true with respect to social capital within ethno-cultural communities. While the literature points to a range of factors – from family traditions to structural barriers – that shape social capital formation in these communities, research is still in its early stages. In Canada, the literature on ethnic communities and social capital has tended to examine economic correlates (Li, 2004; Apinunmahakul, Erika & Meng 2004; Marger 2001; Aizlewood & Pendakur, 2005). Some of the research questions more related to social correlates that come to mind include the following:

1. How is social capital created in ethno-cultural organizations?
2. What variations does social capital take in different types of ethno-cultural organizations?
3. How does the participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in ethno-cultural organizations lead to civic participation in broad-based non-ethnic organizations and formal political organizations?
4. What types of ethno-cultural organizations facilitate this civic participation the best?
5. What are the organizational and structural factors in broad-based organizations that facilitate or constrain civic participation amongst immigrants and ethnic minorities? (i.e., opportunity structures, networks, structural barriers, cultural differences, etc.)
6. What strategies and programs can the state develop to encourage civic participation amongst immigrants?
7. What strategies and programs can the state develop, in conjunction with ethno-cultural and broad-based organizations, to encourage civic participation amongst immigrants and ethnic minorities?

Answers to these and other research questions would provide the knowledge and basis for policy and program development emerging from the community level.

As the dynamics of ethnic and "racial" diversity continue to unfold in Canada, issues of exclusion and lack of full participation of immigrant and ethnic minorities continue to be of concern. These alliances will foster a sense of

belonging, inclusion, and full participation among members of these communities via community-based action research that will produce programs and policies that will strengthen and deepen Canadian democracy. The best type of institutional support that can strengthen ethno-cultural communities' capacities would be one of establishing formal, on-going alliances that allow all partners and stakeholders to engage in an interactive community building process, as well as conduct community-based action research, in order to broaden an understanding of what shared citizenship means while allowing the nucleus to remain dynamic.

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INTERVIEW WITH YASMEEN ABU-LABAN

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What should be done to enhance implementation of the Multiculturalism Act at the institutional and community levels?

As we are nearing the twentieth anniversary of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, it is an appropriate moment to consider what the Act has (and has not) accomplished and ways and means by which its implementation could be enhanced.

Although Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau proclaimed the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework in 1971, the 1988 *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* legalized multiculturalism. In other words, the Act, along with the constitutional entrenchment of multiculturalism in Section 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, served to make multiculturalism a firm part of Canadian law. This helps protect multiculturalism from the shifting views of any incoming government, since mere policy is much easier to undo.

The Act also reflects the way multiculturalism evolved from the 1970s, in response to the concerns articulated by increasing numbers of racialized immigrant groups. So while Prime Minister Trudeau's multiculturalism policy focused primarily on culture, the Act itself also gives explicit recognition to the problem of racial discrimination. Additionally, the Act makes specific mention of the rights of Aboriginal peoples, enhancing non-official languages, contains requirements that compel all federal departments and agencies to take measures to implement multiculturalism, and it requires that there be an annual report to parliament on the Act's operation.

If we examine the actual operation of the Act over nearly two decades, some fault lines become readily apparent. It lacks mandated goals and there are no penalties imposed on federal departments not complying with multiculturalism. When the Act was first proposed, many groups supportive of multiculturalism faulted the relatively weak language of the Act (there are, for example, many instances where the word "may" rather than "shall" appears in the text). While the "spirit" of the law might have prevailed under certain circumstances, this was not the case for much of the past two decades. In the 1990s, multiculturalism itself came under increasing attack, and successive governments became party to what many political scientists refer to as the neoliberal turn, whereby social funding in a variety of policy areas (including multiculturalism) was subject to cutbacks, and any spending had to be justified in new terms. Under these new terms, it has been impossible to get funding for certain kinds of activities for multiculturalism (e.g., support for teaching non-official languages, or for the meetings or communications of community groups with their own members or with members of the larger Canadian society). Moreover, it has been cumbersome for community groups, many relying on underpaid workers or overworked volunteers, to apply for money. If the letter of the law is not changed, at least the spirit of the *Multiculturalism Act* might be better enhanced through greater attention to enforcing provisions, greater funding, and a re-consideration (and simplification) of the terms of funding for community groups. Not least, the spirit of the Act also requires that the outstanding land and self-government claims of Aboriginal peoples be justly handled.

Since 2005, there has been an injection of some new money to support the redress claims of certain groups who historically experienced discrimination at the hands of the Canadian state (Ukrainian-Canadians, Italian-Canadians and Chinese-Canadians). This welcome addition suggests that the government of the day in fact has a great deal of latitude in how multiculturalism is supported and implemented.

Who are the vulnerable groups, individuals and victims of racism and racial discrimination in services, employment and civic participation (e.g. political empowerment?)

Canada's 1986 *Employment Equity Act* usefully draws attention to four groups that have historically experienced disadvantage in the Canadian labour market: women; Aboriginal peoples; people with disabilities; and visible minorities. Studies by sociologists have shown how these same groups can be disadvantaged in accessing services (Carniol, 2005). Studies by political scientists also show that these same groups are under-represented in relation to elected office at the municipal, provincial and national levels (e.g., Abu-Laban, 2002; Hunter, 2003; Bonnett, 2003; D'Aubin and Stienstra, 2004). This then forms an important starting point for understanding discrimination in Canada.

To identify particularly vulnerable groups, we need to go further. For example, those that are poor and lack what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1973) calls cultural capital (i.e. the specific language and cultural skills needed to succeed in a society) face compounded disadvantage. In other words, someone who is a visible minority, has limited knowledge of an official language, and is poor is likely more vulnerable than someone who is a visible minority, speaks English and French, and owns a business. Official language knowledge itself needs nuanced understanding: incoming immigrants who know only French have not necessarily fared well in many parts of Canada outside Québec in terms of accessing services and employment (Razafindrazaka, 2002). The experience of racism and racial discrimination can touch many, irrespective of class and cultural capital.

Racism and racial discrimination specifically manifest themselves in complex and historically specific ways. The defeat of Nazism and the advent of such international instruments as the 1948 United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the 1969 *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (to which Canada is a party) served to widely discredit unfounded pseudoscientific views that there were genetically based differences between different “races.” However, expressions of racism today (such as those seen in far right movements and parties) often do not stress biologically based differences; rather, the stress is placed on purported cultural or value differences. We clearly see this today with respect to Muslim immigrants and minorities, and this has given rise to the problem of Islamophobia across Western countries, including Canada.

To more fully combat discrimination, whether in employment or in other vital spheres of life, it is important to be aware of the complex situations in which we live today and of the layered nuances which may advantage some at the expense of others.

What strategies can help build capacity including social capital for new and/or vulnerable ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities? (What are the best types of institutional supports that can strengthen the newer community's capacity to adapt and overcome barriers to economic, social and political participation?)

As a package, the research that has emerged through Canada's contribution to the international Metropolis Project has highlighted important policy avenues in which the capacity of immigrants and minorities might be better enhanced across social, economic and political spheres. To name a few, these include developing institutional mechanisms to better recognize the credentials of incoming immigrants to enable them to gain employment in areas reflecting their training; enhancing official language training as well as job training; and developing more mechanisms to ensure that the delivery of social and health services meets the needs of immigrants and minorities.

Education, as an institution, is also important. Education is firmly linked to one's life chances, and the diversity of Canada's population needs better representation in terms of who is teaching, what is taught and how it

is taught from kindergarten through university. Put differently, much of what passes today as “multicultural education” is strikingly superficial, and not really geared at empowering those that are disadvantaged to get respect, let alone a fair slice of the pie.

At the level of political participation, I note as a political scientist that in successive elections across all three levels of government, those running for political office (and frequently those speaking about politics in the media) do not reasonably reflect the full range of diversity of Canada's population. This then suggests that institutions like the media and political parties have scope to change to become more inclusive of Canada's diversity. In this context, it is noteworthy that immigrant and minority community groups and associations, unions and the women's movement have played an important role historically in fighting for fairness, not only for their own members (who are increasingly diverse) but for all Canadians. The presence of such groups in Canadian politics and in the media is critically important.

What factors contribute to the exclusion of second generation ethno-cultural and ethno-racial youth in Canada?

The economic, social and political exclusion of immigrant and minority parents can result in the exclusion of their offspring, so it would be a mistake to not acknowledge this fact either in analysis or in policy development.

Education provides an important avenue for individual betterment. However, Canada lacks a universal program for early childhood education, and this is unfortunate because Quebec's experience (as well as that of other countries) shows that such a program can be highly beneficial to both children and parents. All too often, secondary schools are inadequately supported to meet the needs of a culturally and racially diverse student body, and we have yet to put in place mechanisms to support life-long education and training in ways that empower minority youth.

Forms of systemic discrimination (in the justice system, the education system, and the labour market), the experience of discrimination from individuals while shopping or renting a house, and forms of stereotyping in the media and popular culture can also work to disadvantage some members of the second generation, and their children.

A particularly negative trend emerging in the context of the war on terrorism in the past few years is that fear and concern directed at immigrants who are perceived to be Arab and/or Muslim is now directed at “the second generation” of these immigrant groups. In Canada, the arrest of 17 suspects in June of 2006 on terror charges still has to wind its way through the courts. Irrespective of the guilt or innocence of these individuals, it is important to note that the discourse of “home grown terrorist” is one that can contribute to new stereotypes and forms of exclusion.

Not least, at the level of everyday exchanges, it is important to consider how, despite three decades of official multiculturalism (and nearly two decades of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*), the question “where are you from?” is still asked of so many members of racialized minorities who were born and raised in Canada, and some whose parents and grandparents were born in Canada as well.

This would suggest that there is still much work to be done in the name of multiculturalism.

The good news is that recent opinion polls suggest that across generations, younger Canadians tend to be more supportive of multiculturalism, compared to their elders (Jebwab, 2006). This bodes well for Canada's future.

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ENTREVUE AVEC DENISE HELLY

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Que devrait-on faire pour améliorer la mise en application de la Loi sur le multiculturalisme aux niveaux institutionnel et communautaire ?

En France, le Front National a relégué aux oubliettes le différentielisme des années 1980 en matière de respect de la pluralité culturelle. À la fin des années 1980 au Canada, les critiques des Conservateurs et de quelques piliers du Parti Libéral fédéral et l'électoratisme des gouvernants libéraux ont relégué à l'oubli les acquis du multiculturalisme. Durant les années 1990, le Programme disparut du discours public, vit son budget coupé de moitié, sa mémoire institutionnelle quasi anéantie et son action englobée dans un ministère du Patrimoine. Il est depuis lors très souvent décrit comme produisant une folklorisation d'usages immigrés, une ghettoïsation culturelle de groupes minoritaires et comme menaçant l'identité canadienne. Le Programme du multiculturalisme de 1971 à 1976 a certainement servi les propos de rétention culturelle et linguistique des groupes immigrés européens des provinces de l'Ouest, dont l'activisme avait décidé de sa fondation. Néanmoins, durant ces années, des associations de personnes d'origine chinoise et africaine reçurent des subventions significatives et à partir de 1976-77, le Programme prit un virage pour accorder de plus en plus d'attention et de financement aux associations multiethniques et aux initiatives antidiscriminatoires. Ce virage se confirme au début des années 1980 et la lutte antidiscriminatoire, l'apprentissage de leurs droits par les immigrés et le changement institutionnel, soit la prise en compte par les institutions publiques de la pluralité culturelle issue de l'immigration, deviennent le cœur de l'intervention du Programme et le demeurent jusqu'à l'heure (Helly, 2005). Toute description du Programme comme ayant d'autres objectifs est erronée et vise à discréditer une politique de lutte contre le pouvoir que toute majorité culturelle détient du fait de son nombre, de son implantation historique et de son contrôle des instances politiques, médiatiques et scolaires. Il est d'ailleurs significatif que les critiques arguant de l'effet ghettoïsant du multiculturalisme invoquent sans cesse la notion de droits collectifs totalement contraire à l'esprit du Programme, jouent à confondre respect du choix culturel individuel et reconnaissance de pratiques culturelles collectives, méconnaissent les modes et secteurs d'intervention et de financement du Programme et n'ont jamais tenté d'étudier ses impacts sur le terrain. Quant aux critiques arguant de la faiblesse de l'identité canadienne que fragiliserait encore plus la promotion de différences culturelles minoritaires, ils n'ont jamais défini la nature culturelle de l'identité canadienne et ne savent qu'invoquer des référents politiques nullement menacés par le Programme ou son esprit : *la Charte des droits et libertés*, le régime politique.

Aussi tout renouveau du Programme du multiculturalisme supposerait son retour comme durant les années 1980 dans le discours des plus hautes autorités politiques afin d'en rappeler les réels objectifs et effets dont l'un, non des moindres, est le développement d'un sens d'appartenance profond au Canada de la part de nombre d'immigrés (Helly, 2002). Il supposerait un refinancement adéquat de ses actions et de son personnel afin de rétablir les forces du Programme, dont actuellement l'aide à la structuration communautaire des groupes nouvellement arrivés et des groupes vulnérables, parfois les mêmes.

Cette revalorisation du Programme endiguerait les débats empreints de xénophobie qui prennent actuellement la forme en Europe d'une renationalisation des critères d'appartenance sociétale et d'une érosion des droits des travailleurs migrants. Le Canada n'est en effet nullement exempt de cette xénophobie, comme en attestent les disputes sur la double citoyenneté et sur l'accommodement raisonnable, les deux étant des droits et nullement des concessions rétractables à des immigrants considérés comme non suffisamment proches et semblables de la « majorité ».

Quels sont les groupes et les individus vulnérables et les victimes de racisme et de discrimination raciale dans les services, l'emploi et la participation civique (par exemple, l'autonomisation politique) ?

Les individus et groupes vulnérables à la discrimination et au rejet sont ceux qui ne répondent pas aux référents de l'entre-soi ethno-national, qui ne sont pas considérés 'intégrables' selon la formule populaire, car il ne partagent pas la même histoire, socialisation culturelle, religion ou/et langue maternelle, et sont exclus en vertu de cette différence de la jouissance de droits, de la protection sociale, de l'accès à certaines occupations et professions et/ou du droit d'être visibles dans l'espace public. L'idéologie ethno-nationale et xénophobe procède de la réduction d'une société à un univers de réseaux de relations personnelles et d'une crainte de disparition de ces réseaux qui conduirait les natifs de souche à une descension sociale et à une perte de droits acquis (ou d'influence dans le cas d'élites déclinantes). Aussi, la mondialisation économique, autant que la présence de minorités culturelles, nourrit l'idéologie ethno-nationale des catégories sociales

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en perte de statut et de pouvoir. Néanmoins, depuis dix ans, l'ethno-national se pare d'arguments modernistes, s'inquiétant de modes de pensée contraires à la tradition rationnelle occidentale. De plus, dans les pays de tradition catholique, des courants croient encore à la sécularisation inévitable des sociétés occidentales et ostracisent toute croyance religieuse et tout féminisme religieux. Ce faisant, les groupes et personnes exposés à la discrimination sont ceux ne répondant pas à l'entre-soi ethnonational, les minorités religieuses montrant une réelle différence de valeurs, et aussi les immigrants représentant une concurrence sur le marché du travail. Ceux-ci subissent le protectionnisme de corporations professionnelles et l'inadéquation du système de validation des qualifications acquises hors du Canada.

MULTICULTURALISM VS (ANTI-)RACISM:

Duelling Discourses or Discursive Partners?

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ABSTRACT

Of the many paradoxes to engulf Canada's official Multiculturalism, few are as egregious as the belief that multiculturalism and anti-racism are mutually incompatible in the struggle against shifting notions of racism. This paper contends that such a perception is wrong - in part because Multiculturalism is not about diversity but disadvantage, that is, advancing inclusiveness by removing difference-based discrimination. This is in part because the structural changes envisaged by conventional anti racism do not materialize by themselves but with a multicultural mindset. Canada's Multiculturalism remains an ongoing and unfinished project that is evolving in response to the many and changing faces of racism. An official multiculturalism remains in the vanguard of making Canada safe for diversity, safe from diversity. Its role as an anti-racism partner should therefore not be underestimated.

Introduction: The Paradoxes of Multiculturalism

Canada is one of several democratic societies to have capitalized on multicultural principles for managing diversity. Originating in part to harmonize competing ethnicities without losing control of the overall agenda, Canada's official multiculturalism prevails for a variety of practical reasons, in effect reinforcing its status as a political act to achieve political goals in a political acceptable manner (Peter 1978). Not surprisingly, some embrace an official multiculturalism as a solution to Canada's diversity 'problems'; others dismiss it as a problem in search of a solution; and still others see it as problem and solution depending on the criteria.

However much revered or vilified, Canada's official Multiculturalism is prone to paradoxes. To one side, a multicultural Canada is inclined to accommodate diversity; to the other side, it must do so without compromising national unity, the rule of law, or common values (Cardozo 2005). In doing so, it must balance the rights of minority groups without disrupting either majority rights or the rights of individuals within these communities. In short, a commitment to multiculturalism must grapple with the quintessential paradox of society-building: How to make Canada safe "for" diversity, yet safe "from" diversity, while at the same time, making diversity safe "from" Canada yet safe "for" Canada (see Schlesinger Jr. 1992; Pearson 2001).

There is yet another multicultural paradox. Canada embraces a commitment to the principles and practices of an official multiculturalism as a principled basis for living together with differences. And yet Canada remains a site of racism and racial discrimination, despite concerted anti racist initiatives at interpersonal and institutional levels. How, then, do we account for the persistence of racism within a context of Canadian multiculturalism, why is racism proving a moving target, and what is the role of multiculturalism in 'erasing' racism?

De-constructing Multiculturalism: Towards Inclusiveness

Canada is widely proclaimed as one of the world's most robust multicultural societies whose commitment to multiculturalism constitutes its foremost contribution to global peace. For the most part, Canadians tend to be supportive of multiculturalism, according to a raft of survey results over the years (Berry 1977 et al; Jedwab 2002; Biles et al 2005), although the nature and depth of this commitment remains open to question. But support for multiculturalism is one thing; understanding is something else, and the interplay of uncertainty with misinformation tends to complicate and confuse. To the extent that most Canadians are unsure of what an official multiculturalism is trying to, how, and why, the prospects for a cooperative coexistence are somewhat diminished.

If taken as a normative framework rather than specific government program with specified goals and timetables, there is much to commend in Canada's commitment to an inclusive model of multiculturalism. With an inclusive multiculturalism, a Canada of many cultures is thought to be possible as long as people's cultural differences do not preclude full and equal involvement in society. Cultural differences under this liberal universalism are deemed to be less important than what we share in common, especially since true equality arises from treating everyone the same ("equal before the law") regardless of differences. And yet Canada's official multiculturalism also acknowledges that a society of many cul-

tures may require that differences be taken into account when the situation arises, particularly when minorities want these differences to be seriously taken.

After 35 years as official policy, what can be said about Canada's official Multiculturalism? Imperfections and criticisms aside, Canada's Multiculturalism has proven a workable exercise in making Canada safe for diversity yet safe from diversity. An inclusive Multiculturalism underscores a commitment to the integration of new and racialized Canadians, in part by renegotiating a two-way process of incorporation ("you adapt, we adjust"), by fostering tolerance toward diversity, reducing prejudice and ethnocentrism, removing discriminatory barriers, enhancing equitable access to services, expanding institutional involvement, improving intergroup encounters and highlighting citizenship (Duncan 2005; Kymlicka 2005). Cultural differences are tolerated under an official multiculturalism, but limits apply: differences cannot violate individual rights, break the laws of the land, or contravene core constitutional values like gender equity. Clearly, then, Canada's official Multiculturalism is not about promoting diversity or celebrating differences. More accurately, it's about removing those difference-based disadvantages that preclude new and racialized Canadians from full institutional involvement and equal citizenship rights (Fleras 2007).

Problematizing Racism

Canada in the 21st century must confront yet another inescapable paradox. Most Canadians are no longer racists in the classic sense of blatantly vilifying minority women and men. Yet racism continues to fester in unobtrusive ways, deliberately or unconsciously, through action or inaction. Racism is rarely experienced in an immediate and obvious manner, but through constant and cumulative impact of demeaning incidents that quietly accumulate into a 'ton of feathers.' Consider the contrasts: Canadians at the cognitive level have internalized a commitment to tolerance, justice, and equality; yet Canadians continue to rely on racially-based prejudices at subconscious levels. Institutions are increasingly reluctant to openly discriminate for fear of backlash or costly litigation; yet institutions are known to discriminate through rules and practices that have an exclusionary impact. Canada remains at the forefront in fighting racism at individual and institutional levels; yet awareness is mounting that racism is an everyday reality for many Canadians of colour, that racist practices affect individuals in very real ways, and that racism is not some relic from the past, but is dynamically invasive and socially toxic.

References to racism are nearly limitless. From the openly defamatory to those systemic patterns that reinforce existing power relations, racism encompasses those subtle and discreet forms that generally escape detection

unless experienced by victims. Or in the words of Senator David Oliver (cited in the Conference Board of Canada 2004), racism is:

"...not something readily discernable by the senses: you cannot see it, hear it, smell it, touch it, but it does exist. It is subtle, invisible, and ethereal"

Some expressions of racism are unplanned and unpremeditated, but expressed in isolated acts at irregular intervals because of individual impulse or insensitivity. Other expressions are systemic and structural, and manifest through discriminatory patterns that inadvertently exclude or exploit. Certain actions are undeniably racist; other actions are labeled racist to shut down debate.

Racism can be directed at some because of who they are (racism as race) or at others because of their cultural differences (racism as culture). Some see racism as something individuals do; whereas others claim racism involves what people don't do. Exaggerating people's difference (culture-conscious) when irrelevant may be racist, yet ignoring their differences (culture-blind) when necessary may prove equally racist. Even agreement on the scope and nature of racism in Canada is subject to debate. A racial divide (racial rashoman) can be detected: Those who are unlikely to experience racism are prone to underestimate the amount, nature, and degree of racial discrimination; while those more likely to be racially profiled are more likely to emphasize the scope and magnitude of racism. A growing realization that there are many racisms rather than a single racism makes it doubly important to unmask this complex and evolving dynamic.

In short, the faces of racism are shifting in response to a changing and diverse society. Racism is proving to be a "scavenger" ideology that parasitically pounces on the most unlikely of sources, bobbing and bending to escape detection, and losing its precision when used loosely and unreflectively to describe a dislike toward others (Frederickson 2002). Of particular salience is a shift in its conceptualization. Racism is no longer seen as a "thing" or "person" out there that can be isolated and reformed. Rather racism is increasingly envisaged as a "process" or "verb" involving an attribute that is applied to an action after the fact, depending on the context or consequence. This focus on process reinforces a definition of racism as those

"ideas and ideals (ideology) that assert or imply the superiority or normalcy of some over another because of perceived differences, both physical and cultural, together with the institutional power to put these beliefs into practice in ways that control, exclude, or exploit" (Fleras Elliott 2007).

It's relatively easy to reduce racism to a personal problem. Common sense dictates that people are the cause and conveyors of racism. As individuals, people must reflect critically upon our degree of complicity in perpetuating racism through daily actions or inactions.

But debates over re-conceptualizing racism tend to overlook the painfully obvious: Racism costs all Canadians: The costs of racism are absorbed unevenly across society, with some capitalizing on racism for preserving privilege or power while others suffer (Bonnett 2000; Bishop 2004). Racialized minorities live in perpetual fear of physical retaliation. They experience a loss of personal security which, in turn, intensifies isolation and self-defensive behaviours. They endure a restricted set of economic and social opportunities; and their self-worth is diminished by a constant barrage of negative media messages. Exposure to racism may contribute to the poor health of minority women and men – with corresponding pressure on Canada's much beleaguered health care system (Picard 2005).

With racism, in other words, mixed messages are conveyed that often contradict the ideals of Canada's constitutionally protected human rights. As well, racism diminishes the number of people who can contribute to Canada, while useless energy is expended that otherwise could be funneled into more productive channels. The end result is nothing less than a blot upon Canadian society because of racism's capacity to squander our potential and reputation. Finally, institutions that cannot capitalize on a diverse workforce because of racism are destined to lose their competitive edge in the global market place.

Rethinking Anti-Racism

Failure to conceptualize racism as a problem makes it difficult to pin down or put away. Admittedly, most of us would agree that discrimination against someone because of their differences is racism pure and simple, and that something should be done about it. But doing nothing in a society where racism and racial discrimination persists may be no less racist. After all, fence-sitting (through inactivity or silence) is neither impartiality nor neutrality but tacit acceptance of a racialized and unequal status quo. Put bluntly: in the struggle against racism, one is either part of the problem or part of the solution.

The ranges of direct actions that openly challenge racism are known as anti-racism (Dei 1996). Anti-racism entails active involvement in changing those cultural values, personal prejudices, discriminatory behaviour, and institutional structures of society that perpetuate racism. Two styles of anti-racist strategy can be discerned: interpersonal and institutional. One is concerned with modifying individual behaviour through law, education, or interaction; the other with removal of discriminatory structural barriers and systemic roots of racism.

It's relatively easy to reduce racism to a personal problem. Common sense dictates that people are the cause and conveyors of racism. As individuals, people must reflect critically upon our degree of complicity in perpetuating racism through daily actions or inactions. It is equally valid to situate racism within a system of vast and impersonal forces that are largely beyond individual control. But such an approach runs the risk of shifting the blame from individuals to blaming the system, thus exonerating individuals from doing anything. Neither of these positions is entirely correct. Individuals may not be the root cause of racism; nevertheless, racism is located within and carried by the person. Systems may generate root

causes; nonetheless, institutions do not exist apart from patterns of interaction that create, support, and transform patterns of racism.

What is required in an integrative anti-racism approach? In rejecting an either/or approach for a both/and perspective with its embrace of contextuality, connectedness, and simultaneity of unequal relations, an integrative anti-racism acknowledges the interplay of structure with agency. People must take responsibility for improving their awareness, commitment, and actions. They must also and simultaneously challenge institutional structures that deny or exclude. An integrative anti-racism also recognizes the interlocking nature of racism (Bishop 2005). Racialized minorities do not find themselves excluded because of race or class or gender. Rather, each of these 'jeopardies' intersects with the other to amplify overlapping patterns of exclusion and denial (Spafford et al 2006).

Imagining the Improbable: Multiculturalism as Anti-Racism

Another paradox stalks the land. For many, multiculturalism and anti racism are seen as opposing discursive frameworks. For critics, multiculturalism is dismissed as little more than 'happy face' celebration. The aim of multiculturalism is largely attitudinal, that is, to enhance sensitivity by improving knowledge about cultural differences. By contrast, anti-racism involves a commitment to challenge, resist, and transform racially discriminatory barriers at interpersonal and institutional levels through direct action.

Predictably, then, critics attack multiculturalism as a new racism because of its tendency to equate a group's identity and experiences with race or ethnicity, while glossing over entrenched inequalities and power imbalances (Berliner and Hull 2000; Dei 2000). Minority underachievement is not necessarily caused by cultural differences. Nor will cross-cultural understanding contribute to any fundamental change in uprooting the structural roots of inequality (Kivel 1996). In that cultural solutions cannot solve structural problems, moves toward re-priming the lives and life chances of minorities must focus on the behavioural and structural components of racial inequality, along with the power and privileges that sustain racism through institutional policies and procedures. Sweeping structural changes are needed, in other words, rather than tinkering with multicultural cosmetics.

What, then, could be further opposed? Multiculturalism is about attitudes and culture; anti racism is about systems and structure. However true in theory, a different conclusion appears upon closer inspection, namely, a realization that Canada's official multiculturalism is quietly in the vanguard of anti racism activity. First, as noted, Canadian multiculturalism is *not* about celebrating differences but focused on eliminating racial disadvantages created by prejudicial perceptions of cultural differences. Second, Canada's commitment to an inclusive multiculturalism is consistent with the goals of anti racism: to ensure all Canadians are fully and equally included regardless of their differences. Consider, for example, how interpersonal anti racism initiatives are predicated largely on changing people's attitudes toward acceptance and

inclusion. Third, references to structural changes under an anti racism sound good in theory. In practice, neither power relations nor institutional structures undergo change without applying human agency. In short, structures don't change, people do, and a commitment to multiculturalism is crucial in mobilizing the critical mass for structural change.

The paradox between multiculturalism and anti racism is a false distinction. Even those critics who dismiss official multiculturalism as little more than politically correct eye-wash to paper over the contradictions of capitalist society will concede the unavoidable. The inception of an official multiculturalism 35 years ago has helped to construct a Canada in which racism is no longer socially acceptable in public or polite company. The conclusion seems inescapable: Both multiculturalism and/as anti racism are critical as partners in the discursive struggle to 'erase' racism as basis for living together differently yet equitably.

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RACE, RACIALIZATION AND MULTICULTURALISM

Grace-Edward Galabuzi

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ABSTRACT

As Canada embraces multiculturalism as a Canadian value, the salience of issues of race and racialization becomes more important as a public policy concern because of the challenge it represents to building a truly multicultural society. One way to disentangle the various, political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of the racialization processes is using the social exclusion approach, to address how marginalization and differential outcomes are reproduced and to develop comprehensive approaches to effectively address the resulting condition of social exclusion.

Approaches to Racism and Racialization

The last decade has seen the fastest growth in the size of the racialized group in Canada's history. Much of that growth has been achieved through immigration, with over 75% of new immigrants being members of racialized groups. While this development is to be celebrated as an affirmation of Canada's multicultural reality, the growth of the racialized population puts the issue of racism front and centre on the public policy agenda. The experience of racialization and the social, economic, cultural and political marginalization that it structures are a historical reality that predates these newcomers to Canada, and that has defined the relationship between the aboriginal community and the white settlers society from the beginning of the Canadian nation project.

An effective way to tackle racism and racialization is to use a structural approach that locates it in a historical context as a persistent internal threat to Canadian citizenship. The social exclusion approach broadly describes both the structures and the dynamic processes of inequality among groups in society which, over time, structure access to critical resources that determine the quality of membership in society and ultimately produce and reproduce a complex of unequal outcomes. In a society committed to equal citizenship as the fulfillment of the promise of multicultural Canada, social exclusion foretells social tensions that need be understood and addressed to avert the dire consequences of social instability as seen in Paris, France, in the fall of 2005, as well as to maximize the potential benefits of immigration and diversity.

New and Recurring Forms of Racialization

Racism is now manifesting itself in a variety of ways in Canadian society. Among others, it takes on socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions. A growing body of literature analyzing the socio-economic performance and the political status of racialized groups has concluded that they are subject to structural disadvantages that confine them disproportionately to the bottom of Canada's vertical mosaic. Processes of social exclusion and the growing numerical significance of racialized groups have reinforced the structural tendencies towards maintaining and reproducing existing racial hierarchies. Many racialized new immigrants are incorporated into the Canadian mosaic with disregard to the skills and educational attainment they bring with them to this country. The emergence of race as a key constitutive feature of socio-stratification in Canada has prompted consideration of the existence of a *colour coded mosaic*.

Secondly, the term 'immigrant' has come to signify non-whites, especially Africans, Caribbeans, East Asians, Middle Easterners, South Asians and Latin Americans, regardless of whether they are immigrants or born in the particular 'host' country. Immigrant status has become racialized and the inferior status historically imposed on racialized peoples is now extended to immigrants and vice versa, so much so that the quality of their human capital is called into question, with dire consequences especially for those with international qualifications. This category slippage represents a particular form of racialization specific to this period of globalization, which has seen a reversal of traditional global population movements from North to South. This phenomenon is considered dangerous by dominant populations in the global North, especially when applied to the context of a civilizational war between the West and Islam. Some scholars have used the term *neo-racism* to explain the anti-immigrant discourses and policy actions emerging in response to the new 'North-bound' migrations. It represents a particular construction of race at the historical moment of 21st Century globalization and utilizes the social construction of racial categories to demand limits on the numbers of certain racial groups allowed

into the country and also on racial mixing. Its dominant theme is the ‘insurmountability’ of cultural differences and the incompatibility of traditions and lifestyles between the ‘races’. Ironically, it uses the very defense of difference to justify its position.¹ These developments represent a particular challenge to the concept and practice of multiculturalism because of their tendency to reclaim the earlier processes of exclusion in defining citizenship.

Third, a number of dominant racist discourses dominate the media portrayal of racialized communities. These dominant discourses about racialized people represent a racist ideology presented in narratives, arguments and explanations that deny the existence of pervasiveness of racism while characterizing racialized people as the other, whose culture and immigrant status is to be feared and loathed. Islamophobia, understood as the expression of hostility towards those of the Muslim faith and people from what is referred to as the Islamic world, has intensified in the late 20th Century and early 21st Century, particularly in the post September 11 period. Islam is portrayed as fundamentally different and not holding values in common with other faiths, cultures, or affected by them or influenced by them. Islam is considered non-Western and inferior to the West. It is presented as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist. For many commentators, Islam is ‘violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a ‘clash of civilizations’.

Racialization and its Material Implications - Its Costs to Individuals and Society

The material implications of social exclusion have intensified in economic, political and social terms, as differential access to society’s resources translates into differential health care status, higher levels of exposure to poverty, and disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system, to name but a few of the manifestations of these processes of racialization. A combination of the exodus of newcomers and unequal articulations has created concentrations of low income communities of racialized people in Canada’s urban centres – capturing two emerging phenomenon – the racialization of poverty and the racialization of neighborhoods.²

Labour market attachment is critical to the livelihood and identity formation of individuals and groups, but also their ability to claim a sense of belonging and full citizenship. This is especially true of historically socially excluded groups such as racialized groups. Economic restructuring that has imposed precarious forms of work on the economy which, along with employment discrimination and the barriers to access to professions and trades, have intensified the vulnerability of racialized groups and recent immigrants in the Canadian labour market. The experience is defined by a double-digit racialized income gap, which is chronically higher than average levels of unemployment and segmented labour market participation.

This represents an inefficient way to allocate scarce human resources and imposes an economic cost both to racialized groups and the Canadian economy as a whole.

Racialization, Political Participation and Progress Making

Racialized peoples are grossly under-represented at every level of government, whether as elected representatives, in public policy-making positions, or on agencies’ boards and commissions and judicial appointments. Racialized groups are confronted with unequal access to opportunity and participation in the political and social institutions of Canadian society, largely due to historical structures of racial discrimination, poverty, institutional resistance and low levels of community development. Despite the existence of the federal *Employment Equity Act* for the last 20 years, the federal government, which should be a leader in addressing racial discrimination in employment, has been slow in realizing its goals of a representative workforce. Federal public service participation is 8.1% compared to 10.4% availability (a measure that already provides a lower reading of the available qualified racialized pool because it disregards permanent residents). According to the Public Service Human Resources Management Agency, in 2004-2005, only 5.1% of federal public service executives were racialized. This differential access to opportunities for racialized group members robs the economy of a valuable resource in a competitive global environment and undermines the competitiveness of Canadian business at home and abroad. For those whose talents and skills are improperly deployed, their skills degrade with time, along with their self-esteem. Many of these victims of discrimination descend into lives of poverty along with increases in health risks and adverse impacts on their social wellbeing, resulting in increases in national and provincial budgetary costs for dealing with such social conditions as poverty.

What this suggests is that Canadian society is making slow progress on addressing issues of racialization and their implications for social exclusion among racialized groups. Indeed in some cases, we may even be losing ground as poverty among racialized groups and recent immigrants has grown so much so that, in some urban centres, racialized groups are three times as likely to be poor than other Canadians. The youth among them are three times as likely to be unemployed, many experiencing recurring bouts of unemployment and poverty that are becoming chronic.

Multiculturalism and Racialization

Multiculturalism defines Canada’s approach to ethnic and racial diversity as embedded in a broad policy and legislative framework, represented by the official multicultural policy. It has popularized the concept of multiculturalism as a Canadian value and a key defining character of the society. Multiculturalism has brought us new ways

Racism is now manifesting itself in a variety of ways in Canadian society. Among others, it takes on socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions.

of thinking about the challenges that face us as a society of diverse peoples. But while the multicultural public policy acknowledged the demands of a more inclusive society and the reality of cultural difference, it did not fully break the mono-cultural nature of the society. The contradictions and the limits inherent in the multiculturalism policy simply overwhelmed it. Even as officialdom seemed to be acknowledging racial difference by designating racialized groups as 'visible minorities', the hyper visibility implied masked not just the experience of racism, but the fact that the mosaic was becoming more racialized. The victims were more marginalized and 'race' was losing its critical edge in popular discourse. Multiculturalism, presented as a neutral concept in a manner that leveled all ethnic experiences and emphasized cultural celebration as a positive expression of difference, obscured the key markers of oppression, exploitation and exclusion. The symbolic celebration of cultural difference tended to displace the claims and contestations of exclusion by racialized populations and reinforced historical racial hierarchies. In effect, multiculturalism reinforced social closure in certain areas of Canadian life by 'rearranging questions of social justice'. Colin Mooers has appropriately remarked that, even as racialized group members were being accorded the moniker of visible minorities, their experiences became 'hidden in plain sight'.

Finally, to address the contradictions of official multiculturalism and the socio-economic condition outlined above, we need to begin by acknowledging the existence of a process of racialization and its production of social exclusion in Canadian society. Drawing on an anti-racism analysis of our institutions and practices, we need an action-focused and outcome oriented approach to the problems of racialization, with measurable goals, using key specific indicators. We need multi-sector, state-society partnerships (business, labour, faith communities, civil society) to take a comprehensive approach to the complex problems identified, complete with short, medium and long term dimensions, so as to balance urgent need for relief with sustainability. In some areas, we need a community-based focus on those who are socially excluded along with the comprehensive efforts that aim to build capacity for the socially excluded. Finally, to ensure sustainability and structural change, we need to eliminate deep-rooted barriers to economic and political empowerment through facilitating processes of power sharing within socio-economic and political institutions.

Notes

- ¹ Balibar, E. (1991). Is there a Neo-Racism? In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities*. London: Verso.
- ² Halli, S. and A. Kazempur. (2000). *The new poverty in Canada: Ethnic groups and ghetto neighbourhoods*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing Inc.

INTERVIEW WITH AYMAN AL-YASSINI

Ayman Al-Yassini

Ayman Al-Yassini is the Executive Director of the Canadian Race-Relations Foundation, a Crown Corporation mandated to facilitate throughout Canada the development, sharing and application of knowledge and expertise in order to contribute to the elimination of racism and all forms of racial discrimination in Canadian society.

The Canadian Race Relations Foundation's (CRRF) responds to questions posed by the Association for Canadian Studies exploring the current situation of race relations, racism and multiculturalism in Canada. Response to the five questions are drawn from a number of sources which inform the CRRF's work, including findings from some of the research funded by the CRRF, outputs from the various policy dialogues and various other activities through which the CRRF has engaged with Canadians. The responses provided are by no means exhaustive, but reflect the current state of knowledge that is being produced across the country.

What are the best approaches to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of racism in Canada?

In general, the best approaches to improving our understanding of racism are those approaches that place race and racism at the centre of analysis and focus. Some of these approaches are:

- Understanding the relationship between race and racism. This means understanding that race is a social construct, and that racism is an individual, systemic and institutional phenomenon that informs and influences human interactions and outcomes;
- Being self-reflective of how race affects one's advantage or disadvantage in life;
- Applying an anti-racism analytical framework (race lens) to better understand the multi-faceted and complex ways in which racism is manifested and experienced;
- Being able to critically examine the relationship between law (rule of law, application and interpretation of law) and racial power, in order to change it;
- Letting the experiences of victims form our understandings of racism; and
- Understanding the role that race and racism play in the context of Canadian history and society.

What are the new forms of racism, racial discrimination and what can be done to combat them?

The post 9/11 environment has brought about a shift in the construct of race and racism to engender a new focus of who is seen as "the other". This environment reconstructs "the other" based on a combination of race, religion and national background.

- Due to their religious and ethnic backgrounds, Muslims are subjected to racism;
- Welfare racism: the enforcement and surveillance policies and practices of governments to control spending on welfare assistance and to "end welfare fraud". These have had a racialized impact on people of colour;
- Under the tenets of safety and security, there is a convergence in the shifts in policies and practices that are being developed and implemented by governments, public institutions, and private sector, which centralizes race and racism to identify "the other", who is a threat to safety and security. The networking of security strategies and measures that are comprehensively applied ensures that the identity of "the other" is consistent across sectors;
- Although the debate about Canadian identity (and who is a Canadian) is not new, the post 9/11 climate has generated a wider discussion about Canadian multiculturalism, identity, and loyalty to the country;
- Other measures to combat racism: acknowledge that racism does in fact exist; ensure that policies are in place to address racism and discrimination; adopt a creative and simplified approach to the implementation of the Employment Equity Act; enhance work place equity and anti-racism training; and develop and implement public awareness campaigns.

What is the cost of racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace, such as at federal institutions (e.g. indicators to monitor racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace?)

- Some of the indicators to monitor racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace include:
- Under-employment and unemployment rates among and within racialized communities;

- The extent of established and sustainable institutions and support systems within racialized communities;
- The number and ratio (both between White and racialized students and among racialized students) of racialized students successfully completing high school;
- The number and ratio (both between White and racialized students and among racialized students) of racialized students entering and successfully completing post-secondary education;
- The representation of racialized students in the respective education disciplines – “hard sciences” vis-à-vis “soft sciences”;
- The under-representation, and at times, absence of respective racialized groups in academia teaching and research;
- The number and ratio (both between White and racialized families and among racialized families) of racialized families living in poverty and the intersection of gender, age, marital status, etc.;
- The extent and prevalence of social unrest and instability within and among racialized communities (e.g. incidence of violence, crime, etc.);
- The incidence of illnesses and diseases, particularly stress related diseases, mental health illnesses, within and among racialized communities;
- Racial disparities in the provision of and access to health care, and the undertaking of race-based research (health) for Aboriginal peoples and racialized peoples; and
- Participation of racialized groups in the political system/structure.

Workplace

- Under-representation of racialized groups in certain employment sectors such as healthcare, public service, and in leadership and senior management positions;
- Overrepresentation of racialized groups in certain employment sectors (e.g. service sector, entry level positions);
- Incidence of illness and absenteeism among racialized employees; and
- Prevalence of race-based complaints and grievances;

Do you think that we have made progress as a society in fighting racism in Canada?

Canada is internationally recognized for its commitment to human rights and for its fight against all forms of discrimination, including racism. Multiculturalism, diversity and inclusiveness are some of the main characteristics of Canadian identity. A number of key legislative and legal instruments such as the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Official Languages Act*, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, the *Employment Equity Act*, and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, offer a glimpse of Canada’s commitment to human rights and the protection of fundamental freedoms of all. However, despite these legislative and legal instruments, some racist incidents continue to occur. It is against this reality that the CRRF is seeking to eradicate racism in Canada, and to build on our accomplishments to date.

Over the years, we witnessed more openness to respond to and address direct forms of racism. Our challenge is to make more progress in addressing systemic and institutional racism. We note the incremental steps the Federal Government has taken to acknowledge the historical racism that was practiced against some racialized groups, including the recent apology made to Chinese-Canadians.

However, there is a need to aggressively tackle the problems of racism in the country, in particular the problems faced by Aboriginal peoples and the communities of African and Caribbean origin. As noted in the Report of Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Canada is still deeply affected by racism. The country is influenced by a legacy of racial discrimination embedded in the history of trans-Atlantic slavery and of Western colonialism. (Diene, 2004:68).

In what way does multiculturalism impact the fight against racism?

- A number of responses to multiculturalism, both as ideology and as public policy, emerged prior to and following the adoption of the Canadian *Multiculturalism Act* in 1988. Some Canadians felt that multiculturalism constitutes a threat to their own construct and perception of Canadian identity – an identity shaped by the French-English duality;
- We believe that multiculturalism is consistent with Canada’s liberal democratic values, and that it has been a positive factor in strengthening Canada – economically, politically, socially and internationally;
- Multiculturalism, whether at the federal, provincial or municipal levels, protects individual and group rights against racism and racial discrimination;
- There is a need to vigorously implement the federal government’s National Action Plan Against Racism, including the Racism-Free Workplace Strategy, if we are to remove the barriers that affect the hiring and career advancement of racialized communities.

RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND MULTICULTURALISM:

What is the Connection?

Karen R. Mock

Dr. Karen Mock, a registered psychologist, educator and trainer, was the Executive Director of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation from 2001 to 2005, previously serving 12 years as National Director of the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada after working for over 15 years in psychology and teacher education at the university level. Dr. Mock has been qualified by the Canadian courts and Human Rights Tribunals as an expert in racism, discrimination, antisemitism, hate crime and hate group activity.

ABSTRACT

Understanding racism requires awareness and knowledge of the historical context in which it takes place; the recognition that racism and other forms of related intolerance are experienced differently by different groups; and the importance of meaningful interactions leading to empathy within and between racialized communities. Essential also is the understanding of the systemic nature and impact of racism and racial discrimination. Building on the historical and inter-community approaches, Karen Mock highlights current challenges and practical strategies to combat new forms of racism and hate. She cautions that rather than post-multiculturalism, it is important to redefine and clarify the current policies and concepts, along with effective measures for implementation, including the demand for accountability. The connection between multiculturalism and anti-racism lies in the fact that the goals and objectives of a multicultural Canada will never be achieved until racism and all forms of racial discrimination are eliminated.

In the more than thirty five years since the declaration of the *Multiculturalism Policy* (1971), and almost twenty years since it was enshrined in law in the *Multiculturalism Act* (1988), we have come from the euphoria of the commitment to celebrate our differences, through the challenges of effective integration, anti-racism and equity initiatives, to the tension of a backlash against multiculturalism – continually challenging the government and the Canadian population to refine and clarify this unique concept that has attracted world-wide attention and admiration.

The best approaches to improve understanding of the phenomenon of racism in Canada

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” – George Santayana

To understand the phenomenon of racism in Canada, it is essential to recognize that racism occurs in a historical context. A necessary first step towards understanding racism is to become aware of the nature and extent of the history of racism in this country. It has been well documented that racism and hate propaganda have long been part of the Canadian experience,¹ but it is of serious concern how few Canadians are aware of the history of racism in Canada. Early European settlers promoted ideas that Aboriginal peoples were less human than the colonizers, thereby excusing the abuses they perpetrated on the First Nations, some of which continue to this day. Racism, racial discrimination and anti-Semitism were rife throughout the shameful period of the '30s and the '40s, and continued with racist immigration policies post-war.

However, in what may be called the 'pre-multiculturalism' years² leading up to the declaration of the policy in 1971, the government became increasingly concerned about the integration of immigrants and the relations between cultural groups. In the '60's, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, that had been organized during the war, was moved to the Department of the Secretary of State, paving the way for the '70's emphasis on cultural retention and cultural sharing. At the same time, removal of some of the systemic barriers in our immigration policies began to allow fairer access to Canada, along with a greater push nationally and internationally for equality and justice for all minority groups. Along with the multiculturalism policy, there were significant strides made in the '70's.³ Hate propaganda, the promotion of hatred against identifiable groups, became a criminal offence in Canada, when the hate laws were adopted as amendments to the *Criminal Code*. Canada had ratified the *International Convention on the*

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Canadian government began to give more attention to equality issues. The *Canadian Human Rights Act* of 1977, and various provincial human rights codes, were also enacted to provide greater protection of minority rights. That is, the so-called 'high multiculturalism' period saw increased government initiatives to achieve equality, respect and tolerance, through public policies, and 'mainstreaming' of the concept, along with funding of various cultural organizations.⁴

But several serious racial incidents and a growing backlash in the late '70s and early 80's called for action to combat growing racial tension as a result of changing demographics and the necessity to provide better services to the multicultural population of major urban areas across Canada. Public and private sector agencies developed policies to promote equality in their systems and to implement procedures for handling racial incidents when they occurred. Usually it was a catalytic event that led to policy development. For example, an invitation to the KKK to come into a classroom to present "the other side" made a principal and school board in Ontario realize they had no policy to prevent hate mongers from coming into the school to spout racist ideology. Around the same time, having nowhere else to turn, parents in Nova Scotia launched a class action suit with the provincial Human Rights Commission against the local school board to improve education for Black students. Right across the country, it was recognized that if people interpreted multiculturalism as cultural retention and cultural sharing, but not as breaking down the barriers to *real* equality, the policy's promise would never be fulfilled.

Still not able to use the "r-word" and get funded, multicultural councils and educational associations were created to build coalitions and develop curricula, resource materials and programs that were inclusive and designed to put the multiculturalism policy into practice. These programs highlighted another essential element in understanding racism – the importance of intercultural/interracial cooperation and dialogue – that is, getting to know "the other" and the experiences first hand of racialized communities. Aboriginal groups became more vocal at this time, with the concern that multiculturalism, as it was being interpreted, did not include them. With increasing pressure, multiculturalism programming began both more overtly to include race relations and anti-racism initiatives, and to include and enhance Aboriginal participation.

Even with the *Charter* entrenching multiculturalism and equality rights in the constitution in 1982, and with Human Rights Commissions given the power to monitor and enforce those rights, the overall goal of racial equality remained elusive. In 1984, Japanese Canadians' campaign for redress, the "Equality Now!" Task Force and "Employment Equity" Commission highlighted systemic racism both historically and currently in education, the media, health services, the criminal justice system and employment across the country. Ongoing research by the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the Social Planning Council and several other NGO's was unequivocal in documenting blatant discrimination in the workplace.⁵ Study after study revealed that differential treatment of racialized

minorities appeared to be the norm, resulting in lack of equal access to services, and the frustration, alienation, and continued feelings of marginalization and helplessness. Understanding the dynamics of racism, and the role of power and privilege in maintaining it, is also essential for a thorough understanding of the phenomenon.

Equality issues are the result of *systemic* inequalities and therefore beyond the capability of individuals or communities to resolve. That is, the co-operation and active involvement of government and institutions are required to achieve such goals as employment equity and the acceptance, not tolerance, of all communities as part of the so-called mainstream. These concepts are at the very core of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988) that is directed to *all* Canadians, not just to ethnocultural or racialized communities. But failure to engage in effective social marketing of the Act, combined with escalating racism, as well as increasing *anti*-multiculturalism rhetoric concomitant with the rise in right-wing thinking worldwide, has led to ongoing politicization of the concept and increased frustration among equality seeking groups. Twenty years after the proclamation of the Act, many of us continue to ask: how long does it take to turn words into action and policy into practice?

New forms of racism and racial discrimination and what can be done to combat them

By the mid '90's there was the perfect combination of factors that escalated racial tensions and violence. The proliferation of hate group and extremist activity across the country during this 'anti-multiculturalism' period was testimony to the results of these exacerbating factors leading to new forms of racism and racial discrimination – or rather, old forms of discrimination in new guises. Four factors have contributed to the current forms of racism in Canada:

- 1) Fiscal restraint is often the reason (or excuse) given for currently not implementing anti-racism and equity initiatives, and many programs continue to be cut back in this area. Declining resources cause people to retrench and compete, and to think of "me", not to be concerned about empathy and altruism and promoting the "other" in the interest of equality. Such a climate leads to attempts to preserve the status quo and systemic barriers to equality, rather than moving towards organizational and institutional change.

- 2) We are experiencing a severe backlash towards multiculturalism and all that it stands for – a resistance that is unjustified, perpetrated by those who want to preserve the status quo. A recessionary climate leads people to blame others for their misfortune, and in particular to scapegoat minorities. During such times, all identifiable minorities are at risk. Analysis of the data gathered by hate crimes units over the past decade shows a negative correlation between interest rates and incidents of racism and hate crime.

3) International events influence incidence of racism and discrimination in Canada. There has been a rise in right wing extremism and xenophobia worldwide – right wing parties in the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, and the neo-Nazis throughout Eastern Europe, all create a climate in which overt racism begins to be commonplace and serves as a stimulus for people here to become bolder in their racist behaviour. Comparisons with Europe and the atrocities of “ethnic cleansing” in some parts of the world lead some Canadians to think we don’t have problems here; and so they can blame the victims for complaining, rather than acknowledging the racism that is inherent in our own society. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, we witnessed a backlash against racialized minorities, and a dramatic increase in overt racist incidents and hate crimes against Muslim and Arab Canadians, Jews, immigrants and refugees, as documented by police data and in the Canadian Race Relations Foundation’s Appeal for Vigilance Against Racial and Religious Intolerance.⁶ This is recent proof yet again that racism is very close to the surface. Ongoing tensions in the Middle East have resulted in an unprecedented rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Canada in recent years. And in the anti-terrorism frenzy and under a heightened security agenda, racial profiling is not uncommon, with continued reports of the violation and abrogation of human and civil rights, almost reminiscent of the 1940’s – strengthening the resolve of human rights organizations and equality seeking groups to advocate for the crucial balance between rights, freedoms and responsibilities – *not* the perpetration of racism and racial (and religious) discrimination under the guise of security.

4) Increasing divisiveness among and between minority communities and equity seeking groups adds to new forms of racial discrimination. Declining resources, combined with increasing frustration and marginalization, leads people into the dangerous and divisive practice of comparing pain and victimization, and may even result in racism or other violations of human rights in the promotion of ones own agenda.

It is ludicrous for people to claim that they are working to eliminate racism and discrimination, and then continue to stereotype minority groups other than their own. We have witnessed an increase in anti-Semitism even among some who profess anti-oppression principles. And we must stop racism among those who fight anti-Semitism, and homophobia and sexism among many groups fighting for equality and human rights. While we must acknowledge that racial discrimination is experienced differently by different groups, failure to understand intersectionality among and similarities between various

forms of oppression makes single issued and self-centred struggles blatantly transparent. Self examination is essential in our work, lest the victim becomes the victimizer, and the quest for shared power becomes nothing more than a grab for power.⁷

Indicators and cost of racism and racial discrimination in the community and the workplace

Along with new and continuing forms of racial discrimination is the gap that continues to exist between theory and practice in the community and in the workplace. For example, every teacher who understands child development and learning theory will emphasize the importance of individual self esteem, the connection between self worth and learning, and of every child’s having role models so that he or she can reach full potential. But many of those same teachers will argue against employment equity in a school board where a person of colour is more likely to be the caretaker than a teacher or principal. Or that teacher will advocate continuing to call the winter festive celebration the “Christmas” Concert, while children of minority religious groups continue to feel like second-class citizens. In a study I conducted not long ago on the nature and extent of hate activity in Toronto, one young Black student poignantly told me that he went to a school where there was a greater punishment for smoking than for racism.⁸ The emotional and social costs of racism remain great.

Evaluation of the implementation of earlier Multiculturalism and Race Relations policies in school boards and public agencies was disappointing indeed. Any attempt at real organizational change was met with resistance, and resulted in further marginalization of the staff who was trying to combat racism and effect change. Many research studies in education, media, policing and health revealed very little movement in this area. It was also clear that effective race relations training in each of these sectors was sorely lacking. Parents and community groups were becoming more vocal in their demands for equitable treatment in schools. Backlogs were becoming more jammed in the Human Rights Commissions. And all the while alleged police harassment, and even shootings of minorities, in particular Black youth, increased. Clearly celebrating our differences was not enough. And the *real* costs of failure to be accountable for effective implementation of anti-racist change have been great indeed.

Having the courage to name the problem and to use the appropriate language was essential. The Multiculturalism Policy and its programs had enabled us to do the research, gather the data, and have the conferences... but then what? Many of the task forces, commissions and research studies of the ‘80’s and ‘90’s, with all their recommendations, represent the collective voices of many marginalized and victimized Canadians... voices summarized and then silenced in expensive reports on shelves.

‘Post-multiculturalism’ discourse points to the current indicators of racism as the failure of integration in workplaces and communities – highlighting residential segregation, effectively separate schools, different places of worship, disparate and non-communicative community associations, and discrete social networks and places of leisure – claiming that it was multiculturalism that

accentuated and preserved differences and separateness, resulting in breakdown and conflict (the very antithesis of the rationale for the policy in the first place). Post-multiculturalism discourse calls for a sense of common citizenship, shared values and civic identity,⁹ much of what the early discussion of multiculturalism was designed to achieve.

Have we made progress as a society in fighting racism in Canada?

There has been a lot of talk, and many recommendations over the years, with not insignificant costs attached. And we have indeed made progress by enacting significant legislation. The UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, M. Doudou Diene, acknowledged in 2003 that Canada has the most advanced legislative framework in the world in terms of diversity, anti-racism and human rights. But he pointed out that implementation is inconsistent, leaving significant gaps. So much so that there is a feeling of betrayal, frustration, helplessness, and even hopelessness among racialized groups, at the same time as there is a retrenchment and backlash by the so-called dominant groups, who are having an increasing influence on government policies and programs. Politicians have seized on this discontent in their own grab for power, and many of the strides we made in the development and implementation of the multiculturalism policy, as we moved from cultural retention to anti-racism in the quest for equity, have been eroded. As an optimist I say that we would not be experiencing a backlash if we weren't making progress. Let us ensure that evidence of that progress is translated into concrete action that affects those who do not see any change or hope of change for their own lives.

The time is long overdue for putting the policies and the recommendations and the theories into practice, for putting the words into action. It is not the multiculturalism policy that is at fault; it is the lack of implementation of that policy in its fullest form. People feel they have not been listened to and regretfully have been shown that only when their frustration leads to violence and lawlessness will their needs be taken seriously. The situation also makes the disenfranchised very vulnerable to being drawn in by propaganda perpetrated by leaders who, in their quest for power, scapegoat others, build on anger out of proportion to their lived experience, and ultimately turn to violence to enhance their power and control. We don't need new task forces – we need to implement the old ones and build on them, acknowledging progress made and giving credit where credit is due. Such was the finding of the Hate Crimes Community Working Group – building on solid work done over the years and recommending an action plan with eight thematic areas: Definitions (the importance of standardizing terminology and naming the various forms of racism and racial discrimination); Aboriginal Peoples (their unique position); Communities (empowerment, partnerships, networks and coalition building, and meaningful involvement in decision making); Education and Training (the inclusive curriculum and mandatory anti-discrimination training for all professionals); Victim Services (enhancing services and taking a victim centred approach); the Justice System (systemic

change at every level); Public Awareness and Social Marketing (to effect society change in attitude and behaviour); and Implementation and Accountability (in a timely and transparent fashion).

Sadly, not nearly enough progress has been made in effecting systemic change in countering racism in the workplace. For example, the recent federal government employment equity targets as a result of the “Embracing Change” Task Force were a step in the right direction; but we continue to hear of overt and systemic discrimination against racialized minorities in the public service. There must be effective policies in place in each of our institutions at every level of government, if we are ever going to change behaviour and achieve true equality and equity. The Ministries of Education must again mandate and monitor the effective implementation of race and ethnocultural equity policies. And the policing services must have mandatory anti-racism and anti-discrimination or diversity training, as well as strategies for identifying and dealing with hate/bias crime and the victim impact of such crime. But support is continually being withdrawn from such programs, even as the needs are escalating. In the present ‘post-multiculturalism’ climate, in whether it is police, or schools, the armed forces or a government department itself, people are still fearful at every level to stand up against racism – and of losing power (whether it's a job, or elected office). As a result, we continue often to work in poisoned atmospheres, afraid to take the risk. These are all areas which a redefined and effectively marketed multiculturalism policy can and should address, strengthened by a more effective Action Plan Against Racism.¹⁰

Multiculturalism's impact on the fight against racism

With the creation of the Multiculturalism Department a few years ago, with its own Minister and Deputy Minister, and with its increasing emphasis on anti-racism and anti-hate initiatives, it appeared that the will to take the risk was there. But the political will is eroding. Multiculturalism was one of the departments significantly reduced when it was folded into the Department of Canadian Heritage and placed again under the auspices of a junior minister as Secretary of State for Multiculturalism, and there are indications that initiatives may continue to be undermined, as the institutional memory continues to dissipate. Can we withstand the onslaught of right-wing thinking and veiled racist ideology of some of the opposition to multiculturalism, anti-racism and human rights initiatives? Will the federal leadership in human rights and race relations be able to withstand the dismantling of many of provincial agencies and programs responsible for these areas? There are hard won rights and freedoms that we cannot allow to be undermined by those who only wish to maintain privilege and power. Neither should those of us from equality-seeking communities be neither co-opted nor corrupted by the same quest. When we fail to remove the barriers to equality, we are easily co-opted by the same structures, and pitted against one another in the competition for power and scarce resources. This is clearly not in the spirit of the ideals of the multiculturalism policy, and we must remain vigilant to ensure that this is not the case.

Another divisive practice is the deliberate put-down of the concept of multiculturalism by anti-racism activists, when in fact there are intimate connections, historically and particularly in the legislation. One cannot be achieved without the other. For various local and provincial governments to fall into the trap of separating these concepts is to increase divisiveness in the equity seeking and social justice movement, to create competition where there should be co-operation by pitting groups against one another, and to perpetuating old hierarchical power-based structures, under the guise of creating new, more egalitarian or ‘holistic’ models. Witness the failure of countless “multicultural” or “race relations” or “human rights” committees or conferences when people cannot leave their organizational or political agendas behind. One of the most significant features of the recent report of the Hate Crimes Community Working Group was that it was a consensus document, using solidarity and a united front as one of the most effective strategies to make an impact on decision makers, while at the same time naming and addressing each of the forms of racism and hate crime against victimized groups.¹¹

At the core of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act is the commitment to removing the many barriers to equality, racism primarily, so that ultimately all groups within Canada have equal access, equal opportunity, and equal rights, thereby becoming fully Canadian. This was the promise of the policy in 1971, and it was predicted that its implementation would lead to more loyal Canadians. It is ironic that the results of the Quebec referendum of 1995 proved this to be true, as we continued to struggle to define Canada and to achieve Canadian unity in diversity. However, the BC Referendum of 2002 truly showed the tyranny of the majority, when it comes to Aboriginal and minority rights; and the dramatic increases in racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and hate crimes in recent years reveal how far we have yet to go to put the policies into practice.

The challenge for the future of multiculturalism, indeed of Canadian society as we know it, is to build on a model of shared resources in a climate of declining resources – to develop strong individual and group identities through effective coalitions in the interest of social cohesion and integration – the true goals of multiculturalism. Racism and racial discrimination have been acknowledged and documented as realities in Canada. We will never achieve the vision of our multicultural society until racism is eliminated. *That* is the inevitable impact of one on the other and the inextricable connection between them.

Endnotes

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¹⁰ Mock, K. R. (2003). Redefining multiculturalism. In Kess, J.F., Noro, H., Ayukawa, M. and Lansdowne, H. (Eds.), *Changing Japanese identities in multicultural Canada*. University of Victoria, British Columbia.
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NOW THAT RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IS UPON US...

...Canada's Multiculturalism Model is Increasingly Relevant

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Canada.

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ABSTRACT

The demographic portrait of Canada in the 21st century is increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Over the past 35 years, the percentage of visible minority Canadians have risen from around 1% of the total population to over 13% in 2001 and would account for 20-25% of the population in 2017. Simultaneously, the proportion of adherents of non-Christian religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism) have risen from less than 2% in the same period to over 6% in 2001 and would reach 10-12% in 2017. This article explores some aspects of this religious diversity and the relevance of Canada's multiculturalism model.

1. Religious Diversity

Religious diversity is not a recent phenomenon in Canada. This diversity unfolded in layers over the past 400 years, starting with Canada's Aboriginal peoples who have a variety of native customs and spiritual rites, followed by the French settlers in the 16th century who were Roman Catholic Christians.

When the British conquered Quebec in 1759, they were of the Protestant faith but tolerated Catholicism and immediately allowed the French freedom of worship, a freedom that was later reconfirmed in the *Quebec Act (1774)*. Later the *Constitution Act (1867)* provided for denominational school rights.¹

Since the 18th century, and till the early 1980s, Canadian religious diversity was largely one of a variety of Christian denominations from Orthodox to Protestant, along with a tiny Jewish minority and a variety of Aboriginal customs. The presence of eastern religions in Canada (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism) is a recent phenomenon and has become notable only in the past 10-15 years.²

From the vantage point of 2007, religious diversity is becoming a fact of life in Canada, and it is of benefit to social cohesion to understand the dynamic interplay of this fact with the principles of respect and tolerance, and the application of freedom of religion under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

2. Changing Demographics

It follows from the above that Canada has evolved over four centuries, from a country that was essentially white and Christian, to one that is religiously, racially, and ethnically diverse in the current decade (early 21st century). The relevance of, and need for, the supporting statute (the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, the *Canada Labour Code* "Labour Standards",³ etc.) may be greater in an environment of increasing religious diversity.

As the table below shows, adherents of the five minority religions represented 6.3% of the total population of Canada in 2001 (with Islam at 1.9%, Judaism 1.1%, Buddhism 1.0%, Hinduism 1.0%, and Sikh at 0.9%). The question of whether the combined share of the population (6.3%) is significant or not is a complex one, and is also debatable as it goes from one extreme of "one is too many" (Abella and Troper 2002) to the pluralist view that multiculturalism and diversity represent wealth and strength to society.⁴

The table on next page also shows the Statistics Canada projections, which estimate the proportion of adherents of these minority religions at 10%-12% of the total population in 2017 (with Islam at 4.1%, Judaism at 1.1%, Buddhism at 1.2%, Hinduism at 1.7%, and Sikh at 1.4%). Whether these figures are large enough to qualify Canada as *religiously diverse* (i.e., the way India and Russia are), is open to discussion, but two elements are notable in these projections:

| Population by religious denomination, Canada (in thousands and per cent). | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| Non-Christian religious denomination. | | | | | | | | |
| | Muslim | Jewish | Buddhist | Hindu | Sikh religions | Other | Total | TOTAL |
| 2001 | 579.7 | 340.8 | 304.2 | 303.6 | 289.0 | 105.0 | 1,922.3 | 30,616.5 |
| % | 1.9% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.3% | 6.3% | 100.0% |
| 2017 | 1,421.4 | 375.1 | 413.9 | 583.9 | 495.7 | 135.2 | 3,425.3 | 34,582.2 |
| % | 4.1% | 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 9.9% | 100.0% |

Statistics Canada, 2005. Population projections of visible minority groups, Canada, provinces and regions, 2001-2017. Demography Division. Catalogue #91-541-XIE. Percentages: Author's calculations.

That the levels of religious diversity are more significant in large urban centres, e.g., Toronto and Vancouver (we make the assumption here that a city is religiously diverse if the proportion of religious minorities is at least 10% of the population); and that the Muslim proportion would experience the fastest demographic growth between 2001 and 2017, doubling from 1.9% of the total population of Canada to 4.1%.

Building on these two elements, we establish that, unsurprisingly, religious diversity is more significant in large urban centers⁵ (as shown in the table below), particularly in Toronto and Vancouver,⁶ thus qualifying these large centers as religiously diverse.

The shaded cells in the table below refer to cities where a single religious minority is at least 2% of the population, and where the total of all religious minorities is at least 10% of the population.

These are some observations on city differences:

1. In 2001, only Toronto and Vancouver had a proportion of adherents of non-Christian religious minorities of at least 10%. However, in 2017, these religious minorities are expected to be at least 10% of the population in all the cities listed in the table below;
2. Adherents of Judaism were at least 2% of the population in 2001 only in two cities: Montreal at 2.7% and Toronto at 3.5%. These ratios are expected to decline in 2017 to 2.0% in Montreal and to 2.4% in Toronto;
3. Adherents of Buddhism represented at least 2% of the population in 2001 only in two cities: Toronto at 2.1% and Vancouver at 3.7%. These ratios are expected to rise in 2017 to 2.2% in Toronto and to 4.4% in Vancouver;
4. Adherents of Hinduism were over 2% of the population in 2001 only in Toronto at 4.1%, a ratio expected to rise to 6.0% in 2017;
5. Adherents of Sikhism were at least 2.0% of the population in 2001 only in two cities: Toronto at 2% and Vancouver at 5.1%. These two ratios are expected to rise to 2.9% and 6.1% respectively;
6. In 2001, Muslims were over 2.0% of the population in all the cities listed in the table: Montreal (2.8%), Toronto (5.4%), Ottawa (4.8%), Calgary (2.7%), Edmonton (2.1%) and Vancouver (2.6%). In 2017, they are projected to account for 5.8% of the population in Montreal, 10.4% in Toronto, 8.5% in Ottawa, 4.4% in Calgary, 3.0% in Edmonton, and 4.5% in Vancouver.

3. Challenges

Multiculturalism policies and practices and human rights and freedoms have helped create an environment of civilized behaviour in which individual Canadians feel comfortable practicing their religious beliefs, and feel secure that they would never be identified by their religious affiliations, nor do they need to fear declaring their religious beliefs openly.

The current domestic and international climate may be feeding negative sentiments, where the media may be a factor, but this climate is one reason why such policies are needed even more. For example, when the 2017 projections were first released in 2005, there was a media focus on Islam, with newspaper headlines declaring “Islam, the fastest growing religion in Canada”. This occurred at a time when Islam-phobia (the fear of Islam) is increasing in Europe and North America due to the international events of terrorism and war.

In the absence of multiculturalism and diversity programs, social transformations, especially demographic ones that contain cultural and ethnic dynamics, can pose challenges to hitherto racially and religiously uniform societies.

In Canada, nuanced and covert negative attitudes towards Jews, Muslims, and other religious minorities existed for decades. However, Anti-Semitism and Islam-phobia and prejudices against other groups have increased, and recently became recurrent themes in news headlines, especially since September 11, 2001. Increasingly, individual stories about the use of turban and kirpan by Sikhs in Canada and of covering women’s bodies and heads by Muslims and of accommodating the needs of observing Jews and Muslims in Quebec, were receiving wider publicity (including the story about the arrest of several Muslim Canadians in June 2006 on terrorism-related charges).

Increasingly, many Canadians are feeling the strain of providing national security and public safety in a democratic country in ways that may harm its multicultural principles of respect and inclusion, or may compromise human rights and freedoms. The challenge is that perceptions about the ethnic and religious hue of international terrorism are reflected at the domestic level, which may endanger tolerance and acceptance of those who are non-white or non-Christian, opening the way for calls for assimilation and for a culture of uniformity. The concern is that the balance between civil liberties and human rights on the one hand, and national security imperatives in profiling specific racial, ethnic, and religious groups, on the other, may be tested.

| Population by religious denomination, Canada (in thousands and per cent). | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| Non-Christian religious denomination. | | | | | | | | |
| 2001 | Muslim | Jewish | Buddhist | Hindu | Sikh religions | Other | Total | TOTAL |
| Montreal | 96.2 | 92.2 | 38.4 | 24.0 | 7.1 | 4.6 | 262.4 | 3,468.2 |
| % | 2.8% | 2.7% | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 7.6% | 100.0% |
| Toronto | 258.5 | 170.0 | 98.7 | 196.6 | 94.2 | 17.1 | 835.0 | 4,797.2 |
| % | 5.4% | 3.5% | 2.1% | 4.1% | 2.0% | 0.4% | 17.4% | 100.0% |
| Ottawa | 39.2 | 11.5 | 9.3 | 8.1 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 73.8 | 822.0 |
| % | 4.8% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 9.0% | 100.0% |
| Calgary | 25.9 | 6.6 | 16.9 | 7.2 | 13.6 | 3.9 | 74.0 | 964.4 |
| % | 2.7% | 0.7% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 7.7% | 100.0% |
| Edmonton | 19.8 | 4.0 | 14.1 | 7.8 | 9.6 | 4.2 | 59.6 | 948.5 |
| % | 2.1% | 0.4% | 1.5% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.4% | 6.3% | 100.0% |
| Vancouver | 53.6 | 17.8 | 75.7 | 28.2 | 104.0 | 12.2 | 291.4 | 2,036.9 |
| % | 2.6% | 0.9% | 3.7% | 1.4% | 5.1% | 0.6% | 14.3% | 100.0% |
| 2017 | Muslim | Jewish | Buddhist | Hindu | Sikh religions | Other | Total | TOTAL |
| Montreal | 227.4 | 76.7 | 42.8 | 36.6 | 15.3 | 5.9 | 404.8 | 3,897.7 |
| % | 5.8% | 2.0% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 10.4% | 100.0% |
| Toronto | 657.0 | 151.5 | 138.3 | 378.6 | 180.7 | 27.5 | 1,533.6 | 6,315.7 |
| % | 10.4% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 6.0% | 2.9% | 0.4% | 24.3% | 100.0% |
| Ottawa | 96.2 | 14.2 | 15.5 | 20.8 | 7.9 | 4.4 | 159.0 | 1,130.3 |
| % | 8.5% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 14.1% | 100.0% |
| Calgary | 54.7 | 8.4 | 20.6 | 15.7 | 26.4 | 6.5 | 132.4 | 1,251.4 |
| % | 4.4% | 0.7% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 2.1% | 0.5% | 10.6% | 100.0% |
| Edmonton | 35.4 | 5.6 | 15.8 | 12.9 | 16.5 | 5.7 | 92.0 | 1,182.8 |
| % | 3.0% | 0.5% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 0.5% | 7.8% | 100.0% |
| Vancouver | 116.1 | 18.1 | 113.1 | 48.6 | 156.8 | 16.1 | 468.8 | 2,560.3 |
| % | 4.5% | 0.7% | 4.4% | 1.9% | 6.1% | 0.6% | 18.3% | 100.0% |

Statistics Canada, 2005. Population projections of visible minority groups, Canada, provinces and regions, 2001-2017. Demography Division. Catalogue #91-541-XIE. Percentages: Author's calculations.

2017 PROJECTIONS DATA

While the current public debate includes genuine concerns about security and social cohesion and questions whether multiculturalism is “a viable concept for integration” (Duncan 2005, p. 12), religious diversity is receiving closer public scrutiny, and some faith-based and visible minority communities and individuals may feel that their religion is coming under greater public focus in a hitherto more open pluralist society.

The second challenge is whether the Canadian public will continue to be highly tolerant of religious diversity as the proportion of religious minorities is rising from a negligible percentage in 1971 to at least 10% in major Canadian cities, along with increased outward and “visible” manifestations of non-Christian religious beliefs, customs, and clothing.

The experience of other countries with increasing religious diversity in the current international political climate may not be encouraging, where racist attitudes and behaviours were lashed out in the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Australia. Unprecedented extreme language was used publicly compared to subdued or polite expressions of opinion, such as an American commentator who wrote about countries with a majority Muslim population: “We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity (Coulter, 2001). These attitudes were not dominant in the public debate as enlightened views were also expressed, such as this one: “democracy promotion is better accom-

plished by attraction than coercion, and it takes time and patience. The U.S. would be wise to encourage the gradual evolution of democracy, but in a manner that accepts cultural diversity” (Nye, 2006).

Canada was not immune to these, now global, passionate public debates on religious diversity, where many social ills are blamed on multiculturalism. While Canadian values are grounded in the principles of democracy and the rule of law, there are some public signs of discomfort with individuals who look different or who have outward manifestations of their non-Christian religions. Some anti-multiculturalism arguments even went to an extreme of calling for ending multiculturalism and diversity policies, and “assimilating” immigrants, who are already here. Such attitudes may contribute to a narrowing of the acceptable boundaries of difference at a time when Canada is becoming more diverse, hence more in need of multiculturalism policy.

4. Canada's Multicultural Approach

Canada's multicultural approach does not endeavour to forcefully assimilate religious and visible minorities, but rather it recognizes the importance of pluralism and diversity in social cohesion by constantly building common spaces and wide avenues of voluntary integration. This approach is not about a multiculturalism of separateness and divisiveness but about respect for difference and inclusion of all Canadians – from colour and dress to customs and religion.

Multiculturalism is working: Public opinion polls, socio-economic studies, and evidence of greater integration demonstrate that Canada is adapting well to rising religious and ethnic diversity. A continued application of responsible policies and programs in Canada, and the spread of public education and greater awareness would help reduce the potential for paranoia and hate over the next ten years when adherents of the five minority religions groups would almost double to 12% of the total population of Canada.

Tagging individual Canadians in one-dimensional terms (such as a ‘Jew’, a ‘Muslim’, a ‘Sikh’) is a form of racist prejudice and is discouraged, as this tagging ignores the complex attributes of each individual, that this Jew or Muslim or Sikh is also a woman, a professor, speaks flawless English and French, has three children, is an athlete, quite civilized and peaceful, (including of course the possibility that this person is ‘not religious’) etc.

Dialogue: dialogue is Canada’s democratic answer to challenges of social transformations that researchers may consider as potential sources of future tension. The Canadian approach of public dialogue and royal commissions has served the country well over the decades. In this Canadian tradition, many experts call for open debate on issues surrounding multiculturalism and citizenship (e.g., Ostry 2005, Granatstein, 2006). Through peaceful dialogue, Canada has more progressive views on socio-economic issues and immigration and multiculturalism compared to those expressed in Europe and elsewhere. Much progressive thinking since the early 1960s has led to building a unifying vision of the future: an evolutionary peaceful social transformation from the *Quiet Revolution* in Quebec to a series of legislation on social gender and racial equality and multiculturalism.

Conservative Cabinets have introduced some of the most progressive pieces of legislation in Canada (the *Employment Equity Act* 1986, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* 1988).

Legislation: the Preamble of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988)⁷ states that:

WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada provides that every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination and that everyone has the freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons;

Moreover the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1977) guarantees the freedom of religious belief:

2. *Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:*
 - (a) *Freedom of conscience and religion;*
 - (b) *Freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;*
 - (c) *Freedom of peaceful assembly; and*
 - (d) *Freedom of association.*

15. (1) *Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.*

(2) *Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.*

Further, in 1955, the Supreme Court ruled that different religions have rights, based upon tradition and the rule of law, and in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion under the Charter at least includes freedom of religious speech, including “the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination”.

Not only does Canadian democracy mean that government treat its citizens as individuals first, but that it also designates policies to encourage all Canadians to be proud of their heritage and to share it with other Canadians. Having liberalized its immigration policies in the early 1960s, Canada has moved a long way from the pre-Second World War period negative attitudes of restrictions on the immigration of persons of certain ethnic or religious backgrounds. The current policies of commemoration of cultural heritage are helping voluntary integration.

5. Conclusion

Increasing religious diversity in Canada requires greater attachment to already proven laws and policies in place, principally Multiculturalism. However, more efforts should be devoted to harness religious diversity to be a contributing part of Canada’s grand canvas, and this could happen by striking a balance between:

- (1) What the public authorities (at all levels) and the mainstream society can do to better accommodate religious minorities; and
- (2) What members of religious minority groups can do to fully participate in the social, political and economic life of Canada.

Public education on religious diversity should go both ways:

- (1) Educating those who are less tolerant of non-Christian religious minorities, including Canadians who are not immune from inadvertently being intolerant of religious minorities. Even secular individuals may need sensitivity awareness as they may demonstrate a sense of monopoly over goodness and righteousness, a sense that could become unintentionally a total unabashed rejection of a visibly different person who belongs to a religious minority;

(2) Educating adherents of religious minorities on how to integrate in mainstream society without losing self-dignity and self-respect, and without jeopardy to religious freedom. Adherents of religious minorities have to do their share, like all other Canadians, towards social cohesion of Canada. The expression of one's freedom of religion is not a license to create a closed sub-society, away from the mainstream society, where parents or religious leaders or peers could compromise individual freedoms, or where potential radicalizing indoctrination of youth could take place. Such isolationist tendencies are not only divisive to society, but could also lead impressionable individuals to break the law.

Finally, the alternative to people knowing and talking to one another and mixing in common spaces (marriage, workplace, school, community, club, etc.) under circumstances and frameworks that are acceptable to all is isolation and retrenchment in hostile positions that are tantamount to conflict.

A multicultural approach requires nothing short of mutual respect and common embrace of a unifying citizenship. Dialogue as prescribed by multiculturalism is better than coerced integration or forced assimilation that led to the decay of, and even catastrophes in, many countries around the world.

Antipathy towards religious and visible minorities may threaten to roll back hard-fought gains, which over the decades have won a degree of integration of minorities and respect for difference in Canada.

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Notes

- ¹ Reaffirmed by section 29 of the Charter.
- ² Small numbers of adherents of these minority religions did exist in Canada prior to the 1980s.
- ³ For example, Labour Standards under the *Canada Labour Code* would allow religious accommodation in the workplace (religious holidays, reasonable

accommodation of certain religious observances at the workplace, etc.).

- ⁴ That eventually, people of different religious backgrounds will find common spaces in schools, mainstream communities, workplaces, civic participation, etc., and that Canada's social integration model has worked, etc.
- ⁵ The rise in the number of adherents of non-Christian religions is directly linked to the rise in the number of newcomers from Africa and Asia, with the vast majority of newcomers settling in the largest urban centers of Canada.
- ⁶ The rise in the number of adherents of non-Christian religions in Canada is largely attributed to source countries of immigration over the past 20 years.
- ⁷ <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-18.7///en> Accessed February 20, 2007.

HOW DIFFERENT ARE THEY?

Douglas L. Palmer

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ABSTRACT

The author responds to the following questions on the topic of social inclusion/exclusion. This is done partly to critique recent findings by Jeffrey Reitz and Rupa Banerjee on the same topic, and more generally, in light of the author's concern for the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the analysis of social phenomena such as racial discrimination and visible-minority integration.

- 1) Who are the vulnerable groups, individuals and victims of racism and racial discrimination in services, employment and civic participation (e.g., political empowerment?)
- 2) What strategies can help build capacity including social capital for new and/or vulnerable ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities?
- 3) What factors contribute to the exclusion of second-generation ethno-cultural and ethno-racial youth in Canada?

The answers to the above questions require research which fairly and accurately delineates the challenges, with respect to their nature and magnitude, and situates them in their appropriate context. Only then will such empirical findings make clear and effective policy suggestions, with the potential to apply all relevant knowledge.

A recent study by Reitz and Banerjee (2007; Reitz, 2005) speaks to the above questions and policy issues through an analysis of data from the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), conducted by Statistics Canada in collaboration with Canadian Heritage. The EDS, by virtue of its enormous sample of over 40,000, with over-sampling of recent immigrants and their offspring, provides an excellent opportunity to address these issues.

Reitz and Banerjee use the responses to seven questions – regarding citizenship, ethnocultural identity, trust, life satisfaction, belonging to Canada, volunteering, and federal voting – to compare visible minority and white respondents across immigrant generations. But because those authors do not fairly and fully present and consider their findings, the result is a distorted and insufficiently contextualized depiction of the policy challenges.

Incomplete Consideration of the Data

Reitz and Banerjee conclude that, compared to Whites, visible minority immigrants are slower to integrate, with the “gap” widening with experience in Canada and being greatest among the second generation. However, that conclusion is not justified by their analysis.

On their seven indices of integration, each of their four visible minority groupings (Chinese, South Asian, Black, and other visible minorities) and visible minorities, as a whole, score as more “integrated” than Whites on more indices than on which they do worse than Whites, in the analyses of immigrant respondents to the EDS. Yet, rather than see this overall pattern as evidence that visible minorities do better than Whites in the immigrant integration process, Reitz and Banerjee, by “hand-picking” comparisons, see a “gap” in the opposite direction from the overall tendency toward more favourable results. This enables them to see a “growing gap” in the second generation, where visible minority scores on the measures are, in fact, lower than White scores.

Reitz and Banerjee further exclude the admittedly sparse third-plus generation visible minority cases from their analyses. The Black grouping is the primary source of the second generation visible minority versus White differences. However, Black children of non-immigrants, the third-plus generation, show similar negative differences from Whites (Palmer, 2006a).

So, their conclusion of slower visible minority immigrant integration flies in the face of their own analyses, among immigrants, suggesting the opposite conclusion, if any. In addition, the analysis they failed to perform suggests differences from Whites in the responses of Black children of non-immigrants which are similar to the differences displayed by Black children of immigrants. In sum, they present no evidence of an overall visible minority immigrant integration deficit and exclude available evidence that the lower-than-White scores among Canadian-born visible minority youth appear to be unrelated to whether or not their parents are immigrants.

Thus, Reitz and Banerjee do not show that any differences between visible minority and White responses are related to the immigrant integration process. Those differences are more simply explained just as effects of discrimination, effects which are somewhat masked among immigrants by the fact that White immigrants also face some discrimination. The discrimination against White immigrants, because they are immigrants, “goes away” in later generations, while

discrimination against visible minorities, because they are visible minorities, does not.

Further, there is little evidence that first or third-plus generation visible minority youth are significantly less excluded than youth from the second generation.

This suggests that any focus on the second generation, to the exclusion of youth belonging to the first or to the third-plus generations, may be very ill-advised and risk neglecting the needs of persons equally deserving of research and remedial efforts.

Exaggerating Differences

A second major flaw in the Reitz and Banerjee study regards their presentation of results. They cite numerous percentage comparisons as examples of visible minority versus White differences, the most striking differences being found among second generation respondents. They then perform regression analyses showing that differences remain when age is controlled. But they present no percentage comparisons which control for age, nor do they report the strength of the age effect in their regression analyses.

The primary example of how this distorts their results regards second generation reported voting. They now cite a 20% visible minority second generation deficit on this measure. (It was 36%, but I prompted them to remove the under-18 kids from their calculations.)

Regression analysis shows age to account for 25 times as much variance in reported voting as does visible minority status. The age effect is 25 times as strong as the visible minority effect! But not worth mentioning, according to Reitz and Banerjee, despite the fact that the second generation visible minority sample in the EDS has an average age of 26, compared to 46 for second generation Whites.

Comparing that second generation visible minority sample to a similarly-aged second generation White sample reduces the reported voting gap to 6%. Yet Reitz and Banerjee, by citing the 20% number and saying that the effect of visible minority status remains significant when age is controlled, without providing any information about how much of that 20% is due to age, leave their readers thinking that most, if not all, of that difference is due to visible minority status.

The main finding of the Reitz and Banerjee regression analysis of reported voting is that kids do not vote: age is easily the most important factor according to the regression results. But that result is not even mentioned. Why? And why not show what the percentage difference is when age is controlled?

Well, one obvious possible reason is that a 6% difference, even if statistically significant, is not near as impressive as a 20% difference. And given a dramatic result describing what looks like an effect of prejudice and discrimination, there is motivation not to look too closely at

it. Researchers in the area tend to care very deeply about the issue and want very much to make policymakers and the public realize what a serious problem discrimination is. So, when we get a dramatic result, aside from the normal self-serving desire to find something important, we have this additional, more “noble”, motivation that can make us a bit sloppy in our efforts to present data in the fairest and most accurate possible fashion.

Another example is provided by one of the questions circulated for this special issue, which states that, according to the EDS, “65% of visible minority respondents have a perception that racism is prevalent in the workplace.” This may be true but certainly cannot be concluded from the EDS.

The EDS question regarding workplace discrimination was only asked of respondents who reported recent experience of unfair treatment, approximately 35% of the visible minority sample. 53% of those respondents reported unfair treatment in the workplace. This provides no basis for saying that 65% of visible minority respondents overall would have said that racism is prevalent in the workplace. Around 20% of all visible minority EDS respondents reported recent unfair treatment in the workplace but, since only 35% of all visible minority respondents were asked about that situation, we really have no idea what the perception of the overall visible minority population would be in this regard.

As well as the obvious costs of inaccuracy, e.g., inefficient resource allocation, there are other dangers of exaggerating discrimination-related results.

First, any discovery of exaggeration can create an impression that discrimination is being exaggerated generally, that researchers in the area are sloppy and agenda-motivated. This will provide arguments against interventions combating discrimination or helping its victims.

A more subtle danger regards exaggerating results which may reflect effects of discrimination, such as the second generation reported voting numbers. Voting is valued, seen as the performance of an important civic duty. Exaggeration of a negative difference in voting behaviour may feed a negative stereotype of visible minorities, as deficient in performing their civic duty.

A third danger is that exaggeration of difference may incline us to overlook similarity.

A Common Psychology

As said earlier, the main result of regression analysis of the reported voting measure is confirmation of the well-known fact that kids don't vote. The more accurate way of describing the second-generation reported voting results is that they show that kids in general vote a lot less than their elders and that this deficit is more pronounced among visible minority youth.

Kids are problematic from the perspective of societal integration: They do not hatch in a fully integrated form. Rather they take their time growing up and fitting in, creating much agony for parents and other authorities.

Kids are problematic from the perspective of societal integration: They do not hatch in a fully integrated form. Rather they take their time growing up and fitting in, creating much agony for parents and other authorities. You could probably even find a book or thirty thousand about youth alienation and rebellion, etc. Maybe even a couple of good ones.

That context, all those factors which operate on youth regardless of ethnocultural characteristics cannot be ignored when addressing the challenges facing a disadvantaged sub-group of youth. The EDS reported voting results show an exacerbation of a general phenomenon. This is not a unique challenge; rather, a slightly greater challenge, more similar than dissimilar to the challenge with regard to getting White kids to vote.

Framing the question in such a comparative fashion, rather than just referring to “exclusion of second-generation ethno-cultural and ethno-racial youth”, will make it easier to bring to bear relevant knowledge and strategies derived from the study of youth problems in general.

Related to this, one of the most striking findings of analyses of the EDS is an astonishing consistency across ethnocultural boundaries, in the relations between perceptions of unfair treatment and some other measures. In group after group, across Canada’s ethnocultural spectrum, those who report experiencing discrimination or unfair treatment are less trusting of others, feel less of a sense of belonging to larger society, and less satisfaction with life.

This cross-cultural consistency stands as testimony to the fallacy of the racist’s assumption that “they” are “different”. While the survey cannot conclusively demonstrate that these are effects of discrimination, that is certainly the most plausible explanation of the relations. But even if the causal flow is in the opposite direction in some, or even were it most, cases, the pattern’s consistency testifies to a common psychology across cultural boundaries within Canada.

The ethno-cultural or ethno-racial exclusion referred to in the question is actually a matter of degree according to the EDS results, with groups falling under the rubric of visible minorities reporting experience of unfair treatment around three to four times more often, on average. But this is a greater frequency, 30-40% versus 10-20% rates for White groups. There is exclusion of individuals within all these groups, but exclusion of more members of some groups than are excluded in others. And there is evidence that the psychological processes surrounding the experience of discrimination are similar across those ethnocultural boundaries. So, again, there is a pattern suggesting a difference more of degree rather than of nature of the problem.

Further, concern for those who are victimized should not only address the needs of victims if they belong to the groups with the highest per capita rates of victimization. Is the injustice done to a victim of, say, anti-Catholic or anti-Semitic sentiment, of less concern, simply because those forms of prejudice currently may be less prevalent than Islamophobia, for example? That logic would dictate a sole

focus on anti-Black discrimination, because the members of Black groups would seem clearly more frequently victims than members of other visible minority groups are, according to the EDS results (e.g., Palmer, 2006b).

The emphasis of research attempting to understand the problem, or policy and programs attempting either to prevent discrimination or to help its victims, will naturally fall on the groups most affected. But that natural emphasis should not be allowed either to impede our understanding, by over-narrowing our theoretical and research focus, or to lead to the injustice of neglecting victims of discrimination who, through no fault of their own, happen to belong to groups that are less often victimized.

Summary

There is little evidence which would justify any approach focusing on the second generation in particular, when addressing the challenges facing visible minority youth. Further, those challenges may be more similar than different from those facing youth in general. While the differences should not be overlooked, overlooking the commonalities might be even more costly to our understanding and ability to meet those challenges.

The EDS results suggest the need to more effectively address the incidence and effects of discrimination, particularly among Black youth but not to the neglect of other communities. The appearance of differences among the youngest age groups taking part in the EDS suggest that policy and programs should have added focus on the period of transition to the workforce but, as well, need an involvement of educational and other institutions that will enable better addressing the effects of discrimination at earlier ages.

Finally, we need to bend over backwards in our attempts to present research results fairly and accurately. Discrimination is an injustice sufficiently vile to obviate any need to exaggerate its incidence

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INTERVIEW WITH JAMES FRIDERES

James Frideres is the Director of the International Indigenous Studies program and the holder of the Chair of Ethnic Studies at the University of Calgary. He is the editor of *Canadian Ethnic Studies / Études ethniques au Canada*.

How did the multicultural character of Canada evolve between 1967 and 2007 (in qualitative and quantitative terms) and what would be the outlook for 2017 (the 150th anniversary of the confederation)? What are the social and economic impacts over 1967-2017 (50-year period)? What are the risks and opportunities between now and 2017?

In the past four decades the source countries of immigrants has moved from Europe and the United States to Asia, Latin America and Africa. There is no reason to suggest that the number of immigrants from these source countries will be reduced in the next decade. As such, the number of visible minorities has increased and it is projected to increase even more by 2017. The social impact of such a change is that “race” and religion will become important social policy issues in the next decade. Immigration will become a national issue that will force political parties to demarcate their position on entrance and integration.

The offer of dual citizenship has made Canada a primary choice by many potential immigrants. The current strategy of becoming Canadian and then moving all or a portion of the family to the “home” country will need to have more research carried out as to the reasons why immigrants would act in such a fashion as well as the consequences of such action over a long period of time. Return migration has not been an issue and it is clear that Canada needs to have up-to-date information on this process. There is no current research on this issue and the recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated that this social fact must be studied to determine the long term implications of such a policy.

The role of Quebec in Canada will diminish as its relative contribution to the overall population continues to decrease. With the lowest reproduction rates and low levels of immigration, its role in Canadian society may be reduced. At the same time, its focused selection criteria on language may increase the number of visible minorities within Quebec and create unique social and economic issues for the provincial government.

Today’s immigrants are no longer accepting ideology that the dominant society has the right to force assimilation upon them and to dictate the rules of entry into the country as they did a century ago. Immigrants now take the position that, as members of Canadian society, they have a right to give direction to the future of Canada and to set their own time table as to when integration will occur. Their voice will take on a greater importance in how the country operates. This change has introduced tension between native born and immigrants.

We know that children of immigrants inherit the economic position of their parents. This means that, if poverty is characteristic of a family, the children of that family will also be poor. As such, the development of an “underclass” is a distinct possibility for the next generation unless policies and programs changed. What is particularly troubling is the fact that recent immigrants have high educational attainment and yet have low incomes. If immigrants are able to actively participate in the labour market commensurate with their educational skills, Canada will be able to leverage our linkages around the world and ensure Canada’s place as a world leader, both economically and politically. In utilizing immigrant human capital, Canada will be able to drive economic growth in the new “knowledge-based” economy. If we are unable to convert the human capital of immigrants, we become just one more northern nation state that contributes to the exploitation of workers.

How would we ensure that our social and economic programs and policies meet the changing needs of an increasingly diverse population in light of the 2017 projections?

Canada needs a vision! Current political leaders need to ask “where do we (Canada) want to be in 2017?” A focus on youth needs to be emphasized as they are the next leaders of this country and will make up a greater proportion of the labour force. This will require an assessment of our current policies and programs to determine if they can “get us there” or if new policies and programs are required. Considerable research will be required to assess the impact of current programs and the identification of “best practices” that will ensure the economic and social integration of immigrants. With immigrants having higher educational backgrounds and increasingly sophisticated skill sets, our underutilization of them in the labour market creates human capital “wastage” and lessens our competitive advantage in the world economy.

What approaches could be used to ensure that Canadian cities are well prepared to accommodate the rising proportions of visible minorities in their populations and what indicators would measure the results?

Schools will be the initial starting point. Anti racist programs will need to be implemented. The federal government, along with provincial governments, needs to bring into existence a national strategy for a variety of dimensions (e.g., post-secondary education and credentialism). Government will need to insure that social support structures are in place to enhance English/French language abilities. Acculturation and community networks will also be crucial to accommodate immigrants and to strengthen the social cohesion of the country. Municipal governments need to become more proactive in the integration of immigrants.

What factors contribute to better labour market outcomes for Canadian-born visible minorities and visible minority immigrants?

Canada has always carefully selected potential immigrants on the basis of education and occupational skills (over family reunification), and yet they have not coordinated their selection process with the private and public sector. As a result, while 40% of the immigrants are able to integrate into Canada's economic structure, the remaining 60% have not been successful. There must be more collaboration with the private sector to ensure that immigrants with skill sets that do not fit Canadian regulations have an opportunity to obtain those necessary attributes. For example, if immigrant mechanics do not have "Canadian experience," programs need to be created that would allow them to obtain that experience. If immigrant health care practitioners do not meet the criteria established by provincial legislation and health authorities, programs need to be established to provide them with the necessary credentials to meet our labour shortages.

Government needs to expand current programs designed to support immigrants such that they will include family members. For example, spouses of primary immigrants must be provided with language, social and economic skills that will allow them to acculturate and become part of the Canadian community.

We need to vision what the world will be like as the new world powers in Asia and Latin America emerge and what our relationship will be as they take over economic leadership. We need to think about the kinds of linkages we want to build with these areas today, so that when they become economic powers in the future, we will have a meaningful relationship with them.

What policies and programs can prevent potential marginalization of visible minorities in major urban centres by 2017?

Current programs directed toward immigrants and visible minorities, e.g., employment equity, need to be re-examined. In carrying out the re-examination, it should be clear to employers what the consequences will be if they do not meet the minimum standards under current legislation. Second, actual enforcement of the legislation needs

to be undertaken. And third, the enforcement and sanctions need to be widely known throughout the private sector. At present, violations continue for many years and no consequences are incurred. And everyone in the private sector is well aware of it. More vigilant enforcement of systemic racism needs to be undertaken, as "glass ceilings" continue to impact visible minority integration into the labour market.

The private sector needs to take on greater responsibility in the integration of immigrants. With record profits in a number of economic sectors, there has not been any re-investment into Canadian society to enhance the quality of life of Canadians, including immigrants.

As researchers have noted, we need to develop policies and programs to create a collective identity for young people that includes a belief in societal institutions involving politics, justice, education and human relationships. If we are unsuccessful in doing so, we will discover that immigrant youth will gravitate toward gangs, cults and various other social movements that will provide them with short term goals that give them a sense of collective identity.

What approaches could be used to promote diversity in rural communities in Canada? What indicators could be used to measure this progress?

Contrary to myths, rural communities have in/out-migration rates similar to urban centers. However, young rural residents (immigrants or native born) estimate their chances of carrying on a successful economic life as an adult in the rural area are small. Moreover, there is the "lure of the city" with all its lights and excitement as well as high estimates of economic success and these two factors contribute to the "push-pull" factors that lend to high urban migration from rural areas. However, the quality of life in rural areas continues to be rated higher than in urban areas. Hence, if economic success is rated high and social support is provided (which is now lacking), it is likely that many immigrants would prefer to take up residence and work in a rural area.

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VISIBLE MINORITIES IN MULTICULTURAL CANADA'S FUTURE

Madeline A. Kalbach

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ABSTRACT

The author answers the following questions on the topic of the 2017 Projections data:

- 1) How did the multicultural character of Canada evolve between 1967 and 2007 (in qualitative and quantitative terms) and what would be the outlook for 2017 (the 150th anniversary of the confederation)? What are the social and economic impacts over 1967-2017 (50-year period)? What are the risks and opportunities between now and 2017?
- 2) How would we ensure that our social and economic programs and policies meet the changing needs of an increasingly diverse population in light of the 2017 projections?
- 3) What approaches could be used to ensure that Canadian cities are well prepared to accommodate the rising proportions of visible minorities in their populations and what indicators would measure the results?
- 4) What factors contribute to better labour market outcomes for Canadian-born visible minorities and visible minority immigrants?
- 5) What policies and programs can prevent potential marginalization of visible minorities in major urban centres by 2017?
- 6) What approaches could be used to promote diversity in rural communities in Canada? What indicators could be used to measure this progress?

In the early 1960s, Canada's immigration policy became non-discriminatory in that no one could be prevented from emigrating to Canada for reasons of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, citizenship, etc. This resulted in a change in the character of the immigrant stream and hence, a dramatic change in Canada's ethnic and cultural composition. Prior to the 1960s, immigrants were predominantly European. After the policy change, non-European immigrants began to come to Canada in large numbers. Non-European countries quickly were among the top ten immigrant source countries. According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)'s immigration data, nine of the ten leading source countries of immigrants to Canada were European in 1951 and the tenth was the United States. By 1968, Hong Kong became the first non-European country to become one of the top ten immigrant source countries. In 2005, seven of the top ten source countries were non-European, two were European, with the other being the United States.

The increasing ethno-cultural diversity of Canada's population and growth of the visible minority population has been mainly due to immigration patterns and increasing levels of immigration. World events such as ethnic conflict and war have been instrumental in orchestrating some of the patterns of non-European immigration and in increasing the diversity of ethnic populations residing in Canada. Higher fertility, a relatively young age structure and lower mortality are other factors that are contributing to the growth of Canada's visible minority populations. If ethnic diversity is measured by the number of ethnic groups in Canada, it is important to note that by the time of the 2001 Census, there were over 200 different ethnic or cultural groups living in Canada.

The change in the character of the immigrant stream has resulted in a major increase in the number and proportion of visible minority populations in Canada. According to the 1981 Census of Canada, visible minorities comprised 4.7 percent of the population compared to 13.4 percent at the time of the 2001 Census. Furthermore, according to Statistics Canada's population projections, the overall number and proportion of visible minorities is expected to increase by 2017 – no matter which growth scenario is utilized. Ten of the visible minority groups that will see major population increases by 2017 are as follows: Chinese, South Asians, Blacks, Filipinos, Latin Americans, South-East Asians, Arabs, West Asians, Koreans and the Japanese. The largest visible minorities will continue to be the Chinese and South Asian groups. The projections go on to say that almost half of all visible minority individuals would belong to one of these two ethnic groups by 2017. The proportion of the population that will be foreign born by 2017 is projected to be around 22 percent, which is equal to the highest proportions of the twentieth century. Most of these immigrants will be visible minorities.

The social impacts of increasing ethnocultural diversity since 1967 include an increasingly larger visible minority population, a large number of highly educated immigrants who are unable to work in the occupations for which they are

trained, increasing numbers of individuals who adhere to non-Christian religions and increases in ethnic, religious and racial intermarriage.

The risks over the next ten years of increasing numbers of visible minorities could include an increase in racism and discrimination, particularly in the labour market. The health care sector is a case in point. As the population ages, Canadians of the Caucasian race (of European background) will be cared for and ministered to by health care workers who could be mainly visible minorities. Cultural and language differences could result in misunderstandings of needs, ways of doing things and poor communication between patients and staff. The end result may be resentment on the part of the patients as well as on the part of the caregivers. This is already noticeable in many of Canada's long term care centres. Continued income disparity between visible minorities in the labour force and the Canadian-born British is also likely to prevail.

Better labour market outcomes for both foreign-born and Canadian-born visible minorities can, in part, be achieved through enforcement of Canada's *Employment Equity Act*, presenting awards by governments at the federal and provincial levels for the implementation of diversity in the workplace, and through the recognition of individuals who have made major contributions to Canadian society.

In addition, Kalbach and Kalbach's research has shown that immigrants in the labour force who work in the Prairies have incomes that are more congruent to Canadian-born salaries than they do in the large CMAs of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. While there are still income gaps between groups in the Prairies, the differences are not as great. Immigrants would be more likely to settle in the Prairies if the Prairie Provinces applied for more provincial nominees to fill their labour force needs. Labour force outcomes would also be improved through free apprenticeships or job shadowing, which would lead to accreditation in Canada, and by making language training available for both men and women for as long as needed to be able to function in their field. Accreditation examinations should be given in a timely manner after an individual takes part in such programmes.

One of the best ways to ensure better labour market outcomes is to give potential immigrants the information they need regarding the job market in Canada so they can make a more informed decision before they choose to immigrate to Canada. A more drastic solution is to bring in only those immigrants who will have positive labour market experiences in terms of their intended occupation and/or to match an immigrant with an employer before entry to Canada. Another possibility is to make sure prospective immigrants are accredited in their field before coming to Canada.

Getting Canadian experience is always difficult for immigrants. Groups such as immigrant service agencies could provide programmes in consultation with the municipal and provincial governments to provide an immigrant with "Canadian experience". Funding for this kind of initiative would go a long way towards ensuring that immigrants have a successful labour market experience.

The favoured destinations of immigrants have long

been the CMAs of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. According to the population projections for 2017, this will still be the case at that time, although the other CMAs will also see increase in their visible minority populations. If some of the less populated areas in Canada, i.e., the Prairies, encourage their provincial governments to make use of the provincial nominee programme and make an effort to work with the federal government in order to have a greater say in the type of immigrants they need, there will be greater congruency between jobs available and immigrants' skill. If these steps are taken, immigration is more likely to increase. Once visible minority families begin to establish themselves in smaller cities, it is likely other members of their family and friends will come as well, especially if the "first settlers" have a satisfactory experience. One measure of whether immigrants are moving to smaller centres could be mapping indexes of relative concentration and looking at indexes of diversity for Canada's cities and CMAs.

Three of the most important and effective tools Canada has could be used more effectively to ensure a meaningful social and economic experience for visible minorities and for all ethnic groups in Canada. These tools are the *Employment Equity Act*, the *Multiculturalism Act* and our *Canadian Human Rights Act*. Together they have "the teeth" needed to effect change. Together they could be used to help ensure that visible minorities and other ethnic or cultural groups are treated equally and with respect in Canadian society socially or economically. Another powerful tool is education. Government needs to educate all Canadians about Canada's ethno-cultural groups in an effort to promote a greater understanding and harmony between them all.

Much has been said regarding the disconnection felt by Canada's second generation visible minority youth. One such young man said, "He plans to introduce bits of Canadiana into the next generation, and dreams of teaching his children to skate and of taking them on vacation to somewhere other than India" (*Globe and Mail*, February, 2007). Perhaps the third generation will have an even more positive overall experience in Canadian society then either their parents or grandparents may have had.

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INTERVIEW WITH VIC SATZEWICH

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How did the multicultural character of Canada evolve between 1967 and 2007 (in qualitative and quantitative terms) and what would be the outlook for 2017 (the 150th anniversary of the confederation)?

We all know that the regional sources of immigrants have changed over the past forty years. Put simply, Europe supplies far fewer immigrants than it once did, and Asia, Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean now supply far more immigrants than they once did. The late 1960s were watershed years in Canadian immigration. As a result, we have seen a growth in what Canadians like to call 'visible minorities'. This is part of our understanding of how we have evolved as a country over the past forty years. Yet, I think we need to be careful about how we frame and understand the widening of the sources of recent immigrants. In Canada, we seem to assume that, because the skin colours and faces of immigrants have changed over the past forty years, we are now more multicultural than we ever were before. There is, I think, a terminological and conceptual sleight of hand involved in the equation of more 'visible minority' immigrants with more 'multicultural diversity'. This common sense equation assumes that new immigrants, because they look physically different from the ideal typical European immigrant of the earlier period, naturally carry with them a different set of cultural values, attitudes and perspectives on life. There are admittedly cultural differences between recent immigrants (both visible and 'non-visible') and Canadians who are born and raised here. After all, some new immigrants bring to Canada different food preferences, different ways of dressing, and varied ways of praying to gods, prophets and deities. But, as some sociologists argue, these are expressions of symbolic ethnicity. These differences in symbolic ethnicity tend to be overemphasized at the expense of the values and cultural characteristics that many new immigrants and the Canadian born arguably share. I think it is problematic to simply conflate the changing faces of immigrants within the notion that we are becoming increasingly 'multicultural'. Having a particular skin tone does not necessarily mean that a person or a group is, in a cultural sense, completely different from 'white' Canadians. In many ways, immigrants, regardless of where they come from, want the same things as other Canadians, including good schools for their children, decent health care, safe neighbourhoods, a clean environment, good jobs and a chance to participate in the dream of upward mobility. These common values, and perhaps even common cultural characteristics, are sometimes lost sight of when we talk about the growing number of visible minorities in Canada and the increasing diversity they supposedly bring.

What factors contribute to better labour market outcomes for Canadian-born visible minorities and visible minority immigrants?

Clearly, as a number of academics, immigrant aid agencies, and immigrants themselves have suggested, one of the key challenges immigrants in Canada face is securing work for which they have the experience, skills and education. The way that Canadian society evaluates the credentials that immigrants bring to the labour market needs to be rethought. Professional licensing bodies do have a right, indeed an obligation, to be concerned with 'quality control'. After all, nobody wants a bridge built by an engineer, or to be treated by a doctor, who does not have the same professional knowledge and capabilities of Canadian trained engineers or doctors. But, professional licensing bodies operate as guilds that regulate entry to the profession and the roadblocks that they place in the way of newcomers gaining entry to their respective professions seem to be more than just matters of quality control. Professional licensing bodies in other countries around the world that also receive and/or recruit skilled professionals seem to have cracked this problem. Yet, Canada seems to have particular difficulty in coming up with systems and procedures that fairly evaluate the credentials, experiences and skills that immigrants bring to our society. This is a solvable problem that would benefit immigrants and Canadian society more generally.

There does not appear to be much public support for employment equity type policies any more. It is not clear whether employment equity ever really did have much public support, but today there seems to be little discussion of using employment equity as a way of addressing some of the inequality issues that exist in this country. Perhaps there are good reasons for this, after all, employment equity has never had a really effective enforcement mechanism, and as some have argued, it creates the appearance of change without actually changing anything.

But there might be other reasons why employment equity, as we know it, might not be an appropriate or effective policy tool to deal with labour market issues. 'Visible minorities', as we know, are one of the four designated groups covered

by the policy. The concept of ‘visible minority’, a euphemism created in the early 1980s when Canadians were searching for a way to talk about ‘race’ without actually using the term ‘race’, may no longer be an appropriate analytical or public policy category. The concept of ‘visible minority’ lumps together a wide variety of people with different migration histories, backgrounds, and identities. It has trouble dealing with multiple identities and origins, and it also blurs the significance of social class differences within ethnic and immigrant populations. While many ‘visible minority’ immigrants, and Canadian born visible minorities, are struggling economically in Canada, it is wrong to assume that visible minorities, as a socially manufactured collectivity, are an underclass in Canadian society – whose members are all in need of a policy which promotes their access to certain kinds of jobs. The fact is, and we sometimes forget this, that some members of groups defined as ‘visible minorities’ (both immigrant and Canadian born) have privileged class and educational backgrounds and do extraordinarily well in our society. I think it is time for academics and public policies to start making somewhat more rigorous definitions of what constitutes privilege and a lack of privilege, finer distinctions between those who are, and those who are not privileged, and more focused policies on the truly disadvantaged.

What approaches could be used to promote diversity in rural communities in Canada? What indicators could be used to measure this progress?

I sometimes wonder whether promoting diversity in rural communities is desirable from a public policy or immigrant integration perspective. While some academics and policy makers are worried about ethnic and immigrant enclaves being formed in some of Canada’s major cities, it is not clear that these enclaves are, in the long run, bad for Canadian society as a whole, or for immigrants themselves. I am reminded of the moral panic about bloc settlements on the prairies in the early 20th century. Bloc settlements were formed by eastern European immigrants who found comfort, support and community by living and farming close to family members and co-ethnics. However, for some political and economic elites in Canada at the time, the bloc settlements were seen as a recipe for disaster. They were alleged to discourage assimilation, discourage the settlement of better types of farmers in the same vicinity, and were seen as ethnic islands where backward, old-world cultures, values and prejudices were being reproduced. I do not necessarily think that history repeats itself in a simplistic sort of way, but with the benefit of hindsight, the concerns about ethnic enclave formation on the prairies were largely unwarranted. The eastern Europeans living in their ‘enclaves’ who were seen as so threatening to the future stability of the country turned out fine, and Canadian society is arguably better off for their having come and settled in this country. My guess is that we will say the same thing about the enclaves that seem to be forming in today’s major cities. By the time the second generation is having children of their own, they will be thoroughly Canadian.

At the same time, if cities, towns and regions outside of the traditional ‘tier one’ cities of Toronto, Montreal and

Vancouver want to attract more immigrants to help solve labour market and demographic problems, they clearly need to do a better job in marketing themselves to potential immigrants. While Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto are world-class cities, immigrants who consider coming to Canada have less knowledge and awareness of what other cities and locations in Canada have to offer. As a result, second tier cities, rural areas, and other places that are off of immigrants’ social map of Canada – need to do a better job in marketing themselves and making known what they have to offer.

There is, it should be noted, considerable secondary migration occurring within Canada. That is, even though most immigrants initially settle in places like Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal, there is evidence that after a few years, some immigrants move on to live in other, second tier cities like Hamilton, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa. As patterns of chain migration become established from these cities, it is not unreasonable to expect that more immigrants will see these as desirable places to settle. This is an argument in favour of doing nothing and simply letting the dynamics of chain migration take their course.

I am not a fan of measures that would restrict mobility of immigrants to help spread them around. Canada tried a version of this in the early 1950s, when it imposed restrictions on immigrants from eastern and southern Europe who were recruited to fill jobs in industries that were short of labour. Even though they were accepted as immigrants, the Canadian government made them subject to deportation if they did not remain in the job they were initially recruited for a year or two. This policy generated resentments within immigrant communities and there is little reason to think that such a policy would not generate resentment today.

Some have suggested that we need to make more use of migrant labour models to solve labour shortages in more remote locations of Canada, and in industries that are perennially short of workers. The Caribbean and Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers program is seen as a model that can be emulated in other industries. While it might be a success story, at least from the perspective of solving employer recruitment and retention problems, the use of these kinds of schemes come at considerable cost to migrants and their families. Many people around the world are in desperate circumstances and so there is an economic benefit to participate in migrant worker schemes in Canada. They can earn more in Canada than they can in their country of origin, but evidence suggests that women and families back home bear the psychological and emotional burdens of these kinds of schemes. They are also at odds with the values of freedom that other Canadians take for granted.

LEVELS OF IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

Shiva S. Halli and Raluca Buzdugan

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ABSTRACT

We argue that the Canadian population composition would drastically change in favour of visible minorities if Canada adopts an increase in immigration levels for demographic and economic reasons. We think that this is one of the reasons why the Canadian government does not address the issue of the levels of immigration in spite of the economic and labour force benefits of increasing the current immigration level. This may not be a problem if the government of Canada adopts progressive policies for the management of immigrants' social transformation.

Introduction

The issue of immigration will move up the political and economic agenda as the developed world confronts the new demographic reality of a low fertility rate, an aging population, and 'baby boomers' leaving the workforce. Dependency ratios (the workers required to pay for social programs versus those who are retired and using the programs) will continue to deteriorate. The challenge this scenario poses is immense. This combined with the increased cost and usage of medical care by the aging population means that, along with other developed nations, Canada must move beyond accepted paradigms and should not turn towards possible 'stop-gap' measures, such as postponing retirement, relying on temporary workers, or hiking social programs.

While immigration is an obvious strategy, competition for young highly skilled immigrants will only increase as time goes on. As such, it is critical for developed countries to establish themselves as popular immigrant destinations if they are to enjoy future stability and economic growth. Those countries that succeed in this effort will be well prepared for the future challenge, and those who do not, will experience economic decline.

George et al. (2001) argue that even if Canada accepts an annual migration of 225,000 and attains life expectancy of 80 years for males and 84 years for females by 2026, the country will experience a net annual loss in population on the magnitude of about 10,000 persons by 2025 to 2026 because of more deaths over births. The population loss will intensify, reaching about 120,000 persons by 2035 to 2036 and about 197,000 by 2050 to 2051 (George et al., 2001). Other projections also point to the scenario that Canada will have an increasingly older population as well as smaller proportional increase of the working-age population (Li, 1996).

The ultimate question perhaps has less to do with whether Canada has much to gain in expanding immigration, but whether Canada can afford the loss of not increasing immigration. Does Canada want to continue a downward path of

Table 1. Assumptions of five scenarios.

| Scenario | Immigration | Fertility | Mortality | Internal migration |
|----------------------------|--|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| A) Low growth | Characteristics: 67% visible minority Level: 180,000 | T.F.R. of 1.3 | eOM=80 eOF=84 | 2000-2001 |
| B) Reference scenario | Characteristics: 1996-2001 Level: 225,000 | T.F.R. of 1.5 | eOM=80 eOF=84 | 2000-2001 |
| C) Internal migration 1996 | Characteristics: 1996-2001 Level: 225,000 | T.F.R. of 1.5 | eOM=80 eOF=84 | 1995-1996 |
| D) High growth | Characteristics: 80% visible minority Level: 270,000 | T.F.R. of 1.8 | eOM=80 eOF=84 | 2000-2001 |
| S) Scenario 1% | Characteristics: 1996-2001 Level: 1% of total population (365,000 in 2017) | T.F.R. of 1.5 | eOM=80 eOF=84 | 2000-2001 |

Table 2. Population of Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Canada, the percentage change, and the proportion of the total population of Canada, 2001-2017, five scenarios.

| | Population (thousands) | | | | Percentage change (%) | | | Proportion of the total population (%) | | | |
|------------------|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------|------|------|--|------|------|------|
| | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 |
| Vancouver | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 2,144.0 | 2,252.8 | 2,372.3 | 5.3 | 10.6 | 16.5 | | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.2 |
| Scenario B | | 2,203.7 | 2,369.8 | 2,560.3 | 8.2 | 16.3 | 25.7 | | 6.9 | 7.1 | 7.4 |
| Scenario C | 2,036.9 | 2,234.1 | 2,432.2 | 2,665.9 | 9.7 | 19.4 | 30.9 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.7 |
| Scenario D | | 2,273.6 | 2,505.5 | 2,776.1 | 11.6 | 23.0 | 36.3 | | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.6 |
| Scenario S | | 2,287.2 | 2,549.6 | 2,879.0 | 12.3 | 25.2 | 41.3 | | 7.0 | 7.4 | 7.9 |
| Toronto | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 5,129.9 | 5,450.9 | 5,832.3 | 6.9 | 13.6 | 21.6 | | 16.3 | 16.9 | 17.6 |
| Scenario B | | 5,282.2 | 5,751.6 | 6,315.7 | 10.1 | 19.9 | 31.7 | | 16.5 | 17.3 | 18.3 |
| Scenario C | 4,797.2 | 5,291.0 | 5,772.7 | 6,342.3 | 10.3 | 20.3 | 32.2 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 17.4 | 18.3 |
| Scenario D | | 5,457.5 | 6,099.0 | 6,884.9 | 13.8 | 27.1 | 43.5 | | 16.7 | 17.7 | 18.9 |
| Scenario S | | 5,490.5 | 6,210.0 | 7,147.5 | 14.5 | 29.5 | 49.0 | | 16.9 | 18.1 | 19.6 |
| Montreal | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 3,563.0 | 3,648.1 | 3,734.1 | 2.7 | 5.2 | 7.7 | | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.3 |
| Scenario B | | 3,620.4 | 3,755.6 | 3,897.7 | 4.4 | 8.3 | 12.4 | | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.3 |
| Scenario C | 3,468.2 | 3,567.5 | 3,657.5 | 3,751.9 | 2.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 10.9 |
| Scenario D | | 3,691.0 | 3,890.9 | 4,109.7 | 6.4 | 12.2 | 18.5 | | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.3 |
| Scenario S | | 3,675.7 | 3,876.5 | 4,115.7 | 6.0 | 11.8 | 18.7 | | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.3 |
| Canada | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 31,483 | 32,244 | 33,070 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 8.0 | | - | - | - |
| Scenario B | | 31,976 | 33,200 | 34,582 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 13.0 | | - | - | - |
| Scenario C | 30,617 | 31,975 | 33,196 | 34,574 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 12.9 | - | - | - | - |
| Scenario D | | 32,588 | 34,385 | 36,461 | 6.4 | 12.3 | 19.1 | | - | - | - |
| Scenario S | | 32,463 | 34,273 | 36,525 | 6.0 | 11.9 | 19.3 | | - | - | - |

population decline? To understand the full impact of such a loss or gain requires simulations and/or projections made under varying assumptions, in order to capture more accurately the impact of immigration.

The thrust of this exercise is to highlight the importance of developing well informed policies on immigration levels for Canada. It is surprising that, although Canada has had a long history of immigration policies, it never had a policy on immigration levels. In the past, the government has been reacting to the prevailing socio-economic circumstances in deciding the levels of immigration. More specifically, although the government intended to meet the labour force requirements of the time or of its immediate future, the levels have been largely decided arbitrarily. We believe that for a progressive country like Canada, the government should proactively get involved in developing policies on the levels of immigration to address demographic and economic realities. This paper is an attempt to remind Canadian policymakers to address this gap.

To highlight the need for policy on immigration level, we analyze the role of international migration (net of immigration and emigration) on population change (size and age composition) in Canada's future, most specifically on the three largest metropolitan cities, namely Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. The rationale for examining the impact of immigration on these three cities is the fact that, in the recent years, 75 percent of immigrants tend to settle in these cities (Belanger and Malenfant, 2005). Moreover, according to the 2001 Census of Canada, about 60 percent of all immigrants live in one of these three cities. As a result, immigrants represent 44 percent of the population

of Toronto and 38 percent of the population of Vancouver (Halli and Buzdugan, 2006).

Consequently, the negative experience of these three cities seems to influence public perception, especially of politicians, in addressing the issue of immigration levels.

We discuss the available data for Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal separately. Immigrants and visible minorities are expected to represent around half of the populations of Toronto and Vancouver by 2017 (see Table 5). While in Montreal the proportions of these populations are still lower, this might change soon to follow the direction of the other two metropolitan cities. At least in the case of Toronto and Vancouver, the unprecedented increase of the visible minority population has already posed challenges for the social management of this group.

Theoretical Background

Canada has been a country of immigrants from different parts of the world since the time of the first European settlers. For instance, during the first decade of the century, net immigration accounted for as much as 39 percent of population increase (Li, 2003). The contribution of immigration continued to be significant even after War World II. According to Li (2003), during the decades of 1941 to 1951, 1951 to 1961, and 1971 to 1981, immigration's contribution to Canada's population growth has been 21 percent, 26 percent and 24 percent respectively. This trend has been even more dramatic in the recent years. Between 1991 and 1996, net immigration contributed 47 percent of the increase in Canada's population.

Around 1900, the government of Canada established explicit racial discriminatory policies to restrict the access of people of non-European origin (Beaujot and McQuillan, 1982). For instance, in 1903, a head tax of up to \$500 was introduced for the Chinese wishing to immigrate to Canada. Similar restrictions were placed for other Asian groups. For example, an order in council was issued in 1913 to stop immigration from India by prohibiting access for those who arrived in Canada without continuous journey from the country of origin (Halli, 1987). The immigration policies continued to be reformed every time a new government came into power. However, the racially discriminative policies were not changed drastically. Even the immigration policy of 1953 clearly prohibited immigrants of Asian origin by stating that persons with peculiar customs, habits, or modes of life could be refused entry into Canada. The rationale was that Asians could not be readily integrated and assimilated in the Canadian national life and were likely to experience problems in dealing with the extreme climatic conditions.

In 1957, when the Conservatives came to power, new immigration regulations were issued, emphasizing education, training, and skills as the main considerations of admissibility regardless of the country of origin. A more refined policy was brought in by the Liberal government in 1967 (Halli, 1987). This was meant to abolish discriminatory policies and serve the manpower needs of the Canadian economy. This policy clearly identified three categories of immigrants: sponsored, nominated, and independent. A point system was used to assess independent and nominated persons. The assessment system was devel-

oped to distribute the points based on applicants' education, occupational training, personal qualities, age, fluency of official languages, and willingness to be located anywhere in Canada where employment opportunities were available.

One of the important consequences of the new policy is the drop in the proportion of European origin immigrants and the increase in the proportion of newcomers from developing countries. In other words, while in 1960 the top ten source countries were the United States and from Europe, by 1973 the situation changed drastically, resulting in only five countries from Europe and the United States. Twenty years later, only two countries were of European origin and surprisingly, not even the United States was part of the top ten countries (McVey and Kalback, 1995).

While in the past immigration has been linked to economic considerations, now there is a need to link it more with demographic considerations, which would imply a long-term approach to the setting of immigration levels. In fact, the McDonald Commission also argued for long-term objectives in setting immigration levels and made the case for demographic objectives that would use immigration to forestall population decline. Immigration has an impact on the rate of growth and the structure of the population, as well as on the size and composition of the productive labour force. Beaujot (1999) emphasizes that, while analyzing the impact of immigration in the context of population gain in Canada, it is wrong to look at the average age of the foreign born and note that they are somewhat old. This is because the second generation Canadian is not counted in the population. Beaujot sug-

Table 3. Median age of the population, and median age of working-age individuals (25 to 64 years), by CMA, Canada, 2001-2017, five scenarios (years).

| | Median age of the population | | | | Median age of working-age individuals | | | |
|------------------|------------------------------|------|------|-------|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|
| | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 |
| Vancouver | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 38.2 | 39.7 | 40.9 | | 43.2 | 44.2 | 44.4 |
| Scenario B | | 37.8 | 38.9 | 39.8 | | 43.0 | 44.0 | 44.2 |
| Scenario C | 36.2 | 37.5 | 38.4 | 39.1 | 41.5 | 42.9 | 43.8 | 43.9 |
| Scenario D | | 37.3 | 37.9 | 38.5 | | 42.9 | 43.8 | 44.0 |
| Scenario S | | 37.4 | 38.1 | 38.8 | | 42.8 | 43.6 | 43.7 |
| Toronto | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 36.8 | 38.1 | 39.3 | | 42.5 | 43.6 | 44.0 |
| Scenario B | | 36.3 | 37.2 | 38.1 | | 42.3 | 43.3 | 43.7 |
| Scenario C | 35.0 | 36.4 | 37.3 | 38.2 | 40.9 | 42.4 | 43.4 | 43.8 |
| Scenario D | | 35.8 | 36.2 | 36.6 | | 42.2 | 43.1 | 43.4 |
| Scenario S | | 35.9 | 36.5 | 37.0 | | 42.1 | 42.8 | 43.1 |
| Montreal | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 38.9 | 40.3 | 41.6 | | 43.5 | 44.7 | 44.7 |
| Scenario B | | 38.5 | 39.5 | 40.5 | | 43.4 | 44.5 | 44.6 |
| Scenario C | 36.8 | 38.7 | 39.9 | 41.0 | 42.1 | 43.5 | 44.7 | 44.9 |
| Scenario D | | 38.0 | 38.5 | 39.07 | | 43.3 | 44.4 | 44.4 |
| Scenario S | | 38.2 | 38.9 | 39.6 | | 43.2 | 44.2 | 44.0 |
| Canada | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 38.7 | 40.4 | 42.0 | | 43.8 | 45.0 | 45.2 |
| Scenario B | | 38.3 | 39.6 | 40.9 | | 43.8 | 44.9 | 45.0 |
| Scenario C | 36.3 | 38.3 | 39.6 | 40.9 | 42.2 | 43.8 | 44.9 | 45.0 |
| Scenario D | | 37.8 | 38.7 | 39.5 | | 43.7 | 44.8 | 44.9 |
| Scenario S | | 38.1 | 39.1 | 40.1 | | 43.6 | 44.6 | 44.6 |

gests that further simulations and projections should be made under varying assumptions, in order to capture more accurately the impact of immigration. Sensitive indicators, such as the average age of the population, the proportions of children, persons' retirement age, and the numbers of people at ages of entry/departure from the labour force, should also be taken into account. In addition, there is a relatively poor understanding of the issue of labour skill shortage and its implications for both immigration and labour market policy.

The only feasible way to tackle the problem is to focus on long-term demographic objectives and to abandon any attempt to equilibrate age structure characteristics on an annual basis. One could envisage the long-term maintenance of the volume of the potential active population or aim at a ratio of 5 to 8 persons in the working ages to one elderly person via a constant immigration rate. This would avoid any unrealistic population growth rates but would still imply necessary annual immigration intakes.

Discussion and Results

Many population projections and simulations in Canada have shown that population will decline unless there is a substantial increase in immigration levels (George et al., 2001; Belanger and Malenfant, 2005). More importantly, demographic indicators such as median age of population show that the population of Canada is aging much faster than expected. The same thing can be said about the Canadian labour force and its indicators such as the depen-

dency ratio. For instance, currently there are 4.4 people in the labour force for every one person above the age of 65 years (see Table 4). However, this will drastically deteriorate once the 'baby boom' cohort begins to retire. The declining Canadian population will also have implications on the economy of scale, the problem of replacement of skilled labourers, the maintenance of the current infrastructure, and the difficulty of meeting the labour force demands in the industrial sector.

We are sure that the government of Canada and its policymakers are fully aware of the demographic realities of an aging population and labour shortage. However, they tend to address the problem of labour shortage by adopting 'stop-gap' measures (i.e. recruiting temporary foreign workers to meet the labour force demand; postponing the age of retirement). Soon however, Europe and the United States will also be competing for the same international labour pool due to their labour shortage. We can therefore expect that the 'stop-gap' measures adopted by Canada will not last long. We suspect that Canada will be forced to make hard decisions to address the problem of population aging once the 'baby boomers' start retiring in large numbers.

Historically, Canada has always benefited from increased immigration. Immigrants have never been an economic burden for the Canadian society (Li, 2003). On the contrary, they have contributed to the development of Canada's infrastructure, agriculture, wider economy, and culture. Studies have shown that immigrants have been net contributors to the Canadian economy rather than receivers (Basavarajappa and Halli, 1997). This is true even after including immigrants such as refugees, asylum seekers, and sponsored family. In spite of their contribution, the government seems to have serious concerns or hesitations to publicly discuss and debate the immigration levels based on objective criteria. Immigration has always been a contentious issue. It is possible that politicians are not interested in making immigration a central issue in their election campaigns, because they are unwilling to take the risk as they seem to be unable to assess the public opinion on the issue.

In Canada's interest, it is neither desirable nor possible to postpone the immigration level debate for a long time. With this exercise, we would like to draw the attention of policymakers and politicians to this issue. We do not claim to have a solution to the problem, nor a magic optimal immigration level. This analysis is intended to show how the population pyramid and its demographic indicators would be affected by different levels of immigration. Although they do not have theoretical justifications, the immigration levels used in this analysis have been referred to in the past in various government projection exercises.

For the first time, the 2001 Census has shown that the population of Canada has grown because of immigration alone (Belanger and Malenfant, 2005). This is a powerful signal that the future growth of the Canadian population will be closely tied to the level of immigration. Therefore, we include Table 2 to understand how the various levels of immigration affect the size of the population of Canada, Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. As expected, with increasing levels of immigration, the population change

Table 4. Ratio of the working-age individuals (25 to 64 years) and the seniors (over 65 years), by CMA, Canada, 2001-2017, five scenarios.

| Ratio of the working-age individuals and the seniors | | | | |
|--|------|------|------|------|
| | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 |
| Vancouver | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.7 |
| Scenario B | | 4.8 | 4.5 | 3.8 |
| Scenario C | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.0 |
| Scenario D | | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.0 |
| Scenario S | | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.1 |
| Toronto | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.1 |
| Scenario B | | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.3 |
| Scenario C | 5.2 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.3 |
| Scenario D | | 5.1 | 5.0 | 4.5 |
| Scenario S | | 5.2 | 5.1 | 4.7 |
| Montreal | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
| Scenario B | | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.4 |
| Scenario C | 4.4 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
| Scenario D | | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| Scenario S | | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| Canada | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 4.2 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
| Scenario B | | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| Scenario C | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| Scenario D | | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| Scenario S | | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 |

Table 5. Visible minority population of Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Canada, the percentage change, and the proportion of the total population, 2001-2017, five scenarios.

| | Population (thousands) | | | | Percentage change (%) | | | Proportion of the total population (%) | | | |
|------------------|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------|------|-------|--|------|------|------|
| | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 | 2017 |
| Vancouver | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 869.1 | 985.0 | 1,110.9 | 17.3 | 33.0 | 50.0 | | 40.5 | 43.7 | 46.8 |
| Scenario B | | 914.0 | 1,076.0 | 1,261.4 | 23.4 | 45.3 | 70.3 | | 41.5 | 45.4 | 49.3 |
| Scenario C | 740.7 | 943.7 | 1,134.6 | 1,359.8 | 27.4 | 53.2 | 83.6 | 36.4 | 42.2 | 46.6 | 51.0 |
| Scenario D | | 963.9 | 1,178.2 | 1,434.0 | 30.1 | 59.1 | 93.6 | | 42.4 | 47.0 | 51.7 |
| Scenario S | | 984.7 | 1,228.7 | 1,533.3 | 32.9 | 65.9 | 107.0 | | 43.1 | 48.2 | 53.3 |
| Toronto | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 2,106.8 | 2,437.8 | 2,822.2 | 20.2 | 39.1 | 61.0 | | 41.1 | 44.7 | 48.4 |
| Scenario B | | 2,214.4 | 2,659.4 | 3,194.0 | 26.3 | 51.7 | 82.2 | | 41.9 | 46.2 | 50.6 |
| Scenario C | 1,752.6 | 2,219.7 | 2,667.5 | 3,200.6 | 26.7 | 52.2 | 82.6 | 36.5 | 42.0 | 46.2 | 50.5 |
| Scenario D | | 2,334.8 | 2,918.0 | 3,648.2 | 33.2 | 66.5 | 108.2 | | 42.8 | 47.8 | 53.0 |
| Scenario S | | 2,378.9 | 3,022.0 | 3,852.9 | 35.7 | 72.4 | 119.8 | | 43.3 | 48.7 | 53.9 |
| Montreal | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 523.4 | 589.5 | 666.2 | 15.4 | 29.9 | 46.8 | | 14.7 | 16.2 | 17.8 |
| Scenario B | | 548.7 | 639.9 | 748.6 | 20.9 | 41.0 | 65.0 | | 15.2 | 17.0 | 19.2 |
| Scenario C | 453.7 | 548.9 | 639.7 | 748.2 | 21.0 | 41.0 | 64.9 | 13.1 | 15.4 | 17.5 | 19.9 |
| Scenario D | | 578.7 | 702.9 | 858.1 | 27.6 | 54.9 | 89.1 | | 15.7 | 18.1 | 20.9 |
| Scenario S | | 585.6 | 721.0 | 895.1 | 29.1 | 58.9 | 97.3 | | 15.9 | 18.6 | 21.7 |
| Canada | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scenario A | | 4,794.1 | 5,500.5 | 6,313.0 | 18.7 | 36.2 | 56.4 | | 15.2 | 17.1 | 19.1 |
| Scenario B | | 5,030.7 | 5,983.3 | 7,120.7 | 24.6 | 48.2 | 76.4 | | 15.7 | 18.0 | 20.6 |
| Scenario C | 4,037.5 | 5,030.2 | 5,981.8 | 7,116.2 | 24.6 | 48.2 | 76.3 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 18.0 | 20.6 |
| Scenario D | | 5,296.4 | 6,548.7 | 8,109.0 | 31.2 | 62.2 | 100.8 | | 16.3 | 19.0 | 22.2 |
| Scenario S | | 5,383.8 | 6,761.6 | 8,530.5 | 33.3 | 67.5 | 111.3 | | 16.6 | 19.7 | 23.4 |

2017 PROJECTIONS DATA

from 2006 to 2017 varies from as little as 8 percent, to as much as over 19 percent. The corresponding level of immigration for the 19 percent change in population is 1 percent of the Canadian population. The corresponding increases in population for Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal are 49, 41 and 19 percent respectively. The dramatic increase in the populations of Toronto and Vancouver is consistent with the current demographic and immigration trends. This may be an important cause for concern for the authorities, along with the unprecedented growth of the visible minority population of these cities. For example, under the 1 percent immigration scenario, the visible minority population will increase by 120 percent in Toronto and 107 percent in Vancouver (see Table 5). Consequently, the majority of the population of these two cities will be non-white. An additional cause for concern may be that a few visible minority groups may dominate demographically in certain areas. To be exact, more than 47 percent of the Vancouver visible minority population will be Chinese. Similarly, 32 percent of the visible minority population of Toronto will be South Asian (Belanger and Malenfant, 2005: 28). This trend may not be desirable for the dominant groups for a variety of reasons, including the fear of losing their political power base.

We must note that the Canadian population has experienced this magnitude of the immigrant population previously in its history. In fact, between 1911 and 1931, the foreign-born population represented around 22 percent of the total Canadian population (Belanger and Malenfant, 2005: 12). The current concern in the adoption of the level of immigration of 1 percent of the population seems to lie in the fact that 80 percent of new immigrants will be visi-

ble minorities (Belanger and Malenfant, 2005). This was not the case in the past because of explicit discriminatory immigration policies based on country of birth.

In the interest of the economic welfare of the Canadian society, the government should adopt more imaginative integration policies to deal with the inevitable emergence of ethnic diversity in Canada. In the past, Canada has been a leader in adopting the policy of multiculturalism, but has changed its focus over time, moving from the promotion of ethnic identity to forging unity from diversity, building a national identity, and trying to develop the ‘economic advantage’ of being Canadian (Frideres, 1999: 86). Furthermore, Frideres argues that Canada should spend its energy and time in developing programs and strategies to integrate immigrants into the Canadian society and to sensitize Canadians to the benefits of a multicultural society. If there have been concerns over the social cohesiveness in cities such as Toronto and Vancouver, it is because Canada never really had any serious integration policies except for some ESL training workshops to teach people to ‘do their shopping’.

The problems in these cities, due to the visible minority population, lies in the fact that immigrants were never helped to utilize their academic credentials, professional experience, and technical skills. It is not uncommon to read articles in leading newspapers such as *The Globe and Mail* about foreign-educated doctors who deliver pizza and engineers who drive taxis in Toronto. Similar arguments are advanced by Ibbitson (2006: A4). In his recent *The Globe and Mail* article titled ‘Government’s next big job: managing national labour shortage’, where he states that ‘pervasively, federal and provincial governments con-

sciously distort the labour market with policies guaranteed to worsen shortages by encouraging workers to be unproductive'. If the government views immigrants as economic portfolios, invests time and money and fully exploits their talents, skills, experience, and education, immigrants can be employed much sooner and become more productive members of the society.

Ibbitson (July 4, 2006: A4) further states that "the largest public-policy challenge confronting Canada: [is] a nationwide labour shortage. Whether it's a Tim Hortons in Canmore or a university in Toronto, the Help Wanted sign is out". We emphasize that the situation will deteriorate even further once the 'baby boomers' begin to retire, unless the immigration level is increased to adequately compensate this. According to Table 3, if the level of immigration is increased to 1 percent of the total population from the level of 180,000 immigrants per year, the median age of the population can be reduced from 42 years to 40 years. While a population median age of 40 years is high, the corresponding figures for the working age population are even higher. Even at the immigration level of 1 percent of the population, the median age of the 25 to 64 years age group will remain at 45 years by 2017. The median age of Toronto is much lower than that of Canada, mainly because of its visible minority population. At the immigration level of 1 percent, the median age of the population of Toronto will be 37 years by 2017.

Denton et al. (1999) show that immigration tremendously affected Canada's labour force. According to them, between 1986 and 1991, net immigration accounted for 46 percent of Canada's expansion in labour force and for 71 percent between 1991 and 1996. Toronto and Vancouver are experiencing a high concentration of visible minorities and new arrivals, which must have made them grow economically and industrially at a greater pace. In the case of Canada, even if immigration is increased to 1 percent, by 2017 there will be 3.5 persons in the working age group for every one retiree. On the other hand, at the same level of immigration, the corresponding ratio for Toronto is still around 5. This shows that, although Toronto is often projected as experiencing undesirable events due to the increase of the immigrant population, the city is not as chaotic as it is shown to be. No doubt, it has become complex, but the immigrant problem in the city has much to do with the social construction of immigrants.

The behavioural deviations of the visible minority population from that of native-born Canadians are interpreted as a lack of assimilation, and not as a success in building a lifestyle that may deviate from that of long-term Canadians. Frideres (1989) argues that the goal of multiculturalism is to show that the recognition of cultural diversity is compatible with, and will not undermine, those institutions that guarantee equality between individuals

and classes. Immigrants must be given a sense of group worth, cultural autonomy, and the ability to maintain ethnic identity. On the other hand, Frideres argues that

"skin colour has become the basis for social making. Accordingly, members of the visible minority, irrespective of whether they were born in Canada or not, are more likely than those of European origin to be considered immigrants because of their superficial physical features. In this context, the term immigrants also implies undesirable newcomers who are too culturally and racially removed from mainstream Canadians of European origin" (p.45).

This negative image must be changed. Such a change would facilitate conflicts management and resolution.

Conclusion

In the past, immigration has contributed significantly to the rate of population growth in Canada. According to the 2001 census, the rate of growth of Canada's population between 1996 and 2001 is due to immigration alone. It is important to recognize the fact that Canada has profited from population growth in the past and may well profit from such growth in the future (Beaujot, 1991). Beaujot also argues that, while free trade reduces the need for population growth as a source of labour force demand and as a basis for the economy of scale, the main disadvantage of slow growth population involves more marked population aging and a less feasible labour force. However, the 1974 Green

Paper and its subsequent revisions based on expert group consultations seem more cautious. The lack of enthusiastic support for high population growth in the Green Paper is based on the assumption that a high rate of economic growth can be sustained due to technological innovations which increase productivity. This, in turn will take care of the growing dependency.

If Canada does not pursue its expansionist view, its immigration policy will be shortsighted. The United States is powerful economically, politically, and culturally, mainly due to its size and technological advantage. If Canada's population begins to decrease, then technological innovation alone will not be able to maintain its economic position relative to the United States. Consequently, Canada will have an even smaller economy relative to the United States. Since immigration would be the only source from which Canada's population and labour force can continue to grow, Canada has very little to gain in curtailing immigration. The question is not whether or not Canada should have immigration, but what should be the optimal annual intake? In view of Canada's future, and considering the obvious link between immigration and absorption capacity, it would be difficult to justify a policy to reduce

The issue of immigration will move up the political and economic agenda as the developed world confronts the new demographic reality of a low fertility rate, an aging population, and 'baby boomers' leaving the workforce.

the size of annual immigration or for that matter, to just maintain it at the level of 250,000 per year.

Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the level of immigration to Canada has to be increased substantially for demographic and economic considerations. Even if the government or the policymakers are conscious of this need, there are no theoretical or scientific bases for the annual intakes of immigrants advanced so far. For example, instead of proposing any arbitrary levels of immigration, such as 1 percent of the Canadian population, Canadian policymakers need to develop a comprehensive policy on the required level of immigration to Canada for a long-term solution.

For the data and methods involved in this study, please contact the authors.

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MULTICULTURALISM ISSUES IN CANADA

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ABSTRACT

The author answers the following questions on the topic of Applied Policy Research:

- 1) How can we most effectively measure the impact of multiculturalism, both as a policy and in the message it conveys to Canadians?
- 2) What are the policies and initiatives of other government departments that influence multiculturalism?
- 3) What type of research would you recommend be conducted to enhance our understanding of multiculturalism and diversity the most?

Introduction

In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau described the objectives of the Policy of Multiculturalism as “preserving human rights, developing Canadian identity, strengthening civic participation, reinforcing Canadian unity and encouraging cultural diversification”. In implementing the policy, the government was to provide assistance in four ways: to support the cultural development of ethno-cultural groups; to help members of the ethno-cultural groups to overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian society; and to promote creative encounters and interchange among all ethno-cultural groups to assist new Canadians in acquiring at least one of Canada’s official languages. The policy was seen as an instrument to rupture ethnic hierarchies and to establish more equitable relationships between the increasingly diverse ethnic groups in Canada (Helly, 1993).

Over the years, the focus of Multiculturalism has evolved from celebrating differences in the 1970s, to managing diversity in the 1980s and constructive engagement in the 1990s. The focus of the policy in the 2000s is inclusive citizenship (Fleras and Kunz, 2001). The integrative multiculturalism of the 2000s emphasizes rights and responsibilities of being Canadian. The key metaphor also changed over the years – from ‘mosaic’ to ‘level playing field’ to ‘belonging’ and, in the 2000s to ‘two-way street.’ (Fleras and Kunz, 2001).

The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988) along with the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) and the *Employment Equity Act* (1986) was to ensure that all Canadians could participate fully in the economic and social life of the country.

Mulholland and Biles (2004) provide an extensive account of the activities of various government departments to foster integration among Canadians from diverse backgrounds.

A quick review of research on multiculturalism identifies a number of topics/themes that have been identified in measuring the impacts of multiculturalism in Canada. These are: identity; economic marginalization and social inequalities; discrimination and racism; and integration.

The Evidence Series: Facts about Multiculturalism (1998) for example, summarized studies on ethnic identity and attachment to Canada; economic marginalization of visible minorities and, multiculturalism and integration. Countering popular criticisms regarding the promotion of ethnic identity, the Evidence Series presented findings from a number of studies, which suggest that by protecting ethnic identity of minority groups, Canada’s multiculturalism policy promotes mutual acceptance between various groups. Studies on economic marginalization of immigrants and visible minorities consistently provide evidence to the increasing poverty rates among immigrants and visible minority population in Canada. There is overwhelming evidence that Canadians of visible minority origins experience discrimination and racism. Defenders and critics of multiculturalism alike examine integration as an intended outcome of the multiculturalism policy. In response to the criticism of multiculturalism by Neil Bissonnath and Richard Gwyn, Kymlica (1998) examined four crucial ingredients of integration: “adopting a Canadian identity rather than clinging exclusively to one’s ancestral identity; participating in broader Canadian institutions rather than participating solely in ethnic-specific institutions; learning an official language, rather than relying solely on one’s mother tongue; having inter-ethnic friendships or even mixed marriages, rather than socializing entirely within one ethnic group” (pg. 2). While acknowledging that these factors do not form the elements of a comprehensive theory of integration, Kymlica demonstrates the positive effects of multiculturalism, using both domestic and international evidence. Based on the Ethnic Diversity Survey, Reitz and Banerjee (2007) examine seven indicators related to social integration: sense of belonging to Canada, trust in others,

self-identification as Canadian, acquisition of citizenship, life satisfaction, volunteering and voting in elections. The implications of the findings according to the authors is that economic integration is a necessary condition for integration, but not a sufficient condition, as experiences of discrimination and vulnerability can slow down the integration of minorities.

In proposing a research agenda for multiculturalism, a number of strands can be identified.

First is a clear definition of the specific goals and objectives of multiculturalism policy.

“Multiculturalism doesn’t have specific goals and objectives. The majority of the population thinks too much is being done already, while the minorities think the policy lacks credibility” (Reitz as quoted in Jimenez, 2007, pg. 3).

The lack of conceptual clarity around terms such as integration is well documented (George, 2006). If the goal of multiculturalism is integration, the objectives of the policy are to be identified and operationalized so as to make measurements of outcomes and impacts possible. Within the federal department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, integration is identified by Mulholland and Biles (2004) as the outcome of successful settlement of newcomers to Canada. They propose the “Canadian Diversity Model” for integration with some core elements, which include nurturing a culture of inclusion, bringing together Canadians of diverse backgrounds, and committing to the values of acceptance, accommodation, equality, and reciprocity. Notwithstanding the source of definition, it is important more than ever before to have a commonly accepted definition and operationalization of integration. Creating a framework and indicators to measure the impact of multiculturalism policy is essential to understanding the effectiveness or otherwise of the policy. The priorities of the federal multiculturalism program have to be in line with the re-defined goals and objectives of the policy so that we are able to assess the outcomes and impacts of the programs and eventually that of the policy.

If we are to adopt the more recent definition of integration as a “two-way street”, an additional area of research is how Canadian institutions are changing to integrate minorities and immigrants or what the barriers to integration in these institutions are. Even more interesting will be an exploration of the gap between rhetoric and action within some of the mainstream institutions.

The shifting emphasis of multiculturalism, which signals the flexibility of the policy to the changing socio-political environments, although a great asset in challenging times, is very little known outside government and NGO circles. The average Canadian still thinks of multiculturalism as ethnic celebrations of song and dance. A public information and education campaign may be of great value in disseminating the goals and objectives of multiculturalism.

As with any policy or program, the outcomes and impacts of the multiculturalism policy have to be assessed through impact assessment and program evaluation. With well defined goals, frameworks and indicators, assessing the success of the multiculturalism policy will be an exciting inquiry of great relevance to Canadian society and policy.

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INTERVIEW WITH DAVID LEY

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How can we most effectively measure the impact of multiculturalism, both as a policy and in the message it conveys to Canadians?

This is an important objective, though it may well be unattainable. The measurement *per se* of the impacts of a policy like multiculturalism is bedevilled by at least two complications. First, how does one calibrate in measurable units a policy that creates the conditions for integration? The best one can do is to find some outcomes that are measurable. For example, Irene Bloemraad (2006) uses naturalisation rates as an output, and argues that the differential levels of naturalisation in Canada and the US work to Canada's favour due to the 'warmth of the welcome' and, in particular, the positive impact of multiculturalism. Another output could be rates of immigrant political participation, minimally voting, and more ambitiously running for office.

But here we encounter the second difficulty. Does multiculturalism alone generate such outputs? Bloemraad herself notes that it is not only multiculturalism, but also settlement policy, itself tied to the welfare state, that contribute to positive outcomes in Canada. And here's the rub – just how can one separate out the differential effects of multicultural and settlement policies and other relevant contexts? Multiculturalism unfolds in a broader political culture. If we accept Bloemraad's assessment that the impacts are generally positive – and I do – we need to note as well that conditions have been propitious in Canada for a number of particular reasons. Backlash in Europe and in the United States both to immigration and multiculturalism have resulted from events that, largely through good fortune, Canada has been spared. Illegal immigration, for example, with estimates now up to 10-15 million in the United States, has not become an irritant in Canada to anything like the same degree. Kymlicka (2005) has added two other conditions that have incited negative reactions to multiculturalism: a high proportion of asylum seekers among the immigrant flow, taxing the treasury of the welfare state, and a significant share of radical Muslims who are perceived to challenge some of the presuppositions of Western liberalism. The relative absence of these circumstances in Canada has shaped the political culture in which multiculturalism has prospered.

There is another reason to see multiculturalism as only part of the institutional and ideological context of immigration and integration. In the present anxiety concerning immigrant integration in Western Europe and North America, considerable uncritical opinion is blaming virtually every integration failure on multiculturalism. For example, some media writers in Canada readily attribute the creation of immigrant enclaves, limiting social interaction among diverse cultural groups, to the effects of multiculturalism (see Fulford 2006, Gregg 2006). But in fact, segregation is a product of high levels of immigration in conditions both of assimilation and of multiculturalism. Social science approaches to measuring and theorising segregation, including operationalising the idea of the social distance between ethnic groups, were developed in Chicago and other American cities in the first half of the twentieth century, where large immigrant numbers had created distinctive enclaves during the period of unmitigated assimilation. It is no different today, for a study that sought to measure relative levels of segregation in paired cities in multicultural Canada and the more assimilationist United States was unable to find significant differences, save for the higher segregation of Blacks in American cities (Peach 2005). Thus, multiculturalism has no clear relationship with patterns of ethnic and immigrant segregation.

This is an example of the broader need to deflate multiculturalism as a causal factor. Its role in establishing group rights through such legislation as the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Multiculturalism Act*, and the *Employment Equity Act*, has provided backbone to the widespread view of Canada as a country committed to respect for cultural difference and equal treatment in public and private settings. But multiculturalism does not have the capacity to go much further, for example to affect patterns of residential segregation or income inequality (unless discriminatory practices can be proven). Part of respecting multiculturalism is to clearly demarcate its limits.

What are the policies and initiatives of other government departments that influence multiculturalism?

There are two ways of approaching this question. The first, beyond the scope of this brief commentary, would be to document the intersection of multiculturalism policy with the work of other government agencies, federal departments like Citizenship and Immigration or Human Resources and Social Development Canada, their provincial counterparts,

and municipal services such as education and the police. This would be a lengthy empirical assignment.

A second, more normative approach, would be to require all government departments and agencies to embed multiculturalism within their policies and practices, in the same way that it was required that gender be seamlessly embedded in public policy in the 1990s. Some school curricula already take this position. Multiculturalism is not another module, an add-on to an existing curriculum, but is integral to the content of humanities and social science pedagogy.

What type of research would you recommend be conducted to enhance our understanding of multiculturalism and diversity the most?

First, a clear operational definition of multiculturalism is necessary, recognising that both the term and its policy framework have changed through time. This definition could presumably be drawn from formative government documents. Such a definition should be compared with popular perceptions, revealed in longitudinal opinion polls. These two response sets in turn should be compared with the media that have in recent years assumed particular responsibility for inflating multiculturalism to become the ‘fall man’ for any failure of integration, including segregation, immigrant poverty, crime and disorder, and even terrorism (Ley 2006). It is essential that, in assessing multiculturalism, we are in agreement concerning the boundaries of the subject in question.

Second, cross-national comparison of multiculturalism in theory and practice would be profitable. Its ideology and policy content invariably bend before particular national contexts. Dutch multiculturalism, for example, is built upon the national practice of pillarisation that readily contributes to separateness through an extended set of culturally specific institutions. In international conversation, there again needs to be a clear recognition of the precise terms of reference.

Third, in assessing the effects of multiculturalism, there must be a clear identification of the full range of contexts that shape particular integration outcomes. Multiculturalism is just one part of a bundle of policies, economic and geographic contexts, and immigrant characteristics that need to be considered in judging the conditions of cultural diversity.

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MULTICULTURAL POLICY RESPONSES TO ETHNIC EXTREMISM AND REQUESTS FOR RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This author answers the following questions on the topic of Applied Policy Research:

- 1) How can we most effectively measure the impact of multiculturalism, both as a policy and in the message it conveys to Canadians?
- 2) What are the policies and initiatives of other government departments that influence multiculturalism?
- 3) What type of research would you recommend be conducted to enhance our understanding of multiculturalism and diversity the most?

The most important issue confronting Canadian multiculturalism at the moment concerns the adequacy of public deliberation about the character of our commitment to multiculturalism. The difficulty is less about the actual policy impact of multiculturalism than it is about how Canadians from diverse cultural backgrounds can successfully reflect upon and interpret its meaning. Two of the most serious deliberative questions are: (1) how should we understand the relation between multiculturalism and “so called” ethnic extremism? and (2) how should we decide which kinds of cultural practices merit accommodation under the ambit of multiculturalism? The challenge is to create a public culture in which Canadians can engage in the sort of deliberation and debate necessary to respond in a reasonable fashion to tensions that inevitably arise from time to time between mainstream and minority communities about appropriate responses to these questions.

Let me explain the deliberative challenge in relation to two widely publicized controversies, namely, the municipal ordinances in Hérouxville, Quebec and the decision to restrict Muslim arbitration panels in Ontario. What is striking about these two controversies is what they reveal about how mainstream Canada is responding to commonplace tensions that arise in relation to cultural diversity and accommodation. In Ontario, what started off as a legitimate concern to ensure that women would not be coerced into using religious arbitration when public law could offer them better protection, turned into a raucous public brouhaha in which all manner of cultural ignorance and racist fear-mongering were directed at Muslims. All but the boldest commentators from the Muslim community eventually withdrew from the debate. Canadians missed an opportunity to understand the problems that Canadian women face within religious communities, especially in relation to the discretionary ways that private arbitration can work in these communities. They missed the opportunity to build bridges with parts of the Muslim community. And, more importantly, they treated the bridges which have been built, (and built in large part due to the successes of multiculturalism), with surprising indifference. We see these bridges being burnt at the moment in rural Quebec. The municipal ordinances in Hérouxville seem predicated on the dubious assumption that minority communities are especially prone to illiberal extremism and that somehow multiculturalism coddles extremism. Rather than reflecting on how best to arrive at a shared public consensus about what constitutes extremism and how best to respond to it, there is divisive discourse predicated on false stereotypes. I think this is where the most serious problem lies. We should wonder why, after 35 years of multiculturalism, this is the case.

One answer is that these controversies reveal a backlash against multiculturalism. According to this view, Canadians are now defensive in light of the growing numbers of non-mainstream groups. They are reacting to the fact that multiculturalism has gone too far: it has allowed cultural enclavism, legal pluralism and ‘unreasonable accommodation’.

I doubt this answer is correct. It is contradicted by nearly every poll that is done about Canadian attitudes towards diversity, towards Muslims, towards ethnicity and trust, and towards multiculturalism. These polls confirm that we are fairly happy about, if not downright proud of, our national diversity.

A second answer is that recent events reveal gaps in the ways the public and public institutions reason about multiculturalism, that is, how they address and assess the cultural identities and religious commitments of minority groups and how majority groups understand their own identities and commitments in relation to minorities. The first gap is the absence of a reasonable consensus about how to identify and respond to extremism. We don't have reasonable ways to identify extremism within mainstream or minority communities and, as a result, fear of extremism – that is, fear of insular and aggressive minorities or violent enclaves – dominates mainstream debate and regulations regarding some minorities. (The phobia mainly concerns Muslims at the moment; but similar misapprehensions have occurred in relation to Japanese, Ukrainian, German, and Chinese Canadians).

Second, and to put this in a broader perspective, we lack the right tools by which to understand and resolve disputes involving visible and religious minorities when they arise. Too many Canadians mistakenly believe that multiculturalism is about the unqualified preservation of cultural or religious minority communities. Too many believe that protecting individual rights is equivalent to protecting mainstream values rather than minority values.

The reality is that multiculturalism involves a nuanced series of commitments to reasonable and equitable accommodation for ethnic minorities. Yet, very little has been done in public institutions or in the realms of public debate to establish publicly accessible means to understand and assess the commitments, practices and ways of life that different peoples have, or to develop transparent criteria and standards which flesh out what counts as reasonable and equitable in these respects. I think the shari'a controversy in Ontario reveals the consequence of these gaps. After a public inquiry, more than a year of deliberation, a commissioned report, and an extensive series of recommendations, the Government of Ontario found it easier to capitulate to one element of public pressure which demanded that religious arbitration be prohibited, than to side with those who proposed reforms that would show mutual respect without sacrificing the well-being of women. Even those who think religious arbitration is undesirable means to resolve civil disputes, have to recognize that, although the Ontario government was posed with a tough choice, its solution was the easier option despite the fact that it does little to protect women who are most at risk of being exploited.

What sort of initiatives will be effective in responding to these concerns? Instead of measuring whether Canadians are in favour or opposed to multiculturalism, we should be asking Canadians how they reason through concrete conflicts and what sort of information would help them to understand conflicts more fully. We should ask them, through structured deliberation, what kinds of considerations they consider relevant to deciding questions, like whether Ontario should recognize religious arbitration,

whether kirpans ought to be allowed in public schools, or whether Orthodox Jews can build succahs on their balconies. It would be interesting to assess the extent to which these considerations change over time and the extent to which the considerations identified as relevant today also draw into question mainstream practices such as prenuptial agreements that offer women less protection than public legal standards do, religious displays in public institutions, and tax-exemptions for religious institutions that discriminate against homosexuals or women. I'm not suggesting that all mainstream practices need to change. But debates about these practices indicate that people are gaining some perspective about the 'cultural' biases of the public culture. We can only decide which practices ought to be accommodated if we have a good sense of which ones are culturally particular, which ones are important in the sense that they are crucial to the identity of a group, which ones are easy to compromise, and which ones diminish the opportunities open to people.

In relation to policy initiatives, enhancing the representation and participation of ethnic minorities in public institutions is one of the key initiatives intended to influence the accommodation of cultural diversity. But we should recognize that this only goes so far. To invite and even entice ethnic minorities to participate in public institutions and then ignore proposals for how these institutions ought to be reformed to make them more accommodating of ethnic practices and ways of life is an unwise strategy. Participation and representation are important. But they should be viewed as the means to, rather than the replacement for, institutional reform.

One of the problems with multiculturalism is that it is being promoted in the absence of developing transparent and fair institutional mechanisms to ensure that the practices and ways of life of minority groups are understood in a reasonable manner and weighed in an equitable way against public regulations with which they may conflict. In light of this problem, the policies or protocols of government which guide these interpretations and assessments require special scrutiny. In advancing our understanding of multiculturalism today, the questions researchers should be asking include the following. In relation to government departments, for example, what are the means by which policy makers in Health Canada, Immigration Canada or the Department of National Defense assess and interpret the beliefs, values and practices of minority groups in Canada? How sound are the protocols that social workers or police departments use to guide their understandings of and interpretations of cultural differences? What kind of questions do public officials and policymakers ask in order to understand what kinds of commitments or practices are important or meaningful to a particular group? To what extent are their interpretations guided by normative concerns related to gender equality? How are these normative concerns formulated? That is, to what extent are we merely applying mainstream assumptions and understandings of minority practices in order to understand problems that arise in relation to minority communities or practices that are different from the mainstream ones? We should be asking these questions of our public institutions and we should be deliberating about them ourselves.

ENTREVUE AVEC PATRICIA RIMOK

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Le Conseil des relations interculturelles a pour mandat de conseiller la ministre de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (gouvernement du Québec) en matière de planification, de coordination et de mise en œuvre de politiques qui visent les relations interculturelles, l'intégration des immigrants, le rapprochement interculturel et l'ouverture à la diversité. Sa vision est de contribuer à bâtir un Québec inclusif et de faciliter la participation à la vie collective de tous, dans le respect des valeurs communes.

À cet égard, il faut rappeler que le Québec n'a pas épousé le multiculturalisme tel qu'il est véhiculé par le gouvernement fédéral, ayant plutôt choisi de développer une approche québécoise en matière de relations interculturelles. À l'invitation de l'Association d'études canadiennes, le Conseil s'est tout de même prêté à l'exercice de répondre aux questions qu'elle lui a formulées.

Comment pouvons-nous efficacement mesurer l'impact du multiculturalisme, en tant que politique et en tant que message véhiculé aux Canadiens ?

Comment mesurer l'impact du multiculturalisme et des discours l'accompagnant pose des problèmes d'ordre méthodologique de taille. Cela est toutefois nécessaire d'autant plus que, selon la Société canadienne de psychologie, 25 % des Canadiens ignorent l'existence de la politique multiculturelle et 25 % s'y opposent². De nombreuses recherches font état de critiques qui lui sont adressées, alors que d'autres en reconnaissent le rôle positif³.

C'est pourquoi l'évaluation de chaque initiative du Programme du multiculturalisme, outil déterminant de l'application de la politique, apparaît indispensable. Par exemple, en ce qui concerne celles qui résultent d'une aide financière, on sait quels sont les critères et qui peut faire une demande dans ce cadre⁴. On en sait moins sur les résultats des initiatives retenues. Quels sont les budgets pour chaque initiative et sont-ils récurrents? Qui a la responsabilité de leur gestion et quels sont les outils de reddition de compte? Y a-t-il des audits qui permettent de vérifier auprès des groupes visés l'efficacité des diverses initiatives? Les réponses à ces questions permettraient non seulement de faire un portrait de l'ensemble des actions gouvernementales destinées à promouvoir le multiculturalisme, mais aussi d'évaluer l'efficacité et le bien-fondé.

Autrement dit, qu'en est-il des secteurs prioritaires du Programme du multiculturalisme, à savoir la compréhension interculturelle, la lutte contre le racisme et la discrimination, la participation civique et le reflet de la diversité dans les institutions canadiennes⁵? Si on sait que 8,6 millions de dollars ont été injectés dans 125 projets en 2004-2005, quels sont les résultats pour chacun des secteurs prioritaires? Et quels sont les effets d'un secteur prioritaire sur un autre? Par exemple, a-t-on déjà mesuré l'impact du Mois de l'histoire des Noirs ou du Mois du patrimoine asiatique sur la lutte contre le racisme? A-t-on mesuré l'impact de mesures ponctuelles qui visent la compréhension interculturelle en termes de participation civique?

Quant à l'impact des discours, il sera justement plus grand si les autorités parviennent à démontrer que les politiques et les initiatives qu'elles mettent sur pied correspondent dans la réalité aux buts visés. Par exemple, à la lumière des données présentées dans le premier paragraphe, Patrimoine canadien pourrait mettre à jour sa collection « Les Preuves » qui nous indique qu'en 1991, 73 % des Canadiens « jugent que la politique de multiculturalisme confère aux personnes de différentes origines un sentiment d'appartenance au Canada »⁶. Est-ce toujours le cas en 2007? Une des difficultés est d'actualiser le discours avec les nouvelles réalités.

Quelles sont les politiques et initiatives des autres ministères gouvernementaux qui influencent le multiculturalisme ?

Sans doute, dans le cas du Québec, il serait important de chercher à mesurer l'impact que peut avoir le multiculturalisme sur ses politiques qui visent l'intégration des immigrants et des relations interculturelles harmonieuses. On peut considérer que les initiatives du gouvernement du Québec influencent la perception que l'ensemble de sa population peut avoir du multiculturalisme, qu'elle soit positive ou négative. Pour les mêmes raisons, le multiculturalisme peut agir sur la perception que l'ensemble de la population du Québec se fait des initiatives québécoises. Autrement dit, le palier fédéral peut influencer le provincial et vice versa.

En effet, les politiques fédérales et québécoises ont des points communs, « notamment en matière de respect du pluralisme, d'insistance sur la justice sociale et la participation civique des citoyens de toutes origines »⁷. Toutefois, elles divergent entre autres sur la question de la langue, étant donné que le Québec insiste sur l'apprentissage du français alors

qu'au Canada⁸, le multiculturalisme est vague sur l'apprentissage des langues officielles. Plus particulièrement, le Québec chercherait à «à articuler l'identification à un pôle identitaire commun (la langue et les valeurs libérales communes) et le respect des particularismes (le pluralisme identitaire)»⁹. En fait, qu'il s'agisse du Québec ou du Canada, comme il est question de diversité et de pluralisme, les politiques d'intégration doivent permettre l'inclusion politique, l'égalité au plan socioéconomique et l'équité en matière culturelle et religieuse¹⁰.

Bref, il peut exister certaines confusions entre les outils mis de l'avant par le gouvernement fédéral et ceux du Québec, cela malgré l'Accord Canada-Québec qui reconnaît le caractère distinct du Québec en matière d'intégration des immigrants. Ces confusions se manifestent au plan du discours. Et c'est à ce niveau que des identités peuvent se préciser ou, au contraire, avoir de la difficulté à se préciser.

La question qui se pose est de savoir quelle identité revendiquent les nouveaux arrivants au Québec : l'identité canadienne, l'identité québécoise, l'identité de leur pays d'origine, les trois? Cela peut avoir un impact sur les questions entourant notamment les valeurs communes qui peuvent s'avérer plus difficiles à identifier lorsque justement plusieurs identités se superposent. De ce point de vue, on peut dire que l'approche québécoise sur la diversité ethnoculturelle a une influence sur le multiculturalisme tel qu'il peut être perçu par une partie de la population québécoise.

Quel genre de recherche devrait être effectué pour améliorer notre compréhension du multiculturalisme et de la diversité ?

En matière de multiculturalisme et de diversité ethnoculturelle, beaucoup de recherches ont déjà été réalisées, que ce soit au Québec, au Canada ou ailleurs. À cet égard, il faut mentionner l'existence du projet Métropolis, qui vise notamment «l'amélioration des politiques de gestion des migrations et de la diversité dans les grandes métropoles»¹¹. Des comparaisons peuvent être établies entre divers modèles qui visent notamment l'intégration des immigrants ou, plus largement des minorités ethnoculturelles, et des relations interculturelles harmonieuses.

Les études théoriques comme empiriques emmènent à mieux saisir la «réalité». Mais des recherches qui font état de l'efficacité ou non des diverses initiatives en matière de multiculturalisme et de diversité ethnoculturelle doivent être privilégiées, essentiellement afin que cette diversité soit perçue comme une richesse pour l'ensemble de la société et non pas comme un fardeau.

Puisqu'une politique comme le multiculturalisme a des effets sur les perceptions des individus, faut-il être capable de mesurer ces perceptions? Des recherches empiriques sont donc nécessaires.

Les études de cas qui identifient les meilleures pratiques, mais aussi les moins bonnes, peuvent permettre d'identifier les répercussions du multiculturalisme sur la perception qu'a la société canadienne sur sa diversité ethnoculturelle. Ainsi, dans le cas d'une initiative qui vise la promotion du multiculturalisme et qui a des effets positifs sur les relations interculturelles, sa diffusion dans

d'autres lieux peut s'avérer salutaire. Dans le cas d'une initiative dont les résultats sont négatifs, il faut chercher pourquoi et apporter les correctifs, sinon l'abolir. Avant d'en arriver là, il est cependant nécessaire de bien saisir pourquoi, afin de ne pas répéter les mêmes erreurs par la suite. Une revue de la littérature permettra d'identifier ces pratiques. Elle est essentielle avant d'entreprendre d'autres recherches sur le terrain. Ces recherches pourraient, par exemple, cibler une problématique au sein d'un territoire précis ou d'un groupe particulier, ce qu'illustrent les exemples suivants.

Dans tel quartier, des problèmes interculturels sont observés? Il faut rencontrer les individus qui peuvent avoir une influence sur les protagonistes, qu'ils s'agissent de politiciens, de chefs religieux, de leaders étudiants ou de représentants d'organismes communautaires, afin d'examiner avec eux les problèmes et les solutions.

Dans telle région, on s'inquiète de la venue hypothétique d'un trop grand nombre d'immigrants et de la possibilité d'une atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales de la majorité? Il faut rencontrer des individus et des acteurs de ces régions, qu'il s'agisse de citoyens, d'organismes communautaires, d'entrepreneurs ou d'élus municipaux afin de comprendre l'objet de leurs inquiétudes et, le cas échéant, mettre sur pied des campagnes d'information pour les réduire.

Tel groupe représentant une minorité ethnoculturelle se sent persécuté ou rejeté par la majorité? Il faut rencontrer des individus et des acteurs de ce groupe afin de saisir la nature du problème et les solutions concrètes à apporter, notamment en collaboration avec des acteurs de la société civile.

Une telle approche signifie évidemment qu'il y aura des coûts pour l'État qui devra être conséquent face aux solutions proposées. Ce type d'enquêtes ne peut pas être remplacé par des sondages, car ceux-ci ne permettent pas d'aller en profondeur. Les enquêtes demandent du temps et des ressources, mais elles s'avèrent nécessaires pour mieux comprendre les actions gouvernementales face à cette diversité ethnoculturelle croissante qui caractérise le Canada. Comme d'autres États, il est aussi appelé à évaluer et critiquer sa politique du multiculturalisme et ce type de recherches peut y contribuer.

Référence

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RELIGION AND MULTICULTURALISM

Gerald L. Gall

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the constitutional protection of religion (the Preamble and section 2(a)) and multiculturalism (section 27) in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. It also examines the religious nature or content of many contemporary issues in Canadian society. These include the issue of religiously based arbitrations, the Hérouxville controversy, the protection of religious minorities and its effect on gender equality and the use of cultural/religious defenses in criminal law.

The paper illustrates how religion is the central or core component in many contentious issues confronting policy-makers.

There are many contemporary issues that have arisen as a consequence of living in a society that values multiculturalism. Although some individuals may reluctantly accept or even deny this *de facto* and *de jure* reality, Canada is a truly a multicultural nation. In terms of its demography and in terms of its constitutionally entrenched principles, the Canada of 2007 is a country that embodies diversity in its national fabric.

Religion is, for many, a deeply personal conviction that reflects individual commitment to a set of principles and values. For some, even in North America, religion is an integral part of a political movement. In some nations, religion is the embodiment of that nation's culture and that nation's culture is an embodiment of its religious underpinning.

Daily newspapers present the surprising reality that there are myriad news stories, commentaries and opinions with religious content. There is the ongoing tensions and warfare between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East. In Pakistan, a prominent female activist was recently murdered because she refused to wear a veil in public. One reads of the practice of female circumcision in some countries and, on occasion, the possibility that some people might be contemplating similar practices in Canada. There is the influence of religious groups in U.S. politics, the debate over so-called intelligent design and the controversy over the use of stem cells in scientific research.

In Canada, religion remains largely a personal matter that serves as a guide for life and living. But the relationship of an individual to one's deity, as personal as that relationship seems, is arguably being transformed in terms of its societal implications. Recently in Quebec, a soccer referee ruled that an eleven year old girl could not play in a tournament unless she removed her hijab, a decision that was supported by the Premier of that province but not by the International Football Association Board (IFAB). In Bountiful, British Columbia, a breakaway sect of the Mormon church practicing polygamy defends its practice as a tenet of its religious dictates. Elsewhere, there has been much written about the perennial controversy concerning the Gideon International in Canada issuing Bibles to students in public schools. And, of course, there is the seemingly never-ending debate over the issue of same sex marriage.

This paper will explore several instances where contemporary religious issues have had consequences for a multicultural Canadian society.

The Multicultural Heritage of Canadians: Section 27 of the Charter of Rights

Demographically, Canada has undergone changes as a result of government policies that encourage increased immigration. And unlike the United States, which promotes the concept of a population 'melting pot', Canada encourages all citizens to preserve their heritages as part of our cultural mosaic.

Since 1982, we have had a constitutional guarantee of multiculturalism. In particular, section 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* requires that when interpreting and applying other rights and freedoms in the Charter, our courts are required to do so in a way that "preserves and enhances the multicultural heritage of Canadians".

Section 27 does not in and of itself grant any rights, but rather, is an adjectival section. That is, section 27 serves to assist the courts in the interpretation of rights contained elsewhere in the Charter. Even though this use of the multicultural guarantee is of somewhat limited value, it does serve to reaffirm multiculturalism as a Canadian value whenever the section is used. How then has it been used?

During the first decade of Charter experience, from 1982-1991, section 27 was used quite frequently, particularly in cases testing the assertion of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, egalitarian or equality rights and other miscellaneous parts of the Charter.

During the second decade of Charter experience, although the use of section 27 declined, it was still employed in a number of ways. Section 27 was invoked in some cases promoting egalitarianism. It was also used in relation to the legal rights sections of the Charter with respect to those persons in contact with the criminal justice system. One example of this is the right of an accused person to understand the language in which a trial is being conducted. As well, many lawyers added section 27 to their Charter arguments in a last ditch effort to win a case. However, in virtually all of these latter cases, the courts did not even consider the multicultural argument.

Today, it appears that section 27 has continued to decline as a useful and effective tool in reaffirming an important Canadian value.

In the mid-eighties, there had been a case where accused individuals charged with assault wanted to wear their *kirpans* in court. The *kirpan* is a ceremonial dagger that Orthodox Sikhs are required to wear. In that case, the courts decided against the wearing of the *kirpans* in the courtroom, but the case did not reach the Supreme Court of Canada level.

However, more recently, an important case was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Multani or so-called *kirpan* case focused on freedom of religion and dealt with the issue as to whether a local school board could prohibit a Sikh student from bringing a *kirpan* into a school. The Supreme Court supported the position that to deny a Sikh student permission to bring a *kirpan* into school constituted a deprivation of that student's freedom of religion.

Clearly, this case stands out as a strong statement in favour of minority religious freedom. This is important to all religions, especially where the numbers are few and the fight for religious freedom is an ongoing concern.

What is the significance of this case, apart from the obvious victory for freedom of religion? Does the case serve to buttress the legal recognition of multiculturalism in Canada?

Although the case was decided on the basis of freedom of religion, many hailed it as a victory for multiculturalism. In criticizing the decision, one columnist in the *Globe and Mail* described the case as "multiculturalism gone wild".

Significantly, there was reference in that decision to the notion of multiculturalism. However, section 27, our constitutional guarantee of multicultural diversity, was not even used by the Court.

What does this tell us? It tells us that diversity endures as an important Canadian value but also that the usefulness of section 27 as a constitutional guarantee of multiculturalism is questionable. In short, the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism might not over time be significantly advanced by the use of section 27, but rather, will depend almost entirely on the use of other sections of the Charter.

Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Section 2(a) of the Charter provides that everyone is entitled to freedom of conscience and religion. While this is the first substantive right set out in the Charter, it is preceded by a Preamble recognizing the supremacy of God.

Obviously, then, religion (and culture in the context of section 27 of the Charter) occupy a significant position in our 1982 constitutional framework. Moreover, the Constitution Act of 1867 has important provisions in relation to separate, religiously-based schools. So religion and the Canadian constitution are interrelated components of our nationhood.

However, returning to section 2(a) of the Charter, since 1982 we have witnessed numerous cases decided under the section. Charter interpretation, however, is a two step process. A litigant who alleges that a law, a regulation, a policy or practice conducted pursuant to law is violative of the Charter must support the allegation. Subsequently, the Crown or the government may attempt to justify the Charter violation under section 1 of the Charter, the so-called limitations clause. Section 1 provides that a law may abrogate or infringe a Charter right if that law is a reasonable limit as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. To justify the violation as a reasonable limit, the Crown must establish that the law is necessary in order to achieve a pressing and substantial state objective. It also must establish that the means chosen to achieve that objective are rational, non-disproportionate and minimally intrusive. With respect to section 2(a) violations, Canadian courts have adopted an almost absolutist approach to the issue, choosing to accept that almost anything constitutes a religion and that any law that restricts or infringes a religious practice is a violation of section 2(a). That being the case, most section 2(a) cases are determined on the basis of a section 1 analysis as to whether the violation can be justified as a reasonable limit.

There have been dozens of significant cases employing this analysis. These include, for example, the constitutionality of the Lord's Day Act mandating Sunday closing as well as the issues of religious instructions and prayers in public schools. Another case concerns whether a teacher certification agency can prohibit accreditation of teachers who graduated from a teacher-training institution that compelled its student body to adhere to strict religiously based guidelines.

The number of Charter cases invoking section 2(a) is significant. Also of note, however, is that many of these cases have also considered section 27 of the Charter (multiculturalism) in support of a religiously based assertion.

Faith-based Arbitration and Canadian Law

One of the major developments in the Canadian legal system over the past two decades is the tremendous growth of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. ADR serves as an adjunct or complementary means of resolving disputes in a process operating parallel to that of the traditional court system. ADR applies the tenets and traditions of Canadian law in an expeditious and less formal fashion than through the regular courts. A unique

characteristic of arbitration is that disputing parties must agree to submit to the arbitration process and be willing to be bound by its result. So a key issue that emerges is whether all parties to a particular dispute have freely consented to submit to the process without undue pressure.

Over the past three years, much has been written about the move to employ *Sharia* law, the Islamic legal tradition, as a method of settling disputes among Ontario Muslims. *Sharia* dates back more than 1,200 years and is derived from the Qu'ran. The objections most often raised against the application of *Sharia* in ADR relate both to the possible disadvantaged position faced by Muslim women under that legal tradition coupled with the attendant pressure in Muslim families to settle disputes using *Sharia*.

This use of *Sharia* to settle matrimonial and inheritance related disputes is a form of ADR that would operate under the provisions of Ontario's *Arbitration Act*. It has also been suggested that *Sharia* might be employed in other provinces with similarly drafted arbitration acts, such as Alberta.

The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice and the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada are highly supportive of this initiative.¹ In a report to the Ministry of the Attorney General and the Minister Responsible for Women's Issues studying the use of arbitration and family law, former Attorney General Marion Boyd recommended that family law arbitrations based upon religious law be permitted provided certain safeguards be put in place.²

Proponents of the use of *Sharia* point to the existing use of similar ADR mechanisms to settle disputes among other faiths, including the application of principles of *Halachah*, in *betei din* or religious courts, by some Orthodox Jews, also under the provisions of the *Arbitration Act*.

The issue then arises as to whether the dictates of *Sharia* or *Halachah*, or whatever law and related values that govern, are appropriate under the circumstances. With respect to *Sharia*, there have been infamous cases in Nigeria of women being sentenced to death by stoning for committing adultery. With respect to Jewish law, there have been recent cases involving the sometimes coercive withholding of the *get*, or consent to divorce, in resolving some matrimonial disputes in Canada.

One should not, of course, equate these extreme penalties to the use of religious-based principles that would be applied in dispute resolutions under the *Arbitration Act*. Rather, the fundamental issue to consider relates to the use of law that is separate and distinct from the law that would otherwise be applied to the vast majority of Canadians. Namely, is there one law for all Canadians or do we fragmentize our legal system and permit the use of different laws to be applied separately to different segments of society?

In a sense, we have already done so to a limited degree in our criminal justice system. As will be mentioned below

in the discussion of so-called 'cultural defenses', there is a provision in the Criminal Code that specifically mandates courts to take into account the Aboriginal heritage of an accused as part of the sentencing process. And, in certain cases involving First Nation offenders, the sentencing circle can be used as a form of restorative justice. This addresses both the unique heritage as well as the historical disadvantage that Aboriginal persons have experienced in Canadian society.

But the debate about the use of religion-based ADR underscores the notion that we may be moving away from a uniform legal system toward the application of specialized law to select groups. While this may be somewhat troublesome, at the same time, it is also further recognition

that Canada is a multicultural society and that meaningful multiculturalism is more than simply a demographic reality. It may manifest itself in many ways, including having an impact on our traditional legal system.

After considerable controversy, the issue was, in part, put to rest with the enactment in Ontario of the *Family Statute Law Amendment Act*, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Bill 27). This legislation precludes the use of religious law in all family law arbitrations.³ Although it seemed to cease or at least slow down the move to adopt *Sharia*, it did not put a complete end to the matter. Many Muslims voiced objection to the legislation and many Orthodox Jews were offended that the new law would end the use of *Halachah* or Jewish religious law in formal arbitrations.

The application of faith-based arbitration invites consideration as to whether our legal system should remain

a homogeneously applied entity or whether it should demonstrate a flexibility permitting the law to address diverse values and needs within Canadian society.

The Hérouxville Controversy

Section 27 is, in law, an integral part of Canada's constitution and reflects a national value of importance to Canadians and to Canadian life. Notwithstanding this, on occasion there is a backlash to Canadian multiculturalism, a discomfort experienced by some who either are not committed to the principle or who feel that multiculturalism serves to alienate or distance them from their own traditional view of Canadian society.

This is the story of Hérouxville, a small Quebec community. The Hérouxville backlash seems to be directed both at immigrants, generally, and Muslims as well as other religious minorities, in particular. The Municipal Council of the Town of Hérouxville established a set of rules or guidelines for new arrivals.⁴ Some of these standards are set out below.

- We would especially like to inform the new arrivals that the lifestyle that they left behind in their birth country cannot be brought here with them and they

In Canada, religion remains largely a personal matter that serves as a guide for life and living. But the relationship of an individual to one's deity, as personal as that relationship seems, is arguably being transformed in terms of its societal implications.

- would have to adapt to their new social identity;
- ...[W]e consider that killing women in public beatings, or burning them alive are not part of our standards of life;
- Please note that there is no law voted democratically that prohibits a woman treating a man and a man treating a woman. In our hospitals woman doctors can treat men and women and the same for the men doctors. This same principle applies for nurses, firemen and women ambulance technicians;
- In our schools the children cannot carry any weapons real or fake, symbolic or not;
- For the last few years to draw away from religious influences or orientation, no locale is made available for prayer or any other form of incantation. Moreover, in many of our schools, no prayer is allowed. We teach more science and less religion;
- You may not hide your face as to be able to identify you while you are in public. The only time you may mask or cover your face is during Halloween;
- No law or work condition imposes the employer to supply a place of prayer or the time during the working day for this activity;
- If our children eat meat, for example, they don't need to know where it came from or who killed it.

One of these standards relates to news stories abroad about the beating of women for religious reasons. Another relates to culturally-based practices in connection with the relationship of men and women. Yet another is a reference to the Multani case, mentioned below, on the wearing of a *kirpan*,⁶ or ceremonial dagger, by Orthodox Sikhs in public schools.

Clearly, some religious practices or, more accurately, those involving violence or killing in the name of God have no place anywhere. All persons, for example, must respect the provisions of the Criminal Code, for example. However, all Canadians must also respect the multicultural heritage of new Canadians. For example, in contrast to one of the guidelines set out in the Town of Hérouxville, there are many schools in Canada that provide special rooms for prayer by Muslims during Ramadan.

The Hérouxville standards represent an exaggerated reaction to perceived religious and/or cultural stereotypes and practices attributed to new Canadians.

Conflicting Rights: Religious Minorities and Gender Equality in a Multicultural Society

Most Canadians would subscribe to our constitutionally entrenched values of freedom of religion (including its concomitant notion of respect for religious minorities) and multiculturalism. At what price, however, do we seek to promote those values when they conflict with another constitutionally entrenched provision, namely, that of egalitarianism?

The issue of equality is, in itself, a sensitive issue that challenges many tenets of many of the major organized religions. For example, in recent years, Catholicism has struggled with this issue with respect to the admission of women into the priesthood. And, throughout the Jewish world,

there are similar issues regarding the role of women, particularly in traditional branches of that faith community.

Rather than focusing on this deeply felt and contentious matter, this paper is more concerned with how the issue of minority religious freedom has come into conflict with the notion of gender equality in the context of contemporary Canadian society.

Ironically, equality, freedom of religion and multiculturalism are all integral parts of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. On occasion, these rights are the subject of cases before our courts. For example, in the *Multani* case,⁷ the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the right of orthodox Sikh adherents to wear the *kirpan*, or ceremonial dagger, while attending public schools.

However, in recent years, our courts have had to deal with situations where one constitutional right comes into conflict with another constitutional right. This issue of conflicting rights has surfaced not only in terms of cases before the courts, but it also has arisen in respect of various incidents occurring primarily in the province of Quebec. These situations focus on the conflict between the constitutionally protected rights afforded religious minorities and those seeking gender equality.⁸

This clash of rights has centered on the notion of 'reasonable accommodation'. In law, reasonable accommodation is actually quite complex. However, in the present context, this concept addresses the obligation of modern Canadian society to take measures that are necessary in order to accommodate the practices and/or the lifestyle of members of religious minorities.

There have been a number of instances demonstrating the effect of reasonable accommodation upon issues involving gender equality in the Jewish community in Quebec. For example, there is the recent controversy surrounding a YMCA facility being asked and agreeing to cover the windows of its exercise room so that students at a nearby Hasidic (Orthodox Jewish) boys' school would not observe women working out in the gym. Another example is an internal police newsletter suggesting to female officers that it is best that male police officers deal with Hasidic men. There is also the practice that, upon request, only male driving testers be used to evaluate the driving of Hasidic men.

These examples highlight the effect of a policy of reasonable accommodation on societal notions of gender equality, even if the policy is not formally mandated by law. Clearly, reasonable accommodation as a means to protect the Orthodox Jewish religious minority in Quebec has trumped gender equality in the hierarchy of protected rights. And although the above instances relate to the Jewish community, there are other examples of similar conflicts of rights in respect of other religious minorities in Canada.

Our national political leaders have recently expressed opinions on this apparent conflict between reasonable accommodations of religious minorities on the one hand, and gender equality, on the other. Prime Minister Stephen Harper suggested that, while we must encourage diversity in Canada, we must also respect the secular value of gender equality. Similarly, Opposition Leader Stéphane Dion

acknowledged that, while we as a society must be open to the needs of religious minorities, religious minorities must in turn be cognizant that we live in a secular society.

Predictably, some of these matters will end up in court and, no doubt, we will receive some guidance from forthcoming judicial decisions. But in the absence of judicial guidance, society will be left to deal with this dilemma on an issue by issue basis as they inevitably occur.

Cultural Defenses

In some recent criminal cases, cultural/religious defenses have been used, particularly in the context of the sentencing process. Sentencing is a matter falling within the prerogative of the judge seized of a particular case. The Criminal Code expressly specifies that sentencing is a discretionary matter (excepting those instances of offences carrying mandatory minimum). But, the Criminal Code also provides that there are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in the sentencing process. More specifically, section 718.2 of the Code lists several aggravating as well as mitigating factors to be taken into account. These include whether a particular offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate (section 718.2 (a)(I)). The section also provides, again in the context of sentencing, whether “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders” (section 718.2 (c)).⁹ The latter is an express requirement to which a judge must adhere in the sentencing of aboriginal offenders and is a specific invocation of a so-called cultural defense. See, for example, *R. v. Gladue*, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 in which the Supreme Court of Canada commented that

... [i]t is reasonable to assume that Parliament, in singling out aboriginal offenders for distinct sentencing treatment in s. 718.2(e), intended to attempt to redress this social problem to some degree. The provision may properly be seen as Parliament’s direction to members of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process.

However, there are other instances, not specifically mandated by the Code, in which judges have permitted the use of a cultural defense.¹⁰ In *R. v. Lucien*, (1998), A.Q. No. 8, two black men were convicted of sexual assault of a black woman and were given a conditional sentence requiring 18 months to be served in the community, including 100 hours of community service together with a daily curfew. The maximum sentence for the crime committed was 14 years of imprisonment. The judge commented on the lack of remorse on the part of the accused and the sentence imposed. The judge stated as follows:

In this case, the absence of remorse of the two accused seems to me to arise more from a particular cultural context with regard to relations with women than to a real problem of a sexual nature.

This decision eventually led to complaints made to the Quebec Judicial Council. However, the Council did not reprimand the judge.

In the case of *R. v. Nouasria*, 500-01-003139-927 (Cour du Québec), a Muslim man was convicted of 4 sexually-related offences committed on his spouse’s daughter and a relatively mild sentence was imposed. The judge explained that

[t]he mitigating factors are... the fact that the accused did not have normal and complete sexual relations with the victim, that is to say, vaginal sexual relations, to be more precise, so that he could preserve her virginity, which seems to be a very important value in their religion. We can say that, in a certain way, the accused spared his victim.

Again, a cultural/religious defense was successfully invoked. There were a number of complaints to the Quebec Judicial Council. The Council decided that no disciplinary action should be taken against the judge.

One could argue that these examples are more illustrative of sexist attitudes rather than consideration of cultural or religious imperatives.

The notion of a cultural defense is given limited recognition in the Criminal Code. Moreover, its use in particular cases is rare, attracts controversy when it is employed and, when the controversy is based on legitimate criticism, it leads to little consequence in terms of judicial accountability. It is difficult to predict whether there will be greater use of similar defenses in the future, however, precedents have been established. The central point is the use of religion/culture in a context not traditionally known to the Canadian legal system.

Conclusion

Clearly, religion is an issue that has significant legal and constitutional implications. Religion is also at the core of many contemporary issues that dominate the political and social arena. While occasionally it is argued that historically, Canada is a Christian nation, it is also claimed that modern Canada is, in reality, a secular nation. The truth is that however one characterizes the nature of Canada, its body politic and its courts are often engaged in addressing religiously-based issues. Perhaps the reference to the supremacy of God in the Preamble to the Charter, together with the later reference to multiculturalism, give us significant insight into the true nature of Canada and its underlying fabric.

Notes

- ¹ In an earlier example of advocacy in this regard, the Canadian Society of Muslims conducted a review of Ontario's justice system from a Muslim perspective and proposed the creation of new alternatives in resolving family law disputes based upon Muslim religious law. The Society advocated the establishment of a Muslim Arbitration Board. See Canadian Society of Muslims. (1994). *The review of the Ontario civil justice system*. Submission to the Ontario Civil Justice Review Task Force.
- ² Boyd, Marion. (December 2004). *Dispute resolution in family law: Protecting choice, promoting inclusion*. For several views on this issue, see also Saloojee, Riad. (2004, September 6). How Sharia Law could work in Ontario. *Calgary Herald*, Calgary, Alberta. (this article also advocated the use of safeguards in Sharia-based arbitrations); Thornback, James. (2005). The portrayal of Sharia in Ontario. *Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform*, 10 Appeal 1-12; Morris, Catherine. (2006, January 25). Media's mediation and other matters: Faith-based dispute resolution in Canada. Speaking notes for panel presentation. ADR Subsection, BC Branch, Canadian Bar Association, Vancouver, BC, Canada; Bakht, Nathasha. (2004). Family arbitration using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario's Arbitration Act and its impact on women. *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*; and Dondy-Kaplan, Polly and Bakht, Natasha. (2006). *The application of religious law in family law arbitration across Canada*. Women's Legal Education and Action Fund.
- ³ For a critical commentary on this legislation, see Kutty, Faisal. (2006). Faith-based arbitrations in Ontario: a lost opportunity. *The Lawyers Weekly*.
- ⁴ These standards have attracted international attention. For example, a B.B.C. news story titled, "No Stoning, Canada's Migrants Told", appeared on January 31, 2007.
- ⁵ English translation
- ⁶ See the section below on conflicting rights between the protection of religious minorities and gender equality in a multicultural society.
- ⁷ *Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys*, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256.
- ⁸ This issue, in fact, has given rise to attention in the media, including articles appearing in the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* (February 3, 2007).
- ⁹ See Rudin, Jonathan. (1999, February 9). Aboriginal offenders and the Criminal Code. *The Globe and Mail*.
- ¹⁰ See Fournier, Pascale. (2002). *The ghettoisation of difference in Canada: 'Rape by culture' and the danger of a 'cultural defense' in Criminal Law trials*. 29 Man. L. J. 81.
- ¹¹ I wish to acknowledge the research assistance of two talented law students, Stephanie Chau, and Nigel Forster.

INTERVIEW WITH MICHAEL ADAMS

Michael Adams is the co-founder and president of Environics – a group of research and communications consulting companies with offices in Canada, the United States and Europe. Since 1970, Mr. Adams' work at Environics has focused on monitoring and interpreting the impact of social trends on public policy and corporate strategy. Mr. Adams is the author of *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values*, which won the prestigious 2003/04 Donner Prize for the best book on Canadian public policy.

Developments on the world stage in recent years require better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada. What approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination?

It is an interesting time for religion in Canada. Although the latter half of the 20th century saw Canadians (and especially Quebecers) reject traditional religion in the form of Sunday services and automatic deference to religious authorities, religion remains an important site of discussion in this country – not least because religion is enjoying a modest resurgence in Canada as a quarter-million immigrants arrive each year from countries around the world, many of which continue to be strongly religious. Religious groups (including once dominant Christians) are now among the myriad minority groups in this country whose rights and desires serve as tests for our notions of fairness and discrimination. Moreover, religious fundamentalism appears to be reasserting itself around the world in ways that Canadians, from their relatively secular and peaceable kingdom, can only view with suspicion and alarm.

With the collapse of European communism symbolized by the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, global conflict seems to have moved away from the ideological – the competition between communism and capitalism/democracy – and regressed to an earlier form of itself. The main actors in the conflict of ideologies over the past couple of centuries were nation-states. Now it seems we have reverted to the kind of conflicts we had prior to the rise of the nation-state, that between cultures, differentiated primarily by religion and tribe.

Canadians are concerned by their national project of multiculturalism and deeply committed to the ideals of non-discrimination codified in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, a document which, our surveys show, is becoming increasingly important to Canadians' sense of national identity. In view of this disposition, they are wary of discrimination on religious or other grounds. Still, in a global climate whose most consuming struggle is, if not a clash of civilizations (in Samuel Huntington's controversial formulation), then at least heavily informed by religious zeal and rhetoric, Canadians find themselves torn between the ideal of equality and the fear of creeping fundamentalism in their midst.

Most Canadians have for years expressed wariness of fundamentalist Christianity as manifested in American politics. One need look no farther than the anti-same sex marriage initiatives undertaken in many states (and rejected only in Arizona) – invariably spearheaded by religious conservatives – to see that religion plays a different role in policymaking in the United States than in Canada, where even under a Conservative government parliament voted to legalize same-sex marriage.

Then after 9/11, Canadians, like many others, became concerned about violent extremism operating under the banner of Islam. Subsequent clashes and acts of terrorism in a number of European countries (the Netherlands, the U.K., Spain, France and Denmark) have caused deep and sustained concerns about the ways in which religion can become entangled with political extremism.

Canadians are wary of religiosity for two reasons: they fear religious extremists will commit acts of terrorism in Canada as in 1985 with the Air India tragedy off the coast of Ireland and as is suspected was intended in Toronto after the arrest of 18 Muslim men and youth in the spring of 2006. In addition to extremism, Canadians fear that fundamentalist religiosity will imperil core Canadian values enshrined in our now beloved *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, particularly the guarantee of gender equality. A recent Environics poll of Canadian Muslims shows a majority (of both women and men) believe Canadian courts should recognize Sharia law in the settlement of family disputes. The vast majority of the population overall, fearing Sharia Law means religious patriarchy and a barrier to the integration of Muslim newcomers, disagree. They reason that family law in Canada is secular law. In Ontario, the government has refused to recognize Sharia law and, amid the controversy over that code, rescinded the previous alternate dispute settlement compromise extended to Orthodox Jews years before. For the majority of Canadians, religion is a private matter and must take a back seat when it comes to the laws that govern a tolerant, pluralistic society. If as Pierre Trudeau famously said in 1967, the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation, then religion has no place in the nation's legislatures and courts in 2007.

Of course religious groups can speak out on public policy issues and will be more than welcome to do so on issues of national concern such as poverty, homelessness, and foreign policy. But attempting to advance the cause of religious ideology in our public domain will be treated with great suspicion by the majority of Canadians. Even Canadian Christians, when hearing pronouncements from religious leaders, are more likely than not to ask the question, “What would Jesus say or do?” than to automatically defer to those on the top of the religious pyramid.

Demographic projections show noticeable growth in some religions in Canada. What impact could this growth have on economic, social and political integration?

It is my view that first generation religiosity is not to be feared. What is to be feared is discrimination against the foreign-born and the mismatch between the promises of Canadian multiculturalism and actual social and economic outcomes for immigrants. Immigrants who cannot find jobs or can only find jobs paying well below what their paper qualifications would suggest will not be happy in this country. Nor will their children, who will have even higher expectations of equality than their parents – and will be more bitterly disappointed if those expectations are not met. Should the second generation not achieve the “Canadian dream” of equality, there is danger of their reverting to religious extremism, evidence of which is all too apparent in today’s Europe.

Religion is not the issue. If history repeats itself, religiosity will decline or evolve over time from the fundamentalist variety to one of tolerance, inclusion and pluralism.

What are the implications, if any, of religious diversity on policy developments in Canada?

Religious diversity is a fact. It is to be celebrated just as is the diversity of our many races and ethnicities. The real issue is economic opportunity. The plethora of diversities; our system of public education; the role of the media all will inexorably lead to a type of social change that will be very much in the tradition of the non-violent accommodation of diversity.

Is there religious extremism in Canada and what are the manifestations? What is its impact, if any, on the future of Canada?

Religious extremism in Canada is marginal and in decline. Polling shows a remarkable openness to others in this country. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Canada is the most intolerant, racist country in the world, except for all the others.

What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and religious intolerance in general?

Anti-Semitism is a prejudice whose virulence and centuries of longevity are not, I don’t think, fully understood. Anti-semitism has declined dramatically in Canada over the past half-century. Anyone who cites appalling but occasional crimes such as Jewish cemetery desecrations as evidence that there has been little progress on anti-Semitism in recent decades, need only recall that during

the Holocaust, Canadians permitted their politicians to turn away Jewish refugees from Europe, invoking the slogan, “None is too many.” Such behaviour is unimaginable today. Canadians are not perfect – but they have come a very, very long way.

As for Islamophobia, I believe two factors are at work. The first is the association of Islam with terrorism – an association which Muslims with extremist political agendas trumpet, and to which most ordinary Muslims object strenuously. The second is the fact that Muslims have become a lightning rod for many Western countries’ anxieties about the integration of newcomers. Many debates about multiculturalism have come to hinge on Muslims for a number of reasons. There was much talk about Britain’s “homegrown terrorists.” Many European countries’ immigrant populations are overwhelmingly Muslim (because of the colonial links between Europe, Africa, and Asia). And there is the simple fact that some Muslim practices, such as the wearing of headscarves among women, are visible to a casual observer – whereas religious beliefs, political opinions, and cultural practices are not. (Recall the flare-up in Canada when a Sikh RCMP officer fought for the right to wear his turban in lieu of the traditional Stetson – sometimes the concrete matter of a garment can prompt a wide-ranging conversation about values, symbols, and identities.)

In all matters of prejudice, I believe that education and economic opportunity are crucial. Again and again in our surveys we find people with higher levels of education and higher incomes express less prejudiced attitudes than others. When people are well informed and feel secure and free in their own lives, the backgrounds, beliefs, and practices of others are matters of happy curiosity – not suspicious hostility. A second factor that diminishes prejudice is personal contact. Canadians of all faiths who have regular contact with Jews and Muslims are vastly more likely to express positive opinions of these groups. Truly diverse communities yield healthy social outcomes.

What is the place of religious issues in education and school curricula, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards?

Religion is one of the cornerstones of our cultural heritage. The fact that Canada is now a microcosm of the world means our schools must teach children about all the world’s great religions. Religious studies should be a part of the core curriculum in our public schools, as important as Canadian history and the three r’s. This goes for Roman Catholic separate schools too and even the so-called independent schools, including those sponsored by religious denominations.

RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION

The “Otherness” Discourse and the Need for an Inclusive Social Debate on our Core Multicultural Values

Marion Boyd

Marion Boyd is Former Attorney General of Ontario and author of the 2004 review of religious arbitration in Ontario, *Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion*.

ABSTRACT

Having a national discussion on the role of religion in Canada is potentially a positive step. However, unless the discussion is respectful in tone and focuses on inclusion, taking account of differences, rather than exclusion based on differences, it may foster dissension and cast one religion, Islam, as the “Other.” Those who value freedom of religion as a basic right in Canada must recognize it as a universal, not a selective right, and one which requires diligent effort on the part of both religious leaders and governments to make it a reality.

The author answers the following questions on the topic of Religion:

- 1) Developments on the world stage in recent years require better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada. What approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination?
- 2) Demographic projections show noticeable growth in some religions in Canada. What impact could this growth have on economic, social and political integration?
- 3) What are the implications, if any, of religious diversity on policy developments in Canada?
- 4) Is there religious extremism in Canada and what are the manifestations? What is its impact, if any, on the future of Canada?
- 5) What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and religious intolerance in general?
- 6) What is the place of religious issues in education and school curricula, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards?

After many years, when the topic of religion was virtually banned from public discourse and popular academic study by the prevalent emphasis on secular values, discussion of the role of religion in the political, economic and social lives of Canadians is suddenly fashionable and urgent. I contend that it is high time that we explore the role of religion in the development of our country and make conscious decisions to guide the evolution of future public policy.

Historically and sociologically, religion has played a major role in fashioning Canada as we know it, admittedly not always in the most positive way. We tend to overlook the consequences of the vicious sectoral conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in past centuries, or the result of concerted efforts through missions and residential schools to suppress the beliefs of First Nations peoples. Constitutionally, we have acknowledged and enshrined support for multiculturalism and freedom of religion, including the concept of freedom from religion. We institutionalized these values primarily as a result of our pragmatic recognition that we are a largely immigrant society made up of many peoples and beliefs; we needed a framework in which to accommodate diversity. Seldom do we pause to examine the extent to which we, as a nation, have internalized these stated values. Almost never do we acknowledge that the values themselves are rooted in the religious beliefs dominant among Canadians. It is time for a healthy and respectful dialogue about the role of religion and secularism in Canada. Such a discussion could be an engaging and productive way for us to build better understanding of the various beliefs among our citizens and communities and to decide how to embody the values we have articulated. But is that the direction the discussion is taking?

The discourse as it has evolved to date is not particularly fruitful, especially in the popular news media. Stories of the conflict in the Middle East or Africa emphasize that religious differences underlie the factionalism and hostility between opposing groups, but seldom analyze how religious beliefs interface with other critical factors, such as economics, culture and history. Concerns about terrorism focus primarily on an assumption that all terrorists are religious fanatics and their religion is the only impetus for their actions. There is little or no mention of the role of social and/or economic exclusion which influences extreme behaviour. Media commentators seek out spokespeople from selected religious groups to “explain,” usually in a few brief words, what their religion consists of and why it is important to their community. Seldom is this question asked of mainstream Protestants or Catholics, who continue to form the majority of religious Canadians.

Certain faith communities are challenged to defend their beliefs and prove that, despite their religion, they are worthy citizens of this country; these are not questions posed to mainstream religious groups. The story seldom points out that Judaism, Christianity and Islam share the same Abrahamic tradition. As a result, the impression that is given is that religion is only a factor if it is the religion of an existential “Other.” And the “Other” in the western world today is Islam, just as the “Other” was Judaism in the first half of the 20th century in Germany.

In Canada, as in much of the rest of the world, Islam is the fastest growing religion. As the number of Muslims grows, apprehension about “Otherness” also grows, particularly given the sharp decline in mainstream organized religions and the growing influence of secularism. Islam is gaining not just in numbers but also in economic and political influence, both in Canada and in the world as a whole. There is no doubting the economic power of Islamic states which possess vast oil and gas resources, desperately needed by the rest of the world. Nor can there be any illusion that the deliberate political efforts to characterize Muslims as the “other” are not intrinsically tied to the economic and political ambitions of the United States, France, Russia and others.

Power politics is just as evident in local communities as it is on the international stage. As a minority religious group increases in size and influence, apprehension about “Otherness” is magnified and those who have been dominant in the past seek to limit that expansion. It is an old political ploy to isolate the enemy, to make him seem less than human, to subject him to ridicule and oppression, and to make him the object of unreasoning fear, so that no one defends him rights when they are threatened. There are ominous signs in the case of the anti-terrorism laws, complaints about religious garb or the “codes of conduct” adopted gratuitously by small hamlets, for example, that ordinary Canadians may be falling into the trap of seeing their Muslim neighbours as the “Other.”

Many of us in Canada are woefully ignorant about religion. In our zeal to avoid trampling on the religious freedoms of others, we offer little public education about religions in general and encourage the isolation of specific religions in separate and private schools. By relegating education about religion to faith communities or separate and private school delivery, we are encouraging the teaching of specific tenets of faith in isolation, where children may receive no knowledge of and learn no respect for the beliefs of others. By teaching nothing of the role of religion in the public education system, we create a generation of children who cannot understand the influence of religion, either historically or contemporaneously. I often think with deep regret of a wonderful multi-faith curriculum that was developed in Ontario in the late 1980’s to accord with the principles of the Constitution and yet, still allow all students to learn about the diverse beliefs of the major world religions and how their values have common roots in concepts of peace, equality, and justice. It was never implemented in our schools or communities and we desperately need such a program to help rebuild our commitment to freedom of religion and multiculturalism.

Ignorance is always a rich seeding bed for prejudice. As much of the public commentary post 9/11 demonstrates, discrimination and hatred thrive on lack of knowledge and empathy, successfully defining the “Other” as evil always depends on ignorance. We need a meaningful dialogue in the education sector about how to counter ignorance of religions in general without castigating, promoting or enforcing any particular religious faith. We need to acknowledge that individuals who have religious faith of any sort, as well as those who oppose religion on principle, have often used their beliefs to justify violent actions. We have only to consider the Crusades, the Holocaust, Apartheid, the Cultural Revolution and the daily bombing of Sunnis by Shia and Shia by Sunnis to realize that such actions have been justified by all forms of religion. We need to give citizens the knowledge to analyze why only certain aspects of a religion might be seized upon to justify violence, when the basic teachings of the religion promote peace, equality and justice, and to question the impact social, economic and political exclusion have on religious interpretation and activities. We must also be prepared to examine what consequences might flow if secularism were to become the dominant belief structure should religion wane in importance.

As Canadians, we have adopted a public policy approach to organize political and legal institutions around inclusion which takes account of differences, rather than exclusion based on differences. Governments should scrutinize every piece of legislation, every policy and every program to ensure that support for the inclusion of all identified groups, which also takes appropriate account of differences, is actualized in our country. Not just religious groups, but the dominant majority of Canadians, must be prepared to consider whether supposedly neutral laws or policies impact differentially when the protected grounds under Section 15 of the Constitution, including religion, are taken into account. If so, we have an obligation to advocate for equitable treatment for all. All religions must recognize that, if the inclusion of one religious group is jeopardized, the inclusion of all could be in question. Governments under pressure have begun to be more attentive to inclusion with regard to sex and race, but they deal less effectively with religion – we cannot condone our governments’ picking and choosing among the protected grounds because one ground is more politically controversial than another.

Religious, civic and government leaders must work together to foster public awareness and to engage in meaningful debate about multiculturalism, secularism and freedom of religion in our society. If we have the courage to do so, I have no doubt that we will deepen our commitment to inclusion and stop the politics of “Otherness”. But if the debate does not occur, ignorance and fear may erode our core values and jeopardize our Charter commitments.

INTERVIEW WITH PATRICE BRODEUR

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Developments on the world stage in recent years require better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada. What approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination?

Religion, like many other identity markers and concepts, can be the source from which one can convincingly legitimate human behaviour of all kinds, from the worst violence to the greatest peace. In an interdependent world, religion plays as much a role in public life as does any other form of identity such as ethnicity, language, race, social class, or gender, to name but a few. Treating religion differently and expecting to keep religion in the private sphere – according to the dominant secular discourse within Canada but also within much of the international community – can lead to feelings of exclusions or of being unfairly singled out. Such emotions contribute to a growing radicalization expressed in the form of victimization and oppression, real or perceived, to oneself or to one’s community in general. It is therefore crucial to work, intellectually and spiritually, to integrate religion into not only public discourse but also into public life of all sectors, from education to the work place. What do I mean? Simply replace the word “religion” with “ethnicity” or “gender” or “physically handicapped”, and you will get the picture. In fact, much of the life of most faith-based communities is already engaged constructively in all aspects of public discourse in Canada, from health to politics to education. It is a question of expanding those practices by enlarging all tables where discussions on any aspect of public concern take place to include a wider variety of identity groups, including religious, ethnic, racial, social class, etc. By treating religious markers as any other identity markers and insuring full participation around the tables of public decision-making ensures the necessary long term integration for all communities, whatever the basis of their association might be. Social cohesion depends on this principle of non-exclusion, or written positively, of constantly seeking inclusion of all parties directly affected in any given matter.

In a nutshell, the problem is not with “religion” or with “segments of religions”, but with a simplistic understanding of secularism as necessarily demanding a privatization of religious beliefs and practices. While I strongly believe that no religious group can impose its agenda in the political realm, nor can any other identity group, including ideological groups. It is too easy to scapegoat religion today, as a way to blind citizens of much more urgent dangers linked to concentration of power, as in the economic and military realms. Therein resides the real challenge today: in order to ensure a greater practice of equitable and sustainable pluralism in all spheres of life, how do we expand the diversity of ideological perspectives within the various levels of the Canadian political system? By expanding our decision-making tables and following the principle of promoting ever greater diversity and inclusion, many forms of discrimination will be reduced, not only religious discriminations.

Demographic projections show noticeable growth in some religions in Canada. What impact could this growth have on economic, social and political integration?

The impact will depend on how well the process of inclusion (or exclusion) takes place in the next few years. This impact will be minimal for those immigrants that truly integrate into the social fabric – with successful integration first requiring professional insertion. However, the nature of immigrants’ economic, social, and political behaviour may change to reflect local concentrations of certain identity groups. There is nothing new in these social processes, whether the changes apply to language or ethnic or religious sensitivities.

What are the implications, if any, of religious diversity on policy developments in Canada?

True inclusion of religious diversity should enrich Canadian policies, both at home and abroad, if it first takes place in the education realm. This can be accomplished through the academic teaching about religion, especially in the formal schooling system, but also through specific add campaigns to educate the public about respect for religious diversity, best presented through campaigns about diversity in general.

Is there religious extremism in Canada and what are the manifestations? What is its impact, if any, on the future of Canada?

Religious extremism exists depending on how “extremism” is defined. First, it is important not to reduce “extremism” to “terrorism”, which is a very small sub-set of the first as far as Canada is concerned. One can be an extremist in one’s views without having any bearing on violent behaviour. In this respect, religious motivations promoting violence in Canada is probably minimal and no more important than any other motivational sources, although I lack the statistics to prove this point. Second, to the extent that accommodations of all kinds are made by common citizens to facilitate respect for our often very real differences in perspectives and real efforts to find mutually agreeable solutions are made, the levels of violent religious extremism (or other forms) will remain extremely low.

What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and religious intolerance in general?

Any form of exclusion and negative judgement can lead to intolerance of any kind. There are different patterns of social domination and marginalization in various regions of the world, as well as within Canada. Sharing our different perceptions of local, national, and transnational histories is an essential prerequisite to begin to take responsibility, in different ways for the various communities, for past injustices that many people to this day feel victimized by. The reproductive patterns of identity dynamics lead to tensions and conflicts that persist over generations, unless those historical heritages are purified of that which often causes emotional resentment and feelings of revenge against historic enemies.

What is the place of religious issues in education and school curricula, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards?

The above principles of respect, inclusion and equity remain especially relevant in all educational spaces. In fact, the question is not so much what is the place or the role of religion in education, but rather, what do various worldviews (religious or not) contribute to the process of educating respectful and inter-dependent global citizens. The new program in Ethic and Religious Culture that is currently under experimentation in a few Quebec schools, and that will become mandatory from September 2008 onwards, is an excellent example of a constructive approach that seeks to integrate all kinds of religious and non-religious identities and perspectives, while grounding students ethically and informing them about the rich diversity of religious and non-religious worldviews. At its heart lies the aim of educating all persons to practice an inter-worldview dialogue approach that will hopefully, in time, help us all transcend the Enlightenment heritage that is too often dichotomized as the “secular” versus the “religious”. By developing an inter-worldview approach to the teaching of ethic and religious culture, this program is taking a bold new step in the direction of a new paradigm shift towards greater inclusion and respect for all the identities and perspectives which make up the rich diversity of those human beings living in Canada at the moment.

RECOGNITION AS A CORE VALUE OF THE MULTICULTURAL PARADIGM

Micheline Milot

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ABSTRACT

The author answers the following questions on the topic of Religion:

- 1) Developments on the world stage in recent years require better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada. What approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination?
- 2) Demographic projections show noticeable growth in some religions in Canada. What impact could this growth have on economic, social and political integration?
- 3) What are the implications, if any, of religious diversity on policy developments in Canada?
- 4) Is there religious extremism in Canada and what are the manifestations? What is its impact, if any, on the future of Canada?
- 5) What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and religious intolerance in general?
- 6) What is the place of religious issues in education and school curricula, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards?

RELIGION

The controversies surrounding multiculturalism affect all democratic societies. Indeed, these controversies seem to have intensified over the last ten years, especially concerning religion. One of the aspects of this controversy deals with *identity* – be it claimed, confirmed or assigned – and with *recognition*, which is increasingly emerging as a fundamental value of multicultural epistemology. But the supposed threat raised by multiculturalism is usually that of social disintegration, that is, a myriad of identity affiliations exerting a centripetal force on the groups' members. Is this fear well founded? I think not.

To varying degrees, individuals think of their integration into the political sphere in terms of how they perceive themselves and the image with which they have become identified, in short, with their own complex and multifaceted identity. Religion is a part of this multifaceted identity. Except in rare cases, religious groups do not claim collective rights with a view to creating an autonomous political community within the State. They want public institutions and laws to be more responsive to cultural differences, and thus to recognize, respect and integrate them. There is a shift in the act of representation in what is akin to a *democracy of identities*:

“It is a question of representing the distinction among persons and among groups, and of representing them in the sense of making and maintaining the public visibility of this distinction. It involves ensuring their participation as equals in public discussion, but by virtue of what differentiates them, of what they themselves see as their essential distinctiveness”.¹

For some authors, these dynamics of identity lead perforce to the liberal *archipelago* of communities (as described by Kukathas). Accordingly, the scope of political theories was greatly transformed, especially regarding the issue of *recognition*. This can be linked to the observable empirical dynamics of identities.

The Dynamics of Identity and Recognition

The influence of de Rawls in the United States opened up the *issue of justice* as a fundamental pre-requisite for the equality of citizens in a pluralistic society. His theory undoubtedly improved the prospects for *recognition*, even though the latter concept is not central to his political philosophy. Charles Taylor made a more direct contribution by giving the “politics of recognition” a more important role in his social theory.² Fraser³ later formalized a new way of thinking about recognition, by asserting the need to replace the redistribution (of economic and social goods) with recognition of personal dignity. In a similar vein, A. Honneth⁴ maintains that the idea of recognition, together with its opposite (lack of

respect, humiliation), constitute an excellent litmus test for attitudes of injustice in multicultural society. According to Honneth, the normative premises of social interaction are based on the reciprocal principles of mutual recognition that help form a positive self-image. There is a connection between this thesis and that of C. Taylor, who focuses on the *dialogism* through which identity is formed: “The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *misrecognition* of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back a confining, demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves”⁵. Thus, these authors prompt us to view recognition as a core value of the multicultural paradigm.

Despite the politicization that is inevitable in identity dynamics, it seems that recognition, in the way Fraser and even Taylor understand it, is more conducive to encouraging respectful interaction. Recognition also prevents identity-related counter-attacks that arise in reaction to identities imposed or denied by a State advocating a universalistic common identity. Group cohesion is still a concern of constitutional States, but this cohesion is no longer the upshot of individual wills subsumed under a homogeneous and unifying political project. Identity dynamics change conceptions of collective life. Thus, the claims of political neutrality and promises of equality proclaimed by liberal democracies must tally with what occurs in the real life of citizens.

The legal interpretation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Policy* is linked to a type of recognition that places great importance on individual choice (in accordance with the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*), provides safeguards against pressures to conform (either vis-à-vis the majority group or within minority groups) and views the integration of diversity, within the public sphere, as a positive value. However, up to what point is the accommodation of civil society demands of a religious nature compatible with the principle of the equality of all before the law and does it really promote integration? Can the legal activism of members of religious groups exploit multiculturalism for communitarian purposes?

The Case of Kirpan

The case of a young Sikh boy being banned from wearing his traditional kirpan to school in Quebec reveals to us the democratic values that link multiculturalism, recognition and freedom of religion from a juridical standpoint. At first, the Superior Court of Quebec allowed the kirpan to be worn in school under certain conditions designed to meet security requirements.⁶ The school board contested this decision all the way to the Supreme Court.⁷ The judges allowed an appeal and declared the decision of the Board of Commissioners to be void. The Court saw the wearing of the kirpan as a sincere expression of faith, based on a liberal interpretative tradition of religious rights: “In assessing the sincerity of the belief, a court must take into account, *inter alia*, the credibility of the testimony of the person asserting the particular belief and the consistency of the belief with his or her other current religious practices”⁹. The Court, acknowledging that the

wearing of the kirpan is based on genuine religious belief, stated that the absolute refusal by the Board of Commissioners to allow it to be worn infringed on the freedom of religion guaranteed by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Extracts from the decision illustrate that it tended strongly to interpret *recognition* as a fundamental value connected to multiculturalism. First, the Court bore in mind that it was not obliged to refer to more liberal interpretations of Sikhs religious standards on the wearing of the kirpan, and also referred to its own jurisprudence: “The fact that different people practice the same religion in different ways does not affect the validity of the case of a person alleging that his or her freedom of religion has been infringed”⁹.

Recognition of others – and of the symbols that express their identity – as well as tolerance, are values associated with multiculturalism. Therefore, judges make peremptory reference to them. They reject the argument that the wearing of the kirpan should be prohibited because it is a symbol of violence. They also reject the argument that it sends the message that the use of force is necessary to assert rights and that conflict resolution must fail. “Not only is this assertion contradicted by the evidence regarding the symbolic nature of the kirpan, it is also disrespectful to believers in the Sikh religion and does not take into account Canadian values based on multiculturalism”.

Recognition and Education

The main integration and socialization organizations (primarily schools and educational institutions) lack programs designed to promote recognition and tolerance. The educational role of schools in promoting these values figured prominently in the judges’ line of reasoning: “[I]t is incumbent on the schools to discharge their obligation to instill in their students this value that is [...] at the very foundation of our democracy”¹¹. Actually, authorizing the wearing of the kirpan comes under individual rights and is not associated with a collective right granted to minorities¹², thus reminding us yet again that multiculturalism does not go hand in hand with communitarianism. The objective sought in accepting religious particularisms in the public sphere is, in addition to meeting the requirements of Canadian law (Article 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*), integrating individuals who belong to minority groups into the institutions of the majority:

“Since we have found that the council of commissioners’ decision is not a reasonable limit on religious freedom, it is not strictly necessary to weigh the deleterious effects of this measure [leaving the public school system] against its salutary effects. [...] An absolute prohibition would stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism, diversity, and the development of an educational culture respectful of the rights of others”¹³.

The schools have a core role to instill the recognition of the multiplicity of conceptions of life that co-exist in the *Polis*. School is without a doubt one of the first places where children have daily contact with a range of values

and worldviews which shape individual identities. Whether schools are secular, denominational or ecumenical, they all share certain features: 1) there is no real homogenous group of students, even within the same religious tradition, since religious practices and espousal of beliefs differ from one family to another and from one individual to another; 2) in modern society there are different ways of conceiving what constitutes a “good” human life, and these conceptions arise from various religious and non-religious views; 3) children do retain their values and convictions when they enter the classroom. Neither children nor adults can be asked to abandon a large part of their identity in order to form a relationship with others.

Multicultural democratic states are expected to guarantee the paramount educational interests of children, which we have already looked at briefly. A key dimension of education is a child’s right to be fully prepared for life as a citizen within a democratic and multicultural society. Citizens, however, must live together despite their moral and religious differences. Enhanced awareness of the religious dimension should be aimed at ensuring that each child, to whatever extent he or she identifies with a particular religious group, is able to acquire a positive sense of identity, without fear of being judged by others. The more a group feels marginalized socially because of its beliefs or the way such beliefs are publicly expressed, the more frequently it resorts to aggressive or defensive withdrawal strategies, at the expense of citizen participation. In conclusion, education should focus on developing abilities and attitudes which, in a manner of speaking, are the tools needed for the full exercise of citizenship. To augment this, state and policy developments need to encourage greater intercultural understanding and tolerance.

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- ⁶ Wooden scabbard, wrapped with and sewn into a sturdy fabric; the assembly is sewn into the guthra.
- ⁷ (2006). *Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys*. SCC 6.
- ⁸ *Multani*, 35.
- ⁹ *Multani*, 35.
- ¹⁰ *Multani*, 71.
- ¹¹ *Multani*, 76.
- ¹² That said, it is not inconceivable that some individuals in minority groups will interpret the legal right of a person identified with this group as a group right, or even as a community right. However, their interpretation would constitute a legal misconception.
- ¹³ *Multani*, op. cit., 78.

PROFILAGE ETHNIQUE : DÉRIVE DU POUVOIR DISCRÉTIONNAIRE VERS L'ABUS DE POUVOIR ?

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente quelques définitions concernant le profilage racial pratiqué par la loi et conçu par certains fonctionnaires et certaines agences en Ontario et au Québec. Nous présenterons aussi les principaux effets négatifs de cette pratique sur l'individu, les communautés locales et les minorités visibles, surtout en ce qui a trait à la méfiance, la colère et la peur envers les agences de sécurité publique et le système judiciaire. Dans la seconde partie, nous proposons des explications hypothétiques basées sur de la recherche sur le terrain effectuée à Montréal, Bruxelles et Genève au cours des deux dernières années dans les services policiers sur des pratiques et politiques organisationnelles basées sur des données ethno-démographiques. Finalement, nous soumettons des avenues de solutions pour prévenir, détecter et combattre ces pratiques illicites et illégales.

INTRODUCTION

Les relations entre les services de police et les groupes ethniques s'inscrivent dans des rapports politiques, sociaux et professionnels entre une institution du maintien de l'ordre et les groupes minoritaires et racisés. Ces groupes sont souvent victimes de violence, de discrimination et de racisme dans la société. La police n'est pas plus exempte de ces comportements que les autres institutions, mais ce corps professionnel se distingue d'autres corps (médecins, travailleurs sociaux, enseignants, etc.) dans la mesure où elle est la seule institution dont le mode de contrôle se décline autant en termes de prévention, de dissuasion que de répression¹.

L'un des ressorts, pour ne pas dire LE ressort, de l'intervention policière est, et demeure, l'imposition de son autorité. Celle-ci s'exprime plus souvent qu'autrement par le recours non négocié d'une solution autoritaire, fondée sur la force plutôt que sur le dialogue et la persuasion.

De là se développe chez plusieurs policiers un sentiment d'impunité ou, à tout le moins, de se percevoir simultanément à part et au dessus du reste de la société, les amenant à poser des gestes ou à avoir des comportements dérogatoires, et ce, nonobstant les dispositifs disciplinaires et déontologiques existants au sein des organisations policières. Il semble que ces policiers ne reconnaîtraient, comme unique légitime mandant, la majorité dont ils sont issus qu'ils opposeraient aux groupes minoritaires et racisés².

Cette solution autoritaire, quoique de moins en moins fondée sur la force coercitive revêt, des formes plus « douces » et se revendique comme de la prévention situationnelle, en ciblant les infracteurs potentiels de crimes ou encore en déployant pour un même événement, des dispositifs d'intervention d'ampleur différente, tout dépendant s'il s'agisse d'infracteurs du groupe majoritaire ou d'infracteurs de groupes minoritaires ou racisés. Le profilage ethnique* appartient à cette forme de violence.

Le profilage ethnique, décrit par certains comme du *statistical discrimination*, se distingue du stéréotype raciste ou du délit de faciès en ce sens qu'il se fonde sur un calcul probabiliste et prétendument rationnel à l'effet que, selon le type de délit et le profil de l'infracteur, le profilage ethnique permet de prévenir la commission d'actes criminels et à coup sûr d'arrêter un plus grand nombre d'infracteurs. Nous sommes ici en présence d'une « pratique limite » qui n'est fondée ni en droit, dans la mesure où le profilage ethnique n'équivaut à rien d'autre qu'à du harcèlement illégal, ni en raison, puisqu'elle repose sur un sophisme³.

Il n'en reste pas moins que, sous couvert de scientificité et au nom de la prévention de la commission d'actes criminels, cette pratique au sein des agences de maintien de l'ordre en général et des forces policières en particulier est l'expression de ces solutions autoritaires qui, loin d'améliorer les relations entre les représentants des institutions en question et les

groupes racisés, ne font qu'au contraire les exacerber.

Cette pratique limite se trouve, en quelque sorte, légitimée depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. En effet, plusieurs sociétés démocratiques ont adopté des législations antiterroristes qui donnent encore plus de pouvoir aux policiers. Ceux-ci pourront détenir de façon préventive des prévenus, ou des individus, qu'ils soupçonnent appartenir à des groupes ou des réseaux terroristes. On voit bien le potentiel de dérives ou d'abus qu'une telle législation offre aux policiers qui, sous couvert de la loi et de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire, pourraient laisser libre cours à des pratiques de harcèlement.

Dans le cadre de cet article, nous traitons de façon particulière de cette forme de violence qu'est le profilage ethnique envers les groupes racisés en contexte urbain. Nous proposons d'en cerner les principales causes, après avoir suggéré quelques définitions opératoires et les fondements de cette forme de violence, et de mettre de l'avant certaines pistes d'action en vue d'éradiquer cette pratique que plusieurs qualifient de limite et d'autres d'illégitime.

FONDEMENTS ET DÉFINITIONS OPÉRATOIRES DU PROFILAGE ETHNIQUE

La notion de profilage ethnique, loin d'être simple, correspond au fait que certains groupes sociaux paraissent, aux yeux des forces de l'ordre, présenter un risque plus grand que d'autres segments de la société. L'origine ethnique, sans être l'unique facteur, s'ajoute au sexe ou à l'âge, le plus souvent, aux deux. La perception qu'ont les forces de l'ordre d'un certain groupe social résulte d'expériences souvent mal comprises ou mal assimilées, mais tout de même ancrées dans le vécu des représentants de l'ordre.

Autrement dit, la cible la plus fréquente des interpellations, des contrôles d'identité et des fouilles serait l'individu considéré, à tort ou à raison, comme suspect ou potentiellement dangereux par les commerçants et les résidents locaux. On reconnaît le jeune à l'aspect menaçant, avec coiffure mohawk, tatouages, jeans déchirés, vêtu de cuir et de chaînes, ou bien le jeune issu de milieux défavorisés, le jeune maghrébin, le jeune noir ou encore le jeune amérindien.

Fondements

Phénomène contesté aux États-Unis depuis les années 1970, le profilage ethnique se fonde sur des politiques voulant que certains genres de délits soient reliés aux individus appartenant à des groupes ethniques en particulier⁴. Initialement, les individus étaient victimes de cette forme de discrimination dans le cadre de la lutte contre la criminalité et le trafic de stupéfiants, l'*Operation Pipeline*⁵.

Ces règles de pratique ont été importées subséquemment au Canada dans les années 1990, suite à de la formation reçue aux États-Unis par des membres de la Gendarmerie Royale du Canada⁶. Les personnes qui étaient alors généralement victimes de profilage étaient les Noirs, les Latino-Américains et les Autochtones. Toutefois, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, on y a ajouté les personnes d'origine arabe ou de religion musulmane⁷.

Force est de constater que le profilage ethnique prend sa source autant dans des pratiques plus ou moins officielles que de lois à portée discriminatoire. Mentionnons à

cet effet la *Loi antiterroriste*⁸ qui peut avoir une incidence démesurée sur des personnes de certaines origines, notamment des pays arabes; la *Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés* qui prévoit des mesures de renvoi pour des immigrants (statut de résidence permanente) reconnus coupables de certaines infractions quel que soit le nombre d'années passées au Canada, leurs liens avec leur pays d'origine ou l'existence de liens familiaux au Canada⁹.

Scot Wortley¹⁰ souligne la fragmentation du discours entre « nous » et « eux »; les personnes issues des groupes minoritaires sont représentées davantage comme des assaillants; le crime individuel commis par un Blanc est signalé comme une pathologie individuelle, tandis que le crime individuel commis par une personne des groupes « racisés » est interprété comme un trait culturel.

Quelques définitions

Aux États-Unis, la plupart des définitions du profilage ethnique se rattachent aux interventions, sans motif valable, des agents responsables du maintien de l'ordre ou de la sécurité publique envers les individus du fait principalement de leur race ou de leur appartenance ethnique¹¹.

L'African Canadian Legal Clinic, basée à Toronto, a adopté la définition suivante :

« Racial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling refers to that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on the basis of race or colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. In this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal propensity of an entire racial group ».

Pour la Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne, l'expression profilage ethnique devrait :

« ...englober **toute action prise pour des raisons de sûreté, de sécurité ou de protection du public** qui repose sur des stéréotypes fondés sur la race, la couleur, l'ethnie, la religion, le lieu d'origine ou une combinaison de ces facteurs plutôt que sur un soupçon raisonnable, dans le but d'isoler une personne à des fins d'examen ou de traitement particulier (...) L'âge et le sexe peuvent également avoir une incidence sur l'expérience du profilage ethnique (...) »

(...) le « profilage racial » se distingue du « profilage criminel », lequel ne prend pas pour base des stéréotypes, mais se fonde sur un comportement réel ou sur des renseignements relatifs à une présumée activité de la part d'une personne qui répond à un certain signalement. En d'autres termes, le profilage criminel diffère du profilage ethnique, puisque le premier découle de preuves objectives d'un comportement délictueux, tandis que le second se fonde sur des présomptions stéréotypées. »

C'est en s'inspirant des définitions ontariennes et amé-

ricaines que la Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec propose au ministre des Relations avec les citoyens et l'Immigration, à l'été 2003, la définition suivante :

« Le profilage ethnique désigne toute action prise par une ou des personnes d'autorité à l'égard d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes, pour des raisons de sûreté, de sécurité ou de protection du public, qui repose sur des facteurs tels la race, la couleur, l'origine ethnique ou nationale ou la religion, sans motif réel ou soupçon raisonnable, et qui a pour effet d'exposer la personne à un examen ou à un traitement différentiel. »

En Ontario, le service de la police de Kingston a pour sa part entrepris une étude, la première du genre au Canada, afin d'analyser la fréquence et la nature des interventions (dans les espaces publics et sur la voie publique) des agents de la paix auprès des personnes selon leur appartenance ethnique. Les résultats préliminaires concluent à l'existence du profilage ethnique dans le corps de police de Kingston, notamment à l'égard des Noirs et des Autochtones. Par exemple, selon les premières analyses, un Noir (les hommes sont beaucoup plus interpellés que les femmes) âgé entre 15 et 24 ans court trois fois plus le risque d'être interpellé par la police qu'un Blanc du même âge, sans égard à leur représentation dans la ville. Selon l'auteur Scot Wortley, qui a conduit l'étude, d'autres analyses et études restent à faire afin de déterminer et de faire les liens possibles entre le taux d'interpellation et les comportements déviants selon l'appartenance ethnique.

LES EFFETS PERVERS DU PROFILAGE ETHNIQUE

Tel qu'exprimé par plusieurs membres des communautés affectées, la pratique du profilage ethnique a un impact négatif sur différents plans. Une image de délinquance de l'ensemble de la communauté se crée et se cristallise dans les représentations collectives, lorsque reprise par les médias. La police, dans son ensemble, est vue comme un adversaire par des segments complets de ces communautés : nombre de témoignages sont rapportés à l'effet que les jeunes des minorités visibles ont peur ou se méfient de la police. Lorsqu'il y a atteinte à la dignité des personnes qui subissent des contrôles policiers à répétition, la collaboration avec la police devient plus difficile, et il y a un risque réel que cette pratique, loin de combattre ou de prévenir la délinquance, contribue à son émergence. La stigmatisation groupale et humiliation individuelle ajoutées à la méfiance à l'égard des appareils d'état produisent un ressentiment de la part des collectivités locales.

Dès lors, pour comprendre de tels agissements, il nous faut replacer le policier comme acteur défini par son appartenance à des systèmes d'actions et se demander quels mécanismes, de l'ordre de la sous culture policière et de la représentation de l'altérité, sont mis en branle pour comprendre les recours à cette pratique.

Cette pratique traduit, condense et exprime avant tout des préjugés et des attitudes qui dépassent, et de très loin, la seule institution policière; le policier serait en quelque sorte « le représentant du citoyen lambda » avec des maux

qu'on lui associe (les rites et rituels, la revendication de la différence, le côté grégaire des communautés et des bandes, la délinquance et l'omerta ethniques, etc.).

Bref, la pratique du profilage ethnique aurait l'assentiment de la population (majoritaire) qui, quelque part et sans le dire trop fort, légitimerait les forces de l'ordre dans leurs recours à cet usage de la force : une procuration pour passer aux actes à sa place en quelque sorte. La société se sentirait menacée par les étrangers et les immigrants, perçus comme suspects, comme des ennemis de l'intérieur.

Ce procédé et cette mise en catégorie seraient spécifiques aux institutions du maintien de l'ordre et tiendraient de leurs modes de recrutement et de sélection (des organisations fondées sur la reproduction), de la personnalité des *law enforcers*, ou encore de la sous culture policière, de l'histoire de ce type d'organisation et de l'environnement dans lequel travaillent ces intervenants.

Organisation encore fortement homogène au plan socio-économique et ethnodémographique, la police recrute encore massivement dans les mêmes bassins de la population et façonne ses recrues à l'aune d'une même sous-culture insulaire du « nous et les autres » et d'une compréhension plutôt unidimensionnelle de sa mission : le maintien de l'ordre.

Comment expliquer la récurrence de cette pratique illégitime au sein des appareils du maintien de l'ordre ? À partir de plusieurs témoignages de policiers sur trois terrains (Montréal, Paris et Bruxelles), nous avançons l'hypothèse de l'inconfort, de la crainte ou de la peur que ressentent bon nombre de policiers face à la diversification ethnoculturelle du tissu urbain, ainsi que de l'absence de compétences, autres que techniques, pour transiger avec ce type de changement et de la pression aux résultats émanant des échelons supérieurs de la chaîne de commandement¹³.

La peur renvoie au construit policier à l'égard des groupes racisés, à ce qui circule dans les postes au sujet de la criminalité ethnique ou encore à l'équation entre insécurité et immigration; le tout étayé et renforcé par la couverture médiatique d'une certaine presse publique (fort lue en milieu policier) où immanquablement l'origine ethnique est soulignée quand on parle de délinquance et de criminalité ou bien lorsque les quartiers multiethniques se trouvent affublés de l'épithète de ghetto ou encore celui de Bronx.

La peur procède de cette imbrication entre représentations, hauts faits d'armes policiers (peu importe si ces faits sont vrais ou non), sous culture insulaire du « nous et eux » qui se renforce et s'auto entretient par l'homogénéité culturelle du milieu policier et par des relations des plus artificielles avec les communautés et les groupes racisés, dues pour l'essentiel au fait que les policiers ne résident pas dans la ville et à leur méconnaissance (superficielle et partielle) des collectivités locales au sein desquelles ils interviennent.

En ce qui a trait au manque de compétences, il est à mettre en relation avec la peur. Le recours au profilage ethnique est alors symptomatique d'une incapacité à faire autre chose, autrement. Cette incapacité s'explique, entre autres, par le fait que la question des relations entre la

police et les groupes racisés n'est, à toutes fins pratiques, jamais considérée sérieusement par les dirigeants des organisations policières sauf, bien évidemment, en situation de crise.

Culture générale plutôt pauvre, connaissances lacunaires du champ des relations interethniques, manque de savoir-faire et difficultés de rendre opérationnels, dans le cadre du travail quotidien des patrouilleurs, les principes et les stratégies de la médiation et de la résolution de problèmes. Ne sachant comment procéder, le recours à la force sert à pallier le défaut d'autres ressources pour s'assurer le contrôle de l'échange, la carence d'autorité. Bref, la pratique du profilage ethnique fait écran au manque de compétences des agents de l'ordre, tout en leur donnant l'apparence du maintien de leur autorité.

La pression aux résultats, se présente quant à elle, comme l'expression de la contradiction structurelle de la tâche policière, entre l'obligation de moyens et l'obligation de résultats. La population attend beaucoup de la police en termes de résultats. Cependant, on attend surtout que, dans nos États de droit, ces résultats soient obtenus dans le plus strict respect des normes prescrites, à commencer par le code de procédures pénales.

Pistes d'actions pour contrer le profilage ethnique

Outre les actions en justice, les actions mises de l'avant par la Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne se présente, dans l'état actuel des choses, comme étant les plus prometteuses. À titre d'exemple, la Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne¹⁴ retient l'importance de :

- Informer et sensibiliser la population en général, les groupes vulnérables au profilage ethnique ainsi que les acteurs institutionnels (gouvernement, police, avocats, juges, agences de sécurité, agents d'immigration, etc.);
- Prévenir et identifier les situations propices au profilage ethnique. La cueillette systématique des informations concernant l'apparence (âge, sexe, race, signe religieux, etc.) des personnes interpellées lors de toute intervention des agents en autorité pourrait avoir un effet dissuasif, permettre de mesurer l'ampleur du phénomène et faciliter le cas échéant, la preuve devant les tribunaux;
- Légiférer d'une manière spécifique en la matière, prévoir des sanctions pénales et civiles appropriées et voir à l'efficacité du système de gestion des plaintes portées contre les agents chargés d'appliquer la loi.

Les dirigeants des agences de sécurité et des organisations policières doivent questionner ces pratiques illégitimes comme symptomatiques d'un déficit de compé-

tences. Pour ce faire, ils doivent intégrer dans les politiques et les orientations corporatives de même que dans les pratiques de gestion, la composante du dépistage des déviances et des préjugés et la question des relations communautaires, comme faisant partie des fondamentaux d'une police de proximité. Au plan du dépistage, c'est à ces mêmes dirigeants qu'incombe la responsabilité de redéfinir le profil des jeunes recrues, de leurs compétences de base (savoir, savoir-faire et savoir être et de leur capacité à transiger avec des populations hétérogènes. De même, ils ont la responsabilité de s'assurer que le personnel de première ligne – agents et superviseurs – ne soit pas empreint de préjugés ou de stéréotypes à l'égard des groupes minoritaires en général, et des groupes racisés en particulier.

Par exemple, les tests psychométriques utilisés à l'embauche et lors des examens de promotion mesurent la qualité de la flexibilité et le rapport à l'altérité des candidats. Il en est de même des mises en situation, qui permettent de mieux cerner leurs aptitudes à la prise de décision. Ces dispositifs doivent être congruents avec les valeurs de l'organisation policière, qui envoie un message univoque de tolérance zéro envers toute forme de déviance de son personnel.

De la même façon qu'après chaque opération policière, il y a une rétroaction opérationnelle – les *débriefings* – on pourrait tout à fait concevoir des rétroactions perceptuelles/émotionnelles (faute d'une meilleure appellation) où il ne s'agirait pas de sanctionner le comportement du policier, mais bien de comprendre pourquoi il a agi de telle manière plutôt que de telle autre, et quels ont été les mécanismes ou les sentiments qui l'ont amené à poser un tel geste, par exemple. Ces rétroactions devraient être conduites par le superviseur (préalablement formé) et par un professionnel rompu à la relation d'aide ou à la médiation.

En aucun cas ces rétroactions ne doivent être prétexte à la sanction, mais plutôt servir à mieux comprendre les difficultés que peuvent éprouver ces policiers dans leurs rapports avec les groupes minoritaires et racisés, de mieux comprendre également pourquoi ces policiers ont une telle représentation des groupes racisés. Ce genre de *débriefing* est d'autant plus pertinent qu'il permet de déboucher sur des activités de formation qui collent au plus près de la réalité quotidienne des policiers, tant au plan des opérations policières qu'au plan des représentations.

Il y a donc une congruence nécessaire à rechercher et à articuler entre les dispositifs de dépistage de la déviance, dispositifs qui relèvent tout autant des ressources humaines que de l'éthique, les valeurs organisationnelles et les actes de formation à développer.

Cette congruence passe également par une éthique de

En Ontario, le service de la police de Kingston a pour sa part entrepris une étude, la première du genre au Canada, afin d'analyser la fréquence et la nature des interventions (dans les espaces publics et sur la voie publique) des agents de la paix auprès des personnes selon leur appartenance ethnique.

l'intervention, de l'obligance et de la reddition de comptes. La viabilité et la légitimité du service de la police résident avant tout dans la qualité de son personnel et de ses compétences humaines plutôt que techniques. La véritable professionnalisation de cette institution ne peut se limiter qu'aux seules dimensions instrumentales et techniques du maintien de l'ordre et du recours à la force. Elle ne peut plus longtemps faire l'économie d'une révolution tranquille de ses habitus et de sa sous-culture.

La qualité d'encadrement semble être le facteur déterminant dans la qualité des interventions des agents de la paix. La capacité d'un agent d'agir de façon cohérente, et non pas sous l'emprise d'une trop forte émotivité, dépend en bonne partie du travail de son supérieur. De même, la remise en question de stéréotypes relève avant tout des interventions faites par les supérieurs immédiats.

Il appert que la sensibilisation des cadres, supérieurs et intermédiaires ainsi que leur imputabilité pour la modification de la culture institutionnelle sont autant de conditions indispensables à toute amélioration des relations entre la police et les groupes racisés.

Il y a urgence. Urgence, pour les institutions du maintien de l'ordre et de justice, d'une réforme en profondeur de leurs habitus et de leur sous-culture. Urgence de reconnaître que le profilage ethnique est une pratique illégitime, et de prendre tous les moyens pour y mettre fin. Urgence également à rebâtir et regagner la confiance des groupes racisés, à commencer par les jeunes. Urgence de démontrer, hors de tout doute, que ces institutions traitent chaque citoyen en toute équité, indépendamment de l'origine ethnique, culturelle ou religieuse. Il en va de la pérennité de nos valeurs démocratiques.

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- ⁷ Emerson Douyon, «L'impact du 11 septembre sur les communautés ethnoculturelles au Canada», dans *Terrorisme, droit et démocratie, Comment le Canada est-il changée après le 11 septembre?*, Institut canadien d'administration de la justice, Éditions Thémis, 2002, p. 193 – 197.
- ⁸ Voir à ce sujet : ASSOCIATION DU BARREAU CANADIEN, *Mémoire à pro-*

pos de l'examen triennal de la Loi antiterroriste, mai 2005

- ⁹ Cela a pour effet d'imposer une «double peine», d'enfreindre plusieurs droits fondamentaux, tels que le droit à la vie, à la sûreté, à l'intégrité et à la liberté de sa personne, en plus d'avoir des répercussions discriminatoires dans la mesure où ces expulsions affectent de manière disproportionnée des individus de certaines origines ethniques ou raciales. Voir : OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, «Discrimination raciale dans l'administration de la justice», présentation au Comité des Nations Unies sur l'élimination de la discrimination raciale lors de sa 65^e session, août 2004.
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- ¹¹ Par exemple, dans Deborah RAMIREZ, Jack McDEVITT and Amy FARRELL, *A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems – Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*, Northeastern University, 2000,
- ¹² Soulignons aussi que le service de la police de la Ville de Montréal (un des membres du groupe de travail), dans le cadre d'une politique d'intervention «Politique d'intervention numéro 259-1, Le profilage racial et illicite» mise en vigueur le 22 mars 2004 pour prévenir et contrer le profilage ethnique, a retenu une définition très semblable pour les fins de ses opérations : «Le profilage racial et illicite se définit comme étant toute action initiée par des personnes en autorité à l'égard d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes, pour des raisons de sécurité ou de protection du public et qui repose seulement sur des facteurs tels que la race, l'origine ethnique, la couleur, la religion, la langue, la condition sociale, l'âge, le sexe, le handicap, l'orientation sexuelle, les convictions politiques dans le but d'exposer l'individu à un examen ou un traitement différentiel alors qu'il n'y a pas de motifs réels ou de soupçons raisonnables.» (Nos soulignés)
- ¹³ Dominique MONJARDET, «Force publique, compétence professionnelle et mission institutionnelle», dans : «Non-violence, que fait la police?» «Alternatives non violentes», revue trimestrielle, Versailles, Centre National du Livre, no 118, printemps 2001.
- ¹⁴ Pour donner suite à ces propositions, le MRCI a organisé des rencontres avec le ministère de la Justice qui a mis un comité sur pied pour étudier les actions à prendre relevant de leur compétence respective. Par ailleurs, les responsables de la formation du ministère de l'Éducation (MEQ), de l'École nationale de police (l'ENP) et des Services de police ont été mis à contribution. Mentionnons comme mesure concrète, l'introduction d'ores et déjà du concept de profilage ethnique lors des sessions de formation continue des policiers ainsi que dans la formation des futurs policiers à partir de septembre 2005.

INTERVIEW WITH KENT ROACH

Kent Roach

Kent Roach is a Professor of Law at the University of Toronto where he holds the Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy. He has specialized in anti-terrorism law and policy and was a member of the Research Advisory Committee of the Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar.

Are there adverse impacts of perceived linkages among religion, ethnicity/race and/or security/policing issues (e.g. racial profiling)?

Stereotypes associating Muslims with terrorism pose a barrier to equal citizenship. Much national security activity takes place in secret and does not result in adjudication. Many grievances about discriminatory profiling may never be fully considered and could result in resentment and fear in the relevant communities. In addition to offending equality values, discriminatory profiling could adversely affect the integration of various communities within Canadian society. Perceptions of unfair treatment, if not dispelled by independent investigation and appropriate remedial action, may affect the attitudes of many minorities towards the Canadian state and Canadian society.

Discriminatory racial or religious profiling is wrong in principle because it offends Canadian values of equality and individual responsibility. It is also flawed in instrumental and practical terms because it can waste limited investigative resources and it can create fear and resentment in the very communities that could help the police and other officials prevent terrorism and respond to crimes.

How do we respond to links made by some Canadians between immigrants and security concerns?

Although the links made by some Canadians between immigrants and security fears are the result of unfair stereotypes that run counter to the values of equality and individual responsibility, we should recognize that the Canadian state bears some responsibility for such perceptions. Until fairly recently, the Canadian state relied on immigration law as anti-terrorism law. It used, and continues to use, security certificates under immigration law to indeterminately detain five non-citizens suspected of involvement with terrorism. One of the reasons why these cases have dragged on for so long is that both the Supreme Court and the Canadian government has regrettably refused to rule out the option of deporting these men back to countries such as Syria where they face a risk of torture. The Smart Border Agreement between Canada and the United States was oriented towards security issues, but also included a Safe Third Country agreement which deflects to the United States most refugee applicants who reach the United States before coming to Canada. Instead of targeted measures designed to reject the refugee claims of suspected terrorists, the Safe Third Country Agreement takes overinclusive and broad brush measures that will reject thousands of possible refugee applicants each year, without regard to the circumstances and merits of their individual case.

Canadians are starting to recognize that linkages between immigration and security concerns are short-sighted. Although the 1985 bombings of Air India Flight 182 resulting in 331 deaths were motivated by events in India, they were likely committed by Canadian citizens. The 2005 London bombings have confirmed that the threat of Al Qaeda inspired terrorism is not limited to non-citizens. A year before the London bombings, the House of Lords declared that indeterminate detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism was discriminatory and not rationally connected with the prevention of international terrorism, because it wrongly assumed that the terrorist threat came solely from non-citizens and could be dealt with through deportations. Links that some Canadians may draw between immigration and terrorism are wrong because they offend values of equality and individual responsibility. They are also dangerous because they wrongly assume that the terrorist threat will come only from non-citizens.

What can be done at the federal, provincial and territorial levels to address the issue of racial profiling?

The Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar has made several recommendations that are relevant to discriminatory profiling. It found that the RCMP had provided inaccurate and unfair information about Maher Arar to American officials, including a description of both Mr. Arar and his wife as: "Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement".¹ Three of the Commission's twenty-three recommendations touched on issues relating to multiculturalism. It recommended that national security

investigators receive better training including social context training about Canada's Arab and Muslim communities in order "to avoid relying on stereotypes about race, religion or ethnicity in investigations" and to improve relations and outreach with those communities.² Justice O'Connor also recommended that Canadian agencies have "clear written policies" stating that national security investigations "must not be based on racial, religious or ethnic profiling" to respond to:

an increased risk of racial, religious or ethnic profiling, in the sense that the race, religion or ethnicity of individuals may expose them to investigation. Profiling in this sense would be at odds with the need for equal application of the law without discrimination and with Canada's embrace of multiculturalism. Profiling that relies on stereotypes is also contrary to the need... for relevant, reliable, accurate and precise information in national security investigations. Profiling based on race, religion or ethnicity is the antithesis of good policing or security intelligence work.³

The second report of the Arar Commission recommended that enhanced review bodies have a mandate both to hear complaints and conduct self-initiated reviews of the national security activities of not only the RCMP, but also the Canadian Border Services Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre and Foreign Affairs. It stressed that review agencies should have access to all the relevant information and should be able to share information and conduct joint reviews in order to deal with increased integration in national security activities.⁴ Canada's 2004 National Security Policy recognizes the principle that review should keep pace with the increased intensity and integration of national security activities.

The federal government could amend the Criminal Code to define and prohibit discriminatory profiling. My colleague Sujit Choudhry and I proposed such an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act when it was being debated and Irwin Cotler proposed the addition of anti-discrimination clause to the Act, but both proposals were rejected.⁵ In the United States, before 9/11 there was bipartisan interest in an act to end racial profiling, but this has unfortunately lost momentum. Such legislation could help define discriminatory profiling and assist in providing remedies for profiling. One of the challenges of combating profiling is that there are few tangible remedies for victims of profiling. Indeed, it is the victims of profiling who are factually guilty of some offence who tend to have the greatest chance of winning a tangible remedy through the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.

At the provincial level, increased resources and more institutional creativity and energy need to be applied by human

rights commissions and police complaints bodies to discriminatory profiling. There should be increased independent research about both the existence of discriminatory profiling, and perceptions of profiling. Police forces also need to take leadership on this issue, both in terms of training and outreach with the affected communities.

How can government work with all stakeholders to raise awareness about racial profiling and the impact of the heightened security measures?

The 2004 National Security Policy stated:

We reject the stigmatization of any community and we do not accept the notion that our diversity or our openness to newcomers needs to be limited to ensure our security... The deep commitment of Canadians to mutual respect and inclusion helps to mitigate extremism in our society... Canadians stand together in reaffirming that the use of violence to pursue political, religious or ideological goals is an affront to our values and must be met with a determined response by Canadians and their governments.⁶

The 2004 National Security Policy created a Cross Cultural Roundtable on Security Issues. Unfortunately, the Roundtable appears not to have a prominent profile in the relevant communities. When representatives from the Roundtable testified before the Special Senate Committee conducting a three year review of the Anti-Terrorism Act,

many Senators were quite skeptical about the role and mandate of the Roundtable and its outreach to the community and the affected groups. The Roundtable's goal of promoting "zero tolerance for terrorism and crimes of hate" reflects the orientation of Canada's post 9/11 *Anti-Terrorism Act*, which added many new crimes of terrorism to Canada's Criminal Code. The recognition of post 9/11 rises in hate crimes added a new crime of hate-motivated mischief to religious property and provided enhanced provisions for the deletion of hate propaganda from the internet. To be sure, many minority communities had genuine concerns about hate crimes in the wake of 9/11,

but the focus on terrorism and hate crimes is a partial focus even from a security perspective, because Canada's Muslim communities and others have expressed concerns about discriminatory law enforcement practices in the state's anti-terrorism efforts. It is unlikely that outreach to minority communities on security issues will be successful if they do not engage all of the concerns that these communities may have about Canada's security policy, including concerns about discriminatory profiling.

The Cross Cultural Roundtable has so far only held a few formal meetings and when the Chair of the Roundtable appeared before the Senate Special Committee examining the Anti-Terrorism Act, some Senators expressed

Discriminatory racial or religious profiling is wrong in principle because it offends Canadian values of equality and individual responsibility.

concerns that the Roundtable had not connected with other community groups or become an advocate for those wrongfully profiled. To be successful, the Roundtable will have to establish a reputation for independence and critical distance from government. Although the establishment of the Roundtable constitutes a positive gesture of outreach by the government to minority communities, the ultimate success of the Roundtable as an active and credible presence is in doubt, and enhanced efforts should be made in this regard.

Notes

- ¹ Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2006) at 13. Note that this report is available at <http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm>
- ² Ibid at 327.
- ³ Ibid at 355-357.
- ⁴ Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2006) available at <http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm>
- ⁵ Cotler, I. (2001). Thinking outside de box : Foundational principles for a counter-terrorism law and policy. In Daniels, R., Macklem, P., and Roach, K. (Eds.), *The security of freedom*. Toronto: University of Toronto; and Choudhry, S., and Roach, K. (2003). *Racial and ethnic profiling*. 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
- ⁶ *Securing An Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* April, 2004 at 2.

INTERVIEW WITH JACQUES DUCHESNEAU

Jacques Duchesneau is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

Are there adverse impacts of perceived linkages among religion, ethnicity/race and/or security/policing issues (e.g. racial profiling)?

When it comes to both security and policing, any perceived linkages between the policies, procedures or measures in place and religion, ethnicity or race, have adverse impacts. In fact, it does not matter whether these linkages are real, or perceived. The impact on the concerned communities, and the public at large, will be detrimental and damaging in both cases. These realities pose unique challenges for the law enforcement and policing communities that must be addressed consistently and robustly at first detection.

The practice of racial profiling has absolutely no place in either law enforcement or security. It has been proven in many jurisdictions that racial profiling is an ineffective program to achieve the desired result. It is a practice which undermines trust in authority and which erodes public confidence. Both the police and security officials are providers of public safety and have been entrusted to uphold the fundamental values and freedoms of all those they serve, including integrity, fairness, respect, accountability, transparency and competence. Directly targeting specific communities because of their religion, race or ethnicity is contrary to these beliefs and detrimental to progressive and effective security and policing.

Of course, one must take into consideration the reality that when it comes to law enforcement, police officers working the beat may need to take into account race or ethnicity to do their jobs effectively. One specific example when this is the case is when skin colour or ethnicity are part of a physical description of a subject committing a specific crime at a specific time. Oftentimes, such descriptions are used to help police officers find their suspect successfully. They are not used discriminately or without due care and consideration.

Having said that, it is clear that the problem of racial profiling remains, whether real or perceived. The focal point of this problem is not that it targets criminals committing crimes, but that it targets a community inaccurately, unjustifiably and in such a way that it spawns mistrust, resentment, and a wide-variety of security and law enforcement-related problems.

The most damaging impact that a perceived linkage between religion, ethnicity or race and security and policing is that of increased tensions – increased tensions between the affected communities and the authorities and increased tensions in the affected community itself. These increased tensions in turn make the role of policing and security infinitely more difficult, as they may also lead to increased violence, backlash, extremism, and general instability.

Real or perceived linkages between religion, ethnicity, race or sexual orientation and security and policing also inspire feelings of mistrust and incompetence, complicating the work of security and law enforcement officials. It is imperative that the citizenry at large have trust and confidence in the quality and effectiveness of the security measures in place to protect them, as well as that of those enforcing the law. If this trust and confidence is absent, authorities cannot do their job effectively.

What can be done at the federal, provincial and territorial levels to address the issue of racial profiling?

In order to uphold public confidence and trust, and to improve the overall relationship with the communities they serve, law enforcement and security officials, as well as governments, must address any concerns over the existence of racial profiling. There are a number of ways that this can be done, but the most important thing is that the initiatives are continuous, comprehensive, robust and above all else, coordinated and collaborative.

It should be noted that the problem of racial profiling is rooted in the very foundations of the community itself. It is a social problem that stems from general misunderstanding and a lack of knowledge. The issue must therefore be addressed not only by the police, but by the community as a whole. It must also be addressed at the very roots – in families, at school and in the workplace.

The single most important first step in addressing the issue of racial profiling is to ensure an accurate and complete picture. Misperceptions and speculation must be replaced by concrete facts and sound analysis. This necessity makes data collection vital. In the law enforcement domain for example, we can gain an accurate picture of whether racial profiling is in fact a problem by collecting and analyzing data on such things as citizen complaints. This data collection process will help ensure any problems are detected as early as possible and will also serve as a mechanism to help identify any problematic organizational policies or procedures that may also need to be addressed.

Secondly, when it comes to law enforcement in particular, it is critical for police departments to develop comprehensive written policies on racial profiling, strictly prohibiting its use. Education and training on racial diversity and cultural awareness for all personnel is also essential. This training, which should reinforce departmental policies and procedures, must be a coordinated and collaborative effort, involving not only law enforcement personnel, but also community groups and advocacy groups. Open dialogue and discussion with these groups will help ensure a joint effort and a sense of ownership of the program, greatly enhancing its chances of success.

However, without clear direction from the Chief of Police and senior police officers, even robust policies and comprehensive training will not be sufficient. Senior police officers must actively show their support of policies by developing strong relationships with influential community leaders, who in turn can assist in alleviating problems that arise from time to time. Police officers must also demonstrate that members of these communities are always welcome in the department. This is another simple way of showing that there is no racial profiling being conducted and this will also help build confidence within the community.

Having an effective, efficient and fair citizen complaint system in place is also a necessity. By providing such an access for the community and by openly engaging them in discussions on racial profiling, we can help eliminate uncertainty and ensure trust and confidence in authorities is maintained.

The most important thing to keep in mind is that this is an issue of respect. As a government agency, or as an organization tasked with delivering a public service, it is critically important that we act in an ethical and just manner and treat all our clients with respect. The acronym I like to employ is FAIR – we need to respect fundamental values and freedoms and employ the ethical principles of *Fairness – Accountability – Integrity – Respect*.

How do we respond to links made by some Canadians between immigrants and security concerns?

Immigrants come to Canada expecting opportunity, respect for fundamental human rights and a better way of life. However, sometimes they are confronted by racism, discrimination and fear instead. This feeling can readily develop when immigrants come from a country where police is a brutal and feared arm of the government of which they have been victims. Racism, discrimination and fear can also develop during times of significant political and social challenges, or because of domestic and international events, as witnessed in the period following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Because all of the 9/11 hijackers were men of Middle Eastern descent, this community tends to be mistreated and discriminated against.

The most effective way to respond to any tendency to link immigrants with security concerns is to focus on *fear reduction*. This unfounded link between immigrant communities and security concerns is based on fear, misinformation, mistrust and lack of communication. It is for

these reasons that we must make a concerted effort to ensure immigration is not viewed through the lens of fear. Fear only serves to inspire more fear, more problems, and more mistrust.

We need a robust commitment to working together to address the root causes of fear to diminish anxiety over increased security measures. Effective intervention must include attacking the actual terror, and not just the terrorists. How specifically can we actively reduce fear? By providing citizens with lots of information – accurate, complete and useful information. This information must be devoid of politics and devoid of rhetoric. It must be timely and consistent and provide them with the facts they need to make their own objective decisions. If we fail to keep the public informed, security cannot be effective.

In addition, fear can be reduced by actively involving citizens in security. By partnering with the public and making them a critical part of the security architecture, we can help them feel empowered rather than powerless. For example, activating an airport guard program, whereby airport employees are encouraged and specially-trained to seek out and report suspicious activity, involves people in the counter-terrorism model and rather than feeling afraid, they feel important and involved.

More specifically, when it comes to addressing the links made by some between immigrants and security concerns, we need to make a concerted effort to manage immigration by fostering integration. Successful integration of new Canadians into the mainstream of society is absolutely essential to manage fears, to promote healthy community relations and foster trust. Integration is a cross-cutting task that must involve all levels of government, as well as community groups.

Racial profiling is directly linked to fear, which in turn is the direct result of misinformation or ignorance. Knowledge is power, and when we provide knowledge to police on communities and communities on the police, and when police officers get to better know their communities and vice versa, all are less fearful of one another. Under these circumstances, it is less likely that racial profiling issues will arise.

SECURITY IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY:

Policy and Leadership Initiatives to Overcome Barriers to Social Inclusion

Linton Garner

Linton is a long-time community activist who has worked at the municipal, provincial and federal levels on issues of inclusion involving minorities, youth and the economically deprived.

ABSTRACT

The following article deals with issues of security, racial profiling, law-enforcement and the paucity of leadership in the context of Canada's overt commitment to social inclusion in the past three decades. The author wonders if Canadians are truly willing to set aside their fears and prejudices in order to create a truly inclusive society within their borders. Unfortunately, he concludes that the present evidence points to a society that doesn't quite live up to the inclusive image presented, and hence goes on to suggest policy, security and leadership initiatives that might address this shortcoming in our purportedly multicultural social order.

Benjamin Franklin, the noted American statesman, said it best, "He who would give up essential liberty for a modicum of security deserves neither". Clearly, even in the 1700's, the world's first democracy was struggling with the issue of rights guaranteed under the constitution, versus the right of the state to secure the peace and good order of the nation. We still have yet to resolve this issue adequately. In fact, the matter is even more pressing today in the wake of 9/11, because the homogenous nature of Ben Franklin's America has given way to the heterogeneous and diversified North America of today.

Both Canada and the United States have enacted legislation, in the name of national security, that severely compromised the guarantees of rights and freedoms we have grown to expect in our modern day societies. In Canada, the severest threats are Security Certificates which have been available to the government since the 1970's. Since 2002, they have been used under the Citizenship Act, to detain suspected terrorists without benefit of trial, presentation of evidence, or the ability of the accused to refute the accusations against them. Fortunately, the Canadian Supreme Court has just denied the government request to continue to employ security certificates for national security purposes.

Unfortunately, that is not the only tool employed to detain citizens and residents they suspect of criminal activity or threats to national security. Local police forces and national security bodies routinely engage in racial profiling which is essentially the practice of using ethnicity as a predictor of criminal or terrorist activity. In other words, if you are not majority of the population of this country, you will be labelled as suspect and may be subjected to unwarranted investigation.

In its report entitled "Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling", the Ontario Human Rights Commission defined profiling as the following: "Any action undertaken for reasons of safety, security or public protection that relies on stereotypes... rather than on reasonable suspicion, to single out an individual for greater scrutiny or different treatment".

In its report entitled "Racial Profiling: Context and Definition", La Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec stated that the origins of racial profiling stems from the 1970's in the US. At the time, various policies were based on the assumption that some types of crimes were more likely to be committed by individuals belonging to particular ethnic groups. In fact, it was a US federal policy employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration to identify potential drug traffickers at US Customs and on highways. The report went on to say that the technique was introduced to Canada in the 1990's, after RCMP officers received training in the United States.

There is no doubt you will be labelled and stereotyped if you come from a minority community. Minorities experience it everyday, on the street, in the airports, in the shopping malls or in the office. To prove it, I would ask the reader to test the premise. First, picture in your mind's eye a person most likely to be a national security threat. Now picture a person most likely to be a drug dealer. Finally, picture a person most likely to be a law enforcement officer. Which one of those images was a member of the majority community and which of them were minorities? If you are like most people in this country, the law enforcement officer most likely looked like you.

Take for example an article written by Maleiha Malik, published last month in *The Guardian*, UK. Ms. Malik offered us this glimpse of profiling.

“Migrants fleeing persecution and poverty settled with their children in the East End of London. As believers in one God, they were devoted to their holy book, which contained strict religious laws, harsh penalties and gender inequality. Some of them established separate religious courts. The men wore dark clothes and had long beards; some women covered their hair. A royal commission warned of the grave dangers of self-segregation. Politicians said different religious dress was a sign of separation. Some migrants were members of extremist political groups. Others actively organized to overthrow the established western political order. Campaigners against the migrants carefully framed their arguments as objections to ‘alien extremists’ and not to a race or religion. A British cabinet minister said we were facing a clash about civilization: this was about values; a battle between progress and ‘arrested development’.

We’re talking about the Muslims, right? No. All this happened a hundred years ago to Jewish migrants seeking asylum in Britain”.

Do we not hear similar references today? Does this not sound like echoes of Herouxville, Quebec, where its fine citizens have adopted a ‘code’ of standards warning newcomers their values are unwelcome in their town? Does this not sound like what Don Macpherson wrote February 24, 2007 in the *Montreal Gazette*, when commenting on one of Quebec’s political leaders who declared, “reasonable accommodations were ‘crazy’ and threatened not only Quebec’s values, namely women’s fundamental right to equality, but even its identity”? Does this not resemble the multitude of stories we have seen on the news or read in our newspapers over the last five years? Are we not yet tired of hearing about them?

What are the impacts of racial profiling?

We have all certainly heard of a number of transgressions of individuals in the airports or on traffic stops on our streets and highways. They run the gamut from the serious where people’s rights have been severely abused, to the ridiculous where an off-duty secret service agent, on his way to an assignment to protect President Bush, was prevented from boarding a plane because he was of Arab descent.

In a document entitled “No Exit: Racial Profiling And Canada’s War Against Terrorism”, Rheem Badhi clearly outlined what the agenda in a post 9/11 Canada:

“As in the United States, the central question in Canada’s War against Terrorism was whether Arabs and Muslims should be treated as more likely to threaten Canada or indeed global security. Within weeks of 9/11, then Premier of Ontario, Mike Harris, announced the formation of a special police unit designed to track down and deport illegal immigrants. While Premier Harris did not

explicitly indicate that Arabs or Muslims would be targeted, he did report that the unit’s focus would be to prevent terrorism through deportation, thus leaving little doubt in anyone’s mind as to the ethnic or religious identity of those who would receive special scrutiny. Around the same time, 48 per cent of Canadians reported that they approved of racial profiling. Interestingly, despite deep demographic, religious, and other differences between the two groups, both Arabs and Muslims have become the target of popular suspicion, resulting in the ‘Arabification’ of Muslims and the ‘Muslimification’ of Arabs”.

In 2000, the African Canadian Community Coalition on Racial Profiling cited the Toronto Youth Crime and Victimization Survey, which asked 3,400 high school students about their experiences with Police. It found that 34% of African Canadians who had not been involved in criminal activity reported that they had been stopped by Police on two or more occasions in the previous two years, compared to 4% of whites. Twenty-three per cent of African Canadians said they had been searched, compared to 5% of white students.

Finally, a study done by the Canadian Centre for Police-Race Relations found that, in the sample of African Canadians they studied, police drew their weapons against African Canadians more frequently than with other groups when responding to minor incidents (25% v.6.7% for whites and 6.7% for others). 42.7% of African Canadian males reported being stopped by police in the previous two years, compared to 22.1% of whites and Asians.

What should we do and who should do it?

What are we to do about this in our respective communities? It would be easy to call upon government to do something. In fact the Supreme Court has done that for us, for in overturning the use of security certificates, it has charged lawmakers anew with the challenge of adopting measures which are in concert with the basic tenets outlined in our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Court has stated clearly that the government has employed tactics which are not in accordance with the ‘principals of fundamental justice’ and must find new ways of approaching public security issues.

An important measure would be to encourage anti-racist auditing of national security and local police forces. Stephen Lewis, in his 1992 report to then Ontario Premier Bob Rae, called for annual audits, community based monitoring and refining audit methodology. In Leicestershire, U.K., they use the audit to compare their forces internal reviews with non-internal reviews. In Canada, the cities of Kingston and Ottawa have started to collect data based on race and a human rights case in Nova Scotia has required the City of Halifax to do the same.

Auditing and data collection remain an effective way for law enforcement to judge the effectiveness of police interventions. Dr. John Lambert, a consultant on a number of profiling cases in the U.S. stated that in his study and others on stop and searches, in airports or on the highway,

Blacks, Arabs and Whites were equally likely to have contraband when stopped by police. Since that time, nine more independent studies have shown the same results, and in some cases minorities were shown statistically to be significantly less likely to have contraband found following a search.

What does this tell us? Essentially, that profiling doesn't do what security forces intended. In fact, the US Customs service instituted a study in 1998 to look at the efficacy of their policies. In 2000, their completed report showed that they were wasting public funds as the man-hours invested did not produce the intended returns. As a result, they reduced their searches by 75% but their successful hit rate went up by nearly 300% for all population groups. Suggesting the employment of proper policing techniques will produce the more effective results. The Customs Service actually adopted reforms designed to eliminate, racial, ethnic and gender bias from their procedures and instituted stronger supervisory oversight for their stops and searches.

We need to engage in organizational change in all our public institutions, but particularly those charged with protecting the public. More commitment needs to be made to anti-racism and diversity policies and a greater respect for minority community experience. Better training for all public institution personnel and more accountability for performance and service delivery. More partnerships need to be developed with minority communities, particularly around issues of community-based policing, civilian oversight committees and complaints mechanisms.

Lack of Leadership

Although there has been a plethora of studies by government, the private sector and community coalitions, that continually point to the destructive nature of racial profiling and the dangers inherent therein, there has been very little leadership from our political leadership on this issue. In fact, the public waffling we continually see and hear from public officials undermines the basic tenets of what we say we believe in about inclusion, multiculturalism, interculturalism and plain old Canadianism.

Our public officials at all levels need to engage in dialogue with ethnic, minority and native communities and groups. They must actively and sincerely seek their advice on how to bridge the gaps which exist between the majority and minority communities. Minority communities must also begin to influence the public agenda. Minority communities must not let a few people within or without their communities define who and what they are. Minority communities need to engage all levels of our society and demonstrate their contributions, past and present, to Canadian life. Don't get me wrong, I am not for an instant inferring that any community has to justify its existence. I mean don't let anyone minimize any community's contribution nor marginalize them through vilification.

Our national, provincial and territorial leaders must stand up and clearly identify the victims of these processes as Canadians who deserve to be treated as Canadians. They must hold themselves, our institutions and their policies accountable in a public and demonstrative manner which

leaves no doubt as to what we stand for. To that end, positive recruitment of minority community members for political and civil service leadership would help redefine the public face of the country. Without public accountability, Mr. and Ms J. Public will feel it is alright to exclude on the basis of ethnicity, culture, language or country of origin. Without that institutional accountability, everyone could be subject to some type of arbitrary discrimination and abuse of their rights.

Finally, I wish to leave you with a popular reference from a movie from the 70's called 'A Man for All Seasons'. The two main protagonists are King Henry VIII and his Chancellor Sir Thomas More. The King wishes to divorce his first wife Katherine of Arragon and marry Anne Bolin. He wants the Chancellor's blessing as he is the Pope's representative in England and is reputed to be an honest man. The Chancellor refuses to grant the divorce, since according to the Church and his God, divorce is prohibited. Sir Thomas is under great pressure to reconsider both from the King and those loyal to the King. Ironically or fittingly, for the purposes of this discussion we must remember Henry VIII was the creator of the Star Chamber, a body of men along with the King which outside the law decided the fate of many of those deemed an enemy of the state.

In the following scene, Sir Thomas is discussing the situation with his son-in-law Roper. At one point in explaining his position, he states that he would assure that even the Devil, were he to appear on the Earth, should also as any other being, be protected by law. Here's what transpired;

MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law!

ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!

MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?

ROPER; I'd cut down every law in England to do that!

MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast. Man's laws, not God's, and if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.

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

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Libertés fondamentales

1. Chacun a les libertés fondamentales suivantes: (1) Any member of the public has the right to communicate with, and to receive available information from, the legislature or government.

Droits démocratiques

1. Tout citoyen canadien a le droit de participer à la vie de sa collectivité. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to participate in the life of the community.

Liberté de circulation et d'établissement

1. (1) Tout citoyen canadien a le droit de circuler et d'établir sa résidence dans toute province. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to move to, settle in, and be employed in any province.

Garanties juridiques

1. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne. (1) Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person. (1) Any person who is arrested or detained must be informed of the reasons for that arrest or detention.

Enforcement

1. (1) Any person whose rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter have been infringed or denied has the right to apply to a court to enforce those rights or freedoms.

General

1. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any other rights or freedoms that may be guaranteed by or under the Constitution.

Droits à l'instruction dans la langue maternelle

1. (1) Les parents ont le droit de faire inscrire leurs enfants dans une école d'instruction dans la langue maternelle.

Official languages of Canada

1. The Parliament and government of Canada are bilingual and shall be conducted in both English and French.

Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms

1. The rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Charter are subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be justified in a free and democratic society.

Dispositions générales

1. Le fait que la présente charte garantit certains droits ou libertés ne peut être interprété de manière à négocier les autres droits ou libertés.

Application de la charte

1. The Charter applies to the Parliament and government of Canada, to the provinces and their governments, and to the municipalities and their governments.

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Minority Language Educational Rights

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