Religious Diversity and Canada's Future

Jack Jedwab, Editor

La diversité religieuse et l'avenir du Canada

Jack Jedwab, éditeur

CANADIAN DIVERSITÉ CANADIENNE

VOLUME 6.1 WINTER 2008 HIVER

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

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CANADIAN DIVERSITY CANADIENNE

Volume 6.1 WINTER 2008 HIVER

Canadian Diversity is published by
Diversité canadienne est publié par

ACS • AEC
Association for Canadian Studies • Association d'études canadiennes

CANADIAN DIVERSITÉ CANADIENNE

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF / RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF
Jack Jedwab

MANAGING EDITOR / DIRECTRICE À LA RÉDACTION
Marie-Pascale Desjardins

CO-EDITOR / CO-RÉDACTRICE
Dornett Roachford

DESIGN / GRAPHISME
Bang Marketing : 514 849-2264 • 1-888 942-BANG
info@bang-marketing.com

ADVERTISING / PUBLICITÉ
mp.desjardins@acs-aec.ca

ACS ADDRESS / ADRESSE AEC
1822, rue Sherbrooke Ouest, Montréal (QC) H3H 1E4
514 925-3096 / general@acs-aec.ca

RUN OF 8,500 COPIES / TIRAGE DE 8 500 EXEMPLAIRES

CONVENTION POSTE PUBLICATION, 41006541

Patrimoine canadien Canadian Heritage

Canadian Diversity is a quarterly publication of the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS). It is distributed free of charge to individual and institutional members of the ACS. Canadian Diversity is a bilingual publication. All material prepared by the ACS is published in both French and English. All other articles are published in the language in which they are written. Opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ACS. The Association for Canadian Studies is a voluntary non-profit organization. It seeks to expand and disseminate knowledge about Canada through teaching, research and publications. The ACS is a scholarly society and a member of the Humanities and Social Science Federation of Canada.

Diversité canadienne est une publication trimestrielle de l'Association d'études canadiennes (AEC). Elle est distribuée gratuitement aux membres de l'AEC. Diversité canadienne est une publication bilingue. Tous les textes émanant de l'AEC sont publiés en français et en anglais. Tous les autres textes sont publiés dans la langue d'origine. Les collaborateurs et collaboratrices de Diversité canadienne sont entièrement responsables des idées et opinions exprimées dans leurs articles. L'Association d'études canadiennes et un organisme pancanadien à but non lucratif dont l'objet est de promouvoir l'enseignement, la recherche est les publications sur le Canada. L'AEC est une société savante et membre de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines et sociales.

The ACS acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Department of Canadian Heritage for this issue.

L'AEC a bénéficié de l'appui financier du Gouvernement du Canada par l'entremise du ministère du Patrimoine canadien pour ce numéro.

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Religious Diversity and Canada's Future:

Introduction

Jack Jedwab
Jack Jedwab is the Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies.

Public opinion surveys reveal that relations between faith communities and between religious and secular Canadians are a very important preoccupation. The significant demographic change that the country has experienced over the past four decades has been characterized by considerable growth in the percentage of Canadians that are not Christian. Over that same period, there has been an important increase in the numbers of Canadians reporting no religion, partly reflecting the diminished importance of religion in many people's lives.

L'identité religieuse a joué un rôle fondamental dans l'histoire du Canada. Indeed from the very outset, Canada was in the business of managing religious diversity. It established its own version of the wall of separation – in this case, however, it implied the institutional separation of Catholics from Protestants. Dû au fait que historiquement, les droits constitutionnels soient limités aux Catholiques et Protestantes en matière d'éducation, les juifs étaient considérés comme protestants jusqu'aux années soixante-dix. Growing up in parts of Canada in the 1970's, non-Christians attending public schools joined with other students in singing praise to Jesus. Over the past few decades, the introduction of the *Charters of Rights* and the growing support amongst the population for principles of equality might make these examples appear anachronistic.

Still, we are struggling with ways to accommodate religious diversity as witnessed in the very public debates over the funding of religiously-based schools in Ontario, the place of faith-based arbitration and around the establishment of a commission in Quebec looking into reasonable accommodation of diverse cultural practices focused on religious diversity.

To examine these questions, this edition of *Canadian Diversity* has invited some of Canada's leading thinkers to discuss various aspects of the contemporary debate around managing religious diversity. The concept of this issue of Canadian Diversity magazine was developed by Dr. Kamal Dib and Mr. Jaime Opazo, both leading policy researchers at the Department of Canadian Heritage. Early in 2006, they have noted the absence of a holistic approach towards a rational discussion of religion in Canada. They noted the knee-jerk reactions to global events and hasty attempts to "securitize" religion. Hence, they recognized the need to understand the socioeconomic dimensions of religious diversity in Canada and they have started a research agenda that resulted in quality studies and reports. This edition is the fruit of this research agenda on religious diversity. Its publication comes closely after a ground-breaking seminar hosted by the Department of Canadian Heritage on Religious Diversity in Canada on February 27, 2008. Messrs Dib and Opazo hope that the research effort represents a modest contribution to the study of contemporary Canadian demographic diversity. I want to thank them for their support. I also want to thank Jennifer Bitz of the Department of Canadian Heritage for her continued support as well as Fred Dufresne and Sofia-Gallagher-Rodriguez. I also acknowledge the important efforts of the ACS staff Marie-Pascale Desjardins and Dornett Roachford in generating this publication.

In his essay, David Seljak concludes that the refusal to confront the persistence of religion in Canadian society by clinging to an abstract and ahistorical concept of the separation of Church and State leads to misunderstandings and injustices. He maintains that the residually Christian nature of this public sphere places a further burden on members of minority religious communities that adherents of mainline Christian churches do not need to shoulder. The issue of religion must be addressed in discussions of social inclusion, immigrant integration, multiculturalism, democratic participation and justice. Seljak argues that policy-makers and other stake-holders need to engage in a broad dialogue to craft solutions to the issues of religious pluralism and multiculturalism that can take advantage of established interfaith networks.

Dans mon texte, je note que le bénévolat demeure fortement influencé par des initiatives à caractère religieux. L'importance accrue attribuée au capital social pour renforcer notre vie démocratique doit tenir compte du rôle de l'identité religieuse qui demeure la principale motivation pour de nombreux bénévoles. Malgré la préoccupation du bénévolat religieux pour la cohésion communautaire au dépend de la cohésion sociale, les efforts pour distinguer entre le bon et le mauvais capital social demeurent problématiques. En fait, les tentatives de chiffrer les exemples de bon et mauvais capital social ne porte aucun fruit. Par ailleurs, le sentiment d'appartenance au Canada des membres des minorités religieuses engagées dans le capital social à caractère confessionnel n'est pas différent de celui d'autres citoyens.

Bramadat and Wortley review existing evidence related to the question of religious youth radicalization in Canada. Reviewing websites of various religious groups, they find that radicalization has a marginal presence. Most Canadian groups continue to express their opinions, and even their grievances within the established traditions of law and deference that characterize Canadian life. There are, however, a number of problems that face anyone seeking to address what small amount of religious radicalization exists in Canada. They strongly urge that more research be conducted in this regard.

Imam Dr. Zijad Delic reminds us that Canadian Muslims do not constitute a monolithic bloc. He contends that Canada offers a model based on constructive integration which provides an alternative to assimilation or isolation and permits Muslims in Canada to preserve and remain faithful to their religious beliefs. It is important that Muslims be encouraged to greater civic engagement without fearing their religious identity will be undercut He concludes that there is a need for more inter-ethnic and inter-faith sharing of knowledge and experience around the history of Islam.

For his part, Kamal Dib discusses research parameters around the relationship between religious identity and security concerns. He maintains that a multidisciplinary approach in research on security and religion is necessary to support social policy development. This approach needs to address the growing complexity of religious identities in a globalized world. Greater cooperation across the policy-making community is needed so that analysis of religious diversity looks at the intersection between labor market conditions, immigration and justice. On issues of security, Dib cautions that too often cultural and religious explanations for acts of violence are not adequate for a proper comprehension of what underlies such phenomenon.

Pour sa part, Professeur Solange Lefebvre maintien qu'il est impossible d'ignorer les dimensions religieuses de l'histoire canadienne. Or elle évoque le défi d'implantation d'un nouveau cours d'éthique et de culture religieuse dans toutes les écoles du Québec, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire. Lefebvre insiste sur l'importance d'un grand nombre de connaissances religieuses pour comprendre des textes, des œuvres de fond, des histoires et des usages ainsi que des personnages historiques. La culture des traditions religieuses s'avère aussi importante, pour assurer la compréhension et le respect mutuel.

Selon Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, le débat sur les accommodements raisonnables a fait ressortir la présence d'au moins deux atavismes identitaires de la société québécoise. D'une part, l'identité religieuse canadienne-française, que l'on croyait évaporée depuis la Révolution tranquille, a resurgi dans le débat public. D'autre part, le « nationalisme méthodologique » inspirant la saisie que font de nombreux Québécois des évolutions de leur société y exerce plus que jamais une fonction amplificatrice des débats juridico-identitaires les plus triviaux.

La présence au sein de la société québécoise (mais surtout au sein de sa majorité d'origine canadienne-française) de courants idéologiques aussi différents en ce qui a trait à leur conception de la place de la religion dans la sphère publique laisse selon moi planer des doutes quant à la profondeur et à la portée réelles du mouvement de résurgence de l'identité religieuse traditionnelle de cette majorité.

Karim H. Karim and Faiza Hirji point out that, despite conscious efforts that are made to de-sacralize structures of the secular state, a country's culture cannot be completely separated from its religious heritage. They note that debates involving the intersection of religious and civic identities tend to become conflated with negative perceptions of immigration, of overly reasonable accommodation that privileges minority rights over those of the majority, and concerns about gender rights and public security. In several cases, they believe that the extent of the social conflict has been magnified by the media to produce moral panics. Official and unofficial symbols, public ceremonies, common linguistic phrases etc. are often based on religious culture.

In his essay, Marc Gold reminds us that the relationship between religion, society and state has been a core driver in the evolution of the modern western state for the past five centuries, and has been an ongoing theme in Canadian public life, both before and since Confederation. He considers the issue of the relationship between religion and the state from the perspective of recent developments in Quebec, notably over reasonable accommodation. He argues for a *laïcité inclusive* as a model for addressing the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, based as it is on the principles and values embodied in the Canadian and Quebec Charters of Rights that is rooted in the historical and constitutional traditions of Quebec and Canada. More particularly, the debate has been on which conception or interpretation of *la laïcité* ought to be adopted in Quebec. In this regard, the state should be neutral with respect to religion in the sense that it should not promote one religion over another. But the principle of the neutrality of the state does not mean nor require that the state banish all signs of religion from the public space. State neutrality towards religion does not necessarily mean state hostility towards religion. Nor, he adds, should it.

Finally, Sarah Elgazzar examines the place of religion in public institutions as well as some of the key players in resolving the issues surrounding the accommodation of religious and visible minorities. It explores discrimination in attaining employment in the public sector and also explores what Canadian society can do to maintain social cohesiveness and further mutual understanding within our communities. Certain media outlets concentrated on sensationalist headlines focused on often insignificant issues often wrongly characterized as reasonable accommodations. Such coverage increased hostilities towards persons who were openly religious. One of the pillars of a healthy democracy is a well informed public which requires a responsible press and permits the public to be able to counteract misinformation.

Religious Diversity and Canada's Future: Research Themes and Questions

La diversité religieuse et l'avenir du Canada : Thèmes de recherche et questions

1) How do we define the relationship between State (or public institutions) and religion?
2) What is the place of religion in public institutions?
3) What kind of relationship between State and religion maximizes equality and pluralism?
4) What kind of relationship between State and religion helps combat discrimination and encourages mutual understanding?
5) Do you think organized religion has influence in Canada and in what areas is its influence the most felt?
6) Is religious discrimination an important phenomenon in Canada?
7) More generally speaking, what value should we ascribe to religion in terms of our history and cultural heritage?
8) What are the lessons for Canada from the reasonable accommodations debate in Quebec?
9) When it comes to accommodating the practices of religious communities, which of the following sectors (ie. federal government, community organizations, schools and other public institutions, etc) need to show more responsibility and in terms of each, why should they?

1) Comment définissez-vous la relation entre l'État (ou les institutions publiques) et la religion ?
2) Quelle est la place de la religion dans les institutions publiques ?
3) Quel type de relation entre l'État et la religion maximise l'égalité et le pluralisme ?
4) Quel type de relation entre l'État et la religion aide à combattre la discrimination et encourage la compréhension mutuelle ?
5) Pensez-vous que les religions organisées ont de l'influence au Canada et dans quelles domaines leur influence se fait-elle le plus sentir ?
6) La discrimination basée sur la religion est-elle un phénomène important au Canada ?
7) Généralement parlant, quelle valeur devrions-nous attribuer à la religion concernant notre histoire et héritage culturel ?
8) Quelles sont les leçons pour le Canada du débat des accommodements raisonnables au Québec ?
9) En ce qui concerne accommoder les pratiques des communautés religieuses, quels secteurs (gouvernement fédéral, organismes communautaires, écoles et autres institutions publiques, etc) devraient démontrer de plus responsabilité et pourquoi ?

Secularization and the Separation of Church and State in Canada

David Seljak et al[1]

Dr. David Seljak is a Professor of Religion in the Department of Religious Studies, St. Jerome's University at the University of Waterloo, Ontario.

ABSTRACT

This article concludes that the assumption that challenges of religious diversity and freedom have been solved by the adoption of a separation of Church and State represents a real barrier to attempts to address religious intolerance and discrimination. Instead, policy-makers and other stake-holders need to engage in a broad dialogue to fashion a uniquely Canadian solution to the issues of religious pluralism and multiculturalism. Such a dialogue will certainly engage governments at all levels but can also take advantage of established interfaith networks.

Introduction

Most Canadians assume that we have sufficiently addressed the issues of religious pluralism and freedom by creating a secular state marked by a separation of Church and State. Such a model would safeguard the goals of democratic governance, social justice, and multiculturalism, and would prohibit the State from favouring any one religious community, and would allow maximum religious freedom for all. This assumption does not accurately describe Canadian society or Church-State relations.

Unlike the United States and a handful of other countries, Canada does not have a constitutional and legal separation of Church and State, nor is it a fully secularized society. By adopting these assumptions, policy-makers and other stakeholders either ignore or refuse to address the issues of religious diversity and freedom in policies and practices related to multiculturalism, immigrant integration, and social justice.

While some arrangement for the autonomy of the state from religious communities is clearly a prerequisite for pluralistic democracy in Canada, uncritical approaches to the separation of Church and State can present significant barriers to the goals of Canadian democratic participation, social justice and multiculturalism. These approaches may serve to hide the persistence of Christian privilege in Canadian public culture as well as institutional practices and structures; alienate large sectors of the Canadian population by refusing to acknowledge or respect the public elements of their religious traditions; ignore claims made in the name of religion, for example, claims by Aboriginal peoples to access to certain lands in order to fulfill the requirements of Aboriginal spirituality; discourage the contribution to Canadian society made by faith-based institutions and organizations, such as schools, hospitals, social service agencies, as well as cultural, sports and charitable organizations; foster resistance to reasonable accommodation of religious difference, a human right that guarantees that a practice or policy that serves the majority does not discriminate against members of religious minority groups; encourage the creation of religious "ghettoes," that is, closed ethno-religious communities that have relatively little connection to the rest of Canadian society; prevent integration of ethno-religious newcomers (immigrants and refugees) by giving the Canadian state and society a public face that appears foreign or hostile to them.

The issue of religion in discussions of social inclusion, immigrant integration, multiculturalism, democratic participation and justice must be considered when making Canada more just and a participatory society. The assumption that challenges of religious diversity and freedom have been solved by the adoption of a separation of Church and State represents a real barrier to attempts to address religious intolerance and discrimination. Instead, policy-makers and other stake-holders need to engage in a broad dialogue to fashion a uniquely Canadian solution to the issues of religious pluralism and multiculturalism, which can also be taken advantage of by interfaith networks.

The idea that there is a separation between Church and State in Canada is widespread among members of Canada's political, cultural, academic, and media elite. However, there has never been an American-style "wall of separation between Church and State" in Canada. Indeed, there are only in a few states (such as the U.S., France and countries that are or were formerly Communist) where a legal and constitutional separation of Church and State exists. Moreover, the arrangements

for separation of Church and State in those countries vary greatly and produce different results. In contrast to these abstract models, Canada has seen a complex, ambiguous, contested and changing arrangement of relationships between religious communities and various levels of government. While Canada has become more secular and autonomous in recent decades and has a separation of political, economic and social institutions from religious institutions, there still exists no wall of separation. In fact, certain elements of the American separation of Church and States – not to mention France's *laïcité* – would violate sections of the *Canadian Constitution Act* (1982) and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) – as well as other human rights legislation.

Consequences for multiculturalism

The abstract and a-historical belief that there is such a wall of separation in Canada may in fact act as a barrier to achieving some of the goals of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988) and other efforts to promote diversity and inclusion. While Canada needs to negotiate and renegotiate the relations between religious and state institutions, doing so under the model of abstract and a-historical definitions of the separation of Church and State can foster an environment of intolerance and promote discrimination against members of certain religious groups. Moreover, religious identity is closely tied to ethnic identity; it is inevitable that such an approach will serve to marginalize members of ethno-religious minority groups.

An ideological adherence to a strict separation of Church and State either in official policy or in Canada's public culture could discourage religiously defined groups from participating in public debates and projects. Most importantly, a closed secularism communicates to members of ethno-religious groups the understanding that Canadian identity and their religious identity are incompatible. Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jews, and Muslims (as well as Christians who were not part of the "shadow establishment" of Canada's Christian era) find themselves more frequently the targets of the type of intolerance and discrimination (both direct and indirect) promoted by an ideological adherence to a strict secularism.

Secularization refers to the process whereby institutions and spheres of authority are transferred from religious bodies to non-religious bodies. It is a process that began in western societies, building on the Christian division between the "temporal" and the "spiritual" spheres of society. While the State had responsibility for the temporal and the Church had responsibility for the spiritual, both spheres were seen as sacred. However, in certain periods and locations, this gave the Church enormous political power. Only after the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century did Europeans begin to separate religion from politics and church from state, transferring a variety of important public functions to a state that was increasingly free from the control of religious authorities and eventually redefined by a non-religious culture. France and the United States were the first states to formalize these arrangements in their constitutions.

1. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

To say that Canada is a secular state is not an accurate assessment of Canadian constitutional law and jurisprudence. Unlike the United States there is no strict separation between Church and State in the Canadian *Constitution Act* (1982). The situation in Canada is more complex. For example, the *Constitution Act* actually *requires* some provincial governments to fund Roman Catholic separate schools, an arrangement that is simply impossible in the U.S. Even less suitable to Canada's legal tradition is France's adoption of the law prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in public institutions, most notably schools. Such a law would be impossible in Canada, since it would be an infringement of Section 2 (a) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The myth of separation of Church and State may blind us to realities of Canadian history and society and has the potential to promote a false understanding of how Canadians deal with ethno-religious diversity.

Given that there is no constitutional or legal basis for a separation of Church and State in Canada, we need to understand where this idea came from, what it means, and what importance it has. One of the most important sources for the belief in separation of Church and State is, of course, the influence of American culture and jurisprudence. Canadians who follow American politics find such church-state controversies discussed frequently, most recently in the form of George W. Bush's creation of a White House office for "faith-based and community initiatives" in providing social services.[2] In decisions that led to the de-Christianization of the public school system, Canadian courts frequently cited American jurisprudence on the separation of Church and State – despite its dissimilarities with Canadian precedents.[3]

While American secularism is one source of the mistaken belief that Canada is secular, this belief has deep roots in Canada. It is rooted in our conception of modern society as progressing from a past marked by superstition and ignorance to a future based on reason and science. This "myth of progress" is at the root of theories of secularization and is so widely held that for decades social scientists did not notice that they had been proven false by history. Religion has persisted in the modern world, both in the advanced industrial nations and in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Every discussion of church-state relations has these theories of secularization; consequently, it is important to understand secularization and its relationship to modernization.

Secularization is an inherent part of the process or modernization, the enormous social transformation ushered in by the democratic and industrial revolutions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As societies became more democratic and industrialized (as defined by reason, egalitarianism, and economic growth), religion receded. As individuals participated in modern institutions, whose cultures were defined more and more by science, they ceased to believe stories and explanations of their faith traditions. For example, the rational demands of democracy meant that the state had to become autonomous from church authorities. In the interest of representative,

rational, effective, and fair government, the democratic revolution promoted the separation of Church and State.[4] Secularization was thought to be a "structural trend," that is, inherent, universal and irresistible feature of modernization.

During the emergence of market economies in Europe, for example, financiers had to overcome the Christian prohibition against usury (earning interest on a loan) and working on Sundays and feast days. Financiers and politicians claimed a sphere of activity that was relatively free of religious control or interference. This process, more than any other, lead to the separation of Church and State, church and market, church and university, church and hospital, as well as church and almost every other important social institution. Pushed out of important spheres of activity, religion began to lose its power and prestige.

If religion persists at all, theorists say, it does so in the private realm of personal interiority, family relations, ethnic identity, and local community. Religion is redefined as "private," not in the sense that it is something that one would not want to discuss, but rather in that religious institutions are to have no ability to coerce individuals and had no official place in the public sphere. Religion in the modern world, according to secularization theory, was to be privately diverse and idiosyncratic as well as publicly irrelevant and powerless.

Sociologists of religion now reject early secularization theories. First, there has been no evidence of a uniform decline in religious mentalities in industrialized or industrializing countries. The United States saw religious membership and attendance rise as it became more industrial and democratic.[5] The majority of Canadians still believe in God, and there has been little change in atheism, held by only 6% of Canadians in 1975 and 1985, 9% in 1995, and 7% in 2005, marginally higher among men and younger adults than women and people who are older.[6]

While the decline of religion in Europe has been precipitous, there was no straightforward correlation between modernization and secularization. In countries such as Poland and Ireland, religious membership and attendance increased. Only in some Western European countries has there been a decline in religious mentalities, but even in those countries a large majority (some two-thirds of the population) still believe in God or a divine spirit. Globally, the argument for secularization is much weaker. A 2002 PEW Foundation study showed that, with few exceptions, religion was very important for people living in developing nations.[7]

In *Public Religion in the Modern World*, José Casanova shows that in some societies (such as Spain) modernization has meant the privatization of religion while in others (such as Poland and Brazil) the Church has remained a feature of public life. Events such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the role of the Roman Catholic-supported Solidarity labour union movement in challenging communism in Poland, the rise of various religio-political parties in formally secular countries like India and Turkey, as well as the rise of the New Christian Right in the United States, are evidence of both the persistence and power of religion as a force in public life.[8] Canada became more religious in the early stages of modernization in the late 19th century, and to call religion in Canada a wholly "private" affair is an exaggeration. Religion has a public presence in Canadian society.

Casanova argued hat secularization theory has entered the public imagination in European societies, convincing people that to be a good, modern (that is, democratic, effective, prosperous and moral) person, one must become secular. In the United States, the exact opposite occurs. To be a good American, one must believe in God (in one Gallup poll, more Americans said that they would refuse to vote for an atheist than for a Black, woman, Jew, Catholic, Baptist, Mormon or a homosexual).[9] Immigrants in the United States who trace their roots back to Europe are decidedly more religious than their European counterparts. Casanova speculates that it is the social expectation to conform to the dominant culture that helps to promote secularization of individuals in Europe but not in America.[10] The national "personality" of most European societies is that of the secular modern, while that of the United States is the Christian modern.[11]

There is little evidence to suggest that secularization is a fundamental structural trend of modernization. Furthermore, there is no universal law that states that an absolute separation of Church and State is necessary for modernization. In fact, societies have chosen a variety of strategies and arrangements in determining the role of religion in modernity.

2. CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA

There are three periods of church-state relations in Canada: 1) the attempt to transplant "Christendom" from Europe where church and aristocratic government worked hand in hand to define and control society (1608-1854); 2) the creation of a "pluralist establishment" in which the mainline Christian churches (that is, the Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist/United, Baptist and Roman Catholic churches) acted as a "shadow establishment" (1854-World War II); and 3) the increasing separation of Church and State and the secularization of Canadian society after World War II.

In his famous report after the Rebellions of 1837–38 in Upper and Lower Canada, Lord Durham observed that one of the causes of the unrest in Upper Canada was the privileges enjoyed by the Church of England. Consequently, in 1840, the government decided to divide the Clergy Reserves among a larger number of denominations – although the Church of England and the Church of Scotland still received the lion's share. In 1854, the government liquidated the Clergy Reserves altogether. The dream of an established church – Protestant or Roman Catholic – in British North America was over.[12] However, the architects of Confederation still saw Canada as a Christian country. Historians have called this arrangement "voluntary Christendom" or "pluralist establishment," oxymoronic descriptions well-suited to the Canadian "shadow establishment".

At the time of Confederation, Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley, a pro-Confederation politician, recalled the words of Psalm 72, verse 8 ("He shall have Dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth") that would become the motto used in the Canadian coat of arms. The

new entity was called the Dominion of Canada, a name that spoke to its unquestioned Christian foundations. For both the British and French communities alike, to be Canadian was to be Christian. From that assumption arose the support of Christian public education, the creation of social services, institutions for the poor, the legislation of Christian morality (in the cases of sexual behaviour and alcohol consumption, for example), laws protecting the Lord's Day, state-sponsored Christian missions to the Aboriginal peoples (including the disastrous residential school system), efforts to "Christianize" immigrants, and religious discrimination – sometimes amounting to persecution – against religious non-conformists, be they Christian or other.[13]

From Confederation until the 1960s, the mainline Protestant churches[14] (the Anglicans, Presbyterians, and the United Church of Canada, later joined by "junior partners" such as the Lutherans, Baptists, and various evangelical groups) along with the Roman Catholic Church formed a "plural establishment." In the United States, the problem of religious pluralism was solved by articulating a theory of individual rights and erecting a "wall of separation" between Church and State. Although many Canadians today believe their society is also characterized by this American constitutional innovation, in fact the Canadian solution was more conservative. The government formally recognized a limited number of denominations and supported their work. Moreover, the mainline Christian churches enjoyed a cultural and social "establishment" in that the dominant culture and political, economic, and social institutions were clearly defined by Christian values. Christianity set the foundation of Canada's personality for the century after Confederation.

Unlike the United States and a handful of other countries, Canada does not have a constitutional and legal separation of Church and State, nor is it a fully secularized society.

In fact, there were really two Canadian "plural establishments," one for English Canada and another for French Canada. The character of nationalism in Canada highlights this connection between Christianity on the one hand and the dominant English and French cultures on the other. In English Canada, British culture and politics, Protestantism, and a belief in modern political, economic and scientific "progress" formed the three pillars of Canadian nationalism. Roman Catholics, other non-mainline Christians, and of course, non-Christians struggled to find a legitimate place in this society.[15] By contrast, among French Canadians, the French language and culture, the Roman Catholic faith, and the traditional agricultural lifestyle (anchored by the patriarchal family) formed the core of their national identity. Remarkably, even though most French Canadians had become urban, industrial workers by 1931, French Canadian nationalists still heralded and romanticized the life of the simple, pious *habitant* or farmer well into the 1950s. Both English and French versions of Canadian nationalism defined non-Christians as "other". Members of non-Christian groups, from Hindus and Sikhs to Jews and atheists, experienced marginalization and even persecution.[16]

From the mid-1800s up until the 1960s, Canada was considered one of the most thoroughly Christian nations in the world. The number of Canadians who attended churches as a proportion of the total population in the 1950s was as much as one-third to one-half greater than that of the United States.[17] Also during this time, church attendance in the province of Quebec was quite possibly greater than in anywhere else in the world. As a result, the churches wielded great influence over the affairs of the state for a considerable period of Canadian history. What was most interesting about the relationship between Church and State in Canada prior to the mid-twentieth century was the fact that there existed no formal union between these two institutions, as was often the case in other nations with high levels of church attendance. In the United Kingdom for example, the relationship between Church and State was extremely formal, given the existence of an official state church, which was directly integrated with the political structure of the nation. In Canada, however, this relationship was much less formal, evidenced by the absence of an official state-church, but arguably just as influential in determining public policy that favoured the dominant Christian majority. For example, the Canadian state frequently passed laws to enforce the norms of the Christian majority, including laws against the production and sale of alcohol, homosexual activity, birth control, abortion, and divorce.

Secularization and the separation of Church and State

From 1960 on, Canadian society experienced a significant degree of secularization. In the 1961 Census, only one-half of one percent of respondents indicated that they had "no religion." In the 2001 Census, that figure rose to 16.2%.[18] The number of Canadians identifying themselves as Catholics dropped from 46 to 43 percent, while the proportion identifying themselves with the mainline Protestant churches (Anglican, Baptist, and Presbyterian and United churches) dropped from 41 percent to 20 percent.[19] Figures on church attendance tell the same story, after World War II 83% of Canadians attended weekly mass, and in the early 1960s this number was at 50%, falling to less than 23% during the 1990s.[20]

However, despite these declines, the majority of Canadians still identify themselves as Christian. Moreover, there has been a growth of non-Christian religious communities since the early 1970s. Finally, many of those people who identify themselves as having "no religion" on the Census still define themselves as "spiritual," believe in God or a divine spirit and engage in some form of religious practice, such as meditation or prayer.

Table 1: Major religious denominations, Canada, 1991 and 2001[21]			
Religious Affiliation	**2001**	**1991**	**% change (1991-2001)**
Roman Catholic	12,793,125	12,203,625	4.8
Protestant	8,654,845	9,427,675	-8.2
Christian Orthodox	479,620	387,395	23.8
Other Christian	780,450	353,395	121.1
Muslim	579,640	253,265	128.9
Jewish	329,995	318,185	3.7
Buddhist	300,345	163,415	83.8
Hindu	297,200	157,015	89.3
Sikh	278,415	147,440	88.8
No Religion	4,796,325	3,333,245	43.9

While the changes in Canadian attitudes about religion since 1960 have been dramatic, we have not seen much evidence of a decline of religious mentalities. Canadians are still interested in spiritual matters, questions of ultimate meaning, and religion.[22] Even in Quebec, where the Catholic Church had remarkable power, the provincial government was becoming the primary framework for the French Canadian nation. For example, Jean Hamelin and Nicole Gagnon show how, already in the 1920s, the complexity and scale of needs for social services and healthcare in an increasingly urbanized and industrialized Quebec meant that the Catholic Church lacked the financial resources to meet them. The Quebec State stepped in and from that time on the Church became a junior partner in an alliance with the state and business; it was allowed to handle education, healthcare, and social services only to the extent that it served the interests of the Quebec political and economic elite.[23]

Education, healthcare and social services began to be defined as discrete realms of specialization in which professionalism and effectiveness were to trump religious values. Still, it would only be in the post-World War II period – and especially during the 1960s and 70s – that we would see the emergence of what we might recognize as a secular state. In Quebec, that development would be more dramatic and sudden but it was not essentially different. After 1960, across Canada, politicians and senior civil servants implemented public policy and institutional changes that brought about the de-Christianization of Canadian society and public institutions by limiting the influence that the Church had previously exercised over the public affairs of the state. This was a reflection of a political consensus in many Western liberal democracies, including Canada that questioned the hegemonic influence of Christianity. Charles Taylor calls that emerging political sensibility the "politics of universalism." This consensus was based on the idea that all individuals, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, culture, or religion, were equal within a liberal democracy, and that no single gender, race, ethnicity, culture, or religion, was permitted to dominate the affairs of the whole. The politics of universalism differed dramatically from the politics of social hierarchy, the dominant political ideology in the West – including Canada – up until the 1960s, which emphasized the rights of the political, economic and social elite. Worldwide, some of the products of this shift in political doctrine can be seen in the adoption of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) as well as subsequent United Nations declarations common in the 1960s and 70s, the *European Convention of Human Rights* (1950), and the American Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. In Canada, we saw a transformation of public culture that eventually led to the adoption of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) and the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988).

The distancing of Christianity from the apparatus of government and other important Canadian institutions began to accelerate with the victories of Jean Lesage's Liberals over the Union Nationale in the 1960 Quebec general election and Lester B. Pearson's Liberal's over John Diefenbaker's Conservatives in the 1963 Canadian federal election. The Liberal victory in the province of Quebec ushered in the Quiet Revolution, which resulted in the expansion of state support for and control of education, health care, and social services. The Liberal victory in the Canadian federal election meant the initiation of more liberally oriented public policy that extended the proliferation of a politics of universalism on a national level. The secularization of Canadian public policy only intensified during Pierre Trudeau's tenure as Prime Minister.

New public values replaced influences that the Canadian churches had exerted from the eighteenth century through the mid-twentieth, where as Liberal-communal political ideals stimulated by the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* replaced the conservative-communal ideals of Canada's past. Because Christianity had been expressed consistently in the ideals of a conservative-communal social order, when that conservative-communal social order was given up, so was the Christianity.[24] New values attached to multi-culturalism and human rights were developed out of a more liberal politics of universalism and replaced the conservative politics of social hierarchy with which the Canadian churches had become identified.

In fact, the churches themselves were frequently – for distinctly religious reasons – promoters of this new ethic of universalism. Many in the churches began to see Christianity's implication in the conservative social order as religiously illegitimate. They themselves accepted the process of differentiation, demanded the autonomy of the state and church, promoted multiculturalism and human rights, and even became trenchant critics of the secular state for not going far enough in addressing issues of social justice. It should be noted that in Canada, the process of differentiation was undertaken by Christians and not secular thinkers. Even today, most mainline Christians support a separation of Church and State.

Frequently, Canada's increasing religious diversity is cited as a cause for this separation of Church and State, but in fact the process precedes by several decades the influx of immigrants from countries where Christianity is not the dominant religion. Indeed, the number of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jews, Muslims and practitioners of Chinese religion has risen dramatically in Canada in the last fifteen years. Still, taken together they represented a very small percentage of the population from 1960 to 1990. The process of differentiation also preceded by several decades the emergence of official policies of multiculturalism; that means that this separation of Church and State had begun before Canadians took the rights of members of these minority religious groups into serious consideration.

The persistence of religion in Canadian public life

Canada is no longer "God's Dominion," an overtly Christian nation. On the other hand, Canada is not really a "post-Christian society."[25] There are signs that Canada has become a secular country with a separation of Church and State, but there are other indicators that Christianity remains a significant public presence. It is for that reason that we conclude that Canadian secularism is "residually Christian".

There is no doubt that the Canadian state and market – along with other social institutions that depend on them – have become separated from the churches. There are clear signs of this separation: the de-Christianization of Canada's public schools, especially after the adoption of the 1982 *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*; the overturning of the *Lord's Day Act* (1905) in 1985 that allowed for Sunday shopping; the liberalization of laws governing sexual morality, including those concerned with contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and marriage; the state's control over healthcare and social services since the 1960s; the absence of religion at official public gatherings and celebrations, such as the memorial for the Swiss Air Tragedy in 1999 or at the official memorial service for the victims of 9/11.

The state relies on religious communities to supply essential social services, build hospitals, operate universities, and organize charitable campaigns. Recognizing the social contribution of religious communities, the state makes many concessions to them. These include: tax exemption on lands used by religious communities for religious purposes; tax exemptions for residence costs for ministers, priests or other religious leaders; charitable organization status for religious organizations, making contributions to churches, mosques, synagogues and temples as well as a host of religious organizations tax deductible; and power-sharing in the administration of chaplaincy programs in hospitals, prisons and armed forces.

Moreover, Christians have found ways to redefine themselves, both culturally and institutionally, in order to maintain a public presence that serves rather than hinders the creation of a democratic, participatory and open society. A few of the more obvious signs that the churches have transformed themselves into "modern, public religions" include: significant church ownership and operation of healthcare and social services institutions, including large-scale hospitals, health programs, and child welfare services; church sponsorship of refugees, especially during the early-1980s "boat people" from Vietnam; Roman Catholic public (although "separate" schools) in Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the Northwest Territories along with other religiously based schools that receive public funding in many provinces; participation in chaplaincy programs for the Canadian Forces, Correctional Service Canada, and public schools in Quebec; considerable participation in public debates around ethical issues, including sexuality and marriage, abortion, contraception, and homosexuality and participation in debates around social justice.[26]

Even in the state apparatus, there are signs that Canadian secularism is residually Christian. Biles and Ibrahim identify the following significant elements of Christianity in the Government of Canada: the preamble of the Constitution states "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the Supremacy of God and the rule of law…;" the official title of our head of state according to the Canadian election writ is "ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories QUEEN, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith;" the Speech from the Throne, concludes with the words "May Divine Providence Guide You in Your Deliberations;" the national anthem, *O Canada* includes the line, "…God keep our land glorious and free!…;" our currency includes the marking "D.G. Regina" beside the name of Elizabeth II that stands for *dei Gratia* (Queen by the Grace of God); the national motto, *A Mari usque ad Mare* (from sea to sea) is taken from Psalm 72:8 ("He shall have dominion from sea to sea and from river unto the ends of the earth."), twenty-one pieces of federal legislation refer to "God," seventeen to "religion", four to "Christian" and one to the "Bible;" eleven pieces of legislation require the swearing of an oath to God; and the Christian feast days of Christmas and Good Friday are statutory holidays.

Besides the federal government, Biles and Ibrahim argue, provincial and municipal governments also show signs of their Christian past, for example, opening sessions of legislatures and municipal councils with Christian prayers or requiring an oath to God in courtrooms.[27] Beyond this residual public presence, Christianity still defines much of Canadian public culture indirectly. Danièle Hervieu-Leger argues that despite its staunch adherence to a secular public culture and constitutionally guaranteed separation of Church and State, France remain very much a Catholic country.

Hevieu-Léger argues that the structure of France's public institutions – everything from schools and hospitals to courts and universities – "was entirely based on, and has continued to operate (though, obviously, not explicitly) with reference to the Catholic model." She argues that no element of French public life – "from food quality to the ethical regulation of science, the management of hierarchical relationships in business, the future of rural society, societal expectations of the State, and demands for workers' rights" – is untouched by Catholic values. The same dynamic appears is evident in all European societies. This is not, she continues, because religious institutions have remained power brokers in modern states or that they

have a great degree of control over the beliefs of individuals. They patently do not. Their influence is more indirect and subtle, she argues because "the symbolic structures which they shaped, even after official belief has been lost and religious observance has declined, still have a remarkable capacity to influence the local culture."[28]

In Canadian society, this observation is equally valid. Canadian institutions – from our universities, hospitals, and social service agencies to our businesses, public campaigns, and cultural production – still bear the imprint of their Christian origins. As Roger O'Toole observes, the persistently *Christian* character of Canada, in a broad sense, is an important legacy of this past century and a frequently underestimated fact of considerable sociological interest. Despite the impact of secularization, an apparent crisis of religious commitment and a rapidly expanding non-European presence, Canada remains decidedly Christian. [29] This, among other reasons, is why institutions in Quebec operate according to a different culture and ethos than those in the rest of Canada. Canadian secular culture is residually Christian, albeit in different ways in different parts of the country.

The current state of Canada's political culture as well as constitutional and legal agreements is not set in stone. It is the product of historical and social developments and may change in the future. Because there is no constitutional arrangement for separation of Church and State, political parties and policy makers can change the current arrangement in short order. While the courts along with the *Charter* require the protection of the rights of religious minority groups, the relationship between Church and State in Canada today is a) constantly changing, b) contested, and c) ambiguous.

Modernization requires some degree of separation of Church and State as well as church and market. However, this does not automatically mean a constitutional and legal disestablishment. Nor does a constitutional and legal disestablishment necessarily mean a separation of state from religion – as the Canadian experience with a "shadow establishment" surely demonstrates. A constitutional and legal separation of Church and State is not sufficient to guarantee equal treatment of all religious groups by Canadian state or society. As O'Toole observes, Canadian secularism – to the degree that Church and State are already separated – is residually Christian. Mere separation of Church and State cannot address the historical advantages enjoyed by the Christian majority and it does not address the residual cultural influence of Christianity. Even when it is coupled with an adherence to "reasonable accommodation," it cannot address the cultural and structural marginalization of minority religious communities.

3. SECULARIZATION AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Abstract and a-historical assumptions about the connection between modernization and secularization do not take into account the bewildering complexity that marks the modernization of societies – even if we are to look at the developed West alone.[30] While the trend to formal disestablishment and the recognition of religious freedom is unmistakable, there remains a remarkable variety of models of a secular society and for church-state relations. In this section, we explore these models to demonstrate Canada's uniqueness. While Canada shares a structure with a variety of European countries, it departs from them as a result of the division between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and because of the influence of American culture and politics.

Canada's pattern of secularization was unique because, in fact, there were two distinct patterns, one for Canada and another for Quebec. For Canada outside of Quebec, the pattern was remarkably like that of other pluralistic societies where Protestantism dominated. Like Australia and New Zealand, Canada outside of Quebec fell between the United States, with its high degree of pluralism, elevated levels of church attendance, low levels of anticlericalism and broad-based, relatively low-status clergy, and England, which had a lower degree of pluralism, lower levels of church attendance, and higher levels of anticlericalism.[31] This means that in Canada, religious pluralism has helped to guarantee democracy, political pluralism and religious freedom by frustrating the dreams of an established church with close ties to the state and the political, economic and social elite.[32]

In Quebec, the situation was quite different. From 1840 onwards, Roman Catholicism became the touchstone of French Canadian identity and solidarity. The Church, more than the state, became the societal framework for French Canadians, an arrangement that was recognized in the *British North America Act* (1867) and symbolized by the Church's ability to force the provincial government to back down on its plans to create a Ministry of Education in the late 1890s. As it became more industrialized and democratic, Quebec experienced quite the opposite of secularization and the privatization of religion – even in the twentieth century. As Hubert Guindon observed, in reaction to industrialization and urbanization, the Catholic Church became a more important feature of public life from the late 1800s to 1960. The clergy became bureaucratic overlords and the rate of growth of clerical bureaucracies is simply amazing.[33]

Directly or indirectly, the Church created or promoted in incredible number of initiatives, including colonization societies that settled the Quebec hinterland; the *caisses populaires* (credit union) movement; cooperatives for fishers, farmers, and other producers; farmers' cooperatives that adopted scientific agricultural methods; Catholic labour unions; Catholic newspapers such as *l'Action catholique* in Quebec City, *Le Devoir* in Montreal, and *Le Droit* in Ottawa; pious leagues, temperance associations and societies for the promotion of moral behaviour; as well as an extensive network of Catholic Action groups for men and women, workers, students, nationalists, and intellectuals. Beyond these new initiatives, the Church continued to expend it ability to provide education, healthcare and social services for the province's growing Catholic population. Where necessary, the Protestant churches provided a parallel and segregated set of institutions for other Quebecers.

This arrangement suited the political and economic elite of the province. The provincial government could count on

the Church to provide education, healthcare and social services at very low cost – given that the Church had an army of tens of thousands of relatively well-educated, unpaid workers, that is, the nuns, brothers and priests. For owners of large-scale capital – who were mostly English-speaking Americans, Canadians or British subjects -– the arrangement kept social spending and, hence, taxes low. Moreover, they could afford to fund their own set of institutions generously. This alliance of the Church, big business, and small government (under Duplessis' Union Nationale Party) meant that in Quebec, church, state, and public bureaucracy remained curiously undifferentiated until the 1960s. The Quebec pattern of modernization before 1960 was closer to that of Poland and Ireland, where religion and nationalism fused together in the face of an outside "threat" different from the nation in both ethnicity and religion.[34]

The Quiet Revolution in the 1960s overturned this arrangement. The Liberal government of Jean Lesage adopted the interventionist policies of welfare state liberalism and took control of education, healthcare and social services. But Quebec did not suffer the painful cultural schism that marked other Catholic societies such as France and Italy. There have been Catholics on both sides of every controversial public issue, Baum argues, and consequently Catholicism has not been identified with any one political party, ideology, or option.[35] Today, Quebec political culture bears traces of history. A small proportion of the population would like to create a totally secular Quebec. However, the general population does not support this option. While uninterested in attending church (Quebec Catholics have the lowest attendance rate in the country), Quebecers remain loyal to their Catholic identity and refuse to convert to other forms of Christianity in any significant numbers.[36] French Quebecers especially regard Catholicism as essential to their national self-understanding. While the Church often plays a negative role in the national mythos – it is most frequently identified with the oppressive traditionalism of *la grande noirceur* of the Duplessis era – most French Quebecers refuse to abandon Roman Catholicism altogether and ensure that their children undergo the rites of passage rituals associated with baptism, the Eucharist, and confirmation. This attitude is common in Europe and is labeled "belonging without believing," that is, maintaining loyalty to a religious heritage because of its central importance to national or ethnic identity, without necessarily practicing it.[37]

There is no doubt that the Canadian state and market – along with other social institutions that depend on them – have become separated from the churches.

4. MULTICULTURALISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN CANADA

Frequently, Canadians assume that secularization along with the adoption of a separation of Church and State has solved the question of Christian privilege and religious freedom. While there is some truth to this assumption, two recent debates show that this abstract and a-historical conceptualization of the relationship between religion and public life in Canada can actually work against the goals of the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Program and related efforts to promote tolerance and freedom in Canadian society.

By assuming that Canadian public life is already secular and that all religious expression should remain in the private sphere, people tend to ignore the fact that our putatively-secular public sphere is in many ways residually and normatively Christian. This means that its secularity has been shaped – ironically – by Christianity and in a way to accommodate most easily the needs of Christian communities. The most obvious example of this is the fact that the holiest Christian feast days (those around Christmas and Easter) are statutory holidays. Moreover, as Roger O'Toole has argued, the Christian origins of our public institutions continue to inform their culture and structures.

Given these facts, the abstract and a-historical notion of separation of Church and State can act to frustrate the goals of encouraging civic participation and recognizing the cultural diversity of all Canadians by 1) ignoring the lingering privileges accorded to the mainline Christian communities; and 2) countering the claims of all minority religious groups for public recognition of their needs. This promises to remain an important issue in public policy debates in Canada because the numbers of Canadians belonging to non-Christian religious communities is growing.

According to a 2005 Statistics Canada population projection, "persons who are members of non-Christian denominations should represent between 9.2% and 11.2% of the Canadian population in 2017, or between 3,049,000 and 4,107,000 people." In 2001, the authors note, only 6.3 percent of the Canadian population declared its religion as Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh or other non-Christian religions. Even that figure was an increase from 1991 when it sat at approximately 4 percent of the population.[38] The authors continue, based on the demographic 2017 projections, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh would see their membership increase by 145%, 92% and 72% respectively compared to 2001, to reach 1,421,000, 584,000 and 496,000 people respectively in 2017.[39]

This new religious diversity is clearly linked to immigration, a situation that in several European countries has fostered resentment against immigration, multiculturalism, and accommodation of the needs of religious minorities. Even in Canada, we have seen people react negatively to this new religious diversity. Some argue that Canada is essentially a Christian country and newcomers who are not Christians must learn to adapt to this reality. Others argue that Canada is essentially a secular society – with a strict separation of Church and State – and so it cannot accommodate the religious needs of newcomers

without compromising its neutrality.[40] In the end, the burdens imposed by this separation of Church and State weigh more heavily on minority religious communities. Minority communities find their own needs unmet while the needs of the Christian majority are – for the most part at least – already met by the culture and structures of our public institutions. Two recent debates illustrate this point, the unexpected debate around the funding of faith-based schools in Ontario and the continuing debate around "reasonable accommodation" of the needs of religious minority groups in Quebec.

Public funding of faith-based schools in Ontario

The debate over the public funding of faith-based schools in the 2007 Ontario provincial election demonstrated that Ontarians are committed to a secular public sphere, protected by a putative separation of Church and State. Moreover, while the fear of funding faith-based schools was articulated in terms of their alleged threat to social cohesion, in fact, whether implicitly or explicitly most opposition was grounded in fears of the threats to social cohesion and integration allegedly presented by the funding of Islamic schools. Notable in all this debate was that none of the three major political parties – and very few pundits or groups – extended the same critique to Ontario's publicly-funded, separate, Roman Catholic school system. In this debate, the false assumption that Canadians enjoy an American-style separation of Church and State promoted a political culture in which the doctrine of separation was applied primarily to single out a racialized minority religious group.

John Tory, the leader of Ontario's Progressive Conservative Party, announced well before the election campaign began that, were he to be elected, the province would fund faith-based schools as long as they adopted Ontario's school curriculum, submitted to standardized testing, and employed accredited teachers. Dalton McGuinty, leader of the Liberal Party of Ontario, built on the public outcry that followed Tory's announcement and made opposition to the plan a central platform of his party's campaign. By mid-election, a poll conducted for the CTV television network and the *Globe and Mail* newspaper showed that 71 percent of the electorate was opposed to public funding for faith-based schools and 26 percent were in favor of it.[41] In spite of an attempt to backtrack by promising to bring the controversial proposal to a free vote in the provincial legislature, the issue cost Tory his seat in the legislature and is widely viewed as having lost the Ontario Conservatives the election. The Ontario Liberals took the first back-to-back majority in the province in 70 years.

From very early on, the debate was articulated in terms of the liberal-democratic distinction between public and private spheres of society, and governed by the assumption that the public sphere must be free of religion in order for the province's diverse settler, immigrant and religious communities to live harmoniously.[42] Yet, as a survey of their interventions will show, many opponents of funding for faith-based schools expressed an inexplicit but nonetheless unmistakable Islamophobia. Moreover, the defeat of the Conservatives on this issue suggests that for the moment, Ontario's electorate is relatively content with the status quo, in which Roman Catholic schools are the only faith-based schools to receive public funding. This contradiction (opposing funding for religiously based schools but accepting funding for Catholic schools) suggest that the secularism of Ontario's public sphere was defined in this debate in opposition to the specter of a public or institutional expression of Islam. This "secularism" is residually and normatively Christian.

Secularism in Ontario

Most opponents of Tory's proposal argued either explicitly or implicitly that a publicly funded secular school system was necessary to promote and maintain a diverse, multicultural society. On the day he announced that public funding for faith-based schools was going to be the defining issue of the electoral campaign, McGuinty was widely quoted in the media as arguing that the proposal threatened "social cohesion."[43] The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) issued a public statement against the funding of religious schools, signed by individuals ranging from Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC), to Lois Wilson, former president of the World Council of Churches. The statement read: "Our public education system strives to acknowledge, accommodate and celebrate the diversity of faiths in our multicultural society. Our public schools have shown flexibility and creativity in responding to the changing face of our communities while playing a vital role in integrating many cultures."[44] In a brief submitted to Kathleen Wynne, the Liberal Minister of Education in Ontario, the CCLA raised the concern, widely vocalized by opponents of the Tory proposal, that funding for faith-based schools would help promote religious sectarianism and intolerance: "How could the newly-subsidized schools be monitored so as to ensure that public funds are not used to promote hate or discrimination?"[45]

A number of commentators dwelt on the distinction between public and private spheres, arguing that the proper place for religion in Canadian society was in the private sphere, (and by implication not in its public institutions). This reflected the opinion of 33 percent of those polled who opposed Tory's proposal on the basis of belief that "only the public system should be funded with taxpayer dollars and religion should not be a part of a government-funded education."[46] Columnist Margaret Wente, relating the controversy over public funding for faith-based schools to the so-called debate over reasonable accommodation underway in Quebec, argued that "religion as a private matter" constituted one of the primary "civilizational virtues proper to the Canadian way of life."[47]

Secularism and fairness: Why not fund none?

While the *Canadian Constitution Act* obliges Ontario as well as Alberta, Saskatchewan, and the Northwest Territories to fund Roman Catholic schools, Ontario and Saskatchewan are the only provinces that still fund Catholic schools without funding other faith-based schools. In 1999, the UN Human Rights Committee announced a non-binding ruling that Ontario's school funding policy constitutes discrimination on the basis of religion.[48] It

restated its decision in another assessment of the current state of human rights in Canada in 2006. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association was among the few voices in the recent debate to suggest that in the spirit of fairness and out of a commitment to secularism, Ontario should stop funding its Catholic school system.[49] It called for a constitutional amendment to end public funding for the province's Catholic schools.[50] A coalition called "One School System" also received some media attention in July 2007, when it held a press conference at Queen's Park, under the banner "One Secular School System." But these efforts were not received with much enthusiasm from Ontario residents, and the Green Party of Ontario was the only political party to campaign on a proposal to end public funding of Catholic schools. Nonetheless, at least one observer suggested that the increased scrutiny of the public funding of the Catholic school board and the combined values of those who voted against and for Tory's proposal – the strong desire to separate religion and education on the one hand,[51] and "fairness" on the other – will lead to a public acceptance of de-funding Ontario's Catholic schools in the not-so-distant future.[52]

"The elephant in the room"

Some of the interventions in the debate during the election period revealed an undercurrent of Islamophobia in the province that was used to reinforce and even help define the normatively "Christian secularism" with which the Ontario electorate proved comfortable. For example, Premier McGuinty began the only televised leaders' debate by warning that public funding for faith based schools would lead to "strife in the streets" of the kind witnessed in "Paris and London." He told an *Ottawa Citizen* reporter that "People see images of the streets of London, France, Germany, and the Netherlands and when I travel I'm asked why they aren't seeing more evidence of ethnic struggles and strife in Ontario." [53] McGuinty was not referring to strife caused by religious faith in general, or potentially by any number of different faiths, but to strife associated in many non-Muslim Ontarians' imaginations – whether accurately or not – with Islam.

The indirect reference to the riots caused by the intersection of racialized socio-economic injustice and religious radicalization within the South Asian, North African and Middle Eastern Muslim immigrant communities ghettoized by Western European societies seemed, disturbingly, to resonate with fear harbored by his audience.

Some voices supported their arguments against the public funding of faith-based schools with more explicit appeals to the fear of radical Islam. In their submission to the Education Minister, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association quoted the president of the Muslim Canadian Congress to support the argument that public funding for faith-based schools would exacerbate the conservative, orthodox elements in faith communities. According to the president of the Congress, the public funding of religious schools would mean that "more Muslim children will attend religious schools, and therefore have less contact with other Canadians."[54] In their view, our society can anticipate that "a new generation of young Muslims will come to embrace a more orthodox and archaic understanding of Islam."[55]

While there is indeed a legitimate debate to be had about the ramifications of faith-based schools, and it is raging within Ontario's Muslim community, some appeals to this fear played on straightforward bigotry. *Toronto Star* columnist James Travers agreed with the president of the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) Mohamed Elmasry that "the elephant in the room" of the debate "is Islam", but went on to argue, "more precisely, it's fear that immigration trends now skewing heavily to Muslim countries, combined with schools preaching that God's domain is indivisible from man's, will nurture Islam's virulent mutant strain."[56]

Haroon Siddiqui *(Toronto Star)* responded in a pre-election op-ed. Opposed to the John Tory proposal, Siddiqui nonetheless argued that much of the public opposition to funding religions schools was driven by bigotry and implicit "public unease with Muslims and Islam." He noted that "Protestant, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and other faith schools may pay the price for fear of Muslim schools being funded."[57]

Interventions by faith-based communities and organizations

The contrast between the Canadian Islamic Congress and Muslim Canadian Congress positions on the issue cited above provides a sense of the division among Ontario's Muslims. This division may be one of the reasons that prominent Muslim organizations like Council on American-Islamic Relations-Canada (CAIR-CAN) did not intervene in the debate. That said, some explicitly Muslim voices did speak out in favor of faith-based schools. In an opinion piece published in the Toronto Star, two recent graduates of Toronto's Osgoode Hall law school, Muneeza Sheikh and Khurrum Awan, as well as York University law student Daniel Simard observed that "a large part of this debate lies in the fact that, under Tory's proposal, funding would be extended to Islamic schools."[58] They argued that these fears were based on stereotypes and assumptions about Islamic schools – that they isolate or radicalize Muslim communities, trample women's rights – and that "some public figures have adopted a strategy of playing on these stereotypes in order to oppose Tory's proposal." In the remainder of their piece, they tried to debunk those stereotypes. Aisha Sherazi, an occasional writer in the *Ottawa Citizen* and former principal of a Muslim private school in the Ottawa area also wrote in favor of faith-based schools.[59]

As a whole, non-Muslim faith-based organizations were more public in advocating for Tory's proposal. The Ontario Alliance for Christian Schools published several op-eds, was quoted frequently in news reports, and devoted a great deal of web-site space to advocating for public funding.[60] In August, the United Jewish Appeal organized and led a coalition called Public Education Fairness Network described in its press releases comprised of members of the Armenian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh communities. As part of its campaign UJA also produced an online video calling for "Inclusive Public Education" which featured testimonies from a range of volunteers and professionals who attributed their sense of social justice and civic responsibility to their education in faith-based schools. All

were white, the majority were identifiable as Jewish, and none was identifiable as Muslim.[61]

In Ontario, secularism is residually Christian

Ontario's election-time debate over the public funding of faith-based schools was argued in terms of the liberal-democratic division between (secular) public and (religious) private spheres, and premised on the conviction that for Ontario's diverse cultures and faith-based communities to function together in a socially cohesive, pluralistic, democratic manner, the public sphere must be secular. These premises – and their proponents – imply that religion, when it filters from private confession into public practice, is dangerous, divisive, and potentially violent. However, when arguments against the public funding of faith-based schools were articulated or implied on this basis, it was clear that politicians and media pundits alike were speaking not about 'religion' in general but about one particular religion that threatens to provoke unrest and strife: Islam.

The simmering unease with Islam that was raised by the proposal to fund faith-based schools during the 2007 Ontario election campaign helped rally public opinion against it and contributed to defining a notion of secularism proper to Ontario. Considered in conjunction with Ontario voters' decision against public-funding for faith-based schools and their support for the status quo (in which Roman Catholic schools will continue to receive funding), this leads to the conclusion that although most Ontarians believe they live in a secular society characterized by an "arms length relationship between Church and State,"[62] that secularism is residually and normatively Christian.

Quebec's reasonable accommodation debate

Months before the 2007 Ontario provincial election, Quebecers had highlighted the issue of minority religious rights in their own provincial election. During the campaign politicians debated the extent to which Quebec public institutions found it necessary to implement "les *accommodements raisonnables*," that is, reasonable accommodation of the needs of minority religious groups. In an effort to defuse the debate, Premier Jean Charest announced on 8 February 2007, the creation of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences *(Commission de Consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles)* to examine the issues raised by the debate that had been taking place in the Quebec media. Chaired by two reputable senior academics, sociologist Gérard Bouchard and philosopher Charles Taylor, the Commission was mandated to conduct extensive consultations and public hearings with academics, community groups, organizations and individuals across Quebec in order to take stock of practices of accommodation practices and varying views on them. It will ultimately formulate recommendations to the government "to ensure that accommodation practices conform to Quebec's values as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society."[63]

It is ironic that this debate has centered on accommodation of the religious needs and sensibilities of members of Quebec's religious minorities given that the term "reasonable accommodation" has its origins in labour legislation. Marie McAndrew, the Chair of Ethnic Relations at the Université de Montréal, defines reasonable accommodation as "an exception granted to a person or a group of persons upon whom a universal rule would have a discriminatory effect, on grounds prohibited by the *Charter*, and infringe upon the exercise of their fundamental rights."[64] She goes on to note that reasonable accommodation "touches upon all sub-groups protected against discrimination by the *Charter*," and that as such, "its realm of application extends (…) well beyond the question of ethno-cultural or religious diversity."[65] In fact, most legal challenges around the issue of reasonable accommodation have to do with the accommodation of persons with physical disabilities in the workplace.

Because of the expansion of the term in the public debate beyond the parameters warranted by the legal use of "reasonable accommodation," the Bouchard-Taylor Commission has chosen to focus on questions of ethno-cultural and religious diversity. In the document prepared to frame the consultation process, including written submissions and testimonies at regional citizens' forums as well as hearings hosted by the commission as it travels throughout Quebec, the authors write it is true that some protests targeted only one kind of accommodation linked to certain religious practices, but what numerous critics appear to call into question, at least indirectly, is the socio-cultural integration model adopted in Québec in the 1970s.[66]

Although some observers have criticized the manner in which Taylor and Bouchard have framed the issue,[67] the Commission's choice reflects the way the term reasonable accommodation has come to be used in the Quebec media over the past several years. It has most frequently, if not exclusively, been used to describe instances in which the religious practices of members of racialized immigrant communities are perceived to come into conflict with the cultural practices of the dominant francophone community that still has not resolved its relationship to its Catholic past.[68] The consultation document continues, "The opinions expressed in recent months bring back to the fore the question of secularism (*laïcité*). There appears to be considerable uncertainty, indeed, a malaise in Québec society, concerning our relationship to religion."[69] As such, the Commission and the debate over "reasonable accommodation" constitute a fruitful site for examining how Quebecers understand secularism and the relationship between religion and the state.

Government and commission definitions and constructions of secularism

The Commission's consultation document identifies "secularism" as one of four key dimensions of reasonable accommodation. It affirms that, "As Québec Premier Jean Charest has stated several times in recent months, Québec is a secular society, i.e. the sphere of the State (including its institutional extensions) and the sphere of religion are independent and each sphere enjoys its own autonomy."[70] The authors of the document note that separation of Church and State is a fundamental if not the primary

principle of secularism, and indeed, the government order according to which the Commission was created cites "the separation of Church and state" second in the list of the "core values" of Quebec society according to which the Commission is being convened.[71] Thus, by government order, the Commission was founded on an understanding of Quebec as a society in which Church and state are separate.

The Commission document observes, however, that the independence of these two spheres can be understood in two different ways – either as "the neutrality of the State in respect of various religions or world views" or as the "more or less complete elimination of the religious life from the public sphere".[72] In Québec, these two options are called "*la laïcité ouverte*" and "*la laïcité fermée.*" The authors of the document propose that a secular Québec adopt the former interpretation, that is to say, the principle of "neutrality stemming from equal respect for all citizens", complemented by the protection of rights, and the freedom of conscience of religion (following the Quebec and Canadian charters).[73]

Tellingly, after listing a series of questions designed to encourage thoughtful, topical submissions to the Commission on the question "What kind of secularism" Quebec should maintain, the document's authors delineate a special set of questions devoted to considering "Catholicism's place" in this secular society: Do you think it is legitimate in Québec to grant special status to Catholicism, given its place in the society's history? Do you think that society overall would accept it? What might this special status for Catholicism entail?[74]

This tension – constituted on the one hand by a desire to assert secularism founded on the principle of separation of Church and State and, on the other, the need to reconcile this position with a Catholic history that remains an emotional and ideological touchstone that buttresses the cultural identity of Quebec's Francophone majority – has been evident in the media coverage and public response to the series of events that surrounded the creation of the Commission. These events were all framed as controversies over the request or the refusal to "accommodate" non-Christian religious symbols or practices in the public sphere, broadly understood (that is, not necessarily only in those institutions or programs run or funded by government). A brief summary of the events that received extensive media coverage helps illustrate the point:

- In February 2006, the YMCA (Young Men Christian Association) in the midst of Montreal's Hasidic community installed frosted windows, paid for by the Yetev Lev Congregation, so that male students of the congregation would not see women exercising.[75]
- In March 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that barring Gurbaj Singh Multani, a Sikh student at a Montreal school from wearing his kirpan to school violated the student's freedom of religion, as enshrined in the federal *Charter of Rights*.[76]
- In January 2007, the municipal council of Hérouxville, a town of 1,300 with only one immigrant child in it, passed a set of standards *("normes de vie")* directed at new immigrants. While stating in oblique language that halal and kosher dietary restrictions, gender segregation, and a range of religious apparel (from the kirpan to the veil) have no place in Herouxville's schools, businesses or other institutions, it warned that Christmas trees and Christmas carols are to be expected in public schools at Christmas time. [77]

A survey of these and subsequent events, as well as their coverage by the media, reveals how secularism and the notion of separation of Church and State, have frequently been invoked by Quebec media, politicians, and individual citizens (including Internet chat rooms) to argue against, stigmatize, and even criminalize the public expression of non-Christian religious practices or symbols, while reifying a "secularism" in which Christian symbols and practices are acceptable.

The indirect reference to the riots caused by the intersection of racialized socio-economic injustice and religious radicalization within the South Asian, North African and Middle Eastern Muslim immigrant communities ghettoized by Western European societies seemed, disturbingly, to resonate with fear harbored by his audience.

Fear of Islam at the center

Following the Hérouxville *"normes de vie"* episode, the press reported a number of cases involving conflicts over the right of Muslim girls and women to wear the hijab that formed the pegs of the debate over reasonable accommodation:

- In February 2007, a young player on a female soccer team from Nepean, Ontario, was ordered by the referee in a tournament in Montreal to remove her hijab. She refused, supported by her teammates, and the team forfeited the tournament.[78]
- In March 2007, a young Muslim woman was fired from the Bordeaux detention training program because she refused to remove her hijab.[79]
- In April 2007, members of a girls' team from Montreal's Muslim Community Center were refused entry into a Tae Kwon Do tournament for refusing to remove their hijabs.[80] It is worth noting that in all these instances, the official reason the women were told they had to remove their hijabs was because wearing them posed a threat to their safety.
- In March 2007, the Quebec media, and particularly the *Journal de Montréal*, TQS and TVA television networks, devoted a great deal of coverage to an incident at the *Érablière Au Sous-Bois*, a cabane à sucre (sugar shack) not far from Montreal, in which a group of Muslim visitors had, with the permission of the management,

asked country singer Sylvain Boily – a white, francophone Quebecer – and his friends to leave the dance hall for twenty minutes on a Sunday afternoon, so that the group could pray.[81]

Boily's outraged response, broadcast in a TVA report, is worth dwelling on, because it was characteristic of the sort of muddled discourse about secularism and right to religious freedom propagated in the major francophone Quebec media chains: "Vous ne trouvez-pas ça étrange qu'on dénature les cabanes à sucre?", he asked. "On n'est pas raciste," he maintained, but the sugar shack was a public space, and others didn't have the right to force their religion on him there. Then he went on, "Respecter notre religion à nous." The sequence of statements forced a critical viewer to wonder what religion exactly was not being respected when Muslims asked to pray, and why it – whatever it was – had precedence over Islam in the so-called public space of the dancehall to which Boily referred. The TVA anchor did not pose these questions.

Boily's indignation, broadcasted across Quebec, amplified the outrage that had already been directed by a number of so-called "de souche" Quebecers at sugar shacks that had begun to take the pork out of the pea soup, and make pork- and lard-free meals available to groups of visitors upon request. Although this had more to do with good business practices, and tapping into a growing market of visitors – Muslim, Jewish, and vegetarian – who eat a pork-free diet, the issue was cast as a special "accommodation" being provided to Muslims.[82] André Boisclair, leader of the Parti Quebecois, encouraged the media-driven outrage as he headed into a spring election race, telling LCN that "Obviously restaurateurs are allowed to serve whatever they want. But I can tell you that if we are getting into a situation where cabanes à sucre doesn't serve pork anymore, we are getting into big trouble."[83] All of these controversies were sparked by public demonstrations of non-Christian faith. Moreover, it is impossible to overlook the fact that, most often, the controversies involved the public expression of Islam.

"Respecter notre religion à nous!": The passive double standard

The public discourse that effectively allowed some members of the dominant white, Francophone Catholic majority in Quebec to invoke secularism and the separation of Church and State to protect European Christian cultural norms was captured by a *Léger & Léger* poll of 1,001 Quebecers carried out in August 2007. The results, published in the *Montreal Gazette* on September 10th, as the Commission hearings began in the regions, "reveals a passive double standard: a large majority of Quebecers disapproves of open expressions of religion, unless it's Christian."[84] For example, 72 percent are against Jews or Muslims getting time off work to pray, 67 percent do not want the government to subsidize religious schools, 63 percent do not want Muslim women to walk around with their faces covered (i.e., with a niqab, which completely covers the head except for the eyes, as compared to a hijab which covers the hair and the neck) and 61 percent are against Muslim teachers and Muslim girls wearing the hijab to school. Yet almost the same number – 59 percent – approve of keeping crucifixes on the walls of public schools. (Of these, only 25 percent would allow hijabs to be worn by students or teachers.)[85,86]

Like the debates in Ontario over public funding of religiously based schools and the earlier controversy over so-called Sharia courts, the Quebec debate over reasonable accommodation reveals a latent assumption that secularism in Canada can accommodate historically dominant forms of Christianity but not other faiths. In practical terms, it means that the principle of separation of Church and State is applied more to non-Christian religions – as well as certain minority Christian groups – than to the Christian majority.

5. CONCLUSION

The controversies surrounding the uneven funding of faith-based schools in Ontario and the "reasonable accommodation" debate in Quebec demonstrate that questions about religious freedom and diversity – as well as religious intolerance and discrimination – continue to challenge the attempts of the all levels of government to make Canada a more inclusive, just and participatory society. Given that Statistics Canada predicts that the number of Canadians belonging to minority religious communities will grow to approximately 10 percent of the population by 2017, questions of religious pluralism, freedom, as well as intolerance and discrimination will certainly continue to play themselves out in Canadian public life in the decade to come. Consequently, government programs – at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels – that promote multiculturalism can no longer afford to neglect questions of religious pluralism and barriers to religious freedom. These questions intersect with wider issues of racism, gender inequality, ethnic tensions, and immigrant integration. To the extent that the abstract and a-historical idea that Canada is a secular society with a formal and legal separation of Church and State prohibits us from confronting these issues squarely, it represents a barrier to the goals of promoting multiculturalism and safeguarding human rights.

The consequences of ignoring religion

By now it should be clear that the refusal to address religion in a meaningful way is not based on any constitutional or legal restrictions. Rather it is the product of a specific public culture that arose in response to particular circumstances and influences. In other words, it is a public policy choice – and hence it is open to rethinking. From the recent controversies in Ontario and Quebec, we can see that ignoring religion as an element of our multiculturalism and human rights policies can exclude significant (and growing) portions of the Canadian population by: hiding the persistence of Christian privilege in Canadian public culture as well as institutional practices and structures; alienating large sectors of the Canadian population by refusing to acknowledge or respect the public elements of their religious traditions; ignoring claims made in the name of religion, for example, claims by Aboriginal peoples to access to certain lands in order to fulfill the requirements of Aboriginal spirituality; discouraging the

contribution to Canadian society made by faith-based institutions and organizations, such as schools, hospitals, social service agencies, as well as cultural, sports and charitable organizations; fostering resistance to reasonable accommodation of religious difference, a human right that guarantees that a practice or policy that serves that majority does not discriminate against members of religious minority groups; encouraging the creation of religious "ghettoes," that is, closed ethno-religious communities that have relatively little connection to the rest of Canadian society; preventing integration of ethno-religious newcomers (immigrants and refugees) by giving the Canadian state and society a public face that appears foreign or hostile to them.

Consequently, while we do need to protect the autonomy of institutions in Canada's public sphere (the state, political parties, economic institutions, etc.) as well as that of our religious communities and institutions, we do not need to adopt attitudes based on American or French doctrines of separation of Church and State. This means that we can – and should – address issues of religious diversity and freedom in our policies on multiculturalism and human rights. In a report prepared March 2007, we recommended that the promotion of religious tolerance, freedom and diversity be made a priority for agencies interested in promoting multiculturalism and human rights.[87] This has not been the case in the past. For example, in that report, we noted a study conducted by Paul Bramadat that showed that only 3.4% (19 of 546) of research projects funded by the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch from 2000 to 2004 addressed religion in a meaningful way.[88] Our March report to Canadian Heritage also concluded that the increasing number of Canadians who belong to minority religious traditions, their concentration in urban centers, and their increasing demand for accommodations will mean that a variety of government and public institutions will face important public policy decisions regarding respect for religious diversity and freedom.[89] Consequently, it is important for all levels of government to put aside all squeamishness about confronting the issue of religion seriously.

Beyond simply studying the issues of religious diversity and freedom, Canadians have to be prepared to discuss the role of religion in public life. Moreover, political philosophers have begun to argue that to forbid religious discourse in the public sphere – a priori – is a violation of the rights of members of religious communities and contrary to liberal democratic philosophy. They argue that the requirement to translate their religious discourse into a secular idiom in order to participate in a putatively "value-free" public sphere according to allegedly "neutral" rational rules places an unfair burden on members of religious communities. Such a requirement asks some Canadians – and not others – to sacrifice important elements of their identity and group solidarity. Moreover, as we have seen in the Ontario and Quebec debates on religious pluralism, this public sphere is neither value-free nor neutral. The residually Christian nature of this public sphere places a further burden on members of minority religious communities that adherents of mainline Christian churches do not need to shoulder.

Finally, Canadians must undertake this initiative in a manner that reflects the specific challenges, structures, historical inheritance, values and vision for the future that makes Canada unique. Other countries have crafted their own unique arrangements for relations between government and religious communities – and we must do the same. Consequently, Canadians need to begin a public dialogue on the issues of religious diversity and freedom as well as the place of religion in Canadian public life that will lead to an arrangement of relations that reflects their own heritage and vision for the future.

Religion and Canadian multiculturalism

Canada's multicultural model is unique in the world and provides a blueprint as well as wealth of experience for developing the means to address this issue. In a recent article on religious diversity in Canada, Kamal Dib writes, "the Canadian approach of public dialogue and royal commissions has served the country well over the decades… Canada has more progressive views on socio-economic issues and immigration and multiculturalism compared to those expressed in Europe and elsewhere".[90]

Such a public dialogue, Dib writes "would have two goals: to inform the majority about the culture of the various religious communities and to educate adherents of religious communities on how to integrate in mainstream society without losing self-dignity and self-respect."[91] This model of dialogue, in which both established Canadians and more recent immigrants as well as members of the mainstream and minority groups are all called to mutual respect and accommodation, is part of the heritage of our multicultural policies and practices of the last four decades.

Such public dialogue would be greatly facilitated by national interfaith bodies. For example, in Great Britain and Australia,[92] the state subsidizes interfaith networks that serve a variety of functions. In Canada, such networks could address questions of religious diversity by: facilitating communication and cooperation between government departments and public institutions and faith communities on an ongoing basis; promoting understanding and cooperation amongst various religious groups; negotiating conflicts between adherents of religious groups (Canadian Jews and Muslims, for example) and within specific religious communities (within the Sikh community, for example) ; helping members of immigrant communities integrate into Canadian society by promoting those religious structures and practices that facilitate social integration; acting as an information resource centre for government departments, public institutions, and the media on questions related to religion; sponsoring public education – in schools and other forums – on religious diversity, tolerance and freedom; and combating religious extremism in all its forms.[94]

Given that most Canadians identify themselves as Christian, such a national council or network would probably be dominated by representatives from those communities but care should be taken to achieve a fair – if always imperfect – representation from as broad a spectrum of communities as possible. Given that agencies and departments in the federal and provincial governments already have extensive experience in fostering dialogue

among ethnic communities, there is no reason to believe that the creation of such a network should pose an insurmountable challenge. In fact, the government already consults with the Canadian Council of Churches regarding a variety of issues including chaplains in the Canadian Forces and Correctional Services.[95]

At the Sixth National Metropolis Conference, in Edmonton, Alberta in March 2003, a number of religious studies scholars, including me, Paul Bramadat and Harold Coward, participated in a panel on religion and multiculturalism in Canada.[96] After our presentation, we were approached by a senior administrator in the Department of Canadian Heritage who agreed with our argument that those in government who are concerned with multiculturalism must take religion more seriously. This person then said urgently, "We know we have to confront this issue [religion], but …we are *afraid*. We don't know anything about it!" Often when the issue of religion arises in discussions of multiculturalism and democratic governance, we have found that the response is fear that religion will have a polarizing effect on public debates. And while it is certainly true that religion has served to polarize communities in the past, it is equally true that it has helped to overcome differences, promote cooperation, and facilitate communication between groups as well. Religion is – like politics, ethnicity, and other human realities – ambiguous.

Refusing to confront the persistence of religion in Canadian society by clinging to an abstract and ahistorical concept of the separation of Church and State will certainly lead to misunderstandings and injustices. It is precisely those misunderstandings and injustices that are likely to lead to polarization, ghettoization and the radicalization of certain religious communities. Public policies that aim to make Canada a more participatory and just society cannot be developed in an atmosphere of ignorance and fear. The issue of religion must be addressed in discussions of social inclusion, immigrant integration, multiculturalism, democratic participation and justice.

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Notes

[1] Dr. David Seljak is a Professor of Religion in the Department of Religious Studies, St. Jerome's University at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario. With Andréa Schmidt, independent researcher, Toronto, Adam Stewart, University of Waterloo, and Paul Bramadat, University of Winnipeg.

[2] See www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/ for the Web site of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.

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[5] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Among wealthy nations: U.S. stands alone in its embrace of religion. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Retrieved from http://www.queensu.ca/cora/polls/2002/September19-Religious_Belief_across_Countries.pdf.

[6] Bibby, R. Is God dead...Or just misread? Bibby's blog: research, reflections, and rants. Retrieved from http://reginaldbibby.blogspot.com/2007/08/is-god-deador-just-misread.html.

[7] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Among wealthy nations: U.S. stands alone in its embrace of religion.

[8] Casanova, J. *Public religions in the modern world.*

[9] Newport, F. Americans today much more accepting of a woman, black, Catholic, or Jew as President. *Gallup News Service.* Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/3979/Americans-Today-Much-More-Accepting-Woman-Black-Catholic.aspx.

[10] Casanova, J. Religion, European secular identities, and European integration. *Eurozine.* Retrieved from http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html.

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[13] Discrimination against non-Christian traditions is described in Bramadat, P., & Seljak, D. (Eds.). (2005). *Religion and ethnicity in Canada.* Toronto: Pearson Longman.

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[15] One element that has been ignored in histories of Canada is the rampant anti-Catholicism of this period. In Ontario, the Orange Order, an Irish invention to promote anti-Catholicism, thrived in the late 1800s and early 1900s. See Miller, J. R. (1993). Anti-Catholicism in Canada: From the British conquest to the Great War. In T. Murphy and G. Stortz (Eds.). *Creed and culture: The place of English-speaking Catholics in Canadian society, 1750-1930.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. Roman Catholics struggled to define for themselves a place of legitimacy in this society. See McGowan, M. (1999). *The waning of the green: Catholics, the Irish and identity in Toronto, 1887-1922.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. for the example of the Irish in Toronto.

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[17] Noll, What happened to Christian Canada?, 249.

[18] Scholars do not agree on the significance of this figure.

[19] Noll, What happened to Christian Canada?, 248-49.

[20] Ibid.: 249.

[21] Adapted from a Statistics Canada table available at: http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/rel/canada.cfm.

[22] Bibby, R. (2002). *Unknown gods: The ongoing story of religion in Canada.* Toronto: Stoddart.

[23] Hamelin, J. & Gagnon, N. (1984). *Histoire du catholicisme Québécois. Le XX^e Siècle. Tome 1. 1898-1940.* Montréal: Boréal Express.

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[25] Biles and Ibrahim note that at a conference on religion in public life in Canada, a participant stated that Canada was a "post-Christian country"; the audience erupted in surprise and disagreement. Biles and Ibrahim. *Religion and public policy: Immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism–Guess who's coming to dinner?*, pp. 167.

[26] José Casanova defines a modern, public religion as one that operates in the undifferentiated sphere of civil society, recognizes the autonomy of the state and political society, affirms the independence of the individual's conscience, and raises ethical questions in a democratic manner. Contrary to classical liberal theory, the participation of such institutions in public life, he argues, protects civil society and promotes democracy. See Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World.*

[27] Biles and Ibrahim. *Religion and public policy: Immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism–Guess who's coming to dinner?*, pp. 167.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Original emphasis. O'Toole, R. (2000). Canadian religion: Heritage and project. In D. Lyon & M. Van Die (Eds.). *Rethinking Church, State, and modernity: Canada between Europe and America.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp 45.

[30] Needless to say, the situation is far more complex when we look at the entire international scene. India and Turkey, for example, are officially secular states

in which religion still plays an enormous political role. China's communist government sanctions religious communities that it sees as promoting "harmony" but ruthlessly suppresses all others.

[31] ———. Canada in comparative perspective.

[32] Canadian sociologist S.D. Clark discusses how religious pluralism helped to promote political freedom and democracy throughout the history of British North America and Canada. See Clark, S. D. (1948). *Church and sect in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.* and the section on religion (Part II) in Clark, S. D. (1962). *The developing Canadian community.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press., especially "The religious sect in Canadian politics".

[33] Guindon, H. (1988). *Quebec society: Tradition, modernity and nationhood.*(1988). In R. Hamilton and J. L. McMullan (Eds). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 20-21.

[34] Baum, G. (1991). Catholicism and secularization in Quebec. *In The Church in Quebec.* Ottawa: Novalis, pp. 15-47.

[35] Baum. Catholicism and secularization in Quebec.

[36] Bibby. *Restless gods: The renaissance of religion in Canada*, pp. 81-82.

[37] Hervieu-Léger. *The role of religion in establishing social cohesion.*

[38] Bélanger, A. & Caron Malenfant, É. (2005). Population projections of visible minority groups, Canada, provinces and regions, 2001-2017. Government of Canada Ministry of Industry (Ed.)., pp. 19. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/91-541-XIE/91-541-XIE2005001.pdf. For other qualifications of this projections see Seljak, D. et al. (2007). *Religion and multiculturalism in Canada: The challenge of religious intolerance and discrimination.* Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage Multiculturalism and Human Rights Program, pp. 31-32.

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[40] Seljak et al. *Religion and multiculturalism in Canada: The challenge of religious intolerance and discrimination*, pp. 37-47.

[41] Cockburn, C. What do Ontarians think of funding faith-based schools? *The Globe and Mail.* Retrieved from http://images.theglobeandmail.com/archives/RTGAM/images/20070918/wontpoll18/_done_0918ontpoll_800big.jpg, The Strategic Counsel. The race for Queen's Park, 2007: Wave 2. Retrieved from http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007-09-17 GMC TV Sep 13-16 final2.pdf.

[42] See Casanova. *Public religions in the modern world.*

[43] CBC News. Indepth: Quebec Kirpan case. *CBC News Online.* Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kirpan/.

[44] Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Fostering a more tolerant society. Retrieved from http://www.ccla.org/schoolfunding/jointstatement.pdf.

[45] Borovoy, A. A., & Mendelsohn Aviv, N. The public funding of religious schools. Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Retrieved from http://www.ccla.org/schoolfunding/brief-religious-schools.pdf.

[46] The Strategic Counsel. The race for Queen's Park, 2007: Wave 2.

[47] Wente, M. Immigration and identity: A taste of things to come. *The Globe and Mail.* Retrieved from http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20071011/COWENT11/Columnists/columnists/columnistsNational/6/6/7/.

[48] CBC News. UN says funding of Catholic schools discriminatory. *CBC.* Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/1999/11/05/schools99 1105.html.

[49] Human Rights Committee. Considerations of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee. United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/7616e3478238be01c12570ae00397f5d/$FILE/G0641362.pd.

[50] Macleans.ca Staff. Ontario should stop funding all religious schools: Civil liberties group. *Macleans.ca.* Retrieved from http://www.macleans.ca/education/universities/article.jsp?content=20070924_172657_8012.

[51] Some 33% of those polled who were opposed to extending funding to faith-based schools did so out of the belief that "only the public system should be funded with taxpayers' dollars and religions should not be a part of government funded education." Cockburn. What do Ontarians think of funding faith-based schools?.

[52] Valpy, M. (2007). Michael Valpy's winners and losers. *The Globe and Mail.* Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071011.welectionattic11/BNStory/ontarioelection2007.

[53] Cobb, C. McGuinty Family Values. *Ottawa Citizen.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=1e05d708-8106-4321-9d30-a628dfc6df6c.

[54] Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Fostering a more tolerant society.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Travers, J. Faith fight goes beyond the province. *Toronto Star.* Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/article/261807. See Statistics Canada. *Overview: Canada Still Predominantly Roman Catholic and Protestant.*

[57] Siddiqui, H. Ontario democracy fails faith-based test of maturity. *Toronto Star.* http://www.thestar.com/article/264177.

[58] Sheikh, M., Simard, D., & Awan, K. Fear of Islamic schools based on false stereotypes. *Toronto Star.* Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/article/258456.

[59] Sherazi, A. Faith-based schools. *Ottawa Citizen.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=0432d435-d1cf-48e8-a9ab-c11c5d001c90.

[60] Mahoney, J. Equal-funding supporters accept bump in the road. *The Globe and Mail.* Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071002.wontreligion02/BNStory/ontarioelection2007; Vanasselt, J. Dalton McGuinty: Creating a culture of educational profiling. *National Post.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/editorialsletters/story.html?id=92cc7605-1ec8-4e13-89f8-314ed90b28c6&p=2;Ontario Alliance for Christian Schools. Ontario Alliance for Christian Schools Website. http://www.oacs.org/election/.

[61] Inclusive Education Initiative. Inclusive public education. United Jewish Appeal. Retrieved from http://www.feduja.org/jewishtoronto/VIDEOS/EDUCATION/background.html.

[62] Travers. Faith fight goes beyond the province.

[63] Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles. *Échanger pour s'entendre.* Gouvernement du Québec. Retrieved from http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/index.html.

[64] McAndrew, M. *Reasonable accommodation: Foundations, guidelines, and issues.* Retrieved from http://www.couch.ca/conference/McAndrew.pdf.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles. (2007). Seeking common ground: Quebecers speak out. Gouvernement du Québec, pp. 3.

[67] Some critics argue that this broad framing misapplies the term to disputes between individuals and private institutions – not between public institutions or employers and individuals. Daniel Weinstock, "Quatre Clés Pour Éviter La Crise," *L'Actualité*, October 1 2007, 38-39.

[68] Indeed, reasonable accommodations coverage has been so focused on religious practices and symbols that that in an interview with the CBC just after the Commission was struck, Charles Taylor and host Anna Maria Tremonti used the term "religious accommodations" interchangeably with "reasonable accommodations". The Current. (2007). *Charles Taylor Feature.* Toronto: CBC, Audio File.

[69] Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles, *Seeking common ground: Quebecers speak out*, pp. 4.

[70] Ibid., 25.

[71] Government of Quebec. (2007). Order in council: Concerning the establishment of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation of Practices Related to Cultural Differences, pp 1.

[72] Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles. *Seeking common ground: Quebecers speak Out*, pp. 25.

[73] Ibid., 26.

[74] Ibid., 27.

[75] White, M. PQ leader wants complete control. *CanWest News Service.* http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=2a647f1c-e0a2-4037-a179-d77afb0340f7.

[76] Ibid.

[77] White. PQ leader wants complete control.

[78] Even the premier of Quebec weighed in on the controversy. See Larocque, S. (2007, February 26). Interdiction du voile islamique au soccer: Jean Charest appuie la décision. *Presse Canadienne* (PC. It is interesting to note that the referee was himself a Muslim, who defended his decision citing FIFA rules.

[79] Canadian Press. Quebec guard fired after insisting on wearing Hijab. *CTV.ca.* Retrieved from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070314/hijab_prison_070214?s_name=&no_ads=.

[80] Stastna, K. Tae Kwon Do Hijab ban continues, Quebec Federation Says. *The Gazette.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=dc03b28f-c565-4abb-9df1-e517b13ba6a0&k=91310.

[81] LCN. Des accommodements raisonnables à la cabane à sucre. *LCN*. Retrieved from http://lcn.canoe.ca/cgi-bin/player/video.cgi?file=/lcn/actualite/regional/20070319_sucre.wmv.

[82] Nadeau, J. De la soupe aux pois sans jambon. *Journal de Montréal*. Retrieved from http://www2.canoe.com/cgi-bin/imprimer.cgi?id=285217. Baillargeon, G. D. Accommodements dans les cabanes à sucre. *Journal de Montréal*. Retrieved from http://www2.canoe.com/infos/societe/archives/2007/03/20070320-075503.html.

[83] Déry, P. Des accommodements raisonnables à la cabane à sucre!. *LCN*. Retrieved from http://lcn.canoe.ca/cgi-bin/player/video.cgi?file=/lcn/actualite/regional/cabane.wmv.

[84] Heinrich, J. Immigrants welcome - as long as they conform. *The Montreal Gazette.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=fee092fd-5859-48c7-a46e-0a0a43700b73&k=38180&p=1.

[85] Ibid.

[86] It is worth noting that younger Quebecers are more open to public expressions of non-Christian faiths. Heinrich, J. Generation accommodation. *The Montreal Gazette.* Retrieved from http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/saturdayextra/story.html?id=352d10c7-e6d9-4bf3-a689 090a420e11fc&p=3. Thus, it appears that young Quebecers' attitudes toward secularism are shifting and becoming less antagonistic toward expressions of non-Christian faiths in the public sphere.

[87] Seljak et al. Religion and multiculturalism in Canada: The challenge of religious intolerance and discrimination. pp. 87-95.

[88] Bramadat notes that six of those studies were designed specifically to address the repercussions of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Consequently, the number of studies done on religious diversity, for its own sake, numbers 13 in the five years studied. Bramadat, P. (2004). Challenges and opportunities: reconsidering the relationship between religions, the Multiculturalism Program, and the Government of Canada. Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage Multiculturalism Program. pp. 10-11.

[89] Seljak et al. Religion and multiculturalism in Canada: The challenge of religious intolerance and discrimination. pp. 34.

[90] Kamal, D. (2006). Now that religious diversity is upon us… Canada's multiculturalism model is increasingly relevant. *Canadian Diversity*, 5, no. 2, 42.

[91] Ibid.: 42-43.

[92] Since 2001, the British government has awarded an annual grant to the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom, an independent voluntary organization, funded by private donations, charitable trusts and faith communities. For the Australian initiative, see Cahill, D., Bouma, G., Dellal, H., & Leahy, M. (2004). *Religion, cultural diversity and safeguarding Australia*. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Ed.) Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in association with the World Conference of Religions for Peace. RMTI and Monash University, pp. 119-20.

[93] Naturally, interfaith networks will not *resolve* conflicts of this nature that are rooted in deep, historical and transnational animosities. However, they can be used to *negotiate* the conflict so that it is played out, at least on Canadian soil, in a civil, democratic, and non-violent manner.

[94] The authors of *Religion Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia* provide a comprehensive list of the responsibilities of such an advisory body. See Cahill, D. et al. (2004). Religion, cultural diversity and safeguarding Australia. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Ed.). Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Australian Multicultural Foundation in association with the World Conference of Religions For Peace. Rmit University And Monash University, pp. 119-20.

[95] While Christian in its orientation, the Council promotes interfaith dialogue and cooperation. See Canadian Council of Churches. Canadian Council of Churches' Commission on Faith and Witness. Retrieved from http://www.ccc-cce.ca/english/faith/inter.htm. A partial list of interfaith groups in Canada is found at Canadian Council of Churches. Interfaith Groups and Centres in Canada. Retrieved from http://www.ccc-cce.ca/english/downloads/GroupsCentres.pdf.

[96] The Metropolis Project is an international research project on the integration of immigrants and refugees into pluralistic societies. The Canadian project is found at http://canada.metropolis.net/.

Religion and Social Capital in Canada

Jack Jedwab

Jack Jedwab is the Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies.

ABSTRACT

Experts examining the respective state of multiculturalism and/or social cohesion have seen growing attention directed at measuring levels of civic participation, inclusion and social capital. The impact of volunteerism and networking on democratic life constitutes the basis of social capital and religious engagement represents a considerable degree of the capital that is generated in Canada. By consequence, meaningful discussion of the relationship between diversity and social capital must consider the salience of religion and how it is expressed civically. Social capital initiatives often reflect community values through social engagement. Jedwab argues that there is no causal evidence in support of the idea that the social capital of minority religious groups is motivated by a different set of values. Moreover, he demonstrates that minority religious volunteer activity neither undercuts trust of others nor the sense of belonging to Canada.

1. INTRODUCTION

Religious identity and religion's institutional presence in the public and private domain have had a powerful influence on recent debates about multiculturalism and social cohesion. Social cohesion has been defined as the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians (Jackson et al., 2000). There often appears to be greater consensus about what threatens social cohesion (unemployment, poverty, income inequality and social exclusion) than what it promotes. The identification of shared values and norms seems to be closely associated with the pursuit of social cohesion.

According to the Department of Canadian Heritage, multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal and diversity is viewed as a national asset. It is defined by this department as follows: "all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence."

Those desiring that social cohesion become the dominant paradigm in the management of diversity in Canada are concerned with in the perceived absence of strong common norms and references. They worry that too much emphasis on diversity risks undercutting social harmony. For their part, those who favour the multicultural approach fear that cohesion is a euphemism for assimilation and that many cohesionists reject the accommodation of difference – a central tenet of multiculturalism. Those who view multiculturalism and social cohesion as opposing goals are unlikely to find common ground around the best approach to managing diversity. There appears to be some convergence around assessing the impact of diversity on society. Measurement of the societal outcomes of diversity by those respectively stressing multiculturalism or social cohesion is increasingly focused upon civic participation, inclusion and social capital. The impact of volunteerism and networking on democratic life constitutes the basis of social capital. Religious expression and engagement represent a considerable degree of the social capital generated in North America. Therefore, it would be difficult to meaningfully discuss the relationship between diversity and social capital without considering the salience of religion and how it is expressed civically. Clearly not all religious engagement results in positive societal outcomes, nor does it all pursue civic objectives.

Framing questions

This article explores how the Canadian stock of social capital is affected by religious engagement and its impact on policies and practices in regard to multiculturalism and social cohesion. To do so, the following questions have been identified:

a) How do faith-based organizations produce social capital and how is it being used? What elements of social capital do faith-based groups manifest and what is the effect of their community work? This can range from various types of

activities, including fulfilling member's lives through community school programs, athletic programs and voluntary activities.

b) How do faith-based communities, including those involved in charitable work, education, and social services (i.e., health care) affect the quest for social cohesion and integration of minorities and newcomers in Canada? Does membership in faith-based social/cultural/sports organizations discourage joining similar mainstream organizations? Do faith based organizations contribute to the isolation/alienation of their members, especially youth, from mainstream society?

c) Do faith-based communities pose a policy challenge to a religion-neutral State? What models could be applicable to the Canadian context where the principles of Canadian multiculturalism are upheld, respect for human rights is maintained, and individual integrity and enjoyment of life and freedom are not jeopardized? Are there faith-based community organizations that could encourage adherence or attachment to a country other than Canada, and would their members have an emotional and possibly even material investment in that foreign country?

d) Some communities receive provincial funds for faith-based school boards (e.g., Catholic), or for faith-based education purposes (such as Arabic or Hebrew schools). Is that discriminatory to other communities who do not receive such funding? Does this kind of funding affect Canadian national social cohesion? What did the court or the established laws say about such funding?

e) What does the charitable status mean to the faith-based communities in Canada, and what is the significance of this on taxpayers? Is there a distinction in the charitable status between a church or a place of worship and a faith-based community association that is not necessarily involved in theology or prayers? Some charitable faith-based organizations engage in benevolent work to help vulnerable individuals and groups in Canadian society or even in foreign countries (such as Catholic aid to Africa or Mennonite help to refugees), but are such organizations using donations for non-social activities or for supporting states or organizations that condone violence?

f) What do we know about Canadians views concerning organized religion and about state funding to faith-based groups?

2. SOCIAL CAPITAL, IDENTITY FORMATION, AND RELIGION

The notion of social capital – those features of social organization that facilitate working and cooperating together for mutual benefit – has been the object of considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers across the world and particularly since the publication of Robert Putnam's (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. In part, the popularity of Putnam's exhaustive study on social capital reflects concerns in various countries over the erosion of respect for democratic institutions as reflected through diminishing levels of civic engagement. Amongst the principal examples offered for the decline are reduced voter turnouts and decreasing volunteerism. Hence social capital theorists frequently seek to determine how best to revitalize the engagement of citizens in the institutions of society that enhance democratic life. Putnam's (1995) contention that "the vibrancy of American civil society… has notably declined over the past several decades" has moved the study of associational life to the very forefront of analyses of the state of democracy (Putnam, 1993).

In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam contends that: "…of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the most important is the distinction between *bridging* (or inclusive) and *bonding* (or exclusive)." Bonding social capital is often inward looking and thus reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups (i.e., ethnic fraternal organizations) while bridging is outward looking and involves people across diverse cleavages (i.e. ecumenical religious organizations). Putnam remarks that: "bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40."

There are several methodological and theoretical challenges in making distinctions between bonding and bridging social capital. Initiatives described as fostering social capital frequently have an impact on identity formation, a relationship that has not been the object of sufficient attention. Regarding the relationship between identity formation and social capital, the quantity of capital that is generated is less important than the quality of that which is produced. As Putman (2000) has correctly observed, not all social capital necessarily generates positive societal outcomes, as this will often depend upon the type of activity that is pursued and its objectives.

There lacks an important body of work around the role of religion in generating social capital in Canada. Yet, religious or religiously affiliated associations contribute significantly to the quantity of social capital that is generated within society. Roughly speaking, nearly half of North America's stock of social capital is religious or religiously affiliated, whether measured by association memberships, philanthropy, or volunteering.

How do faith-based organizations produce social capital and how is it being used? Undoubtedly, religious social capital is distinctive in terms of its "quantity." There are a variety of ways in which religious engagement can contribute to social capital. The most common form of such engagement is through volunteering and charitable contributions, which is often directed at assisting the more vulnerable segments in society. Given the capacity of religious institutions to mobilize individuals around charitable ends, it is widely held that it has significantly greater potential for harnessing social capital than most other identity-based institutions (Miller, 1998). Churches, synagogues, mosques, and other houses of worship provide a vibrant institutional base for civic good works and a creative ground for civic entrepreneurs. Those regularly attending religious services are believed to do disproportionately greater networking, making such institutions a prime forum for informal social capital building. As Wuthnow (1999) notes, however, "Religion may have a

salutary effect on civil society by encouraging its members to worship, to spend time with their families and to learn the moral lessons embedded in religious traditions. But the impact of religion on society is likely to diminish if that is the only role it plays."

Other ways in which religious social capital may differ from other forms of social capital include the criteria along which services are extended. Efficiency or effectiveness may be less of a consideration in religiously based service delivery than is the case for many secularly-based organizations. Like other identity-based forms of social capital, the religious dimension of such engagement may provide a stronger focus for group cooperation than social capital generated by more secular sources.

When it comes to religious engagement, there are often both bridging and bonding dimensions in the formation of social capital. Indeed, the bridging and bonding dichotomy is highly problematic when it comes to assessing the value of religious social capital, since it often carries elements of both. From a social capital perspective, active participation in voluntary organizations leads to greater and deeper networks of social contacts.

Social capital, identity formation and the role of the State

Civil society is often thought of in terms of communities and associations that operate at a distance from the state. Critics of social capital theory have legitimately argued that there is a tendency to either underestimate if not to entirely neglect the role of the state in supporting civil society and community formation (Walzer, 1991). In Canada, civil society and the engagement of citizens often depends on direct or indirect government assistance. Moreover, identity formation is also shaped in part by government priorities, policies and programs. Federal government support of official language minorities is an example of the way in which the state stimulates identity formation and social capital. Support for aboriginal communities – however satisfactory – is yet another example of the importance of government in identity formation. And while it no longer extends direct support to ethnic communities, some observers contend that multicultural policy enhances ethnically based social capital by encouraging the preservation of cultural heritage. Expressions of religious identity also receive some state support in Canada, notably at the provincial level of government via financial assistance to religious schools. In some cases full funding to religiously-based schools is extended as observed in Ontario with the Roman Catholic separate schools.

However modest in size and scope, government also provides support to religious identity via the provision of assistance to certain charitable initiatives. It is estimated that the federal government provides almost two-thirds of the funding used to operate the country's charitable foundations. Organizations may receive either direct state funding through grants and contributions and/or contracts to undertake or manage projects on behalf of the government. Indirect support is also extended through the extension of tax receipts to organizations doing charitable work. To varying degrees, Canadian governments can play a crucial role in influencing certain expressions of identity by providing direct or indirect forms of support. While there is wide agreement that volunteerism is something to be valued when it intersects with certain expressions of identity, it risks being the object of public debate and this is especially true when government assistance is extended.

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There are at least three types of religious organizations. The first is the place of worship which is generally funded through donations and charitable tax receipts. A second type of organization extends social services under denominational auspices. A third category of organization may extend social services from the place of worship and thus benefit from both its chartable status while securing support for projects from government.

Services that today are widely extended by governments in Canada were once overseen by congregations and religiously-based associations that ran a variety of programs for members and non-members. Such services include self-help groups, job training courses as well as social services, food and housing for the poor and elderly. In pre-1960 Quebec for example, education and health and social services were generally provided by clerical authority and religion was the most important marker of identity in the province. As the government of Quebec replaced the religious organizations by assuming responsibility for such services, the importance of religious identity dramatically declined in the province. Despite considerable increases in state welfare over the course of the twentieth century, religious congregations have by no means abandoned their social mission. However, as Phillips (2000) points out, "little is known in Canada about the extent of social and community involvement of religious congregations, and that which is known is not well-documented."

On occasion, cuts in government funding have affected social service provision, the state and community leaders have encouraged private non-profit agencies to fill the gaps. The capacity of the non-profit sector to address the needs of the population in this regard is uncertain. But when such issues arise, the role of religious charitable associations cannot be avoided given the important place that they occupy in the sector. Some observers have questioned the

capacity of religious bodies to extend services as a result of their parochial character and their presumed inclination to provide benefits to their members only. Operating on this assumption, some critics have questioned whether religious bodies should retain their charitable tax status.

Examining the types of services offered by religious congregations in Ontario, Phillips (2000) finds that some 41 different functions are conducted by more than a quarter of the congregations she surveyed. The services include: "counselling programs for families; programs for the elderly; programs for children and youth; programs for the homeless, poor and other needy persons; health programs; arts and cultural programs; community organizations and development; and a diverse set of social concerns".

What conditions are attached to government support of community based organizations? Although they operate at arms length from government, the direct support obtained by organizations representing official language minority communities makes them more susceptible to the influence of the state. That said, several minority language organizations receiving government funds do political advocacy in order to advance their concerns. In the case of religious organizations, it will be observed that for the most part, they are less dependent on direct government aid and presumably therefore possess greater autonomy in establishing priorities and allocating resources. Thus religious bodies might have greater latitude to defend various political causes. However, their possessing charitable tax status tends to require that they exercise caution when it comes to defending political causes. Moreover, the notion that religion and the state are at least in theory separate in Canada implies that religious organizations should at the very least act prudently when it comes to political matters.

3. ORGANIZED RELIGION AND THE STATE

It is often said that governments in Canada are neutral in matters of religion. But neutrality does not imply that the State does not support religious identity either directly or indirectly. Moreover, such an affirmation overlooks both the historic importance of organized religion – that is the institutional expression of religious communities – and organizations defined along religion lines that deliver services to the public. Religion has a long organizational history in Canada. Unlike the United States and France, it would be incorrect to describe Canada and its provinces as founded upon the principle of the separation of Church and State or separation of religion from public life. Separation of religion from government does not imply a diminishing in the importance of religious identification. Although the United States has constitutionally enshrined the separation between church and state, it is a country with one of the world's highest rates of religious adherence and participation.

Religious organizations can take at least two different forms: (1) places of religious worship, and (2) service organizations, such as schools and hospitals with a religious affiliation. Both are included as part of what constitutes civil society and thus to varying degrees will foster engagement and hence build social capital. Usually the religiously affiliated service organizations are linked to other service organizations and religious worship organizations are looked upon separately. It can be contended that religious service delivery bodies that operate in Canada with state support are de jure religious-or religious in name-rather then de facto religious. It is assumed that the service delivery organizations serve persons outside the faith community with which they are affiliated. Hence a hospital with a Christian or Jewish affiliation tends to provide services to a clientele that may or may not belong to the associated religion. Such institutions may be designated by analysts as examples of bridging social capital even though they reflect the challenge of distinguishing bridging from bonding since they clearly incorporate aspects of both. Not all religiously affiliated service delivery bodies have diverse clienteles. It is not always easy to separate them from places of worship and indeed often to deliver such services. It is the intersection between the place of religious worship and the religious affiliated service body that is the object of debates about bonding and bridging when it comes to generating religious social capital.

Those areas where religious organizations were especially active were within the purview of the provinces. Section 92 of the *British North America Act* stipulates that in each Province, the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, – the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals, asylums and charities amongst others. From Confederation to the middle of the twentieth century, religious communities continued to work closely with provincial authorities in large part because they were responsible for the provision of charitable and philanthropic services. It was the control over the distribution of such services that was crucial to the clergy in supporting religious identification.

Soon after Confederation, the provincial governments began subsidizing private mostly clerically-based welfare initiatives. State involvement though remained somewhat limited and sporadic, in part because provincial revenues were not abundant at the time. Moreover, the dominant ideology of the period saw individuals as principally responsible for their own well-being and so it was expected that any government involvement would channel funds through religious institutions that in turn supported such things as shelters and orphanages.

Over the course of the twentieth century, provincial governments widened their role in the economic domain and also pondered a larger role for the state in social and welfare functions. From the 1960s to the 1980s, spending by all levels of government on health, education, and social services grew at a rapid pace. The direct delivery of many services, however, remained in the hands of non-profit organizations.

As a result, the relationship between the state and the non-profit and voluntary sector became increasingly complex. Many organizations came to rely on government funding, and governments, through various programs and policies, began to influence and increasingly regulate non-profit organizations. In those periods where economic growth slowed and revenues diminished governments

frequently turned to taxation and borrowing to finance the needs of the population. By the 1990s, the public seemed prepared to accept that these solutions were not sustainable, and governments began reducing or eliminating programs and services and devolving others to the local level.

Government cutbacks have served as reminders of the important role that non-profit and voluntary organizations have played in Canadian communities and their dependence on state funding in the extension of services. Moreover the diversification of the composition of the population and the desire for more inclusive standards in social service delivery funded by the State resulted in a growing evolution over time of those institutions that were previously dedicated to serving members of the same community.

In the year 2000, of the 323 major service agencies in the province of Ontario, some 14 had religious affiliations and received $92 million in state support accounting for approximately 8 percent of the province's $1.1 billion annual social service budget. ''If there's a service to be provided and a religious group can deliver the service, we will sign a contract with them regardless of their connection," declared to an official from the Ontario community and social services minister.

The periods which saw reductions in spending on welfare had a profound impact on the non-profit and voluntary sector. Levels of funding for many organizations declined – in some cases dramatically – while the need and demand for services increased. Government criteria for funding also evolved. Whereas many organizations had previously received grants that allowed them to operate according to their own principles, they were often required to compete – sometimes with for-profit companies – to deliver services according to strict government guidelines. Such organizations as the Catholic Children's Aid Society-Ontario branch established in 1894 remain legally responsible for the protection of all Catholic children in the province up to age 16. It receives most of its financing from the federal, provincial and municipal governments. Such charities as the Jewish Child and Family Services have long worked with and been supported by the government.

According to Phillips (2000), congregations do not see themselves as directly responding to government cutbacks by stepping in to fill the gaps created, but were responding to the social needs arising in their communities due to the cutbacks. Congregations emerge as ubiquitous, almost wholly privately funded charities. They are best known as local churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, and other places of worship, and are often viewed as member organizations where individuals go to fulfill spiritual and religious needs. Rarely documented is the commitment to the provision of social services to their communities.

Of those religious organizations that serve people directly, 73% primarily serve the general public in contrast with less than half of all other organizations that do so. From the perspective of what is sometimes described as "good" social capital, it is worth noting that some 27% of religious organizations say that their members benefit most from their activities, while nearly seventy percent report that both members and non-members alike benefit from their services compared to 46% of all organizations where non-members report benefiting from the services that are provided (i.e. in the case of a library you, may benefit from the services that are offered even if you are not a member).

More than 75 percent of the congregations surveyed by Phillips dispensed food, clothing, and international relief. Soup kitchens, services for the homeless, shelters for men, shelters for women and children, and hospital visitations are offered by over 50 percent of the congregations.

Phillips concludes that local religious congregations should not be viewed as member-serving organizations only, but as charitable organizations concerned with the welfare of others. Although members and non-members were likely to provide services that congregations offered, the recipients were more likely to be non-members by a ratio of more than four to one. Nonetheless, important cuts in the social spending in the non-profit sector by certain provincial governments affected the capacity of religiously-based organizations to deliver social services and generate social capital on that basis either via volunteerism or networking.

Observers believe that government is more likely to cut ties with faith-based charities rather than increase support for them. Under these circumstances, some faith-based leadership in the social services domain believe that faith-based communities engaged in charitable work are better served ''to pressure the whole community for more government funding." This realization and the growing shift in charitable resources have undoubtedly influenced debates around political advocacy and charitable purpose. As governments move to assume greater responsibility for social service delivery, the opportunity for generating

Table 1: Society should try harder to accept minority groups' customs and traditions

Permit subsidies for private religious schools	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Strongly agree	16.7%	8.8%	5.0%	11.8%
Somewhat agree	26.4%	25.7%	18.7%	14.3%
Somewhat disagree	18.5%	28.6%	24.8%	11.3%
Strongly disagree	36.3%	35.0%	48.5%	59.6%
DNK/Refusal	2.2%	1.8%	3.1%	3.0%

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, June 2007.

religiously-based social capital presumably diminishes. Such traditional charitable activities as the relief of poverty and the advancement of education increasingly assumed by governments have meant that charitable organizations will turn to advocacy as a means to deal with social problems. An organization that deploys its "capital" to call upon the state to spend more in addressing issues of social justice (i.e. the relief of poverty) may not be considered a charity – even if it is potentially more effective through advocacy than a shelter that offers support to the homeless. Hence there are increasingly frequent situations where the lines between social and political capital are blurred. In a society where the population is increasingly diverse, one can expect that increasing attention will be directed at multicultural policy and social cohesion where government is increasingly viewed as the principal avenue for addressing social justice.

The State and faith-based schools

On matters of public support for religiously-based schools, there is ongoing debate around relationships between multiculturalism and social cohesion. Confessional school funding is one of the most important ongoing debates around the relationship between religion and the state, both within Canada and abroad. In the province of Ontario, a proposal by the Conservative opposition leader John Tory to extend historic public funding of Roman Catholic schools to other faiths became the dominant issue of the 2007 provincial election campaign and contributed to the re-election of the governing party which rejected the idea.

It was in the area of education where confessional identification was a dominant characteristic through much of the nineteenth century and as we shall observe. On a reduced scale, religious instruction continued to be widely available in several parts of Canada well into the twentieth century. In the pre-Confederation provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (present day Ontario and Quebec), problems arose because the religious minorities, Catholic and Protestant respectively, would not adopt the religious practices of the majority. Catholics in what was to become Ontario did not want their children following the Protestant practice of Bible studies in school, while Protestants in Quebec did not want their children learning Roman Catholic dogma. As a result, governments in the two jurisdictions established dual school systems to accommodate both religious denominations. In fact, Quebec and Ontario were unlikely to agree to the terms of Confederation unless the educational rights of the religious minorities were respected. Such protection was not to be extended to other religious minorities-though aside from the relatively small number of the persons of the Jewish faith there were not many non-Christians to defend at the time of the Federation.

From its very inception, the federal government was seen as the contractual protector via its constitution for the confessional minorities residing in the respective provinces. Protecting the needs of what were at the time deemed too vulnerable religious collectivities was to be enshrined in Canadian law. However, such protection was to be limited to Catholics and Protestants on the basis of the federal constitutional framework and any extension of the rights of Catholics and Protestants would depend on the will of provincial authorities that were responsible for education.

Ontario is the only province that fully funds Catholic education while not providing any funding to other faith-based schools as stipulated under the arrangements of the Federation referred to previously. Currently in Ontario, 95 per cent of students attend publicly funded schools, with 650,000 of those or roughly 31 per cent attending Catholic schools. Two per cent or approximately 53,000 students attend faith-based private schools, while the remaining three per cent attend other private schools. The exclusive funding of the Catholic system has confronted ongoing criticism from leaders of non-Christian groups in the province and has prompted numerous court challenges. A number of non-Christians groups have insisted that the situation is unjust and have campaigned for other faith communities to secure similar funding. The matter was even taken to the UN Human Rights Committee, which ruled in 1999 that this was discriminatory. But the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the view that the failure to extend such funding to other religious communities was a violation of the Canadian Constitution.

Advocates of the extension of such funding to other faith-based schools have maintained that the support would generate a system that properly reflects the diversity of 21st-century Ontario. For their part however, Ontario public school authorities have countered that such support would be divisive and foster the creation of "silos" where people focus on their differences rather than unite students in a multicultural society.

Premier Dalton McGuinty argued that "If we are going to bring about more improvement in publicly funded schools, it is regressive to contemplate segregating our children according to their faith," (Wilson, 2007) adding that he wanted kids to continue to come together. A September 2007 survey conducted by Ipsos found that two-thirds of Ontarians opposed the plan to extend funding to all faith-based schools that comply with provincial standards.

Although the discourse underlying the debate over religious school funding seems to pit multiculturalism against cohesion, such a juxtaposition of the issue does not do justice to the complexity of the matter. In effect, such a positioning of the debate says more about the appropriation of the notions of multiculturalism and cohesion in support of the funding than what those who possess a multicultural or cohesionist perspective on such matters may prefer in terms of a societal approach. Based on a national survey conducted in 2007 by Leger Marketing, one observes that those who support the retention of cultural identities do not have substantially different views on funding of religious schools than those who favour the abandoning of cultures of origin. In this regard, we assume cohesionist thinking in its maximal expression to be more assimilationist and multiculturalists to be least so. Those who either somewhat agree or disagree with various diversity issues are classed as either soft multiculturalists or soft cohesionists. According to the Leger marketing survey below, both "cohesionists" (70%) and "multiculturalists"

(60%) are in the majority unfavourable to subsidies for private religious schools.

Similarly, those who feel that society has been strengthened by diversity (58%) and those least likely to agree (68%) both tend to disagree in the majority with the subsidies for private religious schools.

Greater divergence appears between those most favourable to accepting minority groups customs and traditions who are more inclined to agree with subsidies (43%) versus those least likely to agree more effort is needed as some 26% of the group believe there should be subsidies.

In effect, those Canadians most favourable to religious expression in public schools (i.e. the crucifix on the wall) are also most favourable to subsidies for private religious schools (49%), versus those least Some 37% of those favourable to hijabs in public schools agree with subsidies for private religious schools, while those least favourable to the Hijab are least favourable to subsidies.

Civil society organizations, the role of the State and religion

Canada has the second largest non-profit sector in the world, according to a report entitled the *Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective* (2004), which examined the sector in 37 countries on the basis of size, scope and donations. When comparing the full-time equivalent workforce within the non-profit/volunteer segment with the rest of a country's population, only the Netherlands (14.4%) topped Canada (11.1%). The next highest were Belgium (10.9%), Ireland (10.4%) and the United States (9.8%).

Within the non-profit sector, Canada employs more paid workers than other nations and follows Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the use of volunteers. Only about 25 percent of Canada's full-time equivalent workers within the non-profit sector are volunteers, as compared to an average of 38 percent among the nations surveyed.

The non-profit sector makes a significant contribution to the Canadian economy employing the equivalent of over two-million full-time workers (two-thirds in paid positions and the remainder as volunteers). Excluding the one-third of paid non-profit employees who work for hospitals, universities and colleges, the Canadian non-profit sector still employs one-third more workers than the transportation industry and more than one-and-one-half times as many workers as the country's construction industry.

Because of its long tradition of relying on non-profit organizations to address the needs and interests of its population, Canada has one of the largest and most vibrant non-profit sectors in the world. It encompasses "service delivery" organizations in areas such as health, education, social services, community development and housing, as well as those that serve "expressive" functions in arts and culture, religion, sports, recreation, civic advocacy, environmental protection, and through business, labour, and professional associations.

Service organizations dominate the makeup of Canadian nonprofits (74 percent), providing education, healthcare and social services. Canada leads other nations in workers providing healthcare and housing services. The remainder of Canada's non-profit sector is largely 'expressive' – servicing cultural, religious, and professional or policy interests (22 percent).

Service activities are a more dominant feature of non-profit and voluntary organizational activity in Canada than is the case elsewhere. About 74 percent of all Canadian non-profit sector workers (both paid and volunteer) are engaged in the delivery of direct services such as education, health, and housing (compared to 64 percent internationally). Health organizations employ a much larger percentage of workers in Canada than is the case in other countries. Overall, there are fewer individuals involved with organizations supporting expressive activities (e.g., arts, culture, religion, sports, and recreation).

Table 2: Status of belonging: Church, religious organizations in selected countries, 2004

Status of belonging: Church, religious organizations	Belong and participate	Belong not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged to
Ireland	55.8%	19.8%	7.5%	16.8%
Mexico	52.4%	37.5%	1.5%	8.6%
United States	40.1%	21.5%	21.6%	16.8%
Canada	32.7%	28.6%	21.1%	17.6%
Poland	26.5%	37.5%	3.2%	32.7%
Philippines	25.6%	11.5%	8.3%	54.6%
Switzerland	25.5%	35.0%	11.4%	28.1%
Venezuela	20.9%	35.3%	9.2%	34.6%
Chile	20.5%	16.5%	10.5%	52.4%

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada, the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

In Canada, more than half (51 %) of the non-profit sector's revenues come from the government, which is more than other nations surveyed in the report. Healthcare, education and social service organizations are the primary recipients of these grants. Fees account for 39% of non-profit revenue in Canada, and only 9% is attributed to private donations. Even when religious organizations are added into the mix, philanthropy only accounts for 13% of revenue.

Government funding is particularly prominent in the fields of health, education, and social services reflecting the special form that the welfare state has taken in Canada and echoing what is found in a number of European countries. Government support also plays a prominent role in the funding of civic and advocacy organizations. Fee income dominates in other fields.

When expressed as a share of the economically active population, the non-profit sector workforce in Canada is one of the largest in the world, outdistancing the United States and second only to the Netherlands among the countries for which data are available. When it comes to belonging and participating in a church or religious organization, some one-third of Canadians reported doing so in 2004, ranking the country fourth out of thirty-five countries surveyed.

4. HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS SOCIAL CAPITAL

In 2004, religious organizations in Canada accounted for approximately 31,000 or 19% of the country's estimated 161,000 non-profit and voluntary organizations. More than half (51%) have existed for at least four decades. These findings are from Statistics Canada's National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations (NSNVO) which conducted interviews with 13,000 individuals representing incorporated non-profit organizations and registered charities in 2003. (The data presented in the NSNVO were weighted to provide estimates for the 161,000 incorporated non-profit and voluntary organizations and registered charities in Canada).

Non-profit and voluntary organizations, which receive 49% of their revenues from government, 35% from earned income, and only 13% from gifts and donations. The charitable sector is thus quite dependent on the state for its well-being. As a result, government budget cutbacks directly and negatively affect programs that receive the bulk of their funding from the government. The revenue profile of religious organizations is distinct from others in the sector. Unlike other such charitable organizations, religious bodies are considerably less dependent on government support, as two-thirds of their revenue comes from gifts and donations. Their next most important source of funds is from earned income – Government (8%) furnishes less than ten percent of the revenues from religious organizations.

Organizations that obtain half or more of their revenue from one source (i.e. government, earned income, or gifts and donations) are deemed to be dependent on the source. Those which do not have a dominant source are described as diverse. Again, unlike other non-profit and voluntary organizations, religious bodies have different relationships of dependency as over three-quarters are financially dependent on gifts and donations, compared to about one quarter of all organizations.

Only one in six religious organizations is dependent on earned revenues, compared to 46% of all organizations. Less than 1% of religious organizations are dependent on government, compared to 17% of all organizations. The dependency on gifts and donations entails various challenges that have been the object of analysis. Such challenges will vary across communities whose institutional infrastructure is often at different stages of development. Only through comparative analysis of the communities is it possible to determine the relative rates of infrastructure and the services delivered on this basis.

While more of the direct financial support to religiously-based organizations has come from the provinces owing to their jurisdictional authority in education, health and social services, the principal basis for support to religiously-based institutions has been indirect (that does not mean that the federal government does not provide direct assistance to such organizations in other areas). According to the NSNVO, almost all religious organizations (94%) are registered charities allowing them to issue tax receipts for donations. By contrast, some fifty-six percent of all non-profit and voluntary organizations in Canada had charitable tax status.

Under the *Income Tax Act* of Canada (hereafter ITA), charities receive preferential treatment through the exempting of their income from taxation (a charity can issue charitable receipts to donors, who are in turn allowed to deduct amounts from their personal income tax). The preferential tax treatment of a charity is regarded as an indirect government subsidy. Moreover, registered status confers a certain degree of organizational legitimacy as they are accepted for such status on the basis of meeting selective government criteria.

In 1994, there were 71,413 charities registered in Canada, of which 36% were classified as places of worship – the single largest category of charities in the country. Classification according to what is listed as eligible for charitable status that is faith-based is identified as either religion or places of worship. Among the registered charities, more than 40%, or 32,000, are faith-based. In 2006, there were more than 80,000 charities registered with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). A search on the basis of key words of Canadian registered charities reveals that some 2284 included Christian, 1490 Jehovah, Anglican 749, Jesus 786, Jewish 225, Muslim 149, and Sikh 88. Although the figures need to be used with caution, one can tentatively conclude that registered charitable tax status does not include substantial numbers of non-Christian organizations.

The criteria favouring the admission of organizations for charitable tax status is laid out in a manner that is favourable to the objectives and structure of religious organizations and it is in part for this reason that religion represents a critical share of Canadian social capital. An overwhelming majority of religious organizations (89%) provide products or services to people directly versus nearly three-quarters of the entire non-profit sector. Yet another criterion in determining eligibility for charitable tax status is the degree of voluntary participation on the part of the

organization either in the pursuit of its activities (program volunteers) or in the management of its affairs (voluntary members of the board of directors). In this regard, the relative degrees of bridging and bonding social capital on the part of religious organizations are not directly relevant to decisions made by the relevant government authorities in determining whether they qualify as charities. In any event, the evidence from the NSNVO does not support the view that religious organizations are less inclusive in the manner in which they serve constituents.

Approximately nine in ten religious organizations have members, compared to eight in ten of all organizations. Religious organizations are less likely to have restricted membership (33%) than organizations in general (57%). Instead, the majority of religious organizations with individual members report that anyone can join (67%).

Religion and the politics of social capital

There often appears to be less discussion at the federal level than the provincial level of government around the relationship between religion and the state. In large part, this is because the area where religion is believed to collide with public policies is more likely to be in the purview of the provinces. At the federal and provincial levels, there has been discussion over such things as the rules around uniforms or religious headgear for government employees, but these and other supposed "accommodations" for religious differences have received far greater attention when they arise at the provincial or local level.

The extension of charitable tax status is perhaps the most important area via which the federal state supports the advancement of religious social capital. Those individuals who call for government to extricate itself from supporting the institutional expression of religion have far less frequently targeted the issue of charitable tax status of either places of worship or those organizations engaged in supporting various social causes under religiously-based auspices.

Data from the International Social Survey reveal that those who belong to a church or religious organization were more likely to report voting in a past election than those not belonging. Similarly they are also more likely to have contacted a politician or attended a political meeting or rally. Some one in four persons that report belonging and participating in a church or religious organization in Canada say that they belong to a political party compared to one in two in the United States. In the US just over one in five persons that never belonged to a religious organization say they belong to a political party compared to less than one in ten Canadians. Hence there is ample evidence that those who are more engaged religiously tend to be more engaged politically-the latter often viewed as a critical test of civic participation in democratic societies. Social capitalists will seek to find out what form such political involvement takes and whether it reinforces social cohesion.

Canadians who belong and participate in religious organizations are more likely to agree that people in government can be trusted (41%) than those who have never belonged (31%). Some of the societal concerns around the potentially negative dimensions of social capital arising from organized religious expression are a function of the perceived influence on politics of faith-based leadership. Traditionally, there have been important restrictions in Canada upon charities engaged in political activities. Some believe that such restrictions deter organizations with genuine expertise in service delivery from engaging in important public policy dialogues. Indeed, it is in this area where the intersection between bonding and bridging social capital is a source of concern for some who believe that identity-based groups may not be defending the broader societal interest.

When it comes to charitable tax status, a registered charity is required by law to have exclusively charitable purposes. Under the ITA and common law, an organization established for a political purpose cannot be a charity. Political purpose has been defined by the courts as those that seek to:

- further the interests of a particular political party; or support a political party or candidate for public office; or
- retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country.

The principal motivation for ruling out political purposes for charities is that a purpose is only deemed as charitable if it generates a public benefit. To assess the public benefit of a political purpose, a court would have to take sides in a political debate. In Canada, political issues are for elected officials to decide, and the courts hesitate to encroach on their sovereign authority (other than when a constitutional issue arises).

Under the ITA a registered charity must commit nearly all of its resources to charitable purposes and activities. Nonetheless, the ITA permits the deployment of a limited amount of resources towards political activity. Hence, an organization established for a political purpose cannot be registered as a charity, but a registered charity may take part in some political activities if it specifically furthers its charitable purpose(s). The CRA has also modified the definition of political activities so that it no longer includes various attempts to inform public opinion on issues. This change was designed to enable charities to more effectively carry out their public awareness programs.

Questionable social capital

Putnam (2000, 22) has noted that: "social capital…can be directed toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of capital." Negative social capital arises where groups with shared norms seek internal cohesion by treating "others" with suspicion, hostility, or outright hatred. Francis Fukuyama (1999) points to the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia as examples of groups that produce abundant negative externalities for the larger society in which they are embedded.

Fukuyama contends that the reason social capital may give rise to disproportionately greater negative outcomes than physical or human capital is because "…group solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility towards out-group members." Fukuyama suggests that when measuring social capital, it is essential to consider its true utility net of its externalities (its positive

versus its negative dimensions). In other words, he believes that we need to think at least theoretically in terms of a balance sheet approach in estimating the value of the stock of social capital.

As mentioned, religion is a very important source of social capital in mobilizing members around laudable causes and purposes. In some cases however, religious mobilization may be the object of questionable motivation with negative value for social capital. It is difficult to develop a system of classification distinguishing the positive and negative outcomes of religiously-based engagement and it is essential to avoid making generalizations. Still, it is possible to identify cases where mobilization on the basis of religious identity transgresses societal norms.

The Department of Justice acknowledges that charities are a vital component of Canadian society. They help the sick and the disadvantaged, they promote education and provide community facilities and they provide humanitarian assistance throughout the world. However, domestic and international law enforcement agencies have documented the direct or indirect financing of terrorism through organizations that also have or claim to have charitable goals. In response, Canada's Parliament enacted the *Charities Registration Security Information Act* (CRSIA) as part of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The CRSIA allows the Government to have recourse to classified information in determining whether an organization should be registered or continue to be registered as a charity.

If there are reasonable grounds, the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of National Revenue may sign a certificate stating that in their view an applicant or a registered charity has made or will make resources available, directly or indirectly, to an entity that engages or will engage in any terrorist activity as defined in the *Criminal Code*. A certificate is automatically submitted to the Federal Court for judicial review. After a hearing determines that a certificate is reasonable, it becomes conclusive proof that an organization is ineligible to become or remain a registered charity.

Still, since obtaining this power, the Canada Revenue Agency has not issued a single "security certificate" against a charity in the country. That said, in their submission to the Air India inquiry, Carter et al. (October, 2007) contend that one of the major effects of ongoing concern with the terrorism is the scrutiny of the activities of charitable organizations. Undoubtedly, this has both direct and indirect effects on the generating of religious social capital, since it is likely religiously-based charities that have come up for the highest level of scrutiny.

Charitable activities that are otherwise never the object of particular attention might be brought up on criminal charges for facilitating "terrorist activities" or for supporting "terrorist groups." This, in turn, may result in the loss of charitable status and its directors being exposed to personal liability. Charities face some uncertainty over whether the broad legislation will be applied to their activities. Carter et al. (October, 2007) maintain that there is a need to strike a balance between efforts to thwart terrorist financing and ensuring that legitimate charitable programs can continue to operate.

Under its religious designation the CRA adds new charities on a regular basis. But it also deregisters various charities for not complying with established guidelines and an important percentage is religiously affiliated. Religious organizations have been the object of increased public scrutiny owing to concern with the potential for groups to perpetrate violent action in the name of religion.

Conformity on the part of religious organizations to Canadian '*Charter* Values' has been the object of debates whose significance may grow in the years ahead. In a text entitled: "*Living Better Multiculturally: Whose values should prevail?*" (*Literary Review of Canada*, fall 2006), political scientist Janice Gross Stein worries about a "resurgence of orthodoxy in Christianity, Islam and Judaism," constituting a threat to the peaceful coexistence of various cultures in Canada's urban centres.

Stein wonders how committed Canadians are to the secularization of public space. Even though the *Charter* strictly applies only to public space, she contends that its "spirit and values" must be taken seriously. Hence Stein questions whether religious institutions that enjoy special tax privileges given to them by governments are engaged in religious practices wholly private since they benefit from the public purse? She wonders whether equality rights of the *Charter* have some application when religious institutions are officially recognized and advantaged in fundraising.

Stein contends that: "If religious institutions are able to raise funds more easily because governments give a tax benefit to those who contribute, are religious practices towards women a matter only for religious law, as is currently the case under Canadian law, which protects freedom of religion, or should the values of the *Charter* and of human rights commissions across Canada have some application when religious institutions are officially recognized and advantaged in fundraising?"

According to Stein, Canadians are uncertain about what limits there should be to embedding diverse religious as well as cultural traditions within the Canadian context. We know pretty well what the "multi" in multicultural means, but are much less confident about "culture."

According to Cere (see Gyapong, 2007), Stein's suggestion raises the issue of whether "…the courts can deploy the "weapon of rights" to pressure religions to conform to so-called Canadian values. He argues that "Freedom of religion is about creating social space in which religious bodies can be themselves [as] the role of the state is not to impose its views about religion on anybody," further adding that such matters are best worked out by the faith community.

According to one of Canada's foremost charitable tax law experts, Terrance Carter, charitable tax status for religious organizations is not "a current concern." To protect against its future erosion he recommends that clerical institutions maintain their charitable status on the basis of "the advancement of religion," category as validated by government and the courts, and not under the heading of "relief of poverty" or "advancement of education" or other similar communal purposes.

Carter also warns that there is a need for vigilance against a narrowing of what "advancement of religion" means. For example, where does the right of a priest come from to speak on his understanding of the sanctity of life, marriage and divorce, same-sex marriage, women in leadership? he

asked. "They're giving an understanding of their faith, their doctrine," he said. "If there's a narrowing of what 'advancement of religion is,' a religion may be limited to discussions on the worship of God but not allowed to advance the sanctity of life and still retain charitable status. That may be seen "as a commentary on societal issues and therefore political," he said.

Carter notes that government has assumed many activities that were formerly religious activities, such as the care for the poor. He noted that traditionally society has viewed religions as teaching civility to their members but that the view of religion as a social good has been losing ground in public opinion.

Carter adds that: "as broad as freedom of religion is, it is not unlimited. Courts have consistently held that an individual's freedom of religion is limited by the rights of others." He contends that both case law and the CRA require that a 'charity's activities must not be contrary to public policy and therefore it is conceivable that a religious organization could be denied charitable status if CRA determined that its objects were indeed contrary or inconsistent with *Charter* values," He said that so far, Canada's courts are doing a good job balancing rights, including religious freedom. He noted the amendment in the same-sex marriage legislation that is intended to protect the charitable status of those religious bodies that hold a traditional view of marriage. Underlying the debates over the type of social capital generated is not only the motives behind volunteering in religious organizations, but also that initiate such engagement. This will be the object of discussion in the next chapter.

5. PROFILING CANADA'S RELIGIOUS SOCIAL CAPITALISTS

The 2004 *Canadian Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating* defines religious organizations as congregations or groups of congregations. Religiously affiliated organizations that operate in other areas such as social services or health are not classified as religious organizations.

Generating social capital is often an expression of community values. Hence for many, the behavior associated with social capital is a reflection of the way in which people express certain underlying values, needs and interests through social engagement. Although many Canadians assist others outside an institutional framework, the measurement of social capital is associated with the institutional practices of volunteers. Charitable giving is the principal focus of the CSGVP, which reveals that the vast majority of Canadians (85%) made a financial contribution to charitable or non-profit organizations over the period covered by the survey. Most Canadians (83%), say that they helped others directly and almost two-thirds (66%) did so by joining an organization, group, or association. In contrast, volunteering on the part of Canadians is a less common activity. Still, the results of the 2004 CSGVP reveal that almost 12 million Canadians, or 45% of the population aged 15 and older volunteered in the twelve months prior to the survey.

Through their donations, Canadians support the activities of those charitable and non-profit organizations that they value most. Religious organizations were the largest beneficiaries of charitable giving, receiving almost $4.0 billion, or 45% of the total value of donations received by organizations in Canada (health organizations were second, receiving over $1.2 billion in donations or 14% of the total value of donations).

Donors to religious organizations made the largest average contributions ($395), thus enabling them to secure more funds than any other organizations. There are other types of organizations with a wider support base. While religious organizations received donations from some 38% of the population, almost 6 in ten Canadians (57%) made donations to health organizations and 43% donated to social services organizations. Although more than half of all donors supported health and social services organizations, the average donations were such that they ranked behind religious organizations.

Not surprisingly, monetary contributions are primarily influenced by age and income. Those aged 15-24 are least inclined to give (71% made a donation) and peaked among those aged 45 to 64 (90% donated), before declining slightly among those aged 65 and older (87% donated). Average donation rises from a low of $197 among those with household incomes of less than $20,000 to a high of $698 among those with household incomes of $100,000 or more. Although they represent some one in five individuals, those with household incomes of over $100,000 contributed 36% of all donations. Canadians with a university degree were more inclined to give than those who graduated high school.

Religious organizations also draw their financial support from different segments of the population than do non-religious organizations. Religious and nonreligious organizations alike receive more support from those segments of the population that is more educated and have higher incomes in comparison to the rest of the population. They also receive more support from persons over the age of 65 than do non-religious organizations. Religious organizations receive a much higher proportion of their donations from top donors (the 25% of donors who contributed $325 or more) than do non-religious

Data from the International Social Survey reveal that those who belong to a church or religious organization were more likely to report voting in a past election than those not belonging. Similarly they are also more likely to have contacted a politician or attended a political meeting or rally.

organizations. Some 41% of the donations to religious organizations came from persons earning over $100 000.

As noted earlier, religious organizations depend heavily on those who attend religious services weekly for monetary contributions and/or volunteerism. Three-quarters of donations to religious organizations (74%) came from those who attended services weekly. Not surprisingly, those Canadians that are actively involved with their religion are more likely than others to be donors and on average give more than other donors. Such behaviour might represent a concern for those who draw distinction between social capital and its broader societal impact versus such capital whose benefits are confined solely to a given community.

Nonetheless, according to the 2004 CSGVP, those Canadians actively involved in religion also make significant contributions to non-religious organizations. One-fifth of Canadians (19%) reported that they attended religious services weekly. Over nine in ten (93%) of those who attended services weekly made charitable donations compared to 84% of those who did not. Those who attended services weekly also made larger annual average donations ($887 vs. $284). Most of this giving (72% of all donations) is directed towards religious organizations. Indeed, the 19% of Canadians who attended religious services weekly account for 74% of the total value of donations to religious organizations. Still, they also provide 22 % of the total value of all donations to non-religious organizations.

Reasons for engagement

When asked whether they were required to volunteer for the religious organization in which they became involved, some 92% said no, a percentage similar to the overall population when asked about similar such engagement. In the case of persons who were neither Catholic nor Protestant, some 90% that volunteered in a religious organization were not required to do so. Some 42% of all those surveyed said that they directly approached the religious organization in which they are volunteers a percentage similar to that for the overall population in describing how they became involved. On the basis of their religious affiliation, some 42% of Catholics that are engaged in a religious organization say that they approached it themselves compared with 41% of Protestants and 46% of persons who are neither Catholic nor Protestant. Some 41% of Canadian born religious volunteers say they approached the organization themselves compared to 46% of immigrants.

For those concerned with the potential negative effects of religious social capital on social cohesion, there is little in the CSGVP that suggests a difference in the motivation amongst volunteers across religious groups in contrast to all other volunteers. Indeed, there are important similarities in the motivation behind volunteerism either in general or on the basis of religion. The principal motivation for all volunteers across the spectrum of religious identification is to make a contribution to community. Some nine in ten persons surveyed describe this as their motivation, followed by some three-quarters who say that it is to use of one's skills and experience. Forty percent of non-Christian respondents cited religious obligations amongst the principal motivation for participation, compared with 30% of Protestants and twenty percent of Catholics surveyed.

As to the motivation of those who volunteered in religious organizations, it is much the same as that which is identified in general as reflected above. The one significant difference is the importance attributed to religious obligations amongst those who volunteer in a religious organization. When volunteering, in general some 21% of Catholics cite religious obligations, but 56% of those doing in a religious organization give that reason. It is the respondents that are neither Catholic nor Protestant that are most likely (73.7%) to cite religious obligations as a motivating factor in volunteering in religious organizations, while 39.4% identify religious obligations as the principal consideration in their volunteering.

Giving and volunteering among immigrants and religious groups

What might be described as the stock of social capital in Canada is generated somewhat disproportionately by Protestants and non-Christians. This is largely a function of persons with no religious affiliation logically investing very little in religious social capital.

Table 3: Belong to religious organization or group by religious affiliation, 2004

	Yes	No	Total % of sample
No religious affiliation	1.9%	23.1%	17.9%
Catholic	28.3%	36.8%	34.1%
Protestant	57.4%	30.1%	35.1%
Other	7.5%	4.1%	4.7%

Source: Canadian Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating, Statistics Canada, 2004.

When examining the stock of Canada's religious social capital across most faith-based groups surveyed for the EDS, it is the Protestants and Jews that invest more in this regard relative to the overall population. Neither group is underrepresented relative to their share of the sample when it comes to non-religious volunteerism. The percentage of Muslims contributing to the stock of religious social capital is equal to their share of the sample, while the percentage contributed by Buddhists and Hindus is somewhat higher.

According to the 2004 CSGVP, immigrants were nearly as likely to make a donation (85%) as native-born Canadians (86%). Moreover, immigrants ($462) made larger average annual donations than non-immigrants ($394). Immigrants and non-immigrants tend to give to the same types of organizations with health, religious, and social services organizations being the leading recipients. Nonetheless, immigrants (44%) are more likely to give to religious organizations than non-immigrants (38%) and somewhat less likely to give to health organizations (48% vs. 60%). Immigrants also donated a somewhat greater share of their charitable contributions to religious organizations than did the Canadian-born population. Among immigrants, those

Table 4: Overall rates of volunteering with religious group, other volunteering and no volunteering by selected religious group, 2002				
Religious affiliated group	**Volunteer with religious group**	**Non religious volunteer**	**Didn't volunteer**	**Total % of sample**
No religious affiliation	1.9%	19.6%	21.0%	18.8%
Catholic	28.3%	36.2%	36.3%	35.3%
Protestant	40.2%	29.3%	25.5%	27.7%
Christian Orthodox	2.9%	1.6%	2.2%	2.0%
Other Christian	12.4%	5.9%	5.5%	6.1%
Muslim	1.9%	1.5%	2.3%	1.9%
Jewish	4.0%	1.7%	1.2%	1.6%
Buddhist	1.8%	0.9%	1.5%	1.3%
Hindu	2.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1,2%
Sikh	2.3%	0.8%	1.8%	1.5%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

who have resided in Canada for longer periods of time tend to give more than others. Immigrants (41%) were somewhat less inclined to volunteer than native-born Canadians (48%). Nonetheless, the immigrant (165 hours) and non-immigrant volunteers (168 hours) contributed about the same number of hours annually.

Nearly half of Catholics and Protestants made donations to a place of worship, versus 42% of persons that identify with other religions. When it comes to volunteering in religious affiliated groups as observed below it is most common amongst persons of the Jewish faith followed by Hindu, Sikh and Protestant. Catholics and Muslims were least likely to report. Members of the Jewish faith were also most likely to have volunteered and persons of the Sikh and Muslim faith least likely to have done so.

Looking at religious volunteerism on the basis of generational status offers some important insight. As observed below, the second generation in the Jewish, Muslim and Sikh groups was more likely than the first generation to volunteer in religious organizations. In the case of Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Hindus, the second generation was less likely than the first to volunteer in religious organizations.

On the basis of language, there are important distinctions in the degree of religious volunteerism. For Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and Hindus, religious volunteerism is more common amongst those whose mother tongue is neither English nor French. Anglophones that are Catholic, Protestant or Muslim are more likely to volunteer in religious organizations than is the case for francophones in these three communities.

What does the evidence in Canada suggest around the relationship between engagements in religious associations and the encouragement or discouragement of other volunteer activity notably when it comes to non-religious volunteerism?

The CSGVP reveals that just under one-third of all Canadians (31%) are engaged in all four forms of such involvement. Somewhat fewer (30%) took part in three forms; about one-quarter (23%) engaged in two; and 11% undertook only one. Taken together, 85% of Canadians engaged in two or more and 62% took part in three or more forms of social involvement. Most members of organizations belonged to just one (45%) or two (30%) different types of organizations over the course of a year. One quarter (25%) held memberships with three or more different types of organizations.

Table 5: Rates of Volunteering with Religious Group, other volunteering and no volunteering within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Religious affiliated group	**Volunteer religious organization**	**Volunteer other organization**	**Did not volunteer**
No religious affiliation	0.7%	41.0%	57.4%
Catholic	5.5%	40.4%	53.0%
Protestant	10.0%	41.7%	47.5%
Muslim	6.8%	29.9%	60.5%
Jewish	17.2%	42.5%	38.0%
Buddhist	9.5%	28.4%	59.7%
Hindu	12.8%	37.4%	47.4%
Sikh	10.9%	22.5%	63.7%
Total	6.9%	39.4%	51.6%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 6: Rates of Volunteering with Religious Organization by generational status within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Religious affiliated group	**1st generation born outside Canada**	**2nd generation born in Canada**	**3rd generation or more born in Canada**
No religious affiliation	0.9%	0.9%	0.4%
Catholic	8.1%	5.6%	4.0%
Protestant	11.4%	10.1%	9.4%
Muslim	4.3%	13.0%	–
Jewish	13.5%	19.9%	17.6%
Buddhist	10.5%	7.2%	8.6%
Hindu	13.9%	10.9%	–
Sikh	9.1%	13.8%	–

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 7: Volunteering with Religious affiliated group and not with religiously affiliated group and respondent involvement in numbers and types of organizations, 2002			
	Volunteer in religious affiliated group	**Volunteer but not religious affiliated group**	**Total population**
Not a member of or did not take part in the activities of a group or organization.	–	–	51.3%
1 type of group or organization	48.6%	81.2%	35.4%
2 types of groups or organizations	31.7%	15.2%	8.2%
3 types of groups or organizations	14.3%	3.1%	2.2%
4 or more types of organizations	5.5%	0.5%	0.6%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

The CSGVP does not provide information on the patterns of volunteerism amongst specific minority religious groups (its focus is on those who have no religious affiliation that are Catholic, Protestant or 'other'). Such information can be secured from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey where the vertical dimensions of engagement can be identified. By vertical dimensions, we refer to the numbers and types of groups or organizations in which Canadians are involved. This information has some bearing on the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital as analysts have contended that those engaged on the basis of their identity are less likely to become involved in various other groups or organization. Nearly half of Canadians were either a member of, or took part in, the activities of a group or organization. As observed below, those involved in religious organizations were more likely to take part in several types of groups or organizations than those who volunteer in non-religious organizations.

Even on the basis of various religious groups, multiple involvements are not uncommon, though it is somewhat more likely in the more established groups.

6. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION

Social capital theorists often describe their objective as the advancement of democracy. As mentioned at the outset, Putnam and Fukuyama contend that democratic values are enhanced through civic engagement and in this regard increased social capital expands democratic life. Volunteerism augments what is described as the accumulation or stock of social capital. In the previous chapter several value-laden factors motivating volunteerism or civic

Table 8: Volunteering with Religious affiliated group and respondent involvement in numbers and types of organizations, by selected religions, 2002							
Volunteer in religious affiliated group	**Catholic**	**Protestant**	**Muslim**	**Jewish**	**Buddhist**	**Hindu**	**Sikh**
1 type of group or organization	45.9%	45.6%	61.8%	49.1%	65.4%	66.2%	59.7%
2 types of groups or organizations	33.8%	32.0%	27.3%	34.2%	15.4%	26.2%	20.9%
3 types of groups or organizations	13.8%	17.7%	5.5%	11.4%	9.6%	6.2%	16.4%
4 or more types of organizations	6.5%	4.7%	5.5%	5.3%	9.6%	1.5%	3.0%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 9: Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization and importance of citizen engagement and values in selected areas, 2004				
6-7 Very important for citizens to Canada	**Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization**			
	Belong and participate	**Belong not participate**	**Used to** belong	**Never** belonged to
Help less privileged-country	73.0%	58.2%	41.0%	27.7%
Understand other opinions	63.5%	60.7%	43.3%	32.4%
Always Obey Laws	92.7%	88.1%	84.6%	82.6%
Active in Associations	36.2%	22.8%	25.9%	18.9%

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

engagement were identified. But as mentioned earlier, Putnam cautions not all social capital contributes to positive societal outcomes and in some instances the values driving collective action or engagement may seek to undermine the desired democratic outcomes. In "Bowling Alone", Putman distinguished between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital with the former targeting positive social outcomes and in turn supporting cohesion by building trust amongst citizens.

Managing diversity is an obvious preoccupation for social capital theorists given their concern with identity formation and the issues of trust and solidarity to which they give rise. As a considerable degree of the social capital generated is identity-based, it is not surprising that social capital discussion has become intertwined with debate over shared or common values, diversity, multiculturalism and national identity. Robert Putnam has recently observed that: "although the linkage between identity and social capital is only beginning to be explored, it is an important frontier for research. The relationship between the two is almost certainly powerful and reciprocal: Whom you hang out with probably affects who you think you are, and who you think you are probably affects whom you hang out with".

Defining social capital as "…an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals" Fukuyama concurs that not just any set of norms and values sustain social capital. The norms that constitute social capital can range from reciprocity between two friends, all the way up to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism.

In 2007, Putnam argued that in-group and out-group attitudes need not be reciprocally related, but can vary independently. In effect, it was necessary to allow for the possibility that diversity might actually reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity – that is, both bonding and bridging social capital. The relationship is not necessarily zero-sum – in other words people engaged in bonding with like persons are often more engaged in bridging than is often assumed.

Still, in the essay entitled "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century", Putnam's main argument is that ethnic diversity triggers anomie or social isolation and therefore "…people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down' – that is, to pull in like a turtle." He concludes that in the short term, immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and by consequence inhibit social capital. In the medium to long term, however, Putnam believes that immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more

Table 10: Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization by selected religious group and importance of citizen engagement and values in selected areas, 2004				
6-7 Very important	Status of belonging: Church, religious organization			
	Good citizen: Help less privileged-ctry	Good citizen: Understand other opinions	Always obey laws	Active in association
Roman Catholic	74.6	68.3	85.0	34.2
Protestant	71.6	70.5	86.7	30.4
Jewish	87.6	72.3	82.8	42.6
Islam	71.5	51.2	80.5	51.2
Buddhism	68.7	55.8	79.2	33.0

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

Table 11: People can be trusted by immigrant status for selected religious groups, 2002				
Do you trust people	Born in Canada	Born outside Canada	Before 1991	1991 to 2001
No religious affiliation	55.0%	56.4%	56.7%	56.0%
Catholic	44.5%	44.7%	44.3%	47.3%
Protestant	58.6%	54.1%	54.9%	49.3%
Muslim	37.4%	45.7%	49.1%	43.3%
Jewish	54.5%	49,5%	50.0%	47.1%
Buddhist	49.0%	43.4%	42.2%	46.2%
Hindu	39.8%	44.6%	47.4%	41.6%
Sikh	38.9%	33.8%	35.5%	32.1%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

encompassing identities. As we shall observe, Putnam feels that religion –especially the Catholic faith – can constitute an encompassing identity in that it can bring together persons of diverse ethno-cultural and ethno-racial backgrounds within the same institutional setting.

How do religious identities and the values transmitted by religion(s) fit into the bridging and bonding dichotomy? It is an issue with which social capital theorists continue to grapple. When investigating the relationship between religion, values and social capital, there emerge some striking paradoxes. Religion is widely viewed as stimulating charitable giving by establishing norms and responsibilities for it adherents and offering a moral basis for civic pursuits. In the previous chapter, we reviewed data revealing that people who are religiously motivated also have a greater tendency to volunteer and donate money to assist others in society. Much volunteering and charitable aid is based on the ethical mores taught by most religions. Indeed on the basis of a survey conducted in 2004, it is observed that the more one is involved in a religious organization, the more likely they are to feel that it is very important to help others in need, understand their opinions, always obey laws and be active in associations.

Social integration is measured at least in part by degrees of civic engagement (i.e., volunteerism). Recognizing that much of North America's social capital is religiously based, it might follow that where religion becomes salient it, favours social integration. Indeed, North American researchers are divided over how best to assess the role of religion in promoting social capital with some insisting that the primary concern should be with its civic contribution, while others are preoccupied with its cultural and moral underpinnings. So even if religious institutions may promote positive social values and civic engagement and the fundamental reasons for such participation are sound, there remains a concern that religious engagement is not inclusive and that the social capital arising from it benefits only the members of the group to which one belongs. While religion is seen as an integrative force, for some it is also widely viewed as a catalyst in generating social division within civil society. The concern that religion is the principal basis for social division is reflected in surveys conducted in Canada, where tension between faith communities is currently identified as the main source of intergroup conflict. Some have gone so far as too argue that clashes between persons

Table 12: People can be trusted and rating importance of religion for selected religious groups, 2002					
People can be trusted	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	48.3%	46.3%	45.2%	45.7%	42.1%
Protestant	59.5%	62.6%	59.3%	58.8%	54.1%
Muslim	48.9%	55.0%	41.1%	47.1%	40.9%
Jewish	51.9%	47.1%	57.9%	56.2%	50.8%
Buddhist	30.0%	48.5%	40.4%	50.5%	49.4%
Hindu	42.9%	53.3%	62.7%	43.8%	37.0%
Sikh	–	50.0%	41.8%	34.6%	35.7%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 13: People can be trusted in your neighbourhood and rating importance of religion for selected religious groups, 2002					
People can be trusted in your neighbourhood	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	52.7%	54.4%	56.3%	61.7%	62.8%
Protestant	67.0%	70.4%	70.8%	73.5%	70.3%
Muslim	48.9%	47.5%	42.1%	41.3%	49.1%
Jewish	44.4%	52.9%	52.9%	58.7%	65.3%
Buddhist	–	47.0%	43.3%	51.4%	49.4%
Hindu	38.1%	46.7%	52.3%	55.1%	53.1%
Sikh	50.0%	42.8%	47.7%	49.5%	45.7%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

with strong religious identities contribute to irreconcilable global conflict.

Putnam maintains that "Americans have more or less deconstructed religion as a salient line of social division over the last half century, even though religion itself remains personally important…for most Americans their religious identity is actually more important to them than their ethnic identity [according to Putnam's findings] but the salience of religious differences as lines of social identity has sharply diminished." Putnam believes that that the "permeability" of religious identities has resulted in substantial positive gains for social capital for Americans while they have not forsaken their own religious loyalties. Irregardless of whether Putnam's assessment of the place of religion in the US is accurate it does not appear applicable to Canada. As noted in Chapter 3, many Canadians were particularly concerned over the degree to which religion constitutes a basis for social division.

As an example of religion's ability to encompass other expressions of identity, he concludes that "religious institutions – and in our era, as a century ago, especially the Catholic church – have a major role to play in incorporating new immigrants and then forging shared identities across ethnic boundaries. Ethnically defined social groups (such the Sons of Norway or the Knights of Columbus or Jewish immigrant aid societies) were important initial steps toward immigrant civic engagement a century ago. Bonding social capital can thus be a prelude to bridging social capital, rather than precluding it. But we need to work toward bridging, as well as bonding."

Robert Wuthnow (1999) has argued that there is an important distinction between volunteering for the internal maintenance of one's church and volunteering for activities and organizations that stretch beyond it. Mainline Protestants and Catholics are more likely to volunteer in activities designed explicitly to benefit the broader community; conversely, the energies of Evangelical Protestants are more likely to be expanded within church voluntarism, benefiting only members of their denomination.

Table 14: Do you trust people?				
People can be trusted	**Volunteer religious affiliated group**	**Volunteer other**	**No volunteer**	**Total**
No religious affiliation	52.7%	62.4%	51.2%	55.3%
Catholic	59.5%	50.9%	39.0%	44.5%
Protestant	62.6%	63.8%	52.5%	57.8%
Muslim	49.1%	46.5%	43.1%	43.3%
Jewish	57.0%	56.6%	50.2%	53.0%
Buddhist	69.2%	48.1%	42.4%	45.5%
Hindu	41.5%	50.5%	39.4%	42.9%
Sikh	47.8%	42.0%	33.3%	35.9%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

How do religious worldviews relate to social capital when understood through its bonding and bridging prism? Major world religions – Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam – possess some equivalent of the "Golden Rule" (i.e. for Christians that is "Do for others what you would like them to do for you," or "love your neighbour as yourself."). Most persons who engage religiously believe that the relief of poverty and/or suffering (i.e. good deeds) represents a practical application of their faith. When breaking down a 35 country inquiry into issues of citizenship on the basis of five religious groups that are religiously engaged, one observes few differences in opinion of certain tenets of good citizenship.

Religion, trust and identity

It may be countered that analyzing trust on a national scale overlooks the concentration of diversity in larger cities which has been the focus of attention around measures of trust. In this regard however, findings from the EDS that examine trust between people, neighbourhood trust and trust in the school and workplace provide no empirical support for the idea that trust is lower within Canadian cities. Other than Montrealers appearing somewhat less inclined to say they trust other people than do Torontonians and Vancouverites, when it came to neighbourhood trust there were no meaningful differences across communities. Underlying the idea that ethnically diverse cities fuel less trust, it might be assumed that immigrants exhibit lower levels of than non-immigrants. Yet again, the evidence from the EDS reveals that those born in Canada (51.7%), were only slightly more inclined to trust others than those born outside the country (48.3%). As to neighbourhood trust, some 62% of those born in Canada felt people could be trusted a lost compared to 57% of immigrants. As to trust at work or school, some 56% of the Canadian born felt that people could be trusted compared to 48% of immigrants.

Table 15: People can be trusted and strong sense of belonging to Canada for selected religious groups, 2002		
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	**People can be trusted**	**You cannot be too careful in dealing with people**
No religious affiliation	81.3	83.8
Catholic	82.9	75.6
Protestant	89.2	84.6
Muslim	90.4	84.3
Jewish	86.0	81.6
Buddhist	72.0	70.0
Hindu	81.7	84.6
Sikh	86.4	82.7

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

On the basis of religion, there are some noticeable gaps in levels of trust. Protestants (57.3%), persons with no religious affiliation (55.3%) and Jews (53%) were most likely to say that people can be trusted, while Buddhists (45.5%), Catholics (44.5%), Muslims (43.3%), Hindus (42.9%) and Sikhs (35.9%). Yet another issue that is sometimes the object of attention is immigrant trust in various religious groups. Here again however the distinctions in levels of trust are not substantial. Only in the case of Muslims do immigrants possess noticeably higher levels of trust than non-immigrants. In the case of Sikhs, those born in Canada are more trusting than those born outside of the country.

The above findings focus on issues of religious identification as opposed to the importance attributed to religion. The distinction can be important. In the case of Quebec for example, a significant percentage of the population identifies as Catholic and yet much of that group describes religion as being of little importance. Putnam's findings around diversity suggest that is it is the

Table 16: Rating for importance of religion and strong sense of belonging to Canada for selected religious groups, 2002					
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	62.7%	69.1%	72.5%	81.9%	86.1%
Protestant	83.2%	85.1%	87.8%	88.8%	86.0%
Muslim	87.3%	85.0%	82.1%	76.9%	84.9%
Jewish	85.2%	82.4%	82.8%	78.5%	82.6%
Buddhist	50.0%	59.1%	66.3%	72.5%	73.2%
Hindu	66.6%	63.3%	77.6%	80.2%	83.6%
Sikh	–	78.6%	80.6%	81.3%	83.2%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 17: Strong sense of belonging to Canada by volunteering with religious group, other volunteering and no volunteering within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	Volunteer Religious Group	Volunteer Other	Did Not Volunteer
Catholic	87.8%	78.9%	76.2%
Protestant	88.4%	88.1%	85.6%
Muslim	87.3%	82.7%	87.6%
Jewish	87.8%	83.4%	82.9%
Buddhist	76.9%	67.3%	68.9%
Hindu	86.2%	81.6%	81.4%
Sikh	80.6%	82.6%	82.3%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

presence of demographic diversity of groups that fuels mistrust, thus weakening social solidarity and cohesion. He does not look at the importance of their identity and it appears assumed rather than affirmed. Yet examining the degree to which one acts according to their identity raises the matter of whether generalizations about group behaviour can be with confidence. As observed below, members of the Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh faiths that attribute more importance to religion are less likely to be trusting of other people than those who regard religion as less important. But this is not the case for the Protestant, Jewish and Buddhist groups.

Neighbourhood trust does not vary much on the basis of the importance attributed to religion across various faith groups. While the more religious Christians and Jews are more likely to say they trust people in their neighbourhoods than the other groups, it is unclear that religious salience is the principal reason for such gaps. By consequence caution should be exercised before making strong conclusions about the relationship between religiosity and trust.

Along with several studies, the EDS confirm that income is an important factor in the degree of trust. Those with lower income are generally less trusting. Increases in income amongst all religious groups indeed result in higher levels of trust.

For the most part, religiously-oriented volunteerism resulted in more trust than other forms of volunteerism. As observed below however, this was not the case for those identifying as Hindu, Protestant and reporting no religious affiliation.

Religion, social capital, trust and national identity

Yet another area that is the object of attention for proponents of social cohesion is the question of national identity. In Canada religion is perceived by many as a source of social division and regrettably some raise questions about whether certain religious groups transmit values that contradict Canadian values, however defined. As observed below however, across the religious groups those who say that people can be trusted are no more likely to have a strong sense of belonging to Canada than those who feel you cannot be too careful in dealing with people.

Only in the case of Catholics and Hindus does religious salience generate a stronger sense of belonging to Canada. This may have more to do with the age of the respondent than the importance they attribute to religion

There is little evidence that volunteerism has any significant effect on the sense of belonging to Canada. With the exception of Catholics and Buddhists there the gaps in degrees of belonging across the spectrum of religious groups are relatively unimportant irrespective of whether it is religiously-based volunteerism, other forms of volunteerism or not doing any volunteering. When it comes to the issue of national identity, the causal link between social capital and what is described as social integration is tenuous at best. Conversely, it is difficult to make the case that those whose volunteer engagement is religiously-based emerge with a weaker sense of belonging to Canada.

Conclusion

A distinction between faith-based social capital arising from houses of worship and the extension of religiously-based community service is often made. Often however, the two are interconnected. Assessing the effects of faith-based social capital on social cohesion much depends on how such cohesion is defined. We assume that for purposes of this study the idea refers to a degree of shared values of those engaged in religious social capital, the level of trust of others and the strength of belonging to Canada. As defined on this basis, the empirical data presented here does not support the idea that religiously-based engagement somehow constitutes a threat to cohesion. In effect, there is no casual evidence that engagement across faith communities is guided by different values. Moreover, the results are inconclusive when it comes to the idea that religious engagement fosters less trust amongst its participants. Some religious groups are in fact more trusting of others but it is not apparent whatsoever that this is attributable to involvement in religiously-based activity. As to belonging to Canada, if anything the empirical evidence suggests that religious engagement fosters greater belonging. Nor is there evidence that faith-based organizations contribute to the isolation/alienation of their members, especially youth, from mainstream society. While members of religious minorities are more likely to have friends with the same first ancestry, there is no evidence to suggest that when they are engaged in religious organizations they are more likely to have fewer friends outside of their communities or to have considerably lesser levels of life satisfaction.

Still while there is little evidence to support the idea that religious engagement undercuts cohesion, there is not much proof that it supports it either. And despite the empirical data, the public remains concerned that religious engagement and relations between faith communities undercuts cohesion. It would be imprudent to dismiss these concerns.

The presence of faith-based communities does not pose a policy challenge to a religion-neutral State. Rather, it is the manner in which religious diversity is managed by that State and how the idea of religious neutrality is applied in practice that determines the nature of policy challenges. Multiculturalism presumes that various expressions of identity (i.e. ethnicity, ethno-racial and religious) are not in competition with the national identity. Moreover it assumes diverse expressions of culture rather than a common culture. According to the definition offered by the Department of Canadian Heritage "…multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures." When it comes to policy implementation there are various models of multiculturalism often reflected in the degree and type of resources that are allocated to further such descriptive ends. At least two dominant models of State multiculturalism may be identified. One is more collectivist in orientation and is characterized by State funding for ethnic, religious and/or racial groups is extended in support of their identities. This is more often the case where there is an official state religion and some degree of equity for other groups that are not officially designated to receive State support.

In this model, the State may designate a community organization to represent an identifiable constituency. Oriented more towards the individual is the multicultural model that provides support to persons who wish to preserve their group identities by removing barriers to do so. This is in line with the Canadian approach which is intertwined with commitments to human rights including freedom of religion. But freedom of religion also includes freedom from religion.

That said, the multicultural/individualist orientation does not undercut historic commitments that may have a collective dimension. In the case of Canada, there are constitutional commitments to aboriginal peoples, official language minorities and to Catholic and Protestant religious groups. The Canadian version of multiculturalism either as idea or policy recognizes these commitments. Even in the province of Quebec the modification of a constitutional commitment to Protestant schooling was in no way influenced by multicultural policy. Canadian multiculturalism does not require that the State support ethnic or religiously-based institutions despite arguments to the contrary. Still the lines between the collective and individual approaches to multiculturalism can be blurred and where this occurs, the multicultural policy does not provide simple answers to questions relating to the management of religious diversity. For example, it offers no obvious guidance on such issues as religious arbitration of divorce or the funding of religiously-based schools. Surveys suggest that the public funding of religiously-based schools is not supported by the majority of Canadians in any part of the country. Nonetheless, most provinces do extend support to faith-based schools under varying conditions. As education is provincial jurisdiction, the extension of such funds does not undercut cohesion on a national scale. However, what it implies for equal treatment of religious groups can be a national concern.

The programmatic objectives of Canadian multiculturalism do encourage the facilitation of full and active participation of ethnic, religious, and cultural communities in Canadian society, improve the ability of public institutions to respond to ethnic, religious and cultural

diversity by assisting in the identification and removal of barriers to equitable access and increase public awareness, understanding and informed public dialogue about multiculturalism, racism and cultural diversity in Canada. It is apparent that these objectives are more consistent with the individualist oriented multiculturalism. Organized religion contributes a considerable amount of Canada's social capital, a reality that is too often neglected in discussion of the engagement of citizens. Mutual assistance, employment services, immigrant adjustment, social services and help to the poor and needy both within Canada and abroad are all amongst the types of activities generated by religious organizations. Already a number of organizations that are engaged in such initiatives under the auspices of a religiously-based body do receive some government assistance – though not from the multiculturalism program. It might be contended that organizations engaged therein are nominally religious however when looking at the values motivating the volunteers -- as reported in the CGVPS – they do not appear out of line with principles of good citizenship.

The charitable tax status afforded to religiously-based institutions whether they are houses of worship of religiously-based social or educational initiatives may be seen as incorporating both the collective and individual dimensions of Canadian multiculturalism. It is worth noting that accordance of charitable tax status to religious institutions has a long tradition in Canada that predates the introduction of multicultural policies. Though the origins of such status are rooted in a largely Christian society, in Canada's growing multicultural and multi-confessional environment, such status has been provided to all faith-based organizations that meet criteria set forth by the Canada Revenue Agency. The conferring of charitable tax status is likely the principal means by which the State encourages religiously-based social capital. It is influenced by the idea that both in its bridging and bonding dimensions religiously-based engagement promotes positive societal values. Again however, the organizations that benefit from such status cannot operate outside of the provisions of the *Charter of Rights*. A survey conducted by the Canadian Revenue agency reveals that Canadians widely support the extension of charitable tax status and are comfortable that there are effective mechanisms in place to regulate charitable activities should they contravene Canadian norms.

To-date there has been no detailed analysis of the impact of charitable tax status on religiously-based social capital. Nor has there been a link made between charitable tax status, religious volunteerism and the policy and practice of multiculturalism in Canada. Does according charitable tax status diminish the individualist orientation of Canadian multiculturalism? It is contended here that it does not. In effect, it does not extend direct assistance to religiously-based organizations and instead it provides individuals with indirect incentives to contribute to religious charities if they so choose. As observed, few Canadians feel compelled to either give to – or volunteer for – religiously-based charities. By no means does this suggest that there are neither organizations nor movements that in the name or religion-Christian or non-Christian-pursue activities that may be inconsistent with fundamental rights and freedoms and run counter to the individualist orientation of Canadian multiculturalism. However, the existing data provides little evidence that this phenomenon is sufficiently important within any particular group in Canada to warrant its being dubbed a broader social problem threatening cohesion-defined in this case as either undercutting the sense of belonging to Canada or imperilling the fundamental rights of a group of citizens.

At the community level, cohesion is often associated with bonding, whereas at the societal level it is generally linked with bridging differences in values and reducing inter-group tension. Immigrants often engage in bonding as a means of adjustment to new societies and it is legitimate for persons of the same community to freely associate-bond-in supporting identity needs. The stigmatization of identity-based bonding amongst community members would contradict the spirit of Canadian multiculturalism which will minimally aim to ensure that the conditions for such bonding are in place.

Programmatically however, Canadian multiculturalism tends to prioritize bridging initiatives which is consistent with its emphasis on inclusion. Hence where religiously-based bodies are engaged in bridging social capital and their initiatives support broadly-based participation in Canadian society than they can certainly bid for federal assistance under the multiculturalism program. Such programming will also respond to concerns on the part of Canadians around relations between religious communities and the challenge they potentially represent to cohesion. However, it is not clear in what manner any such religiously-based or interfaith dialogue might be framed. A discussion between faith communities may not successfully address public concerns around cohesion that have more to do with the place of religion in a society that favours a secular state. Indeed, it is somewhat paradoxical that a secular State will invest in interfaith dialogue to strengthen cohesion. Over the years, interfaith dialogue appears to have been the object of less interest in light of the broad decline of religious identity as reflected in data on levels of religious participation amongst the population.

It would follow therefore that religiously-based bridging social capital that is characterized by dialogue or outreach across faiths has been on the wane. Hence investing in such bridging social capital in the Canadian context may support an identity-based dialogue that does not effectively address the broader concern over the role of religion in public life. Those preoccupied by the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism and cohesion are most likely to agree on endorsing initiatives that reach across congregations, denominations, and religions to promote a larger sense of community – that is, to build the stock of bridging social capital without undercutting the bonding that is very often a defining element of religious identities.

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Religious Youth Radicalization in Canada

Paul Bramadat

Dr. Paul Bramadat is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Winnipeg.

Scot Wortley

Dr. Scot Wortley is Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Toronto.

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the existing evidence related to the question of religious youth radicalization in Canada. Our analysis suggests that all religions contain within their histories messages, texts, and movements that have supported both violence and non-violence. Our website study demonstrates that the rhetoric of religious radicalization has a marginal presence on the main websites designed by and for members of the five religious traditions we considered. Most Canadian groups continue to express their opinions, and even their grievances within the established traditions of law and deference that characterize Canadian life. There are, however, a number of problems that face anyone seeking to address what small amount of religious radicalization exists in Canada. The power of the ideology of secularism and the theory of secularization makes it difficult for people to consider other ways to manage diversity and to include religious individuals and considerations in the public arena. Moreover, the widespread religious illiteracy that characterizes Canadian society makes it difficult for policy makers or religious groups to influence public discourse around religious issues. Evidence suggests strongly that perceptions of unfairness predispose youth to criminal activities and to identification with radicalized worldviews. Nonetheless, all of these issues can be addressed through concerted and coordinated efforts.

Introduction

Parents, teachers, law-makers and other people over the age of forty view their society's youth with some suspicion. These anxieties have many roots: some are concerned that the next generation is not equipped to survive the challenges that previous generations have created for them (overpopulation, climate change, crime, drugs, economic instability); others worry that the popular culture that shapes the *Weltanschauung* of today's youth culture will lead to widespread moral vacuity. Some see in today's youth the specter of criminality and random violence; others worry that youth will be drawn into radical groups; and others are troubled by the possibility that the internet will alienate young people from their peers and parents and will make them easy prey for unscrupulous individuals and groups. The fears are many and deep.

For a moment, let us set aside the perennial concerns about "kids these days," and turn to something we might well consider a relatively new feature of public and political discourse in the West. It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that there is a new specter haunting not just Canadian society, but indeed Western society in general: and that is the specter of the return of religion to the international public arena. We argue that in order to understand the current and potential state of youth radicalization in Canada or elsewhere, one must see these issues in terms of a powerful intersection between age-old anxieties about youth behaviour and relatively new anxieties about the failure of the Enlightenment-era convictions that secular liberal democracy would become the universal norm.

In this article, we discuss the nature and causes of the religiously-oriented youth radicalization that might exist in contemporary Canada. Our expectation is that by accurately thematizing this issue, we might set the phenomenon in its proper context and perhaps diminish the damaging consequences of the almost exclusive focus in the West on Muslim youth radicalization. Very little research has been conducted on this phenomenon in Canada, though clearly one can see throughout public discourse (especially in the media) that the matter is on the minds (or in the nightmares) of many people.

We focus mostly on Canadians between the ages of 14 and 24. However, we feel that it is important to include both adolescents and young adults in our analysis. The early twenties is a crucial period in life that often represents an important transition from the formal education system to workforce, from living with parents to residential autonomy, from the dependence of childhood to the independence and personal responsibilities of adulthood. It includes those in school and out of school, those living with parents and those who are living on the streets, those with children of their own and those

that are childless, those who have found employment and those who are still looking for work, those living in poverty and those living in relative opulence. Within this cohort we find people from a wide variety of different life situations, racial and ethnic backgrounds, subcultures, maturity levels and degrees of moral development. Although age and religion are our primary organizational constructs, we are aware of the plethora of other social variables that impact young people.

We are exploring youth radicalization in five of the major religious traditions found in Canada: Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam. Religious radicalization is understood to connote forms of religiously-framed resistance to the dominant society (or to the society that is perceived as dominant). These forms of resistance vary in intensity; clearly and almost by definition, most expressions of religion in Canadian society do not fit under the rubric of radicalization. Religious groups promoting the peaceful use of the broader society's laws and policies in order to redress a perceived moral or religious flaw in that society cannot plausibly be considered purveyors of radicalized versions of their religious sensibilities since they are seeking to effect social change within an accepted and shared set of public mores. When we use the term "radicalized," we have in mind groups and individuals who espouse what is typically a militant minority approach to their own religion (Lincoln 2003; cf. Juergensmeyer 2002). We also employ the suffix "ized" to underline – as in the term "racialized" – the extent to which radical-ness cannot be understood except by juxtaposition against other dominant and putatively "moderate" expressions. So, one is radicalized in as much as one subscribes to a religiously-embedded view of the world that a) sets one apart from most of one's co-religionists, and b) advocates a significant degree of resistance to some larger society (and sometimes to one's co-religionists).

We are concerned here with groups of people – especially youth – whose involvement in particular radicalized movements cannot be separated from their association with a particular religion. The two phenomena must be intimately related to attract our attention. We are concerned with individuals and groups whose explicit self-understanding and whose public presence (or, to use an anthropological turn of phrase, whose public performances of identity) inextricably link their religious and their radical convictions.

Ideological subtext

While our concern is religious radicalization in contemporary Canada, it is crucial to set this phenomenon against the backdrop of broader historical shifts that occurred over the last several centuries in Europe and North America. The ideology of secularism is a crucial feature of many Western liberal democracies; it is the proverbial iron gate of reason that guards our proverbial cities from the religious, tribal, superstitious barbarians outside. With the secularization hypothesis now in tatters, it is rather problematic to assert or assume – as secularism encourages – that even in the West history is unfolding in a particular direction (toward freedom and reason and away from tyranny and religion).

Jurgen Habermas (2005) speaks of a post-secular society; however, he is not referring to the emergence of societies that are throw-backs to medieval Europe, nor to the rise of theocracies on par with Saudi Arabia. The fact is that we are in a kind of *ideological interregnum*, a liminal period in Western history during which it is not at all clear how religion and the state will be related in the coming decades. Within this interregnum, a great deal of anxiety is felt by scholars and policy makers who had understood themselves to be courtiers in the old regime of optimistic liberal secularism after September 11th, 2001.

The anxieties about religious youth radicalization grow out of an age-old concern about the younger generation. Indeed, the dominant narrative of socialization in the modern West assumed that it was normal – almost a rite of passage – for youth to rebel against their parents. Myths and legends around the world are full of such stories (cf. Shapiro 2003), and so much of modern psychology is founded on the notion of observable and predictable stages of personal and cognitive development. While the ancient myths and the modern developmental theories might presuppose conflicts between the mercurial energies of youth and the strictures of adulthood, they also involve in most cases the individual's eventual reinsertion into the existing (though perhaps somewhat expanded) adult social fabric.

What happens to a society when this narrative of reinsertion fails or grows weary? To put it another way, and to underline where this broader concern intersects with our current question, what happens when elders fear that their own youth or the youth in their neighbourhood will become attracted to radical and oppositional religious worldviews that the adults, and especially the elites among them, had left behind during migration from abroad, or during their own individuation? What happens when we find we need to question the founding assumption that as individuals and as culture mature, they will progressively eschew religion (and here we might add: magic, tribalism, superstition)?

It is crucial to remember that the concerns expressed in the public domain about religious youth radicalization cannot be separated from racism. It is an unfortunate reality that the community most associated with the specter of religious youth radicalization – Canada's roughly 750,000 Muslims – is also mostly comprised of first or second generation Canadians of South Asian, Arab and African ethnic origin. When the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* was released in 2003, its analysis of religious discrimination – which posited that in most cases such incidents were in fact attributable to racial differences that were in some sense conflated with religious differences – reminded us of the powerful role of race in our current debates about religion. We should not shy away from wondering whether the concerns expressed over "Islamic extremism" in fact represent redirected or implicit racist stereotypes about Arabs, Africans, and South Asians (Bhabha 2003; Karim 2003; cf. on racial profiling, Gabor 2004; Wortley and Tanner 2005).

However, while commentators must always be alert to the power of racism and Orientalism (Said 1979) in the way social conflicts emerge, it is also the case that religion is also often a relatively independent variable in the anxieties that

have surfaced in Canadian public discourse. That is, we live in an ideological interregnum in the midst of a mortally wounded 200 year old secularism, and it is religion – though especially its "Islamic" and "fundamentalist" strains – that is framed as the quintessential modern *bête noire*.

Religion and youth in Canada

The Canadian literature on religion and youth is ten to twenty years old (cf. Ban 1986a; 1986b; Bibby 1987; 2002; 2004; Bibby and Posterski 1992; Hewitt 1993; Waugh, Abu-Laban, Quereshi 1991), and very little examines the experience of religious youth in the wake of the cultural turning point of September 11th, 2001, which certainly led to dramatic shifts in the place of religion (per se, but especially "non-Western" religions) in public discourse (cf. Beyer 2005a; McDonough and Hoodfar 2005; Ramji 2007).

Reginald Bibby (2002; 2004) has argued that the Canadian churches have begun to rebound from the numerical declines they have been suffering over the last few decades; and these signs of recovery are associated with the fact that contemporary youth are either returning to churches, or (for those who stay away from formal church structures) at least continuing to pursue traditional existential questions in ways that are still decidedly Christian. The aura of nostalgia that pervades Bibby's sociological work in the past two decades is still evident here, as is his conviction – one might say, his theological conviction – that the attachment of youth to established Christian structures is good for them and the broader society (by which he appears to mean: "good" both socially as well as spiritually).

Seljak and Bramadat worked with scholars from across Canada to produce *Christianity and Ethnicity* in Canada (2008). In this work, Seljak and Bramadat heard – contrary to Bibby's portrait – a consistent and coherent "discourse of loss" from the senior scholars they gathered together, each of whom was asked to write a chapter about the denominations or traditions they knew best. The only author whose story about the future of his denomination or tradition in Canada was not a story of loss was Bruce Guenther, the author assigned the task of writing about the evangelical tradition; it is no accident that his chapter's tradition is the only one in which there have been gains, overall the evangelical story is positive both in terms of their raw numbers as well as their efforts at reaching out to youth.

In line with Guenther's account, Bramadat's *The Church on the World's Turf* (2000) explored the way the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship offered its evangelical and fundamentalist university student members satisfying alternatives to secular social activities many members felt were debauched. Bramadat found that the IVCF enjoyed significant growth in the late 1980s and 1990s due to effective leadership and changes in the broader Canadian and North American societies that put many conservative Protestants on the defensive. The IVCF became a home away from home and a safe context in which they could renegotiate what it might mean for these youth to be both fully Christian and fully committed to their ostensibly secular studies.

Some see in today's youth the specter of criminality and random violence; others worry that youth will be drawn into radical groups; and others are troubled by the possibility that the internet will alienate young people from their peers and parents and will make them easy prey for unscrupulous individuals and groups. The fears are many and deep.

With a few exceptions (e.g., Beyer 2005a), most sociologists in Canada are not particularly interested in non-Christian youth's religious experiences, except to note that the Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Sikh communities of which the youth are members, have grown dramatically between 1991 and 2001 (each roughly doubled in that time, largely because of immigration (Bramadat 2005; 2007)). However, while non-Christian groups might be growing rapidly (Beyer 2005a; Bramadat and Seljak 2005), their absolute and even relative numbers are still modest (at roughly 6-7% of the Canadian population), so collecting data related to their religious lives is methodologically difficult. As a result, there is not very much academic research available that would illuminate the lives of this cohort of Canadians.

The American literature – also based mostly on studies of Christian individuals and communities and thus of limited use for a study such as ours, where one of the main phenomena we seek to address is non-Christian radicalization – explores the question of the relationship between youth religious identification and the religious lives of their parents, concluding (rather predictably) that youth are more likely to be involved in a formal religious community and to identify with the broader tradition if their parents modeled similar practices and values (Dudley 1999; Kiren and Munro 1987; cf. Penner 1995); that females are more interested in religion than males of the same age cohort; that religion is, overall, very important to youth; that subjective religiosity does not appear to decline significantly with age during youth; that about two thirds of American youth identify comfortably with the formal structures of religion; that roughly 15% of American youth are completely uninterested in religion; and that this percentage shows no signs of increasing (Smith, Faris, Denton Lundquist, Regnerus 2003).

Roughly 15% of American youth in this major national study are alienated from the communities of their parents

or have adopted approaches to their religious identities that vary significantly from those embraced by their parents. Other studies have explored the question of the relationship between deviance/crime and religiosity, though most of the studies examine Christian groups, and most confirm that higher levels of religious identification tends to be correlated with lower levels of criminality.

One very significant study for the present analysis found that for university-aged Muslim students, the Islamic dimension of their identities became increasingly significant to them in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, as many non-Muslims treated them differently (Peek 2005). The Muslims transformed this newly ascribed identity into a central feature of their personal identities. This study reminds us of the dialogical nature of identity formation so well outlined by Charles Taylor in his now classic 1992 article on "The Politics of Recognition". As such, when exploring the way a group or an individual describes him or herself, it is crucial that observers pay close attention to the way the individual or group is described by others.

By way of some general reflections on the broad changes occurring within religion and youth culture in Canada, we would observe that the religious lives of young Canadians are currently in flux. In part, this is clearly a perennial truth: to be between 14-24 means by definition that one's life is changing rapidly as one's body matures and as one's personality and career trajectory become somewhat more stable. However, the cohort we have defined as "youth" is living in a time of unprecedented change, especially if we consider the rapid pace of globalization and the quantum leaps that have occurred in telecommunications and transportation technologies. Youth today – at least in the developed world – are probably more able and inclined than youth of any other time in history to conceive of themselves as global citizens.

One should not be too rhapsodic about such changes, and one should not assume that these changes have altered the basic patterns of cognitive or social development so well outlined by developmental psychologists over the last century. However, the capacity of youth to acquaint – and if they so desire, to involve – themselves with previously remote peoples, religions, cultures, and ideas has arguably increased exponentially over the last fifteen years. Moreover, the social and personal costs associated with extending one's reach outside of the geographical or social spaces into which one is born are arguably lower today than ever before, as is evident both in the increasing rate of mixed-race marriages that characterize the Western metropolis and the proliferation of websites that create virtual communities inhabited by people previously separated by vast differences in geography, class, economics and ideology. This extension into other realms of life can be a boon to pluralism, of course. As Trinitapoli (2007; cf. Bramadat 2000) discovered, the increasingly well-entrenched pluralism that marks our current period in the urban West has tended to soften the way exclusivist religious groups articulate their singular religious message. The fact that even profoundly exclusivist believers (such as evangelical Christians) who once could have articulated their views without fear of reprisal or censure now realize they must moderate their assertions, indicates something new about the current terrain on which individuals negotiate their identities.

The effects of this new latitude are ambiguous, and it is too early to know how these changes might influence the broader religious communities in which these youth reside. Moreover, the effects of this new terrain vary depending on the traditions one considers. For example, one might speculate – as many of the authors of *Religion and Ethnicity* in Canada (2005) and *Christianity and Ethnicity in Canada* (2008) have – that we are witnessing the gradual disintegration or attenuation of institutionalized and relatively established religions (i.e., Christianity and Judaism) in Canada. However, this hypothesis likely describes processes at work in the lives of established Christian and Jewish youth of European descent much more than it does the forces that influence the lives, for example, of newcomer Asian and African Christian youth and adults who might understand ethnically-specific religious groups as important markers of their identities.

Similarly, the future symbolic significance of the mosque, temple, and *gurdwaras* for the other communities we consider in this paper is difficult to predict due to the paucity of evidence on these communities. At present, however, and based on our impressions of the current state of affairs, the situation seems to be mixed: for some youth, these religious institutions are crucial sites where they can meet friends and negotiate their identities in a comfortable setting; for others, no doubt, these sites safeguard regressive ethnic sensibilities that the youth would prefer to transcend. It seems likely that most Muslim, Hindu and Sikh youth fit somewhere between these two approaches to their traditional places of worship.

Many second and third generation youth are comfortable with notions of religious "hybridity" or "syncretism" (that is to say, the fusion of previously incommensurate horizons of meaning), may reflect their integration in the broader Canadian zeitgeist of post-modernity. Indeed, they may be in some sense the vanguard of Canadian multiculturalism: distinctly religious individuals whose religious identities are nonetheless a blend of the ancient and the modern, the here and the there, the transcendently-grounded and the historically-contingent. Perhaps in these individuals – imagine, for example, a fluently tri-lingual (French, English, Arabic) Muslim Montrealer who wears a hijab, prays five times a day, does not eat halal meat, plays hockey, is engaged to a Christian, is a political science major at Concordia University and intends to represent the Bloc Quebecois in a future federal election – are harbingers of new modalities of identity?

Perhaps, but such hybridized individuals fill others within the same communities with dread. For other youth who might be insecure about their own identities (especially if they have been the victims of discrimination by members of the dominant society), such a woman may exacerbate their own anxieties about their inabilities to negotiate their own identities as creatively as she has. Such critics might interpret this woman's hybridity as an indication of the encroachment of Western liberalism on their notion of the purity of their religion (cf. Beyer 2005b). So, while hybridized and cosmopolitan liberal youth who

are fully at home in the modern (or postmodern) world might be the ideal citizens imagined by liberal multiculturalists, for other youth, such individuals may represent great threats to their tradition and to themselves.

It is by no means the case that conservative Muslims are the only critics of the liberal cosmopolitanism we associate with contemporary youth culture. After all, readers will recall that Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh opponents of the Canadian government's 2005 same-sex rights legislation learned that they shared (to say the least) a general wariness about this particular policy and some of the broader liberalizing shifts it reflects. This acknowledgement led to concerted joint efforts to oppose the government's plans.

Given the fact that the cohort we are discussing in this paper is generally quite comfortable in the de-territorialized realm of cyberspace, there is reason to worry that if a segment of this population feels alienated from the broader Canadian society and their relatively more integrated religious peers, they may be inclined to engage in relatively anonymous identity- and solidarity-generating virtual communities that encourage them to frame their problems in Canada in terms of what Mark Juergensmeyer (2002) calls the rhetoric of a "cosmic war."

Youth in contemporary Canada

Since they are a group with relatively little economic or political power, it is relatively easy to condemn or scapegoat young people for the challenges facing modern societies. Nonetheless, despite the abject worrying and commiserating of each successive generation of adults, the vast majority of young people will ultimately grow older, take on adult roles and responsibilities and make valuable contributions to society. In other words, most young people eventually come to "behave like adults."

A common theme in the public discourse about young people is their apparent vulnerability to media influences. In the 1950s, for example, we observed media driven moral panics concerning the impact that rock and roll was having on youth values and sexuality. Likewise, in the 1960s, it was often argued that popular music directly contributed to rise of the "hippie" generation and an increase in illicit drug use and hedonism. The seventies and eighties produced similar fears that both movies and music (disco, punk, heavy metal, etc.) were destroying the moral fabric of the younger generation. Finally, over the past eighteen years, concern about youth crime – especially youth violence – has increased dramatically. As with previous decades, a great deal of discussion continues to focus on how violent forms of popular media (video games, "gangsta rap," film, etc.) may be influencing youth behaviour. Following the events of 9/11, however, new anxieties emerged concerning youth radicalization, terrorism and the influence of the Internet. Thus, while the impact of music and movies continues to be a concern with respect to "common" forms of youth violence, the Internet is thought to be a potential cause of religious radicalization among young people. Such anxieties are particularly widespread in diverse, multicultural societies such as Canada.

Critics have responded to the "media causes bad behaviour" hypothesis by noting that few studies have ever established a direct causal link between media consumption patterns and crime, violence or substance abuse. Indeed, the vast majority of consumers of violent media never engage in serious violent behaviour (see Freedman 2002). Interestingly, recent research also suggests that while most people believe that the media has absolutely no influence on their own behaviour, many feel that the media has a negative impact on others. Additional findings suggest that many adults feel that young people, and those from lower class backgrounds, are particularly vulnerable to media effects (Hoffner et al. 2001). In sum, these studies suggest that adults may find the media a convenient scapegoat when trying to explain complex social problems. Indeed, further analysis suggests that the root causes of both youth crime and youth radicalization are much more complex than simplistic media-based explanations would suggest. However, before examining issues of youth crime and radicalization in more detail, it is important to examine the general state of "the kids today."

Are things worse for youth in contemporary Canadian society than they were 10 or 30 years ago? Do we have more to fear from today's youth than previous generations? The informed answer to these two questions is a resounding "no." Nonetheless, the results of numerous studies and reports do suggest that, much like previous periods in our history, there is cause for both optimism and concern.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that young Canadians are doing just as well – if not better – than previous generations (see Smart and Adlaf 2007; Yau and O'Reilly 2007; Schissel 2006; Social Council on Social Development 2006; Boyce 2004; Doob and Cesaroni 2004; Bibby 2001). The following facts represent a few of the more promising trends:

- Young people are more educated than at any other period in Canadian history. Both literacy and high school graduation rates rose dramatically in Canada between 1950 and 2000. Similarly, in 2005, both university and community college enrolment figures hit an all time high. Canada has one of the highest post-secondary graduation rates in the world. Compared to other western nations, a high proportion of young Canadians (under 30 years of age) have either a university or college degree. The educational aspirations of high school students are much higher today than fifty years ago. Today's teens expect to graduate from university or college, compared to less than 20% in the 1950s.
- Canada's young population is more racially and ethnically diverse than older Canadians. Young Canadians are more likely than their older counterparts to speak a language other than French or English. Young Canadians are also more likely to report a non-Christian religious background. Many experts believe that presence of a young, well-educated, multicultural and multi-religious population in Canada will give the nation the cultural capital it requires to compete in the global economy.
- Regardless of racial or ethnic background, the vast majority of Canadian youth pursue conventional goals. Most want to graduate from university or college, get a good job within the mainstream economy, get

married and raise a family. The traditional Canadian dream is very much alive among young Canadians.

- On the other hand, there is very little evidence of widespread youth radicalization or extremism.
- Today's youth are much more tolerant of diversity than their predecessors. Research suggests that, compared to older adults, young people are much more likely to socialize with people from outside their own racial, ethnic or religious group. Furthermore, the current generation of Canadian youth is much less likely to openly express racial, ethnic or religious prejudice than previous cohorts.
- Younger Canadians are also much more likely to accept sexual diversity than older Canadians.
- Although the level of alcohol use has remained relatively constant among young people over the past twenty years, rates of tobacco use have declined dramatically. Illicit drug use – including marijuana use – has also declined significantly among young Canadians over the past decade.
- Overall, despite public and media concerns, the rate of youth crime in Canada has remained relatively constant over the past twenty years. However, there were significant increases in officially recorded youth violence during the 1990s and early 2000s, but much of the spike in youth violence during this period has been attributed to zero-tolerance policies in schools and tougher police charging practices on the street. In other words, school fights and other minor youth violence that used to go unrecorded by the justice system were now resulting in criminal charges. Interestingly, since the advent of the Youth Criminal Justice Act in 2003, the number of youth being charged with criminal offences has declined significantly across Canada.
- Criminological research does suggest, however, that young people are more likely to become involved with crime – as both victims and offenders – than older adults. It is important to note that the vast majority of young people never engage in serious criminal activity. Furthermore, most criminal behaviour is "adolescent-limited." In other words, while some young people may engage in crime or deviance during their teenage years, most youth mature out of crime by the time they reach their late teens or early twenties. Additional research suggests that this "aging out" effect occurs with or without special community programming or criminal justice intervention.

These findings suggest that, in general, young Canadians are doing just fine. However, despite this mainly positive picture, there are a few disturbing trends that deserve to be highlighted.

- There is growing evidence that young Canadians have become more economically polarized over the past thirty years. In other words, while the proportion of youth from high-income backgrounds has increased, so has the number of youth living in conditions of poverty. By contrast, the proportion of youth from middle-class backgrounds appears to be shrinking (see Hulchanski 2007; MacDonnell et al 2007).
- Research indicates that neighbourhoods – and by default youth – are becoming more economically segregated. Hulchanski (2007), for example, found that Toronto has become three geographically distinct cities: 20% affluent, 36% poor and 43% middle-income. The number of middle-income communities has declined significantly over the past 25 years. The affluent areas are concentrated in the centre of the city and along the subway line. The poor areas largely lie outside the urban core in what has been called the "inner-suburbs."
- Research also indicates that youth from economically disadvantaged communities (regardless of ethnic background) are more likely to suffer from a myriad of social problems including poor health, poor school performance, high drop-out rates, high unemployment, low income, low rates of university admission, high rates of teenage pregnancy and higher than average rates of both criminal offending and victimization (Greenwood 2006; Morendoff et al. 2001; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987).
- Research also indicates that urban neighbourhoods in Canada are becoming increasingly segregated along racial and ethnic lines (Hulchanski 2007; Walks and Bourne 2006). While some segregated neighbourhoods represent relatively affluent "ethnic enclaves", recent immigrants and certain racial minority groups (i.e, African Canadians, Native Canadians, Hispanics, etc.) are becoming increasingly concentrated in poverty stricken neighbourhoods (see Ornstein 2000; Hulchanski 2007; Walks and Bourne 2006).
- As racial minority youth become more concentrated in poor communities, they will suffer disproportionately from the various problems associated with growing up under conditions of economic disadvantage (including crime, poor educational performance, teen pregnancy, unemployment, low income, etc.).
- Although research indicates that youth crime rates have not changed dramatically over the past twenty years, serious violence may have become more concentrated among young, disadvantaged, minority males. This finding is totally consistent with findings that suggest that Canada is becoming economically segregated along racial/ethnic lines.
- To begin with, there is some evidence that serious violence may have increased somewhat among young people since the turn of the millennium. For example, in 2000, only 43 young offenders (aged 12-17 years) were charged with murder in Canada. By 2006, however, this number had almost doubled to 83. Similarly, in the 1970s the average age of Toronto homicide victims was 37 years of age and only 25% of all victims were under 25. Since 1998, however, the average age of Toronto homicide victims has declined to 33 and over 40% are under 25 years of age. Homicide victims are also increasingly male. Prior to 1990, for example, 64% of all Toronto homicide victims were male. By contrast, since 1990, this figure has increased to 74% (see Gartner and Thompson 2004).

- There is evidence to suggest that serious violence has become increasingly concentrated among poor, minority populations in Canada. For example, Gartner and Thompson (2004) found that, between 1992 and 2003, the homicide victimization rate for African Canadians in Toronto (10.2 per 100,000) was approximately five times greater than the average for the city (2.4 per 100,000). Data from a recent *Toronto Star* article revealed that over 40% of all Toronto homicide victims in 2007 were black males between 14 and 29 years of age. Disturbingly, according to the 2001 Census, black males in this age category represent less than one percent of Toronto's total population. Other research indicates that homicide victimization rates are much higher than average among Canada's Aboriginal population and among South Asian youth on the West Coast (Wortley and McCalla 2007).
- There is some evidence that youth gang activity may be increasing in Canada, particularly among minority males, and that this gang activity is responsible for the rise in youth homicide rates. It is difficult to determine whether gang activity is actually increasing – or becoming more serious (see Chettleburg 2007; Wortley and Tanner 2007).
- Data also indicate that the number of homeless street youth in Canada has increased significantly over the past two decades. As with disadvantaged minority youth, street youth suffer from high levels of criminal victimization, poor educational attainment and economic marginalization (see Karabanow 2004; Public Health Agency of Canada 2006).
- As discussed above, most young people in Canada are fully engaged with mainstream society and have conventional goals and aspirations. However, recent research suggests that a growing proportion of Canadian youth – particularly racial minority youth – have lost faith in Canadian institutions. For example, compared to white youth, minority youth are more likely to perceive racial bias or discrimination with respect to policing, the criminal courts, educational opportunities, employment opportunities and housing (School Safety Advisory Panel 2008; Wortley and McCalla 2007; Ruck and Wortley 2002).

It is important to determine the extent to which such perceptions of social injustice reflect personal experiences within Canadian society. It is equally important to examine the possible consequences of these feelings of alienation. Is it possible that young people who perceive social injustice are more likely to justify criminal activity and violence? To what extent do perceptions of injustice contribute to youth radicalization and extremism? We turn to these issues in the next sections of the report.

Race, perceptions of social injustice and youth alienation

A large body of international research documents demonstrated that significant racial differences exist with respect to people's perceptions of how criminal justice is applied. American research, for example, consistently indicates that African Americans are considerably more likely to perceive discrimination and bias within the criminal justice system – and American society in general – than white Americans. Furthermore, racial differences in perceptions of discrimination remain strongly significant after statistically controlling for other variables including age, social class, education and income.

Studies have demonstrated significant racial differences in perceptions of discrimination within the criminal justice system. For example, Henderson and his colleagues (1997) surveyed residents of Ohio and found that, while blacks and whites share some views concerning crime and criminal justice issues, they are persistently divided with respect to the neutrality of the justice system. African American respondents are much more likely than whites to express the belief that blacks are more likely to be unfairly stopped by the police, jailed without reason and sentenced to death than whites. These racial differences remain significant after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, experience with the criminal justice system, experience with crime, neighbourhood disorder and both political and crime-related ideology. However, contrary to Hagan and Albonetti's (1982) findings, perceptions of injustice were strongest among the least affluent African Americans.

Weitzer and Tuch (1999), also found that race and social class strongly predict people's attitudes towards the justice system. In their analysis of national survey data, these authors found that, consistent with Hagan and Albonetti (1982), middle-class blacks are actually more critical of the police and justice system than lower-class blacks. Consistent with previous research, this study also shows that racial background is by far the strongest predictor of negative attitudes toward the police and criminal justice agencies. While white Americans tend to view the justice system as colour-blind, blacks are more likely to perceive racial bias and report discriminatory experiences with the police (Weitzer and Tuch 1999). The results of this study also show that educational attainment also conditions people's perceptions of the justice system. Higher educated blacks are significantly more critical of criminal justice agencies than higher educated whites and blacks with lower levels of educational attainment. However, while better educated whites are more likely to perceive discrimination against blacks than less educated whites, they are still disinclined to see police racism as widespread (Weitzer and Tuch 1999).

Recent American studies further demonstrate that perceptions of injustice are just as widespread among minority youth as among adults. A study of over 18,000 Chicago high school students (Hagan et al. 2005), for example found that black youth perceive more criminal injustice than Latino youth, who in turn perceive more criminal injustice than white youth. Hagan et al. (2005) suggest that this finding likely reflects the fact that African American youth are at a greater risk of criminal justice surveillance activities (including racial profiling) and police mistreatment than Latino Americans, who are at a greater risk than whites. This study also found that when racial differences in structural disadvantage were taken into statistical account, minority youth perceptions of injustice become more closely aligned. However, after controlling for social class, attitudinal differences between minority students and white students actually increase. Additionally,

the results of this study show that the perception of criminal injustice among African American and Latino youth varies with respect to the proportion of white students in their school. As the proportion of white students increases, so does the perception that the criminal justice system is biased. However, once the proportion of white students drops to less than half of the student body, minority perceptions of criminal injustice decline significantly. This finding suggests that certain levels of integration may produce perceptual and attitudinal changes that close the gap in racial perceptions of injustice.

Other research, conducted in the United States, confirms that perceptions of racial discrimination are not restricted to the operation of the criminal justice system. Indeed, studies consistently reveal that blacks and Hispanics, regardless of their level of education and socio-economic status, perceive high levels of racial discrimination in American society. Indeed, compared to whites, racial minorities perceive high levels of racial bias with respect to education, employment opportunities, health care and housing (see Siegelman and Welch 1991; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Morin 1995). In addition, while the majority of white Americans believe that black economic inequality is the result of black motivational deficiencies, most black Americans believe that racial inequality is the result of white racism and structural barriers to achievement.

During the 1980s, allegations that the justice system was racially biased were frequently dismissed by Canadian officials as representing the unfounded opinions of "radical" activists. It was argued that the vast majority of black and other visible minority citizens had complete confidence in the police and criminal courts. However, subsequent research has illustrated that, as in the United States, perceptions of racial discrimination are widespread in Canada.

In 1994, for example, the *Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System* conducted a survey of 1,200 Toronto adults (18 years of age or older) who identified themselves as either black, Chinese or white. Over 400 respondents were randomly selected from each racial group. The survey results indicate that three out of every four black Torontonians (76%) believe that the police treat members of their racial group worse than white people. Furthermore, 60% of the black respondents also felt that members of their racial group are treated worse by the criminal courts. Interestingly, the findings also indicate that perceptions of racial bias are not isolated within the black community. Indeed, over half of the white respondents (56%) reported that they think black people are treated worse by the police and a third (35%) think blacks are treated worse by the courts (see Wortley 1996).

Additional research suggests that a high proportion of black youth also perceive that the criminal justice system is discriminatory. For example, a 1995 survey of 1,870 Toronto high school students found that over half of the black respondents (52%) felt that the police treat members of their racial group much worse than the members of other racial groups. By contrast, 22% of South Asians, 15% of Asians and 4% of whites felt that they were subject to discriminatory treatment. This study also found that black and other racial minority students are more likely than whites to perceive racial bias with respect to school disciplinary practices and feel that racial discrimination by teachers is a major barrier to high educational achievement (Ruck and Wortley 2002).

Similarly, another high school survey, conducted in 2000, found that 74% of black students believe that members of their racial group are more likely to be unfairly stopped and questioned by the police than the members of other racial groups. This opinion was shared by only 31% of South Asians, 27% of Asians and 13% of whites (see Wortley and Tanner 2002). It should be noted that, consistent with American findings, the results of this survey suggest that perceptions of racial discrimination are in no way limited to the criminal justice system. Indeed, compared to white students, black and other racial minority students are more likely to perceive racial bias in Canada with respect to educational opportunities, employment opportunities and housing. Importantly, racial differences in perceptions of social injustice cannot be explained by racial differences in social class, parental education or other relevant demographic variables.

It is important to note that youth perceptions of social injustice in Canada do not seem to have abated with time. For example, consistent with earlier studies, a 2007 survey of over 2,000 Toronto high school students also found that a very high proportion of racial minority students believe that their racial group often experiences discrimination with respect to police treatment, teacher treatment, post-secondary educational opportunities, employment opportunities and housing. In general, black students are the most likely to perceive racial discrimination in Canadian society, followed closely by Aboriginal students, Hispanics, South Asians, West Asians and Asians. By contrast, white students are much less likely to perceive racial discrimination than students from all other racial categories (School Community Safety Advisory Panel 2008).

Findings such as these have caused various government and criminal justice representatives to admit that the "perception" of discrimination exists in Ontario and that, at the very least, the criminal justice system suffers from a serious "public relations" problem. It has also motivated various police organizations to implement programs designed to improve relationships with various minority communities (see Stenning 2003). However, there is still considerable debate about the cause of these perceptions of racial bias. Critics of the justice system feel that perceptions of discrimination reflect reality and are rooted in the lived experiences of black people. On the other hand, the conservative view is that perceptions of injustice are inaccurate and caused by other factors such as peer socialization and exposure to stories about racism in the American media. One popular explanation is that most black people in Canada are immigrants from countries where the criminal justice system is corrupt, brutal and oppressive, like Jamaica or Nigeria. As a result, many black people have based their opinion about the police and the courts on their experiences in their home country. The hypothesis is that second and third generation blacks, who have been raised in Canada, will have a much better opinion of the Canadian justice system. Research, however, suggests that the opposite is true. Recent immigrants, in fact,

perceive much less discrimination in the Canadian justice system than immigrants who have been in Canada for a long period of time. Indeed, blacks who were born in Canada tend to have far worse perceptions of the police and the criminal courts (see Ruck and Wortley 2002; Wortley and Tanner 2002; Wortley et al. 1997). How can we explain this finding? Are perceptions of discrimination based on personal and/or group experiences?

The importance of all these perceptions should not be underestimated. Indeed, how an individual perceives his or her environment may be more important than objective reality in that one's perceptions will influence how they respond to the social environment (Ruck and Wortley 2002). Some researchers have argued that the greater the perception of criminal injustice, the less likely people are to trust criminal justice professionals and cooperate with criminal investigations (see Wortley and McCalla 2007). Some scholars are beginning to recognize that perceptions of social injustice may ultimately impact the level of criminal activity within a society. Katherine Russell, for example, argues that perceptions of injustice may contribute to the higher levels of offending among the black population in the United States. She claims that "for blacks the perceived existence of unfair sanctions, combined with the absence or lack of sanctions for race-based harms, cause a diminished faith in the justice system, which in turn sets the stage for criminal offending" (Russell, 1996, 609). Considering the strength of the current racial divide in perceived injustice, it is important to further explore this hypothesis.

A large body of international research documents demonstrated that significant racial differences exist with respect to people's perceptions of how criminal justice is applied.

A brief review of the theoretical literature suggests that a connection between perceptions of social injustice and crime might well exist, and that perceptions of injustice can lead to crime. Perceptions of injustice, in our opinion, should be added to the list of possible neutralization techniques. If offenders, for example, believe that the social system in which they reside is unjust, and that their opportunities for success are blocked, they may be less likely to trust officials, lose faith in the system and resort to crime. It is plausible that perceived injustice essentially becomes a rationalization or justification for criminal behaviour. Indeed, work in the area of legitimacy and compliance suggests that people who believe that life is unfair, and that their best efforts are blocked by external forces, such as racism or class interests, are more likely to break the law.

While the research thus far has focused on the perceived fairness or legitimacy of the criminal justice system in isolation, recent Canadian research suggests that perceptions of justice in other areas of social life might be equally important in predicting deviant behaviour. A recent Canadian survey also examined the impact of perceived discrimination and social injustice on gang membership (see Wortley and Tanner 2006). This survey, conducted in 2000, involved a representative sample of 3,393 high school students. Unlike media accounts, this survey found that immigrant students (5%) were actually less likely to be currently involved in gangs than Canadian-born youth (7%). Nonetheless, the rate of gang membership was twice as high among Black (13%) and Hispanic youth (12%) than among White (6%) and Asian (5%) youth. It must be stressed that while black and Hispanic students were more likely to report gang involvement than white students, a large proportion of all gang-involved students (over 40%) were white.

Logistic regression analyses revealed that the impact of race on the probability of gang membership *was not* reduced after statistically controlling for social class, educational performance, single parent family background, peer deviance or self-control. However, the impact of race became statistically *insignificant* after introducing a variable that measured respondent perceptions of racial discrimination and social injustice. In other words, respondents who perceived racism against their own racial group – with respect to policing, housing, education and employment opportunities – were more likely to be involved in gangs than those who did not perceive racism. Furthermore, group differences in perceptions of racism seem to explain why our black and Hispanic respondents are more likely to report gang involvement than either white or Asian students (Wortley and Tanner 2006). In our opinion, these survey results are important. They indicate that, at least in the Canadian context, there may be a strong relationship between experiences and perceptions of racism and social injustice and the likelihood of gang involvement.

Conclusions drawn from the above survey are supported by additional findings from the 2005 *Toronto Youth Gang Pilot Project* (Wortley and Tanner 2007; Wortley and Tanner 2008). This project involved over detailed, qualitative interviews with over 100 known gang members from Southern Ontario. Gang members were asked to explain, in their own words, why they first became involved in gangs and their reasons for remaining involved in the gang lifestyle. The results indicate that youth, regardless of racial background, provide numerous utilitarian justifications for their gang activity. These justifications include financial gain, protection, respect, social support and companionship. However, unlike white youth, racial minority youth often maintain that their involvement in gangs is directly linked to experiences of racism, oppression and social exclusion. The following quotes are typical or respondents who felt that racism and social injustice are at the heart of a growing gang problem in Canada:

"What chance has a guy like me got in the real world? A poor black guy? Schools are shit, teachers don't think you can do the work. Nobody's gonna give me a good job. So I'll

get paid and live in another way, in another world where I can get respect and nobody cares what I look like or where I came from. I know I'll probably die young or go to jail, but what other chance is there? (Case 66, black male, 22 years).

"I remember growing up in school they would always tell you that you could become anything you want. That's pure bullshit. When you are poor, like you got nothin. I went to school with these rich kids – white kids and Chinese kids – who did fuckin nothin. But their parents gave them everything for just being fucking alive. Their parents would buy them clothes and cars and IPods and take them to travel places. They didn't realize how fuckin lucky they are. I hated those assholes. I have no problem robbing those motherfuckers and taking their shit. They don't deserve anything more than me (Case 99, Asian male, 22 years).

"It's like the only jobs they got for poor black people is like Macdonalds or Wendy's or other bullshit like that. Low, low pay, no respect. You basically just a slave, just a punk, while some fat owner gets rich. I'm not goin down like that. I'm my own boss, make way more money and don't sell myself out to shit like that. I'd rather die than embarrass myself like that (Case 64, black male, 23 years).

Indeed, some minority respondents went so far as to openly denounce Canada and their position within the social hierarchy. These individuals clearly viewed their gang membership as an act of defiance against a society that had rejected and abandoned them:

"This is not my country. This country does not care about me or my family. They just want people like us to clean the shit out of white people's toilets or look after their fuckin' kids. They want us to keep our place and keep the peace so they can go on with their fuckin lives. I'm not going out like that. I'm not goin to be some bitch. People will know who I am – I don't bow down to nobody. I won't take their fuckin shit (Case 123, black male, 22 years)".

"Canada does not care about me. Canada does not care about my family or about black people. This country is for rich white people. They make the rules. They run shit here. They just want us to stay quiet and know our place. They want us to take the shit jobs and not complain about racism. I'm not being no white person's bitch. I'm not working no low paying slave job. I will sell drugs in my crew and steal shit and not bow down to white people. At least that is some power (Case 97, black male, 21 years)".

Research to date has clearly shown that there are profound racial differences in perceptions of discrimination and social injustice. Unfortunately, the impact of these perceptions on subsequent behaviour is only now being investigated. While current American research focuses on the perceptions of black people and how such perceptions may impact their propensity for crime, it is important to note that, at least theoretically, perceptions of injustice have the potential to explain offending among people from all racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds.

Although the existing research literature suggests that perceptions of social injustice are positively related to crime and delinquency, the question remains: if experiences with discrimination and perceptions of social injustice can lead to criminality, is it possible that such negative perceptions of society can lead to religious radicalization and extremism among young people. We turn to this question in the next section of this report.

Social injustice and religious radicalization

Few studies have attempted to explore the extent of religious radicalization among Canadian youth; or the causes of religious radicalization. How can researchers identify radicalized youth? Once identified, how can researchers gain access to such individuals? If access were granted, would radicalized or extremist youth be willing to talk honestly to researchers about their experiences, perceptions and motivations? As a result of these obstacles, we know very little about youth extremism in this country. Although high profile cases – like the arrests of the Toronto 18 – point to a *possible* problem with religious radicalization – the magnitude of this problem is almost impossible to determine.

Despite serious data limitations, academics, community activists, security advisors and politicians have all, at one time or another, provided ideas or hypotheses regarding the causes and growth of religious radicalization. In general, explanatory frameworks can be dived into two broad models: 1) The Importation Model; and the 2) The Strain Model.

The Importation Model holds that religious extremism or radicalization develops in foreign countries and is "imported" into Canada and other Western nations. Importation can involve either the importation of radicals themselves (i.e., people who are radical at the time of their migration to the host country) or the importation of radical ideas and philosophies (through documents, religious texts, videos, music, sermons, Internet content, etc.). Under the importation framework, Canada bears little responsibility for the development of youth radicalization. Radicalization is created in other countries. Motivated extremists migrate to the West with the explicit goal of engaging in extremist acts or converting more followers to their cause. The policy implications associated with the importation model include increased spending on security, intelligence and surveillance strategies, increased cooperation with the international security community, preventing the immigration of known radicals, pre-screening immigrants and refugees for extremist tendencies, censuring radical literature and media content and detaining or deporting radical individuals who pose a threat to national security. This "get tough on immigration" perspective is quite popular in the United States – especially since 9/11 (see Andreas and Biersteker 2003; Kimmel and Stout 2006; Kerwin 2005; Renshon 2005; Welch 2003). Although major tenets of the importation model have had a strong impact on Canada's domestic security policies (see Bramadat and Keeble forthcoming; Harvey 2005; Pratt 2006; Roach 2003), critics continue to argue that Canada needs to further toughen its immigration system to prevent radicalization and extremism from spreading in North America (Bell 2004).

According to the Strain Model, on the other hand, most immigrants do not immigrate to Canada or other Western counties with the explicit intention of engaging in acts of religious extremism. Rather, most immigrants arrive with the intention of integrating into the mainstream social fabric of their host county. We should remember that there

is often a significant overlap between immigrants belonging to racial minority and those belonging to a religious minority groups. Moreover, these newcomers often experience great hardships including economic and social marginalization, poverty, poor housing, religious intolerance, racial profiling, blocked employment opportunities and other forms of discrimination (see Abu Laban 1998; Basran and Li 1998; Hiebert 2003; Hyman and Beiser 2000; Kazemipur and Halli 2000; Keeble 2005; Kazimpur 2000; Lyman and Cowley 2007; Picot 2004; Preston and Wang 2003; Saloojee 2002; Zaman 2004). These strains, in turn, produce feelings of social injustice and social alienation. According to the strain model, therefore, religious radicalization and extremism is rooted in the conditions immigrants face within host counties – not the social conditions that existed in their country of origin. Radicalization, in other words, is not imported from the outside. Rather, religious extremism is inspired by the negative or traumatic experiences minorities experience within the host country (see Wortley 2004).

The Strain model may be particularly relevant for explaining the religious radicalization of second-generation minority youth within Western nations. These youth, after all, grew up in Western democracies and have little lived experience in other nations. Furthermore, although they may be exposed to radical religious philosophies that originate in other countries, their negative experiences in the West may make them more vulnerable or receptive to these messages. Jock Young, for example, argues that both crime and religious radicalization emerge among second generation immigrant youth because, unlike their parents, these young people expect economic, legal and social equality but continue to experience discrimination, poverty and social exclusion. Under these circumstances, he argues, crime and extremism can flourish (Young 2003). European scholars have also found that recent terrorist incidents – including the 2005 riots in France and the 2005 bombings in London – typically involve angry, alienated second generation youth with a religious or racial minority background. These scholars typically attribute the disaffection of these youth to their "home-grown" (that is, French and British) experiences with inequality, racism and exclusion (see Angel-Ajani 2000; Baudrillard 2006; Brighton 2007; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 2006; Jacobs 2005; Jupp 2006; Kundnani 2007; MacDonald et al. 2005; Murray 2006; Nagel 2001; Poynting 2007).

In sum, a review of the existing literature indicates that the root causes of youth religious radicalization may be similar to the root causes of youth crime. Youth who are subjected to inequality, intolerance and discrimination are more likely to develop perceptions of injustice and feelings of social alienation than youth who are not subjected to such strains. Perceptions of social injustice, along with associated feelings of anger, despair and alienation, may provide young people with the motivations/justifications they need to participate in both crime and extremism.

Are particular religions more or less subject to radicalization?

One feature of the public discourse about religious youth radicalization is the claim, or the worry, that certain religions are inherently more prone to violence (not just youth-generated violence, but violence per se) than others. Of course, the religion that generates so many anxieties at the moment is Islam, but the role of fundamentalist Christianity in the current American administration has certainly caught the attention of some pundits and scholars (Ali 2002; Hedges 2007). A closer analysis of these five religious traditions, however, indicates a remarkable internal heterogeneity when it comes to the connections between religion and violence. In all five of these traditions, adherents have historically been able to use their religious texts and worldviews to justify both violent and non-violent postures regarding their imagined others (understood here as infidel/heathen states, cultures, tribes, or individuals).

When public commentators do acknowledge the moral ambiguity and socially constructed nature of all religion – and thus, one presumes, the likelihood that they might foment *or* discourage violence – it is often the case that such assertions are rather lacking in specifics. That is to say, the assertion itself is made as a kind of "act of faith" in the notion that no particular religion is inherently wicked. The motivations behind such bland assertions might be laudable, but without at least some details, the claims may appear to be expressions of wishful thinking. The following tables are meant provide some basic information that seems to support the circumspect claims sometimes made by commentators.

Table 1

CHRISTIANITY AND VIOLENCE

Pro-Violence Texts	"But as for the towns that the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance, you must not let anything that breathes remain alive. You shall annihilate them – the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites – just as the Lord your God has commanded." Deuteronomy 20:15-18 "From his mouth comes a sharp sword with which to strike down the nations, and he will rule them with a rod of iron; he will tread the wine press of fury of the wrath of God the Almighty." Revelation 19:15
Anti-Violence texts	"He shall judge between many peoples, and shall arbitrate between strong nations far away; they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears in to pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore." Micah 4:3 "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy; But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those whose persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous. For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Matthew 5.43-46 "If you refuse to love, you must remain dead; to hate your brother is to be a murderer, and murderers, as you know, do not have eternal life in them."1 John 3.15 "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who treat you badly." Luke 6.27-28
Pro-Violence Figures	**Emperor Theodosius:** (346-395CE) Used forceful imposition alongside peaceful proselytizing to spread Christianity. **Augustine:** (354-430CE) Believed that if one could not be led to worship of Christ through teaching, physical harm in the name of the church was excusable if bringing someone to Christ. **Pope Urban II:** (1st Crusade, 1095) Believed that Christ commanded the warriors of the Crusade to expel Muslims from the Christian lands (Etzioni 2007: 105). **St. Thomas Aquinas:** (1225-1274) Violence towards non-believers, or non-Christians, was said to be the responsibility of secular authorities. **Martin Luther:** (1483-1546) Recommended violence/force against Spiritualists, Anabaptists, and Antinomians. **John Calvin:** (1509-1564) Found Protestant justification for the violent suppression of heresy.
Anti-Violence Figures	**Tertullian:** (160-230CE) **St. Ambrose of Milan:** (340-397CE) **St. John Chrysostom:** (347-407CE) **St. Bernard of Clarivaux:** (1080-1153CE)

Early Christian Martyrs: Many early Christians demonstrated pacific beliefs and nonviolent practices by their refusal to enter the Roman army.

Erasmus: (1466-1536) Believed that violence drove humans to believe "what they do not believe."

George Fox: (1624-1691)

Martin Luther King Jr.: (1929-1968)

Pro-Violence Movements

The Crusades: (11th-13th Centuries), **The Spanish Inquisition:** (1478-1834), **The Protestant Reformation:** (beginning in 1517). Throughout each of these movements violence in the name of Christianity occurred with diverse justifications. Note also however, that each period of violence also inspired the defense of nonviolence as superior to violence and coercion.

The Lord's Resistance Army: (Uganda) Have terrorized northern Uganda since 1988 in its attempt to bring down the government of President Yoweri Museveni and put in its place a regime based on the Ten Commandments.

Aryan Republican Army: (U.S.A.) The Aryan Republican Army (ARA) was a militant group of Aryan Nations members and Christian Identity followers who committed 22 bank robberies in the Midwest during 1994 and 1995.

Ku Klux Klan: (U.S.A.) The Ku Klux Klan is a racist, anti-Semitic movement with a commitment to extreme violence in order to achieve its goals of racial segregation and white supremacy.

Army of God: (U.S.A. and Canada) The Army of God promotes "justifiable homicide," claiming "that killing abortion providers" is "justified in defense of innocent lives."

Anti-Violence Movements

The Waldensians: (10th Century)

Peace of Augsburg: (1555) Was a treaty signed which officially ended the religious struggle/violence between the Catholics and Lutherans and made the legal division of Christendom permanent within the Roman Empire.

Treaty of Westphalia: (1648) Were a pair of treaties signed in 1648, which ended The Thirty Years War and The Eighty Years War. The treaty called for peace between the Protestant and Catholic churches.

Lollards: (14th Century)

The Moravians: (13th and 14th Century)

Christian Humanists:(15th Century)

Anabaptists: (16th Century) Generally promoted pacifism.

Classic "Just War" Ideologies

St. Augustine, The City of God, (Book XIX, Chapter 12): Augustine is often cited as the most classic example of Justification for war in the name of Christianity. "For even they who make war desire nothing but victory – desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? and when this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace."

CHRISTIANITY AND VIOLENCE

Current Stance On Violence

Today, in general, justifications for violence are not widely accepted by Christian theologians and there is a greater emphasis among theologians on nonviolence and belief made from free decision.

On the other hand, there are many groups/movements that condone Just War and violence in the name of Christianity.

As well, many scholars believe that the Bush Administration's justifications for invading Iraq are closely connected with fundamentalist Christian apocalyptic sensibilities about the return of the Messiah and the role of the Middle East in this grand narrative.

JUDAISM AND VIOLENCE

Pro-Violence Texts

"One who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death; the whole congregation shall stone the blasphemer. Aliens as well as citizens, when they blaspheme the Name, shall be put to death. Anyone who kills a human being shall be put to death. Anyone who kills an animal shall make restitution for it, life for life. Anyone who maims another shall suffer the same injury in return: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; the injury inflicted is the injury to be suffered. One who kills an animal shall make restitution for it; but one who kills an man shall be put to death." Leviticus 24:16-22

Anti-Violence Texts

"I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant with them; and I will bless them and multiply them, and will set my sanctuary among them forever." Ezekiel 37:26

Pro-Violence Figures

Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) and his son **Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook** (1891-1982): Both believed that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land marked the beginning of the Messianic Age, and that the settlement of Israel, and the surrounding occupied land was a divine commandment. Some followers believed that it was their duty to destroy the Arabs in the occupied territories.

Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932-1990): Founded the militant **Jewish Defense League** in 1968, in New York City. Though the JDL is not specifically considered to be an active terrorist organization, the JDL is referred to by the U.S. government as a "violent extremist Jewish organization." In numerous speeches and essays, and in several books, Meir Kahane preached a message of Jewish supremacy. For the JDL leader and his many fervent followers, any and all measures to further Jewish survival and welfare – including terror, dispossession and murder – are entirely justified. Meir Kahane also advocated a complete eviction of Arabs from Israel and proposed laws that separated Jews from non-Jews in every aspect of life.

Anti-Violence Figures

Rabbi Judah Leon Manges (1877-1948): Dedicated much of his life to reconciliation with Arab Palestinians. Advocated a peaceful, binational solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Martin Buber (1878-1965): Was a supporter of a non-violent, binational solution in Palestine.

A.D. Gordon (1856-1922): Believed the land of Israel could be acquired by agricultural labour, not war.

Toma Sik (1939-2004): Was a Holocaust survivor, and was known for his opposition to Israeli militarism. He is often called the "pioneer" of the Israeli-Palestinian search for peace.

Amos Oz (b. 1939): a representative of the left-wing Zionism and founder of Peace Now; a supporter of the binational solution; he does not oppose violence in the name of Israeli self-defence, as evidenced by his support of the recent Israeli war against Lebanon.

Pro-Violence Movements

Gush Emunim (The Bloc of the Faithful): Gush Emunim is an ultra-nationalist, religio-political revitalization movement and it was formed in March 1974 in the aftermath of the October 1973 War. The major activity of Gush Emunim has been to initiate Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The movement has thousands of members (hundreds of thousands in the 1970's and 80's). They take literally the promise of God to the people of Israel in Ex 23:31: "I will set your boarders from the Red Sea to the sea of the Philistines, and from the wilderness to the inhabitants of the land, and you shall drive them out before you." In 1984 followers of the Gush Emunim movement were found to be responsible for a number of terrorist attacks against Arabs. There were attacks on Arab Mayors in the West Bank, and on an Islamic College in Hebron. There was also a plot to bomb the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.

Anti-Violence Movements

Jewish Reform Movement: There are approximately 1.5 million members of the Jewish Reform Movement in the United States, and about 900 congregations worldwide. Central to their belief is that Judaism must adapt to the modern age. Their 1937 document entitled "The Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism" clearly outlines the rejection of war and promotes peaceful solutions to conflicts, and harmonious relations between warring groups. The document suggests: "the spiritual and physical disarmament of all nations has been one of its [Judaism's] essential teachings."

Union for Reform Judaism: A resolution passed in June 2004 outlines the public protest by Jews of the demolition of Palestinian homes. However, it is also important to note that Reform Jews do not understand themselves as pacifistic since Reform Judaism still supports Israel and advocates for its protection and the retaliation against terrorism.

The Workmen's Circle: A Jewish social justice movement concerned with promoting peace, particularly in Palestine.

Classic "Just War" Ideologies

Although peace is the central teaching of rabbinical Judaism (teachings based on the writings of early Jewish scholars), the idea of Holy War occurs in the Hebrew Bible. The idea of 'Just War' is clearly expressed both in the Old Testament (see Deuteronomy 20:10-15,19-20) and in the later rabbinical tradition. While revenge and unprovoked aggression are condemned, self defense is justified.

Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932-1990): He believed in a philosophy of "sacred violence," or that killing Arabs was God's will. He suggested that violence with the intent to protect Jewish interests, was never wrong.

Current Stance on Violence

Jews have been victims of dreadful persecution, usually at the hands of Christians, for nearly two thousand years, culminating in the Holocaust. Defending modern Israel and dealing justly with the Palestinians places thoughtful Jews in a difficult dilemma. There have been stronger legitimizations of violence in Judaism, or among Jews since 1948, when Judaism was invested in a state, and during periods of the first and second temple. Extreme religious nationalism is often characteristic of those who support violence in connection with Judaism (especially after the major wars of 1948 and 1967). Many Jewish communities around the world struggle with pro- and anti-violence philosophies. Zionism in particular, (a movement concerned with the return of the Jews to Israel, the promised land, for the purpose of establishing a national state), is the backdrop against which major debates about the justification of violence are entertained.

Pro-Violence Texts

"And fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression." Qur'an 2:193

"Fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war; but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful." Qur'an 9:5

Anti-Violence Texts

"Allah has knowledge of the Prophet's cry, 'oh my Lord! Truly these are a people who will not believe!' But turn away from them, and say 'Peace!' But soon they shall know! Qur'an 43:88-9

"Oh you that reject Faith! I do not worship that which you worship, nor will you worship that which I worship. And I will not worship that which you have been wont to worship. Nor will you worship that which I worship. To you be your way and to me mine." Qur'an 109:1-6

"But if they desist-behold, God is much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace." Qur'an 2:192

"And fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not commit aggression-for, verily, God does not love aggressors." Qur'an 2:190

Pro-Violence Figures

Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949): Was the founder of Muslim Brotherhood, a complex group components of which support violence in order to defend Islam and Islamic societies from Western influence.

Ibn-Taymiya (1263-1328): His thought inspired Bin Laden. Believed that "the apostate is more blameworthy in his infidelity than an original unbeliever."

Osama Bin Laden (b. 1957): Bin Laden is a militant Islamist believed to be responsible for the foundation of Jihadist Organization Al-Qaeda. He issued two fatwa that instructed Muslims to kill American and other Western civilians and military personnel until they withdraw military forces from Islamic countries.

Anti-Violence Figures

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988): Was a Pathan (or Pushtun) of Afghanistan and a devout Muslim, and raised the first nonviolent army in history to free his people from British imperial rule. He persuaded 100,000 of his countrymen to lay down the guns they had made themselves and vow to fight nonviolently.

Imam Muhammad al-Shirazi (1928-2001): A highly revered teacher in Shia Islam, Shirazi calls upon all Muslims to adhere to the teachings of Islam in all domains. The teachings most predominantly recommended by Shirazi are peace, nonviolence, freedom of expression, and pluralism.

Jawdat Said (b. 1931): An Islamic scholar who has written a number of books on nonviolence in Islam.

Pro-Violence Movements

PLO (The Palestinian Liberation Organization): Established in 1964 with Arab support. The PLO charter calls for the "elimination of Zionism" by a "war of liberation."

Hamas (Egypt-Palestine): Hamas (a word meaning courage and bravery) was established in Palestine in 1987. Hamas disagrees with the Israel-Palestine peace process and has been involved in suicide attacks and other forms of violence against Israelis.

Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah: Is a Palestinian organization better known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). The Organization is headed by **Sabri al-Bana (Abu Nidal)** and was founded in 1974 as a consequence of Abu Nidal`s split from the Fatah organization.

Taliban: The Taliban are a Sunni Islamist nationalist movement that came to power in Afghanistan in 1996. The Taliban implemented a highly restrictive interpretation of Sharia law and became internationally known for their poor treatment of women. Both men and women faced public execution for violation of their laws.

Al-Qaeda: Osama Bin Laden established al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world. Merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) in June 2001. On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets.

Hezbollah (Party of God): A political-religious paramilitary movement based in Lebanon. The movement was created in July 1982, initially as a form of resistance to the Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon. Most of Hezbollah's followers are Shia Muslims. Hezbollah includes components oriented toward the provision of social services, as well as components oriented toward anti-Western and anti-Israeli objectives.

Anti-Violence Movements

Egypt's National Society (1850): Under the leadership of Sayyed Jamal ad-Din Afghani, forty members of the ENS, through the diligent practice of only seventeen of Islam's most basic codes, almost brought about a nonviolent revolution in Egypt against forgiven influence. Wanted their most violent weapon to be their religion and the practice of its principles.

Khudai Khidmatgar (1929): A movement organized by Ghaffar Khan in India. The movement adopted nonviolence to effect political, social, and economic reforms, based on Islam. The KK was able to carry out a nonviolent program to the extent of establishing a parallel government for a short period in Peshawar. The ideal of the KK was to serve Allah and to realize the pleasure of Allah through serving humanity.

Classic "Just War" Ideologies

Jihad in Islam represents an effort to fulfill the will of Allah. There are four functions of Jihad. These are: the development of Islamic principles to subdue carnal desires; the eradication of evil; the extension of the word of Allah to the world; and the development of security against injustice and aggression. Contrary to many stereotypes in the West (in which the word "jihad" is simply "translated" as "holy war") jihad is not synonymous with war.

There are verses in the Qur'an that command followers to enter into battle (see above), though this is usually understood to be justified only when the war is understood to be defensive in nature.

Current Stance on Violence

There is a debate within the Muslim world over the use and implementation of violence to combat what is sometimes understood to be forces working in opposition to Muslims (personally) and forces working to subvert Muslim control over regions understood to be essentially Islamic. Islam is often characterized as a religion that legitimizes violence and clashes with the liberal and democratic West, even though a) Islam (like Christianity) includes rules that govern the appropriate use of force, and b) many Muslims have been living peacefully and productively in the West for centuries.

Just as it is misleading and overly-simplistic to claim that Islam is a religion of peace, it is also misleading and overly-simplistic to claim that it is a religion of war.

SIKHISM AND VIOLENCE

Pro-Violence Texts

'Eternal God, Thou art our shield, The dagger, knife, the sword we wield, To us protector there is given. The timeless, deathless, Lord of Heaven, To us all-steel's unvanquished might, To us all-time's resistless flight, but chiefly Thou, protector brave, All steel, wilt Thine own servant save." Guru Granth Sahib (source to be confirmed)

"When all avenues have been explored, all means tried, it is rightful to draw the sword for noble cause". Guru Gobind Singh, in the Zafarnama.

"In the Guru's house, religion and worldly enjoyment should be combined – the cooking pot to feed the poor and needy and the sword to hit oppressors." Guru Hargobind

Anti-Violence Texts

"With constant peace and tranquility, they enshrine the Lord within their hearts." Hairao, Third Mehl

"No one is my enemy
No one is a foreigner
With all I am at peace
God within us renders us
Incapable of hate and prejudice."
Guru Nanak

Pro-Violence Figures

Guru Hargobind: (1595) Organized a small Sikh army and believed that it was necessary to fight in order to protect the weak and oppressed. Was the first of the Sikh Gurus to defend the faith using violence.

Guru Gobind Singh: (1666) He created the Khalsa (The Pure Ones) in 1699, changing the Sikhs into a saint-soldier order with special symbols and sacraments for protecting themselves.

Beant Singh and Constable Satwant Singh assassinated **Indira Gandhi** on October 31st, 1984. Subsequent riots after the assassination led to the death of thousands of Sikhs in India.

Anti-Violence Figures

Guru Nanak: (1469) Was the first Sikh Guru and founder of Sikhism. Preached a message which rebelled against ritualism, caste, prejudices, hypocrisy and idolatry. He advocated non-violence.

Guru Arjan Dev: (1563) He promoted non-violence resistance to the Mogul army and thus became the first Sikh martyr.

Ram Singh: (1815-1885) Preached about the end of foreign rule in India. He and his followers promoted a non-violent reaction to British forces by refusing to use the services provided by the British government.

Pro-Violence Movements

Violence in Sikhism is very closely related to the struggle for political control of Punjab as well as the death of Sikh Guru Arjun Mal, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, at the hands of Moguls who tried to convert the Sikhs to Islam. The Sikhs responded by violently defending their right to live as they wanted. Still, temples across Punjab were destroyed and captured by Muslims and Sikhs were forcibly converted to Islam.

The Khalistan Movement: (Beginning in the 1970's and 1980's) Sikh leader Jagjit Singh Chauhan traveled to the U.S.A and throughout India to propagate the formation of an independent state in the Punjab. During the 1980's some Khalistan supporters around the world turned to violence to express their concerns. The movement caused huge rifts between the Indian army and Sikh militants.

SIKHISM AND VIOLENCE

	Dal Khalsa: A pro-Khalistan organization associated with hijackings and both violent and non-violent struggle to establish Khalistan.
Anti-Violence Movements	**Sikh Martyrs:** Since the 17th Century, many Sikhs refused to renounce Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, even under though this meant that many would be killed. **Singh Sabha Movement:** (1873) Organized campaigns against the British occupation in India where Sikh men, women and children would (among other objectives) ask peacefully to be given possession of their shrines.
Classic "Just War" Ideologies	Although many of the Gurus, such as Guru Nanak, Guru Arjan Dev, and Guru Har Krishan advocated martyrdom and non-violence, others such as Guru Hargobind, and Guru Gobind Singh justified violence and war for the protection of the Sikh faith.
Current Stance on Violence	Most Sikhs would argue that violence is not tolerated in their religion. However, the tradition has often (throughout its history) been perceived as a threat by the ruling religious communities (and states). As such, being prepared for persecution and for a valiant response to this persecution has a long history in Sikhism.

HINDUISM AND VIOLENCE

Pro-Violence Texts	"O Kaunteya, if you are killed you will ascend to heaven. On the contrary if you win the war you will enjoy the comforts of earthly kingdom. Therefore get up and fight with determination." *Bhagavad Gita* 2.37 "With equanimity towards happiness and sorrow, gain and loss, victory and defeat, fight. This way you will not incur any sin." *Bhagavad Gita* 2.38
Anti-Violence Texts	**Ahimsa**, or the Hindu concept of nonviolence is named as one of the five essential virtues in the Chandogya Upanishad (3.17.4), and is discussed in the *Bhagavad Gita*.
Pro-Violence Figures	**Nathuram Godse** (1919-1949): Godse was the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi and a former RSS member (see below). He envisioned India as a nation defined by militant Hinduism. Often used parts of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana to support violence in order to condemn Gandhi's nonviolent beliefs. Interestingly, Gandhi used the same texts to justify nonviolence. **Vinayak Savarkar** (1883-1923): Known as the "Father of Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva")." Believed that Christians and Muslims could never be recognized as true Indians. Promoted violence in order to defend and promote Hinduism in India and was an associate of Godse. **Madhavrao Sadashivrao Golwalkar** (1906-1973): Prominent Hindu Nationalist leader and important figure within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

SIKHISM AND VIOLENCE

Anti-Violence Figures

Mahatma Gandhi (Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi) (1869-1948): Gandhi spent much of his energy trying to transform the abstract concept of nonviolence into a political tool. Nonviolence, according to Gandhi was both a political and religious duty. Gandhi promoted an Indian Nation in which no one religion would dominate the others. Gandhi believed that cosmic battlefields that are discussed in Hindu scripture and traditions were representative of one's inner battlefield, where ethical lessons are learned and decision-making occurs.

Sri Sri Ravi Shankar (1956): Known as "His Holiness," Sri Sri Ravi Shankar is involved in promoting peace and nonviolence throughout the world. His vision is to create nonviolence through Hindu wisdom and to create a violence-free global family fostering peace through human values and service. Has been given hundreds of awards for his global peace efforts.

Pro-Violence Movements

Karsevaks (meaning "volunteers"): In the Indian context, the term is often used to refer to the militant Hindu activists who, in 1992, destroyed the 16th century mosque Babri Masjid, or the Mosque of Babur, located in Ayodhya. They believed the mosque was built over top of the destroyed temple commemorating the birthplace of Lord Ram. They also believed the destruction of the mosque was the first step to restoring Hindu rule in India. This act set off Hindu-Muslim riots as far away as London.

Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP): Ardent supporters of the Hinduization of India and vocal critics of Dalits (low-caste Hindus) who convert to Islam. They are also known to terrorize Christian charity groups and others suspected of "anti-Hindu activities." Christmas 1998, the VHP went on a ten day rampage against Christians in the southern part of Gujarat. Violence is justified by the VHP for two reasons: a) lower castes do not possess agency in matters of faith, and b) Christianity and Islam are affronts to the integrity and cohesion of the Hindu nation.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): Another Hindu nationalist group, they draw heavily on symbols within the Hindu tradition that support a violent ideal of masculinity.

Anti-Violence Movements

Satyagraha: Was both a philosophy and a movement developed by Mahatma Gandhi. The word means "to grasp the truth." Part of this concept involves nonviolent resistance and it was developed during the Indian independence movement.

Indian Independence Movement: Both violent and nonviolent philosophies were advocated in efforts to promote Indian independence from British colonial control.

Classic "Just War" Ideologies

Hindu texts, such as the Vedas and the *Bhagavad Gita* promote Hindusim as a warrior tradition and war is often discussed as one's religious duty. Many Hindus believe, in conjunction with these texts, that if a person dies while fighting a war in defense of his religion, he attains Viraswargam, a heaven-like place or state of existence.

Current Stance on Violence

The question of violence and its possible justifications within Hinduism have been the subjects of heated debate for centuries. A tradition that includes both Gandhi and the *Bhagavad Gita*, and that has been closely associated with political movements that have sometimes sought to use Hinduism to shape Indian identity against both Islamic and then British rule, certainly includes numerous pro- and anti-violence discourses and movements.

A satisfactory account of the connections between violence/non-violence and religion in these five traditions would approximate the length and breadth of a multi-volume encyclopedia. The preceding tables are intended to provide very preliminary evidence of a general claim we make throughout this report: all religions are internally complex cultural phenomena that are intractably related to political, social, existential and economic forces. As such, all religions have been associated throughout their long (as with Judaism) or short (as with Sikhism) histories with both violent and non-violent texts, figures, movements, and ideas.

It is regrettably quite common to adopt a naive approach to religion in which religion is understood to be, *by definition*, virtuous and faultless. The corollary to this approach is the view that wherever violence, calumny or genocide are expressed under the banner of a given religion, the religion has been, again *by definition*, "hijacked" or "distorted" (Lincoln 2003). This position is, of course, most commonly promoted by members of religious traditions themselves, and that fact alone should lead outsiders to be cautious about accepting it. There is now rather overwhelming evidence that contradicts this simplification and points instead toward the validity of the position we advocate here: that there are a great many Christianities, Hinduisms, Sikhisms, etc. Some of them are violent, intolerant, misogynistic, and others are peaceful, communitarian and egalitarian. It is not just inappropriate for scholars to make *assumptions*, but also impossible for scholars to make conclusive *assertions* regarding the veracity of one group's claims to represent the only authentic way to be Muslim, Christian, etc.

Many scholars, policy makers and members of the general public are greatly concerned about links between Islam and violence. Scholars might be asked to offer opinions on the religious claims made by a given Muslim group (or a cluster of Muslim groups). Nonetheless, one should be highly suspicious of such opinions, since mounting evidence regarding the multi-valent nature of religions throughout history (Etzioni 2007) indicates that every tradition has within itself the seeds of violence, just as each has within itself the seeds of generosity and pacifism. Islam is like all other religions in this regard.

Religious websites

There is considerable public concern that young people's extensive use of the Internet may be a possible source of religious radicalization. In order to lore this topic we decided to conduct a preliminary content analysis of major religious websites regularly accessed by Canadian youth. This analysis is designed to address two research questions: 1) To what extent do religious websites contain radical or violent content; and 2) Do the websites for some religious traditions contain more radical content than others.

We explored popular, youth-based websites for five major religious traditions: Christianity; Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam. We conducted a content analysis of 181 different religious websites with a specific youth audience: 80 of these sites (44%) are classified as Christian, 45 are Jewish (25%), 40 are Muslim (22%), 11 are Sikh (6%) and 10 are Hindu (5%).

After reviewing the content of these websites, they were classified according to six basic categories. Definitions for each category of website are provided below.

Celebration Site: Contains positive information that celebrates the religious tradition. Usually such sites promoted socialization between from the same faith and promoted both religious and social events of interest to young people. Little, if any, space devoted to discussions of controversial issues.

Complaint Site Level 1: Considerable space devoted to the discussion of discrimination and bias experienced by members of the religious tradition in question. No evidence of political organization or activism.

Complaint Site Level 2: Goes beyond just listing incidents of bias or discrimination. Frames incidents of discrimination or bias as expressions of a broad Canadian social prejudice or hostility toward their group.

Complaint Site Level 3: Tries to motivate others to engage in lawful protest against discrimination and bias. Encourages peaceful protest and activism (including calls to organize lawsuits, protests, marches, human rights complaints, letter writing campaigns, etc.).

Table 2: Type of website, by religion

Type of Website	Christian Sites	Jewish Sites	Muslim Sites	Hindu Sites	Sikh Sites	TOTAL
Celebration	36%	50%	47%	90%	55%	46%
Complaint Level 1	27%	35%	17%	10%	18%	25%
Complaint Level 2	14%	3%.	20%	0%	9%	12%
Complaint Level 3	16%	7%	16%	0%	18%	13%
Complaint Level 4	4%	3%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Complaint Level 5	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Sample Size	80	40	40	10	11	181

Complaint Site Level 4: Tries to promote activism and protest as with Level Three sites. However, also contains warnings or predictions that physical conflict will result if the situation faced by their group are not addressed or remedied.

Complaint Site Level 5: Directly and explicitly promotes direct, aggressive action against Canadian institutions – or at least condones or celebrates it and frames such action as necessary and virtuous/religiously sanctioned.

The findings of our analysis are presented in Table 2. Overall, we could find very little evidence of religious radicalization on the Web across all five religious traditions. Almost 50% of all the websites we examined were Celebration sites. Level One Complaint sites are the next most common (25%), followed Level Two (12%) and Level Three Complaint sites (13%). Only 7 (3.8%) of the 181 sites we visited reached a Level Four or Level Five categorization. Five of these sites are Christian, and two are Jewish. Our research did not uncover any Muslim, Sikh, or Hindu sites that reached Level Four or Level Five standards.

According to our Muslim research colleagues, it is important to note that many Muslim youth are very aware of the heightened monitoring their community experiences in North America and Europe as result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus, it may be the case that many Muslim youth will simply refrain from engaging in debates or discussions on the Web that may be deemed as threatening, violent or radical by international security forces. In other words, Muslim youth who are interested in discussing issues that may be considered 'radical' would not do so on the Web where they are open to public scrutiny. Within the Muslim community, therefore, more "radical" or "extremist" discussions could be restricted to private settings with well-known or trusted associates. Some of our Muslim colleagues, in fact, admit that they actually fear discussing controversial issues at mosques because of a fear that they will be misinterpreted and labeled an extremist by undercover CSIS agents. On the other hand, extremists within the Christian community may feel somewhat more confident about expressing their radical views on the Web because they have come under much lower level of surveillance or scrutiny than Muslims.

Obstacles to responding meaningfully to religion in Canada and to religious youth radicalization

Any even superficial consideration of the central topics of major national academic and political conferences – not to mention any analysis of the stories filling Canadian national newspapers – indicates that religion has become one of the most significant sources of anxiety in the West. Even when scholars and policy makers do not claim to be focused on religion (as in discussions of military policy in Afghanistan, education policy in the Greater Toronto Area, or crime problems in the Netherlands), religion clearly haunts these ostensibly secular discussions. What absorbs so many commentators are the implications of the intersection of religion and race, ethnicity, violence, misogyny, social justice, secular civil society, migration, discrimination, security, and so forth. Once consigned to the garbage heap of (at least Western) history, "religion and…" is back on the agenda. Indeed, in some places, it has taken over the agenda, even when participants try not to admit as much.

In this article, we are concerned with the intersection of worries about youth radicalization (and its expression in criminality and terrorism) and concerns about religious radicalization. In order to understand how people might more practically and meaningfully respond to religious youth radicalization, it is useful at this point to move very briefly into the foreground the three barriers faced by people who wish to make some progress in this particular conversation. Some general remarks will elucidate the significant resistance that exists in the public and political arenas to the development of a more nuanced approach to religious youth radicalization.

First, both secularism – that is, the ideology that promotes the marginalization of religion as part of a teleological vision of human development – and the secularization hypothesis, are under siege as a result of the dearth of empirical evidence and recent political events (not merely, but certainly most famously, the events of September 11th, 2001). For scholars devoted to a dispassionate non-theological study of this issue, both the ideology and the "vulgar" expression of the secularization hypothesis are increasingly being revealed as expressions of late enlightenment-era projection and wishful thinking (Swatos 1999; Casanova 1994). Nonetheless, on some level, the growing scholarly consensus on these matters is dwarfed by the fact that both the ideology and the hypothesis are still the reigning forces governing public and elite discourse about religion in the West (Saunders 2008). The reasons for the on-going power of these models are too complex to elucidate here, but probably the simplest and most plausible explanation would be that there has yet to emerge a satisfying and world-ordering alternative paradigm.

Many people still speak as though religion will one day fade away into oblivion, even though all around the world, religion is alive and well and making in-roads into the public arena. However, we have yet to find an account that might explain the current prominence of religion in local, national, and international affairs. Similarly, we have yet to develop very adequate theories to explain so-called "home-grown" terrorists or the religious radicalization of Canadian-born (or British-born, American-born, French-born) youth. The point is that we cannot adequately explain the religious radicalization of "our" youth, partly because we cannot adequately explain (or accept) the rather striking vitality of religion in the world today.

The question one often hears is: what is wrong with these youth? What trauma occurred in their lives in the past, or to use the theory advanced above, what "strain" is plaguing them now that prevents them from accepting the dominant secular society as normal, acceptable, and natural? The question might be turned around, though: what is wrong with our Western societies that we cannot yet integrate religious ideas, values, and individuals in a productive manner? We have certainly made some considerable progress toward integrating the racial and ethnic other, but one might ask: what happened in the development of our society that made it so resistant to or intolerant of the religious other?

We have sought above to explain how secularism eventually came to dominate elite discourse in the West. So, it is worth articulating clearly that the first and most basic obstacle an activist, policy maker, or scholar faces when trying to respond to religious youth radicalization is the quite well entrenched tendency to treat Western secularism as the universal norm against which we can measure all other societies, religious communities, and civilizations. Secularism as an ideology has become so naturalized in the West as to be rendered invisible to those whose inclinations and assumptions it so accurately reflects (Taylor 2007). However, this ideology is neither invisible nor neutral to many of the people and groups we have considered in this paper. The reason a minority of religious Canadians might reject the hegemonic ideology of secularism – and might therefore involve themselves in religious groups we might consider radical or fundamentalist – is not because they are too ignorant or cognitively rigid to accept this norm, but rather because this norm is far from universally appealing.

The second obstacle to responding meaningfully to religious youth radicalization is the power within elite discourse of a binary schema according to which religious groups, individuals or movements are framed as either good and real expressions of a given religion, or evil and inauthentic expressions of a religion. There is within a certain field of public discourse a dramatically pessimistic kind of essentialism according to which particular religions (usually, in the West, the religion in question is Islam, though this argument is sometimes used to describe all religions) are understood to be essentially pernicious, with all appearances of benevolence and pacifism being attributed to individuals, or interpreted as exceptions that prove the (negative) rule. However, as Jose Casanova points out (2007; cf. Bramadat 2008), aggressively ethnocentric anti-religiousness is in fact fairly rarely articulated in elite public discourse, and the consequences for such expressions are fairly severe, as we see in the repercussions of David Ahenakew's anti-Semitic remarks. As such, we will focus on the more common binary formulation outlined here.

Beneath this dualistic view one finds the assumption alluded to above: that all religions are *essentially* oriented toward love, peace, kindness, and egalitarianism; conversely, all violent, exclusionary and radicalized religious phenomena are only *apparently* religious. It is very common, in fact, for academic and religious commentators to appeal to this sensibility, and to characterize expressions of religious radicalization as *essentially* political, economic, and pathological in origin and motivation. Although this "naive" essentialism does produce the positive consequence of safeguarding members of (usually) minority groups, it vastly underestimates the internal heterogeneity of religion throughout history and around the world (Lincoln 2002; cf. Beyer 2005b; Bramadat and Keeble 2008; Bramadat 2005).

One can understand why it might be difficult for religious insiders to accept that religions are like all other human phenomena in that they are constituted by people, ideas, movements, discourses, texts and expressions that are violent, peaceful, misogynistic, egalitarian, progressive, conservative, ugly and beautiful. However, if we as scholars, policy-makers, and activists hope to respond constructively to religious youth radicalization, we must abandon the caricatures of religion that now stand in the way of a dispassionate approach to the very real problems that face us all.

The third and final obstacle to a meaningful response to these issues is the fact that both the elite and non-elite levels of our society suffer from what Lois Sweet calls "religious illiteracy" (1997). Sweet argues that for a variety of reasons, we as a society have decided it is not worthwhile – and even those who think it is worthwhile would still argue that it is imprudent – to teach students about religion. For many decades now decision makers, enthralled as they were by the gilded promises of secularism, have opted to exclude the dispassionate study of religion from most provincial curricula (cf. Seljak 2005). As a result, we have a general public that knows virtually nothing about a force that now plays a major role shaping Canadian and international society. Moreover, this religious illiteracy now makes it extremely difficult for teachers, parents, law enforcement officials, scholars, and policy makers to engage or even understand youth who may be attracted to radicalized religion communities.

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Religious Diversity and Security in a Pluralistic Society:

A Canadian Research Approach

Kamal Dib

Dr. Kamal Dib is a manager of research at the Department of Canadian Heritage. This article is based on a presentation at the *Roundtable International Perspectives on Immigration, Immigrants and Hosts: Perceptions, Interactions, and Transformations*, (Using Research to Address Policy Issues), Toronto May 31-June 2, 2007. It describes research work that feeds into social policy development at public organizations, and has a Canadian focus, which may be relevant and useful in a comparative international context. This article has benefited from the generous comments of Dr. Margaret Adsett and Dr. Ian Donaldson (Canadian Heritage), and Mr. John Biles (Canadian Metropolis Project).

The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Canada.

ABSTRACT

A multidisciplinary approach in social science research is essential to support public policy development in a multicultural country such as Canada. Such an approach is especially required for policies that walk the line between respect for citizenry in a religiously diverse society and maintaining national security. This article provides researchers and those interested in policy development with a multidisciplinary research method to tackle such a challenge.

1. INTRODUCTION

Religion plays an increasing role in the lives of individuals in most countries, with different levels of intensity and implications for public policy. The intensity varies from regions of the world, such as the Middle East, where religion takes premier position in the affairs of state and constitutions define states by the majority religion, and Europe, where the European Union is debating policy approaches towards the large Muslim minority and the attached security threat of Muslim radicals who committed crimes in Madrid and London.[1]

Recent religious issues in Canada are not of the same magnitude or intensity as experienced elsewhere in the world. They include clothing preferences (e.g., wearing a head cover for Muslim women, wearing a turban for Sikh men), faith-based arbitration, increased Anti-Semitism and Islam-phobia, etc. The low intensity of the religious experience should not be an invitation to downplay the importance of religion in Canadian society. If anything, Canada is becoming increasingly religiously diverse. There is therefore a need for secularizing policies or for State neutrality.

In this Canadian context, research has a role to inform policy development in the area of social policy and security. Understanding religious diversity in Canada and devising ways to harness the positive social capital of faith-based communities – and encouraging inter-faith dialogue – would serve both social and security policy development. Such policy development will benefit from taking lessons from recent developments on the world stage. The incorporation of a better understanding of the role of religion and faith-based communities in public discourse in Canada in public policy development can lead to better policies that foster social cohesion within a religiously diverse population, and to prevent victimizing individuals and or groups associated with certain faiths.

Overly stressing the negative manifestations of religion in the world may eventually lead to religious diversity being "securitized" in Canada. Which begs the question whether geopolitics at the world scale are using religion as the scapegoat for global competition for resources and power – as ideologies were used during the cold war – or if it is true that religions are experiencing a self-driven upheaval around the world and manifest tendencies to violence.

A multiculturalism policy perspective on this issue is that the preoccupation with national security can potentially lead to perceptions of racial and religious profiling, which may adversely impact on civil liberties and equality provisions for some minority ethnic or religious communities. Several faith-based communities felt the strain of the need to increase security precautions and provisions in a liberal democracy. Coupled with negative media portrayals of these communities,

this may lead to stereotyping and victimizing some minority Canadian communities. A multicultural approach towards this issue would maximize the satisfaction of security needs by viewing them more widely as "social" security, and by working with communities and keeping in mind the social aspects while factoring in the respect for public liberties and human rights.

In addition to the immediate security arrangements, approaches and strategies could be used to engage faith-based communities, foster public awareness, and combat religious discrimination. This approach becomes more relevant in the light of the 2017 demographic projections that show noticeable growth in minority non-Christian religions in Canada (from around 6% in 2001 to 10-12% in 2017). Such an increase would have an impact on economic, social, cultural, and political inclusion of minorities, especially if we see growing gaps with the majority in terms of income, employment, and education.

So far there is little consideration of this growing religious diversity in Canada in public policy development. However, many questions can impact on policy development. For example, is there religious extremism in Canada and what are its manifestations? What will the impact of religious diversity, if any, be on the future of Canada? What factors lead to Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and religious intolerance in general? What is the place of religious issues in education and school curriculum, media coverage, public opinion, and the separate school boards? These questions and others should be answered through objective research before policies are developed, since only evidence-based research can lead to meaningful and useful policies.

2. MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

A multidisciplinary approach in research on security and religion is necessary to support social policy development. Such an approach responds to three realities:

1) The emerging complexity of issues and challenges in a globalized world. This complexity requires new thinking styles and forward looking approaches to research. The multi-disciplinary approach is necessary for dealing with complex and far-reaching issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and national security.
2) Public organizations, programs, and policies, even with apparently stand-alone mandates or functions, require horizontal cooperation that is based on a multi-disciplinary approach to research and policy and program development. Whether dealing with environmental issues, public health, religious diversity (i.e., "reasonable accommodation"[2]), the labour market, policing and justice, or immigrants and refugees, the variables in each case are such that acting solo is counter-intuitive. Judgements based on single factors are dangerous.
3) Emerging challenges in the 21st century for Canada include addressing the needs of a significant proportion of Canadians belonging to visible or religious minority groups. Such needs include having a level playing field without barriers to employment and social services, respect in the community, and full participation in society and politics.

Social, economic, religious, cultural and scientific issues are increasingly converging to the extent that researchers cannot conduct a study objectively without considering the wider context and the inter-relationships among various factors and other seemingly unrelated elements.

A large proportion of the world's population adheres to faiths with global reach, such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The globalized dimension of religion requires careful attention from researchers and policy makers. The messages of these religions are universal in scope and are not to be confused with questions of national identities and belonging, not even with contemporary political issues and geopolitics. The simplest example is that the Vatican is the spiritual capital of all Roman Catholics in the world, but this does not make Irish or Spanish Catholics citizens of this spiritual place. At a socio-economic level, one cannot understand individuals of the Muslim, Christian, or Jewish faiths simply by referring to the Bible, the Talmud, or the Koran. Researchers respond to complex issues by deploying multiple skills.

Even within individual academic disciplines, one finds multiple sub-disciplines. For example, social psychology has crossovers with other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, religious studies, history, statistics, econometrics, and the medical sciences. Being a solid social psychologist today requires several skills and exposure to many disciplines.

In the following sections, a description of the steps from research work to policy development in a public organization is presented, followed by a discussion of an approach to religion and security. A list of definitions of key concepts used in this article is found at the end.

Research for policy development in government organizations follows the steps identified in the schematic below, and these steps include:

1) Theme identification;
2) Setting the context and reviewing available literature to find a research topic;
3) Developing researchable questions;
4) Project design;
5) Collection and analysis of data; and
6) Answering the research questions.[3]

Projects also test a hypothesis. An example of a project without a hypothesis would be an analysis of the incidence of unemployment on Muslims in Canada compared to non-Muslims. A project with a hypothesis would test whether strong expressions of religiosity and of adherence to the rites of a faith could be interpreted as tendency towards extremism or at least, to non-belonging and alienation.

To produce useful and meaningful research products, researchers look at wide multidisciplinary contexts permitting new ideas and questions to be identified beyond existing practices and theoretical horizons. For example, research on crime that focuses on policing in a strict sense, but not on the socio-economic environment of crime, cannot help combat crime effectively and strategically.



Source: Keith F. Punch, Introduction to Social Research, 2nd edition, Sage Publications, 2005, pp.41-49.

Researchers in policy organizations have three basic functions:
1) Knowledge creation;
2) Knowledge dissemination; and
3) Networking/partnership.

They maintain working relationships with researchers in other public organizations, academics, researchers, and think tanks. They follow universal standards of academic work and respect for the goal of objectivity, and maintain a certain degree of independence in the advice they provide.

Non-research areas in a public organization – such as policy or program areas – are to be discouraged from conducting research activities. They would otherwise erode the research capacity of the organization by dispersing resources and would weaken the overall credibility of the research effort at the organization. Such *ad hoc* research may also be of questionable quality.

Research results inform policy recommendations. Policy development would benefit when the positions it recommends are evidence-based and supported by objective findings. Such findings add to the body of knowledge in the world and do not stop at usage in policy development. When properly conducted, the research fosters similar research among academic circles and external research bodies.

3. CONTEXT

Contextual parameters guide research and reinforce the research mandate and needs of the organization in a forward-looking approach to research.

Social and economic context

Canada, a country of almost 33 million people with a Gross Domestic Product of $1,400 billion and a member of the Group of Seven (G-7) largest industrial countries, appears frequently at the top of the United Nations *Human Development Index*, and has one of the highest standards of living in the world. Canada is viewed by many countries, especially members of the OECD,[4] as a leader in multiculturalism, human rights and diversity. Such wealth in human resource attributes has protected Canada from many of the adverse impacts of globalization and allowed it to compete for the scarce skilled workforce necessary for a sustainable knowledge-based economy. The promotion and preservation of Canada's multicultural character contributes to more productive workforces, stronger communities and an improved well being.[5] However, Canadian society is not immune to racial prejudices, discrimination practices against visible and religious minorities, and to social fragmentation. Accordingly, observing and researching the multicultural realities of Canada and their social and economic outcomes enhances policy development.

Legislative context

Public organizations are democratic institutions involved in the production of public goods, and derive their authorities, mandate and raison d'être from legislation and regulations and by extension, from detailed program and policy descriptions.

Canadian multiculturalism is broadly defined in the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*.[6] In 1971, the diversity of the population of Canada was relatively limited as far as visible and religious minorities were concerned (they represented at that time around 2% of the population), and multiculturalism as policy and as an idea was nascent. This should not diminish the importance of the types of diversity that existed before, such as the differences among the various Christian denominations (Catholic and Protestant) and European ethnic groups.[7]

Over the past 35 years, changing demographics have shown a growing relevance and need for multiculturalism policy. *The Multiculturalism Act*'s preamble cites the rights and freedoms enshrined in the *Constitution of Canada*, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*,[8] the *Official Languages Act*, the *Citizenship Act* and the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, and the *International Convention on Civil and Political Rights*.

The *Multiculturalism Act* states that "the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians and regards to race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada".[9]

Canada is signatory to six United Nations conventions pertaining to human rights and diversity.[10] The increasing complexity of social issues and the persistence of racism and discrimination, in old and new forms, have also emphasized the importance of human rights legislation.

4. PRIORITIES[11]

Research themes and questions are developed in the following chronological order: (1) literature reviews, (2) environmental scans, and (3) consultations with key players and stakeholders.

The following seven themes cover elements of research on security and religious diversity.

1) ***Social Exclusion:*** refers to multi-dimensional disadvantage of religious minority groups and individuals. The exclusion is of lengthy duration and involves dissociation from the major social and occupational milieu of society;
2) ***Demographic Projections:*** Canada's religious diversity has evolved between 1967 and 2008, and the outlook for the next 25 years predicts that non-Christian minorities may constitute at least 15% of the population;
3) ***Applied Research*** on existing policies and programs and whether they are addressing the current and future needs of a religiously diverse society;
4) ***Racism and discrimination:*** The issues of hate, racism and discriminatory practices on religious grounds, in access to public services, employment and civic participation.
5) ***Regional Dimensions:*** Researching regional particularities is essential for intelligent policy and program development for a religiously diverse society, especially in Canada where geography is intertwined with demographic differences in the population (linguistic, ethnic, religious, etc.). In the past ten years, the issue of reasonable accommodation is particular to Quebec, whereas the issues of religious arbitration and publicly-funded religious schools were particular to Ontario.

Religious diversity is increasing in contemporary western societies, but religion-related issues in Canada remain relatively minor compared to the U.K. or France. Recent religious issues in Canada range from clothing preferences (wearing a head cover for Muslim women, wearing a turban for Sikh men) and faith-based arbitration to increased Anti-Semitism and Islam-phobia, and secularists' attitudes towards religion-practising individuals. Articles and speeches abound where events in Europe are listed followed by – without transition – a description of the various sizes and growth rates of non-Christian religions, particularly Islam, in Canada and concluding with an implicit or an explicit warning that "it could happen here".

Understanding religious diversity in Canada and devising ways to harness the positive social capital of faith-based communities are important research questions to help develop programs and services. Hence the need for research on a balanced approach aiming to satisfy security needs in a pluralist democracy.

5. INTO POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Once themes, topics and questions are identified, research is undertaken either by contracting independent academics or private consultants. Some of the work could be conducted in-house. The ultimate purpose of research, or perhaps its primary objective, is to inform policy development. The following is a definition of policy in the Government of Canada:

> *A Policy is a clear goal and/or direction. It comes from the considered selection of one choice among competing choices. Policy directs, but does not consist of, operational programs and details. It is best expressed as vision and goals, with associated strategic objectives, work plan and a program of activities, resources and leadership to achieve that choice.*[12]

Similar to the schematic for research presented above, policy development also comes in a series of steps starting with an agenda building.

Agenda building: The public policy agenda is a list of subjects or issues to be addressed by government and stakeholders. Not all research outcomes get into the policy agenda. Research is one among several competing elements that inform public policy development. These competing elements include media reports, election platform commitments, interest group submissions, ideology, etc. The process leading to building the policy agenda includes how issues are recognized and framed/reframed as problems to be addressed, and how these problems are placed on an agenda for discussion.[13]

Two factors affect agenda setting:

- Participants (who are they and who do they represent? if they are persons from a religious group, are they



Source: based on details from Glen Milne, Making Policy – A Guide to the Federal Government's Policy Process, Ottawa, 2002.

coming forward as individuals or do they represent the community? What is the size of their community in Canada's population, etc.?). Participants include government elected officials and public servants, community and interest groups, media and academics.

- Process: the process would identify limits on participation, circulation of documents, and lists the stages of approval, and whether the issue is an item for Cabinet, etc.

Agendas are built in three ways:

- Mobilization from the outside (community and public pressure);
- Engagement process (initiated from within the government but quickly attracting the public); or
- From the inside (initiated from within the government, but was not on the public agenda).

Stating the problematic: Stating the problematic that the policy being developed is trying to resolve is the most visible step in policy development. It generally revolves around a critical event. Recent events related to religious diversity suggest that multiculturalism policy can also be part of the public agenda due to critical events (reasonable accommodation, ethnic enclaves, incidents related to religious diversity, security and pluralism, racial profiling, violence, etc.). Stating the problematic is vital to a policy development process, but this has to be based on facts and objective research independent of biased influence.

Policy options: This step deals with providing elected officials with options/alternatives to addressing the problematic.

Policy statement, legislation, etc.: This is the role that elected officials play on behalf of the government: i.e., making policy decisions, sending bills to Parliament, etc.

6. RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECURITY[14]

In the remainder of this article, I shall explore how one social science discipline, i.e., social psychology, may approach research on religious diversity and security in a pluralistic society.

Some social psychologists like to be called "cultural psychologists" or "inter-cultural psychologists", a title that fits them neatly in multiculturalism/diversity research. Therefore, the potential of using their expertise is obviously there. Social psychologists study how social conditions affect human beings, using individuals and groups as their units of analysis. Despite the similarity with other social sciences (primarily psychology and sociology), the discipline of social psychology tends to differ in the respective goals, approaches, methods, and terminology, as well as in separate academic journals and societies. Therefore, social psychology is in fact interdisciplinary, which is precisely the approach needed for the purpose of conducting research for public policy development to address the complex issues of religious diversity and national security.

Social psychology focuses on the individual, and attempts to explain how other people influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of this individual. In other words, it emphasizes the immediate social situation, and the interaction between person and situation variables. They also focus on group behaviour, and thus examine such phenomena as interactions and exchanges at the micro-level, and group dynamics and crowds at the macro-level. They are interested in a variety of demographic, social, and cultural phenomena, including social inequality, group dynamics, social change, socialization, social identity, and symbolism in inter-personal dynamics.

Social psychologists use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, such as surveys and statistical regressions. Research presented in the Toronto roundtable tended to be highly empirical and quantitative.[15] This is half a compliment, as quantitative exercises should not replace wider literature reviews and a deeper intellectual research of the significant and the truism of the findings of a regression. The idea that "if it is not quantifiable, it is not research" is an extreme approach to objective research. The deductive approach should not be discounted and is useful to supplement quantitative or qualitative methods.

How can social psychology research be relevant to public policy discussions in Canada and other pluralist democracies? I will divide the answer into two sets of issues: how-to issues and thematic issues, in both cases of relevance to multiculturalism and diversity.

Here is a list of "how-to" questions, such as using research in policy:

- What policy issues seem most open to the contributions of social psychological research, and what special information can social psychologists provide that other social science areas cannot?
- What level of proof or scientific certainty is required or recommended for social psychological data to be used in policy debates?
- What are the difficulties and obstacles to using scientific knowledge in the context of political decisions? And what channels and processes can be used to transfer such knowledge to political decision makers?

Some presenters at the roundtable also asked about the framing of the topics, as this may influence the way groups in society are viewed.

The second list includes issues directly related to multiculturalism:

- Are there limits to multiculturalism in terms of what host societies are willing to accept, and what are the situational factors that may influence the definition of these limits? What type of research would be useful from the perspective of researchers and policy makers for addressing these questions?
- How do current events, such as the Madrid train bombing or September 11, 2001, influence the perceptions and policies toward immigrants? Are there ways for researchers to understand these events?
- From the perspective of immigrants, what strategies can a host community employ that would most likely improve the "warmth of welcome" that they perceive prior to and upon entering the host community?
- What are essential factors for promoting a sense of national identity and inclusion for first – and later – generation immigrants? Is it possible for immigrants to adopt a new national identity and still maintain loyalty to the country of origin?
- What factors in the history of immigration in your country seem particularly relevant to perceptions of contemporary immigrant groups and the policies that are in place to deal with immigration?

As for the multiculturalism angle on this topic, questions would include:

- Are there adverse impacts of perceived linkages among religion, ethnicity/race and/or security/policing issues (e.g. racial profiling)?
- What can be done to address the issue of racial profiling?
- How can government work with all stakeholders to raise awareness about racial profiling and the impact of the heightened sense of security?

Turning to the thematic questions, I will use a case study project that potentially collapses the research themes into one.

This project requires a multidisciplinary approach and requires:

- Economists and statisticians to review the incidence of racism and discrimination at work and in the community, and the economic conditions of affected persons or groups;
- Sociologists to study the symptoms of stratification and segregation of victims of racism;
- Historians to provide a wider context of the issues to discourage the temptation of seeing it as "emerging" or as a media story;
- Anthropologists who review ethnicities and origins and patterns among communities and groups; and
- Social psychologists to study the impact of racism and discrimination on children and youth and the social-psychological origins of racist mind frames, etc.

The research project would include elements such as labour market outcomes of the different religious groups, the adverse impact of discriminatory barriers on the maximization of the workforce of Canada, the low-income cut-off and poverty amongst affected groups, etc. Researchers will study groups affected by racism and discrimination and in what ways does racism touch the lives of religious minorities.

Controversy could arise as to whether poor labour market outcomes are explained by racism or by other variables, such as age, skill level, experience, education, language proficiency, etc.;[16] or whether poor labour market outcomes for visible minorities and recent immigrants is a failure of the mainstream or the host society in accepting and integrating minorities and recent immigrants, or that these minorities and immigrants "do not want to integrate".

Recent research on the *Ethnic Diversity Survey* resulted in three different interpretations of the EDS' responses by visible minority youth and the sense of belonging. The interpretations have led to controversial front-page headlines and feature articles in a major Canadian daily.[17]

The differences in these interpretations were about whether there is a racial gap in belonging and cultural identity, where some have argued that "rootedness" does not necessarily lead to greater attachment of second generation youth, citing the example of Aboriginal peoples who are the most rooted group in the country but who have their own views about belonging.

Moving along the schematic shown earlier in this article, I will assume here that researchers have already established the socio-economic context which helps address some of the themes. I will now introduce more complexity with the themes of religious diversity and security in a pluralist society. This complexity requires opening a wider spectrum on issues confronting Canadian multiculturalism, and allows me to demystify the perceived usefulness of mono-disciplinary research approaches to security and policing that are conducted in isolation of the wider social contexts.

Factoring in the assumption that this case study will be conducted by cultural psychologists or inter-cultural

sociologists, I will present the hypothesis to be tested through which I will address the thematic questions:

Hypothesis: Whether culture can explain terrorism

In 2006, media reports and anti-multiculturalism circles have criticized/attacked Canadian multiculturalism, stating that it encourages segregation and apartness in society. Criticism also held that the multiculturalism policy impeded the integration of ethnic or religious communities, some of which follow extreme ideologies that are prone to violence and terrorism. Such generalized criticism requires careful attention to deconstruct what is a useful exercise in questioning applied policy for the sake of improvement, from the more ideological interest of sending the wheels of social progress backwards to gain uniformity and the coercive integration of the past.

The case study will contextualize the hypothesis and covers the first half the research schematic, up to the point of validating the hypothesis to be tested. Once this task is completed, the topic would be ready to be commissioned as work by independent researchers.

Principles of research

Let us first return to *Research 101*, which students ought to acquire in high school:

- That the aim of research is the investigation of phenomena;
- That all phenomena, including domestic crime and international terrorism, have explanations;
- That the business of research is *explanation and investigation*, and that this business should not be confused with *justification* (neither justifying the criminal acts themselves nor the methods used to combat them);
- That the requirement to analyze factors, intentions and root causes of criminal behaviour through research should not limit the necessity of deterrence against crime, although research findings may modify the application of such deterrence and make it better-informed, more effective and successful;
- That security and policing issues are complex, with far reaching impacts on the domestic Canadian scene and individual communities. If not addressed properly, such issues have the potential of targeting specific ethno-racial/cultural or religious minority groups of Canadians;
- That the application of deterrence is part of a package that includes education/awareness, dialogue with and links to communities, as well as preventative, mainly positive, social measures.
- If a permanent prevention of crime, within a context of social cohesion and harmony, is the desired outcome of policy making, then this is not possible if one remains ignorant of the complex factors that lead to crime (i.e., research should be dealing with causes not only manifestations of criminality, etc.).

Definitions of concepts

With these research principles in mind, the research exercise proceeds to a definitional drill. In fact, defining concepts is a prerequisite to framing the research questions of any topic.

Safety and security involve two pieces, national security and domestic crime. National security includes various elements such as the challenges of global terrorism in the 21st century. Domestic crime is a more obvious area where a deep understanding of social issues such as segregation, racism, poverty, etc, is needed.

Media portrayals and public discourses should not cloud the search for the right approaches to combating crime. For example, in the United States, policy would be ineffective if it relied on anecdotal reports and Hollywood stereotypes that portray Blacks as prone to violence and associate them with crime and drug dealing, etc. Two American professors conducted a thoughtful analysis of data gathered from inner-city Chicago drug-dealing gangs and found a world of poverty where only the top drug bosses make money. The research showed that scores of underlings in these gangs still live at home with their parents, earn below subsistence wages, run a high risk of being shot-gunned, do not have a social security card or a bank account, and are condemned to a life of poverty.[18] Clearly, a social program would be the right approach here.

If improperly researched, causes of domestic crime could be confused with issues of national security. For example, academics and politicians sometimes list the Paris riots as one of the flares of international terrorism in recent years. This characterization would immediately imply a certain type of response and the application of deterrence. However, a French professor has discovered, after two decades of investigation, that the mono-dimensional research he has been doing on employment did not yield useful findings for tangible or permanent solutions to the problem of ghettos in French cities;[19] that sending in the police to control riots is simple-minded, that the historical factors of the development of the French ghetto and the wider societal responsibility for such misery falls on everyone.

The portrayal of the residents of ghettos in France and their riots in 2005 as an extension of "the war on terrorism", or that the riots provide further evidence of a people "who do not want to integrate", can only mislead public policy. It not only establishes a premise that generalizes such events as somehow proof that "immigrants are a menace", but also insinuates that policymakers should do something about them, especially through security-driven policies, whereas the real main area of responsibility falls on the shoulder of social policy and social services.

Several participants at the Roundtable, especially from Europe, apply a misnomer when they say "immigrants and second generation immigrants". How can one still be an immigrant in the country of his/her birth? Here, the Canadian approach differs from the European approach, to the extent where the word "immigrant" is applied very narrowly to someone who is foreign-born and is a permanent resident in Canada but did not yet receive Canadian citizenship; which is not to deny the importance of the experiences of the second generation as an indicator of integration success. When we explore this subject we speak of second generation *Canadians,* which is an important semantic distinction.

Also some participants used the word "foreigner" to refer to immigrants or minorities, such as in the presentation

about Germany. This is not a word in use in Canada; even students from other countries studying at Canadian universities are called international students and not foreign students. The word *Auslander* may not have the same meaning as the word "foreigner" in a North American context, as it may mean who is an ethnic German and who is not, which may exclude German-born citizen of Turkish origin in popular usage.

"Culture" of terrorism?

I will now focus on whether culture can explain terrorism. An immediate difficulty for the researcher is that an agreed-upon definition may not be allowed. The idea that "terrorism" as a concept is self-contained, politically-charged, and evokes high emotionalism, forbids attempts of inspection and analysis. The word becomes a boxed approach and counterintuitive to the principles of research listed above. The difficulty here is that the absence of a definition yields a situation where "terrorism" becomes a monologue among "security experts", and a pretension that everyone knows what they are talking about, but without a definition.

Even if a definition of "terrorism" is provided, most often it will define it by its outcomes – such as providing a number of groups and organizations and listing their violent beliefs and statements and the amount of heinous crimes that they have committed. Thus, based on the analysis of symptoms – not causes – such research may lead to simplistic policy recommendations: that this violence (and for that matter any social violence, because the issue becomes symptoms or outcomes) is terrorism and is deserving of the amount of coercion deployed against it.

The more serious approaches of social science – and science in general – require that a proper relational connection exist between a concept – such as terrorism or culture – and something else outside it. This is necessary because no phenomenon, social or natural, is self-defined or self-contained. This is precisely what Plato, 2400 years ago, had criticized Parmenides for, where Plato blamed the latter for "concentrating exclusively on Nature"[20] and on nothing else.

The case at hand should not be any different; otherwise research, let alone a multidisciplinary one, would have no business addressing such issues.

Having established the importance of the relational factor in understanding, and thus better addressing undesired phenomena such as terrorism and crime in general, no research on security in a pluralist society is possible without a workable relational definition of concepts. Even when proper social science methodologies are applied, the outcome may be of poor quality, but may nevertheless be taken as an objective inquiry and used in policy development. Many reports, articles and books have focused on "culture" as a possible "midwife" of terrorism, that a "culture of terrorism" is central to the psyche of some societies or ethnic or religious groups. This approach has opened the door over the past 15 years to an avalanche of literature and dissertations, and has led to a flourishing of disciplines such as religious studies and anthropology to study the cultural "traits and basic "characteristics" of certain ethnicities and societies. There is also the Samuel Huntington[21] approach, which prophesizes the coming violent warfare of the clash of cultures ("civilizations", as he calls them).

In the above example, we can see that a "relational definition" is provided, but it is one based on culture, without a clue as to whether policy development can get far with such an approach. The problem with the term "terrorism as founded in cultures", and by extension, making multi-"culturalism" responsible, is that it is basically racist. This definition assumes that communities (ethnicities or societies) are prisoners (or in anthropological parlance, "sedentary creatures") of "basic cultural traits", which is a racist classification of individuals' behaviour, motives, and energies, as having foundations in biological certainties. Unfortunately, research reports that use this vein would conclude that individuals, as belonging in a racial or religious group as a closed community, are indistinguishable from one another and are similar to the teeth of a comb - one is bad, all are bad.

What would be the impact of such research on policy development? Placing entire groups as hopeless anthropological cases buried in behavioural uncertainties, would not allow for a window of opportunity for public policy to assist behavioural change (upbringing, mainstreaming, liberal education, socializing, etc.) nor would they give hope for a better future outside violence and deterrence. Moreover, such "anthropological certainties" feed into stereotyping, racial profiling, and, again, to talk that "these people do not want to integrate".

Explanations for terrorism should be much larger (geopolitics, socio-economic, etc.) than the simple bashing of other cultures or of multiculturalism policies as breeders of terrorist behaviour.

Framing questions

By deconstructing the simplistic approach of using "culture" as an explanatory of terrorism, and by emphasizing the importance of relational factors, the next stage would be framing the research questions based on what we have learnt so far:

Would all acts of violence qualify as terrorism (for example, is it accurate to make a sweeping statement about "terrorism" in Europe to include the socially-induced riots in Paris and the bombings in London in 2005)? If terrorism is the conscious targeting of the innocent to sow seeds of fear in the general population, then the London bombing qualifies as terrorism. This should be distinguished from the Paris riots which would qualify as social or political violence.

There is a heavy emphasis on religion to describe and analyze contemporary terrorism. In the quest for a generalized academic approach, how can religion or anthropology be used to describe and analyze the left wing terrorism that proliferated over 35 years ago in industrial societies (and included the American *Black Panthers*, the *Bader-Meinhof Faction* in Germany, the *Japanese Red Army,* the *Basque Liberation Front*, the *Irish Republican Army,* etc.)? How would this western "home-grown" terrorism since the late 19th century from Russia to France differ from leftist Middle Eastern variety of the 1960s and 1970s, where radical movements were modeled along Marxist lines? In

fact, these Middle Eastern leftists considered Islamic fundamentalists as their archenemies.

Is religion a factor in terrorism and why? Today's global terrorism is associated – more or less – in public discourse, the media and a large number of books – with Islam and Muslims, which implies the culpability of the "Muslim culture". By extension, if religion is an explanatory of terrorism, would the "Christian culture" provide a relational definition of terrorism in Europe in the late 19th century and much of the 20th century?

Research becomes inconsistent when religions and cultures are triggered at convenience to explaining terrorism (that one culture/religion is superior, and that another religion is inferior, backward, barbaric, etc.) and at another time are not. Granted, terrorist minds could use religious and non-religious elements in their ideologies, but this is equally true of several religions. Voltaire has said that "intolerance is the *maladie* of Catholicism" in France. By extension (what another writer has added), if Fascism is the *maladie* of Europe, then religious fundamentalism is the *maladie* of Islam.[22] This would be a more balanced approach of seeing how religious dynamics are at play in world geopolitics today.

Simple cultural interpretations of terrorism, favouring one religion and demonizing another, may, intentionally or unintentionally, contribute to the backdrop of some policy responses:

- It was unthinkable to bomb West Belfast when the IRA wreaked havoc and killed innocent civilians in London; it was equally unthinkable to attack Boston, which was the source of funding for the IRA. In both instances, authorities treated incidents as crimes by individuals and pursued and arrested the perpetrators, and then engaged in thinking about permanent peaceful solutions.
- In the Oklahoma bombing in May 1995, the perpetrator was a member of a white supremacist militia, many of which have proliferated in the United States over the past 25 years. There was no thought of bombing militia strongholds in Montana or Idaho. Instead, Timothy McVeigh was arrested and an enquiry was launched to understand and deal with the sources of hatred that breed violence in American culture, especially among young men. It is interesting that no anthropological approaches were applied here, and not even a consideration that American society, and for that matter every society, is dynamic and would change over time, and where mores and behaviours are not etched in stone.[23]

The research approach towards IRA terrorism and supremacist terrorism was not applied when analyzing terrorist incidents since 2001. Instead, we have seen an avalanche of literature about a major world religion that "hates us", and louder talk about the menace of coloured immigrants. There were TV talk shows featuring "authoritative" specialists who said:

> "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren't punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians. That's war. And this is war."[24]

To this biased research backdrop, the policy response in the post-2001 world was military, and war was waged on a series of countries. The impact on minority visible and religious groups in Europe and North America is far from positive. There, hitherto popular individuals and communities were perceived as suspect and unpopular, and community members may be voicing the cry that it is not pleasant to be, for example, of Muslim or Arab origin.

All this is to say that research on religion and security is not being done properly, as much research is essentializing culture with respect to the impulse of terrorism. Of course, there are cultural and religious influences in explaining terrorism and improving security, but there are other influences as well.

Mono-disciplinary explanations focusing on culture, anthropology and religion[25] are therefore harmful or at least not useful, when done in isolation of the socio-economic analysis and the wider geopolitical circumstances and events in the world. Such mono-disciplinarily approaches run contrary to the social structures of Canada and the United States, which are both societies of immigrants and are multicultural nations in principle and in demographic reality. Social psychology has a lot to contribute to the themes explored in this article, such as on the situation of individuals and the typology of those at risk.

Only in good solid research will effective policy be possible. Leave a knowledge vacuum and decisions will still be made, decisions we may all have cause to regret in the future.

Multicultural terms

Multidisciplinary research covers a wide spectrum of social, economic, civic, and cultural issues that have implications for Canada, in the present and in the future. This annex provides a compilation of terms and their definitions. While these terms and their definitions do not constitute a legal opinion or government policy, they do help in understanding current notions and concepts used in multidisciplinary research on Canada. They may also apply to other multicultural societies.

BIGOTRY: Dislike or hatred of persons because of her/his membership in a particular group.

BULLYING: Bullying is characterized by repeated physical or verbal interactions that are meant to be hostile, cause distress, and involve a power differential between bully and victim. Bullying can occur in many forms across the lifespan, from playground interactions to dating violence, workplace harassment, and elder abuse.

CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which forms Part I of Canada's 1982 constitution, sets out most of the rights and freedoms that the federal, provincial and territorial governments of Canada must respect. It includes certain fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of religion, expression and association, as well as certain democratic, mobility, legal, equality, linguistic and Aboriginal rights. The courts enforce the Charter, not human rights commissions.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM: The use of one's own culture as a yardstick for judging the ways of other individuals or societies would generally lead to a negative evaluation of the values, norms, and behaviours of these other individuals or societies.

DISCRIMINATION: Discrimination involves formally and informally classifying people into different groups with the intent or effect of according the members of each group unequal treatment, rights or obligations. The criteria delineating the groups determine the kind of discrimination. For example, there can be discrimination on the grounds of race (racism), gender (sexism), religion (religious discrimination), height, ethnic background, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation, among others. However, there is also discrimination based on grounds that are not reflected in laws and these include preference or behaviour, results of IQ testing, age or political views, among others.

DIVERSITY: The term diversity when associated with human diversity, relates specific social, economic, cultural, and political contexts. It is a term that applies to a range of human perspectives, backgrounds and experiences as reflected in characteristics such as age, class, ethnic origin, race, gender, nationality, physical and learning ability, Aboriginal status, region, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, education, employment, as well as cultural values, beliefs, and practices. The idea of diversity is passive, while multiculturalism includes notions of respect and recognition, equality and social justice as regards diversity, as well as integration and participation.

ETHNIC: Of or relating to people grouped according to a single or a combination of common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, and/or cultural origin.

ETHNIC ENCLAVE: Ethnic enclave is a neutral term meaning a geographic concentration of an ethnic group. Impartially, unlike a ghetto, they tend to exist by conscious choice, not by coercion or poverty. The development of such enclaves is related to the history of immigration and settlement in Canada (i.e., where the Irish, French, Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, etc., chose to settle). Large Canadian cities have neighbourhoods with certain concentrations, such as so-called Chinatowns and Little Italy, etc.

ETHNIC ORIGIN: In 2001, Canadians reported over 206 ethnic origins, with roots in all parts of the world, mostly in Europe (English, Irish, French, Polish, Italian, Hungarian, etc.), but also in Asia (Pakistani, Afghan, East Indian, Japanese, etc.), Africa (Ugandan, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Ethiopian, Somali, etc.), Latin America (Chilean, Brazilian, Argentinean, etc.), Caribbean (Haitian, Jamaican, etc.), and the Middle East (Iraqi, Turkish, Egyptian, Iranian, etc.). Ethnic origin is one of the 11 prohibited grounds of discrimination in the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, referred to in the legislation as "national or ethnic origin".

ETHNOCENTRISM: The attitude of prejudice or mistrust towards outsiders that may exist within a social group; a way of perceiving one's own cultural group in relation to others. An attitude that one's own culture, society, or group is inherently superior to all others. Ethnocentrism refers to the inability to appreciate others whose cultural attributes may include a different racial group, ethnic group, religion, morality, or language, hence, the tendency of a host culture or a mainstream culture to dismiss other perspectives as inferior or irrelevant.

Recent religious issues in Canada are not of the same magnitude or intensity as experienced elsewhere in the world. They include clothing preferences (e.g., wearing a head cover for Muslim women, wearing a turban for Sikh men), faith-based arbitration, increased Anti-Semitism and Islam-phobia, etc.

EUROCENTRISM: The practice of consciously or unconsciously privileging the cultures of Europe over other cultures. Euro-centrism is a belief in the superiority of European-based moral thoughts and practices, and treats them as a norm that provides the standard by which others are judged and interpreted. Some geographic terms that place Europe at the centre of the world should be avoided, such using *Orient*, *Far East* and *Middle East* to refer to Asia, a continent with billions of people, as east of Europe. Or using the New World (which ignores the ancient civilizations of the Americas), the Old World (referring to Europe), the Third World (suggesting somehow that Western Europe is first, Eastern Europe is Second and developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are Third), the Orient, and "the Western World" (suggesting a certain mythical homogeneity of the countries of Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand).

FOREIGN NATIONAL/FOREIGNER: A person who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident. Such a person could be a visitor or a student. The word "foreign" is discouraged in use, and is viewed similar to the term "alien nationals".

GHETTOIZATION: The conscious or unconscious phenomenon of segregating members of a group from the larger community, that confines them to specific geographic location, deprives them of the elements of social, economic and political participation of the wider mainstream society, and abandons them to face poverty and need. Ghettoization, as a social process, is coercive and not a question of choice for the residents of the ghetto.

HUMAN RIGHTS: Human rights refer to fundamental rights regarded as belonging to all people. Human rights are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. In Canada human

rights are entrenched in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and in the *Canadian Human Rights Act* at the federal level and in provincial human rights codes.

IMMIGRANT: At the more technical level, refers to a person who is, or has been, a landed immigrant in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by the immigration authorities. Recent immigrant refers to a person who immigrated to Canada in the 5 years preceding the census, excluding the census year itself (e.g., recent immigrants in 2001 were those who immigrated from 1996 to 2000). In more general use, an immigrant in Canada is someone who was born somewhere else. In contrast, in most European countries the term immigrant may be used to describe those who do not belong to the national ethnic group, even if they were born in the country and hold its citizenship.

INTOLERANCE: An unwillingness to consider, endure and/or respect the beliefs and practices of an individual or group. Racial intolerance refers to an unwillingness to permit equal opportunity and full societal participation to members of other racial groups; religious intolerance is the unwillingness to accept, endure or respect those of other religious beliefs.

MARGINALIZATION: This occurs when individuals or groups end up in positions of minor importance and influence or power because they have been excluded from decision-making, or have not had an equal opportunity to participate. Marginalization exists when the voices of a group are separated and contained apart from the problem-solving and central decision-making process of an institution or a society. Marginalization refers to the experience of certain groups, which do not have full and equal access to and cannot participate in the social, economic, cultural and political institutions of society.

MEMBERS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS: groups who are socially excluded from the benefits and privileges enjoyed by the mainstream society. Social inclusion could be a laborious and lengthy process that occurs at a later stage once socially excluded groups and individuals gain access to the mainstream. Any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental disasters, or economic hardship, than other groups within the State; any group or sector of society (such as women, children or the elderly) that is at higher risk in periods of conflict and crisis.

MINORITIES: A minority may be considered to be a group of people which is numerically smaller in size to the rest of the population of a country or a community, where such a group is in a non-dominant social position, whose members possess ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic characteristics, which differ from those of the rest of the population, and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their group's culture, traditions, religion or language.

MINORITIES, VISIBLE: According to Statistics Canada, a member of a visible minority group in Canada is someone (other than an Aboriginal person) who is non-white in colour/race, regardless of place of birth. This includes persons from the following visible minority groups or origins: Black, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, South Asian/East Indian (including Indian from India; Bangladeshi; Pakistani; East Indian from Guyana, Trinidad, East Africa; etc.), Southeast Asian (including Burmese; Cambodian; Laotian; Thai; Vietnamese; etc.), Non-White West Asian, North African or Arab (including Egyptian; Libyan; Lebanese; Iranian; etc.), Non-White Latin American (including indigenous persons from Central and South America; etc.), Person of Mixed Origin (with one parent in one of the visible minority groups listed above); other visible minority group. Visible minority persons could be first generation Canadians (i.e., born outside Canada) or second and more generations (Canadian born). The term 'visible minority' is not a synonym of 'immigrant' and vice versa.

MULTICULTURALISM (AS POLICY): The Canadian multiculturalism policy as stated in the federal *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* affirms the value and dignity of all Canadian citizens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their religious affiliation, and promotes public sphere transformation to reflect Canada's diversity. The Act also confirms the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the status of Canada's linguistics duality. Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to the belief that all citizens are equal, and citizens might have different cultural identities and take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging to Canada. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence.

MULTICULTURALISM (AS IDEOLOGY): Multiculturalism is a condition of cultural pluralism. It promotes tolerance and cross-cultural understanding and strives to the ideal of equality and mutual respect in a society with a diversity of racial, ethnic, religious or cultural groups. Multiculturalism recognizes that diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and of its national character. It also attempts to foster full participation in all aspects of Canadian society for all Canadians regardless of culture, ethnic or national origin, religion, race and colour.

MULTICULTURALISM (AS DEMOGRAPHIC REALITY): Multiculturalism is used to characterize a society with ethnic or cultural heterogeneity. It has been used in Canada as an attribute of Canadian society for at least the last four decades. Canada has become a multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious society, and is expected to become more diverse in the coming decade. Statistics Canada predicts that visible minorities will represent 20%-25% of the population of Canada in 2017, and religious minorities will represent 10%-12% in the same period.

NORMS/VALUES: Norms are rules for accepted and expected behaviour. Norms prescribe "proper" behaviour. Values are culturally defined standards held by individuals, groups or organizations about what is desirable, proper, beautiful, good (or bad), that serve as broad guidelines for social life. Many norms and values are incorporated into laws. Norms should not be confused with national values, such as respect for law and order or the embrace of parliamentary democracy which exist at the level of political culture.

PLURALISM: An approach in which some degree of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other group distinction is maintained and valued by individuals. A concept used to express the notion of a society in which groups can remain voluntarily apart from each other when it comes to traditions, cultural practices and beliefs, while sharing a set of commonly held principles and consensus on social and political values.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: According to the *International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1965), to which Canada is a signatory, the term racial discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has had the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

RACIAL PROFILING: Judgments about an individual or group based solely on their ethnicity or color of their skin; racial profiling also refers to actions based on such judgments. Often defined in a law enforcement context, the Ontario Human Rights Commission defines racial profiling as "any action taken for reasons of safety, security or public protection that relies on stereotypes about race rather than on reasonable suspicion, to single out an individual for greater security or different treatment".

PREJUDICE: Prejudice is an unjustified, usually negative attitude directed toward others because of their social category or group memberships.

SEGREGATION: The economic, physical, political, and social separation of diverse groups or individuals, particularly referring to ideological and structural barriers to civil liberties, equal opportunity and participation by minorities within a majority ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, or social group.

SOCIAL EXCLUSION: Social exclusion refers to multi-dimensional disadvantage which is of substantial duration and which involves dissociation from the major social and occupational milieu of society. It is a shorthand term for what can happen to people or areas from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health, and family breakdown and/or racism.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION: Integration in the context of multiculturalism is not the mild equivalent to "assimilation". Social integration refers to the creation of a society that respects cultural diversity and at the same time promotes the goal of equal opportunity across private and public domains.

STEREOTYPE: Stereotype is a false or generalized conception of a group of people, which results in the unconscious or conscious categorization of each member of that group, without regard for individual differences. Stereotyping may relate to race or age; ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographical, or national groups; social, marital or family status; sexual orientation; physical, developmental or mental abilities; and/or gender.

TOLERANCE: The term tolerance suggests agreement to disagree and acceptance that others have different opinions or preferences even if you do not agree with them. While tolerance is an element of respect, it has been considered in the multiculturalism discourse as a passive, or even grudging, acceptance of diversity (e.g., quiet resentment of the presence of members of visible minority or Aboriginal groups in the workplace).

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Notes

1 Not to mention the major obstacle that Turkey is facing regarding its membership in the European Union, which is its Muslim religion.

2 *Reasonable Accommodation* refers to the accommodation of persons with disabilities, women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples in the workplace as stated in the federal *Employment Equity Act*, and to the "accommodement raisonnable" in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights.

3 The use in policy will be discussed later.

4 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

5 Several issues of *Canadian Diversity*, *Our Diverse Cities*, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, and work conducted by researchers of the Metropolis centres of excellence, contain information on the benefits of multiculturalism and diversity to society.

6 See terminology at end of this article.

7 For example, differences among Catholics, Baptists, Anglicans, etc., as well as among English, Scottish, Irish, French, Polish, etc., were important and figured prominently in earlier manifestations of multiculturalism in Canada. Today, these differences are less prominent where categorizations of simply "European" and "Christian" are utilized, but distinction remains at least between Orthodox Christians and other Christians.

[8] *15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.*

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians".

[9] From the *Preamble.*

[10] The *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,* the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*, the *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child.* In addition to these established conventions, the U.N. is developing a *Disability Convention*.

[11] For a detailed description of research priorities, including themes and questions, see Jedwab, J. (2006, Spring). Thirty-five years of Canadian multiculturalism 1971-2006: Research themes and questions. *Canadian Diversity*, Volume 5:2, 11-15.

[12] Milne,G. (2002). *Making policy: A guide to the federal government's policy process.* Ottawa.

[13] Soroka, S. (2002). *Agenda-setting dynamics in Canada.* Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.

[14] The remainder of this article was presented at the second day of the Roundtable *International Perspectives on Immigration Immigrants and Hosts: Perceptions, Interactions, and Transformations*, which was attended by 42 academics from Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany; Toronto May 31-June 2, 2007.

[15] Social psychologists are interested in such topics as attitudes, social cognition, cognitive dissonance, social influence, and interpersonal behaviours such as altruism and aggression. Two influential journals for the publication of research in this area are the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, and the *Social Psychology Quarterly*. There are also many other general and specialized social psychology journals. Information accessed on May 29, 2007, from:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_psychology.

[16] Cheung, L. (2005). *Racial status and employment outcomes.* Canadian Labour Congress, Research Paper.

[17] See Reitz, J., and Banerjee, R. (2007). Racial inequality, social cohesion and policy issues. In K. Banting, T. Courchene and L. Seidle (Eds.). *Belonging? Diversity, recognition and shared citizenship in Canada* (pp. 489-546). The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP); Palmer, D. (2006, Spring). How different are they. *Canadian Diversity*, Volume 5:2; Jedwab, J. Workshop on religious diversity held by the Association for Canadian Studies, *25th Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,* University of Ottawa, April 2007; Jimenéz, M. (2007, January 12). How Canadian are you? Visible-minority immigrants and their children identify less and less with the country, report says. *The Globe and Mail.*

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[20] Rhoads, P. (2001, January-February). Down with the Dark Ages. *Cosmopolis*, 13, pp. 1-4.

[21] Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilization and the remaking of the world.* New York: Shuster.

[22] « Si, selon Voltaire, l'intolérance fut la maladie du catholicisme, si le nazisme fut la maladie de l'Allemagne, l'intégrisme est la maladie de l'islam », in *La Maladie de l'islam*, Abdelwahab Meddeb, Seuil, 2005, Points essais.

[23] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkley, University of California Press, 2000.

[24] Coulter, A. (2001, September 14). *Town Hall.*

[25] Such as the suggestion that to understand the "Muslim mind", it was sufficient to analyse the Koran, a 14 centuries old holy book.

CONSTRUCTIVE INTEGRATION OF CANADIAN MUSLIMS:

Comparison with Canada, Bosnia and France

Imam Zijad Delic

Imam Dr. Zijad Delic is the National Executive Director of the Canadian Islamic Congress and is promoting the *Muslim History Month in Canada*. A native of Bosnia & Herzegovina and a Canadian citizen, Imam Delic is a trained religious scholar and a holder of a B.A. (Hons) in Islamic Studies and Arabic and a PhD from Simon Fraser University.

ABSTRACT

After placing Canadian Muslims within the context of Canadian multiculturalism, a comparison is made with Muslim experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina and France. This reveals three different models by which the essentials of the Canadian approach can be more clearly identified and lessons learned articulated. A vision for integration and inclusion is developed that calls on both Muslims and Canadian society as a whole to work together for its realization. The report concludes with ideas on how to overcome the obstacles of integration and inclusion and how to expand the opportunities for the engagement of Canadian Muslims in Canada's civic, economic, social and political life.

1. INTRODUCTION

Constructive integration is a notion of multiculturalism, where multiculturalism is a policy, a philosophy and a lived reality for Canadian Muslims. I argue in this article that being Muslim is compatible with *being a good Canadian citizen; one reinforces the other.*

Canadian Muslims live in a multicultural society, which encourages integration through participation and shared citizenship. For Muslims, this model opens opportunities to renew and reform their communal outlook within the mainstream society while maintaining their religious beliefs. This approach is unlike the one experienced by Muslims in France, who live in a model of systemic assimilation, or Muslims in Bosnia, who were politically and socially under pressure to abandon their religious beliefs and become "others".

My central question is: how can Muslims in Canada preserve and remain faithful to their religious beliefs and constructively integrate in a pluralist society? Although Canadian society is highly inclusive, minorities, when making adjustments to social realities, may be following a pattern of either assimilation or isolation. However, some members of these groups fail to see, due to lack of information, the most beneficial third alternative to assimilation or isolation, which is constructive integration, the core element of Canadian multiculturalism.

Constructive integration offers balanced choices, enhances positive experiences and minimizes undesirable extremes. It can help minorities – visible or religious – engage in their surroundings, reconcile societal differences and create realistic opportunities for everyone – minorities and majorities – to contribute positively to society as a whole. Intellectuals of the Muslim faith in western democracies encourage the adoption of constructive integration through spontaneous participation as means of progress and reform.

The expression of Muslimness, i.e., identifying with Islam as a religion in Canada, varies depending on the almost 100 different countries, cultures, languages, and traditions where Canadian Muslims hail from. The variety of "Muslimness" is compatible with Canadian multiculturalism and can also adjust through dialogue and policy development to become a sort of Canadianness that is an expression of Islam unique to Canada.

2. CANADIAN MUSLIMS: AN EXCELLENT COMPLEMENT

Canada is a country of vibrant diversity. It is home to a wide variety of ethno-cultural groups, making up the mosaic of Canada's current population (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 39). Canada is a land of immigrants and their children who comprise one of the world's leading democratic multicultural societies. Canada is "the showpiece of multiculturalism" (Vasta, p. 16, 2007), and "is among the most poly-ethnic and poly-religious countries in the world today" (Elmasry, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, the Canadian approach to diversity naturally reflects a Canadian reality of several regional, communal and personal identities, in addition to the national identity (Banting et al., 2007, pp. 648, 650). Newcomers to Canada have always brought

their religious beliefs, practices, conceptions of community and institutions with them, adding their distinctive richness to Canada's multicultural mosaic (Bowlby, 2001, p. 8).

Among the many factors that characterize multicultural societies, religion plays a dominant role in the formation of personal and communal ethnic identity. Max Weber and Emile Durkheim hold that "religion is necessary to a society as a vital mechanism of integration for human beings and as a means to unify symbols" (Driedger, 1989, p. 20). Scholars have emphasized the importance of religion as a vital element of identity (Gordon, 1964; Barth, 1969; Mol, 1976; Abu Laban, 1983; and Herberg, 1989). According to Mol (1976), "religion defines… [humanity's] place in the universe." Yousif (1992, p. 535) also suggests that the defiance of religious practices or beliefs means stepping outside one's boundaries or place and thus "outside of one's own identity."

Religious diversity is a fact of life in Canadian society (Dib, 2006, p. 39), just as is the racial and ethnic diversity (Adams, 2006, p. 76). Canada encourages all citizens to preserve their heritage as part of the cultural mosaic (Gall, 2006, 69). Religion occupies a significant position in Canada's constitutional framework (Gull, 2006, 70). Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1977) provide that everyone is entitled to freedom of religion and belief and guarantees this basic freedom. The Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that freedom of religion under the *Charter* includes freedom of religious speech, including "the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination" (Dib, 2006, p 42).

Over the past three decades, a large number of Muslims have made Canada their home (Statistic Canada, 1981, 1991, 2001), bringing along various cultural and religious expressions from their country of origin. Whereas they often constituted the majority of the population in their country of origin, they come to Canada where they are a minority. Some of the challenges they face are internal: accommodating to a different national culture, reframing one's personal identity, and living with a conflict between first and second generation Muslims. Other challenges are external: dealing with systemic Islamophobia, discrimination and/or racism (Abu Laban, 1980). In response to these challenges, Muslim intellectuals and leaders reject the concept of being regarded as the "other" in Canadian society and prefer to preserve distinct Islamic values and simultaneously work to integrate Muslims more fully into Canadian society.

The necessity for the constructive integration of Muslims has grown exponentially in Canada, with their emergence as a national group with a presence in every province and major city. This, however, does not mean Muslims are by any means a recent addition to Canada. Although the majority of Muslims came to Canada within the last three decades, smaller numbers have existed at least since the middle of the 19th century (Scholes, 2002). They have settled wherever economic opportunities presented themselves, especially in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta, as shown in Table 1. Canadian Muslims have come from nearly every continent – South and South-East Asia, the Arab world, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean.

Table 1: Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims in Canada – Provinces and Territories

Province and Territories	Canadian Sunni Muslims		Canadians of Various Shi'ite Muslim Affiliations	
	Number	%	Number	%
NFDL & Labrador	600	0.12	30	0.03
Prince Edward Island	170	0.03	25	0.03
Nova Scotia	3,300	0.68	250	0.27
New Brunswick	1,200	0.25	50	0.05
Quebec	91,600	18.79	17,000	18.45
Ontario	291,500	59.81	61,000	66.19
Manitoba	4,600	0.94	500	0.54
Saskatchewan	2,000	0.41	200	0.22
Alberta	45,000	9.23	4100	4.45
British Columbia	47,000	9.68	9000	9.77
Territories	225	0.05	–	0.00
Canada	487,500	100%	92,155	100%

Source: Statistics Canada 2001 and author's estimates.

The diversity of Muslim ethnic origin has been reflected in the diverse expressions of Islam. Although the majority came from countries with Sunni Muslim majorities, each group observed its own doctrinal and ritual forms of faith. Sunni Muslims represent almost three-quarters of all Canadian Muslims, at 487,500 people, or 1.5% of the population of Canada in 2001. There is a significant number of Shi'ite Muslims in Canada as well, who also have diverse expressions of faith and who originate from several countries. Moreover, diverse national backgrounds resulted in the attendance of particular communities at different mosques and centres such as the South Asians, Arabs, and Africans, Turks, Fijians, Bosnian and others.

Muslims in Canada have several different customs and lifestyles, including eating habits, matrimonial customs and artistic expressions. These cultural expressions are significantly influenced by the wider world of Muslim tradition. For example, the first word in the Qur'an is an invitation to "Read" (in the sense of learning), while a most famous *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad is "to seek knowledge even in China" (meaning, even in the most distant land from the vintage of 7th century Arabia). The variety of Muslim expression is a living evidence of "world culture" *(Weltkultur)*, where the doors are always open to diversity of expressions and to adaptability. Muslims in Canada know and readily embrace Canadian identity.

Those looking for a single reality of Islam's expressions in Canada may be disappointed. Canadian Muslims do not constitute a monolithic bloc at all. Recent research shows distinctions among different groups of Canadian Muslims (Bayer, 2003). Any attempt to study the Canadian expression of Islam has to take into consideration the dynamics of Muslim diversity. Not only is the Canadian expression of Islam highly diverse, but for many Canadian Muslims, it is a novel experience to live in a pluralist liberal democracy like Canada. It would be fascinating to study the interplay of Muslim diversity and Canadian identity, as Muslims establish roots in Canada and their children become fully and constructively integrated.

I argue that an objective analytical construct would recognize that the expression of "Muslimness" in Canada is compatible with Canadian multiculturalism and can adjust through dialogue and public policy development to become a sort of "Canadian-ness," that is, an expression of a uniquely Canadian Islam.

A number of factors led Muslims to choose Canada as their home, although these factors vary from one individual or family to another (Abu Laban, 1983 and Haddad, 1978). Yousif (1993, p. 17) mentions five reasons for Muslims to come to Canada:

a) better economic opportunities; b) political instability in their homelands; c) educational opportunities for their children; d) desire to join or reunite with family members and friends already in Canada; and e) the freedom of expression (religion) and association guaranteed by the Canadian constitution. In short, "they all came for a better life." (Sirajul Islam, 1999, p. 133).

Early records indicate that there were 13 Muslim residents in Canada in 1871, who came primarily from Syria (Abu Laban, 1983, p. 76). North America's first mosque was *Al Rashid*, established in Edmonton, Alberta, in 1938 (Yousif, 1992, p. 534). Until the Second World War, the growth rate of the Canadian Muslim population was slow. It only reached 3,000 in 1951 (Zaman, 1999, p. 14). Reforms in Canada's immigration policy during the 1960s led to a regular inflow of immigrants of the Muslim faith. Further liberalization of immigration rules in the 1970s led to an even greater influx of Muslim immigrants (Rashid, 1985, pp. 15-19). The 1981 Census of Canada listed the number of Muslims at 98,165 (Statistics Canada, Vol. 1, p. 9). However, researchers believe that the number should be larger. Muslim associations have estimated the number of Muslims in Ontario alone in 1987-88 at 100,000 (Hussaini, 1990). That estimate is based on surveys of Canadian Muslims and community phone directories of households (p. 23). The 1991 Census counted 253,000 individuals of the Muslim faith, more than twice the number reported in 1981. In 2001, the Census reported 579,640 Canadian Muslims; again more than double the 1991 figure. According to more recent estimates (Mujahid and Egab, 2004), Muslims in Canada numbered more than 750,000 in 2004, accounting for 2% of the national population.

Table 2: Muslim Population in Canada from 1871 to 2007

Year	Population
1871	13
1952	3,000
1981	98,000
1991	253,000
2001	579,640
2004 (estimate)	750,000
2007 (estimate)	1 million +

Sources: Census Canada: 1981, 1991, 2001; Hamdani (1984); Mujahid & Egab (2004).

Canadian Muslims are among Canada's most highly educated citizens. A recent Environics Survey of Muslims in Canada (2007) also suggests that Canadian Muslims are well educated: 45% of them have at least one university degree.

However, a disturbing contrast is that Muslims as a group have the second-highest unemployment rate in Canada; 14.4% of Muslims are listed as jobless, almost twice the national unemployment rate of 7.4% (2001 Census; Mujahid and Egab, 2004; MCCO-G 2004).

3. MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION

On July 27, 2007, Bosnian Muslims celebrated 600 years of Islam in their nation. The celebration reminded the world that Balkan Muslims are not transient communities, but are indigenous to Europe. Mustafa Ceric, a leader in Bosnia, observed during the celebration, "This is an opportunity to remind the world that we are indigenous Muslims in Europe and that by celebrating centuries of

Table 3: Education				
Highest Level of School Achieved (15 years old and over)	**Muslims**	**% of Muslims**	**Total Population**	**% of Total Population**
Population 15 years +	411515	100	23901360	100%
Less than High School	102290	24.9	7476900	31.3
High School Certificate	55475	13.5	3367875	14.1
Post Secondary Education	253760	61.7	13056560	54.6
- Some Post Secondary	51450	20.3	2590165	19.8
- Trades certificate/diploma	25420	10.0	2598925	19.9
- College certificate/diploma	43800	17.3	3578400	27.4
- University below Bachelor	16230	06.4	601425	04.6
- University degrees (total)	116855	46.0	3687650	28.2
- Bachelor's degrees	74445	29.3	2534010	19.4
- Above Bachelor's	9630	03.8	382955	02.9
- Master's degree	26475	10.4	642055	04.9
- Doctorate	6310	02.5	128625	01.0

Source: 2001 Census; MCCO-G 2004.

Islam in the heart of Europe, Muslims want to naturalize Islam in Europe. Bosnians have demonstrated how Islam can be harmonized with a European way of life" (*International Herald Tribune*, July 28, 2007).

The same words were echoed by Michael Schmunk, the German Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina: "Islam as practiced in Bosnia could be a good model which might contribute to social progress in Europe", and that Bosnian Islam would fit into current social fabric in Europe (*The European Weekly*, November 20, 2007). Smailovic (1980) emphasizes that "the roots of Islam in the Balkans are more than five hundred years old" (p. 133). Shakir (1975, p. 152) holds that Islam appeared in the Balkans in the 10th or 11th century when Muslim rule expanded into Sicily and other parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Others claim that Islam was introduced to the Balkans twelve centuries ago, even before it became dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean region (e.g., in Christian Syria). They explain that the Muslim kingdoms in Spain (Granada, Andalus, etc.) were established since the 8th century and that a large number of men from the Balkans served at the courts of these kingdoms (pp. 19-28). However, records of the earlier presence of Islam in the Balkans, at least prior to the Turkish phase, are still poor and incomplete (Smailovic, 1980). Therefore, the Turkish period is the best documented phase in the history of Islam in the Balkans (p. 133). From that time on, and especially during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islam quickly spread in the region (Smailovic, 1980), and Muslims, Christians and Jews thrived and lived in harmony.

A substantial conversion of Balkan people to Islam occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Balic, 1992, p. 385; Donia, 1981). One reason which encouraged Balkan people, especially in Bosnia, to adopt Islam was the way they were treated by the Kingdom of Hungary, which maintained an oppressive rule over Bosnians. Eventually, Hungary itself was a target of Ottoman expansion. Balic concludes that "a large part of the indigenous population of the Balkans, led by the aristocracy, adopted the Islamic faith… thus the political propaganda that Bosnian Muslims betrayed the nation by adopting Islam, a non-Serbian faith, is nonsensical." (1992, p. 385).

The decline of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century led to fatal consequences for the Muslim people of Bosnia in particular and the Balkans in general (Khan, 1996, p. 52). The rivalry between the European powers over the decaying Ottoman Empire resulted in the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 by the Austro-Hungary Empire. This occupation "had a considerable impact on the life and status of Muslims and their future in the Balkans" (Smailovic, 1980, p. 133).

The proof that Bosnian Islam was authentic and not driven by loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, is that Turkey attempted to supervise Muslim functions in Bosnia, but Bosnian Muslims eventually freed themselves from Turkish influence. However, the promise of liberalization by Europe was a hollow one. As soon as Turkish rule ended in the Balkans, it was replaced by Austro-Hungary rule, which exercised a strict control over Muslim religious life (p. 134). To maintain their culture, Bosnians established a domestic council of Muslim clergy, the *Ulema Medzlis*, in 1882. The situation did not improve under the Austro-Hungary Empire or under a united Yugoslavia later. For much of the twentieth century, Muslims in the Balkans faced rigorous trials (pp. 134-135).

After the First World War, Serbs and Croats refused to recognize Bosnian Muslim identity, and suddenly, what was an Ottoman Question (i.e., Problem) in Europe, became a "Muslim Question" in Balkans politics. The struggle for recognition of Bosnian identity has been at the core of virtually all conflicts in former Yugoslavia that involved Bosnian Muslims. Bosnians were caught between two competitors for power – Serbs and Croats. Such competition resulted in demands "by both competitors that Bosnian Muslims be "nationalized" either as "Serb Muslims" or "Croatians" of the Islamic faith." (Khan, 1996, p. 57). During the communist regime of Joseph Tito in Yugoslavia, Muslims launched a difficult struggle for recognition, but the communist regime has created even more barriers to their recognition than those that existed under the Austria-Hungary Empire. In the 1948 Yugoslav census, Bosnian Muslims had three choices for ethnic self-identification: Serb-Muslims (i.e. Serbs of the Islamic faith); Croat-Muslims; or ethnically "undeclared". It was government policy at the time that Muslims should be absorbed into either Serb or Croat ethnicities (Khan, 1996, p. 60). Muslim resistance to this policy is shown by the fact that 8% declared themselves as Serb-Muslims, 3% Croat-Muslims, and an overwhelming majority of 83% as ethnically undeclared (Ramet, 1992, p. 179). Census taking changed in 1971, as a category was created to designate Bosnian Muslims as Bosnians (Balic, 1992, p. 384), and Bosnian Catholics as Croatians, and Bosnian Orthodox as Serbians. From then on, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were competing to win over Bosnian Muslims as belonging to their national identity, in a country that was officially atheist and recognized no religion. The two national groups worked openly towards eliminating Bosnian identity from the political vocabulary and popular consciousness in the Balkans.

Bosnian Muslims have vied for national identity for the past 30 years. The 1981 Yugoslav census counted two million people in Bosnia as Muslims (Friedman, 2000, p. 174). This proved that Tito was responding to the needs of the various peoples of Yugoslavia. However, such self-identification in the census was possible "until the death of Tito". The institutions Tito created and the ambience of multinational acceptance in the land of "Brotherhood and Unity, also died" (Friedman). In the 1991 census, Muslims in the national sense accounted for about 44% (1, 9 million) of Bosnia. Those who marked "Yugoslav" (242,682 or 5.5%) or "Other" (104,439 or 2.4%) were almost all Bosnian Muslims, while tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims chose to self-identify as Croats or Serbs (Balic, 1992, p. 385).

The death of Tito signalled the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and an unexpected brutal aggression against Bosnian Muslims took place between 1992 and 1995. Although the Serbs and the Croations quickly established their national states, they denied to the same for Bosnia. Bosnia, like the other former states of Yugoslavia, began to affirm its belonging to Europe as a country with a Muslims majority. The Serb and Croat citizens, supported by neighbouring states, were not tolerant of this affirmation. Bosnians never actually wanted to establish a state based on religion and were a proud European nation. Early in 1988, Ferhad Efendi Seta, a Bosnian Muslim leader, said: "Those who adopted the Islamic faith in this country have the good fortune of originating from long established European inhabitants and in participating in the finest achievements of European culture" (Balic, 1992, p. 386).

Despite all affirmations by Bosnian Muslim leadership that Muslims want peaceful dialogue with their neighbours, and that Bosnian Muslims only want to maintain their distinct expression of Islam within Europe, Bosnian aspirations in the 1990s became a target of abuse not only by the mass media and political authority of the Government of Serbia, but also by some Serbian intellectuals who participated in a campaign that prolonged the historical exclusion of the Bosnian Muslims (Balic, 1992, p. 386). Things turned for the worst. What was a verbal exclusion under Tito and the Austria-Hungary Empire became a violent physical exclusion of the Muslim population in 1990s. It was clear, as Bringer suggests, that the rhetoric that Bosnians were bringing international Islam into the Balkans had the undesired effect of turning Bosnian Muslims into "others," "intruders," "those who do not belong," "those who threaten our well-being, power and prosperity"; "in order to pacify them, they had to be dominated or eliminated" (2002, p. 214).

Bosnia's claim to belonging to Europe is a genuine one. Following the end of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, Bosnians lived under the Austro-Hungary Empire (Karcic, 1999, p. 147), which "opened for Bosnian intellectuals the potential of a positive relationship between Islam and European culture." Many recognized that rejecting European norms and institution was not the right path for the Muslims of Bosnia. A position of selective adaptation of European culture was gradually developed by enlightened Bosnian intellectuals, who emphasized the importance of adapting European culture while keeping a Muslim lifestyle. Ceric (2007) points out that the expression of Islam among Bosnians was quite distinctive from other Muslim countries. Despite the experience of being ignored and rejected by Europe and the rest of the world during the time between 1992 and 1995, Bosnian Muslims continued to stand for a tolerant, liberal, modern and European interpretation of Islam (Moe, 2003).

Although Ceric (2007) understood the feeling of Muslims being rejected in Europe because of religion, he insisted that Bosnians needed to make efforts to "fit in" in Europe. He stated "Europe is not yet ready to accept Muslims as they deserve to be accepted, but unfortunately, Muslims are also not living up to their responsibilities in Europe… we Muslims have no choice but to work for our presence in Europe and to show that we are ready to accept the values of human rights, democracy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and all those values that are also Islamic values."

Today's Bosnia should be a case study for millions of European Muslims who have no role model to guide them. Bosnian Muslim religious scholars understood the European social context, as they are inheritors of a long tradition of living in a country with a Christian majority since 1878. Bosnian responses to the challenges of modernity under the Austro-Hungary Empire laid down a foundation for dealing with similar issues in the following decades. One of the reasons for Bosnian Muslim success in

adapting was the role played by Muslim clergy who relied on *fiqh* (Muslim jurisprudence) to modernize Bosnian society without a loss of identity. This response was an early embrace of the "challenges of modernity" (Karcic, 1999, p.158). Today's Bosnian Muslim clergy have the skills and knowledge to deal with the challenges facing Muslims in Europe.

The image of a mosque, a Catholic church, an Orthodox church and a synagogue, standing shoulder to shoulder in Sarajevo is a strong metaphor of the tolerant pluralist, inter-religious relations that have characterized Bosnian history and for which Bosnian Muslims particularly claim credit (Moe, 2004). Bosnian history provides an exceptional case of religiously motivated harmony among various religious groups. Karic (1999) calls Bosnia "a grand multicultural or multi-religious tapestry," "a filigree", "a mosaic comprised of four communities". It is "a society of Abraham," and "the only country in Europe which sprang out from the pages of the Holy Bible and the Qur'an" (pp. 90-92). The peaceful co-existence of four major religions has indeed been a feature of Bosnian history (Moe, 2004, p.1). Some Bosnian intellectuals seek a secular nationalistic trend, reject the "multicultural" identity and prefer to speak of a single Bosnian culture that integrates Islam, Roman Catholicism, Serbian Orthodoxy, and Judaism (Mahmutcahajic, 1999, pp. 163, 301-2). However, they still recognize the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb ethnicities long established under the communist regime (Moe, 2004, p.3).

Bosnian history is about how different faiths have co-existed peacefully for centuries. This co-existence can be attributed to the peaceful nature of Islam towards peoples of other faiths (Karic, 1999, p. 91; Moe, 2003, p.3). Bosnian Muslims recognize Christianity and Judaism as Abrahamic faiths or People with a Holy Book and that followers of these other faiths should enjoy rights in countries with a Muslim majority. This has been exemplified in the "*Ahdnama*" (Covenant), by which Sultan Mehmet al-Fatih in 1463 granted security for life and property of Franciscan monks who worked in Bosnia to spread Catholicism (Mahmutcahajic, 2002; Hafizovic, 2002). Roman Catholics contributed to tolerance, while Orthodox Christians and Jews also had good relations with Muslims (Karic, p. 91).

Bosnian Muslims became the group that was mostly identified with Bosnia as a homeland, but a homeland that recognized unity in diversity and religious pluralism (Mahmutcahajic, 1999). At the centre of Bosnian nationalism is the understanding that non-Muslims would recognize and protect the rights of others (Mahmutcahajic, 1999, p. 110). Today, Bosnian Muslim identity in the Balkans is still an issue and a source of tension. This standstill only hinders Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia & Herzegovina from a vision that enhances the constructive integration of Muslims in the Balkans and Europe. A joint effort among all the groups is the step forward for everyone.

4. MUSLIMS IN FRANCE: ASSIMILATION AS OFFICIAL POLICY

The Muslim presence in France "dates back to [the] 12th – 14th centuries, during the time of the Andalusian epoch". Muslims lived since the 8th century mostly in the south of France, particularly in Avignon (Ramadan, 1999). However, the contemporary presence of Muslims in France started with the rise of French colonial power in Africa, continuing with the arrival of new waves of Muslims in France at the beginning of the 20th century and following the Algerian War of Liberation 1954-1962 (p. 5).

While Muslim immigrants arrived in France in the late 19th century, more significant Muslim migration happened after World War II, especially in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s (Vaisse, 2006, p. 1). A large influx of Muslims immigrants occurred in France in the 1950s, following the collapse of the French empire and due to France's need for labour, especially after the Second World War and the loss of population. A majority of Muslims came from North Africa, followed by Black Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa. (*Muslims in the UE - Cities Report: France 2007*, p. 16).

Following World War II, immigrants arrived from Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and sub-Saharan Africa – Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. Immigration from Turkey occurred in the 1960s after France and Turkey signed the first agreement on labour movement (p. 17). These immigrants came to France without their families at the end of the 1960s. In the 1970s, immigration occurred through family reunification: many women and children joined their families (Cities Report: France 2007, p. 17). Besides immigration, some other factors have led to an increase in the Muslim population in France, such as a high birth rate among Muslims, a need for immigrant workers due to the aging of France's population, and flight from impoverished and unstable home countries in the last decades (Gallis, 2005).

"France is all the French," said Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, referring to the unifying power of French secularism. However, Maillard (2005) comments that "Some among those French are Muslims" (p. 62).

There is no precise information about the size of the Muslim population in France, but estimates vary between 5 million (Vaisse, 2005, p. 1) and 8 million (Front National's estimate, Vaisse, 2005). Several academic and institutional surveys also provide information on the Muslim population (Gallies, 2005). There is agreement that approximately 10% of the population of France, or about 6-7 million people, are Muslims of whom up to one third have French citizenship (Gallis, 2005, p. 22). There is reason for the absence of an official count. In keeping with France's republican ideal that all citizens are equal, the collection of statistics on racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds of the population was forbidden and this lack of statistics did not permit scientific research into incidences of racism in employment and social achievements among religious and visible minorities in France (*Les critères raciaux restant interdits dans les statistiques*," LM, September 16, 2005).[1] Since 1872, the national census of France stopped collecting data about religion. This was made more difficult in the 20th century as France became officially secular along the republican model of its revolution (equality, fraternity, and liberty).

The relationship between France and the Muslim world has always had ups and downs (Wharton, 2004). Since the

time Napoleon entered Egypt in 1798, the relationship has been paradoxical; this colonial past having an impact on Muslim integration in French society. French Muslims are not a coherent group and are divided by their national origin, language, culture or ethnic background (Gallis, 2005, p. 23). One of the most important factors, common to all Muslim populations throughout Western Europe and North America, (Kepel, 1987), is the heterogeneity of Muslims. This heterogeneity has been a serious factor in why the Muslim voice in French politics is weak. Therefore, it is no surprise to find the representation of French Muslims in public life to be significantly less in proportion to what would be expected given their numerical strength (Wharton, 2004, p. 16).

Not all French Muslims are immigrants. While first generation French Muslims held French citizenship, they kept strong ties with their country of origin. The situation is different with second generation French Muslims. They are born in France and as such are French citizens by *jus soli*. They speak French as their mother tongue and readily absorb French culture and as such cannot be designated as immigrants. However, even this reality does not make second generation French Muslims welcomed by the mainstream compared to the relative welcome accorded to first generation immigrants from other European countries, including Jews and Protestants, Italians and Russians. Muslims who are relatively well integrated into French society and who think of themselves as French find themselves sometimes being treated in a sub-standard way (Tlemcani, 1997). Most French citizens of North African origin feel they are trapped in a hopeless downward spiral of joblessness, racial discrimination, and clashes with police. What Black Americans have experienced in inner city ghettos in the United States, Muslims are experiencing in the banlieux ghettos (suburbs) in France. Many researchers claim that the French have never fully accepted North African immigrants; and they have accepted second generation Muslims perhaps even less (Vertovec & Peach, 1997, pp. 42-50).

Canadian Muslims live in a multicultural society, which encourages integration through participation and shared citizenship. For Muslims, this model opens opportunities to renew and reform their communal outlook within the mainstream society while maintaining their religious beliefs.

While France intensely protects its secular policies, Muslims try to live in a society of power relations coupled with their own socio-economic weakness. Part of the power relation stems from France's colonial past and the *colon* mentality that never disappeared (Wharton, 204). "Some observers believe that there remain lingering notions of inferiority in the French Muslim population that grew out of the relationship between France as a colonial power and the subject populations in North Africa and elsewhere" (Gallis, 2005, p. 24). The colonizer/colonized relationship is an important element of how French public opinion views French Muslims. This dichotomy is decisive in shaping Muslim self-awareness in French society and in Muslim perception of their role in the societal space which has been assigned to them in France. This factor has led to the development of a Muslim identity in France which is socio-political rather than strictly religious. To illustrate, while the Catholic Church is a religious establishment in France, French Catholics lead normal lives in a French secular society, whereas Muslims do not (Wharton, 2004, p. 17). Identification with Islam as a socio-economic reality is therefore externally imposed by the host society rather than a result of any strong religious convictions among Muslims.

The difference in the speed of integration of immigrants between Europe and North America is not enough to explain the tension which underlies French society (Ramadan, 1999, p.25). Joppke (2007) explains that state policies in the last 40 years in Europe were not set up to properly accommodate migrants and religious and visible minorities. What was put in place is insufficient or even harmful. Even in a state long believed to adhere to articulating a coherent model of secularism, as the case is in France, failure of public policy has been notable not only following the 2005 Paris riots but much earlier. A review of French post-war immigration experiences noted that the State was fixated on refining instruments of immigration control while integration policies remained "badly defined in objectives and principles," "incoherent," "contradictory" and "insufficient" (Cour des Lomptes, 2004, pp. 9-10).

Even the simplest of Muslim expression of religious belief, such as wearing the head scarf (Hijab), burial rites and cemeteries, or the purchase of Halal food are viewed even in official circles – and among academics in the name of freedom of conscience and worship in France – as expressions of extremism and fundamentalism. This attitude reflects a narrow approach to integration. The proclaimed freedom of all French citizens in law and in official discourse has led to a paradoxical situation, where tolerance of diversity is subsumed in normative assumptions of the superiority of mainstream cultural norms, values and models. Effectively, the representatives of the dominant collective community have created the "other" (Knocke, 1997).

There is a widely held view in France that Muslims are not well-assimilated. France demands of its citizens and residents to embrace French language and French cultural norms. This embrace is usually guided by the strong hand of the State. In the past several years, "the French government has adopted new measures to assimilate and control its Muslim population" (Gallis, 2005, p. 27). Even though the French government accepted multiculturalism

as a phenomenon that enriches social life (Gallis, 2005, p.21), in reality, France has discouraged multiculturalism in practice (Gallis, 2005, p. 2). Attempts to assimilate immigrants led France to the formation of barriers between mainstream society and the various ethnic communities (Hussain, 2004, p. 107). This approach ignores the Canadian multiculturalism principles that participation and integration of minorities cannot be achieved without developing a sense of belonging to society. The sense of belonging, shared values and trust can only emerge from the people, in this context from French Muslims themselves. It cannot be forced on them since "social cohesion cannot be engineered" (Amin, 2002, p. 972).

The debate over assimilation in France is not new. For many years, the public education system, military service and employment have played a major role. This has also been the State approach to manage religious practices (Gallis, p. 22). A 1905 law recognized Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism and introduced means for these three religious groups to develop representative bodies that would deal with the State regarding matters of importance, on behalf of their respective religious groups. Only in the mid-1980s did France officially recognize the Muslim faith, and only in 2002 did Muslims in France gain the right to create an official institution representing them before the French government (Gallis, 2005, p. 22).

Consequently, France has recognized conditional, not voluntary integration – the State respects the individual's cultural or religious characteristics as long as the individual is ready for a social contract in which he/she would promise or swear allegiance to the principles of secularism and the unity of the Republic. This promise includes shunning practices and cultural norms that are foreign to France and that would lead to *communautarisme*. The idea of such a contract lacks the element that it has to be voluntarily accepted by both sides – otherwise, it would not be a "contract." According to the Haut Conseil's initial proposal, for an integration contract to be valid, there must be "the willingness of immigrants [minorities] to fit into the host society." This process has to be voluntary" and mutual (2001, p.60).

While France offers a favourable climate for fruitful relations among diverse religious groups, it remains deeply influenced by a Christian past despite the social reality of the presence of a substantial number of Jews and Muslims. Indeed, France's openness includes respect for all religious groups, acceptance of all forms of worship without officially supporting any of the groups, and allowing citizens to believe or not to believe. However, such policies are not always reflected in reality (Lamand, 1994, p. 102). Due to different historical, political, cultural and religious reasons Christians, Jews, and Muslims do not occupy equal status in French politics or society. The framework of equality of these three groups is questionable since some are more equal then others.

The Open Society Institute (OSI, 2002) quotes a French Muslim leader as saying: "Muslims have rights but the problem emerges when it comes to practice" According to the OSI Report, "neither the legal system nor the State public administration has succeeded in formulating clear answers for a number of issues linked to the public management of Islam such as the construction of places of worship, Muslim plots in local cemeteries and ritual slaughter (p. 115). "Theoretical tolerance has not yet materialized… To say that the State has to recognize and respect the religious identity of everyone supposes, for instance, that the French State and Muslims are in agreement on what exactly constitutes a Muslim identity" (Ramadan, 1999, p. 24). Thus, in reality, secular French society resists the recognition of Muslims as a spiritual community with a different and unique religious entity [as they did with Christians and Jews]. Public opinion and government policies strongly oppose such recognition under the premise that it would lead to the Lebanonization of France (Wharton, 2004).

The needs and concerns of French Muslims have long been ignored and considered to be of secondary importance. However, Muslims have developed more and better working relations with the French State (Cities Report, 2007, p. 20). "The situation of Islam in France has evolved considerably" and "it [Islam] became more visible in the public space." Few French Muslims see conflict between being good Muslims and citizen living in a modern society. Seven in ten French Muslims or 72% perceive no such conflict, a view shared by virtually 74% of the French general public (Allen, 2006). This attitude of French Muslims is quite positive even though they are more likely to report experiences of racism compared to Muslims in other EU countries.

Rediscovery of religiosity among French Muslims started in the 1970s in the course of social struggles, and the French Socialist Party has facilitated a progressive integration of Islam in France starting in the 1980s. Since the 1980s, there was a marked increase in riots in the suburbs that involved young people of North African origin, which allowed the National Front (a far right party) to strengthen its support among French voters. The National Front vilified young Muslims and encouraged xenophobia against immigrants and minorities living in France. In the 1990s, French Muslim organizations have appealed for a reassessment of official secularism. They argued that while they accept its global frame, they maintained that it should permit a balanced integration approach and that the State should apply it in the light of the new reality of French society that has a large Muslim component (Ramadan, 1995). "Limited legal reform could be introduced, or at least discussed to permit respect of both French identity and Muslim worship; when all is said and done, it appears that it is more a question of strictly implementing what the laws say rather than a matter of reform" (Ramadan, 1999, 26). Ramadan (1999) suggests that in their quest for solutions in the current conflicts, "if only Muslims in France knew – or were interested in – these laws and tried to organize themselves in order to obtain the rights which are effectively theirs, more progress could be made".

Several surveys and studies on French Muslims and the place of Islam in their lives (such as by the French Institute of Public Opinion IFOP, 1989, 1994, 2001, Michele Tribalat 1992, Claude Dargent 1998-2001 and Brourard and Tiberj 2005) confirm that religion continues to play an important role among French Muslims and that even if they do not practice their religion regularly, they at least respect it as a

point of reference for their identity (*Cities Report: France*, 2007). Out of the 6 million Muslims in France, approximately 33% say they observe the practices. The IFOP study suggests that the majority of Muslims are attached to Islam or at least recognize their Muslim origin (95%). Muslim institutions in France are not under supervision from the countries of origin and French Muslims also have leaders that understand Islam and are knowledgeable about French culture and laws. France should take into account the Muslim presence and allow Muslims to find their place in French society (Cesary, 1994, pp. 147-156)

5. EXPRESSION OF "MUSLIMNESS" IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT

Since the middle of the 19th century when the first Muslims arrived in Canada, Canadian Muslims and their children have made significant moves toward embracing and adapting to a liberal democratic society. This is not to say that they have abandoned their beliefs, but that embracing democratic values is compatible with the faith of Islam.

Throughout 14 centuries in a variety of geographic and cultural contexts, Islamic teachings have not obstructed Muslim societies from change and reform, no matter when or where Muslims have lived. Muslim intelligentsia have predominantly urged Muslims to embrace new social and political realities while remaining faithful to a Muslim lifestyle in western societies. Islam is a civilization because it is able to express its universal and fundamental principles through time and space (history and geography), while integrating diversity and taking on the customs, tastes and styles that belonged to various cultural contexts (Ramadan, 2004, p. 214).

Integrating into western cultures is a significant process in Muslim contribution to different cultures. Such an approach is founded on Islamic intellectual and spiritual tradition – namely the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*. However, Muslims' practices of their religion is often confused with loyalty and belonging to cultures of origin and are misjudged as not embracing and being loyal to the host nation. Ramadan (2004) explains this experience:

> They tried without really being aware of it, to continue to be Pakistani Muslims in Britain and the United States, Moroccan and Algerian Muslims in France, Turkish Muslims in Germany, and so on. It is with the emergence of the second generation that problems appeared and the questions arose: parents who saw their children losing, or no longer recognizing themselves as part of, their Pakistani, Arab, or Turkish cultures seemed to think that they were losing their religious identity at the same time. However, this was far from being the case. Many young Muslims, by studying their religion, claimed total allegiance to Islam while distancing themselves from their cultures of origin (p. 215).

This brings us to constructing a Canadian expression of Islam and the question of how the integration of Canadian Muslims should emerge: How would Muslims accept change and transition without abandoning traditional religious values? How can Canadian Muslims create a new, visible and self-sustaining Canadian Muslim culture with a distinct Canadian expression of Islam?

Being able and willing to address these two challenges will help Canadian Muslims reconcile their religious beliefs with the challenges of a multicultural environment. To succeed, Muslims in Canada must bring to the fore dimensions of reading and re-reading the texts of Islamic tradition, with, as Tariq Ramadan says, "the aim of recovering forgotten principles or discovering a horizon as yet unknown" (p. 216). Muslim identity is not, as some Muslims and non-Muslims think, a narrow-minded construct, confined to rigid and inflexible principles. Rather, it is based on a constant dialectical and a dynamic movement between the foundational sources of Islam and the environment in which Muslims find themselves. Its ultimate aim is to find a way of living harmoniously with the fabric of societies. Thus, as Ramadan suggests, "Muslim identity is one that gives direction" (2007, p. 455), a direction towards social and economic integration. Islam contains progressive elements that support integration into a multicultural society. Those elements that define Muslim identity are characterized by openness and a constant interaction with society. They help Muslims to acclimatize successfully into different cultural contexts while remaining faithful to their religious values. Ramadan suggests that: A return to the scriptural sources allows us to establish a distinction between the religious principles that define the identity of Muslims and the cultural trappings that these principles necessarily take on according to the societies in which individuals live… the elements of Muslim identity that are based on religious principles allow Muslims to live in any environment (2004, p. 78).

As long as Muslims utilize and reflect upon the religious texts and sources, they will have no problem in remaining faithful to their religious values and at the same time integrating in host societies no matter what kind of an environment and what historical era they lived or currently live in. Islamic teachings encourage acceptance of other cultures as long as they do not harm Muslims and their beliefs. Tariq Ramadan (2004) thus supports the idea of integration in all matters that are "good" (or *halal*) in nature. Islamic identity rests on an *attitude of intellect that marries an understanding of the Texts and of the context* in which the texts are practiced. Muslims cannot truly live as Muslims if they are ignorant of the marriage between their core religious texts and the environment in which they live. An open and active expression of faith makes it possible to hand down the teaching of Islam to children and to pass on the message of Islam to the broader community. An outward expression of faith takes place through *positive action and participation* in the way one treats oneself, others, and all of creation (pp. 79-82). That is to say, Muslim identity is about being a good individual and a good citizen in equal measures, and is about being useful to everyone around you.

The Prophet Muhammad once said, "The best people are those who benefit others" (Daud, p.12). In this Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad did not qualify "people" as being only

Muslims or believers, but he used the simple and inclusive term, "people", referring to everyone – Muslims and non-Muslims. It becomes apparent from such reasoning, then, that to be Muslim is to act according to the teachings of Islam in harmony with the adopted society and *not* in contradiction with it. There is nothing in Islam that commands Muslims to withdraw from society, or to become ghettoized, in order to be closer to God. On the contrary, in order to be in full harmony with their religious identity, Muslims need to exercise vigorously the choice and freedom to practice Islamic teachings in a Canadian context. At the same time, they must consciously develop a Canadian image and pattern of their identity.

The true nature of Muslim identity, according to Ramadan, can be achieved only as an open and dynamic spirit or attitude in constant interaction with the environment (2004, pp. 83, 85). This identity results from internal subjective perceptions and self-reflection, while being receptive to external influences. Hence, identity today is an evolving process of "becoming" rather than simply "being" (Dillon, 1999, p. 250). It changes over time and under different social changes (Haddad, 1994; McMullan 2000; Nagel 1995). Hence, there is no contradiction for Muslims in taking up full citizenship and embracing Canada as their country. This is what I mean by the path of constructive integration of Muslims as compared to the less constructive choices of assimilation and exclusion.

6. CONSTRUCTIVE INTEGRATION

In my endeavour to analyse Muslim integration in Canadian society, I reflect on Islamic formative principles, interpreted by Muslim intellectuals who are citizens of western societies. I am also analyzing here this approach within the dynamics of Canadian cultural and social realities. By following this approach I am being faithful to the sources of Islam and guided by reformist ideas (see Al-Faruqi 1982, 1987, Fazlur Rahman 1984 and Ramadan 2004). The combination of traditional and modern approaches has helped me in reading primary Islamic sources in light of the Canadian reality that came to know. I claim here that Canadian Muslims' understanding of faith and life remains incomplete if a he or she does not supplement this life with considerable understanding of Canadian culture. The marriage of personal faith and multiculturalism is a relevant and possible choice open to Muslims in Canada.

Canadian Muslims need to focus on the foundations of their faith and how it interplays with other faiths in a liberal democratic society. Ramadan (2004, p. 9) suggests that they need to delineate what they have gained spiritually and what they have lost by living in a western context. The contact with mainstream Canadian culture has triggered a challenge for Muslims of how to reconcile Islam as a worldview to a multicultural Canada where Muslims constitute a small minority. The alternatives and approaches may not be a novelty to Muslim kids who are born and raised in Canada, but the task would be simpler for those kids who have the advantage of inheriting their parents' heritage and at the same time learning new approaches to life.

I argue that to be successful, integration should be constructive – not just passive – to avoid any reluctance on both sides. I am also saying that Canada's multicultural model is the preferred model for constructive integration for Muslims. Its natural development in Canada started in the late 1960s, when minorities were seen as part of a national strategy for nation-building (Apap, 2006, p. 30). It accepts the maintenance of cultural or religious differences and it tolerates differences and encourages diversity. Integration as an element of multiculturalism is a healthy alternative to "assimilation."

Muslims in Canada are familiar with the public policies of integration that have been in place for the past 50 years. Research evidence on early Muslim adaptive experience in Canada is rather limited and much of it tends to focus on acculturation or assimilation of Muslims into Canadian society (Abu Laban, 1980, p. 98). Later reports (Hamdani, 1997; Environics Research, 2007) suggest that Muslims in recent decades have been quite involved in Canadian life, participating in civic activities and expressed the sentiment of being happy.

The experience of a new society could instil in the hearts of newcomers the rejection of any degree of assimilation and fear of loss of religiosity and cultural identity. Hence, some individuals may segregate themselves into small "safe zones", or ethnic enclaves, and hinder the process of integration into the new society. Elmasry explains:

> The choice between assimilation and isolation is a problem experienced by all minorities, especially those singled out within their own countries by negative media stereotyping, and who suffer from resulting discrimination in the workplace, in the educational system, and in virtually all contacts with government services. They become the "others"— people who are disliked and ridiculed because their accent, religion, skin colour, hair, clothing, or mannerisms are different from the norm (2005, p. 3).

Constructive integration – or *integration by selective choice* – is an alternative that helps Muslims live their faith within the context of modern Canadian liberal democracy. Integration by selective choice is the most efficient, proactive and useful option because of its reformist attitude and outcome (Ramadan, 2004). Selective adoption of western cultural norms has been gradually developed by a progressive-minded cross-section of Muslim academics. Elmasry (2005), for example, urges a happy medium for Canadian Muslims called "smart integration." Constructive integration, when adopted by the mainstream society, signals respect and that a minority is considered an asset (Elmasry, 2005, p. 4). Once the sense of trust, respect and appreciation sinks in, Muslims would be eager to contribute to the well-being of the country.

> The smart (constructive) integration model is optimal, as it requires overall less effort in terms of maximum benefits to the individual, the community and the country. It allows individuals to be proud of their heritage – all essential ingredients to foster a sense of purpose and direction. Smartly (constructively) integrated

> individuals would not try to hide their ethnicity or religion, nor would they feel inferior as compared to their fellow citizens. In sum, they would not feel restricted or handicapped by their identity (Elmasry, 2005, p. 4).

I argue that Muslims can adapt individually and as a group within the framework of an Islamic worldview and within a nurturing Canadian reality. This process of adapting involves staying faithful to Islam as a religion while embracing Canadian culture within one's daily life. Reformist thinking holds the principle of not changing today's Muslims into an image of Muslims of yesterday. Faithful to their principles, they must find out how to live within their own time (Ramadan, 2004, p 222).

Therefore, for Ramadan and other Muslim academics in the west, being Muslim in Canada means staying faithful to core values while being adapted to the time and place. Canadian Muslims will adapt while retaining their religious identity. This approach respects the past by learning from it, but not depending on it or attempting to emulate it. The Canadian multiculturalism policy not only accepts this approach, but also makes it into law in the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act.* Dib (2006) stresses, "Not only does Canadian democracy mean that government treat its citizens as individuals first, but it also designates policies to encourage all Canadians to be proud of their heritage and share it with other Canadians" (p. 42).

According to contemporary Muslim writers, some ideas circulating among Muslim groups in western societies do not reflect the core logic of Islam. They lack the internal coherence found in primary Islamic texts. Muslim community leaders in western societies sometimes think and behave within social models that have been copied verbatim from countries of origin into a context of modern western Muslim communities, without consideration for the different context.

When discussing educational systems in Muslim societies, Al-Attas (1974) blames imported educational systems into Muslim societies for what he calls "captive minds." Muslims who receive higher education in western universities return to their countries and apply what they have learnt in education and public policy without regard for local conditions, cultures, economies and politics. Al-Attas explains that this is not about "a simple adaptation of techniques and methodologies but of the conceptual apparatus, systems of analysis, and selection of problems. The captive mind does not consider another possible alternative, that is, methodological non-alignment. One can, after all, choose one's own problems independently; develop methodology according to local needs, without being dictated by external forces" (Al-Attas, 1974, p. 695).

This is also true of individual Muslims who made Canada or other western countries their home but still suffer from the "captive mind" syndrome, bringing along the thought process of their country of origin. In my view, the "captive mind" of some of the Muslims who made Canada their home is uncreative and incapable of formulating original ideas and solutions; it is incapable of devising an analytical method independent of current stereotypes; it is fragmented in outlook; it is alienated from the major issues of Canadian society; and is tragically unconscious of its own captivity by the value and approaches of the country of origin and the conditioning factors that have made it that way (p. 691). As citizens of Canadian society, some Muslims do not address emerging problems nor offer solutions. Rather, they see the world as either white or black, with no middle ground.

It is this attitude, more than anything else, which explains why it has been so difficult for some Muslims to reconcile the internal and external conflict between their cultures of origin and the Canadian society to which they have immigrated. And it is this attitude that is in urgent need for change so that new aspirations and progress can be brought into the Canadian Muslim population. This could be achieved through increased education and public participation and engagement, motivating Muslims to claim their rightful place in the current history of the liberal, democratic and multicultural Canadian society.

7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CANADA, BOSNIA, FRANCE

The Canadian model of inclusion is fairly stable and inter-group relations in Canada are relatively peaceful. The major difference with France and the Balkans is that Canada *consciously* and officially defines itself as a multicultural state in the sense that it not only tolerates but also welcomes multiple ethnic origins, respects minority religions and cultures and provides constitutional commitments to this end. Genuine inter-group cohesion and harmony in diverse societies do not occur spontaneously. In its own way Canada devotes considerable attention to the management of all types of diversities through its immigration policies/practices, multiculturalism and integration. Subsequently, multiculturalism is recognized as part of Canadian national identity (Vasta, 2007, p. 17).

Research on Muslim integration in France, Bosnia and Canada, reveals some peculiarities. These three different models of dealing with Muslims result in three approaches by which Muslims express their religious identity. Differences in the models are shaped by historical events in each country, the attitudinal approaches of Muslims, the policies in dealing with minorities, and how diversity and integration are defined in each country. Placing the responsibility of integration squarely on the shoulders of minority groups is an unfair approach that does not provide a realistic and positive solution. The majority in a society and the minority groups must seek mutual integration. Minorities and majorities have to adapt to each other for everyone to benefit and for the society to grow.

Integration happens when public institutions facilitate the right conditions for smooth interactions between all parties. Members of different cultures and religions would coexist, accept and respect each other and interact through those institutions. Benting, Courchene and Seidle (2007) describe the multicultural twin agenda of recognition and community as "shared citizenship." For them, the predominant definition of the integration agenda in Canada focuses on "the need to build a sense of belonging and attachment to a country that incorporates distinct identities" (p. 652).

The history of Canada is an evolving acceptance of diversity. The Aboriginal Peoples in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had to learn to live under the French and British colonial administrations. In the twentieth century, Canada accommodated and accepted successive waves of immigration (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 39). At each step along the way, Canada's stability and prosperity have depended on its ability to respond constructively to new forms of diversity, and to develop new relationships of coexistence and cooperation, without undermining the (often fragile) accommodations of older forms of diversity, which are themselves continually being contested and renegotiated. "Canadian multiculturalism recognizes the importance of pluralism and diversity in social cohesion by constantly building common spaces and wide avenues of voluntary integration.

This approach is not about a multiculturalism of separateness and divisiveness, but about respect for differences and inclusion of all Canadians, from colour and dress to customs and religion" (Dib, 2006, p. 41). Not all Canadians are comfortable with religious diversity. Some opt to be against such a model of multiculturalism and they advocate, as Dib (2006) articulates "for ending multiculturalism and diversity policies and 'assimilating' immigrants, who are already here" (p. 41). He cautions, "Such attitudes may contribute to a narrowing of the acceptable boundaries for difference at a time when Canada is becoming more diverse, hence more in need of multiculturalism policy" (Dib, 2006, p. 41).

Different from the experience of France and Bosnia, the Canadian approach to pluralism and diversity is one that allows Muslims and others to be proud of their backgrounds. Canada, unlike France, does not have serious issues of social segregation. The poor socio-economic conditions of religious and visible minorities in France make the political leadership of France worry about how minorities react to segregation. In Canada, many of the traditional indicators of social integration of Muslims into the Canadian context remain relatively reassuring for this multicultural society (Environics, 2007). Language is another issue. While France worries about minorities not learning the French language, Canada does not face this challenge, at least not at the level of basic language proficiencies (Keith et al., 2007, p. 660). In a survey of immigrants who arrived in Canada in 2000-01, 82% of respondents reported they were able to converse well in at least one of Canada's two official languages when they first arrived to Canada (Statistics Canada, 2003; Keith, 2007).

8. BEING CANADIAN AND MUSLIM: NO DICHOTOMY IN PRAXIS

Canada is my example of a leading and successful multicultural society. This country is listening to its citizens, including Muslim citizens. Here, citizens are encouraged to speak up about issues that concern them, especially those related to their integration into mainstream Canadian life.

I argue that constructive integration is the best stepping-stone for Muslims toward full participation in Canadian society. I am also recognizing and respecting the choice of some Muslims – for various cultural or personal reasons – to limit their engagement and contribution in Canadian society. However, no attitude is cast in stone, and everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim in Canada, is encouraged to increase participation and contribution to Canada's multicultural society. This involves more inter-ethnic and inter-faith sharing of knowledge and experience around the issues of multiculturalism and the history of Islamic religion and the various Muslim countries. It is also important that Canadian policy makers in the fields of education, political participation, social services, and other areas understand the religious and cultural perspectives of Islam. Encouraging Muslims, especially young people to participate entails engaging and including them into new societal context. Canadian Muslims need not fear for their religious identity being undermined or lost.

Multiculturalism as a principle in the Qur'an

For Muslims in Canada – even for those who are not born here – multiculturalism is hardly a new concept since the core of Islamic faith and lifestyle is inherently and historically multicultural. The Qur'an frequently addresses this reality in many verses such as: "O humanity! We [God] have created you from a male (Adam) and a female (Eve), and made you into nations and tribes, that you may [make effort to] know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you in the sight of God is one who is the most righteous. Verily, God knows and is aware of all" (*The Qur'an*, 49: 13).

This verse emphasizes that all people have natural ability to "know each other," which suggests a universal tendency towards multiculturalism by stressing its importance to all peoples. The phrase "made you into nations and tribes," affirms the essence of multicultural society as it has developed today in Canada. And in the best of situations, multiculturalism can achieve its potential to deliver information and knowledge to diverse citizens in a manner that is sensitive to their religious and cultural backgrounds, while sharing the attributes of others.

The message of the verse I have quoted aptly captures this notion of knowing others and understanding them as a foundation for engagement and consequently the growth and progress of individuals and society. Addressing the fact of diverse religions, the verse also points out that by first understanding, appreciating, and respecting our similarities, we can grow naturally to embrace one another's differences as well. The verse also suggests that the most honourable citizens are Muslims who are the most righteous, not the citizen who are the most Muslim.

Being a Canadian Muslim citizen involves rights and responsibilities. More importantly, Canadian citizenship is about being a truly engaged participant in the well-being of this country. The saying that "Citizens are made, not born," by seventh-century philosopher Spinoza is especially applicable to Canada. We are blessed to live in a country that actively seeks to treat all of its citizens fairly and allows them ample opportunities to become more engaged within society at large. In this way, Canada encourages minorities to integrate well, participate in social and political activities and contribute to the country's present and future health. Despite obvious differences and periodic tensions and challenges, Canada's state-sanctioned policy of conscientious respect for all ethno-cultural and religious communities is a model for its own citizens and the world.

As Husaini (1990) states: Canada is a unique country … where preservation and advancement of multiculturalism is an official governmental policy. It is Canada's ingenuity and inner security that could allow freedom of cultures and their enhancement" (p. 98).

Participation is not just a social obligation, but is encouraged by religion as well as centuries of international Muslim history. Wherever Muslims settle and live, they tend to participate in their adopted environments and contribute to individual and communal life. At the same time, with their cultural attributes, they would add a distinctively Muslim flavour to their new environments and create a Canadian expression of Islam. I tell myself, then, that if Islam is a great world cultural tradition, it would make sense that a unique European, Australian, American or Canadian expression of Islam develop in these countries.

A recent Environics survey (2007) clearly indicates that a majority of Muslims in Canada (about 81%), are satisfied with their lives as Canadians, and are well integrated and happy with what they have achieved, despite experiencing some degree of discrimination. About 17% of respondents sense threatening hostility to their faith from other citizens. Despite all the negative representations of Muslims and Islam (largely in mainstream media) after September 11, 2001, the survey numbers do not suggest that Muslims in Canada feel isolated or besieged. In fact, they love Canada and, according to Environics (2007), their biggest complaint is the cold weather.

Survey results do demonstrate a need for more public education on the issue of religious rights and accommodation. We often forget that the history of the Canadian Muslim community stretches back for some 150 years. Much of that history is negated if Canadian Muslims are viewed solely from the perspective of recent immigrants. Muslims, since the late 19th century, began a process of establishing roots in Canada. As of the 2001 Census, 10 percent of Canadian Muslims are born in Canada.

Muslims in Canada do not have specific constitutional rights like the two founding nations or the Aboriginal peoples or the Roman Catholics. Canadian Muslims, like other Canadians however, are protected by general rights and freedoms of religion and the right not to suffer discrimination on the basis of religion in section 2 and 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom*. Section 27 of the *Charter* also provides that the *Charter* should be interpreted "in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada" (*Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, 4th ed., 2005).

Unlike Bosnian and French Muslims, Canadian Muslims do not have a historical baggage with Canada as it is the case with Bosnian Muslims who, for centuries, lived in conflict with their neighbours and French Muslims whose country of origin was once under French occupation and dominance. Thirdly, unlike Bosnian and French Muslims, who were subject to exclusion or assimilation, Canadian Muslims enjoy full rights as citizens and the multicultural policies in Canada which are focused on social integration, inclusion through participation and shared citizenship. Thus, there are considerable differences among the three countries, but obviously I can infer that there are solid and positive foundations in Canada that can help Muslims achieve constructive integration.

It is a universal human tendency to be socially engaged as a full citizen in one's society and to belong to it. However, as Malik argues, there are a number of reasons why people do not engage successfully. This is evidenced by poor participation in local, provincial or national politics (2004, p. 169). There are obstacles that impede the participation of Muslims, and the situation has been exacerbated by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. In the years following this event, there has been a marked increase in reported incidents of racism, discrimination and Islamophobia directed against Muslims due to an external societal backlash. Western Muslim communities have also had to contend with internal obstacles related to differing interpretations of Islamic sources around engagement with non-Muslim society and culture.

Canadian Muslims need to focus on the foundations of their faith and how it interplays with other faiths in a liberal democratic society.

Canadian Muslims, due to Islamophobia and discrimination, are not fully embraced into Canadian society as full citizens. This is a legitimate concern since it is difficult to belong to a place if there is a perception of not being accepted. It is important that the reciprocal nature of the relationship between belonging and acceptance/respect is highlighted in policy discussions that are gravitated towards citizenship tests and other measures to encourage people to integrate. As Hussain (2004) asserts, "If people are constantly reminded that they do not belong, whether on the crude level of the rhetoric of far-right discourse or media or the day-to-day discrimination, subtle or otherwise, that they may face, or when the government fails to listen to their concerns and request for needs, it is only a matter of time before they will feel alienated and lose the desire to belong" (p. 112), as in the case of French assimilation mentality or Balkan exclusion politics.

The climate of public indifference to one's religion in Canada has had an effect on Muslims in general and young Muslims of the first or second generation in particular. Canadian Muslims are re-examining their identity and the way they interpret their religious practices and beliefs. They are creating a new expression of Islam more reflective of the Canadian context. Narrow interpretations of Islam are challenged by globalization as well as by the majority of Muslims who grew comfortable in the Canadian environment. They establish Islamic organizations to discover Islam without being contaminated by inherited traditions.

These new developments have generated debates among Muslims, particularly among community leaders and

scholars in Canada. Conferences on the topic of Islamic identity, Canada and integration are organized and do involve Muslim participants. One such conference was organized by a national Muslim organization in Canada called the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). The conference was held in Ottawa in May 2007. The topic of the conference was "Shaping a Canadian Muslim Identity" and the scholars who discussed the topic came from Europe, the USA and Canada. Scholars at the conference stressed that Canada needs to be accepted as a domain of social contract, the place of testimony or the domain of treaty or unity, because Muslims here are not "others" – they are Canadian.

Analogically to this view, Ramadan (1998) holds that a European expression of Islam is inevitable. I believe that Muslims in Canada are more prepared to embrace this view. To be a Canadian Muslim means to interact with the whole society. The question for Ramadan is then how to be fully Muslim while fully being a Westerner. While he advocates that Muslims integrate into and learn from the west, he also believes that the west must work to accept Muslims in its midst. For him, "loyalty to one's faith and conscience requires firm and honest loyalty to one's country: *Sharia* Law requires honest citizenship" (1998). Why then do Muslims in Canada lack full participation in the civic and political arenas?

There are several domestic reasons for the lack of full participation of Canadian Muslims in Canada. Besides being divided into ethnic and cultural groups by virtue of their places of origins, Muslims in Canada are divided in how they express and practice their beliefs. Secondly, many Canadian Muslim associations focus on a single city or region rather than being national in scope. Sometimes these institutions are not accustomed to the Canadian democratic standards of association, but rather follow a particular culture of membership and executive. Often these institutions are ineffective because of the scope of activities they are involved in. They try to do too much, from the basic educational activities for children and adults to political advocacy in municipal and national elections. While some Muslim organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), Canadian Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN), Muslim Student Association (MSA) or Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) are trying to overcome divisions among Canadian Muslims on ethnic, national or sectarian lines, they acknowledge that such a fragmentation has made it difficult for Canadian Muslims to project a single recognizable public voice.

9. CONCLUSIONS

This article adds to the previous Canadian research regarding means to foster a positive integration of Muslims in Canada and a better understanding and cooperation between all Canadians. I have focused on Muslim inclusion in Canadian society and urged Muslim leaders/scholars to reread religious texts as they apply to the Canadian context. I also urged policy makers in Canada to interpret policies on Multiculturalism and citizenship in the spirit of the current Canadian reality.

A deep understanding of the mechanisms promoting Muslim integration and the obstacles hindering it in the three different contexts of Bosnia, France and Canada contributes to social and public discourses on multi-culturalism, integration, citizenship, religious pluralism, and democracy. It should be noted that there is nothing in Islam that commands Muslims to withdraw from society, or even to become visibly ghettoized, in order to be closer to God. On the contrary, to fully be in harmony with their identity, Muslims need to be able to choose and vigorously exercise their freedom to practice Islamic teachings in a Canadian context. At the same time, they must consciously develop a Canadian image of their identity for both the present and future. This is not only their social but an Islamic religious responsibility as well.

Overcoming the obstacles to integration and inclusion and expanding the opportunities for the engagement of Canadian Muslims in Canada's civic, economic, social and political life should be a major national undertaking. A majority of Canadian Muslims feel at ease and comfortable in Canada (CBC News and Environics study 2007), recognize Canada as their homeland and are proud to be called Canadians (CBC News 2007). It is therefore critical that the Canadian Muslim leadership and policy makers in government realize that more engagement of Muslims in Canada should be made a priority. The living conditions of Muslims in Canada are far better than those in other democratic societies, but there are still areas for improvement. Steps could be taken to facilitate Muslim participation in society and consequently integration. Muslim leadership, scholars and institutions in Canada as well as non-Muslim leaders and institutions should find ways to assist Canadian citizens of the Muslim faith to fully participate in Canadian society, consequently achieving full integration/inclusion.

The following are ideas that can facilitate full Muslim inclusion in Canada:

1) **Recognition:** Canadians of Muslim faith are citizens of Canada who have contributed greatly to Canada's well-being in all aspects of life since their arrival here in the middle of the 19th century. The government of Canada could do more to help combat misconceptions and facilitate communication and cooperation with citizens of the Muslim faith. This would lessen public misunderstanding and promote Muslim contribution to the well-being of Canada. Encouragement must come from senior politicians in government since they are scarcely made. Public statements can present an opportunity to strengthen public acceptance of Canadian Muslims and further recognize the contributions they make.
2) **Public perception and media coverage:** Several newspapers and broadcast media have improved the quality of their coverage of Islam and Muslims since September 11, 2001. Some media outlets present Islam in a negative light, confirming stereotypes and lending credence to the "us-versus-them" discourse. The task of educating the public about Muslims and Islam has been greatly complicated by the insecurity and instability across the world as well as the individuals

who do violence claiming that they do it in the name of Islam. The negative attitude toward Muslims in Canada mostly springs from the limited knowledge that most Canadians have of Islam (Environics, 2007). Opinion polls suggest that those Canadians who are familiar with Islam and who personally know Muslims are more likely to see them as being just like other Canadians. Media and Muslim associations can discuss and jointly sponsor seminars and devise solutions that address Muslim sensitivity and journalistic principles and practices.

3) **Canadian content of community associations:** It is of great importance that Muslims build institutions that would reflect their needs in Canada and not elsewhere, with a focus on developing resources that meet their needs. Muslims in Canada were not well equipped at the time of the tragic event of September 11, 2001, to defend their civic rights and to respond effectively to challenges that came from the public at large, the media and from the government of Canada. This should be a priority for Muslim leaders in Canada. There is also need for the development of local Muslim leadership and scholarship in order to serve community members and help integrate Muslims in Canada and build bridges of understanding between other faith groups, the media and government institutions. Muslims in Canada need leaders and institutions that are in tune with the local Canadian context, not a context transplanted from other countries which often have quite different cultural, political, economic and social norms.
4) **Educational democratic organizations:** Muslim institutions in Canada should be inclusive and democratic and open to members of any culture or faith who wish to enrich their personal experiences within a Muslim association. Canadian Muslims are in a need to build organizations that are inclusive and expressive of the diversity within the Islamic tradition. These institutions should offer regular educational seminars to the public about Islam and Muslim cultures without stressing a particular expression of Islam. They should provide information on the rich Islamic civilization and heritage in activities through a *Muslim History Month Canada*, sponsored by the Canadian Islamic Congress, in line with similar activities of other major national, regional and local organizations. This would help Canadian Muslims to improve dialogue, not only with other faith groups, but also with groups dealing with issues related to politics, culture, education, etc.
5) **Civic engagement:** Canada's greatness depends on its ability to accept diversity of faith, cultural and ethnic backgrounds. However, unless this diversity is actively expressed through civic and political participation, Canada will not be able to fully benefit from it. The fact is that not all Muslims are fully engaged or fully participate in the larger Canadian context as they should. By engaging themselves into the larger Canadian society, Muslims could gain a better sense of themselves as stakeholders and partners in building Canadian society. Whenever any group increases its civic participation, the larger society will view it in a more positive light.
6) **Second generation youth:** Young, educated, professional Muslims in Canada, like their elders, should be included in the integration picture. It is vital that Muslim organizations and leaders, and other institutions and their leaders, build programs for the next generation of Canadian Muslim youth. The majority of these young Canadians have a strong interest in engaging themselves into the activities of the mainstream society. This engagement should promote integration and diminish the potential of alienation and vulnerability. It also provides a needed talent pool and brings young Muslims into jobs, think-tanks and the media, helps in building bridges between Canadian Muslims and the broader public and facilitates the emergence of leaders with whom younger Canadian Muslims can easily identify.

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Notes

[1] The law forbids businesses from asking for such information on job applications or to run a self-identification campaign amongst the workforce of companies for equal opportunity policies (Gallis 2005, p. 22).

« Culture Wars » in Québec :

Remarques à propos du débat québécois sur les accommodements religieux

Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens

Dr. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens est professeur agrégé et titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les identités juridiques et culturelles nord-américaines et comparées à la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Montréal.

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur se penche dans cet article sur la supposée résurgence, dans le cadre du récent débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables, d'une identité religieuse canadienne-française que l'on croyait évaporée depuis la Révolution tranquille, ainsi que sur la fonction amplificatrice des débats juridico-identitaires qu'exerce le « nationalisme méthodologique » inspirant la saisie que font de nombreux Québécois des évolutions de leur société. Il y met en lumière les paradoxes que soulèvent certains discours entendus lors de ce débat, qui a à plusieurs égards pris les allures d'une « guerre culturelle » à la québécoise.

Le débat sur les accommodements raisonnables a fait ressortir la présence d'au moins deux atavismes identitaires de la société québécoise. D'une part, l'identité religieuse canadienne-française que l'on croyait évaporée depuis la Révolution tranquille a resurgi dans le débat public. D'autre part, le « nationalisme méthodologique »[1] inspirant la saisie que font de nombreux Québécois des évolutions de leur société y exerce plus que jamais une fonction amplificatrice des débats juridico-identitaires les plus triviaux. Je proposerai dans cet article quelques réflexions, tantôt hypothétiques tantôt polémiques, qui mettront en lumière certaines contradictions internes des discours entendus pendant le débat sur les accommodements.

1. LA RÉSURGENCE DE L'IDENTITÉ RELIGIEUSE CANADIENNE-FRANÇAISE ET LA PLACE DE LA RELIGION DANS LES INSTITUTIONS PUBLIQUES DU QUÉBEC CONTEMPORAIN

Que l'on ne se méprenne pas : le débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables a essentiellement porté sur l'accommodement des revendications religieuses. En ce sens, l'un des mérites de ce débat aura été de rappeler le rapport ambigu de la majorité d'origine canadienne-française du Québec à son héritage religieux, voire à la religion en général. On le sait, le processus de laïcisation qui s'est mis en branle lors de la Révolution tranquille a à certains égards pris la forme d'un grand balayage de l'héritage catholique des membres de cette majorité. Depuis près de cinquante ans, non seulement a-t-on évincé la religion de la plupart des institutions publiques, mais la fabrication, par l'action conjuguée des élites et de l'État, de l'identité québécoise a passé par un rejet de l'identité canadienne-française, notamment en ce qu'elle était inextricablement liée à une identité religieuse catholique. Or, que constate-t-on depuis le début du débat sur les accommodements raisonnables ? De plus en plus de citoyens revendiquent leur héritage catholique et semblent affirmer en avoir été dépossédés plus ou moins contre leur gré. L'affirmation d'autres identités religieuses dans l'espace public aurait en ce sens agi comme révélateur de cette dépossession et aurait provoqué la « prise de conscience » à laquelle on a assisté ces derniers temps.

S'il est plausible qu'un segment important de la population éprouve un sentiment d'attachement à l'égard de cet héritage et s'il n'y a rien de répréhensible à ce que des éléments d'une mémoire religieuse particulière informent l'identité culturelle de certains citoyens, voire de la majorité d'entre eux, la prudence est en revanche de mise lorsqu'il s'agit de tirer des conclusions quant aux causes de cette dépossession et aux conséquences normatives pouvant découler de l'affirmation de cette mémoire.

Je n'ai nullement l'intention d'analyser les causes de cette dépossession, en supposant que dépossession il y eut. Je me bornerai à signaler qu'attribuer cette dépossession à des groupes qui affirment aujourd'hui dans l'espace public une identité religieuse minoritaire constitue une position singulièrement anhistorique, puisqu'elle fait l'impasse sur les évolutions internes survenues depuis cinquante ans au sein de la population québécoise d'origine canadienne-française. Quant aux conséquences normatives découlant d'une réaffirmation « publique » de la mémoire chrétienne de la majorité de la population québécoise, le débat sur l'enseignement religieux à l'école qui a resurgi à la faveur de celui sur l'identité québécoise illustre la confusion régnant dans les esprits et, surtout, l'absence de quelque consensus que ce soit eu égard à la place de la religion dans les institutions publiques.

On a vu certains politiciens s'offusquer d'une réforme axée sur la compréhension et la mise en dialogue de diverses traditions religieuses au motif que pareille réforme nierait le rôle particulier qu'a joué le christianisme dans l'évolution de la société québécoise (bien que ce rôle y soit mis en évidence). Ce sur quoi je veux attirer l'attention ici n'est pas tant

l'étrange logique permettant d'affirmer que l'initiation à une multiplicité de cultures religieuses dans le cadre d'*un* programme scolaire relativise indûment la contribution de la tradition religieuse de la majorité dans l'édification de la société – comme si la reconnaissance de cette contribution ne passait que par l'école – que la logique du tiers-exclu qui inspire une telle conceptualisation : l'espace que l'on donne aux « Autres », on « nous » l'enlève. La réalité est, à l'évidence, plus complexe. Ironiquement, il s'agit précisément là du type de logique que plusieurs Québécois reprochaient à leurs compatriotes du reste du Canada d'adopter lorsqu'il était question de reconnaître formellement le caractère distinct du Québec…

Bref, pour les uns, la religion serait insuffisamment présente dans l'espace public. Mais l'on ne parle pas ici de n'importe quelle religion ; on parle de celle de la majorité chrétienne. C'est ainsi que l'on s'est plaint de certains accommodements consentis par des institutions publiques à des religions minoritaires, mais que l'on s'est en même temps élevé contre l'idée d'enlever le crucifix dans le salon bleu de l'Assemblée nationale. Double discours, certes, mais peut-être aussi instrumentalisation d'un héritage religieux en vue de mobiliser la population en faveur d'un projet nationaliste en rupture avec l'image « civique » qu'on a voulu lui donner depuis quelques décennies. Aussi, sans nier l'authenticité de l'attachement de plusieurs Québécois à l'héritage chrétien de la province, il n'est pas illégitime de s'interroger sur la part d'opportunisme politique qui inspire la soi-disant résurgence publique de l'identitaire religieux canadien-français.

Cela dit, en supposant que l'on assiste à une telle résurgence, celle-ci risquerait vite de se heurter à une mouvance laïciste très présente au Québec, et ce, même si cette résurgence n'impliquait aucun appui de l'État à une religion quelconque. De fait, le bilan de la présence du religieux dans l'espace public que font certains participants à cette mouvance se situe à l'opposé de celui que dressent les partisans d'une réaffirmation de la tradition religieuse minoritaire. Pour les premiers, malgré la sécularisation de la société québécoise et la déconfessionnalisation des écoles, le religieux encore trop présent dans l'espace public québécois, et les accommodements religieux ne font qu'empirer les choses. D'où leur opposition à ces accommodements au nom d'une laïcité sacralisée comme si elle constituait, à la française, un principe de l'ordre constitutionnel, ce qu'elle n'est pas. Bien qu'elle soit particulièrement poussée au sein de ces cercles « laïcards », cette méfiance relative face au phénomène religieux me semble toutefois assez représentative d'une tendance lourde au sein de la majorité de la population québécoise, pour qui le rapport à la religion a une connotation essentiellement culturelle et identitaire plutôt que métaphysique ou transcendantale.

La présence au sein de la société québécoise (mais surtout au sein de sa majorité d'origine canadienne-française) de courants idéologiques aussi différents en ce qui a trait à leur conception de la place de la religion dans la sphère publique laisse selon moi planer des doutes quant à la profondeur et à la portée réelles du mouvement de résurgence de l'identité religieuse traditionnelle de cette majorité. En bout de ligne, pareille division aiguille l'attention sur le caractère essentiellement incantatoire de l'invocation d'un « Nous » ethnique canadien-français qui, à un moment donné, se serait métamorphosé en « Nous » civique québécois, mais primordialement francophone.

2. NATIONALISME ET SCHIZOPHRÉNIE IDENTITAIRE

Le débat sur les accommodements raisonnables a instillé une nouvelle vigueur aux discussions sur le « Nous » québécois[2]. Or, au-delà des discours creux sur les « valeurs fondamentales » ou les « valeurs communes » de la société québécoise[3], le débat sur le « Nous » s'est rapidement cristallisé autour de la relation entre la majorité canadienne-française du Québec et les « Autres » (surtout les minorités ethnoculturelles et religieuses)[4]. Comment concilier les « droits » de cette majorité, sa mémoire historique inextricable de la condition identitaire particulière du Québec contemporain, et les droits des groupes minoritaires ? C'est dans ce contexte que certains ont erronément conceptualisé les accommodements raisonnables *stricto sensu*, c'est-à-dire ceux fondés sur l'égalité des individus avec leurs différences plutôt qu'en dépit d'elles, comme des « privilèges » accordés aux minorités, ou les ont abusivement assimilés à des diktats imposés par une classe juridique à des citoyens qui, majoritairement, n'en voudraient pas[5].

Ce débat sur le « Nous » me paraît intéressant pour deux raisons. D'une part, dans la mesure où la définition que l'on semble vouloir donner à ce mot encode une volonté de ré-enracinement collectif dans un imaginaire canadien-français déterminé par une idéologie mêlant, comme jadis, mémoire de survivance, exceptionnalisme et messianisme, on risque de refaire du nationalisme québécois non seulement un nationalisme ethniciste, mais surtout un nationalisme de ressentiment[6], état que l'on croyait avoir dépassé depuis longtemps. Si l'on se fie au discours anti-immigration entendu en certains milieux et à la panique linguistique savamment entretenue par des médias et des politiciens des mouvances nationaliste et sécessionniste, cette hypothèse n'est pas complètement farfelue. Ce qui frappe dans tout cela, d'autre part, c'est le retour en force d'un discours où la majorité est systématiquement présentée comme la victime des « Autres », comme assiégée par eux, quels qu'ils soient (les minorités, le gouvernement fédéral, etc.) et où la complaisance dans la victimisation est érigée en art majeur, avec la déresponsabilisation sociopolitique en découlant[7]. Si l'on dit souvent que la « nation québécoise » se définit par le français comme langue commune, une culture distincte et la mixité juridique, j'émettrai l'hypothèse qu'un élément essentiel de son identité tient aussi dans une mythologie de victimisation que perpétue le « nationalisme méthodologique » désormais pratiqué par une majorité de Québécois, toutes tendances politiques confondues. Les audiences de la Commission Bouchard-Taylor, où les « Autres » ont souvent été dépeints comme autant de chevaux de Troie potentiels dans l'enceinte de la « nation », ont révélé la prégnance de ce discours.

Mais voilà, tout cela se passe dans l'ordre du discours : dans le concret, la situation est peut-être moins préoccupante qu'il n'y paraît. En effet, les Québécois qui, sur le terrain, ont à gérer les accommodements demandés

par les membres de minorités religieuses se montrent souvent ouverts[8] et, surtout, pragmatiques[9]. Cette ouverture et ce pragmatisme sont cependant fréquemment occultés dans un environnement où se trouve systématiquement amplifié tout débat social ayant une dimension identitaire, si minimale soit-elle.

La distance entre la réalité sociale, chaotique certes, mais néanmoins vivable, et la perception de crise identitaire qu'encouragent le nationalisme méthodologique et la « macro-identitarisation » des débats sociaux en découlant ressemble fort à une forme de schizophrénie où les frontières entre réalité et rêve s'estomperaient peu à peu. Le problème est que les Québécois qui y succombent le font en postulant l'unité d'un « Nous » collectif constitué, ou dominé, par la majorité canadienne-française. J'aurais pour ma part tendance à croire que tout ce discours sur le « Nous » masque plutôt un certain désarroi face au constat de l'irrémédiable fragmentation de ce « Nous », non pas à la suite de sa dilution dans l'ensemble canadien, mais plutôt en raison de la maturité d'une société démocratique où les membres d'une minorité à l'échelle canadienne et continentale se représentent avant tout comme des individus plutôt que comme des membres d'un groupe ethnique. Cette hypothèse apparemment paradoxale, qui verrait dans le débat sur les accommodements raisonnables le dernier sursaut d'une conception ethniciste de l'identité québécoise, mériterait d'être explorée plus avant.

Cela dit, quelles leçons le Canada dans son ensemble peut-il tirer du débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables ?

Premièrement, ce débat a remis en lumière les sérieuses réserves qu'inspire au Québec la politique canadienne de multiculturalisme, qui est souvent perçue comme une tentative de dilution de la communauté historique distincte qu'il forme au Canada. Il y aurait sans doute lieu, à cet égard, d'affirmer plus clairement le caractère foncièrement libéral du multiculturalisme au Canada[10] et de tenter de remédier à la conception amnésique du Canada qu'a encouragé le développement d'un nationalisme s'articulant autour de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés*.[11]

Deuxièmement, concernant la relation entre l'État et la religion, le préjugé défavorable à l'expression des identités religieuses perceptible dans bon nombre de discours entendus lors du débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables ne permet pas de rendre adéquatement compte de la complexité du sentiment religieux. En ce sens, une saisie politico-juridique de la relation État-religion qui refléterait une attitude de neutralité hostile de la part de l'État face à la religion serait problématique, en plus d'être en rupture avec la tradition constitutionnelle canadienne. En revanche, une approche purement subjectiviste de la religion et une représentation du phénomène religieux qui ne le présente que sous un jour favorable, comme la Cour suprême du Canada a récemment tendu à le faire[12], fait aussi l'impasse sur la dimension parfois éminemment politique des revendications religieuses, qui transcendent dès lors leur impulsion spirituelle initiale pour entrer de plain-pied dans le champ du temporel. De sorte que si la neutralité de l'État constitue probablement la meilleure manière d'appréhender les religions, cette neutralité ne doit être ni hostile, ni naïve.

Troisièmement, le débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables devrait inciter les Canadiens à prendre acte de l'utilité heuristique de plus en plus faible du mot « nation », notamment eu égard à l'ambiguïté et à la contingence identitaires croissantes, et à reconnaître qu'autant la nation politique canadienne que la nation politique québécoise représentent des construits dont le sens varie selon qui les utilise. Ces deux construits sont probablement « injuridicisables ».

Enfin, et surtout, peut-être les Canadiens devraient-ils réfléchir sur les limites de la politique de la reconnaissance, que celle-ci soit promue par une majorité ou une minorité, et se prémunir contre le fétichisme juridique qui, inévitablement, découle de cette politique.

Notes

1 Voir notamment : Beck, U. (2000). The cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second age of modernity. *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51, 79.

2 Lisée, J.-F. (2007). *Nous.* Montréal : Boréal.

3 Lesquelles sont, hormis la primauté du français, largement les mêmes au Québec que dans le reste du Canada, en Belgique ou en Norvège, bref que dans d'autres démocraties libérales.

4 Cairns, A.C. (2008, Winter/Spring). Bouchard-Taylor and Nation-Building. *Inroads*, no. 22, 64.

5 Voir : Bock-Côté, M. (2007). *La dénationalisation tranquille.* Montréal : Boréal.

6 Voir : Angenot, M. (1996). *Les idéologies du ressentiment.* Montréal : XYZ éditeur.

7 Voir : Pratte, A. (2006). *Au pays des merveilles. Essai sur les mythes politiques québécois.* Montréal : VLB éditeur.

8 Girard, M. (2008, 21 janvier). Les Québécois sont très accommodants au travail. *La Presse*, pp. A3 (faisant état d'un sondage CROP).

9 Goma, K. (2007). Accommoder la réalité : dans les coulisses d'un CLSC. Dans : M. Venne et M. Fahmy (dir.). *L'annuaire du Québec 2008* (pp. 148). Montréal : Fides.

10 Voir : Swinton, K. (1994). Multiculturalism and the Canadian diversity. Dans : H.P. Glenn & M. Ouellette (dir.). *La culture, la justice et le droit* (p. 78). Montréal : Institut canadien d'administration de la justice / Éditions Thémis.

11 Gaudreault-DesBiens, J.-F. (2003). Memories. 19 *Supreme Court Law Review,* 2nd Series, 219.

12 Voir notamment: *Syndicat Northcrest* c. *Anselem* [2004] 2 R.C.S. 551, dont l'approche purement subjectiviste est indirectement remise en question dans *Bruker* c. *Marcovitz*, 2007 CSC 54.

Entrevue avec Solange Lefebvre

Dr. Solange Lefebvre est professeure titulaire à la Faculté de théologie et de sciences des religions à l'Université de Montréal et titulaire de la Chaire Religion, culture et société. Elle est également directrice du Centre d'étude des religions (CÉRUM) de l'Université de Montréal.

1) GÉNÉRALEMENT PARLANT, QUELLE VALEUR DEVRIONS-NOUS ATTRIBUER À LA RELIGION CONCERNANT NOTRE HISTOIRE ET HÉRITAGE CULTUREL?[1]

L'histoire et l'héritage culturel sont des domaines très vastes. J'aborderai ici deux enjeux : la question du patrimoine religieux, matériel et immatériel et la transmission d'une culture religieuse. Dans les ceux cas, la valeur à accorder à la religion est très élevée. Si cela paraît aller de soi, il est vrai qu'une société sécularisée comme la nôtre n'est pas toujours au clair avec cette dimension. Le mot sécularisation désigne plusieurs choses mais dans le contexte canadien, il concerne une certaine privatisation de la religion. Bien que les religions chrétienne et juive, de même que les spiritualités autochtones aient eu des impacts profonds, historiques et durables sur l'histoire canadienne, une discrétion les entoure souvent au Canada. Si bien qu'une réflexion sur leur importance au sein de l'héritage culturel n'est pas superflue. Pour exemple, on évoquera le fait que le domaine de la recherche « interculturelle » a jusqu'à maintenant souvent refoulé la dimension religieuse à la marge ou l'a absorbé dans la culture. Bien qu'une dimension de la culture, la religion ne s'y réduit pourtant pas.

a. Patrimoine religieux

Depuis une quarantaine d'années, le rapport à la mémoire collective et au patrimoine culturel et religieux s'est transformé. La conscience très vive de leur valeur, justement, s'est développée, parfois trop tard… Les récits de dilapidation d'objets précieux sur le marché, d'abandon d'archives, de rénovations irresponsables d'œuvres patrimoniales, ne manquent malheureusement pas aujourd'hui, du moins au Québec. Notamment une majorité catholique installée depuis les débuts de la colonie a produit une masse d'édifices et d'objets. Le catholicisme prise les objets, les représentations artistiques et les images. Les communautés religieuses ont accumulé des archives, des objets de collection provenant dans le cas des communautés missionnaires des quatre coins des contrées de leurs missions nombreuses à l'extérieur du pays. Et ce, sans compter les patrimoines protestants aussi très riches. Une collègue travaillant sur les patrimoines autochtones me disait récemment à quel point ils étaient négligés et leur richesse, insoupçonnée.

Lorsque des experts du patrimoine religieux sont consultés à ce sujet, tous s'entendent pour insister sur l'urgence de la situation. En fait, la rapide transformation interne des groupes religieux présents et détenant divers biens patrimoniaux soulève plusieurs questions : la prise en charge matérielle du patrimoine, sa transmission et son appropriation. Jusqu'à maintenant, les groupes religieux avaient charge de la conservation. Mais leurs membres engagés diminuant, qui prendra le relais ?

Les mutations contemporaines du rapport aux traditions religieuses suscitent, simultanément, des questions tout aussi urgentes : Quels sont les défis éducatifs à relever, dans un contexte à la fois de continuité et de rupture avec l'histoire religieuse ? Quels types de réappropriation du patrimoine peuvent s'opérer ? Il est question d'un processus de patrimonialisation des biens religieux. Dans ce contexte, la responsabilité étatique est cruciale : évaluation et identification des biens, critères et moyens de conservation, conservation et éducation.

b. Transmission d'une culture religieuse

Il est impossible d'ignorer les dimensions religieuses de l'histoire canadienne. À cet égard, des efforts sont faits, assez variables, dans diverses provinces canadiennes. J'évoque ici le défi d'implantation d'un nouveau cours d'éthique et de culture religieuse dans toutes les écoles du Québec, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire. Étant donné que la question porte sur l'héritage et l'histoire, nous nous attardons aux traditions religieuses principales présentes depuis longtemps sur le territoire : spiritualités autochtones, catholicisme et protestantisme, judaïsme. Puisque je contribue à des efforts de rédaction de manuels scolaire et la formation de futurs enseignants, je vois tout le défi rattaché à ces nouveaux programmes. D'une part, un grand nombre de connaissances religieuses sont précieuses pour comprendre des textes, des œuvres de fond, des histoires et des usages, des œuvres d'art et littéraires, des personnages historiques.

D'autre part, partout où le christianisme est devenu majoritaire, il a développé des discours et des réflexions abondantes sur l'Autre. Les juifs, par exemple, se trouvent souvent évoqués et compris à travers les images et les textes du christianisme.

Tout en tenant compte de cette réception du judaïsme au sein des traditions chrétiennes, il faut aussi mettre à jour le judaïsme en lui-même, tel qu'il s'est développé de manière autonome depuis deux millénaires. Quant aux spiritualités autochtones, elles se voient diffusées à travers plusieurs canaux : l'art, les légendes, les réseaux actuels politico-religieux, les attractions touristiques. Nombreuses, très marquées par l'oralité et donc les transformations et les adaptations, il existe à leur sujet peu de travaux aidant à n'en clarifier les contours. Surtout, nulle synthèse éclairante n'est disponible à ce sujet.

La culture des traditions religieuses installées plus récemment sur notre territoire s'avère aussi importante, pour assurer la compréhension et le respect mutuels.

2) QUELLES SONT LES LEÇONS POUR LE CANADA DU DÉBAT DES ACCOMMODEMENTS RAISONNABLES AU QUÉBEC?

Il faut insister d'emblée sur le fait que le Québec n'est pas, au Canada, le champion des causes juridiques de nature religieuse, chaque province et région canadiennes ayant son lot de batailles juridiques à cet égard[2]. Il est cependant vrai qu'il se démarque par la réaction publique réfractaire à l'expression religieuse visible de certaines minorités, si l'on compare aux autres provinces où celles-ci vivent (Colombie Britannique, Ontario). Une anecdote illustrera cette différence en contexte canadien. À Toronto, des universités torontoises rendent disponibles des lavabos pour l'ablution rituelle des pieds pour les étudiants musulmans, permettent le regroupement associatif sur une base religieuse, ainsi de suite. À Montréal, le cas bien connu de l'École de technologie supérieure du Québec (ÉTS), en conflit avec plusieurs dizaines d'étudiants de religion musulmane, est révélateur d'une différence importante entre les deux grands centres urbains. Au terme du conflit qui a mené au dépôt d'une plainte de discrimination devant la Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (CDPDJ), celle-ci n'a concédé aux étudiants musulmans que le droit de bénéficier d'un accommodement leur permettant de prier sur une base régulière « dans des conditions qui respectent leur droit à la sauvegarde de leur dignité », mais n'a par ailleurs pas jugé discriminatoire le refus de l'ETS d'accréditer leur association étudiante à caractère religieux (puisqu'ils pouvaient se regrouper en association non accréditée) ni le fait d'avoir une affiche interdisant de laver les pieds dans les lavabos[3].

En janvier 2007, lors d'un colloque à Toronto, je demandai à un musulman, militant pour les droits des homosexuels et ayant reçu des menaces de mort pour un article paru dans le journal étudiant universitaire, de commenter la décision de la CDPDJ au sujet de l'ÉTS. Il suggéra de manière générale de sursoir à leurs demandes pour éviter qu'ils ne se marginalisent. Vers le mois de juin 2006, un réseau de dix-sept jeunes musulmans (17 à 43 ans) de la région torontoise soupçonné de complot terroriste a été mis au jour, certains étant issus d'universités de la région. Or, discutant avec des collègues de ces universités après cet incident, et leur demandant s'ils remettaient en question les diverses adaptations de nature religieuse faites dans leurs institutions, je me fis répondre sur un ton quasi indifférent : « *It is never an issue* » (ce n'est pas un enjeu). Lorsque je me trouve dans une autre province canadienne ces dernières années, on m'interroge et on s'étonne toujours au sujet de la réaction forte des Québécois à l'égard de diverses expressions religieuses minoritaires, telles que l'*eruv* des Juifs hassidiques à Outremont et le *kirpan* d'un adolescent Sikh à l'école : « Pourquoi en faites-vous un tel plat », me semble-t-il lire dans leurs yeux ?

> Les mutations contemporaines du rapport aux traditions religieuses suscitent, simultanément, des questions tout aussi urgentes : Quels sont les défis éducatifs à relever, dans un contexte à la fois de continuité et de rupture avec l'histoire religieuse ? Quels types de réappropriation du patrimoine peuvent s'opérer ?

Pourquoi en faire un tel plat ? Certes, plusieurs intervenants des institutions publiques et parapubliques ont raison d'insister sur le fait que la plupart des adaptations se font sans bruit et sans problème. Il est aussi vrai que les médias répercutent les litiges de manière telle qu'ils lui procurent un excès d'attention et suscitent la controverse. Mais reste qu'un réel malaise est perceptible, malaise qu'il importe de considérer sous plusieurs angles.

Notre conception du droit au Québec et au Canada est certes influencée par la philosophie libérale anglo-saxonne, en ce sens qu'elle accorde une primauté aux libertés individuelles. Mais le ressac de l'opinion publique des derniers mois et les faits qui viennent d'être rapportés montrent que d'autres forces sont aussi à l'œuvre au Québec dans les mentalités, au regard de la religion. Nous en identifions trois parmi d'autres. Ils renvoient au fait que le Québec compte une majorité catholique romaine d'origine française importante. Premièrement, on y trouve une culture socioreligieuse centralisatrice, rattachée au catholicisme, qui uniformise les pratiques religieuses et porte en elle une certaine conception de la «visibilité» et de l'affirmation religieuse. Deuxièmement, on y rencontre également une culture laïque de type républicain tout aussi uniformisatrice, influencée par la France.

La troisième force aussi à l'œuvre dans les réactions est celle-ci : une portion de la majorité socioreligieuse historique réagit à la préférence juridique pour les droits individuels, les droits collectifs n'ayant guère de place dans la jurisprudence canadienne, tant pour la majorité que pour les minorités. Ce dernier point est une question non résolue

ou du moins en suspend au Canada en général, qu'il s'agisse des diverses formes de serments sur la Bible, de l'éducation confessionnelle, des prières dans les assemblées politiques, de mille et une coutumes provenant du christianisme et toujours présentes dans la sphère publique. Est-ce que le pluralisme religieux et convictionnel doit forcément se gérer par le refoulement du religieux dans la sphère privée ou individuelle ?[4] L'adjectif convictionnel entend ici inclure les personnes athées ou non religieuses. Les courts et les débats publics seront certainement très sollicités sur ces questions dans les prochaines années. Quant à moi, il me semble qu'une approche équilibrée de la neutralité de l'État devrait tenter de conserver un équilibre entre majorités, histoire et minorités.

Notes

[1] Voir S. Lefebvre (dir), Le patrimoine religieux du Québec. Éducation et transmission du sens. Actes d'un colloque tenu en novembre 2006, à paraître à l'automne 2008. Voir www. http://www.patrimoine-religieux.qc.ca/fr/activites/colloques.php.

[2] Cette réflexion est plus développée dans S. Lefebvre, «Dimensions socioreligieuses des débats sur les accommodements raisonnables», dans Marie McAndrew (dir.), Faculté des sciences de l'éducation, Actes des Journées d'étude et de réflexion, Pour une prise en compte raisonnée de la diversité religieuse dans les normes et pratiques de l'école publique, 27-28 mars 2007. À paraître.

[3] Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Québec, Résolution COM-510–5.2.1.

[4] Pour de plus amples développements, voir S. Lefebvre (dir.), La religion dans la sphère publique, Montréal : Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2005.

Religion and State in a Pluralist Nation:

Policy Challenges in Contemporary Canadian Society

Karim H. Karim and Faiza Hirji

Dr. Karim H. Karim is Director of the School of Journalism and Communication at Carleton University and an Associate Professor. His publications include *The Media of Diaspora* and *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence*.

Faiza Hirji is an instructor in the School of Journalism and Communication at Carleton University. Her research interests include identity formation among minority youth, diaspora, transnationalism, and media representations of diversity.

ABSTRACT

The Canadian state has long made room for the practice of religion while maintaining its secular framework for public life. Recent years have seen increased policy discourse about religious identity in the public sphere, mostly due to growing pluralism. Debates involving the intersection of religious and civic identities tend to become conflated with negative perceptions of immigration, of overly reasonable accommodation that privileges minority rights over those of the majority, and concerns about gender rights and public security. In several cases, the extent of the social conflict has been magnified by the media to produce moral panics. Public figures have also over-reacted to reports of apparent disputes. Central to this po?licy debate is the upholding of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all, particularly human rights and the ability to participate in public life.

Church and State

Political developments over the last few centuries have favoured the separation of church and state. Whereas such leanings towards the secular generally translate into neutrality towards religious belief, some states like China have adopted policies of official atheism. On the other hand, religious authorities have significant influence in the Iranian model. According to Richard Neuhaus, a prominent American churchman who grew up in Canada, secularism has produced a "naked public square" in contemporary Western society because religion and religious values have been systematically excluded from consideration (Neuhaus, 1988). It is useful here to make a distinction between "secular" and "secularism." Although some view that *secular* positions do not necessarily mean the elimination of religion from public life, *secularism* does stand in strong opposition towards religion. Aziz Esmail notes that, "Secularism in the strong sense of the term has the characteristics of an ideology, treating religion as a rival to itself, and attempting to offer a total explanation of its own…" (quoted in Salam, 1991, p. 24).

Religion is a basic (although not the only) source of most societies' concepts of public ethics, morality and values. Fundamental notions underlying theories of good governance, justice and human rights are drawn from precepts developed in religious philosophy. Key elements in national constitutions and bodies of legislation are often based on ideas that originate in the religion of the majority.

Even though conscious efforts are made to de-sacralize structures of the secular state, a country's culture cannot be completely separated from its religious heritage. Official and unofficial symbols, public ceremonies, common linguistic phrases etc. are often based on religious culture. Even though the spiritual significance of Christmas and Easter may not be acknowledged in official government discourses, these events are commemorated as holidays in the national calendars of Western countries, where Sunday is also the weekly day of rest. This includes France, despite its rigorous application of the policy of *laïcité*. Although India is officially secular, its national days include several Hindu and Muslim festivals and Indian states with significant populations of Sikhs and Christians publicly mark their sacred commemorations.

Canadian governments at various levels have historically engaged with aspects of religion. *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees "freedom of conscience and religion" as a fundamental right. While the *Charter* gives all Canadians the right to hold their own respective beliefs, Christianity, the faith of the majority in Canada, has historically been given a particular status. The lyrics in French of the national anthem, "O Canada," adopted in 1980, proclaim, "Il sait porter la croix," a clear acknowledgement of the country's Christian heritage. At the formation of the Canadian nation, the *Constitution Act* of 1867 provided for separate religious-based schools. Roman Catholicism, the faith of most francophones, was given recognition

within the Canadian state in addition to that accorded to the Church of England. By 1967, three other Christian denominations and the Jewish faith had been included in the Federal Government's Order of Precedence, which determines the placement of individual persons – in this case, religious representatives – at official state ceremonies. In the early 1990s, the religious category in the Order was made inclusive of all religious groups, in acknowledgement of the broadening religious diversity of the population.

However, such entente between religion and state in Canada does not mean that they have not been in periodic conflict with each other. Given that aspects of the national culture are based on the norms of mainstream Christian denominations, the latter's confrontations with the state appear to occur when these norms undergo changes, such as the legalization of Sunday shopping, abortion and same sex marriage. Recent years have seen an increased discourse about religious identity in the public sphere, mostly due to the growing pluralism of Canadian society. Requests for accommodation have come from a variety of religious groups including Sikhs, Muslims, Jews, Mormons and Mennonites. This has created policy challenges at both the provincial and federal levels of government in the secular Canadian state.

Debates on accommodation

One of the most contentious national debates involving non-Christian groups occurred in the early 1990s and concerned the right of Sikh Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers to wear turbans instead of stetsons as part of their uniform. The point of contention in such cases is usually, but not always, the ability of the members of minority religions to participate in public institutions while continuing to adhere to the precepts of their respective religions.

A brief listing of some of the controversies over religion in the Canadian public sphere is illustrative of this issue's significance.[1]

- The proposal of some Muslim organizations to use *sharia* ("Islamic law") as the basis for arbitration in matters of family law.
- Provincial and federal inquiries into allegations of sexual abuse in a polygamist Mormon community living in Bountiful, British Columbia.
- A Supreme Court decision allowing the wearing of Sikh *kirpans* in Québec schools.
- A Supreme Court ruling making it permissible to erect temporary *succah* huts (outdoor structures built by Orthodox Jews during the festival of *Succot*) in the balconies of condominiums in a Montreal complex.
- The Québec Human Rights Commission ruling allowing prayer on school grounds.
- The decision by the Commission scolaire Marie-Victorin in Longueuil, Québec to restrict access to a high school pool so that three Muslim students could have private swimming lessons.
- The passage of an ordinance by the town council of Hérouxville, Québec that advised immigrants of community norms and informing them that the traditions of their countries of origin could not be brought to Québec.
- The Alberta Court of Appeal's ruling that individuals in the Hutterite community who had religious objections to having their pictures taken were not obligated to obtain photographs for their driver's licences.
- The ejection of a Muslim girl playing in a soccer tournament in Laval, Québec from the game by a referee who ruled that her hijab posed a safety concern.
- The barring of five Muslim girls from a Montreal tae kwon do team from competing in a tournament because they were wearing hijabs.
- The installation of frosted windows in a Montreal YMCA building in order to block the sight of exercising women, which a neighbouring Hassidic community felt would be highly distracting for its young male members.
- The circulation of an internal document by Montreal police advising its female officers that they might need to step aside and allow male officers to take command in investigations involving male Hassidic Jews who felt uncomfortable speaking to women.
- The decision by a provincially-run community health clinic in Montreal to offer prenatal classes for women only, in order to meet the needs of their Hindu, Muslim and Sikh populations.
- A major Toronto-area amusement park granting turbaned Sikhs exemption from the helmet requirement of the Ontario safety authority after a Sikh man obtained a provincial Human Rights Commission ruling exempting him from wearing one.
- The motion by the town council of Oxford, Nova Scotia declaring December to be the Christmas season, which prompted the Canadian Jewish Congress to accuse Oxford of being exclusionary.
- Strong criticism by the *Journal de Montreal* for owners of *cabanes à sucre* (sugar shacks) for accommodating Muslim visitors by providing prayer space and omitting lard and pork from their meals.

In examining such controversies, it is useful to consider the distinct nature of the situations leading up to them. They are not necessarily reflective of a conflict between religion and state. Some have emerged out of the process of policy development at various levels of government, such as the initiative to incorporate the *sharia* into the work of faith-based tribunals in Ontario. Others have come to prominence through rulings in courts; for example, the issue of whether Khalsa Sikh males can wear kirpans in schools. Whereas most of these cases are widely covered in the media, there are specific issues that have become "incidents" as a result of media highlighting and have caused a "moral panic."[2] This panic is prompted by the feeling that the accommodations granted to various minority religions are eroding society's values.

Need for careful examination

Incidents need to be reviewed carefully, in terms of their pertinent historical, social, political and economic contexts, and in terms of the identities of the actors involved – including the media, civil society, institutions, community groups and the public. At times, a minor event may be magnified as a major happening and presented as deman-

ding instant action, particularly by stakeholders who feel that they may gain an advantage of some kind, or conversely that they are under attack. The way incidents are given public definitions by the media and other public opinion leaders should be examined.

Certain media have failed to examine controversies with the level of detail and analysis that is necessary. Particular media have tended to adopt a consistently inflammatory tone. For instance, in covering many of the above-mentioned cases, the tabloid *Journal de Montreal* has told Québecois that they have accommodated minorities for too long and may be in danger of losing their own traditions (see Hanes, 2007 and Valpy, 2007). Some journalists have fanned the flames of discontent, promoting the perception of a crisis where none may exist. For instance, the so-called sugar shack controversy was made out to be a problem, even though it did not touch upon a public policy issue, was not before the courts, nor was it the source of any known consumer complaint. A Muslim who visited the *cabanes à sucre* noted that this was not a case of reasonable accommodation in the policy sense, but of private accommodation – or, as one of the owners put it, good business. It seems that the newspaper had taken upon itself to make an issue out of what appears to have been an amicable arrangement. On the other hand, the media can and often does play a moderating role. Several Canadian journalists have spoken eloquently and compassionately about the challenges of reasonable accommodation.

Some actors are too quick to respond to media reports without sufficient understanding of particular cases. Occasionally, individuals or organizations exploit the situation for their own advantage. Some politicians were quick to jump into the fray during the campaign leading to the Quebec election in March 2007, in cases such as that of the hijab-wearing soccer player, as were their federal counterparts in their response to the decision by Canada's Chief Electoral Officer to permit the wearing of *niqabs* (full veils covering the face). No Muslim group had asked for the latter accommodation, yet several media discussions implied that the issue was prompted by Muslims' unreasonable demands. Canadian leaders need to be aware that such a tendency has had disastrous consequences. A prime example is India, where political parties have exploited feelings of fear against religious minorities resulting in deadly attacks against them.

Rights in the public and private spheres

It is clear that the issues raised here involve a lot of grey areas. In many cases, it is not obvious who has jurisdiction and who is expected to act. Policy analysts are often unsure of the steps they need to take and what kind of advice they should offer to decision makers. They are expected to support the public interest, seeking to balance the range of claims made by competing elements in the public sphere. They are also guided by the objectives of ensuring that all citizens have the opportunity to participate in public institutions – that their adherence to the precepts of their respective religions should not become barriers to such participation.

Beyond the participatory function of citizenship, policy makers also seek to promote adherence to a sense of belonging that buttresses social cohesion in the nation. Discussions have often broached the notions of the core values, basic principles and civic identity which shape Canadian society. They have proposed that responsibilities should be highlighted in addition to rights. Some fear that the accommodation of specific religious practices may impinge upon efforts to ensure equality in society, and that the rights of individuals may collide with those of groups. Whereas the implications of many issues at the intersection of religious and civic identities remain ambiguous, there are certain boundaries, such as those defined by the Criminal Code and human rights, which help to delineate the limits of acceptable accommodations. For example, proposed changes to public norms that would threaten the safety or liberties of women would not be permitted. The answers to many of these difficult situations are often sought from the judiciary.

> Religion is a basic (although not the only) source of most societies' concepts of public ethics, morality and values. Fundamental notions underlying theories of good governance, justice and human rights are drawn from precepts developed in religious philosophy.

A key issue that underlies many of the incidents is the conceptualization of the public sphere. It includes the common physical spaces of a society and the discursive spaces made possible by the mass media. Most of the controversies are about the apparent conflicts of minority faiths with public bodies. But several of the debates regarding the intersection of religious and civic identities have occurred over the practices of private institutions like sports associations, women's gyms and sugar shacks. They are brought into public discussions by media. In other cases, "publicness" is accorded to a situation when a high profile person speaks about the issue. There are other aspects of the public sphere that are shaped by the nature of the act involved – a crime conducted in the private domain such as the abuse of a woman's fundamental rights comes within the purview of the authorities.

Some occurrences are given a high profile that tends to demand the immediate attention of governments. But in certain cases, the tensions are those that inevitably unfold in the process of social adjustment as an immigrant group and the host society come to terms with each other. The passage of time usually provides the solution as the two sets of actors get to know each other better. But it is the very magnification of the conflict in the public eye, and the resultant controversy, which causes it to last longer than it normally would.

Debates involving the intersection of religious and civic identities tend to become conflated with negative perceptions of immigration, of overly reasonable accommodation that privileges minority rights over those of the majority, and concerns about gender rights and public security (Adams and Langstaff, 2007). They are also often framed within a perceived "failure of multiculturalism." The moral panic over the fragmentation of Canadian society due to the accommodation of minorities calls for a closer examination of the term "accommodation." Its use in these circumstances implies a derogation of societal norms. However, if human rights, equality of opportunity to participate in society and the freedom of conscience and religion are fundamental Canadian principles, then perhaps "accommodation" is not the correct word to be used in these circumstances. Certain changes to societal norms are actually permitting immigrants to integrate more effectively into Canadian communities.

The Canadian state has long made room for the practice of religion while maintaining its secular framework for public life. Among the many civil society actors who interact in the public sphere, religious organizations are legitimate participants who seek to speak for their communities. Protestant-Catholic conflicts in early Canadian history have become a distant memory and these groups have found a place from which to carry out a conversation with the state. As the Canadian religious sphere has become more pluralistic, there has been a growth in the number of bodies that are interacting with the state and other mainstream institutions. The demands of Jews, Sikhs and Muslims may sound alien to a dominantly Christian country, but they are only the most recent in the longstanding engagement of religion with Canadian society. Central to these negotiations is the upholding of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all residents of this country, particularly human rights and the ability to participate in public life. An individual's adherence to any religion should not hinder these primary guarantees that the Canadian state affords every citizen.

The research from which this article draws was commissioned by the Strategic Policy, Planning and Research, Department of Canadian Heritage. It was presented at the 12th International Metropolis Conference in Melbourne, Australia and at the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance conference in Montreal, both of which took place in October 2007.

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Notes:

[1] These controversies are discussed in greater detail in Karim and Kassam (2007).

[2] Stanley Cohen (1972) defines the term as a societal reaction to a group based on the false or exaggerated perception that its cultural behaviour is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to societal values and interests.

Religion and the State:

in Defense of *la Laïcité Inclusive*

Marc Gold

Marc Gold is Vice President of Maxwell Cummings and Sons Holdings Ltd. and an Adjunct Professor of Law at McGill University. As a volunteer, he serves as President of Federation CJA and Co-President of *La Fondation de la Tolérance*.

ABSTRACT

This article considers the issue of the relationship between religion and the state from the perspective of recent developments in Quebec, notably the reasonable accommodation debate, and addresses the meaning attached to the concept of *la laïcité* as the framework for addressing the issues. The author offers a conception of *la laïcité inclusive* that is rooted in the historical and constitutional traditions of Quebec and Canada.

Introduction

The role of religion in Canadian society has been in the news across Canada for some time now, so no ink need be wasted on justifying the relevance of this edition of *Canadian Diversity*. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that this is not a new issue. The relationship between religion, society and state has been a core driver in the evolution of the modern western state for the past five centuries, and has been an ongoing theme in Canadian public life, both before and since Confederation. As I will argue, the Canadian way of addressing these issues demonstrates a wisdom upon which we can and should rely as we confront the questions currently being debated.

This article addresses the issue from the perspective of recent developments in Quebec, notably the reasonable accommodation debate and the establishment of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission.[1] This is not because the issue is limited to Quebec. On the contrary, the debate in Quebec both reflects and informs what has and will be played out in the rest of Canada and the western world, albeit in different keys and tempos. But the specific history of Quebec and the rapid social and demographic changes that have characterized the past fifty or so years give the issue a particular dimension and focus that is both unique and instructive.

Framing the issue: on the meanings of *la laïcité*

If the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec has turned on (and been fueled by) the intense media focus on a number of discrete incidents – most of which have nothing to do with the notion of reasonable accommodation as a legal concept – the intellectual debate in Quebec has centered on the concept of *la laïcité*, a concept which can be translated only imperfectly as secularism.[2] More particularly, the debate has been on which conception or interpretation of *la laïcité* ought to be adopted in Quebec.

To understand the significance of the issue in Quebec, one must say a few words about history, the role of the Church and the current state of anxiety about the future of Quebec identity.

As is well known, organized religion in general, and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, played a larger role in the public life of Quebec than it did elsewhere in Canada. Indeed, up until the mid twentieth century, the Church exercised many of the functions that were otherwise assumed by the state elsewhere.[3] This changed radically in the post-war period with the Quiet Revolution, a central element of which was the displacement of the Church from its previously dominant role and the rise of an activist state. This legacy has resulted in a fear that any recognition of religion in the public sphere would represent a step backwards from the hard-won achievements of personal freedom and equality that are invoked as the achievements of the Quiet Revolution. At the same time, there remains the perennial concern amongst many Quebecers of French origin that, as a minority within both Canada and North America, their culture and identity remains fragile and in need of special protection. In the face of the increasing number of immigrants from non-Christian backgrounds and their demands (real and perceived) that their religious and cultural practices be accommodated, many Quebecers are insisting that the state not yield to those demands but should legislate to preserve, if not indeed privilege, the patrimonial (read Catholic) heritage of Quebec.

This complex dynamic informs the current debate in Quebec concerning the role of the state and religion. For some, the invocation of the concept of *la laïcité* is sufficient in itself to resolve the debate. Given that the state is now *laïc*, religion simply has no place in the public sphere. And so it has been argued that all religious symbols ought to be removed from public space; that public employees ought to be prohibited from displaying their religious affiliation in their manner of dress or ornamentation; that no accommodation on religious grounds should be permitted for public employees, and so on.

But this is to adopt one and only one interpretation of *la laïcité*, one that is inspired by the model in France as it is currently understood. Notwithstanding its virtue of apparent simplicity, one should not adopt the French model uncritically. First, it is deeply rooted in the particular history of France, in the religious conflicts that marked its history and in its choice of a republican model of government. Moreover, it took over a century before it was formally adopted in France, and it remains the subject of a vigorous debate and reevaluation, as its limitations as a tool of integration are becoming more manifest.[4]

But most importantly, it simply is not our model. There is a Canadian and Quebec conception of *la laïcité*, even if the term has not been used to describe it up to this point. This conception has the twin virtues of being grounded in our history and social context and of providing the best answer to the modern challenges of life in an increasingly diverse and pluralistic society.

Towards a home-grown model: *la laïcité inclusive*

The Canadian approach to the relationship between the state and religion has evolved over time, but it finds its modern expression in the jurisprudence based upon the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*[5] and the *Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms*,[6] as well as upon the human rights legislation at the federal and provincial levels. This approach rests on three main pillars: (1) the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis religion; (2) the guarantee of freedom of religion; and (3) the concept of reasonable accommodation as a legal response to an infringement of rights. In Quebec, one should add a fourth element, that of the recent deconfessionalization of the education system.[7] To join issue with the language of the current debate in Quebec, one can describe this as a model of *la laïcité inclusive*.[8] In broad terms, this model provides the framework through which to address many of the issues of the day.

The state should be neutral with respect to religion in the sense that it should not promote one religion over another. But the principle of the neutrality of the state does not mean nor require that the state banish all signs of religion from the public space. State neutrality towards religion does not necessarily mean state hostility towards religion. Nor should it.

Many citizens take their religious beliefs seriously as being fundamental to their identity. They see the expression of those beliefs as an important part of who they are in all aspects of their life, both private and public. This does not necessarily entail a rejection of a vision of Quebec or Canadian society that is secular and democratic, nor a desire to remove themselves from full participation as citizens. In a society that is increasingly diverse and global, it is increasingly clear that we all have multiple and composite identities that cannot be reduced to one Procrustean model.[9] Nor in a free and democratic society should we be required to deny those dimensions of our personhood that are most central to our existence.

These considerations underpin the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion we find in both the Canadian and Quebec Charters of Rights. Properly understood, freedom of religion is an important element in our conception of the neutrality of the state with respect to religion, not a value that is in conflict with it.

The concept of the neutrality of the state also requires that individuals and groups be treated equally, and that rules and practices that discriminate on the basis of religion be avoided to the fullest extent possible. It is in this respect that the concept of reasonable accommodation is best understood, as a legal concept designed to militate against an infringement of rights. To be sure, the public debate in Quebec has almost totally stripped this term of its proper legal meaning and scope, applied as it has been to all matters of private arrangements between neighbours, to individual initiatives of entrepreneurs, and so on. Nevertheless, properly understood, the concept of reasonable accommodation is an important and necessary component to our commitment to equality and to the neutrality of the state in matters of religion.[10]

What then of the issue of religious symbols in public spaces? The short answer is that it depends. In this regard, one can and should distinguish between different kinds of public buildings and spaces. Different answers may well be appropriate when dealing with hospitals as compared with schools, or as between schools and official government buildings. Furthermore, one can and should distinguish between the different roles that people play in those public spaces, whether we are dealing with teachers and students, or judges and their support staff. One might also sensibly draw lines between religious symbols that are permanent, and those that are temporary or seasonal.

Consider for example the question of the wearing of religious symbols in public schools, an issue raised on a number of occasions before the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. The general rule in Quebec is that students are free to display their religious conviction in their dress.[11] As for teachers, there is no hard and fast rule. The current debate seems to turn on whether teachers ought to be prohibited from displaying religious symbols in their dress so as to communicate the secular nature of the public school system, or should be free to express their religious belief through their dress, thereby educating students about the diversity of their society. I find the latter argument more compelling, but reasonable people may and do disagree.

Limited space permits only a broad examination of all the issues at hand, and in a sense, entering into a detailed examination would contradict one of the central points of my argument. There is rarely one right answer to many of the issues, and much depends on the context and the judgment of the actors seized with the particularities of the decision. What is important is that all of the rights, interests and social policies at stake be taken seriously, and that the analysis should not be short-circuited by a rigid adherence to an inflexible and static model. Often the best one can hope for is a sensible choice from amongst the range of options that are reasonable and not unjust.

Conclusion

I have argued for a conception of *la laïcité inclusive* as the model for addressing the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, based as it is on the principles and values embodied in the Canadian and Quebec Charters of Rights. This is not to defend every

decision of the courts. Indeed, one may disagree with how the Supreme Court struck the balance in any one of their recent decisions.[12] Nevertheless, this basic approach to resolving these issues – taking seriously the rights in question and the policy justifications for their limitation – remains sound.

One may object that this approach and the model of *laïcité* are simply not up to the task of resolving the hard questions that arise in particular circumstances. To admit that there may be no uniquely right answer, or that reasonable people may disagree, is to admit that the model resolves nothing at all.

But in a deep sense, this is the point. The model provides the framework for a conversation and debate about what is truly important to us as citizens. This is both healthy and necessary in a democratic and pluralistic society.[13] What do we share together as common public values, and how do we structure our lives together in light of what may be differences that are fundamental to our own unique and multiple identities? The approach that we have developed over time – the neutrality of the state with respect to religion, a commitment to freedom of religion and to equality – provides us with both the space and the opportunity to engage in this conversation as citizens.

I would go one step further. The model of *la laïcité inclusive* expresses a deep and profound vision of society, one that is no less profound for having evolved incrementally as opposed to having been designed rationalistically. This vision affirms the importance of a common set of public values that are constitutive of our political culture, as expressed in our constitutional documents and jurisprudence and, in the case of Quebec, with the affirmation of French as the official language. It is a vision that respects and protects the liberty and autonomy of individuals and insists that people be treated as equals and with respect. At the same time, it recognizes that people are more than simply rights-holders, that there is a complex integrity to human personality that our legal and social structures must reflect. Accordingly, while protecting the important values of individual liberty and autonomy, this vision also recognizes the extent to which religious and other communities are constitutive of personal identity,[14] thereby melding the protection of individual and collective rights into our constitutional framework.[15] Simply put, we have developed an approach which takes into account the fundamental facts of social coexistence while accommodating the competing demands of personal autonomy, equality and social solidarity.[16]

If what we have achieved is precious and worth preserving, one should not lose sight of its fragility. We need political and intellectual leadership that explains and defends the magnificent achievement of our pluralistic democracy, not leadership that exploits citizens' anxiety about their future or rests silent as others pander to peoples' fear of "the other". We need our schools better educate our children about the common values that we share as citizens, about the richness and diversity of our increasingly pluralistic society, and of the ways in which the inevitable social frictions that arise in such a society can be managed in a civilized and neighbourly fashion. Let us not take for granted what we have built together. Much still needs to be done to secure it for our future.

Notes

1 *La Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles*, Décret 95-2007.

2 In France the concept of *la laïcité* refers essentially to the separation of Church and State, but it has become the battleground for different conceptions of what that separation entails. I use the French concept here to maintain the tension surrounding the meaning to be given to it, a tension that would be blunted if not lost by using the more familiar, but not totally accurate, translation of secularism.

3 Notable examples include the areas of education, health care and welfare services.

4 See Beaubérot, J. (2006). *L'Intégrisme républicain contre la laicité.* La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube.

5 *The Constitution Act, 1982*, Part I, being Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

6 R.S.Q. C-12

7 Milot, M. (2005). Neutralité politique et libertés de religion dans les sociétés plurielles : le cas canadien. In J. Beaubérot and M. Wieviorka (Eds.), *De la séparation des Églises et de l'État à l'avenir de la laïcité* (pp. 274). La Tour d'Aigues : Éditions de l'Aube.

8 Supra note 4.

9 See Maalouf, A. (1998). *Les Identités meurtrières.* Paris : Éditions Grasset. See also Maclure, J. (2003). *Quebec identity: The challenge of pluralism.* Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.

10 See Woehrling, J. (1998). L'obligation d'accommodement raisonnable et l'adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse. *Revue de droit de McGill*, 43, 325.

11 See, e.g. *La laïcité scolaire au Québec. Un nécessaire changement de culture institutionnelle.* Avis au ministre de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport. Octobre 2006. www.mels.gouv.qc.ca/affairesreligieuses/CAR/PDF/Avis_LaiciteScolaire.pdf

12 Notable examples include *Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys*, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, concerning the wearing of a *kirpan* in school; Syndicat *Northcrest v. Amselem* [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, concerning the erection of a *sukkah* on a condominium balcony; and *Bruker v. Marcovitz*, 2007 SCC 54, concerning the validity of an agreement that the husband grant a religious divorce (*get*) immediately upon the civil dissolution of their marriage.

13 One might go so far as to say that one of the most important functions of our core values like freedom, equality, democracy and so on are that they exist to be argued about. In this respect, the notion of *la laicité*, like so many of our important notions, is best understood as a contested concept, one that admits of a number of different conceptions or interpretations. They may share the same conceptual and linguistic form, but cash out quite differently as applied in the world. See Connolly, W. (1983). *The terms of political discourse.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

14 See Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

15 See Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

16 For a philosophical defense of this vision of society, see Rawls, J. (2001). *Justice as fairness: A restatement.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

The Sacred Public Sphere:

Praying for Secularism

Sarah Elgazzar

Sarah Elgazzar holds a B.Sc. from McGill in Psychology (neuro) and Middle Eastern Studies, and is a former spokesperson for the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-Can).

ABSTRACT

This article examines the place of religion in public institutions as well as some of the key players in resolving the issues surrounding the accommodation of religious and visible minorities. It explores discrimination in attaining employment in the public sector and also explores what Canadian society can do to maintain social cohesiveness and further mutual understanding within our communities.

The debate surrounding reasonable accommodations in Quebec and Canada as a whole has pushed Canadians to ask many questions regarding the future of our society and has demanded deeper and deeper levels of introspection. We now, as a nation, must channel those reflections into solutions that will increase social cohesion, and address the ills that challenge our society.

Among many of the questions les Québécois, and by extension, Canadians are being asked to ponder is the place of religion in public life or public institutions. It is therefore important to define the nature of such institutions. The Latin root of "public" is *publicus*, which literally translates into "pertaining to the people", and means "open to all in the community".[1] Public institutions and public places should, in theory, be accessible to all citizens, regardless of colour, gender, creed and so on. Not only should everyone have access to the services provided, but also the opportunity to provide those services to others by working for such public institutions.

On this last point however, there appears to be much discussion. Should people who publicly display their faith be permitted to work for a public institution? If we were to speak in purely theoretical terms, a public institution pertains to outwardly religious people, and they certainly are a part of the community. Therefore, simply by implication, they should have the opportunity to serve and be served. We do not, however, live in a purely theoretical world, do we?

So can a man wearing a turban objectively take your driver's licence photo? Some will argue that no, he cannot, as he is clearly affiliated with a religion, and the state is not. So how can this be reconciled?

These critics will say that because the state is secular, then its representatives should not display any affiliations, so as to remain objective in rendering services. This argument is based on the assumption that the state is actually secular. We first must understand the parameters within which we are asked to work. While Quebec, for example, is a secular province, Canada, strictly speaking, is not a secular country.[2] It is worth noting that, for all intents and purposes, Canada operates as though it were a secular country despite the presence of religious references. For example, the preamble to our *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* recognizes "the supremacy of God". So while the references to religion are present, they tend to be more ceremonial in nature.

And even if Canada did strictly identify itself as a secular country, for the state to be defined as secular, it must not espouse any one religion. That is to say that the state, in and of itself, does not give precedence to any religion over others and has no affiliation with a particular religion. The term "secular" is defined as "not pertaining to or connected with religion".[3] In no way does the definition indicate something that is anti-religion; it simply is not affiliated with religion. The state may be secular; the people that reside within it need not be.

Secularism was instituted in many countries. It was instituted in France, for example, to restore equality between men and women, believer and non-believer, and to make all citizens equal before the law. Bearing this in mind, a secular state will not favour a religion over another, and more broadly speaking, favour one individual over another for the purposes of employment, except on the basis of merit. Simply put, secularism, by virtue of its definition, means that we should all have equal access to opportunity, regardless of race, creed, gender and so on. Secularism cannot be used to justify discrimination.

Yet still, some will argue that a representative of a secular state should appear outwardly to be completely objective and neutral, so anyone that displays public religious observance does not qualify. If that were the case however, then where would we draw the line? We would be headed down what lawyers call the slippery slope. If a religious person is feared not to be objective enough to serve the population, for fear that he or she might favour people with the same observance and deny services to others, then would people of colour be objective enough? Would homosexuals? Feminists? What about women versus men? Which gender would be more objective in that case? If we begin to discriminate to find the perfectly objective person, we will be searching endlessly, as they do not exist.

If at the end of the day, our goal is to further mutual respect and social cohesion, this will only happen through daily interactions between people of different faiths (or non-faiths for that matter) and cultures, and what better place for this kind of exchange to occur than the workplace? It may sound like grandma psychology, but we as humans naturally fear what is unknown to us. The more we learn about something or someone, the less we fear and we begin to draw our understanding from practical experience, rather than programmed prejudice.

A survey conducted by the Council on American-Islamic Relations in the United States reported that the more contact non-Muslim Americans had with their Muslims compatriots, the less likely they were to have a negative opinion of Muslims in general.[4]

These results can likely be extrapolated for any religious group, or even more generally to visible minorities.

So while the debate about reasonable accommodation rages on, and we as a society discuss the various cases that are presented to us by the media, it seems that we have missed the forest for the trees in many instances.

Firstly, reasonable accommodations are made everyday in Canada, without the flashbulbs of cameras, and the myriad of microphones surrounding them to show Canadians how it can be done. Yielding your seat to an elderly person on the bus is a reasonable accommodation. So is offering to carry a heavy box for a pregnant woman. We do these things all the time. Though this debate has been heavily reported in the media as of late, and has even become an election issue during the 2007 Quebec elections, Canadians have been accommodating for a long time now, and overall, we get along quite well in our society.

To "reasonably accommodate" someone simply means to re-adjust circumstances to help an individual remain included in the mainstream group, in this case, Canadian society. The individual in the wheelchair does not have to make the painful decision to stay home from school because there is no ramp or elevator to allow her into the building. No harm is presented to walking individuals if a ramp is put in the place of stairs, and this small gesture makes a world of difference to the individuals that must use a wheelchair. Their needs have been considered and addressed and they feel like they belong to their school's community.

Now the example of pregnancy or of physically challenged people is rather benign, as we will seldom hear any objections to those kinds of accommodations. Religion, however, is just slightly more controversial in today's world, isn't it? Now any accommodation made public is contested, to the point that people making the accommodations will deny that they have done any such thing to avoid the plethora of emails, voice mails and interviews that will undoubtedly come their way.

The example of the International Tae Kwon Doe Federation allowing Muslim women to wear their head-scarves beneath their helmets at a tournament this past summer in Quebec City comes to mind. When the spokesperson was asked if he had made "a reasonable accommodation", he replied "Oh no! This is not a reasonable accommodation, no no!...". It is quite ironic that reasonable accommodation was designed to promote inclusion and unity and is now perceived as exclusionary and divisive.

Secondly, reasonable accommodations are rights, not privileges, that are accessible not only to religious minorities, but to all people living in Canada. It is after all, the principle of reasonable accommodation that allows women to take maternity leave from their jobs, and to be able to return to the same position when that leave expires. This applies to many women in Canada, nowadays. Keeping these points in the foreground, we must highlight that not all reasonable accommodations apply exclusively to religious or minority groups, but are rather quite mainstream.

Lastly, while religious accommodations are usually well received in the public and private sectors, the greatest "accommodation" that can be offered to religious and visible minorities is a stable job. Access to employment remains the biggest challenge faced by minorities, religious or otherwise. This is a problem that we as a nation must tackle, with the various levels of government leading the way.

Maria Barrados, president of the Public Service Commission ("PSC") reported that in 2004, the PSC asked 18 departments and agencies to prepare and submit their executive staffing plans. Eleven of the 18 organizations complied. These plans included over 280 potential vacancies, of which only eight were targeted to members of visible minorities.[5] In 2006, Barrados reports 18 departments made a total of 254 appointments. Only six of those went to visible minorities. And in 2007, the hiring of visible minorities fell again, despite that fact that overall hiring increased by 9.5%. The number of visible minorities hired decreased from 9.8% to 8.7%.[6]

A great many articles were also published in Canada's francophone newspapers, such as *La Presse*, investigating hiring individuals with French-Canadian names versus others with Arab or Muslim names.[7] The results were often disappointing. Other articles explored the hiring practices of the Municipality of Quebec City. Journalists did not have to explore deeply to discover that women wearing hijab, and particularly women wearing niqab, were not welcome to even apply to Quebec's City Hall according to the late mayor Andree Boucher.[8]

Our political leaders and governments have a duty to set examples for the greater public, as well as other institutions, and are expected to show leadership in treating visible and religious minorities as full-class citizens. Otherwise the social fabric that is our society will be very easily ripped apart, as there is little to hold the seams together. This unravelling has already begun in countries like France, and has led to disastrous consequences. To avoid similar consequences in Canada, we must tackle the issues of accessibility to employment swiftly and thereafter the other issues that pertain to accommodations of various sorts.

To act swiftly, there are many lessons to be learned from the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec. Three of the lessons will be highlighted below.

Firstly, there is always someone that has a vested interest in pitting groups against one another. The old "divide and conquer" strategy has worked for as long as there have been people to divide. By stirring up questions of identity threat

in Quebec, and fears about organized religion coming back to take over the province, many players had something to gain. By pouncing on the question of Quebec's identity being threatened, and the need for a separate constitution to clarify to immigrants Quebec values, Mario Dumont, leader of the Action démocratique du Quebec (ADQ), stood to gain about 15-20 seats. And he did gain them. Certain up and coming journalists seized the opportunity to launch their careers on the backs of the most "unreasonable" accommodation they could find. Some journalists even published books about the supposed threat to Quebec's very existence.

And while we in Quebec were having debates about the hypothetical situation of "veiled voting", in ridings where there are virtually no Muslims, we failed to make our infrastructure, environment, and not to mention our ailing healthcare system potent elections issues. All most politicians had to worry about in this last Quebec election was whether little girls should be allowed to play soccer with headscarves on.

The second lesson we can draw from this debate is how important our media has become in shaping our attitudes towards one another. Their coverage can propel us forward in our goals of social cohesion or, conversely, can be completely detrimental. The constant repetition of the similar stories, from very similar angles during this debate inflated the perceived occurrence of conflict between communities. The viewers were bombarded with the same stories over and over again, until the cries of threatened identities began to sound terribly legitimate. Yet for the handful of controversial stories, there were hundreds of others that demonstrated mutual respect and understanding.

While certain media outlets concentrated on sensationalist headlines, and finding the most ridiculous examples of reasonable accommodations, they did not seem to realize that their coverage increased hostilities in the day-to-day life of anyone who was outwardly religious.

Yet there were other outlets that went far more in depth to discover how to solve problems. In certain cases, there were some journalists investigating the claims of their colleagues. In one particular case, a story of so-called reasonable accommodation was exposed as a complete fabrication.

One of the pillars of a healthy democracy is a well informed public. A responsible press gallery is therefore essential to a thriving democracy and social cohesion. Irresponsible media may thwart any advances that we wish to make, unless we participate actively in countering misinformation.

Lastly, and perhaps the most powerful lesson learned in this debate, is that of acceptance. This was not a lesson learned from our politicians, our scholars or journalists. This lesson was a demonstration put on by a small group of 11-year old girls at a tournament in Laval. Asmahan Mansour's soccer team had fully accepted her presence among them, and valued her contribution not only as a talented soccer player, but also as a friend. They had come to know Asmahan and liked and respected her for who she was. They did not simply tolerate her because they had to, but rather accepted her as one of them. Though this wasn't the focus of the media, it remains a very powerful lesson from an often overlooked source.

We have much work to do in the way of mutual understanding and social cohesion. Most people would agree that the best way of overcoming our fear of the unfamiliar is to get to know one another. And it is not only in religious texts that we find this prescription.[9]

> "C'mon people, now
> smile on your brother,
> everybody get together,
> try to love one another right now."
>
> *– Chet Powers, The Youngbloods*

Notes

[1] The Online Etymology Dictionary. (2008). Retrieved from http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=public.

[2] Department of Justice Canada. (2007). *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, 1982. Retrieved from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/.

[3] The Online Dictionary. (2008). Retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/secular.

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[8] Vaillancourt, C. (2007, October 30). Accommodements: pas de femme voilée à l'hôtel de ville. *La Presse.* Retrieved from http://www.cyberpresse.ca/article/20071030/CPSOLEIL/71029231/7113/CPSOLEIL.

[9] Qur'an 49:13.

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

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









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