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CANADIAN DIVERSITÉ CANADIENNE

VOLUME 2:1 SPRING 2003 PRINTEMPS

CITIZENSHIP
Values and Responsibilities

LA CITOYENNETÉ
Valeurs et responsabilités

Guest editor / Rédacteur invité
Will Kymlicka, Queen's University

SPECIAL INSERT INCLUDED:
Citizenship and immigration sessions at the Halifax 2003 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences

ENCART INCLUS :
Les séances sur la citoyenneté et l'immigration au Congrès des sciences humaines 2003 à Halifax

Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Science
Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines

METROPOLIS

This edition of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne* is a collaboration of the Metropolis Project, the Canadian Federation of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Association for Canadian Studies

Un appui financier a été fourni par le programme des Études canadiennes (Patrimoine canadien), la Direction générale de l'intégration (Citoyenneté et immigration Canada) et le programme de Multiculturalisme (Patrimoine canadien)

INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CELEBRATE!

INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS ON OMNI

Name of Program	Language	Original Time	
Caribbean Vibrations	English	2:30PM – 3:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Kontakt	Ukrainian	1:00PM – 2:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Latin Vibes Television	Spanish	4:00PM – 5:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Lehen Malti	Maltese	10:00AM – 10:30AM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Macedonian Heritage Hour	Macedonian	5:00PM – 6:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Magyar Kèpek TV	Hungarian	12:30PM – 1:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Morning Waves	Russian	7:00AM – 8:00AM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Noi Românii	Romanian	12:00PM – 12:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Pasqyra Shqiptare	Albanian	2:00PM – 2:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Russian Waves	Russian	10:00PM – 10:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.1**
Admas	Amharic (Ethiopian)	2:30PM – 3:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Afghan Hindara	Pushto/Dari	1:00PM – 1:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Amantran	Bengali	12:30PM – 1:00PM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Arirang Korea	Korean	6:30PM – 7:00PM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Flip	Filipino-English	12:00PM – 12:30PM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Front Page Philippines	Tagalog, Visayan	4:00PM – 4:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Iran Zameen Today and Pasargad Today	Persian	12:00PM – 1:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Kala Kavaya	Sinhalese	10:30AM – 11:00AM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Malayala Shabtham	Malayalam	11:00AM – 11:30AM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Munawa'at Arabia TV	Arabic	1:30PM – 2:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Muuqaalka Soomaalida	Somali	10:00AM – 10:30AM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Nor Hai Horizon	Armenian	9:00AM – 10:00AM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Ondes Africaines	French (African)	3:00PM – 3:30PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
Planet Africa Television	English (African)	3:30PM – 4:00PM *(Saturday)*	– **OMNI.2**
TV Viêt Tiên	Vietnamese	11:00AM – 12:00PM *(Sunday)*	– **OMNI.2**

With the launch of OMNI.2, Rogers Media television set new records in diversity broadcasting. Combined, OMNI.1 (CFMT-TV) and OMNI.2 will provide quality programming to over 50 different communities.

Twenty-five Independent producers were introduced at the OMNI Launch and joined The Hon. Sheila Copps, Minister of Canadian Heritage as she congratulated the OMNI team in numerous languages. Ted Rogers spoke of his 35 years of ongoing commitment to multilingual television in Canada.

Upholding this commitment to cultural diversity, Madeline Ziniak, Vice President and Station Manager, announced the production initiatives totalling $50 million, of which $30 million will be specifically dedicated to Independent Production.

Committed to Cultural Diversity!

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CANADIAN DIVERSITY CANADIENNE

Volume 2:1 SPRING 2003 PRINTEMPS

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Canadian **Federation** for the Humanities and Social Science
Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines

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The ACS would also like to highlight the generous support of Omni Television (Rogers Communications) and diversitynow.ca to this publication

OMNI ROGERS

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Diversité canadienne est une publication trimestrielle de l'Association d'études canadiennes (AEC). Il est distribué gratuitement aux membres de l'Association. Diversité canadienne est une publication bilingue. Tous les textes émanant de l'Association sont publiés en français et en anglais. Tous les autres textes sont publiés dans leur langue d'origine. Les collaborateurs et collaboratrices de Diversité canadienne sont entièrement responsables des idées et opinions exprimées dans leurs articles. L'Association d'études canadiennes est un organisme pan-canadien à but non lucratif dont l'objectif est de promouvoir l'enseignement, la recherche et les publications sur le Canada. L'AEC est une société savante, membre de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines et sociales. Elle est également membre fondateur du Conseil international d'études canadiennes.

LETTERS/LETTRES

Comments on this edition of Canadian Diversity?
We want to hear from you.
Write to Canadian Diversity – Letters, ACS, a/s UQAM, V-5140, P.O. Box 8888, succ. Centre-ville, Montreal (Quebec) Canada, H3C 3P8. Or e-mail us at <robert.israel@acs-aec.ca> Your letters may be edited for length and clarity.

Des commentaires sur ce numéro ?
Écrivez-nous à Diversité canadienne
Lettres, AEC, a/s UQAM, V-5140, C.P. 8888, succ. Centre-ville, Montréal (Québec) Canada, H3C 3P8. Ou par courriel au <robert.israel@acs-aec.ca> Vos lettres peuvent êtres modifiées pour des raisons éditoriales.

The challenge of developing a stable political community amidst great ethnic, religious, regional, and linguistic diversity has been a constant theme in Canadian history. The following collection of essays suggests that the challenge will be with us for a long time to come. None of the essays suggest these forms of diversity will fade in their sociological incidence or political salience. Nor do they suggest that the challenge of managing diversity will somehow take care of itself if just left to the logic of the free market or to the solicitude of individual Canadians. Managing diversity in Canada has always required conscious state policies, and will continue to do so.

Many of the issues discussed in the essays, therefore, will be familiar to readers: ie., how to reconcile the recognition of diversity with the building of common feelings of membership and solidarity; how to understand the links between economic disadvantage and cultural exclusion, since many minority groups suffer from both; how to promote genuine mutual understanding rather than simply the tokenistic appreciation of diversity; how to enable greater public participation, yet also ensure that participation is conducted responsibly, with a spirit of openness and fairness, and is not simply a way of asserting dogmatic claims or scapegoating unpopular groups.

Ce sont là quelques-unes des questions opposant fréquemment les étudiants de la citoyenneté canadienne. Alors que ces questions de base n'évoluent pas beaucoup au fil des ans, il existe certains changements dans les concepts que nous employons pour en parler. Par exemple, de nouvelles notions de « cohésion sociale » et de « capital social » ont fait leur entrée dans le débat au cours des dix dernières années. La première notion provient d'Europe alors que la seconde, des États-Unis. Les deux ont vite trouvé leurs voies dans les débats canadiens et elles sont fréquemment invoquées dans les essais qui suivent. Il reste maintenant à se demander si la popularité de ces notions est simplement une question de mode intellectuelle ou si ces concepts peuvent en fait contribuer à une meilleure compréhension du phénomène. (I'm more optimistic that "social capital" will prove a fruitful addition to our conceptual toolkit than "social cohesion")

In addition to changes in our conceptual vocabulary, there are also changes to the nature of society itself. The challenges Canada faces today are different from those we faced 10 years ago. The most obvious change concerns the salience of religion in debates about Canadian diversity, including the essays in this issue. This is partly due to the events of 9/11, which have put Muslim communities under a spotlight throughout the West. But the rediscovery of religion as a pivotal issue predates September 2001. The claim that the Canadian model of multiculturalism marginalizes religion was advanced first by evangelical Protestant groups, linked to similar Christian movements in the United States. Some conservative Jewish and Muslim groups have entered into an alliance with evangelical Protestants to push for a more "religion-friendly" model of multiculturalism, particularly in the field of education. Aboriginal Canadians have also emphasized the centrality of spirituality to their visions of Aboriginal self-government. Even those Canadians who are not religious have started to recognize that an understanding of world religions is needed to make sense of various international conflicts, or indeed of our own history in Canada.

All of these factors have highlighted religion as a form of diversity that must be debated and accommodated. Pessimists might wonder whether the "Canadian model" can cope with this additional challenge, or whether this will be the straw that breaks the camel's back. After all, none of our earlier challenges of diversity have been solved: charges of racism against blacks in the police forces and judicial system are again in the news; the appalling conditions on many Aboriginal reserves remain a national disgrace; recent immigrants have had a more difficult time finding an economic footing; not to mention the unsettled constitutional wrangling with Quebec. Can we hope that a system under such strain can cope with the demands of increasingly assertive religious groups, particularly when one of these groups has become associated with fundamentalism and terrorism?

Pour ceux qui sont de nature pessimiste, il y a matière à s'inquiéter. Quelques-uns des essais suivants expriment le désespoir et le découragement. Sur une autre note, ils expriment aussi une confiance surprenante que le Canada surmontera ces obstacles, en apprenant au passage et en évoluant à partir des leçons passées au sujet de la gestion de la diversité. Il semble y avoir un consensus général que les bases constructives menant au succès de la diversité sont en place au Canada, non seulement en termes de lois et d'institutions politiques, mais aussi en termes d'attitudes populaires. Nous nous accordons aussi à dire que les leaders politiques responsables pourront canaliser ces ressources pour traiter avec n'importe quel défi que nous affronterons.

We can compare this confidence with the anxious, almost panicked, response to diversity that we see in some other Western countries, reflected in the rise of extreme right anti-immigrant parties in France or Belgium, or the "retreat from multiculturalism" in the Netherlands, or the heavy-handed coercive policies towards immigrants in Austria. In all of these countries, there has been a strong backlash against new immigrants, and against multicultural accommodations. In the Canadian debate, by contrast, we find general support for the basic outlines of our immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism policies. There is no suggestion in the following essays that we should dramatically reduce our immigration intake, or curtail access to citizenship, or retreat from our public commitment to multiculturalism. The authors suggest ways of extending these policy commitments, not of backtracking on them.

Of course, this may be a biased sample: perhaps the authors invited to contribute to this issue already have a personal or professional stake in the success of the Canadian model. Undoubtedly there are many people in Canada with more pessimistic views. One can find such views expressed loudly in newspaper columns or radio talk shows. And yet I think the confidence expressed in the following essays reflects the predominant view within the Canadian public. There have been periodic attempts by some politicians to whip up opposition to our immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism policies, but they have been surprisingly unsuccessful, at least in comparison with most other Western countries. The public might not be in the mood for the sort of bold leap forward that some authors recommend, but nor do they support any serious retrenchment or backtracking. Given the uncertain times we live in, and the dangers of ill-conceived over-reactions to new challenges, that sort of calm support for the status quo is perhaps not a bad thing.

Will Kymlicka, Queen's University

Interview with

Sheila Copps
Minister of Canadian Heritage

The Government of Canada frequently speaks of "Canadian Values." What do you believe these values include? To what extent are these values uniquely Canadian? To what extent are they more universally shared by liberal democracies and across major world religions?

Canadians are no different than citizens of other liberal democracies in their commitment to the values of freedom, justice, equality and the rule of law. These are universal values, not simply Canadian values. When we talk about «Canadian values», I think we mean the unique way Canadians express liberal democratic values – a way that has been shaped by Canada's distinct history and struggles.

In Canada, the rule of law is expressed in our constitution as «peace, order, and good government.» In times of tragedy and conflict, we see how important this enduring value is to Canadians.

We share the value of freedom with our American neighbours but the expression of that freedom continues to take a very different form in Canada, where the balancing of individual and collective freedom means that citizens are able to choose who they want to be, and to embrace multiple identities and attachments. The value Canadians now place on mutual accommodation, respect for diversity and civility has its origin in part in the centuries of dialogue and negotiation between Canada's Aboriginal peoples, French and British settlers, and the generations of settlers that followed.

In the same way, justice and equality are values shared by all liberal democracies, but they take on a unique expression in Canada. While other factors are important, Canada's harsh climate, vast landscape, thinly spread-out population, and proximity to the United States have meant that Canadians need to act deliberately and collectively in order to survive. This has contributed to Canadians' sense of mutual responsibility and reciprocity – values that are now reflected in our health care, educational, and other major social and cultural institutions.

These are just a few examples of ways that our unique history and struggles have shaped who we are and the expression of our liberal democratic values. We would need historians, sociologists and other story tellers to tell the full story.

In this context, I would like to mention the recent study by the Canadian Policy Research Network (CPRN) in partnership with the Department of Canadian Heritage, entitled *Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future: A 21st Century Social Contract*. One of the more interesting findings was citizens' desire to articulate a set of core Canadian values. Citizens from in and around ten cities across Canada and representatives from a range of diversity groups identified six core Canadian values: shared community – i.e. despite their differences, Canadians have a unique bond; equity and justice – i.e. each person is respected, valued, and treated the same; respect for diversity – i.e. we value the contributions of all Canada's cultures and traditions; mutual responsibility – i.e. with rights, each citizen has responsibilities; accountability; and democracy – i.e. citizens take ownership of government.

What role does the Government of Canada play in shaping and articulating values?

As a country with such great geographical, regional, linguistic, and cultural diversity, in close proximity to an economic and cultural giant to the south, Canada has never been able to take its existence for granted. Canadians have had to be deliberate about building Canada, about making connections, and fostering a sense of country.

The Government of Canada has played a central role. Over the years, it has been a key instrument for accommodating and balancing the interests of diverse groups and regions, of fostering connections among Canadians, and of articulating the shared values of Canadians.

We have done this through our constitution and legal framework, our Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and our federal system. We have done this through institutions such as the national railway, the Trans-Canada highway, the CBC, through exchanges, and now through our use of the Internet. We have done this through policies such as universal health care, official bilingualism, official multiculturalism, Canadian content regulations, and other defining Government initiatives.

As we confront the challenges of globalization, it will be more important than ever for the Government of Canada to help Canadians articulate their values and who they are. We saw this in health care reform, where the Romanow Report identified values as the foundation for moving forward. We see this in our approach to international terrorism, where our values of multilateralism have been our guideposts. We see this in our approach to humanitarian aid where mutual

responsibility has become Canada's answer to global instability and security.

Key to these efforts to articulate Canadian values has been the Government's engagement with Canadians on values. Our foreign policy review is a good example of such engagement. The Government must continue this dialogue with Canadians across the spectrum of issues.

What responsibilities do all citizens have in Canada?

Canadians have rights but they also have responsibilities. Indeed, responsibilities underlie and sustain our rights.

I have talked about the profound freedom we have in Canada to be who one chooses to be and to enjoy multiple identities and attachments. For instance, we encourage new Canadians to bring their stories and traditions to Canada, to maintain and sustain them, and to share them with Canadians. We are learning, especially through our experience with Aboriginal communities, that communities with a stronger sense of identity and tradition are stronger and can contribute more confidently to Canada's economic, social and cultural life.

Canadians have had to be deliberate about building Canada, about making connections, and fostering a sense of country.

Accommodation and respect for diversity did not arise out of the blue, however. They evolved out of Canada's heritage and traditions. They are premised on core values such as the dignity of the individual, the rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflict. Canadians, including new Canadians, need to be encouraged to have a deeper understanding of these core values and to understand and participate in the Institutions that sustain them. They need to be encouraged to see that respect for diversity is coupled with certain responsibilities. Just as the traditions of new Canadians enrich, and are respected by, other Canadians, new Canadians must learn and respect Canadian traditions and history.

It is in recognition of that principle that the Immigration and the Refugee Protection Act, proclaimed in 2001, includes in its objectives the recognition that the integration of immigrants involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and members of Canadian society.

Again, in this context, it is worth noting the study I mentioned earlier concerning *Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future: A 21st Century Social Contract*. Canadians surveyed clearly stated the expectations they have for their fellow citizens. They expect each other to contribute to Canada's quality of life through paid employment, family and volunteer work and self-development, each to the highest level they are capable.

How does the programming of the Department of Canadian Heritage contribute to fostering attachment to Canada? Does our inclusive national identity help or hinder this process? Does globalization, cosmopolitanism, and dual/multiple citizenship threaten a sense of shared Canadian citizenship?

Canadians, like citizens of other countries, are attached to their country and to one another because of relationships of trust that have been built up over the years. Some of these relationships are based on shared stories, myths and symbols; some are built upon shared experiences established through connections between citizens; some are built upon shared values and a sense of common purpose.

In Canada, the stories, myths and symbols, the connections we have with one another, and shared values all contribute to a sense of attachment. Canadians have some national stories, myths and symbols, but because of Canada's cultural and geographical diversity, they perhaps do not have the same kind of national resonance that comparable stories would have in countries like France or Japan. Equally, Canada's great distances makes connections and shared experiences difficult to forge; indeed many Canadians will never have a chance to see Canadians in other parts of the country. And, as I said before, perhaps more than most countries, a key source of our relationships of trust in Canada are shared values.

The programming at Canadian Heritage is directly focused on strengthening these crucial elements of attachment, namely to promote the sharing of the diverse stories, myths and symbols of Canada, to foster connections among Canadians, especially across diverse communities, and to promote and affirm the shared values and civic relationships that bring Canadians together.

Together, these elements contribute to a model of shared citizenship, where the diversity of our peoples and their stories and perspectives are seen as a strength and where shared values act as a kind of glue. In this unique model of citizenship, Canadians do not fear diversity and cosmopolitanism brought on by globalization. On the contrary, our model positions us well to make diversity and cosmopolitanism our comparative advantage in the new globalized economy.

To realize this opportunity, however, we must be vigilant about strengthening the elements of our shared citizenship: namely, the diverse cultural stories we share and the capacity to participate and have access to Canada's cultural life, the connections we have with one another and especially our shared values, including the rights and responsibilities of civic life in Canada.

I would like to comment on an important contribution we have made to these goals. I recently hosted a forum on diversity and culture which brought together people from diverse communities with decision makers from the cultural sector. The aim of the Forum was to address how we can build a stronger Canada by opening up equitable access to all of the programs and services reflected through our government's investment in cultural expressions. The Forum signals our efforts to investigate how to eliminate systemic barriers in programs and services, how to create strong bonds in communities, how to invest in capacity building to enable diverse expression and the telling of stories, how to contribute to better representation of all facets of our communities in our institutions and how to establish

the means by which we can monitor and hold ourselves accountable to the progress we will make in the future.

It has been suggested that participation in decision-making processes is a key responsibility of citizens. We note the lack of strong analysis on ethnic, racial and religious minority participation in the Canadian Elections Survey and in other research and wonder, how does the Government of Canada identify barriers and work to remove them?

Yes, I believe that to build the kind of democratic society we want in Canada, we need the active participation of citizens in decisions that affect our collective future – not only in elections but in all forms of political processes, public institutions, governance structures and voluntary work. In order to better understand and overcome the barriers to full participation, the Government of Canada draws on many sources, of which surveys are just one example. To be useful, we need adequate sample sizes to do the kind of in-depth analysis you are talking about. We also need to ask the right questions. But more importantly, we need effective partnerships.

Key to these efforts to articulate Canadian values has been the Government's engagement with Canadians on values.

For example, the Metropolis Project, which is funded by a consortium of federal partners including Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canadian Heritage, is an exciting example of how the research, policy and NGO communities can collaborate on interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research, including important issues of civic participation in a diverse society.

Another promising partnership is the Ethnic Diversity Survey, a joint effort of Canadian Heritage and Statistics Canada. When the results of this innovative post-census survey are released in the Fall of 2003, we will have a more comprehensive picture of the ethnic and cultural background of people in Canada and how it relates to their lives. By measuring the attitudes, civic involvement and social interactions of participants, the survey will help the Government of Canada better understand the barriers to cross-cultural understanding and greater civic participation by ethnic and religious minorities.

Regional identity and attachment play strong roles in Canada. How do grant and contribution programs distributed to communities across the country facilitate participation? An attachment to Canada?

It has been my observation that Canadians are at the same time profoundly attached to their local communities and to their country. This is one of the strengths of our Canadian model. In this country, a person can have multiple identities and multiple attachments and still feel proudly Canadian.

Questions of regional and community identity are of course important to Canadians but my focus is always on the federal role. How do we connect Canadians in communities from sea to sea to sea in meaningful ways? How do we build bridges across differences and distances and promote understanding? How do we ensure everyone has opportunities to participate in Canada's cultural and civic life?

Canadian Heritage, including our family of portfolio agencies, delivers services directly to Canadians and we also work with national, regional and local organisational partners to achieve results. Whatever the focus of our programs – the arts, cultural industries, official languages, sport, parks, heritage or youth – our overarching purpose is to contribute to building an inclusive society where our diversity is a creative advantage, where differences are respected and all citizens have a role in shaping Canada's future.

For example, the funding assistance offered by Canadian Heritage's Multiculturalism Program has supported several hundred community groups across this country in their targeted efforts to promote collaboration, dialogue and understanding among Canadians from a wide range of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The Program also works to bring down barriers created by racism, intolerance and hate through efforts such as our annual March 21st campaign.

In the area of official languages, we help to ensure the ability of Canadians to participate in their official language through support for minority language education and the development of minority language communities. We also promote opportunities for Canadians to appreciate the value of our linguistic duality and learn a second language.

Canadian Heritage received $9 million over three years in the wake of September 11 to foster interfaith and inter-community connections. How were the resources spent in the first year and did they successfully foster inter-faith and inter-community connections?

As we have seen, world events and intercultural tensions can have significant impacts domestically. In a country as diverse as Canada, it is more important than ever that we strengthen the connections that promote our understanding of each other and of core values. This requires us to take a new approach to implementing Canada's Multiculturalism policy, one that emphasizes mutually reinforcing themes of combatting racism and discrimination, institutions that reflect Canada's diversity, shared citizenship and cross-cultural understanding.

The funding provided last year enabled Canadian Heritage's Interdepartmental Committee on Public Education to support projects in four key areas: policing in a multicultural society; community cohesion; education and youth initiatives and diversity and culture. Assessing the success of these projects requires us to look at both the immediate tangible outcomes as well as some longer-term impacts on community relations and levels of trust.

For example, in February 2003, Canadian Heritage with the RCMP organized the *Policing in a Multicultural Society Forum* which brought together members of the police and ethnocultural communities for dialogue and sharing of best practices. The concrete outcomes of this forum included enhanced awareness of the key issues

surrounding diversity and policing and recommendations for action that in the long term will assist the delivery of more culturally sensitive policing services in Canadian communities.

A community based research project, championed by Status of Women Canada, provided assistance to the Canadian Council of Muslim Women to increase awareness of the impacts on Muslim women's lives following the events of 9/11. As well as giving Muslim women the opportunity to voice their experiences and concerns, the project produced practical recommendations for enhancing interfaith understanding.

Our Canadian Studies Program also worked with the Association for Canadian Studies on a very effective conference held on the 2002 anniversary of September 11 to assess and study its impact on Canada, on Canadians, and on our relations with the United States. Our partnership with the CPRN was funded from within this financial envelope, as was a significant investment in the Metropolis Project to examine identity markers, the intersections of diversity and relevant policy issues.

In this country, a person can have multiple identities and multiple attachments and still feel proudly Canadian.

What role do Canadian Heritage programs like exchanges and the summer language bursary programs play in fostering connections across diverse communities?

We should not underestimate the value of face to face interactions and shared experiences in building bridges of understanding in this country. This is especially important for young Canadians whose positive experiences with the rich diversity of Canada's communities, languages and cultures can produce lasting impacts throughout their lifetime.

Youth exchanges and the Summer Language Bursary Program supported by Canadian Heritage create opportunities for tens of thousands of young Canadians annually to gain a better understanding of their country, its regions, linguistic duality, diverse cultures and each other. Bringing youth together to bridge some of the inherent divides in Canadian society is an important priority. We also encourage the participation of groups traditionally under-represented in exchange programs, such as Aboriginal youth, youth with disabilities, visible minority youth, youth from low-income households, and youth from rural or isolated areas.

The letters and feedback I receive from youth participants in these programs are overwhelmingly positive. For many young people, it is their first opportunity to experience life in another community outside their province or territory. Not only do they return from their experience with an enhanced appreciation for Canada's diversity and new friends from coast to coast, but the experience also has an enormous impact on their self-confidence, interest in public affairs, leadership skills and career choices.

Many have argued that knowledge of our official languages, history, cultural heritage, and civic/political processes is essential to an active and engaged citizenry. What role does the Department of Canadian Heritage play in promoting/encouraging the acquisition of this knowledge through learning materials, celebrations and commemorations? Should the Government of Canada play a stronger role in promoting civics education?

It is imperative that Canadians, and the next generation of Canadians in particular, be more engaged in the public life of their country. We cannot build a better Canada otherwise. The federal government has a duty to promote knowledge and information about our national achievements, in order to strengthen Canadians' sense of pride, attachment, and investment in the achievements to come. We can do this by working with the provinces in the area of curriculum, but also by the many other means available to us – imaginative ones harnessing the power of the Internet, for example.

Canadian Heritage leads the Government's efforts in this regard, with our huge array of programs in the areas of responsibility that you mention. Specifically, our Canadian Studies Program, as part of its mandate focusing on civic education, has pioneered dynamic and productive partnerships resulting in highly effective ways to help Canadians learn about our country. The popular *Heritage Minutes* have brought to many citizens valuable insights into the history and values of Canada – when *This Hour has 22 Minutes* parodies a product, then we know it is reaching a wide public! We've also recently issued a new resource guide, *Canadians and Their Government*; it's a comprehensive and user-friendly tool to help young people learn about how we govern ourselves.

Citizenship has been identified as a cross-cutting issue by many departments within the Government of Canada as well as to a range of other partners. How do you see Canadian Heritage's role in this wider milieu?

The Government of Canada recognizes that citizenship is more than a certificate or a place of origin. The 2002 Speech from the Throne highlighted the need for deliberate efforts to reinforce Canada's unique model of citizenship, based simultaneously on diversity and mutual responsibility. Canadian Heritage is playing a leadership role in delivering on these commitments to strengthen the partnership between citizens and government. These include initiatives to link Canadians to their history and heritage, putting into action the accord signed with the voluntary Sector last year, implementing an action plan on official languages and working with Aboriginal peoples to preserve and enhance Aboriginal languages and culture.

Canadian Heritage also co-chairs the Interdepartmental Committee on Citizenship Promotion with Citizenship and Immigration Canada to coordinate the roles and responsibilities of a number of government departments and agencies tasked with promoting citizenship values.

Entretien avec

Denis Coderre
Ministre, Citoyenneté et immigration Canada

Le gouvernement du Canada nous parle souvent des « valeurs canadiennes ». À votre avis, qu'entend-on exactement par « valeurs canadiennes » ? Ces valeurs sont-elles exclusives au Canada ? Jusqu'à quel point sont-elles répandues à travers les démocraties libérales et à travers les diverses religions à l'échelle mondiale ?

Le Canada est unique parce qu'il est doté d'une Charte des droits et libertés de la personne. Cette Chartre est le reflet de la substance du Canada. Lorsque nous parlons de valeurs canadiennes, nous entendons parler de répartition, d'opportunité, de tolérance et de liberté. Par dessus tout, nous entendons parler de multiculturalisme. Ce caractère multiculturel propre au Canada nous rend plus sensible à la diversité culturelle, ethnique et religieuse. Le tout rend le Canada unique en son genre. Notre politique en matière d'immigration n'est pas seulement axée sur les points d'entrée au pays, mais aussi sur le processus d'intégration des nouveaux venus dans la société canadienne. Plusieurs de nos valeurs sont effectivement universelles mais nous sommes également différents. L'essence de cette valeur intrinsèque se retrouve dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.

What role does the Government of Canada play in shaping and articulating values?

The Government of Canada is about the people of Canada. The government reflects the multicultural make-up of Canada and its citizens and the values they hold so dear. We have to ensure that our policies reflect the values of the people of Canada.

What responsibilities do all citizens have in Canada?

The pillars of our policies are based on values that represent our citizenship. Our responsibility as citizens is to make sure we are ambassadors and promoters of those values. At the same time we need a balanced approach between freedom and rights, and duties and responsibilities. So every context is different. The most important thing is to strike that balance. We must keep in mind those values, that openness to maintain the uniqueness of this great country of ours.

Comment les programmes de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada contribuent-ils à promouvoir l'attachement au Canada ? Est-ce que notre conception d'une identité nationale inclusive facilite ou gêne le processus d'attachement ?

Les politiques d'intégration du département facilite l'adaptation et l'accoutumance des immigrants dans les communautés à travers le Canada en favorisant l'acquisition de connaissances plus approfondies par les Canadiens et les nouveaux arrivants les uns sur les autres. Les programmes d'intégration promeuvent l'apprentissage d'une de nos deux langues officielles dans le but de faciliter la participation sociale et économique des immigrants dans leurs nouvelles communautés. Le programme d'hôte encourage les Canadiens à approfondir leurs connaissances des nouveaux arrivants et de leur contribution à l'évolution du Canada. Cette approche réciproque à l'apprentissage et au respect fait partie intégrale de notre identité nationale. C'est dans cette nature chaleureuse que l'on retrouve l'attachement au Canada.

Quel est le rôle de la citoyenneté et de l'allégeance dans l'agenda de la sécurité nationale ?

Les Canadiens sont fiers de leurs politiques respectueuses et paisibles. Les nouveaux arrivants sont attirés vers le Canada précisément parce qu'ils s'y sentent les bienvenus et sont encouragés à devenir des citoyens canadiens à participer pleinement dans une société libre et démocratique.

It has been suggested that participation in decision-making processes is a key responsibility of citizens. We note the lack of strong analysis on newcomers in the Canadian Elections Survey and in other research and wonder how the Government of Canada identifies barriers and works to remove them?

Newcomers should be encouraged to participate in all aspects of Canadian society. To do this, they are encouraged to learn one of our official languages, to understand our governance structures, to become Canadian citizens and to vote. The vote gives them the ultimate power to influence the future of their new country. We need to understand the barriers to these processes and best practices to overcome such barriers. The federal government works with provincial governments and academics to promote such immigrant-related research. Every avenue is explored to ensure that immigrant issues are reflected in polls and surveys. Metropolis is an excellent tool for bringing together policy makers and researchers to ensure that areas of interest are examined.

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Regional identity and attachment play strong roles in Canada. You have been particularly active in engaging Canadians and their governments in regions across the country, even regions with lower levels of immigration like the Atlantic provinces, the Prairies and the North. How do you imagine that your department can assist these regions to attract and retain more newcomers?

I firmly believe that all parts of the country should benefit from immigration. Discussions are ongoing at many levels, federal, provincial and local. It will be through these collaborative efforts that communities will self-identify as wanting more immigrants and being prepared to welcome newcomers. I believe that those communities will identify employment opportunities, take into account newcomers' needs for housing, schooling, health care and education, to name a few key elements, and most importantly ensure that they are welcoming. For our part the Department will work with provinces through existing programs, like the Provincial Nominee Program and other pilots to support these communities in their efforts to better attract and retain newcomers.

What role do Citizenship and Immigration Canada programs like language training and the host program play in fostering connections across diverse communities?

Language skills are essential to social and economic participation in communities. Federally funded language training and host programs help newcomers to better orient, adapt and settle in communities. Our settlement services rely on service providers who are close to the newcomers. These providers foster positive relations between different groups through a multicultural approach to orientation and language training. Our Host program links newcomers with established Canadians so they can learn about each other's traditions and cultures, thus building mutual respect.

Many have argued that knowledge of our official languages, history, cultural heritage, and civic/political processes is essential to an active and engaged citizenry. What role Citizenship and Immigration Canada play in promoting/encouraging the acquisition of this knowledge?

Citizenship and Immigration Canada promotes citizenship through settlement programs and citizenship promotion. Outreach through citizenship and reaffirmation ceremonies, combined with activity guides for schools and communities, create the basis for welcoming communities. Speakers' programs and sharing of immigrant success stories help established Canadians to better understand newcomers' contributions to Canada. The more welcome newcomers feel, the more they will be involved in building their new communities. My department has taken a leadership role in encouraging the acquisition of knowledge about Canada and our citizenship legislation ensures that new Canadians have demonstrated their language and knowledge skills as well as their attachment to Canada through a residence requirement.

Le sujet de la citoyenneté a été identifié comme une question interdisciplinaire par plusieurs départements du gouvernement fédéral ainsi que par leurs partenaires paragouvernementaux. Comment percevez-vous le rôle de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada dans cet optique élargie ?

Mon département, ainsi que celui de Patrimoine canadien partagent la chaire d'un comité formé de départements fédéraux qui sont intéressés à la promotion de la citoyenneté canadienne. À travers certains projets collaboratifs et à travers la communication d'information, tous les départements seront mieux armés pour diriger leurs efforts et élargir leur rayon d'action.

Civic Participation

On Active Citizenship, Social Capital and Public Policy

Daniel Schugurensky
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Traditionally, the term 'civic participation' has been associated with activities related to formal political rights and responsibilities. These rights include activities such as voting, affiliation to political parties, participating in electoral campaigns, contacting politicians, writing letters to government representatives, becoming a candidate in an election, and the like. The responsibilities include being aware of parties' platforms, following political debates in the news, critically analyzing those platforms and debates, and expressing freely political opinions while listening carefully to those who disagree.

In recent times, civic participation has been conceptualized in broader terms, and it is often related to other basic civic responsibilities like obeying the law, ensuring that the law is properly enacted, and promoting changes in the law whenever it fits. It also encompasses other fundamental civic duties like keeping communities clean and safe, protecting the environment, helping neighbours in need, putting the common good ahead of self-interest, eliminating discrimination and injustice, and respecting other people's rights.

Beyond these individual rights and responsibilities, civic participation is also extended to a wider set of activities that entail active involvement in community (civic) life. In this regard, it includes active participation (and not only membership) in organizations such as hobby groups, service clubs, sports and recreation organizations, school councils, environmental groups, heritage associations, neighbourhood associations, international solidarity groups, or political organizations. Moreover, civic participation is also about the active and respectful engagement in collective processes of deliberation and decision-making on matters that affect our lives. In this sense, civic participation relates to the link between the citizen and public policy.

This understanding of civic participation is consistent with the two key dimensions of citizenship noted by Kymlicka and Norman: as legal status (full membership in a particular political community), and as a desirable activity (the extent and quality of one's participation in that community). It is also consistent with the notion of citizenship endorsed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. In their booklet *A Look at Canada*, produced for people applying for citizenship, we are told that "being a Canadian citizen is more than voting and obeying laws" because "being a citizen also means getting involved in your community and your country" (p. 31). Then, the text outlines ways in which people can participate to make Canada a better place. Examples include joining community groups, volunteering to work on election campaigns, helping neighbours, working with others in solving community problems, and becoming a candidate in an election.

The effective enactment of citizenship requires both distributive policies and enabling structures that promote people's engagement. One is not enough. An egalitarian society does not produce necessarily an active citizenry, and a participatory society does not necessarily lead to more equality. Indeed, it is possible to have active participation without equality of status, as in classic Athens, where civic participation was high, but it was restricted to male property owners. At the same time, a relative high degree of egalitarianism can coexist with low civic participation, as it happened in some twentieth century socialist societies and welfare state systems. In short, equality of condition and active participation feed each other in building an inclusive and engaged society, and both require appropriate public policies and institutional designs.

It is not only that civic participation go beyond political participation, but also that political participation represents only a small portion of civic and community participation. According to the last national survey of giving, volunteering and participating (published in a report entitled *Caring and Involved Canadians*), less than 3% of the Canadian population over the age of 15 are involved in political organizations. This pales in comparison to engagement in work-related organizations like unions or professional associations (21%), sports and recreation associations (18%), religious organizations (13%), community or school-related groups (10%), cultural, educational and hobby-related (10%), or service clubs and fraternal organizations (8%). Moreover, longitudinal data on Canada suggests that participation in political organizations is declining, while participation in social and community organizations is rising.

The choice of community participation over formal political participation is particularly noticeable among youth. A study undertaken by the Harvard University Institute of Politics in 2000 with college students in the U.S.A. found that political involvement was low but community volunteerism was high, and that youngsters were seeking new ways to solve local and national problems. The findings of the study show that students chose community volunteerism over political involvement as the preferred means of civic participation: 85% claimed that community volunteerism is a better way than political engagement to solve important issues facing their communities, and 86% stated that volunteering in the community is easier than volunteering in politics. Not only easier, they say, but also more pleasant: 97% believed "enjoyment of

activity" is an effective factor in motivating them, but only 7% strongly agreed that political activity is enjoyable. These attitudes translate into action. Whereas 60% of college students were or had been involved in community service during the past year, only 16% had joined a government, political or issues related organization, and a mere 7% had volunteered or planned to volunteer in a political campaign. Similar findings were reported in another study conducted in 1999 by the League of Women Voters. This study found that in the U.S.A. more young people preferred to volunteer than vote: while only 32% youth voted in 1996 and less than one in five voted in 1998, more than half (51%) of them wanted to become more involved in community and volunteer activities.

The interest for community participation seems to be higher than the interest for political participation, and it may be on the increase, but it is still below past levels. Putnam reports that between 1973 and 1994, the number of people in the U.S.A. who took any leadership role in any organization decreased by more than 50%. Attendance in club meetings also decreased, from 12 club meetings on average per year in the seventies to five club meetings on average per year in the nineties. The time devoted to organizational life also fell during the same period, decreasing from 3.7 hours per month in 1965 to 2.9 hours per month in 1975, and to 2.3 hours per month in 1985. Putnam also reports that civic engagement expressed in participation in town meetings or school affairs showed a decline of about 40% over the last twenty years. For the Canadian case, the *Caring and Involved Canadians* study mentioned above found a noticeable decline in participation in civic activities between 1997 and 2000, particularly among people with higher levels of education and income. In that period, membership in organizations or groups decreased from 74% to 67% for university graduates and from 73% to 63% for upper income households. During the same period, the total number of hours volunteered declined by 5%, and the rate of volunteering decreased from 31% to 27% (with a larger decline among those with university degrees, from 48% to 39%).

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Membership in most organizations has also declined, although some professional organizations have experienced an increase. However, in most cases involvement is restricted to mere membership, and this does not necessarily mean active participation or real human connections. As Putnam pointed out in a visit to Canada, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), to which he belongs, has boomed in the last two decades, growing from about 300 thousand to 34 million members. At first sight, this suggests a positive sign of civic participation. However, as Putnam noted, his total membership activity in the AARP consists of the 36 seconds it takes to write a cheque for eight dollars, and the time it takes to flip through the pages of *Modern Maturity* magazine. The point here is that an increase in membership is not always an increase in connections.

In the same meeting, Putnam was asked about the reasons for the decline in community involvement. After exploring several hypotheses that included factors related to gender, age, income, government interventionism, and architecture (like the shift from front porches to the backyard), Putnam concluded that the main explanation is television. In the last decades the number of multi-set homes has skyrocketed, and now the average person in North America spends between 3 and 4 hours per day watching television.

Television is making us more homebound and isolated, and less likely to engage in our communities. According to Statistics Canada, Canadians aged 15+ spend on average 5.5 times as much time watching television as participating in civic or voluntary activities. Putnam argues that the more time people spend in front of a television, the less likely they are to vote, to join a group and to trust other people. The Internet is expanding the network of connections to a planetary level, but it is not necessarily increasing involvement in local communities. As Putnam noted, "the fact that I don't know the person across the street would astonish my father more than the fact that I am talking to people across the globe everyday." In the booklet *Canada: a cultural profile*, published by the Catholic Immigration Centre, newcomers to Canada read the following: "Watching television is a favorite national pastime and people who spend too much time in front of the TV are called 'couch potatoes." If we are devoting so much time watching TV and surfing the Internet than engaging in our neighborhoods, we may become 'civic couch potatoes.'

In any case, partly because of television, and partly because of other factors, we are voting less, we are participating less in community groups, we are less connected to our neighbours, and we are exchanging ideas less often about public affairs. While public spaces shrink and shopping malls proliferate, and while politics becomes an activity to be performed by professional politicians and a spectacle to be watched by the rest, civic deliberation and civic participation continue to decline.

Does it matter that we are less civically engaged? The available evidence suggests that it does, as civic participation results in a variety of personal and social benefits. For instance, there is a positive impact of social connections on physical well-being. People who are involved in community groups are healthier and tend to live longer than people

who are not. It is not that people who are already healthier join groups, but the other way around, that is, there are positive physiological effects of connecting with other people, of cultivating friendships, of feeling attached to a community and of engaging in meaningful collective projects. There is also a body of educational research on the relationship between student achievement and the involvement of the community in children's' education. Crime is also lower in communities where the levels of engagement, trust and reciprocity (that is, social capital) is higher. Civic participation also enhances the process of political representation. When more opportunities are given for people to put forward opinions and preferences, and when these opinions are seriously taken into account, decisions are more likely to be not only better, but also sustainable in the long run.

Moreover, civic participation, particularly when it is linked to good processes of deliberation and decision-making, develops democratic capacities. In other words, good civic participation nurtures the development of an informed, critical, responsible and engaged citizenry. By participating in local democratic processes, we learn many things. For instance, we learn to listen to each other, exchange ideas, solve conflicts, reach consensus, develop creative solutions to problems, organize, administer public resources, move from individualism to solidarity, and probably more importantly, find our own power to transform reality. Because participatory democracy is based on public deliberation, it is reflective and allows us to explore collectively all options. This is different from the logic of formal politics, which is based on opposition, debate and eloquent speaking. Moreover, as the literature on participatory democracy consistently tells us, meaningful participation in governance allows individuals to learn about themselves, develop reciprocal bonds with neighbours and peers, define and eventually share common goals or values, and collectively take on the challenges and responsibilities of citizenship at the organizational, provincial, or national level (see, for instance, the works of Abers, Bai, or Berry et al.). The existing empirical evidence strongly suggests that the process of developing democratic capacities is a long term one, and can be learned mainly by doing, as a hands-on, minds-on, real world experience.

A participatory local governance can also improve accessibility, equity and intercultural relations. Edgington and associates from the Vancouver Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies (RIIM) note that local governance can contribute to the development of citizenship in a multicultural community by making its services more accessible and equitable, opening up the possibilities for citizen participation in the democratic processes, ensuring all constituents are able to use the services provided for them, and reinforcing the acceptance of difference and diversity within and between ethnic groups. The lessons from participatory governance experiments in different parts of the world (including my own research on the participatory budget process in Brazil) confirm this statement.

My argument here is that the theory and practice of participatory democracy can provide a helpful tool to revitalize civic engagement, particularly in marginalized communities, and especially when civic participation is connected to decision-making. A great booklet published by the Toronto Healthy City Office suggestively entitled *We've got to Stop Meeting Like This: 36 Ways to Encourage Civic Participation*, confirms once again that traditional public consultations are no longer enough, and that we need to develop new institutions and new ways to engage citizens. In assessing the different modes available for the public to participate in civic life, the City of Toronto asks four relevant questions: does the public have clear and easy access to public decisions?; do citizens feel there is any value to participating?; how do citizens get involved in the civic process?; is there a satisfactory type of participation for every citizen in the city? These four dimensions (accessibility, value, involvement and diversity of options) are important guidelines for developing public policy aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of civic participation.

Does it matter that we are less civically engaged? The available suggests that it does, as civic participation results in a variety of personal and social benefits.

Unfortunately, many programs carried out by national and international agencies to help disadvantaged communities in Canada or abroad seem to involve working for communities rather than with them. These programs are often imbued by a charitable and paternalistic approach to development, rather than by an empowering one. From an empowering perspective, an effective way of promoting civic participation is through community organizing projects that begin with the recognition of the assets already present in the community. This leads to the concept of civil investing, a conceptual lens that provides a new way to look at communities. This concept can be particularly helpful for private foundations, government agencies or non-governmental organizations interested in promoting civic participation. Such an approach allows these agencies to see four things that are not always explicit in other approaches. First, they can notice connective structures below the official realm, such as informal networks, ad hoc groups and the like. Second, they become aware of processes other than legislative or programmatic. Third, they look at people as citizens solving problems rather than clients, a general audience, or interest groups. Fourth, instead of focusing exclusively on immediate outcomes, they look at the capacity of the community to act together.

Participatory democracy, capacity building for local governance, and civil investing and are three related strategies that can help to revitalize civic involvement. These approaches can also help to a redefine the concept of participation, moving us – as Gaventa and Valderrama suggest- from an exclusive concern with 'beneficiaries' or 'the excluded' to a concern with broad forms of engagement by citizens in policy formation and decision-making in key areas which affect their lives.

Expressing Citizenship Through Electoral Participation: Values and Responsibilities

Erin Tolley
Currently on assignment with the Metropolis Project.

The opinions expressed here are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Metropolis, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or the Government of Canada.

The *right* to vote and stand for election is affirmed in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and there is good reason to facilitate the exercise of this democratic entitlement. Principle among these reasons is that the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the state is indicative of the state's health and vitality and, moreover, such opportunities are an important expression and affirmation of citizenship. Indeed, the right to vote and stand for election remains one of the principle demarcations between citizens and non-citizens, further asserting the centrality of electoral participation to any conception of citizenship.

However, a purely rights-based conception of electoral participation is inadequate because, in a real sense, it is the *inclination* of citizens[1] to exercise these rights that largely determines the nature and extent of electoral participation. In short, the value placed on inclusive participation, and citizens' sense of responsibility to achieve it, are perhaps more important than the mere promotion and protection of rights. And while the values-based discourse has been the object of much criticism – based, in part, on applications that have ranged from problematic to offensive – it resonates with Canadians, who if public opinion polling is to be believed, are more strongly attached to their values and the constructed "Canadian way" than to the absolute protection of the rights enshrined in legislation.[2]

Participation as a Responsibility

In its most common conception, electoral participation is taken to include voting, running for office, holding a seat in an elected assembly, and involvement in political parties. To some extent, referenda are another means of participating in electoral activities, while the recall mechanism and online voting may, in the future, emerge as important avenues of electoral participation. Those who participate in this broad slate of activities are conceived as participators and are typically thought to be, among other things, fulfilling some sort of civic duty. As Waldron points out, the concept of civic duty is inextricably tied to responsibility, which entails not threatening the peace and according attention to the wants, needs, and beliefs of fellow inhabitants, a loose framework that the literature on democratic theory appears to support.[3] Robust, responsible participation benefits not only individual participants, but also the state and, sometimes, both. These benefits include political socialization; legitimacy, authority and better policies; integration; and the building and maintenance of social capital.

Political Socialization

Participation in electoral activities teaches citizens about political processes, institutions and the norms of our political system. As an example, Pammett points out that elections "perform an important political socialization function by focussing attention on the political system and thereby providing citizens with opportunities to learn."[4] Political parties are also important agents of political socialization because they articulate issues around which citizens can mobilize and, through the consultations that precede the development of the party platform, offer opportunities to become intimately involved in the formulation of policy. Sayers and Jetha note that for new immigrants, "with little experience in politics, working for a political party at the local riding level provides a relatively quick introduction to the forms of Canadian politics."[5]

Legitimacy, Authority and Better Policies

Elections serve an important legitimization function, as well, because they provide support for the system and the government that results.[6] Further, citizens who have sufficient opportunities to voice preferences and influence outcomes are more likely to abide by decisions if they have had a hand in making them. Finally, the involvement of a wide range of interests in the making of collective decisions improves the quality of those decisions because it allows for the articulation, consideration and negotiation of the interests of those who will be affected.[7]

Integration

For new Canadians, electoral participation is a component of integration and, as Kymlicka notes, "is a symbolic affirmation of citizenship."[8] Moreover, as Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer point out, "By making their voices heard in political debates, immigrants become familiar with the political culture of the country and insert themselves into its political institutions."

They point out that political involvement "permits immigrants to organize themselves, to articulate their interests, and to set their demands on the political agenda . . . and may also have an educational effect for those immigrants who come from less democratic countries."[9]

Social Capital

Electoral participation also promotes the building and maintenance of social capital, which the Policy Research Initiative has defined as the "social networks and shared norms that facilitate collective action."[10] In Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer's view, high rates of participation "promote political community through a shared sense of common responsibilities."[11] On the other hand, as Black points out, declines in participation are typically not uniform but rather, are differentially distributed across particular social groups, including youth, immigrants, and the poor, which effectively results in a marginalization of their interests. As Black notes, "In Canadian politics as elsewhere, voices that are not heard are usually not heeded."[12] This may have deleterious consequences for social capital, which is premised on strong networks, trust and collaboration, relationships that are difficult to forge if interests are misunderstood or ignored.

Further, citizens who have sufficient opportunities to voice preferences and influence outcomes are more likely to abide by decisions if they have had a hand in making them.

Inclusive Participation as a Value

While participation may begin with an individual's decision to become involved, electoral participation is not wholly a personal choice. Rather, it is influenced by institutional barriers, the political opportunity structure, and discrimination. Because much of the research on electoral participation has focussed on identifying exclusionary factors, we now have significant knowledge about the social-structural features that affect an individual's participation in mass politics, particularly voting, as well the factors that affect their "electability." Although most research has, until now, focussed on the effect of single factors, such as gender or race, typically in isolation from other factors, future research should consider the effect that *intersecting* identities may have on electoral participation.

With respect to voting, all Canadians over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, with non-citizens being the notable exception, but voter turn-out in federal and provincial elections typically is not higher than 65 per cent.[13] Voters' personal characteristics – including age, income, education, religiosity, immigrant status and geographic factors – can explain, in part, why some Canadians vote and others do not.

Research indicates that age is a significant predictor and that young people are increasingly less likely to vote than in the past. Moreover, unlike previous generations, they are likely to continue to abstain from voting even as they grow older.[14] In the last federal election, only 22.4 per cent of voters between the ages of 18 and 20 voted; the figure for voters aged 68 and older was 83.3 per cent.[15] Although apathy and cynicism are often cited as the cause of low voter turnout among youth, research suggests that young people are just as politically interested as older Canadians. However, they are also more likely than older Canadians to use political activities apart from voting as their means of engagement and empowerment.[16]

Income and education also affect one's propensity to vote; those with lower levels of income or education are less likely to vote.[17] However, Blais et al. note that even as the educational attainment of Canadians is rising, voter turnout is declining, suggesting that the influence of education, while still important, may be weaker than in the past.[18]

Blais has found that religion is a predictor of voting behaviour, noting that "people who regularly attend religious services are more likely to vote," which is perhaps a result of the connection between religosity and duty, or because "church attendance helps to foster people's sense of attachment to and involvement in their community."[19]

Early research on the political participation of immigrants found that, after the application of controls, there were no significant differences between immigrants – whether British or non-British – and the native-born in terms of voting, campaigning, community activities and contacting politicians.[20] Later research, by Chui et al., found similar rates of participation among immigrants and the native-born, particularly when socio-economic status was controlled, but that there is a small generational effect. That is, children of immigrants participate more frequently than other immigrants and the native-born, possibly because the motivation to engage in political activities is passed on by their parents.[21] More recent research on the correlates of non-voting suggests that newcomers to Canada are less likely to vote than established citizens, perhaps because of citizenship requirements or concern with meeting immediate economic needs rather than participating in politics, although this is unclear.[22]

Geographic factors also have an affect on propensity to vote. For example, higher mobility is correlated with lower voter turn-out, and a longer period of residence in a community correlates with higher voter turn-out;[23] communities with highly mobile populations, including students and seasonal workers, may have low voter turn-out. Geographic concentration – particularly of immigrants and ethnic minorities – is also important and may contribute to the election of individuals from these communities.[24] Indeed, this was the goal of Nova Scotia's Electoral Boundaries Commission when it created, in the redistribution undertaken in the 1990s, four "protected constituencies" designed according to concentrations of minority populations, to "'encourage, but not guarantee' the election of three Acadians and one Black to the legislature."[25]

Not only does participation in the act of voting vary according to personal attributes, but the representation of particular groups in elected bodies is also uneven. Research suggests that women, visible minorities, persons with dis-

abilities, youth, and those from lower socio-economic classes are not elected to governments in proportions that accurately reflect their proportion in the general population.[26] Preliminary results from research conducted by the Political Participation Research Network suggest that immigrants are similarly under-represented in elected bodies.[27]

Achieving strict mirror representation where elected bodies reflect exactly the attributes of the general population, is not, in the short term, a guaranteed means of building representative institutions. As Erickson points out, with respect to women, there is a "fallacy in assuming that increasing the number of women in positions of political power will necessarily produce more public policies and political procedures that favour women."[28] Although achieving numerical parity should not be ignored as a long-term goal, the focus has turned toward increasing the overall participation and representation of marginalized groups and ensuring that structural factors are not the cause of gross under-representation. The focus is on identifying and removing barriers that may prevent or impede effective participation and encouraging the inclusion of a broader range of interests than is currently the case. Although most overt barriers to participation have been removed by, for example, broadening the franchise, many more covert barriers remain. These include differential access to the financial resources and social networks that are needed to win elections, a lack of knowledge or information on how political processes function, an inability to penetrate political parties, a lack of familiarity with political norms and party culture, discrimination, and linguistic and mobility challenges.

Although apathy and cynicism are often cited as the cause of low voter turnout among youth, research suggests that young people are just as politically interested as older Canadians.

Although rights-based protection for electoral participation – beyond the right to vote and run for office – may guard against some of these impediments, guaranteeing legislative protection for the full slate activities encompassed in a broad conception of electoral participation would be somewhat problematic. First, legislative safeguards would require the categorization of types of participation as electoral or non-electoral to ensure the protection of electoral participation rights and, as the literature on political participation indicates, differentiating between modes of participation is no easy task. Second, while all residents of Canada are eligible to become members of political parties, parties retain significant discretion with regard to membership. For example, they may circumvent traditional candidate nomination procedures,[29] remove elected representatives from party caucus,[30] or set parameters for membership in the party.[31] Parties would likely resist the removal of these discretionary powers.

The rights-based discourse may thus have only limited utility here. A more workable alternative is an appeal to values that stresses, in particular, the value of inclusion. Canadians seem to feel inherently comfortable with a values-based discourse, perhaps because many quintessential Canadian policies – including multiculturalism, universal healthcare, and social welfare – are fundamentally tied to particular values. Indeed, while Canadians permit limits to be placed on particular rights, the mere perception of offence to deeply-held values provokes outcry.[32]

Policy and Research Directions

Unfortunately, while we have some information on the profile of those who participate in electoral activities and are elected to governments, the data are incomplete. With few exceptions,[33] data collection has been limited to the federal and provincial levels, to the exclusion of municipal governments and school boards. We require further information on the composition of Canadian governments on a range of variables that extends beyond the traditional areas of focus – race, gender and ethnicity – to include age, socio-economic status, ability, religion, and sexual orientation. Information on diversity in Canadian political parties would also be useful.

Research in this area, however, reveals that the widespread collection of such data is difficult. Previous research has generally relied on ascription to obtain information about the personal characteristics of elected officials because large surveys are time-consuming and may not garner a response rate that is high enough to yield statistically-significant results.[34] Where surveys have been used, they have typically been supplemented by ascriptive techniques.[35] Although ascriptive techniques are useful for gathering data on some variables, such as gender and race, they are less useful for other variables, including immigrant status, age, educational attainment and, in some cases, ethnicity, making a large-scale survey a more preferable instrument.

However, research conducted by the Political Participation Research Network reveals that response rates for such surveys vary across the different levels of government, with school board trustees being the least likely to respond. In some cases, this may have been because of limited administrative assistance, busy schedules or "polling fatigue." In other cases, and for reasons that are not known, superintendents explicitly instructed their trustees not to participate in the survey, resulting in a 100 per cent non-response rate for some boards. Future work in the area will need to ensure sufficient resources are devoted to informing potential respondents about the nature of the study and its end-use, liaising with the superintendents of school boards, and ensuring that there is adequate follow-up.

In spite of these challenges, the collection of such data is paramount. Information on the composition of governments and the presence, or absence, of diversity within them is the means for exposing marginalization and under-representation. Canadians value diversity and, thus, they need to know if diversity is being included in the bodies that represent their interests. When complete data on the composition of elected bodies is collected and made public, under-representation, should it exist, is difficult to ignore.

Moreover, such data will allow policy-makers to target measures for increasing numerical representation and addressing marginalization.

Policy responses could include an instructional program on the fundamentals of elections and campaigning, or electoral reforms, such as proportional representation, which could increase the electoral representation of traditionally marginalized groups. With respect to voter turnout, a permanent voters list, lowering the voting age, ensuring that accurate election information is available, employing multilingual enumerators, and instituting transportation programs to assist the elderly, the infirm and the disabled to polling stations are all measures that could increase the participation of voters who may not otherwise have the inclination or ability to do so.

Electoral participation may also be improved by focussing on political knowledge and civic literacy. Indeed, this is the thrust of Milner's recent work, which suggests that newspapers, public broadcasting, and targeted civics instruction for older adolescents all have a hand in increasing political knowledge and civic literacy.[36] Youth councils, such as the City of Toronto's Youth Cabinet, which was created in 1998 as an advisory body for city council on youth issues,[37] may encourage youth engagement in electoral processes and policy-making and have the effect of enhancing knowledge and civic literacy.[38]

Given that political parties are one of the principle vehicles for electoral participation and act as agents of political socialization, ensuring that they are open to a broad range of participants is essential. While, in theory, parties should include anyone who is interested in joining, they may, in practice, be inhospitable or act as gatekeepers to participation. This is a prevalent theme in the literature on women in politics, which refers frequently to the so-called "pink-collar ghetto" where women are relegated to clerical and administrative party roles.[39] The research on other marginalized groups in political parties reaches more mixed conclusions. In some cases, parties appear to be open to the participation of minorities, as Sayers and Jetha have found,[40] while in other cases, according to Stasiulis, "there is a legacy of exclusion that is reinforced by the hegemonic bicultural discourse of party politics, by patterns of recruitment through networks, and by party traditions such as the incumbency factor within the electoral process."[41] The New Democratic Party (NDP) has been proactive, instituting a voluntary affirmative action policy that encourages the nomination of "diverse" Canadians in winnable ridings and provides resources to affirmative action candidates, while the Liberal Party, by virtue of its policy stance on a number of issues, is often perceived as simply being more open to ethnic pluralism than other parties.[42] Interestingly, while the Canadian Alliance has been painted as being "anti-immigrant," it recruited, in the 2000 federal election, more minority candidates than the Progressive Conservative party and roughly the same number as the NDP, suggesting that affirmative action policies may not be the only means of opening up parties to diversity. Indeed, research suggests that drawing on ethnic networks at the local level is also effective.[43]

Understanding and strengthening non-electoral participation would also be beneficial. Although the bulk of political participation research, including this article, focuses exclusively on electoral participation, scholars are beginning to recognize the links between electoral and non-electoral participation, and research on multiple ways of participating is emerging.[44] Such an examination and understanding of other avenues of participation is needed because if marginalization from the electoral arena persists, non-electoral forms will remain an important means of influencing decisions and therefore cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, as Kymlicka points out, "many of the barriers that affect women, visible minorities and other disadvantaged groups in the electoral process also affect their access to these alternative mechanisms of representation."[45] As such, linking research on electoral and non-electoral participation may therefore reveal common barriers. At the same time, preliminary research indicates that non-electoral participation may serve as a supplement or a stepping stone to electoral participation, suggesting that we may be able to capitalize on the synergies between the different modes of participation.[46] In addition, participation in community associations has been found to fill an integrative function and to strengthen social capital by building the trust and linkages that are important components of healthy and inclusive participation in electoral activities.

Finally, public service announcements and advertising may encourage the exercise of democratic rights and assist in promoting responsible citizenship and the value of inclusive electoral participation.

In spite of these challenges, the collection of such data is paramount. Information on the composition of governments and the presence, or absence, of diversity within them is the means for exposing marginalization and under-representation.

A Tradition of Social Capital in Minority Communities

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Members of Canada's ethnocultural communities have long recognized that 'social capital', or the voluntary connections between individuals and families (Putnam, 2000), imbues both public benefits to the host country and minority groups, as well as private benefits to individuals. These connections can be both formal (membership in organized associations such as ethnic clubs, sports leagues, youth groups, community service associations, etc.) and informal (contacts with families and friends) in nature.

Studies in the United States, Italy and Great Britain have shown that communities rich in social capital enjoy benefits ranging from reduced crime, improved child welfare and economic prosperity, to effective government performance and innovative public policy. Social capital has also been linked to higher levels of involvement in public life, reciprocity and interpersonal trust (Putnam, 1993; 2000: 19,20, 41-9, 296-349; Hall, 2002).

International scholarship is increasingly looking to voluntarism as a building block for more just, inclusive and democratic societies. That this has always been the case would come as no surprise to Canadian historians who have chronicled how early immigrant communities drew upon their homeland experiences with associational principles to establish rich networks of voluntary organizations in a new setting (Burnet, 1988: 185-95; Harney, 1985).

Early ethnic organizations included the credit-raising associations, reading clubs, libraries and athletic clubs established by rural Chinese, Ukrainian or Icelandic settlers. German, Italian and Polish immigrants in mining and construction camps set up mutual aid societies to provide emergency financial assistance to family members. With the growth of the welfare state during the Second World War, the mission of these earlier mutual aid and philanthropic associations was transformed into informing and directing recent immigrants toward public sources of aid (Burnet). More recently, voluntary lobby organizations representing visible minorities have emerged as advocates on issues ranging from redress for the property expropriation and deportation of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War, to addressing the religious and racial backlash that some Muslim and Arab Canadians have experienced in the wake of the September 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre.

Throughout Canadian history, voluntary organizations have helped new arrivals satisfy their immediate material needs, protect their civil and legal rights, and preserve their language and traditions. Their varied missions speak to the efforts of immigrants to integrate into Canadian society, as well as to state reliance on these intermediary organizations to ease that transition process.

Long-term declines in social capital in the United States and Australia (Putnam, 2000: 19-21, 31-147, 252; Cox, 2002) have raised questions about the nature of social capital in contemporary, multicultural Canada. Attempting to quantify the immigrant presence in the voluntary sector raises several thorny issues concerning what might be considered an 'acceptable' level of involvement, 'desirable' forms of voluntary participation, as well as the appropriate frame of reference for the foreign-born. These legitimate questions cannot be resolved here. Nevertheless, debates emanating from these questions must be premised upon a reliable database on rates of voluntarism.

This objective will be furthered through a statistical analysis of survey evidence drawn from the 2000 Canadian Election Study. The analysis will explore the extent to which foreign-born Canadians fit into a multidimensional characterization of social capital. It will also propose some explanations as to why immigrants are attracted to some forms of voluntarism and examine the role of selected socio-demographic characteristics in accounting for those participation rates.

The first dimension of social capital distinguishes between *formal and informal* connections. Membership in organizations such as parents' organizations or labor unions are '...formally organized with recognized officers, membership requirements, dues and regular meetings...' (Putnam and Goss, 2002: 10). Informal networks would include family dinners or gatherings at pubs.

Thick and *thin* forms of social capital are determined by the frequency and closeness of contacts between individuals (10). A nod to acquaintances or strangers in public places would be one way of engaging in 'thin' voluntary connections. Working with a group of individuals every day, and then socializing with them on a regular basis, would constitute a 'thick' connection.

The third dimension demarcates *inward-looking* from *outward-looking* forms of social capital. Inward organizations are concerned with promoting the material, social or political interests of their members. Outward forms are concerned with public goods. Examples of the former would include chambers of commerce, labor organizations and credit unions set up by new immigrants. Charitable groups such as the Red Cross and environmental movements would fall into the second category (11).

The fourth dimension distinguishes between *bonding* and *bridging* social capital (11-2). The former type brings together people who share common socio-demographic characteristics (including ethnicity), whereas bridging social capital refers to networks whose participants are drawn from dissimilar backgrounds.

Methodology

The Canadian Election Study (CES) 2000 consists of three waves of surveys that were administered to 3,648 English and French-speaking Canadians aged 18 and over, during and following the 2000 federal election campaign. Fortunately, it features a series of questions probing the *formal* voluntary connections of the respondents. There were, however, several limitations associated with the survey. First, it did not contain measures of *informal* and '*thick* and *thin*' social capital. Second, the wording of the *formal* participation items did not measure *current* participation in *Canada*. Respondents were asked whether they had *ever* joined certain voluntary associations *during the past five years*. Despite these limitations, the CES can serve as an important benchmark for understanding networks of social capital.

After comparing the voluntarism rates of foreign-born and native-born Canadians, I assigned the foreign-born respondents to three smaller groups representing individuals who have lived in Canada ten years or less (n=102), 11 to 20 years (n=80); and more than 20 years (n=363). This was done because previous research on immigrant involvement in political and electoral activities has shown that participation rates tend to converge with those of the Canadian-born after longer periods of residency (Black, 1987; 1991). Historical research also suggests that the forms of voluntary activities in which immigrants engage, undergo changes with the passage of time (Burnet).

After comparing the rates and types of *formal* voluntarism reported by the Canadian-born and different waves of immigrants, I examined the relationship between country of birth and voluntarism for sub-sets of respondents divided along sex, age, education and household income lines.[1] These characteristics were selected for closer inspection because they have been reported to influence social capital in other settings (Putnam, 2000; Young, 2002: 118)

Throughout Canadian history, voluntary organizations have helped new arrivals satisfy their immediate material needs, protect their civil and legal rights, and preserve their language and traditions.

A Multidimensional Portrait of Formal Social Capital

Participation rates for both the Canadian and foreign-born in most formal, voluntary organizations tended to be low, with inter-group differences emerging as statistically significant for just five of the nine indicators of associational life (Table 1). While community service, professional associations, sports associations and religious associations that cover both aspects of the *inward-outward* and *bonding-bridging* dimensions of voluntarism were the most popular choices for both the Canadian-born and immigrants, community service groups were the only organizations that close to half of the respondents in each group joined. Between 26 and 42 per cent of the survey respondents reported belonging to religious and sports associations, while very few reported joining outward-oriented environmental or women's groups.

While immigrants were significantly more likely to join professional (inward), ethnic (bonding) and religious (bonding) associations than native-born Canadians, the Canadian-born were significantly more likely to join sports associations (bridging) and labour unions (inward).

The relatively stronger attachment of immigrants to religious associations might be traced to their key role in helping new arrivals settle and adapt to a new country (Burnet: 125-50). Explanations for the stronger presence of immigrants in professional associations are less intuitive. While one might attribute this to their need to establish job-related credentials and contacts, it is problematic to argue that native-born Canadians are not under the same pressures to do so. The fact that just three respondents who had lived in Canada for 10 years or less had joined a professional association might reflect the challenges they face in meeting Canadian qualifications for their profession.

Within the immigrant sub-sample, recent arrivals were significantly less likely than more established immigrants to join cross-cultural (bridging), community service,

Table 1- Formal Voluntary Association (% indicating had joined group in last 5 years)*

Association/ Group	Canadian-Born	Foreign-Born	Residency: 10 yrs or less	Residency: 11-20 yrs	Residency: 21+ yrs
Community Service	48.4 (535)	43.3 (68)	**23.5 (4)**	**23.8 (5)**	**48.2 (55)**
Business	15.2 (168)	12 (19)	0 (0)	14.3 (3)	14 (16)
Professional	**23.4 (259)**	**36.9 (58)**	**18.8 (3)**	**57.1 (12)**	**36.8 (42)**
Environmental	9.3 (103)	12.7 (20)	0 (0)	4.8 (1)	15.8 (18)
Women's	8.8 (97)	7.6 (12)	0 (0)	4.8 (1)	7.9 (9)
Labour Union	**19.2 (212)**	**11.4 (18)**	0 (0)	9.5 (2)	13.2 (15)
Ethnic	**2.8 (31)**	**13.4 (21)**	29.4 (5)	4.8 (1)	13.2 (15)
Sports	**34.7 (383)**	**25.9 (41)**	**5.9 (1)**	**4.8 (1)**	**32.5 (37)**
Religious	**34 (376)**	**41.8 (66)**	58.8 (10)	38.1 (8)	40.7 (46)

Source: *Canadian Election Study, 2000 (weighted)*.

*Statistically significant differences between the foreign-born and Canadian-born, and between different arrival groups, are indicated in bold. All differences sig. ≤ .05

Table 2 - The Intersection of Immigrant Status and Other Identity Markers

Association/Group	Sex	Age	Education	Income
Community Service		35-50 years*		
Business Association				<$40,000*
Professional Association		18-34 years**	High School or Less**	
Labour Union	Male, Female**	18-34 years; 51 years+**	High School or Less**	
Sports Association		51 years+**	Post-secondary or more**	<$70,000**
Religious Association	Female**	35 years and over**	Post-secondary or more**	$70,000+**

* Statistically significant differences between Canadian and Foreign-born emerge for that group.
** Statistically significant differences between Canadian and Foreign-born disappear for this group.

professional and sports associations than immigrants who had lived in Canada for more than 10 years (Table 1). Community-based, ethnic and religious associational memberships were the only organizations which recent arrivals joined at higher rates than the more established immigrants (inter-group differences were insignificant). These patterns confirm Burnet's observation that recent arrivals gravitate to bonding organizations in order to meet immediate settlement needs such as the maintenance of their language and culture, or needs that can't be met by bridging associations as a result of 'language barriers, discrimination and other obstacles' (185). As was the case in earlier studies, the appeal of ethnic associations diminishes for more established immigrants.

I then examined whether these relationships changed for sub-groups of all respondents (Table 2). Age emerged as the most powerful factor in distinguishing between the voluntarism rates of the native and foreign-born. Initially inconsequential differences in community service group participation became significant for respondents aged between 35 and 50 years old. Just 29.6 percent of immigrants in this age group, compared to 51.2 per cent of native-born Canadians, reported having joined a community service group in the previous five years (data not shown). On the other hand, initial, statistically significant differences in participation rates in professional associations, labour unions, sports and religious associations became *insignificant* for certain age groups (Table 2). On two of these measures, the Canadian-born held the participatory advantage; on two others, the foreign-born.

Education and income also accounted for some of the initial differences in voluntarism (Table 2). Amongst respondents with a high school education or less, membership rates in professional associations converged at just under 10 per cent for both the Canadian and foreign-born (data not shown). Interestingly, the best-educated immigrants held a 16 per cent advantage over the Canadian-born with respect to professional association membership (data not shown). Amongst respondents who had attended a post-secondary institution, the initial immigrant advantage in religious organization membership disappeared. Religious groups continued to be popular avenues for the acquisition of social capital for immigrants with a high school level of education or less. Just over 53 per cent of less educated immigrants, compared to 35.4 per cent of their Canadian-born counterparts, reported having joined these organizations in the past five years (data not shown).

At first glance, there were no significant differences between Canadian-born and foreign-born involvement rates in business associations (Table 1). Upon closer examination, it was found that immigrants reporting household incomes of less than $40,000 were significantly more likely to join business associations than their Canadian-born counterparts (27.3 percent versus 7.4 per cent). This finding, when considered with the comparatively strong presence of the best-educated immigrants in professional associations, speaks to the importance of *inward* social capital in ethnocultural communities.

Finally, immigrants were more drawn to religious organizations than the Canadian-born, and that remained the case for individuals in the lower and middle income groups. However, inter-group differences in religious associational life disappeared and *reversed* for individuals reporting incomes of $70,000 or more. Just over 35 per cent of the relatively well-heeled immigrants, compared to 43.5 per cent of the wealthiest Canadian-born respondents, participated in religious organizations (data not shown). Thus, in the same way that length of residency contributes to the diminishing appeal of *bonding* organizations (Table 1), foreign-born Canadians appear to distance themselves from these organizations as their socio-economic status improves.

The Intersection of Varied Forms of Social Capital and Other Identity Markers

There were few large differences in the voluntarism rates of native-born and foreign-born respondents in formal voluntary organizations. Immigrants were more prone to join *bonding* than *bridging* organizations, but this trend subsided as they spent more time in Canada. *Outward*, *bridging* groups such as women's and environmental organizations held relatively little appeal for both the Canadian and foreign-born. Sports organizations (bridging and outward) only drew relatively large numbers of immigrants who have lived in Canada for 20 years or more. Foreign-born Canadians were active in some *inward* associations (professional organizations), but less so in others (labour unions). The analysis of sub-samples of immigrants demonstrated that an understanding of social capital in Canada's ethnocultural communities is often contingent on how immigrant status intersects with other identity markers.

Social Inclusion and Democratic Citizenship

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For citizenship to matter it must be inclusive and for inclusion to matter it must successfully deal with social exclusion in a society that is fractured along numerous fault lines. The European discourse on social inclusion is too narrowly focussed on poverty and labour market inclusion (Viet-Wilson 1998; Walker and Walker, 1997; Bryne, 1999; Gore, 1995). Howard Duncan is correct in saying that this is not a useful starting point for either understanding the concept or for identifying a policy agenda for creating an inclusive society (Duncan, 2003: 30-31). Similarly Biles and Burstein argue that the narrow conception ignores other important dimensions of inclusion – cultural and political inclusion (Biles and Burstein, 2003: 14-15). This paper suggests that the European conception can not be readily applied in the Canadian context for one other reason – it pays scant attention to the importance of democratic citizenship[1]. Given these criticisms, it is necessary to distinguish between weak and strong versions of the social inclusion discourse. The former focus simply on assimilation and integration of the excluded (via a state commitment to multiculturalism), while the latter take a structural approach that focuses on historical processes that continually reproduce oppression, discrimination and exclusion. Strong approaches to the social inclusion discourse therefore are intimately concerned with rights, citizenship and restructured relations between newcomer and marginalized communities and the institutions of the dominant society. The focus is on valued recognition and valued participation by those excluded from full participation in society and the benefits of society. This requires a broader conception of citizenship with an interlocking set of reciprocal rights and obligations (Bryne, 1999: 2; Gore, 1995: 2).

Duffy notes that social exclusion refers to "the inability to participate effectively in economic social, political and cultural life, and, in some characterizations, alienation and distance from the mainstream society" (Duffy, cited by Barry, 1998: 2). The link between social exclusion and citizenship in part hinges on the degree to which individuals from newcomer and marginalized communities encounter structural and systemic barriers and are denied or restricted from participating in society. In 1990 the *European Observatory on National Policies for Combating Social Exclusion* was established to look at "the basic rights of citizenship to a basic standard of living and to participation in major social and economic opportunities in society" (Room as cited in Gore, 1995: 2). Social inclusion then is fundamentally about citizenship rights and about the rights of citizens. In this sense, social inclusion as a political response to forms of exclusion recasts the debate about citizenship in a number of important ways. First, in a society like Canada that is multicultural, multiracial, multilingual, multiethnic and multi faith, social inclusion it is about creating a level playing field and enhancing equality of opportunity for all members of society. Second it is about changing our way of thinking about citizenship (as that conferred on members of a nation state by virtue of birth or length of residence). And third as Duncan suggests it forces policy makers to think about how citizens and communities can and do increase social capital (Duncan, 2003: 32).

In a society as diverse as Canada, identity formation and social cohesion of racialized communities and immigrant communities is a complex response to many factors. Their respective citizenship claims are intimately linked to making equality claims and to ensuring their rights and freedoms enshrined in the *Charter* are not eroded. In Canada, these citizenship claims are in no small measure, mediated by the histories of immigrants in the sending countries, the state in the host country and its multicultural practices, and they are also mediated by the reality of discrimination and exclusion. Discrimination undermines citizenship and erodes a person's ability to develop their talents and capacities. This dual mediation is reflected in the two phases of multiculturalism in Canada. Through an official policy of multiculturalism, the state in Canada has attempted to deal with racial discrimination and significantly determine the nature of state /minority relations within a liberal tradition that promotes equality and encourages group social cohesion and social inclusion.

In the narrow sense citizenship is exclusionary. It is about who is a citizen of a nation state and what bundle of rights

that citizen can exercise and it is about what that citizen is entitled to as a member of the nation state. In the realm of formal equality the laws, the constitutions, the human rights codes proclaim the equality of all citizens. In this realm, it is just that citizens should be equally entitled to certain rights typically associated with a democracy – the right to vote, to freedom of association, freedom of religion etc.

Social inclusion forces the discourse beyond the realm of formal equality and into the realm of substantive equality which is characterized by challenges to discrimination, exclusion and inequality. It was the Abella report that advanced the notion that equality does not mean sameness and that equality means that we have to treat differences differently (Abella, 1984). This is the necessary minimum precondition for achieving social inclusion. The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that minority rights do not erode democratic citizenship, rather "The accommodation of differences is the essence of true equality" (cited by Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 33). Accommodating differences and eliminating barriers to equality of opportunity are the hallmarks of social inclusion. The latter however ought not to be confused with social cohesion for multiple forms of exclusion can exist in a socially cohesive society. Nonetheless, important questions persist: inclusion around what vision and inclusion to what? Are we talking about assimilation? Is this a new way of managing state minority relation? Is this "Anglo conformity" or even "multiculturalism" in a new guise? As Kymlicka and Norman point out there have been major disputes both about the legitimacy of assimilation as a way of eliminating differences, and about multiculturalism as the official recognition of differences (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 14-16).

In a society like Canada that is multicultural, multiracial, multilingual, multiethnic and multi faith, social inclusion it is about creating a level playing field and enhancing equality of opportunity for all members of society.

In Canada, the government developed a public policy on multiculturalism that committed it to three primary activities. First, recognizing and promoting the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society. Second, eliminating barriers to full and equitable participation faced by members of minority communities in all spheres of Canadian society. Third, ensuring that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection of the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity. Certainly, it is not clear that a policy of protecting and promoting the equality rights of ethnic and racialized minority groups will erode the practices of responsible democratic citizenship. What it will do is simultaneously erode the racialized and exclusionary conception of citizenship embedded in the notion of binationalism and build the case for a democratic pluralist conception of citizenship in Canada. Social inclusion begins from the premise that it is democratic citizenship that is at risk when a society fails to develop the talents and capacities of all its members. The move to social inclusion is eroded when the rights of minorities are not respected and accommodated and minorities feel "Othered".

In the context of accommodating differences and promoting social inclusion there is space for the state to intervene to ensure equal treatment (equality of opportunity). Within a liberal discourse, a societal commitment to equality of opportunity ensures that all members of society are provided with the opportunity to exercise the broadest possible citizenship rights and to secure the valued goods and services free from the multiple forms of exclusion that erode substantive citizenship. The notion that democratic citizenship requires assimilation is not only patently absurd, it is patently unfair. As Phillips suggest, "It should not be necessary for people to make themselves the same as the others in order to qualify for equal respect" (Phillips, 1999: 128-9). For social inclusion there is no contradiction between democratic citizenship and differentiated citizenship (where people can hold dual and even multiple loyalties). Democratic citizenship is about valued participation, valued recognition and belonging. At a minimum, it is characterized by:

- All the political rights associated with formal equality;
- A right to equality and a right to be free from discrimination;
- An intimate relationship between the individual and the community;
- Reciprocal relationship of rights and obligations;
- Barrier free access, a sense of belonging and not being "othered" and marginalized;
- A commitment on the part of the state to ensure that all members of society have equal access to developing their talents and capacities; and
- Providing all members of society with the resources to exercise democratic citizenship.

Conclusion

The vision of a Canadian multiracial multiethnic multi faith polity, is one that "democratizes democracy" and embraces a broad "inclusive" conception of citizenship. Social inclusion and democratic citizenship both involve ensuring that all members of society are provided with the opportunity to develop their talents and capacities and secure the valued goods and services in society. In the urban environment this requires a fundamental movement from tolerating diverse cultures to recognizing and respecting them. Democratic citizenship is fully capable of both recognizing the politics of difference and transcending its narrow confines precisely because it embraces an inclusive vision that suggests common purpose and shared community can be achieved through inter-group solidarity. Canada will be a much stronger country if we embrace democratic citizenship and social inclusion as transformative tools and as normative ideals.

My Night Or Yours? The Literary Life of a Nation

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Ironically, Depression and chronic unemployment played a key role in the development of twentieth century American literary culture. As part of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, the Federal Writers Project was short-lived, but at its peak in 1936 it employed more than 6500 writers, whose work resulted in 800 titles. In the process, the notion of an American "cultural commonwealth," of the primacy of folklore, oral history, and minority cultural forms were highlighted, while such writers as Ralph Ellison, John Cheever, Saul Bellow, and Zora Neale Hurston promoted and were themselves immersed in the idea of a socially conscious public art that documented the immediacy of American life during a crucial decade. Their experience contributed to a documentary literary tradition that Canada lacks. The idea of the "Great Canadian Novel" cannot, therefore, have the same resonance as it does in the United States, where one writerly goal continues to be a kind of all-purpose, encyclopedic text capable of taking the full measure of the land and its people.

Even before the inception of the Federal Writers Project, John Dos Passos pioneered the documentary method in *U.S.A.*, a mammoth work begun in the 1920s that begins this way:

> The young man walks fast by himself through the crowd that thins into the night streets; feet are tired from hours of walking; eyes greedy for warm curve of faces, answering flicker of eyes, the set of a head, the lift of a shoulder … muscles ache for the knowledge of jobs, for the roadmender's pick and shovel work, the fisherman's knack with a hook…

An epic list of nobodies who are somebodies follows, their specificity and variety being what Dos Passos aims to enliven under cover of what he calls the "cold glistening electric night." This nocturnal tableau motivated Jack Kerouac's love for the "tired faces in the dawn of Jazz America," and later, gave shape to the denizens of Tom Waits' "dark warm narcotic American night."

This dialogue among writers who share – even horde – their nocturnal visions and the people that inhabit them has no counterpart in Canadian letters. The earliest would-be epics of Canadian experience are poetic, follow European forms, and focus not on people but on things – natural monuments like the Laurentian Shield or such human accomplishments as the transcontinental railroad. Canada is celebrated as a wide expanse, a site of wonders both natural and manmade, which become its epic features rather than the jostle of eyes, shoulders, and aching muscles in Dos Passos' portrait of the American metropolis.

In the last thirty-five years Canadian literature has acquired some of the newsreel immediacy of Dos Passos' experiments, but not in order to take the measure of an entire people. Rather, communities, their specific identities and neighbourhoods, including Montreal's Main, Toronto's West Indian streets, or Vancouver's Japan and Chinatowns have entered our literary landscape. Recent Canadian novels convey citizenship as *local* rather than *global*, as a communal narrative rather than a national one. It's as if the corners of Bloor and Dovercourt, Rachel and St. Lawrence, or Vancouver's Commercial Drive were principalities of their own, each with their own history, rituals of acceptance and exclusion, as well as their own literary and linguistic heritage. The Canadian nation state remains an abstract and official presence, a backdrop against which these minor principalities define themselves.

An early exception to this trend can be found in the work of Montreal poet and novelist A.M. Klein. Famously dissatisfied with his reception in Canada, Klein published in 1948 two startling documents in favour of Canadianness as a shared experience – the northern mythic counterpart to Kerouac's "Jazz America." *In The Rocking Chair and Other Poems* Klein goes beyond his beloved Montreal for symbolic currency, employing the prairie grain elevator as

> an absolute. Because
> always this box flowers over us
> with all the coloured faces of mankind…

More remarkable is a pamphlet entitled *Huit Poemes Canadiens*, which includes an essay introducing Klein as a "Poète juif parmi nous." In a prefatory note to the poem "Parade of St. Jean Baptiste," Klein explains that his recent poetic experiments contribute not only to an understanding of Canadian citizenship, but to a new shareable Canadian language:

> Ce poème, l'un d'une série d'essais, peut s'interpréter comme un "langage bilingue" quoi-que le vocabulaire de la poésie est plutôt d'origine latine et Normande. Chacun des mots (à l'exception toutefois d'articles ou de mots auxiliaires) ont une consonnance synonyme à ceux de la langue française.

The first lines of "Parade of St. Jean Baptiste" convey the extent of Klein's foray into shared language:

> Bannered, and ranked, and at its stances fixed
> the enfilade with vestment colors the air.
> Roll now the batons of the tambours round
> ruminant with commencement…

A more cynical view might hold that Klein's efforts court the utopian possibilities of a multicultural ideal, without acknowledging its challenges. (Strangely, as Klein promoted the myth of a shared Canadian voice, he suppressed his usual reliance on Jewish motifs and language, most notably Yiddish.)

We might view the local quality of contemporary Canadian fiction, its love of the communal over the national, as the return of the suppressed; if not the return of Klein's Yiddish, then the assertion of Japaneseness, of a Native imaginary view, of a Caribbean voice as parts of a tradition increasingly focused on the particularities of Canadian life. In this sense, our literature of the last three decades has acted as screen on which new and shifting notions of citizenship are introduced.

Communities, their specific identities and neighbourhoods, including Montreal's Main, Toronto's West Indian streets, or Vancouver's Japan and Chinatowns have entered our literary landscape.

A striking example of these shifts can be found in Joy Kogawa and Kerri Sakamoto's fictional response to the internment of Canadian Japanese during the Second World War. Kogawa's *Obasan* (1981) and Sakamoto's *The Electrical Field* (1998) are the literary descendants of earlier historical studies, such as Ken Adachi's *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians* (1976) and Barry Broadfoot's *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame: The Story of the Japanese Canadians In World War II* (1977). Sakamoto's novel explores what cultural critics call post-memory – the presence in a younger generation of "memories" of their elders' experience. In an interview in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Sakamoto remarked on how the Ontario landscape of her childhood "was surrounded by bungalows that, from an airplane, look like photographers of the old tar-paper shacks of the internment camp built on the valley floor of the Rocky Mountains." Similarly, Kogawa recalls how her girlhood experience of the Alberta internment camps made it nearly impossible to "come to terms" with the Prairies, "a place without trees, and with wind, it felt like hell to me." Landscape, in each of these cases, is marked (and marred) by painful history, so that one can only live in such space as a figure at remove from the mainstream. *Itsuka*, Kogawa's 1992 novel examines the terms of Japanese-Canadian citizenship by reflecting on the 1988 agreement by the Canadian government to pay reparations and to apologize for its wartime and postwar treatment of Japanese Canadians.

Kogawa, however, does point in an interview to a sense of shared experience among other Canadians whose history includes government abuse:

> Japanese-Canadians who went through the political process of attempting to publicize their story and gain redress…developed political wings, as they say, a form of new consciousness. After the redress movement many joined in alliance with native peoples and created an identification and moved on in a kind of solidarity.

The representation of First Peoples in Canadian literature has undergone phenomenal change in the past thirty-five years, in part because Native writers have taken the subject for their own. George Ryga's 1967 play *The Ecstasy of Rita Joe* caused a sensation with its condemnation of Canadian treatment of Natives, portraying the development of what Kogawa calls "a form of new consciousness." It also created an archetypal figure in Rita Joe, which young urban natives had a stake in, even though she was created by an Albertan of Ukrainian ancestry. More recent work, such as Thomas King's 1994 novel *Green Grass, Running Water* portrays a cultural divide between native and mainstream Canada, with the vantage point having shifted almost entirely to that of a Native point of view: the Alberta landscape, its local language and culture represent a Canada apart, a territory through which non-Natives travel like boobs abroad. In a sharply comic scene, King's native characters lampoon visitors named S. Moodie, A. Belany, and J. Richardson, who stand in not only for a past tradition of Canadians who wrote about Natives, but for all Canadians who haven't a clue about the particularities of Native life. King's decentred landscape is the obverse of Klein's land of a "langage bilingue." It demands an intense sense of history, a cultural and linguistic awareness, and it insists on the reality of borderlands within the larger nation, across which one can pass like a boob out of the past or as a more astute contemporary traveller. Much of the pleasure in reading King's fiction comes from his ability to show us that in this dilemma there is not only civic responsibility but great humour.

The novels of Sakamoto, Kogawa, King, and others operate a bit like the guidebooks American authors penned for the Federal Writers Project, in order to portray life in each state and their far-flung localities. In the American case, national calamity and New Deal optimism inspired a nation to develop a shared public art that included an attention to the makings of minority cultures. In Canada, postwar prosperity and an increasing multicultural reality brought about a related outcome. Whether our fiction will lift the Canadian night – be it dark, warm, electric or otherwise – to the status of a shared myth remains to be seen.

Study of Religions For Citizenship: Why Not?

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«A peculiarity of our age,» Stephen Carter (2000, p. 190) insightfully observes in his book, *In the Name of God*, «is that we proclaim our respect for diversity except when the diversity is religious.» It seems no less a peculiarity of Canada, a country with deep religious beginnings, that about 90% of students in its public schools finish their secondary education without being required to study religion. This should prove disturbing for those who are concerned with raising the quality of citizenship in culturally diverse democratic societies. Given that the culture of a people is shaped by their religion and that good citizenship requires an understanding of society and its institutions, the absence of religion in the public school curriculum is not only a peculiarity but also a glaring omission on the part of educators.

Thus far, there has been little concern in Canada about the lack of study of religion in public schools. Though litigation involving religious instruction and religious exercises in Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba attracted some degree of attention, there was little outcry about the ensuing court decisions which found them unconstitutional, and nothing perceptible transpired to reflect any real popular desire to carve a secure place for religion in the public school curriculum. Worse, it was business as usual for educators. It was clear that, to them, the virtual elimination of religion in public school systems was of little or no consequence at all.

Yet, it should not take much reflection for educators – particularly those concerned with citizenship education – to realize that the study of religion matters and that schools are missing an important curricular component which can provide an indispensable contribution toward the development of informed and responsible citizens. The September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Centre is a chilling reminder of the tasks ahead for educators: while provoked by the terrorists, the many subsequent instances of violent, prejudiced treatment of Muslims and those who looked like them, both in Canada and the United States, were nonetheless reprehensible acts and demonstrated a failure of schools to cultivate tolerant and enlightened citizens.

The Cultural Context of Canadian Citizenship

The democratic way of life we take for granted in Canada requires that we respect the rights of all persons and treat them with justice, irrespective, particularly, of their race, ethnicity, or religion. As Stephen Macedo points out in his book *Liberal Virtues* (1990, pp.266-267), it requires not only the attitudes of tolerance and sympathy for those who differ and disagree but also the capacity to reason and act from an impersonal standpoint in a pluralistic social milieu. Beyond these liberal, individualistic virtues, it calls for communal virtues involving the predisposition and ability to reflect upon human experiences, values, and ways of life in an effort to promote meaningful human interaction and the flourishing of human life (Brian Stiltner, 1999, p. 105).

Needless to say, these attitudes, predispositions and abilities are dependent on the possession of knowledge and understanding related to the cultural context within which citizenship rights and obligations are exercised in interaction with others. As everyone knows, that context for Canadian citizens is marked by cultural diversity. What is often not recognized, or acknowledged, is that that context has had religious history and character.

Thus far, there has been little concern in Canada about the lack of study of religion in public schools.

Christopher Dawson's works on culture and religion (e.g., *The Historic Reality of Christian Culture*, 1960; *Religion and Culture*, 1948; *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*, 1950) have demonstrated that «Throughout the greater part of mankind's history, in all ages and states of society, religion has been the great central unifying force in culture» and that «from the beginning the social way of life which is culture has been deliberately ordered and directed in accordance with the higher laws of life which are religion.» Indeed, throughout history, religion has functioned as conservator and creator. Cultural achievements have religious beliefs that lie behind them; outstanding creative works are due to religious inspiration or a religious end; great literatures have religious themes; and the institutions of family, marriage, and kinship have a religious background and have been maintained with religious sanctions. Thus, Dawson (1948, pp. 49-50) insists that «we cannot understand the inner form of a society unless we understand its religion» (1948, pp. 49-50). While secularization has been a dominant force in contemporary societies, it is a relatively modern phenomenon and, perhaps, an anomalous one. Rightly or wrongly, religious sympathizers have recently been given some reason to dream of religious renaissance by Reginald Bibby (2002), who has observed that religious groups may expect rebirth and renewal under appropriate circumstances.

Renaissance or not, the reality and history of Canadian culture are similar to those of other western societies and have been amply documented. Terrence Murphy and Roberto Perin's volume, *A Concise History of Christianity in Canada* (1996. Also, J. W. Grant, 1988), which traces the evolution of the major Christian denominations in Canada over several centuries, highlights the experiences of the churches and the profound impact that Christianity has had on both French- and English-Canadian societies and cultures. However, reflecting the reality in most western countries with religious beginnings, the volume concludes that the concept of 'Christendom' , a society where Christianity and culture are essentially integrated, is gone forever in the country. This conclusion is shared by John Webster Grant (1988), who notes the tremendous role that religion has played in the life of the country, but nevertheless views the religious prospect as an ambiguous one. He detects some promise in the increasing outspokenness of religious leaders and assemblies on social and economic issues, as well as in the growing prominence of conservative evangelicals and charismatics within and beyond the traditional churches. However, he feels that «the noise of things that are dying still drowns out the voice of the things that are coming to birth» (p. 245).

The demise of 'Christendom' in Canada does not mean, however, that the religious factor is gone. Terrence Murphy (in Murphy & Perin, 1996, p. 369) sees that the defining reality of contemporary Canadian society is pluralism, which includes religious diversity. Indeed, while Protestant and Catholic churches remain the two largest categories of religious denominations in the country, membership in all of the largest Protestant denominations has declined. In contrast, the categories of Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs have made significant membership between 1981 and 1991. Each more than doubled, and some tripled, their membership. As Wsevolod Isajiw (1999, p. 61) notes, this reflects the substantial immigration of people from the countries in which these religions predominate. It is only to be expected that the arrival of peoples of different cultural backgrounds should bring religious diversity to the country.

Religious Presence in the Public Square?

The increasing religious diversity that characterizes Canada's cultural mosaic makes it imperative that institutions in the country, particularly its educational systems, promote religious literacy. As Will Kymlicka (in Lois Sweet, 1997, p. 246) puts it, «Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens. It requires a conscientious effort to distinguish those beliefs which are matters of private faith from those which are capable of public defense, and to see how issues look from the point of view of those with different religious commitments and cultural backgrounds.»

How to develop liberal citizens is, unfortunately, a problem in Canadian education. The absence of study about religions and cultures reflecting the diversity of peoples in the country fails to meet the need to promote citizens who can understand the points of view of peoples with different religious and cultural backgrounds. In Canada the development of educational systems that are intentionally designated as public and secular has fostered the view that religion has no real place in the public school and has not encouraged the inclusion of religion in the school curricu-

lum. The Appeal Court ruling in Ontario (*Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Ontario*, 1990), which declared the Elgin Country religious education curriculum unconstitutional, is likely to have the same effect as the series of Supreme Court decisions in the United States, starting with the *McCollum v. Board of Education* case in 1948, which confirmed the doctrine of separation of church and state in the area of education. The erection of the «wall of separation» effectively discouraged attempts to provide for religion in the school curriculum, though the Court in that ruling did not intend its complete banishment. Specifically to clear up the Court's position on this matter, Justice Clark declared in *Abington v. Schempp* (1963) as follows:

> …(O)ne's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.

Nevertheless it was not until the early 1990s that educators in the country started the drive to include the objective study of religion in the American classrooms. Undoubtedly the spate of court litigation challenging the secular curriculum and the substantial exercise of parental choice in favour of private schools prompted the move to secure a beachhead for religion in the public schools.

The absence of any stirrings among public educators to explore a place for religion in Canadian public schools may be explained, in part, by the unspoken assumption that Canada is a secular state, and that religion has no place in any of its public institutions, including politics and education. As John Webster Grant (1988, p. 216) points out, secular developments since the 1920s, including industrialization and the provision for urban amenities, produced a new breed of Canadians oriented toward materials goods and worldly ways rather than the bible and spirituality. As he puts it, «Realization that Christendom was dead, even in Canada, dawned with surprising suddenness in the 1960s.... Despite the fact that large numbers of Canadians remain either Catholic or Protestant and affirm Christian beliefs, such as belief in God and the death and resurrection of Christ, religion has been relegated in the public mind to the private sphere in Canadian life.» Carter's (2000, p. 1) observation on the American situation may as well apply to ours: many present day citizens, including leaders in government and other public institutions, have lost track of the relationship between religion and politics. For them, the mere mention of religion and religious views in our public and political life is an offense against the separation of church and state.

It is not surprising that, professing his commitment to his Christian faith, Carter should argue that «there is nothing wrong, and much right, with the robust participation of the nation's many religious voices in debates over matters of public moment» (ibid.). For him, to condemn religious voices to silence is «a sure way to accomplish the task of alienating the religious from democracy, for it places official imprimatur on the cultural message that religion is an inferior human activity» (p. 4).

More importantly, amidst a consumerist culture concerned largely with the satisfaction of desire through market and political processes, «the religious voice is perhaps the only remaining force that can call us to something higher and better than thinking constantly about our own selves, our own wants, our own rights» (p. 5).

> The increasing religious diversity that characterizes Canada's cultural mosaic makes it imperative that institutions in the country, particularly its educational systems, promote religious literacy.

Indeed, it is fair to say that to muzzle religious voices is to lose the positive contributions which religion, particularly Christianity, can contribute to the common good. Such contribution consists, among others, of (i) intellectual resources for the formulation of a public philosophy, which include well-developed views on human rights and emphasis on the role of mediating institutions; (ii) a reservoir of conditions for social harmony marked by a commitment to neighbourly love and justice; and (iii) a commitment to neglected human goods demonstrated by the critique of society on behalf of the poor (Stiltner, 1999, p. 114). Unfortunately, calling attention to the merits of the religious viewpoint and to the alienation felt by silenced voices is not likely to influence the non-believer. It is all-too-easy to argue that religion has been a negative factor in human societies, and that, therefore, it is better left alone in the private arena. Thus, assuming that the merits and the demerits of religion cancel themselves out, it is important to seek other arguments for the claim that religion is entitled to a place in the public square.

Fortunately tighter arguments on behalf of the religious presence in the public arena are available. It is possible to argue, as legal philosopher Michael Perry (1997) does, that neither citizens nor even legislators or other public officials violate the non-establishment of the religion standard by presenting arguments in public political debate. Further it can be insisted that, as a matter of political morality, it is not only permissible but also important that religious arguments be presented, so that they can be tested in public political debate. This position can be extended to claim, as Christopher Eberle (2002) does, that religious citizens may publicly support, with religious arguments, coercive laws (e.g., against abortion) even without having public or secular justification. As Eberle points out, expecting religious citizens to refrain from entering the debate with their religious arguments is gratuitously burdensome because it requires them to disobey their God and

therefore imposes a substantial burden for which no compelling rationale exists. Moreover, it is arbitrary, because there is no principled reason to restrict the public expression of religious convictions on public issues, provided that it does not have disastrous consequences for political decision making and advocacy (Eberle, 2002, p. 332). It may be argued, of course, that some form of restraint on the expression of religious viewpoint to support issues of public policy may be justified. Nonetheless, as Greenawalt (1995, p. 180) insists, the principle holds: religious convictions may not be subjected to some general or rigorous exclusion in the political sphere.

More positively, the need for expression of religious views – and expression in meaningful, significant ways – on public issues becomes clear when we are reminded that the reality and challenge of moral pluralism and socio-cultural diversity have brought about the theory of deliberative democracy (Melissa Willliams, in Kymlicka & Norman, 2000, p. 125. For extensive discussion, see J. Bowman & W. Rehg, *1997*; A. Gutmann & D. Thompson, 1996; and J. Habermas, 1996.). According to this theory, legitimate government is based on consent about the terms of social and political cooperation and arrangements reached as a result or outgrowth of reasoned exchange among citizens. As citizens, then, religious individuals and groups have a rightful place in the deliberative process. This place may rightfully be reserved and protected if Williams is correct that in this process due attention must be given to the needs and identities of marginalized groups. In the light of differential powers of different groups in society, where class, wealth and prestige are prime considerations, the voicelessness of religion in our predominantly secular society would seem to justify special effort to facilitate full participation of religious individuals or groups in public forums.

Democracy's deliberative processes would reject restraint on the expression of religious viewpoints and, instead, foster their active involvement in the public arena.

Study of Religion in Public Schools: The Time is Now

It is clear why possession of knowledge about religions is a necessity in a democratic society. Democracy's deliberative processes would reject restraint on the expression of religious viewpoints and, instead, foster their active involvement in the public arena. At the same time, the requirement in a democratic society to respect individuals and groups, as well as their rights and freedoms, enjoins citizens to empathize with others and to avoid prejudicial actions against them.These considerations make it imperative that citizens understand other individuals or groups, as well as their perspectives and ways. Given that such perspectives and ways have underlying religious basis, knowledge and understanding of religion, in its various forms, becomes a necessity. Further, given that the doctrine of the separation of church and state is not an established one in Canada, and that our courts have adopted the U.S. Supreme Court reasoning in *Abington v. Schempp* noted above, there is no legal barrier to the development of an objective religious curriculum in Canadian public schools. It is ironic that little or no movement to develop such a curriculum is detectable in Canada, when such a movement has made progress south of the border, where the separation doctrine used to intimidate efforts to include religion in public education.

Needless to say, the crowded public school curriculum and the probability of controversy, which any attempt to include religion in the curriculum will invite, must prove intimidating. Nonetheless, developments in some school boards in the United States show that it can be done (Haynes, 2001, pp. 5-10). In 1995 twenty-four religious advocacy groups and major educational organizations, including the American Teachers Federation, the National School Boards Association, and the American Association of School Administrators, adopted a series of consensus guidelines, the most clearly articulated of which is *Religious Liberty, Public Education, and the Future of American Democracy: A Statement of Principles* (Haynes, 2001, p. 6). On the basis of this document, as well as C. Haynes and O. Thomas's *Finding Common Ground: A First Amendment Guide to Religion and Public Education* (1998), California has included in its curriculum a study of the basic tenets of the world's major religions and the role of religious beliefs in shaping American history. With the new curriculum, the contributions of religion in world history, art, music, and belief systems have been discussed and are no longer marginalized (Brophy, 2001, 12). Indeed, the succcessful implementation of the curriculum in two California school districts, the Snowline Joint Unified School District (Vondra, J. 2001, 13-19) and the Ramona Unified School District (Annicharico, 2001, 20-22) demonstrates that, even under restrictive legal constraints, teaching about religion is possible.

It is unfortunate that the well-meaning and commendable efforts of the Brotherhood of Anglican Churchmen in the early 1990s to produce a multi-faith resource material for grades 5 and 6 Ottawa pupils failed, despite a previous Ontario government announcement that religious education may be provided in grades 1 through 8 for up to 60 minutes a week, provided that no single religion is given primacy (Sweet, 1997, 219-222.). The opposition coming from the Humanist Society of Ottawa, though unfortunate, might have been the occasion for exploring whether the material produced would have survived legal scrutiny or not, and whether alternative resource material that is more inclusive and developed with blessings from concerned groups could have done it.

The odds against the development of an objective religious curriculum are great, but the need for the study of religion is now more important in pluralistic Canada than ever. It is time to try.



Informed Citizenship: Canada in a Comparative Context

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Without the knowledge to act meaningfully, citizenship is empty. This is true for individuals. It is also true for communities. In *Civic Literacy: How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work*[1], I compare 15 Western democracies as to the proportion of their citizens possessing the knowledge to effectively exercise their citizenship through casting an informed vote. Surely democracy is less than what it could be if half the adults lack such knowledge – as in the United States?[2]

Is this also true of Canada? In the last federal election, barely sixty percent of potential voters made it to the polls, and, as a recent study for Elections Canada revealed, only 26 percent of those 18 to 24 turned out.[3] There are many reasons for this, but one – too often neglected – has to do with political awareness. Can we expect people who do not keep up with political events to vote? In this article I assess the situation in this country drawing upon my research on the high civic literacy countries of northern Europe.

The High Civic Literacy Society – and how it gets to be that way

Political knowledgeability is not automatic: even for the citizens of advanced industrial societies it needs the coordinated and funded support of the community and its institutions.[4] In countries where more newspapers are read, people vote more. Total daily newspaper circulation in Canada is the equivalent of well under 20 per cent of the population, below even that of the US. In Scandinavia, where newspapers that are not dominant in their markets are subsidized,[5] newspaper circulation equals almost 50 percent of the population. In addition, public-service television and radio are generously funded to reduce dependence on commercial electronic media, which results in their remaining dominant, if not always in audience share, at least in setting the standard for news and public affairs.

There is even a widely distributed daily special newspaper, *8 Sidor*, containing national and international news articles written in easy Swedish for those with learning difficulties or new to the Swedish language.[6] Such initiatives should be seen in the context of a societal priority on continuing education. Every indicator we have points to the high levels of participation in various forms of adult education in Scandinavia, in what Olof Palme once termed "study-circle democracy." Palme had in mind most of all the efforts of the Workers' Educational Association (ABF),[7] affiliated with the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party, the largest of 11 adult education associations, which together organize state-supported activities in which over 50 percent of Swedish adults participate each year. The Nordic countries lead (with annual participation rates over 50 percent) in the only available comparative survey, one which combines participation in adult education and training programs, with Canada at 39 percent. These data come from the International Adult Literacy Survey,[8] the main results of which showed that among Scandinavian adults, well below 10 percent were functionally illiterate, compared to 18 percent in Canada and 22 percent in the United States.

The low electoral turnout reflects low levels of political knowledge, and, therefore, the failure of Canada's educational system to inculcate civic literacy.

The Political Awareness of Young People

The low electoral turnout reflects low levels of political knowledge, and, therefore, the failure of Canada's educational system to inculcate civic literacy. This is surprising given that according to the OECD's recent PISA survey,[9] after Finland, Canada has been producing the best overall results among Western 14 and 15 year olds in science, math and reading. Yet the facts are clear. The National Geographic-Roper 2002 Global Geographic Literacy Survey assessed 3,250 young adults in nine countries, as to how aware they are of geography in the context of current events. Out of 56 questions that were asked across all countries surveyed, on average young Americans answered 23 questions correctly, with young people in Canada (with 27) and Great Britain (28) faring almost as poorly.[10] Sweden led with 40, followed by Germany, Italy, France and Japan.[11]

Moreover, there appears to have been a significant decline in the level of political knowledge especially among young Canadians in the last 10 to 15 years. In a 1990 survey carried out for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, 56 percent of 18 to 29 year olds were able to answer at most one of three political knowledge questions correctly (Who is the PM? Who is the Liberal leader? Who is the NDP leader? For the survey sample as a whole, the figure was 40 percent.) By 2000, the younger group was lagging further still: when asked to identify the prime minister, finance minister and official opposition party, fully 67 percent of 18 to 29 year olds scored no more than one out of three compared to 46 percent for the sample as a whole.[12]

In another paper, Paul Howe compared responses to the political knowledge questions in the 2000 Canadian Election Survey with those to two Gallup polls from 1956.[13] Age differences turn out to be important in both periods, but significantly more so in 2000. As he concludes, "not only are the young less informed about politics today than they were forty-five years ago, they are also more likely to allow this condition to influence at least one important element of political behaviour, the decision to vote or not to vote."

Is it possible that young people who believe in democracy but are disengaged from mainstream politics translate that belief into some form of non-traditional political activity or even attentiveness? Evidence of any such a generalized trend is, however, skimpy. Though some young people today have replaced engagement in mainstream politics with involvement in non-conventional political activities, this is still marginal. The key development is simply disengagement. Canadian data shows that young people, though less attentive and informed, are in fact more supportive of "politics as usual" than older Canadians O'Neil (2001) found 18-27 year-olds to be roughly 10 percent more satisfied with Canadian democracy and elections than other age groups, and comparatively even more willing to view the federal government as fair and effective.[14]

Moreover, it is one sub-group, poorly educated young males, that most accounts for the change. Young women were less engaged and less educated than young men previously. They have now significantly surpassed males in educational levels. So the civic drop outs are typically poorly educated young men, who, in previous generations were sufficiently attentive and informed of politics to vote.

Civic Literacy and Political Institutions

Could political institutions be a factor? The fact that our winner-take-all electoral (First-past the-post) FPTP system makes it hard for parties reflecting an alternative political current to get a foothold surely has a discouraging effect upon turnout, perhaps disproportionately among young people. The report on Youth Voter Participation from IDEA (The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance[15] noted that while the average turnout level for voters between 18 and 29 years old was 8 percent below the overall participation rate, in Sweden, it was only 4.3 percent. The most significant factor accounting for differences appears to be a proportional (PR) electoral system facilitating access to representation in parliament for small parties. In such countries, there is a youth turnout rate almost 12 percentage points higher than in countries where access for small parties is not present. We know that because PR systems are fairer at translating votes into seats they can, and do, bring excluded sectors of the community in under the umbrella of electoral institutions.[16]

This is not to suggest that PR will bring 12 percent more young Canadians to the polls; the problem of civic drop-outs is deeper than can be got at through the reform of political institutions. But we do know that proportional

electoral systems create an environment that brings those at the margins of non participation into the political process, manifested in the turnout boost established by the literature to be associated with electoral systems based on PR.[17] This is due, first, to the fact that with every vote counting under PR, every voter in a PR election is like a resident in a highly contested single-member district which we know to experience higher turnout.[18] But it is less a matter of the individual's increased chance of affecting the outcome, which, in reality, is still minuscule, than the different incentives placed on political parties. In an FPTP election, parties ignore many voters, investing effort and money to get the attention of voters in close contests.[19] Moreover, there is less incentive for political leaders under PR to distort facts – and thus inhibit the awareness of the electorate of alternative positions on the issues of the day – than for FPTP-based ones, who know that the choices of a small number of voters can make the difference between monopolizing political power and having none whatsoever.

Beyond this, PR raises civic literacy by simplifying the political map and reducing the incentives for politicians to distort information. Under PR, since every vote counts equally toward electing representatives of one's preferred party, parties have an incentive to inform all voters of their programs, rather than target the median voter through stressing personality at the cost of issues as under a first-past-the-post (FPTP). Moreover, compared to PR, FPTP exaggerates a party's weakness, creating a disincentive against being involved locally in regions where it is weak. Over time, this tends to remove parties from effective presence in local politics – as is the case in Canada. As a result, voters cannot easily apply political knowledge from one level to another. In addition, the representational logic of PR-based multi-party systems is to inhibit precipitous changes to a party's principles and identity, that is, the elements that constitute its place on the political map. Political actors, and the voters themselves, can thus count on a relatively clearly drawn and stable political map on which to plot their own paths.

In the high-civic literacy Scandinavian countries, proportional electoral systems at all levels are linked to measures supporting the informational activities of political parties. There is a generous system of direct subsidies to the informational activities of political parties. Scandinavian newspaper subsidies were established not simply to foster diversity in the media, but also to facilitate the political parties publicly presenting their views. There is also a direct relationship with adult education. In Sweden, each of the parties is associated with one of the eleven adult educational associations. Especially in the period before an election – or a referendum, like those that have place over nuclear power and EU membership – the associations organize state-supported study circles for their sister parties to familiarize members and sympathizers with programs and strategies.

A related set of policies from which we can learn concern transparency in political information dissemination, namely the regulations that govern the availability and accessibility of information related to the public interest. One relevant such regulation concerns the Nordic countries' requirement - with ombudspersons appointed to ensure that this is done – that public institutions open their books to interested citizens (Axberger, 1996). More important, though typically more informal, are arrangements giving an important role to political parties in nominating members of school boards and representative councils in various sectors, even the Church. You simply do not see – as is universal in the United States – and common in Canada – demands to "keep politics out of…" It is normal for elected politicians to be invited to Swedish high schools, for example. In the US, in contrast, politics is kept out of schools, and young people are encouraged to volunteer for community groups on the clear understanding that such activity has nothing to do with politics, with the result that such volunteers are no more likely to vote or otherwise participate in policies.[20]

Though some young people today have replaced engagement in mainstream politics with involvement in non-conventional political activities, this is still marginal. The key development is simply disengagement.

The Socioeconomic Outcomes of Civic Literacy

Informed political participation is a worthy end in itself; it is also a means to an end, that of more egalitarian socio-economic distribution. Canada is regularly among the countries at the top of the United Nations' Human Development Index, which combines per capita income, educational enrollment, and life expectancy. In 2002, it came in third after Norway and Sweden. But they pull away from all the others when the UN Index takes into account the level of poverty and the relative position of women. The Scandinavian welfare state's resilience has much to do with high civic literacy. Informed individuals can better identify the effects policy options have upon their own interests and those of others in their community and make their votes count toward attaining desired long-term economic outcomes. Low civic literacy excludes from informed political participation people with low economic and educational resources, those most dependent on social policies to address their needs.

Canadians take pride in social policies that distinguish us from our powerful Southern neighbour. There, the interests of the economically disadvantaged – who, more than elsewhere, are excluded from informed political participation through lack of civic competence – carry less weight. But Canada risks following the United States down the low civic-literacy road. Unless we learn from the civic-literacy enhancing policies – and institutions – of the Scandinavians, Canadians will increasingly find themselves navigating with a political map from which the high civic literacy road and the kinder gentler society to which it leads is nowhere to be found.

Diversity Without Divisiveness: A Role for Social Capital?

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How do we sustain social development and harmony at a time when our societies are increasingly multi-faith, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual? This is a challenge that Canada, as well as other OECD countries, currently face and will continue to address in the decades to come. Immigrants and their descendents have transformed Canada into not only a country in the world, but also a country of the world. Over 200 ethnic origins were reported in the 2001 Census and more than 18% of the Canadian population was born outside Canada. Such multicultural reality brings opportunities and challenges.

The role of social capital in managing diversity

In the 1990s, an old concept, social capital, gained prominence as a potential tool in policy development.[1] This could be a useful concept in designing policies that promote diversity without divisiveness in pluralistic and multicultural societies. This is because social capital may foster mutual understanding and respect between different groups. It enables individuals and groups to get by and to get ahead in the society in which they reside.[2]

What is social capital? As defined by the OECD, social capital consists of "networks together with shared norms, values and understanding which facilitate co-operation within or among groups"[3]. Networks constitute the objective component of the definition and relate to the behaviour of actors who enter into associative activity. By contrast, shared norms, values and understandings relate to the subjective dispositions and attitudes of individuals and groups, as well as sanctions and rules governing behaviour, which are widely shared.

Generally speaking, three basic types of social capital have been identified: bonding, bridging and linking[4]. *Bonding* refers typically to relations among members of families and ethnic groups. *Bridging* refers to relations between ethnic and other social groups. *Linking* refers to relations between different social strata in a hierarchy where different groups access power, social status and wealth. In multicultural societies, the relation between bonding and bridging social capital is essential in understanding the dynamic of ethnic relations.

Even though a good deal of research has been devoted to social capital, networks and values, many of the social capital concepts have yet to be translated into policies and practices. How does social capital facilitate relations among ethno-cultural groups? What is the role of social capital in immigrant integration? How can governments and institutions in pluralistic societies use social capital as a tool to manage relations among ethnic and immigrant groups? Responses to these questions will enable decision makers in Canada and in other OECD countries to develop policies and programs to manage and benefit from its cultural diversity. The Government of Canada's Policy Research Initiative, in partnership with the OECD and several federal departments, is planning an international conference to address the role of social capital in the social and economic integration of immigrants and in managing diversity.

Integration through bonding, bridging and linking social capital

The relation between social capital and immigrant inclusion is complex. Individuals acquire their networks differently. How well immigrants can participate fully in the receiving society depends on the type of social capital that they are able to acquire both within ethnic communities and in mainstream society such as the workplace, schools, and the community at large.

Bonding social capital has already been identified as a possible contributor to the concentration of immigrants in urban areas. Through generations of migration, some ethnic groups have developed an infrastructure such as businesses and social services that often parallel those in the mainstream society, hence the term, 'institutional completeness'[5]. Co-ethnics can often provide valuable information on the local labour market. As well, these ties can provide a social safety net by meeting material and financial needs during lean times and caring for children and elders[6]. On a structural level, Isajiw[7] concludes that retention of home language and of ethnic identity derive from a high level of 'institutional completeness' and the viability of the ethnic group.

Bridging occurs when individuals of one group interact with others who are of different cultural heritage. Most immigrants do not want to remain in their own ethnic community, nor do they wish to reproduce their home country in Canada. As they immerse in their new country, immigrants are becoming 'the locals'. They become citizens, learn French and English, and become aware of the value and norms of the receiving society. Bridging capital enables immigrants to fully participate in their adopted country socially and economically.

However, the acquisition of social capital is a two-way street. To accumulate bridging capital not only requires the willingness of immigrants to connect with the society at large, but also the willingness of the receiving society to accept newcomers. Immigrants may be excluded from the mainstream society because of race, ethnicity or religion. For example, a recent survey in Germany shows that 49 percent of the respondents would not want to live in a neighbourhood with high concentration of Muslims, and 20 percent would not want to have foreigners as neighbours. Public attitude towards immigrants varies depending on the social, economic, and political environments in the receiving country as well as internationally.

Immigrants and ethnic minorities want to be represented in the decision-making process. For immigrants, 'participating in politics is a way of gaining a voice from the muteness of being uprooted in one society and transplanted in another.'[8] By doing this, they will have more social and economic opportunities. Through *linking*, ethnic groups, regardless of immigration status, are able to have a say in the type of society that they want.

How well immigrants can participate fully in the receiving society depends on the type of social capital that they are able to acquire both within ethnic communities and in mainstream society.

Not all forms of social capital are equal

Particular forms of social capital have the potential to impede social cohesion in certain circumstances. Although strong bonding ties give particular communities or groups a sense of identity and common purpose, without "bridging" ties that transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status), bonding ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow interests, and can actively exclude outsiders[10]. Relatively homogeneous groups may be characterized by strong trust and co-operative norms within a group, but low trust and co-operation with the rest of society. High levels of 'institutional completeness' also mean that immigrants work and conduct daily business within the ethnic community. In other words, they can be self-sufficient or even advance themselves socially and economically without having to acquire the official language of the receiving society.

Uneven access to social capital can also have undesirable social outcomes. While those with a lot of social competencies and with strong social networks may be able to cope with change as they build new social capital, large proportions of immigrants may fail to derive benefits from getting access to new forms of social capital due to a lack of language skills and other barriers. This situation may be compounded in the future as some groups are likely to have access to new technologies and forms of learning linked to enhanced labour market opportunities.

Equally worrying is the possibility that some social networks may exclude others and that over time, social networks and civic as well as political participation may become more unequal in some societies. For those on the "inside" of particular networks and communities, there are important means of access to resources and assistance from which "outsiders" are effectively excluded. In fact, the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey reports disturbingly unequal access to social capital in many ethnically diverse communities in the United States[11].

These developments may have potential consequences. Rodrik found evidence to support the notion that social polarisation can impair an economy's ability to react to negative economic shocks12. Moreover, the existence of important social, ethnic and gender cleavages may impede the spread of shared norms (bridging and linking) thus undermining social capital. Accordingly, some people can be excluded entirely from accessing "quality" human and social capital.

Importing social capital

So far, the discourse on immigration has focused largely on the human capital (e.g., education and language abilities) that immigrants have. Less is known about the social capital that newcomers bring and how it impacts the social and economic development of the receiving society. For example, cultural vibrancy has often been considered to be a marketing advantage of a country when it comes to hosting international events. In the age of globalization, immigrants can also, through their cultural and language skills, facilitate trade and cultural exchanges between their home and receiving countries[13].

The role of governments and stakeholders

Governments can help create and develop social capital to facilitate successful immigrant integration and in fostering mutual understanding between ethno-cultural groups. Schools can play a central role in building social capital by instilling habits of civic and political engagement in children and teenagers. Schools and knowledge institutions have also become crucial nodes in social capital loaded networks through parents, private organizations and alumni.

Governments ought to consider the importance of "bridging social capital" in policies to encourage inclusion of various groups, while preserving cultural or other group identities, in educational programmes, employment and more mixed residential arrangements. In these areas, governments have to make sure that the transformation pressure is tolerable given the capacity to cope with the process of construction and destruction of social capital.

In order to promote equity and inclusiveness, governments can promote a fair distribution of human and social capital – through schools, job training, life-long learning opportunities and through community and social policy – in such a way that access to high quality human and social capital is achievable for all.

In conclusion, the role of social capital in fostering an inclusive yet diverse society deserves more attention. This PRI-OECD conference (Fall 2003) will shed new light on an old concept by bringing together a number of different perspectives and disciplines in the analysis of the potential contribution of social capital to the integration of immigrant and managing diversity.

La citoyenneté, l'inclusion et la diversité dans l'administration publique fédérale du Canada

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Les opinions émises dans cet article sont celles de l'auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement les vues du Centre canadien de gestion.

Une débauche d'initiatives gouvernementales

L'ensemble de l'appareil législatif et administratif mis en place par le gouvernement du Canada pour gérer le pluralisme de la société canadienne fait souvent l'envie d'observateurs étrangers, qui voient, dans ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le « modèle canadien », une approche à la fois axée sur des principes moraux élevés et ancrée dans un pragmatisme de bon aloi.

Depuis la fin des années 60 et le début des années 70, le Canada a adopté, à un rythme accéléré, un nombre impressionnant de politiques et de mesures concrètes pour promouvoir et mettre en pratique les concepts d'inclusion et de diversité au sein de la société civile et des instances administratives fédérales.

C'est ainsi qu'on peut mentionner, pêle-mêle, la mise en œuvre d'une politique d'immigration neutre du point de vue racial, l'adoption de lois (langues officielles, multiculturalisme, droits de la personne, équité en emploi…), l'apparition d'organismes parlementaires chargés de surveiller la mise en œuvre de certaines de ces lois (Commissaire aux langues officielles, Commission des droits de la personne…), la création de Commissions royales d'enquête (bilinguisme et biculturalisme, situation de la femme, peuples autochtones…), la mise sur pied de groupes de travail (Groupe de travail sur une fonction publique inclusive, Groupe de travail sur la participation des minorités visibles dans la fonction publique fédérale…), et la mise en œuvre de programmes spécifiques avec d'importantes ressources financières et humaines à la clé comme autant de mesures visant, entre autres, à reconnaître et à valoriser certains aspects de la diversité de la population du Canada, et à s'assurer que cette diversité se reflète dans la composition et les modes de fonctionnement des institutions fédérales.

Il se trouve cependant des commentateurs plutôt sceptiques face à cette débauche d'initiatives gouvernementales adoptées pour défendre et pour promouvoir des droits nouveaux, qui reflètent l'évolution des valeurs collectives du pays, mais qui ne font pas nécessairement l'unanimité dans la population ni même au sein de la fonction publique fédérale. Ces critiques se méfient des réponses bureaucratico-rationnelles à des problèmes de société complexes qu'il vaudrait mieux, estiment-ils, laisser se régler d'eux-mêmes ou, du moins, régler sans intervention étatique trop intempestive. La critique, dans sa généralité, est injuste car, s'il est vrai que les interventions du gouvernement peuvent parfois sembler lourdes et même inefficaces compte tenu de l'ampleur des moyens investis, elles valent, au demeurant, mieux qu'une inaction qui risquerait de déboucher sur des tensions irréconciliables.

La question, au fond, se pose plus à propos de l'adéquation des moyens mis en place qu'à propos du bien-fondé d'une intervention gouvernementale.

Examinons, à cet égard, deux domaines dans lesquels le gouvernement du Canada a cherché à infléchir à la fois la composition et les comportements de l'administration : la participation des minorités visibles au sein des institutions fédérales et l'usage du français et de l'anglais comme langues officielles de travail dans ces mêmes institutions.

Où finit la diversité et où commence l'inclusion (et vice versa)

Les minorités visibles constituent une composante du programme fédéral d'équité en emploi qui vise, en outre, les Autochtones, les femmes, et les personnes handicapées et qui cherche à donner, à chacun de ces groupes, une représentation correspondant à des critères de participation équitable comme leur poids démographique ou leur disponibilité sur le marché du travail. Selon la Loi sur l'équité en matière d'emploi (1986), les employeurs sont tenus de recenser et d'éliminer les obstacles à l'emploi auxquels se heurtent les quatre groupes désignés. Les employeurs doivent s'attacher à la représentation de ces groupes dans leur effectif et, à cette fin, élaborer et mettre en œuvre un plan en consultation avec les représentants des employés. En outre, comme suite aux modifications à la loi adoptées en 1995, les employeurs peuvent faire l'objet d'une vérification de conformité.

Les efforts visant à augmenter le taux de représentation des minorités visibles dans la fonction publique fédérale se sont intensifiés au cours des dernières années sous l'impulsion, en particulier, des titulaires du poste de Greffier du Conseil Privé, du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor, de la Commission de la fonction publique et de la Commission des droits de la personne. Bien que la grande majorité des ministères et organismes fédéraux restent encore en deçà de leurs objectifs de représentativité, on peut constater une progression constante, et dans certains cas spectaculaire, vers la réalisation de ces objectifs[1].

Ce qui frappe, c'est que ces avancées se manifestent surtout en matière de recrutement et qu'elles sont plus timides en ce qui concerne les promotions et la capacité à maintenir les membres des minorités visibles dans la fonction publique après leur nomination. Bien que la question mérite de faire l'objet d'analyses plus fines, on peut émettre l'hypothèse que les efforts investis par l'administration publique fédérale pour une inclusion véritable des minorités visibles une fois l'étape du recrutement franchie n'ont pas été suffisamment robustes – ou alors qu'ils n'ont pas encore donné les résultats escomptés. Le taux relativement élevé de cessations d'emploi devrait inciter les organismes compétents à se pencher sur les structures et le climat d'accueil ainsi que sur les processus de promotions internes mis en place par les ministères et organismes qui sont en butte à ce problème.

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Une piste qu'il vaudrait sans doute la peine d'explorer serait d'établir un dialogue approfondi et soutenu entre les employés qui font partie des minorités visibles (et, bien sûr, des autres groupes désignés) et leurs collègues. Cela permettrait peut-être de favoriser un appui proactif à ce programme qui irait au-delà d'une justification soit purement légaliste (c'est la loi, ce sont les règlements et les directives qui l'exigent…) soit de type utilitariste (la diversité nous permettra d'avoir des politiques qui reflètent la diversité de la population canadienne, notre diversité nous donne un avantage concurrentiel à l'ère de la mondialisation, ces politiques auront une plus grande légitimité, et nous aurions alors une meilleure gouvernance…), pour déboucher sur un modèle de conformité axé sur les valeurs : reconnaissance de l'Autre, respect, équité, recherche de la diversité comme valeur en soi… De telles conversations dialogiques pourraient aussi chercher à dissiper le flou sémantique qui entoure la juxtaposition même des termes « inclusion » et « diversité » qui, à certains égards, semblent contradictoires. Parlons-nous d'une inclusion prise dans ses acceptions premières, qui sont de nature scientifique, pour signifier une simple relation entre deux ensembles dont l'un est inclus dans l'autre? Ou avons-nous en tête un mariage, ou une symbiose, autre terme scientifique, qui renvoie à une association durable et réciproquement profitable entre deux organismes vivants?[2] Et quand nous utilisons le mot diversité, nous limitons-nous à une diversité purement statistique? Ou voulons-nous privilégier le second sens du mot qui met l'accent sur les notions de divergence, d'écart et d'opposition?

Il ne s'agit pas de faire du byzantinisme ni de couper les cheveux en quatre, mais bien d'avoir une idée claire du sens des mots que nous utilisons pour mobiliser une organisation de près de 200 000 personnes. Où s'arrête la diversité et où commence l'inclusion? La question est loin d'être oiseuse pour les fonctionnaires visibles (si je peux me permettre ce raccourci) qui hésitent à s'identifier comme tels dans le cadre des recensements effectués par les ministères pour essayer d'obtenir des statistiques aussi précises que possible sur cette catégorie d'employés. D'après les commentaires entendus lors de débats consacrés à cette question[3], les hésitations semblent découler de l'ambivalence que des membres des minorités visibles ressentent entre, d'une part, le désir de proclamer leur différence et, d'autre part, le souhait d'être considérés comme des fonctionnaires « normaux » et de ne pas faire l'objet d'une attention particulière.

Les initiatives du gouvernement donnent parfois l'impression d'être aux prises avec la même ambivalence. D'un côté, on invite les fonctionnaires à adopter la diversité comme valeur, de l'autre, on établit des profils de compétence communs pour les postes de gestionnaires. En caricaturant quelque peu, nous pourrions nous réveiller avec une fonction publique statistiquement très diversifiée mais aux comportements bokanovskifiés.[4]

Je donne ma langue au chat (ou à la majorité)

La question de l'utilisation du français et de l'anglais comme langues de travail dans les institutions fédérales présente une problématique différente.

La nouvelle Loi sur les langues officielles, adoptée en 1988, a donné une base législative claire à ce qui avait été, depuis les années 1970, une politique bien établie du gouvernement du Canada, à savoir que le français et l'anglais sont les langues de travail des institutions fédérales et que les agents de ces derniers ont le droit d'utiliser, à certaines conditions, l'une ou l'autre dans des régions désignées.

Le gouvernement a surtout utilisé deux piliers pour tenter de donner plein effet à ce droit. Premièrement, il s'est appuyé sur une autre disposition de la loi qui concerne la participation (c'est-à-dire, la présence) des Canadiens d'expression anglaise et d'expression française dans les institutions fédérales dont les effectifs doivent tendre à refléter la présence au Canada des deux collectivités de langue officielle, compte tenu d'un certain nombre de facteurs (il faut qu'il y ait présence avant qu'il y ait usage). En second lieu, le gouvernement a mis en place une batterie de mesures administratives (exigence linguistique des postes de cadres supérieurs dans les régions désignées, cours de langue,

règles encadrant le régime linguistique des communications internes, etc.), qui toutes visaient à encourager l'usage des deux langues à l'intérieur des institutions fédérales.

D'autres, et en particulier la Commissaire aux langues officielles, sont mieux placés pour évaluer le succès de ces approches, mais on permettra à un vieux routier de la fonction publique fédérale de formuler quelques brèves observations. Il ne fait aucun doute que du point de vue de la participation, les efforts faits au cours de ces quelque trente dernières années ont été couronnés de succès, à tel point qu'il faut maintenant, dans certains cas, faire attention de ne pas se retrouver avec un déséquilibre inversé, c'est-à-dire une sur-représentation prononcée des employés d'expression française. Des progrès ont été également accomplis en ce qui concerne l'usage des deux langues. Cela est observable et, s'il faut en croire les résultats globaux du récent sondage auprès des fonctionnaires fédéraux, respectivement 85% et 87% des répondants se sentent libres d'utiliser la langue officielle de leur choix durant les réunions de leurs unités de travail ou pour rédiger leurs textes[5]. Mais, ces chiffres sont sans doute trompeurs puisqu'ils comprennent les réponses de tous les fonctionnaires, dont la majorité travaille dans des régions considérées comme unilingues. Il faudra donc attendre des analyses plus pointues et la publication de ces mêmes résultats ventilés par région bilingue pour avoir une idée plus précise de la distance qui sépare encore la coupe des lèvres.

Bien sûr, nous avons affaire à une interaction extrêmement complexe et dynamique, façonnée par l'histoire, les schémas mentaux et les habitudes, mais il n'en reste pas moins intrigant qu'après une trentaine d'années de tentatives plus ou moins méritoires, cette question soit encore à l'ordre du jour. C'est ainsi que le Greffier du Conseil privé a identifié l'utilisation des deux langues dans les communications internes comme l'une des priorités stratégiques de la fonction publique du Canada pour 2002-2003 et que le Centre canadien de gestion a pris l'initiative de créer une Table ronde de recherche-action sur la même question. Les conclusions de cette Table ronde feront l'objet d'un rapport dont la publication est prévue pour le printemps 2003.

Les piétinements qu'on peut constater sur le terrain sont particulièrement flagrants dans les communications entre fonctionnaires. Ce problème a d'ailleurs été amplifié par les nouvelles technologies (téléconférences, vidéoconférences…) et l'accent mis sur le travail en équipe et les communications horizontales (groupes de travail comprenant des fonctionnaires travaillant dans des régions unilingues et bilingues, comités interministériels…). Un autre irritant pour les fonctionnaires d'expression française découle du recours, assez fréquent, à des consultants externes qui ne sont pas en mesure de les interviewer dans leur langue.

Ici encore, comme dans le cas de l'équité en emploi, il semblerait que la fonction publique fédérale pourrait améliorer sa performance en mettant l'accent sur des modèles de conformité qui aillent au-delà de la conformité légaliste (c'est la loi, etc.) et utilitariste (on est plus efficace quand on travaille dans sa première langue officielle, on a de meilleures chances de promotion si on apprend la langue de ses collègues…) – qui sont, certes, primordiales mais semble-t-il insuffisantes – pour chercher à établir des comportements linguistiques qui seraient axées sur des valeurs, identiques du reste à celles qui ont été évoquées plus haut pour la promotion de la diversité. À cet égard, il faut souligner le projet-pilote extrêmement prometteur de l'Agence canadienne des douanes et du revenu qui a établi un dialogue approfondi entre fonctionnaires d'expression anglaise et d'expression française pour favoriser des communications dans les deux langues entre son administration centrale et les régions bilingues.

D'un côté, on invite les fonctionnaires à adopter la diversité comme valeur, de l'autre, on établit des profils de compétence communs pour les postes de gestionnaires.

Conclusion

Que peut-on conclure de ces trop brèves et quelque peu éparses considérations? Tout d'abord que le gouvernement du Canada a entrepris avec sérieux les réformes administratives liées à une gestion progressiste de la diversité et des langues officielles. Ensuite, qu'il ne suffit pas de s'en tenir à des modèles de conformité légaliste ou utilitariste et qu'une compréhension réciproque des espoirs, intérêts, frustrations et craintes des majorités et minorités multiples concernées semble être primordiale si l'on veut solidement ancrer ces réformes dans des valeurs partagées. Enfin, que malgré les obstacles auxquels se buttent encore les initiatives du gouvernement fédéral, le Canada peut, à juste titre et avec fierté, accepter de jouer le rôle de modèle que les observateurs étrangers semblent vouloir lui assigner.

Citizenship Profiles of Young Canadians

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Cette recherche a été réalisée avec la collaboration très appréciée d'Alan Sears et d'Andy Hughes de l'Université du Nouveau Brunswick et d'Yvonne Hébert de l'Université de Calgary. Elle a été financée par des subventions provenant du Fonds FCAR, du CRSH, du Programme d'études ethniques du Ministère du Patrimoine Canadien et de Métropolis.

In this short paper, we offer some results of a comparison of young citizens who were studying in colleges or universities in three Canadian provinces during the year 2000: New Brunswick (N = 515), Québec (N = 1195) and Alberta (N = 823), their mean age being respectively 18, 19 and 20. Around two thirds of the samples were females and one third males. The Québec and New-Brunswick samples present an approximately representative number of respondents who have French or English as a first language. Young Canadians of first and second generation of immigration are also strongly represented in all three samples. The same questionnaire was used in all provinces, although we obviously adapted certain questions, for instance, when referring to linguistic policies and to the province's cultural characteristics.

The comparison is based on three broad dimensions: **social identities**, **agreement with equality norms** and **civic participation**, each composed of four factors identified through statistical analysis. This paper will consider those three dimensions together and focus on the identification, through the use of cluster analysis, of the number of profiles of citizenship necessary to give a full account of the data collected. Although the questionnaire provided a large variety of socio-demographic information, the aim was to capture the actual forms of citizenship present in each provincial sample, without basing our analyses and comparisons on the categories thus made available. It ensues that profiles are heterogeneous in their socio-demographic composition. In order to respect the specificity of each provincial context, separate factorial and cluster analyses were performed and the items composing some factor differ slightly between the three samples. The questionnaire used in this research measures the process of identification, attitudes and actual or intended behaviours. Even if it doesn't measure values *per se*, the comparison of profiles reveals similarities and differences from which we can generate hypotheses about their underlying values.

The **social identity dimension** is made up of two main factors: civic identities and self-defined cultural (group) identity. We have also added to this dimension the attitude towards linguistic diversity, which presents remarkably high correlations with the identity factors.

The most striking general result to emerge is that the cluster analysis for each province has differentiated types of citizens who are quite different from one another with respect to some, but not all, factors within as well as between samples. Thus, we obtained four types for Québec and for New Brunswick and five types for Alberta, between which, as we will see later, there is much similarity.

In Québec, one type presents a high average on all factors of the identity dimension, while another type scores low on all factors. The two other types feature contrasting scores between provincial and national identification, one of these represents a high level of identification to Canada and a lower level of identification to Québec and the other presents the opposite profile. Even among these two types, both poles of civic identity are not antagonistic; rather, we find an order of precedence between the two. Both of these types do not distinguish themselves in their level of cultural identification.

Interesting similarities and differences among the three provinces come to light when we consider the New-Brunswick and Alberta data where, in contrast with Québec, there is no separate factor of provincial identification, civic identity being entirely expressed in a single factor that amalgamates Canadian and provincial identities.

Despite this important characteristic, we find in these two provinces a type which presents, like in Québec, the highest score for civic and cultural identity, as well as two types in Alberta and one in New Brunswick featuring the weakest levels of civic and cultural identification. The remaining profiles in these two provinces present moderately high levels of identification.

Thus, one of the interesting general results seems to be the emergence of two similar types in all three provinces, one presenting the lowest social identity levels while the other presents highest levels.

The composition of the factors measuring civic identity in the three provinces also presents an interesting contrast. In New Brunswick, the only items composing this factor measure collective self-esteem whereas, in Québec, items relating to the feeling of resemblance to the other members of the community add themselves to collective self-esteem items. In Alberta, the items measure social resemblance and proximity, but no item measuring collective self-esteem is included in the factor. This result may be an indication of differences in values linked to civic identities.

In Québec, the type with a higher level of provincial identification strongly distinguishes itself through a rather negative attitude towards the use of languages other than French in the public sphere, the items for this factor measuring support for the application of Bill 101. The contrasting type with a higher level of Canadian identification is more favourable to the public use of another language. As could be expected, the majority of Francophones in the sample is to be found in the first type and the majority of Anglophones in the second.

In Québec, the type with a higher level of provincial identification strongly distinguishes itself through a rather negative attitude towards the use of languages other than French in the public sphere.

In New Brunswick, two types present a less positive attitude toward that province's bilingualism policy. They account for 60% of the Anglophones comprised in that sample. Two thirds of Francophones can be found in the two other types that present a favourable attitude towards bilingualism. It thus becomes apparent that the members of linguistic minorities in Quebec and New Brunswick are predominantly in favour of policies that protect the public use of minority languages.

In Alberta, types are highly contrasted in their attitude towards the use of languages other than English. Three types demonstrate tolerance in this regard, while the remaining two strongly endorse the exclusive use of English. The first language of respondents does not distinguish between these types.

Thus, in all three provinces, linguistic policies appear to be a controversial subject that divides citizens, although a little less so in New Brunswick than in the other two provinces.

The **equalitarian dimension** comprises four factors: (1) the inclusion of cultural diversity in the perception of the province's collective identity; (2) the attractiveness of relations with people different from oneself (general unspecified difference); (3) the attitude towards reasonable accommodations; and, (4) the attitude towards the presence of persons of diverse cultural identities in the public sphere (cultural difference).

The comparison reveals that the levels of agreement expressed in Québec and in Alberta are similar, that they oscillate around the mid-point of the scale and that the level increases from the first to the fourth factor. We notice a slightly higher level of agreement with equality standards in New Brunswick, which, of the three provinces, is the one that attracts the least immigrants and includes the smallest population of Neo-Canadians.

In all three provinces, the type that features the highest level of both civic and cultural identification reveals itself as the most clearly pluralistic in its relation to cultural diversity. If we leave aside this particular type and concentrate on the others, we notice that the most significant results in Alberta and Québec occur in relation to the accommodation factor. In Québec, two types express a more negative attitude and the two others demonstrate a more positive attitude. In Alberta, we observe a sharp contrast between two types that score very low and two that score significantly higher. It comes as no surprise that the subject of accommodation is a controversial issue in Quebec and Alberta, since these provinces have been embroiled in intense public debates over cases of accommodation and that nothing of the sort has occurred in New Brunswick.

For the other three factors, the contrasts between types are not very significant in New Brunswick and Québec. A high contrast between types occurs between the two low identity types in Alberta, where one presents higher pluralistic attitudes than the other. From this result, and considering also that the high identity level type has the most pluralistic attitudes, we may infer that the level of collective identity does not appear to be directly associated with the agreement with equality.

It is interesting to note that the two types, which, in Québec and Alberta, present the least positive attitudes towards accommodations, both have positive attitudes towards the presence of a significant number of individuals of diverse cultural identities in the social and public sphere. They can accept the place occupied by cultural diversity where this does not involve exceptional measures that modify the traditional standards of public institutions.

The **participation dimension** includes four factors. Current participation is measured through actual political or civic participation behaviours, both inside and outside of the place of study, in the 12 months prior to filling in the questionnaire. Future participation is a factor that measures the declared intention of investing oneself in political and community activities, opinion and interest groups and charity work in the coming years. Trust in political figures measures the extent to which respondents believe that serving the public interest is the main concern of elected officials. Finally, the fourth factor, Efficiency of participation, measures the respondents' estimation of the degree to which citizen investment in participation can effectively contribute to obtaining the results s/he seeks or desires.

For this dimension, in all three provinces, we find that the type characterized by high identity levels and high pluralistic attitudes also has the highest levels of response for all factors measuring participation, whereas the type of citizens that presents low identity scores also scores the lowest

on the participation measures, the other types always scoring between these two. From a general point of view, this dimension provides the least contrast between profiles; the levels of response falling quite clearly below the middle of the scale and the contrasts between types rarely exceeding one point on a ten-point scale.

In Québec the Current participation factor indicates involvement in the areas of political, community and social life. The level of response, which is clearly below the middle of the scale, must be interpreted as a low level of participative investment in a wide range of activities of political and civic participation, extending much further than school-related activities which might mainly serve socialization purposes.

Three items that make up the Current participation factor in New Brunswick and Alberta refer to participation at the place of study and 2 items measuring out-of-school community involvement complete this factor. A very high level of response of two types in New Brunswick thus mainly indicates a strong participation in student activities at the place of study, which may involve many activities related to the social student life and student cultural activities. Current participation in Alberta is of the same nature, although the levels are not as strong, which could indicate a lesser importance of social life at the place of study.

The same holds true for the declared intentions concerning future participation, where most of the types are consistent in their response level. However, a few do express the intention of making a greater investment in the future than at the present time. Here again, we must take into account the fact that, in Québec and Alberta, the level of response covers a wide range of activities of political and civic participation. As regards the political domain, this relates to a highly active involvement in political life, such as joining a political party, working for elections, and contacting politicians to express one's opinions. The results express the fact that youths in all three provinces intend to occasionally invest themselves in a wide array of activities representing a high level of political and civic participation.

It should be noted that voting in elections is not included in these factors because the level of response to this item is generally quite high and varies very little within and across all samples. Thus, the intention to vote in elections is very widespread among these youths. The interpretation of this level of response must nevertheless take into account the data pertaining to the actual level of voting participation among youths between 18 and 24 years of age. Although our respondents show a strong intention to vote, a recent survey reveals that only 28% of young Canadians within this age group exercise their right to vote (Léger Marketing, La Presse, June 10th 2002).

As can easily be observed, the level of trust towards elected officials scores below the middle of the scale and the various types are not differentiated by this factor. Young citizens appear to share a feeling that is apparently generalised throughout the population, as public opinion polls have also revealed.

On the other hand, as regards the Efficiency of Participation factor, apart from the low identity type that tends to score lower than the others in all three provinces, there is no differentiation between types. It should nevertheless be noted that this factor provides the highest levels of response among the four Participation factors both in Alberta and New Brunswick. We observe a medium size positive correlation in the three samples between the Efficiency factor and the Current and Future Participation factors throughout the sample. Although the most participative respondents are also those who give the highest scores for Efficiency of participation, a high level of confidence in efficacy is only linked to a very moderate level of participation.

In all three provinces, the type that features the highest level of both civic and cultural identification reveals itself as the most clearly pluralistic in its relation to cultural diversity.

The first general observation that follows from the present study is that there are important differences between young citizens within each province, but that those internal differences do not generate an indecipherable diversity, since we can summarize the date in a four type typology, in two cases, and a five type one in the case of Alberta. The second general observation is that studying samples in several provinces does not indefinitely increase the types of citizens. On the contrary, as was shown previously, we find a limited number of types in each province and two types that are clearly comparable across provinces. Even if those two types are not similar on all factors, as only the Quebec sample distinguishes the provincial and Canadian identities, the overall pattern of response remains the same across the three provinces.

If we consider provinces that share similar experiences, a large linguistic diversity or, as is the case in Alberta and Québec, a large immigrant population, the comparison reveals differences between profiles that reflect true controversies. For example, in the case of linguistic diversity, members of the linguistic majority in each province are mainly found in profiles which are characterized by a preference for the use of the majority language in the public sphere. In the case of the attitude towards reasonable accommodations, one profile in Québec and two in Alberta have the less favourable attitude towards accommodations which was strongly expressed in the public opinion, as opposed to other types which appear much more favourable. We have also presented similar aspects across provinces, particularly in the case of participation.

We can thus conclude by proposing that research resolved on studying the diversity of actual forms of citizenship reveals more complexity but can still prove to be fruitful, as it seems improbable that it shall wander into a limitless heterogeneity.

The Values Debate, Citizenship Policy and Education in Canada:
What world do we want?

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The question of values is one that reoccurs periodically in policy and educational circles (Desaulniers, 2000). Today however, this question is raised within a global context experiencing rapid political, economic, social and religious change (Turner, 2000). This question is at the heart of an intense and complex dynamic typical of democratic societies that are also pluralistic, secular and postmodern. The values debate today calls upon us to define what kind of world we want.

Canada is known de facto to be a pluralistic society, notably in linguistic, cultural and religious terms, resulting from the impact of policy changes sensitive to immigration (Troper, 2002). In recent years, the values debate has become sharper and more acrimonious, especially in school contexts (McAndrew et al, 1997). Generally speaking, students themselves are bearers of values that they construct upon social and familial experiences; and administrators and educators are confronted daily with decisions to make regarding the best possible response to conflicts of values that occur in educational institutions. In a context of globalization marked by the blurring of the frontiers and greater interconnectivity, the question of values in citizenship policy calls into review the pedagogical dimension of education.

However, what are we talking about when we talk of 'values'? Like the term 'citizenship', the concept of *value* is complex, multidimensional, and has multiple ramifications depending upon the views of individual actors, theoretical perspectives adopted, and specific objectives being considered. There is considerable confusion about a variety of terms used to talk about 'values', including such words as 'principles', 'dispositions', or 'virtues', often taken as equivalent terms. In other cases, values refer indiscriminately to the development of a moral code, the recognition and respect of diversity, or the respect of human rights.

Defining Values, Principles, Dispositions and Concepts

Understandings of the term '*value*' vary greatly and have evolved over time. In the 17th century, the term referred to the merit, qualities or interest for which a person, idea, painting, literature, or music was esteemed (Rey, 1997). The original meaning is retained today in phrases such as the 'value of a musical note' and the 'aesthetic value of a painting', which bring in notions of weight and measurement. This meaning includes the idea of personal judgment of moral values and assumes a scale of values as a tool for measurement. Today, the term has sociological meaning, referring to systems of social values based on judgment and societal norms. Values are defined as referring to a constellation of ideals relating to democratic citizenship, which may be manifested as principles, dispositions and concepts. Deeply held, *citizenship values* have individual and social meaning, as well as cognitive, affective and moral dimensions (Evans, Gräbler and Pouwels, 1997).

Principles are a set of basic moral rules that define personal conduct. The term includes the notion of being in first place, of founding elements, of primary source, motive and cause (Rey, 1997). Consequently, *principles* refer to foundational elements of general scope which logically constitute a science or discipline. The term '*principle*' also refers to normative rules of moral action, formulated explicitly or not, to which a person or group is attached and which flow from dominant values in a given society.

Democratic dispositions are best distinguished from values, referring to inclinations whereas the other terms refer to fundamental ideals. Democratic dispositions are thus defined here as acquired inclinations to engage with others, in altruistic ways that are consistent with underlying citizenship values and principles. In other words, dispositions are a developed capacity to understand, accept, and act on the core principles of democratic society (Galston, 1991: 245-246). The meaning of *disposition* also includes the notion of arrangement, of being in good state and spirit as in 'divine disposition', and of good will, taste and aptitude (Rey, 1997). These are different than *concepts*, which originally referred to thought and to conception. Over time, *concepts* have come to refer to dynamic schematas of thought, rather than static configurations of notions (Rey, 1997).

Four Domains of Citizenship

The recognition of developmental stages of democratic citizenship is part of the ideas of T. H. Marshall who identified the evolution of civil, political, and socio-economic rights as three domains of citizenship: civil, political, and socio-economic (1998: 19). We take these up here as we wonder how values are linked to rights which have served, in the period since World War II, as a central focus for thinking about democracy.

The *civil domain* includes freedom of speech, expression and equality before the law, as well as the freedom of association and access to information. Civil citizenship refers to a way of life wherein citizens define and pursue commonly held goals that are related to liberal conceptions of society on how common spaces, resources and opportunities are shared and how interdependence is managed. Fundamental community values, limits of governmental decision-making in relation to the individual

citizen as well as the rights of private interest groups and associations are inscribed in the civil domain of citizenship which deals with the balance between individual and group concerns.

The *political domain* involves the right to vote and to political participation. Free elections are key to this part of this dimension of citizenship, as is the right to freely seek political office. The civic dimension of citizenship, referring to legal status defined in terms of rights and obligations of individuals, is a more confined notion than the civil domain and, in Marshall's view, flows more properly from the rights and responsibilities of the political and social domains.

Referring to the relationship between individuals in a societal context and requiring relational loyalty and sincerity, the *socio-economic domain* of citizenship refers to rights of participation, in political spaces, in the definition of social and economic rights, such as the rights to economic well-being, for example, the right to social security, to work, to minimum means of subsistence, and to a safe environment. Given the dynamic nature of Marshall's conception of citizenship, "the constituent components of modern citizenship – civic responsibility, social trust, egalitarianism and a world-oriented individualism – cannot be viewed as static and isolated" (Kalberg, 1993: 107). This perspective recognizes the complex interaction between the political, civil, and socio-economic components and the implications for citizens within a global context.

A fourth domain of citizenship has since emerged in reference to the culture-state relationship. The *cultural domain* refers to the manner in which societies take into account the increasing cultural diversity in societies, diversity due to a greater openness to other cultures, to global migration, and to increased mobility. Included in this domain is the quest for recognition of collective rights for minorities which, in Canada, are those of multinational groups, i.e., Francophones and Aboriginal First Nations who were *in situ* before the legal establishment of the federated state, as well as multicultural rights (Kymlicka, 1995), all set within the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982). The culture-state relationship is based upon human rights which recognize an anthropological dimension of the person, and which imply a certain conception of human beings, their dignity, and the affirmation of legal equality against all forms of discrimination on the basis of membership in a particular group or category.

Towards a New Analytic Framework for Understanding Citizenship Values

Our goal in developing an analytic framework of Canadian citizenship values, based on the sociological, survey and educational literature, is to schematize the basic values, principles, dispositions and concepts by placing them in logical relationship and by representing them spatially. In doing so, we adopt the four domains discussed above as organizational framework and, in response to critiques of the Marshallian model, expand and complete this model of rights-focussed citizenship with their complementary values. The first level of network organization is represented by a central category, citizenship values proper, radiating out into a set of macro-concepts from the overarching concept (see Figure 1). In turn, each of these values leads to other levels of interrelated logical organization. In this way, citizenship principles form the second level of schematization, dispositions a third and concepts a fourth. Although the diagram below does not indicate directionality, it may be assumed that these all flow from citizenship values, but also that they inter-relate with each other, across level and from level to level, in logically inclusive relationships, thus reflecting the complexity and multi-dimensionality of citizenship values. Serving as heuristic devices, the figures are not intended as quantitative measurements of values, but as a spatial representation, which allows for a visual account of the interrelationships between different levels of citizenship values.



Figure 1: Macro-Concepts of Citizenship Values

The essence of Figure 1 are the macro-concepts, twelve fundamental citizenship values consisting of *loyalty, sincerity, openness, civic-mindedness, valuing freedom, valuing equality, respect for self and others, solidarity, self-reliance, valuing the earth, a sense of belonging,* and *human dignity*. Situated in a first circle, logical relationships may be read between them. For example, sincerity contributes to respect for self and others, just as valuing freedom contributes to being equal, to solidarity, and to a sense of belonging, and so on. Similarly, logical relationships may be read, from the centre of the wheel, to each macro-concept, as these are in an 'is-a' relationship. In other words, self-reliance is a citizenship value, as is human dignity and civic-mindedness, and so on.

Serving as supra-ordinate organizers of a network of citizenship values in four clusters, the four domains (civic, political, socio-economic and cultural) inform the schematization of three other levels of logically inclusive relationships, though only one, the cultural domain, is discussed in-depth here. In presenting the elements of the schematic structure of the analytic framework, we support their identification as a citizenship value or related principle, disposition, or democratic concept, i.e., as second, third or fourth order citizenship values.

To date, two citizenship values are identified within the cultural domain, which is fewer than in the other three domains, as may be expected from its recency. Represented

in Figure 2, a *sense of belonging* and *human dignity* are key values in the cultural domain as they are predicated upon a view of individuals, not merely as political or legal entities, but upon a recognition of the social and cultural nature of human beings (cf., Pouwels, 1997).

A *sense of belonging* assumes the existence of collectives, be these groups, communities, or the state, and thus of collective responsibility (Marzouk et al, 2000, Peters, 1995) as a citizenship principle which reflects social cohesion in that looking after others strengthens the well-being of society. In other words, Canadian society would be stronger if we collectively look after one another. Seemingly contradictory, the values of self-reliance and collective responsibility nonetheless co-occur in a dynamic tension. It is not possible for an individual to be entirely self-reliant, free and separate from community, since to be an individual presupposes a community in which true freedom is intermeshed. The tensions between the two create the civil, political, social and cultural institutions, which sustain both our freedom and satisfy our need to belong to something greater than ourselves.



Figure 2: Network of Citizenship Values in the Cultural Domain

The value placed on *human dignity* requires a principled recognition of the dignity of others and of one's own, as well as a commitment to pluralism (Kymlicka, 1995; Pagé, 1997; Ouellet and Benoît, 1997; Hemon, 1997; Lessard et al, 1997; Magsino, 2002; Bourgeault et al, 2002). This commitment is implied by the valuing of one's place(s) as part of collectivity which, in its turn, assumes and involves. In a pluralist conception, civil engagement is as necessary and obligatory as social, economic and cultural participation which can lower the barriers that divide society into minority and majority groups, going beyond group and individual identifications (Pagé, 1997: 24; Ouellet and Benoît, 1997: 33). These principles feed the recognition and respect of diversity, characteristic of a contemporary pluralist society such as Canada, as well as mutual respect and compassion for others. And finally, the value on human dignity, manifested as a principled recognition of others and of self, as well as a commitment to pluralism, acted upon in the form of mutual respect and compassion, flows from and into democratic concepts of multiculturalism, tolerance and acceptance of others.

Unpacking Controversial Values

This analytic framework could be interpreted differently, from a reading other than the one we have proposed. It could, for example, be considered to be incomplete as we have voluntarily omitted those values that do not seem to fit liberal, participatory democracy (Cunningham, 2002), as practiced in Canada. This is the case for a particularly virile disposition of 'a willingness to fight on behalf of one's for country' (Galston, 1991) which encourages citizens to put their lives in the service of their country. Illustrating the fragility of democracy, the application of this third order value raises serious questions about the inherent contradiction between respecting others and forcibly trying to oblige adherence to a democratic way of life. Though this virtue is important in republican democracies, most citizens in Canada take a more muted stance to defusing internal and international conflict. Known for our peacekeeping history, Canadians would generally rather resolve issues peacefully, using violent measures as a last resort. Is peacekeeping an inherent principle of democracy? In making explicit the differences between principles, dispositions and concepts, the framework can help unpack the meanings and practices behind controversial values.

Relevance of the Network of Values

Citizenship today transcends the frontiers of the local community, the province or the national territory. From this flows the idea of being a citizen of the world and contributes to an emphasis on global education. Thus, whether citizenship education programs are specific or transversal, they aim to raise citizens' awareness of global issues, of different perspectives and to prepare them to act and interact with other citizens of the world to protect the environment, to struggle against inequalities and to preserve cultural artefacts and symbols.

While this model is not representative of all the diverse values held by Canadians, it can serve as a starting point for clarifying the values debates with respect to citizenship education from a global perspective. It can also be used to begin conversations about common human values, such as respect, that transcend nationality, culture, and heritage. This will move the debate away from focusing on the values that constitute a unique Canadian identity and towards a more thought-provoking discussion of issues that contribute to patterns of conflict and paths of peace. This ethical and conceptual framework of citizenship values also avails itself to research on how values are lived and learned, to pedagogical and programmatic possibilities, and to policy development, be these social, political or educational.

DU 24 AU 26 OCTOBRE 2003

LA PRÉSENCE DU *Passé*

UNE CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SUR L'ENSEIGNEMENT, L'APPRENTISSAGE ET LA COMMUNICATION DE L'HISTOIRE DU CANADA

HOLIDAY INN HALIFAX – HARBOUR VIEW DARTMOUTH
DARTMOUTH, NOUVELLE-ÉCOSSE

Suite au succès de deux conférences, *Donner à l'avenir un passé* (Winnipeg, 2001) et *Donner au passé un avenir* (Montréal, 1999), *La présence du passé* portera un regard sur les méthodes d'enseignement de l'histoire les plus efficaces et innovatrices et traitera de l'importance de l'histoire et sa présence dans notre vie de tous les jours. Cette troisième conférence nationale examinera les différentes approches à l'enseignement de l'histoire qui ont fait surface grâce aux nouveaux choix de curriculum et aux nouvelles techniques d'enseignement, et explorera comment l'enseignement de l'histoire a évolué dans le contexte d'une réalité sociale plus large.

Plus de mille personnes ont participé aux deux premières conférences nationales sur l'histoire. Une fois de plus, des académiques canadiens de premier plan, des professeurs, des étudiants, des professionnels et des organismes voués à la dissémination d'information sur l'histoire du Canada seront présents à Halifax, ainsi que des organisations œuvrant dans la construction de nouveaux outils et de techniques d'apprentissage.

La présence du passé comprendra aussi des séances plénières spéciales avec des professeurs qui enseignent le Canada historique et contemporain dans des salles de classes à l'étranger, offrant ainsi aux participants une perspective unique et intéressante sur le sujet.

Cet événement à Halifax sera la seule conférence nationale à rassembler un groupe aussi diversifié d'individus impliqués dans la communication et l'enseignement de l'histoire du Canada afin de partager de l'information et des ressources. Professeurs, étudiants, professionnels et toutes autres personnes impliquées dans le domaine de l'Histoire du Canada sont invités à participer à cette conférence.

La conférence comprendra plus de 45 sessions – des individus et des organisations de perspectives régionales, nationales et internationales y participeront – ainsi que des excursions et un nombre d'événements. Les sessions aborderont l'histoire du Canada en commençant par les méthodes d'enseignement conventionnelles et en passant par les récentes méthodes les plus innovatrices. D'autres sessions adresseront un nombre de questions importantes reliées à l'histoire du Canada.

À noter : plus de 20 organisations représentant des musées, la télévision, le cinéma, le multimédia, les gouvernements ainsi qu'une variété d'organisations à but non lucratif et académiques participeront à une *Exposition éducative*.

À SOULIGNER DANS LA CONFÉRENCE :

- Les participants à l'**Exposition éducative** : La fondation Historica, La Société d'Histoire Nationale du Canada, La bibliothèque nationale du Canada et les Archives nationales du Canada, l'Office national du film du Canada, Chinook Multimédia, Le Ministère de l'éducation (Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Écosse), Le Ministère du Patrimoine canadien, L'Association des musées canadiens, Les Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada / Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs / Les micro-reproductions historiques canadiennes et plusieurs autres organisations.
- Cocktail de bienvenue au Pier 21
- Banquet spécial le samedi soir avec des activités marquant le 400e anniversaire de l'arrivée de Champlain en Nouvelle-France.
- Des ateliers et des panels comprenant les historiens et les professeurs de premier plan au Canada.
- Des invités d'honneur spéciaux, des excursions et des sessions interactives
- Des séances plénières comprenant des auteurs, des académiques, des journalistes, des enseignants et des représentants gouvernementaux du Canada et internationaux
- Des séminaires de développement interactifs avec des créateurs de ressources qui démontreront leurs nouveaux matériaux d'apprentissage interactif, les matériaux reliés aux ordinateurs et tous autres matériaux pertinents et offriront aux éducateurs un regard en profondeur sur le potentiel de ces ressources en tant qu'outils dans la salle de classe
- Des sessions et des activités qui aideront les professeurs à intégrer de manière efficace les médias, les musées, les archives, le multimédia/l'internet et les autres ressources autres que les manuels dans la salle de classe
- Des sessions hors-site et des activités qui impliquent des étudiants des niveaux élémentaire, secondaire et universitaire.
- Des événements et activités spéciaux appuyés par des organisations dédiées à l'avancement de l'enseignement et de l'apprentissage de l'histoire du Canada.

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Regionalism, Citizenship, Identity

Andrew Nurse
Mount Allison University

Does regionalism still matter? The question may sound odd because on one level regionalism is obviously an important factor in political economy. On another level, however, the question needs to be asked. While political scientists remain concerned about regional cleavages in the body politic, other scholars seem more interested in other matters. Studies of multiculturalism, identity, gender relations, gay and lesbian rights, diasporic communities and the place of First Nations within the evolving federal union, for instance, all tend to neglect regional dynamics in favour of other "identity markers."[1] Moreover, while regional disaffection with the working of the federal union remains strong – particularly in western Canada – public opinion surveys suggest that regional distinctions in social values are less pronounced than parliamentary political representation indicates.[2]

If scholars are increasingly focusing their attention on other matters and public opinion surveys suggest that there is a great deal that binds Canadians together across regional divides, what role does regionalism play in contemporary Canadian life? Does it affect the ways in which people self-identify? Does it affect lived experience? Does it constitute an identity, into-and-of-itself, of which scholars and policy makers should be taking note? Or, can regionalism be seen as a legacy of the past and of feature of political economy, an element of the Canadian experience that is being displaced in the cultural sphere – and in terms of identity – by what we might think of as other subject positions that are more in keeping with the supposed postmodern globalized cultural order developing about us?[3]

Regionalism counts, but in a simplistic way. The importance of regionalism for the contemporary Canadian experience – for considerations of identity, citizenship, democracy – lies not in adding regionalism to an already long list of "markers" that affect the ways in which identities are ascribed and lived.[4] Instead, regionalism is important for considerations of identity and citizenship in three separate respects: as a core social problem related to regional economic disparities that the Canadian constitution binds the federal government to address, a part of distinct regional patterns of ethno-cultural and linguistic relations, and as a problem for democracy. In each of these respects, regionalism needs to be taken into consideration if Canadians are committed to the development of effective public policy and a meaningful citizenship.

Regional Disparities and the Political Economy of Individualism

Regional economic grievances have a long history in Canada, but with the establishment of Pierre Trudeau's "just society" liberal reform project regionally based inequality took on new meanings. As Trudeau later explained, the problem of regional inequalities posed a fundamental challenge to liberal conceptions of equality of opportunity as an inherent right of Canadian citizenship. He noted that the need to address regional economic inequalities were as pressing for his government as the need to ensure an equality of French- and English-language public services on the part of the federal government. The Trudeau administration enshrined this commitment in the patriated Canadian constitution to guarantee "the principle of equalization payments for the redistribution of revenues from wealthy provinces to the less wealthy ones."[5] This commitment was to ensure that the basic needs of citizens were met and that economic disparities did not unduly hamper an individual's free self-development regardless of their region of birth.

The implication of this principle for regionalism in Canada is clear, but infrequently considered. Social rights, as David Laycock has explained, stand at the heart of contemporary liberal thought. Social rights are rights that exist beyond human and civil rights (such as the rights to life and free expression, respectively). They include such things as the right to accessible education and health care, and are the means through which the liberal commitment to individualism is actually put into place.[6] Without an activist state promoting equality of opportunity, regional concentrations of wealth and class distinctions impede equality of opportunity to such an extent that it becomes meaningless in practice.

The key here is that regional economic policy is framed as a right of citizenship. Through its "just society" reforms, the Trudeau government reconstructed regionalism as a problem of individual rights. As Canadian citizens, residents of regions have the right to have economic inequalities addressed by the federal state as a prerequisite of the state's commitment to equality among citizens. Regional economic development programmes, regionally specific social transfer programmes, and intergovernmental equalization payments were means through which the Trudeau government attempted to address this issue.

This is important because regional economic disparities remain a pressing concern. The on-going economic problems of northern, prairie, and Atlantic Canada combined with the regionalized effects of Canada's free trade agreements,[7] will ensure that intergovernmental transfers and specialized individual income transfers will remain part of Canadian political

economy. After the Trudeau era constitutional reforms, a failure to address regional inequality transcends issues of federalism to directly address the rights of citizens as individuals.

"Multicultural Regionalism"[8]

A second issue with direct implications for regionalism is ethnic and linguistic diversity. "Region" is a complex and contested term; regions are not static but part of a process of historical change.[9] As Leo Driedger has explained, in contemporary Canada, regions are not simply political entities but also include distinctive patterns of ethno-cultural diversity and language usage. According to Driedger, it is these distinctive patterns that distinguish different Canadian regions from each other. Atlantic Canada, for example, outside of northern New Brunswick, is characterized by relatively modest levels of bilingualism, limited use of second languages. The vast majority of people living in Atlantic Canada trace their ancestry to a British heritage. Immigration is similarly limited and the dominant factors in regional diversity are defined by the indigenous black community, First Nations, and Acadians. Northern Canada, by contrast, is characterized by the extensive use of Aboriginal languages, the minority status of ethnically British Canadians, and new experiments in the eastern arctic in self-government within territorial status for the Inuit. Western Canada is the most ethnically diverse part of the country. Here, Canadians of British and French descent constitute a minority of the population. This, combined with high rates of immigration and a large First Nations population, makes for a diverse society and extensive second-language use in a regional social order that is, nonetheless, also notable for its integrative use of the English language.[10]

What is important to note are the implications of distinctive patterns of cultural diversity within regions for an understanding of regionalism itself. Instead of isolating particular and distinctive types of regional culture, Driedger's argument suggests that regional cultural processes need to be understood as processes of ethno-cultural interaction and regional cultural dynamics retain their importance precisely because of this. Regional location can have a determining effect on the availability of heritage language education, religious institutions, important foods, access to ESL or FSL education, and a range of other matters.

The implications of regional cultural geography bear directly on public policy, particularly multiculturalism and diversity. In Atlantic Canada, for example, immigrant settlement and integration policies must necessarily proceed in different ways than on the Canadian West Coast or in the GTA. While the aim of a fair and just integration may remain the same, the institutional and social structure that can sustain this objective differs dramatically in practice. A failure to consider regionalized demographics, in other words, will produce public policy ill suited to the dynamics of life, the needs of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and the needs of regions.

Regionalism, Citizenship, Democracy

A final important matter related to regionalism is the integration of regional voices into the political process. This is another long-standing concern of regional protest movements, but one with new implications. A number of public commentators feel that the most effective response to regional alienation lies in enhancing democracy in Canada. Regionalism, in fact, expresses discontent with national politics virtually by definition. Democratic reform could allow Canada to simultaneously address its "democratic deficit" and provides regions with a means to articulate their concerns directly within the federal government. Canada, it is frequently noted, is almost unique among federations in providing little means for regional concerns to be articulated within the central institutions of the federal government. The end result is combative federal/provincial relations and a sense of regional alienation and frustration with federalism.[11]

On a regional level, democratic reform will also need to address the aspirations of First Nations. In Northern Canada, for instance, particularly the eastern Arctic, regional voices also need articulate Inuit voices into the policy process. Measures designed to enhance democracy in the northern territories need to take the changing status of Aboriginal peoples into account and their need for expanded social, economic, political, and cultural autonomy. Autonomy does not imply isolation or even self-sufficiency, but it does imply the ability of First National groups to manage, administer, and direct policy in their national interests.

Similar matters need to be addressed in Atlantic Canada, where a distinctive regional treaty structure and a limited land base combine with other elements of a unique regional history for First Nations to create a problem that may be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve outside of a regional policy framework.[12] In British Columbia, the complete absence of land surrender treaties in much of the province poses other, different issues that are addressed – to a greater or lesser extent – through a modern treaty process, used in only limited instances elsewhere in Canada. Regional political reform, in other words, may be needed not only to extend democracy but to address the legitimate demands of First Peoples.

Beyond Regionalism?

Regionalism in Canada is not about to disappear. Economic disparities, distinct histories, and differing demographics combined will ensure the salience of regionalism into the future. But, the regionalism of the twenty-first century is not the regionalism of the twentieth. Regional identities and cultures are not "in competition" with other identities. Advances in scholarship on ethnicity, multiculturalism, gender, sexual orientation, and a host of other matters, in fact, suggest that regional considerations need to play an important role in public discourse about diversity and in public policy. The ideal of equality of opportunity, a supposedly fundamental right of modern liberal societies, cannot be addressed without attention to region nor, I would argue, can a host of other matters. An understanding of regional demographic, economic, and cultural dynamics is, then, central to considerations of citizenship, individualism, identity, and diversity in Canada. It is the practical ground on which supposedly general problems actually need to be addressed.

Citizenship and Attachment Across Borders?

A Transnational and Anthropological Research Agenda

Pauline Gardiner Barber
Dalhousie University

... identity is always an open, complex, unfinished game – always under construction... it always moves into the future by means of a symbolic detour through the past... It produces new subjects who bear the traces of the specific discourses which not only formed them but enable them to produce themselves anew and differently. (Hall 1993: 362)

Much of the research-based knowledge we have about immigrants to Canada is based on social surveys which reference "immigrants" generically and/or selective named groups of immigrants within homogenous categories. Most commonly, our research labels distinguish immigrants by their countries of birth and mark their difference from other Canadian citizens. But at the same time the labels obscure migration histories and the social complexities that give rise to im/migration trajectories. Such categorization is also presumptive, relying as it does upon constructed similarities and ideas of fixed, stable identities amongst newcomers and other Canadians. For example, immigrants from the country of Somalia might be thought of, correctly or incorrectly, as sharing a perceived ethnicity (as in Somalis), religion (as in Muslim), or generic culture (for example, African). Some immigrants are constituted into groups with reference to the subject's visa status (for example, refugees), others through reference not to their countries of origin but to the continents where the countries are located. For example, African refugees may be unhelpfully used as a descriptor for immigrants coming to Canada from Somalia during the political upheavals of the late 1980s early 1990s (Berns McGowan 1999). Hence immigrants, as newcomers, are portrayed in overly generalized, often reifying, statistical categories that, I will argue here, obscure the diversity, richness and shifting nature of their im/ migration experiences, social identities, and cultural and national loyalties.

As a global process migration produces citizens who have multiple connections and attachments. Im/migrants view the world comparatively through a lens we now describe as transnational (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994) and many live transnational lives in as much as they maintain connections with people in their places of origin and/or transit. They may also seek social alliances with people from that place of origin in their new environments and constitute a diaspora even under conditions where "multi-culturalism" prevails (as official policy and/or lived experience). Thus it may be said that all migrants, potentially at least, hold transnational identities. Such a framework, extending beyond the local to international contexts and global events, is essential to understanding issues of citizenship and identity and how their meanings shift over space and time.

As transnationalism complicates the idea of migration as precipitated in rupture followed by a clean start, so too with citizenship. Citizenship situates im/migrants (with or without documents) legally and politically within a nation where they occupy social, economic, cultural, and often ethnically charged spaces. Beyond formal requirements and various individuals' interpretations about civic participation, there is an invisible elasticity to how citizenship takes form in the lives of newcomers to Canada. For new immigrants the practical and emotional challenges of citizenship are prone to greater complexity as a result of transnational relations that connect people to their countries of origin. This operates in at least three ways: legally in terms of home country policies that regulate the terms of out-migration and the reception of remittances and goods which are frequently shipped home; subjectively in terms of the continuing loyalties, social and cultural attachments that migrants carry with them no matter how eagerly they embrace their new ways of living and locales; and, economically in terms of support provided by immigrants to kin who remain behind.

Sometimes, political loyalties to the countries of origin take the form of displaced (long-distance) nationalism. For example, writing about the migration experiences of Haitians living in the United States, Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) reveal a cross-border citizenship, underscored by shifting social, political and economic dynamics in both countries and fueled by a relentless, uncompromising, indiscriminate racism. Despite their middle class and professional occupations, some of the subjects in this study remained vulnerable to racist challenges which fan their longing for family and "home" in Haiti. Similarly disappointment about economic opportunities and political struggles in Haiti reverse the feelings of commitment. Such fraught commitments and fragmented loyalties are also apparent in my research with Philippine migrants living abroad and in the Philippines where future potential out-migration remains an ever present topic for conversation (Gardiner Barber 1997).

Alternatively, there are ways of speaking about immigrants from particular countries and regions which hyphenates their Canadian/ness and marks it as both secondary and provisional (as in Chinese-Canadians). This could be a practice which is done to members of a particular group in a racialized cultural politic which operates on an ideological level to legitimate discriminatory practices (for British examples see Avtar Brah 1996). But, hyphenation can also constitute an affirmative

identity claim when deliberately inserted by immigrants in an effort to mark their previous cultural heritage. Much has been written about the cultural and social politics of hyphenation and hybridity, nowhere so eloquently as in the writings of widely influential post-colonial scholars such as Homi Bbabha (1994) and Stuart Hall (for example, 2000). Similarly, anthropologist Lisa Lowe (1996) writes against the idea that Asian Americans be considered as an amorphous collectivity. For my purposes here, I simply want to indicate that the use of the hyphen reads as if birthplace indicates a common personal history and produces a sameness of experience in Canada. Qualitative research reveals this is decidedly not the case; immigrants (regardless of their visa status) have distinctive personal histories and are as socially, economically, and politically differentiated as more longstanding Canadians. They also maintain varied and shifting relations with their countries of origin which are subject to change in accord with events in those countries and here in Canada. Likewise, and with particular acuteness in the recent debates over border security, it is commonplace that religion is often conflated with ethnicity, culture, or geographic point of origin Sometimes all elements are at play simultaneously; for example in the widespread yet profoundly mis-informed assumption that people from middle eastern states share a pan-Arab culture and are Muslims - as noted in Edward Said's pioneering work *Orientalism (1978)*. What is shared and not shared, along with questions of faith and their meaning in everyday life, is more properly the subject for qualitative research.

Having pointed out the complexities which underlie how immigrants are profiled and socially and politically responded to, it needs to be stated that clearly, there are valid and useful applications for many kinds of statistical profiles about immigration scenarios and how and where immigrants locate themselves in Canadian labour markets, communities, and social, political and religious institutions. Planning and policy depend upon such measures. There are also groups and circumstances where homogeneity of immigrant experience and history seems more real than the forms of reification outlined above. Beside statistical information, what other kinds of knowledge about immigrant experience may inform our understandings of citizenship and attachment?

Here I want to reverse the lens, to convert immigrants from the objects to the subjects of immigration by proposing the need to consider immigrant experience in a qualitative and processual manner. Simply put, I argue for a focus upon the lived experience of immigrants and for research that sets out to capture the transnational complexity that is typically the end result of the im/migration process. I also propose that we look to anthropological studies (such as Lowe's, and Glick Schiller and Fouron's mentioned above) for theoretical and methodological guidance in producing such knowledge. As a research focus, migration should compel researchers to consider conditions in multiple nation states and, increasingly to raise the kinds of post-structural questions about migrant identities and agency that I am laying a case for here. And yet, paradoxically, much migration research remains bound to theoretical conventions of "methodological nationalism"; migrants and migration flows are considered from the vantage points and/or confines of particular nation-states. This parallels but disguises earlier research conventions premised on migration as a radical break or rupture in the lives of migrants. Alternatively, some new approaches appeal discursively to a globalizing world and celebrate supposedly novel flows (of people, cultural practices, and currencies). Aside from the ahistorical nature of many such arguments there is also cause for suspicion when claims about an homogenizing global culture remain ungrounded in the lived experiences of migrants. Anthropologists, based on their field-based ethnographic studies, have been arguing that the opposite is occurring; that so-called globalization, evidenced in market and price fluctuations, changing property relations and, most well described in western press, the presence of western commodities and popular culture, does not straightforwardly produce "westernization". Equally possible is retrenchment, rejection, and renewed commitment to local ways of living (see contributions to Inda and Rosaldo 2002).

To conclude, the acquisition and awarding of citizenship is not best imagined as a means end relationship; nor is it about moving people from one "national container" to another. Rather immigration and the acquisition of citizenship is a contingent process where loyalties and attachments to countries new and old are structured by social, cultural and other forms of otherness so fundamental to the migration process. Newcomers compare their present lives against their memories of other lives and their projections for the future. The comparative terrain – transnational for the way it straddles borders – shifts in concert with events in both places. Arjun Appardurai (1991) offers the concept of ethnoscape to refer to new configurations of identity made possible by the forces and flows of contemporary globalization. He proposes a transnational anthropology which can reveal how migrants and other displaced groups frame their identities in terms of common historically and politically situated perspectives, even as they also experience socio-spatial-cultural dislocation, de-territorialization and perhaps disjunction. This means that for migrants we cannot read off their identities in simplifying bi-polar hyphenated terms (for example, in my own research on Philippine migrants, as Filipino-Canadians). Instead, Appardurai envisions migrants' identities as composed of several deeply meaningful, fluid attachments akin to landscapes. Shared ethnoscapes constitute social formations connecting people (actually or potentially) living in different parts of the world, regardless of the actual location of the places called "home". Ethnoscapes become the building blocks of "imagined worlds" – spread around the globe. Moreover, ethnoscapes can have an unprecedented effect upon the politics of (and between) nations as has been the case with Philippine efforts to facilitate safer conditions for Filipinos working abroad. My caution about the idea of ethnoscapes is, however, to the point of my overall argument; this is a matter for qualitative research not assumption and projection. We cannot assume citizenship induces similar commitments from immigrants, nor more established Canadians for that matter. Canadian/ness suggests a multiplicity of attachments and practices, and for im/migrants there can remain a cross-border set of contingencies but this is for the research to describe.

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

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

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ASSOCIATION FOR CANADIAN STUDIES
ASSOCIATION D'ÉTUDES CANADIENNES

2003 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Halifax

Citizenship: Values and Responsibilities

Dalhousie's Student Union Building – Conference Room B
Dalhousie University

Monday, June 2, 2003

9:00 - 10:15 am — **Panel 1: Knowledge: Responsibility of Citizenship?**
Chair: Joanne Wilkinson, Canadian Studies Program, Department of Canadian Heritage
- Carrie Dawson, Dalhousie University (invited)
- Yvonne Hébert, University of Calgary
- Christian Laville, Université Laval
- Hector Mackenzie, President, Association for Canadian Studies
- Penny Bryden, Mount Allison University

10:15 - 10:30 am — **Break**

10:30 - 12:00 pm — **Panel 2: Citizenship: Political Participation and Protest**
Chair: John Biles, Metropolis Project Team
- Erin Tolley, Metropolis Project Team
- Henry Milner, Université Laval
- Elizabeth Cohen, Yale University

12:00 - 1:30 pm — **Lunch**

1:30 - 2:45 pm — **Panel 3: Social Construction: Citizenship and Identity**
Chair: Norman Brown, Multiculturalism Program, Department of Canadian Heritage
- Lori Wilkinson, University of Manitoba
- Tom Sinclair-Faulkner, University of Manitoba
- David Seljak, University of Waterloo
- Anneke Rummens, University of Toronto
- Yolande Cohen, UQAM

2:45 - 4:00 pm — **Panel 4: Citizenship, Rights, and Nation**
Chair: to be determined
- Marie-Hélène Giroux, Université de Montréal
- Joe Garcea, University of Saskatchewan
- Marcel Fournier, Université de Montréal
- Claude Denis, Université d'Ottawa

4:00 - 4:15 pm — **Break**

4:15 - 5:00 pm — **Closing Session: Newly Released ACS/Environics Data on Citizenship and Values**
- Jack Jedwab, Association for Canadian Studies

Congrès des sciences humaines 2003 à Halifax

La Citoyenneté : Valeurs et responsabilités

Dalhousie's Student Union Building – Salle de Conférence B
Université Dalhousie

Lundi le 2 juin 2003

9:00 - 10:15 — **Plénière 1 : Connaissances : une responsabilité de la citoyenneté ?**
Chaire: Joanne Wilkinson, Programme d'études canadiennes, Patrimoine canadien
- Carrie Dawson, Dalhousie University (invitée)
- Yvonne Hébert, University of Calgary
- Christian Laville, Université Laval
- Hector Mackenzie, Président, Association d'études comediennes
- Penny Bryden, Mount Allison University

10:15 - 10:30 — **Pause**

10:30 - 12:00 — **Plénière 2 : Citoyenneté : Participation et Protestation**
Chaire: John Biles, Projet Métropolis
- Erin Tolley, Projet Métropolis
- Henry Milner, Université Laval
- Elizabeth Cohen, Yale University

12:00 - 13:30 — **Dîner**

13:30 - 14:45 — **Plénière 3 : Constructions Sociales : citoyenneté et identité**
Chaire: Norman Brown, Multiculturalisme Patrimoine canadien
- Lori Wilkinson, University of Manitoba
- Tom Sinclair-Faulkner, University of Manitoba
- David Seljak, University of Waterloo
- Anneke Rummens, University of Toronto
- Yolande Cohen, UQAM

14:45 - 16:00 — **Plénière 4 : Citoyenneté, Droits et Nation**
Chaire : à déterminer
- Marie-Hélène Giroux, Université de Montréal
- Joe Garcea, University of Saskatchewan
- Marcel Fournier, Université de Montréal
- Claude Denis, Université d'Ottawa et Université de l'Alberta

16:00 - 16:15 — **Pause**

16:15 - 17:00 — **Fermeture du colloque : Nouvelles données de sondages AEC/Enivronics sur la citoyenneté et les valeurs**
- Jack Jedwab, Association d'études canadiennes

Canadians and Their Government: A Resource Guide

The Government of Canada is pleased to provide Canadians with access to a new resource guide to assist us in learning more about our system of government and its institutions.

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The guide is contained in a binder and includes additional posters, booklets and a video. A CD-ROM version will also be made available in the near future.

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Le gouvernement du Canada est heureux de mettre un nouveau Guide de ressources à la disposition des Canadiens et des Canadiennes. Le Guide a été élaboré afin de permettre à la population de mieux connaître le système de gouvernement canadien et ses institutions.

Le Guide contient une foule de renseignements et toute une panoplie d'activités. Il a été élaboré à l'intention des jeunes de 12 à 16 ans. Il peut toutefois être facilement adapté à tout autre auditoire.

Le Guide est inséré dans un cahier à anneaux. Des outils de références (affiches, brochures, vidéo) sont joints au document. Une version cédérom sera disponible sous peu.

You can order this **FREE** guide by contacting us at:

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The Canadian Studies Program
Department of Canadian Heritage
12 York Street
Ottawa, Ontario
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Reading Canada

The public good and private pleasures of reading

A NATIONAL FORUM

Lire le Canada

Les bénéfices publics et les plaisirs privés de la lecture

UN FORUM NATIONAL

November 6-8 Novembre 2003
Ottawa, Ontario

The year 2003 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the National Library of Canada and the thirtieth anniversary of the Association for Canadian Studies. Together with partners in the fields of reading, publishing, writing and literacy, they will present *Reading Canada: The public good and private pleasures of reading* - a national forum to be held in Ottawa in November 2003. The forum will offer a setting for all those involved in Canadian writing and publishing to come together and share their thoughts, concerns and experiences on a variety of important issues including:

L'année 2003 marque le 50ème anniversaire de la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada et le 30ème anniversaire de l'Association d'études canadiennes. En collaboration avec divers partenaires des domaines de la lecture, l'édition, l'écriture et l'alphabétisation, ces deux institutions présenteront *Lire le Canada : les bénéfices publics et les plaisirs privés de la lecture* - un forum national qui aura lieu à Ottawa en novembre 2003. Le forum donnera l'opportunité aux intervenants des domaines de l'écriture et de l'édition canadienne de se réunir et d'échanger leurs pensées, intérêts et expériences sur une multitude d'importants sujets, dont entre autres :

LITERACY/ILLITERACY - NEW READERS
PUBLICATIONS POLICY
PRINT VS ELECTRONIC - THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK
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NON-FICTION AND POETRY
SELF-DISCOVERY THROUGH READING
THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF READING: YOUNG AND OLD
DEVELOPING CANADA'S FUTURE WRITERS
MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS
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LES GRANDS ECRIVAINS CANADIENS - ROMAN,
ECRIT NON FICTIF ET POESIE
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JEUNES ET MOINS JEUNES
LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES FUTURS ECRIVAINS
LES MAGAZINES ET JOURNAUX
LE ROLE DES BIBLIOTHEQUES PUBLIQUES ET SCOLAIRES
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Muslims and Citizenship in Canada

Sheema Khan
Chair of CAIR-CAN

Riad Saloojee
Executive Director of CAIR-CAN

Since 9/11, the multicultural fabric of Canada has been under strain. Racial profiling and a re-invigorated suspicion of immigrants, for example, have affected many Canadian minorities. Canadian Muslims, in particular, have felt a devaluing of their citizenship. Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab backlash, the repetition of a number of troubling media themes, and the impact of hastily-legislated omnibus anti-terrorism legislation have all affected the entitlements of citizenship and challenged the belonging that Canadian Muslims feel towards Canada.

Muslims in Canada: A Rich Heritage

In 1996, Daood Hassan Hamdani, an authority on Muslim demographics in Canada, gave an address on Parliament Hill in which he noted that the 1991 census indicated there were more than 250 000 Muslims in Canada compared with 98 000 in 1981 and 33 000 in 1971. Most came to Canada to escape racial or ideological intolerance, flee religious and political persecution, escape famine and, above all, to seek a better life.

Current lay estimates, based on extrapolations of immigration trends, place the Muslim population at 600 000.

Muslims make up the largest non-Christian community in 10 of 25 metropolitan areas across Canada. They have settled everywhere; however, the majority, about 85%, live in six major cities. In fact, Metropolitan Toronto has more Muslims than all of the provinces and territories combined, excluding the province of Ontario. Two thirds have settled within 350 miles of each other. Mr. Hamdani noted: "The Canadian-born Muslims, barely visible a decade ago, have emerged as a force that will influence the development and orientation of Muslim institutions in the country."

The resurgence of Islam among young Muslims and its growing acceptance by non-Muslims at a time when young people are increasingly alienated by organized faith is one of the most significant phenomena of Canadian religious history.

Islam's presence in Canada dates back to the mid-19th century. Agnes Love, a teenage bride of Scottish origin, gave birth to the first Muslim born in Ontario, 13 years before Confederation. The first Muslims to arrive in Canada were settlers and adventurers. After the Second World War, skilled workers and professionals helped reconstruct the post-war economy.

Then, in the mid-1960s, teachers, technocrats and entrepreneurs began arriving to contribute to the expanding economy. "The demographics and work ethic of the Muslim labour force have very significant implications for the cost and funding of the country's social security system," noted Hamdani. "Proportionally, they withdraw much less from the system and contribute much more to it than the Canadian population as a whole."

Canadians have become accustomed to seeing the signature minaret atop a mosque in most towns and cities. Today there are more than 200 mosques in Canada. The first mosque in North America, Al-Rashid, was built in Edmonton in 1938.

At present, third and fourth generation Muslims live in Canada alongside new immigrants from virtually every part of the world, from China to Nigeria. Muslims comprise a multiplicity of over 44 different ethnicities and nationalities.

A poignant indication of this is the appointment of two Muslims to the prestigious order of Canada: Lila Fahlman, an Edmonton teacher, community activist and founder of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women; and Haroon Siddiqui, Editorial Page Editor Emeritus of the Toronto Star.

It is thus clear that Muslims in Canada, though having ties elsewhere, have been full participants in the fabric of Canadian society.

Post 9/11: Suspicion and Solidarity

However, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, placed a tremendous burden on Canadian Muslims. The events of that fateful day were traumatic enough -- defenseless civilians of every faith, age and race, mercilessly slaughtered while going about their daily routines in the heart of North America. Canadian Muslims, like everyone else, were horrified and fearful. However, the brief unity in grief soon gave way to fearful isolation, once it became known that the perpetrators committed this heinous act in the name of Islam.

Canadians of the Muslim faith instinctively knew that they would become the subject of collective guilt in their own country. Many took precautions by keeping their children home from school, staying out of the public eye and contacting the police for protection for Muslim institutions.

Community organizations, individuals, and imams, all condemned 9/11 in the strongest possible terms as antithetical to Islam. Still, that did not stop those committed to venting their blind anger. Taunts, threats, physical assaults and vandalism against personal property and Muslim institutions were recorded by police units and across the country within the first months after 9/11.

Thankfully, our elected politicians were unequivocal in their opposition to the wave of hate activity. Prime Minister Jean Chretien, for example, stated that he was "ashamed by the escalating violence against Muslims and Arab Canadians," denounced the scapegoating of both communities, and promised that the full force of law would be brought to bear on the perpetrators. On other occasions, the Prime Minister dissociated Islam from the attacks. Conservative leader Joe Clark warned against a guilt by association standard that targeted Canadian Muslims and Arabs. Provincial leaders likewise issued similar warnings. New Democratic Leader, Alexa McDonough, was particularly vocal. She moved for a motion in the House of Parliament to "issue an urgent and immediate plea to political, community and faith leaders to speak out against violence, intolerance, or hatred of any kind, directed at Muslims, Arabs and other visible minorities." She furthermore proposed an action plan with a detailed budget and timetable to fight the rising tide of intolerance and racism directed against Arab and Muslim Canadians.

Many other groups also stood in solidarity with Canadian Muslims and Arabs. The Canadian Federation of Nurses, for example, issued a public statement exonerating Canadian Muslims of all blame and condemning hate activity directed at them, and on October 5, 2001, a coalition of thirty high-profile peace, labour, student, religious, women, environmental, cultural and community groups formed a national coalition to speak out against racist attacks resulting from the September 11th. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Canadian Council of Churches expressed sympathy and solidarity. In many cities, police services published notes of support and vigilance.

In addition to hurtful questions about their loyalty as citizens, Canadian Muslims were alarmed at the unprecedented powers given to the state under the new anti-terrorism legislation Bill C-36.

Media and the Entitlements of Citizenship

As the spike in documented hate crimes faded after two months, Canadian Muslims felt a more insidious form of discrimination: that of a community under suspicion. The entitlements of their citizenship were frequently compromised by a number of recurring media themes that questioned the loyalty of Canadian Muslims and held them to a stiffer test of patriotism than their fellow Canadians; represented them, with alarming frequency, as a fifth column; called for institutionalized racial and ethnic profiling; and framed them as 'violent' or the 'other'.

The charge of a complicit silence was frequently levied against Canadian Muslims. Muslims were held to a more rigorous standard than their compatriots – and found to come up short. From the outset, it was argued that Canadian Muslims should prove their loyalty and patriotism by, as Rory Leishman of the London Free Press stated, "doing whatever was necessary to track down terrorists and their sympathizers." Muslims bore a special responsibility – ostensibly because they shared the same faith with the terrorists – for rooting out terrorism in Canada. Haroon Siddiqui of the Toronto Star referred to this as "a stiffer test of patriotism." And although Canadian Muslims and their institutions did condemn the attacks unequivocally - a fact reported prolifically in the press - their patriotism was still singled out as suspect and worthy of scrutiny. Indicative of the lax civic consciousness of Canadian Muslims was the fact that they did not verbally pledge allegiance to Canada: "We rarely heard Muslims in the West pledging loyalty to the countries in which they lived," articulated National Post columnist George Jonas.

With alarming frequency, Canadian Muslims were portrayed as a 'fifth column' – sleeper terrorists waiting to undermine Canadian society. Most of these representations displayed raw speculation and an extreme paucity of hard data. In one example, a writer warned that "not all the terrorist caves are in Afghanistan…some are in Quebec and Ontario." Another – an increasingly common motif – stated that any one of the nineteen men who committed the attacks could have been your next door neighbour. In the Globe and Mail, a prominent columnist, Margaret Wente, warned that extremists, "turn out to be the guys next door. They watch baseball on Sony television sets. They go to bars. They eat pizza. They meet girls, or try to. They seem a lot like us, except they hate us, and want us dead." The same writer later revisited this theme in a column entitled, "The terrorist who's still next door." (Emphasis added)

Racial profiling was explicitly endorsed by a number of writers, even newspapers. The logic was simple; it was "not prejudice…nor Islamophobia," argued Peter Worthington of the Toronto Sun, but "good sense": "If Muslim terrorists hijack commercial aircraft and crash them into buildings, is it unreasonable that Muslims boarding aircraft get extra scrutiny?" It was multiculturalism, with its "relativistic creed that assumes all immigrant cultures are equally tolerant, civilized and enlightened," that was the culprit stated Jonathan Kay of the National Post. Consequently, he continued, "[W]e should not pretend that an effective fight against terrorism [in Canada] can be waged in a truly color-blind fashion. The fact is, those who plot the annihilation of our civilization are of one religion and, almost without exception, one race."

Samuel's Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis was resurrected and re-applied liberally to understand the attacks against the US. More problematically, however, is that it was consciously used to present an apocalyptic scenario of the West versus Islam. Many preferred to couch their analysis using Huntington as their intellectual bulwark. In his column entitled, "Don't buff the sharp edges off Islam," Robert Fulford of the National Post candidly quoted and endorsed Huntington's conclusion that "Muslims show a greater propensity for war than any of the other disputatious civilizations now competing for territory on the planet." Other columnists, however, were more direct, unencumbered by any theoretical rationalization. Peter Worthington of the Toronto Sun, for example, stated: "[N]o media outlets attack law-abiding Muslims or Islam as a religion just because it is prone to attract suicidal fanatics."

Citizenship and Civil Rights

The erosion of civil rights, particularly of Canadians of the Muslim faith, also weighed heavily in the minds of a fearful community. High profile cases of Muslims in Canada accused of aiding and abetting al-Qaeda further added to the anxiety.

Trial by media, guilt by religious identity, seemed to be the norm as the Canadian public was treated to a spectacle of Muslims paraded by the RCMP as "prime suspects": a Canadian NSERC nuclear engineer of Egyptian origin whose alleged wrongdoing was based on having a name similar to that of lead hijacker Mohamed Atta; an Ottawa man originally from Somalia who managed wire transfers for Canadians sending money to support their families in Somalia; a Toronto copy shop owner who was also the uncle of the infamous Nabil al-Marabh. Full of sound and fury, these dramatic announcements were found later to signify nothing.

Despite these glaring errors by intelligence authorities, Muslims have remained under a cloud of suspicion. A September 2002 IPSOS-Reid poll indicated that 35 per cent of Canadians were more suspicious of Arabs and Muslims from the Middle East, an 8-per-cent increase since the poll asked the same question on Sept. 21, 2001. And 48 per cent of Canadians also indicated that they favoured some form of racial profiling.

In addition to hurtful questions about their loyalty as citizens, Canadian Muslims were alarmed at the unprecedented powers given to the state under the new anti-terrorism legislation Bill C-36. It defined terrorism in broad terms; it allowed a terrorist list to be created as an administrative decision through the use of secret evidence and secret foreign intelligence evidence; it prescribed detention without warrant or charge for up to 72 hours if there were 'reasonable grounds' to suspect commission of terrorist activity; it provided for investigative hearings with no right to silence; it restricted judicial controls on wiretapping and extended the duration for authorization of wiretapping; it allowed the interception of international communications without a warrant; and it provided for a closed trial process, with restricted disclosure and relaxed evidentiary rules.

They were worried about the Bill's potential impact on innocent citizens. Those who will be wrongfully charged, arrested and imprisoned may be vindicated in the fullness of time, but at an incalculable cost: the stigma, shame and humiliation will have devastating effects on families, reputations, friendships, businesses and jobs.

It should be emphasized that community groups and institutions have urged Muslims to assist law enforcement in ensuring the safety and security of Canadian citizens. Standing up for justice, even against oneself or one's community, is an Islamic duty. However, assisting law enforcement should not be at the loss or forfeiture of fundamental rights and freedoms.

In a few instances, Muslim individuals have reported law enforcement agents asserting that no reason is needed to detain people, and that citizens can be detained under the anti-terrorism act without a warrant or charge. Similarly, Muslims have been told that if they do not speak immediately, they can be compelled to speak under the law. Both assertions by law enforcement are false. The anti-terrorism legislation does not allow individuals to be detained or compelled to answer questions without any basis whatsoever. And on a few occasions, when an individual has requested to speak to law enforcement in the presence of a lawyer, the agents have declined to meet. These are legitimate concerns regarding the rights of Muslims as Canadian citizens with regards to due process and fundamental judicial rights.

Mending the Mosaic

Given the above uncertainties, will Canada's unique multicultural foundation be eroded as openness gives way to suspicion; inclusion replaced by enclaves of disaffected minorities; transparency of justice clouded by secret evidence and secret trials?

The events of the past year have forced many Muslims to explain their faith to the wider public. This is a responsibility that the community should have borne long ago. It has also led to introspection, and in many instances to a strengthening of faith and identity. And it has exposed fundamental differences within the community regarding interpretation of religious teachings and its role here in Canada.

As Canadian Muslims look to the near past, they discover that many ethnic groups have gone through similar trials: Ukrainians and Poles during the First World War; Germans, Italians and Japanese during the Second World War, and Jews during the first half of the past century. By fighting discrimination, each group emerged stronger, with its role further entrenched in the Canadian mosaic.

Canadian Muslims must come to terms with the reality that it is now their turn. Will they fight discrimination and challenge violations to civil rights, thus contributing toward the evolution of social justice in Canada? Will they consolidate their tremendous reservoir of talent and values into instruments of change for the benefit of all? Or will they retreat into ghettos, contributing to the vicious cycle of mutual suspicions between "civilizations"? On a more sober note, what efforts will they make to forge opportunities for their children?

Social harmony, however, is a two-way street. And the results of a CAIR-CAN poll provide optimism: More than 60 per cent of Canadian Muslims reported acts of kindness and support by their fellow citizens in the wake of 9/11, according to a poll released in September 2002 by the Canadian office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN). Numerous interfaith dialogues, town-hall meetings, and open houses are evidence of the spontaneous outreach extended by other Canadians.

It is this wellspring of basic human goodness that must continue to flow for the preservation of social cohesion. The pillars of Canadian society – tolerance, compassion and fairness – will be tested in the years to come. Yet every Canadian must reflect seriously upon his or her role in shaping our society for the better, against those forces who desire otherwise. Are we, individually and collectively, up to the challenge?

OCTOBER 24-26, 2003

PRESENCE OF THE *Past*

A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TEACHING, LEARNING AND COMMUNICATING THE HISTORY OF CANADA

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Building upon two successful conferences – Giving the Future a Past (2001) in Winnipeg, Manitoba and Giving the Past a Future (1999) in Montreal, Quebec, *Presence of the Past* will look at the ways in which the history of Canada can be most effectively taught, as well as at the presence and relevance of history in our daily lives. This national conference will examine different approaches to teaching history, with new choices in curricula and new tools and techniques for teachers, and will explore how the teaching of history has evolved in the context of a broader social reality.

Over one thousand participants attended the first two national history conferences. Once again, many of Canada's leading academics, teachers and researchers, as well as organizations disseminating information about Canada's history, will be present in Halifax, as will those who are bringing innovative tools and technology in this field into the classroom.

Presence of the Past will also feature special plenary sessions with professors who teach contemporary and historical Canada in classrooms abroad, thus providing participants with a unique and interesting perspective on the subject.

This gathering in Halifax will be the only national conference to bring together such a diverse group of individuals involved in communicating and teaching the history of Canada for the purpose of sharing information and resources. Teachers, students, professionals and others involved in the field of Canadian history are invited to participate.

The conference will feature over 45 sessions – featuring individuals and organizations from local, regional, national and international perspectives – as well as a number of excursions and events. Many sessions will focus on Canadian history from conventional means of teaching to the latest innovative methods, while others will address several important issues in Canadian history.

Of special interest will be a Learning Exhibition featuring over 20 organizations – representing museums, television, film, multimedia, governments and a variety of educational and non-profit organizations – displaying their latest resources.

CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE:

- **Learning Exposition** featuring: The Historica Foundation, Canada's National History Society, the National Archives and Library of Canada, the National Film Board, Chinook Multimedia, the Ministry of Education (Government of Nova Scotia), the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Canadian Museums Association, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada / Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs, Canadian Historical Micro-Reproductions and many other organizations.
- Welcoming cocktail reception at Pier 21
- Special Saturday night banquet with activities marking the 400 anniversary of Champlain's arrival in New France
- Workshops and panel sessions featuring Canada's leading historians and professors
- Special keynote speakers, excursions and interactive sessions
- Plenary sessions featuring leading Canadian and international authors, academics, journalists, teachers and government officials
- Interactive professional development seminars with educational resource developers demonstrating hands-on, computer-based and relevant take-home materials to give educators a more in depth look at the potential for these resources as classroom tools
- Sessions and activities to aid educators to effectively incorporate media, museums, archives, multimedia/internet and other non-textbook information in their classrooms
- Off-site sessions and activities involving elementary, secondary and university students
- Special events and activities sponsored by organizations dedicated to the advancement of the teaching and learning of the history of Canada

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The Art of the Possible:

Literature, Citizenship and Canadian Multiculturalism in a Global Context

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Remember Charlie Smoke? Charlie Smoke's name was in the news for a few weeks in 2002 when Canadian immigration officials made an unsuccessful attempt to deport him to the U.S. after discovering that he was working as a teacher's assistant in Regina but did not have proof of Canadian citizenship. Charlie Smoke belongs to the Lakota First Nation in Alberta. He was, he says, born at Akwesasne, a Mohawk territory on the border between Ontario and New York, though he was never issued a birth certificate and never registered as a status Indian. At any rate, he considers himself to be neither a Canadian nor a U.S. citizen. Instead, Charlie calls himself a pre-Canadian aboriginal person and claims he has the right to live on either side of the border.

Eight years before Charlie Smoke's citizenship claims were held up for public scrutiny, Thomas King wrote "Borders," a short story about a Blackfoot family from Alberta who are retained at the American border because the woman driving the car refuses to identify as either Canadian or American, but chooses to identify as Blackfoot. So they camp out in the "no man's land" of the parking lot behind the duty-free store and her son entertains television reporters who ask him "how it felt to be an Indian without a country," while his mother attempts to negotiate their passage.

King's prescience is remarkable. But his story resonates for many other reasons, including the humor that is valued as a mode of survival and resistance in so many works of Native Canadian literature, and that is integral to King's readings and media performances. The desperately earnest and bewildered border guard who makes a show of being culturally sensitive while maintaining that "you have to be American or Canadian" deserves a laugh. But it is what Margaret Atwood calls "subversive laughter," a laughter that turns on the unfunny need to move beyond models that construe our countries as homogenous national communities. King's story recalls Marshall McLuhan's argument that Canada is "a borderline" case, a nation defined by its interfaces, its alterity, not its essence. But those of us who encounter King's "Borders" after Charlie Smoke's name is no longer newsworthy – after it has been eclipsed by declarations of war and so many stories about terrorism – are also reminded of the alienation and "unhomeliness" endured by those Canadians for whom border crossing has become increasingly difficult.

If King's story speaks to a kind of citizenship that is not conferred or confirmed by borders and birth certificates, Catherine Bush's novel *The Rules of Engagement* examines the privilege of Canadians who take their national identity and their passports for granted. "Traveling as a Canadian is perhaps the easiest way to find safe passage," Bush writes. "In a crisis everyone wants to be one of us. We're known globally for our innocuousness, our apparent harmlessness. No wonder our passports are the most forged in the world." In spite of and because of the privileges that Canadian passports confer, diffcult questions nonetheless arise: "Are we to intervene or not? Who are we to let slip within our borders? Who's a stranger? Whom do we allow ourselves to love?" Ultimately, Bush's novel is about the personal finding expression in the political, whereas King's story is about the trauma of having the political imposed on the personal, but both are about the deep cultural meaning that inheres in the ways that one imagines belonging or not belonging to a nation.

Fiction such as "Borders" and *The Rules of Engagement* does more than help us appreciate issues under debate in the contemporary context. As Frank Davey points out, an attentive reading of a literary text not only helps us understand the "unspoken assumptions, wishes, or fantasies" that "underlie that conscious debate." It also allows us to "influence the terms in which it is conducted." Equally important, it helps us to imagine alternatives. As the poet William Blake said, "What is now proved was once only imagined."

Oscar Wilde's paradoxical witticism that "life imitates art" similarly speaks to the role that creative writers play in shaping the ethics of everyday practice and the vision of what might be possible. The metamorphosis of the Canadian literary canon and the expanding readership for an increasingly multi-racial, multi-ethnic Canadian literature both at home and

abroad in the last three decades does much more than simply mirror the development of cultural diversity as a Canadian value. It has also been a primary cause of that social transformation. One has only to consider, for example, works like Joy Kogawa's *Obasan*, which, in Austin Cooke's words, helped to turn "around an entire country's understanding of itself and its history." In fact, portions of it were read aloud in the House of Commons during the movement to redress the injustice done to Japanese Canadians.

Like Kogawa, many other creative writers have turned to fiction to rewrite lost and erased histories, as in Wayson Choy's *The Jade Peony* and Sky Lee's *Disappearing Moon Café*, with their moving portrayals of the repatriation to China of the bones of the Chinese-Canadian laborers who helped to build Canada's railways for shipment and were then abandoned. Others turn to seering social critique, as in Dionne Brand's novel *In Another Place, Not Here*, with its haunting representation of the legal, psychological and systemically racist limbo inhabited by Carribean migrant workers in Toronto. Where Catherine Bush's protagonist muses on the myths of Canadian multiculturalism from a position of privilege, the disenfranchised and disillusioned temporary residents and "illegal aliens" who populate Brand's novel too often find that social justice and fundamental rights can only be found "in another place, not here."

Many Canadian creative writers challenge and transform social values by working simultaneously in differing literary forms. Consider, for example, the prolific George Elliott Clarke, who sings the stories of Atlantic African Canadias ("Africadians") in lyrical poetry, rewrites black history in Canada in operatic librettos (*Beatrice Chancey*), and contests, in scholarly essays, a "model blackness" based on African American templates or a myth of Canadian black homogeneity. Typically too, the works of the new generation of Canadian writers syncretically interweave diverse cultural traditions and practices. Thus Tomson Highway blends Cree and Ojibway myths with ballet and European traditions of classical music and epic in *Kiss of the Fur Queen*, his eloquent testament to the cultural devastation and dislocations wrought by the residential school system. In *Chorus of Mushrooms*, Hiromi Goto similarly intertwines Japanese cultural traditions and the myths of the Canadian West, showing how some values shift across generations while others remain the same.

Given its capacity to embed social values within myths, traditions, languages, and communities, literature gives a human face to more quantitative or ostensibly objective studies of populations, issues and social trends. As Winfried Siemerling observes, too often cultural diversity "is seen not as an abundance of articulate social practices," engaged in by individual human subjects, "but as a group of silent objects to be studied quantitatively." Working within particular communities, or using imaginative empathy to counteract "negative othering," writers explore experiential dimensions of social and political structures and beliefs from the inside out, so to speak, both within communities and individuals.

Bharati Mukherjee's short story about the Air India tragedy, "The Management of Grief," is a case in point, raising questions about the extent to which "human values" are, in Neil Bissondath's words, "exclusive to no race." In a few brief pages Mukherjee explores both the occasions when grief is shared across cultures (the simple human gestures of the Irish villagers offering sympathy to the relatives of those killed), and the contexts in which collisions between cultures occur: as in the failure of the government social worker to understand or effectively communicate with those she is sent to help. As Deborah Bowen suggests, "grief is transcultural; the management of grief is not." The social worker's textbook models of "multicultural" grief management incorporate Western Christian assumptions about death, the afterlife and rituals of grieving that aggravate suffering instead of relieving it. Indirectly, too, Mukherjee conveys her critical view of the subtle denial of full citizenship rights and justice to those who died on Air India flight 182 and their families – in part because the conflict that led to the terrorist act was not conceptualized primarily as a Canadian conflict and a Canadian government responsibility. Instead, it was viewed as an Indian conflict and an Indian tragedy.

> Oscar Wilde's paradoxical witticism that "life imitates art" similarly speaks to the role that creative writers play in shaping the ethics of everyday practice and the vision of what might be possible.

Tragedy and grief are catalysts for new forms of community in "The Management of Grief," including transnational forms of community. But we also learn from literature that community itself is valued in subtly different ways by different cultures. For example, the ethos of competitive individualism associated with many European-Canadian traditions and underlying concepts of civil rights and copyright is at odds with the valuing of the social group or collectivity or kinship systems in many other cultural traditions. "I've been brought up to believe in kinship, or those with whom we share," as one of the characters says in Sky Lee's *Disappearing Moon Café*. The valuing of the community over the individual in both African Canadian and Anishanabee traditions is similarly brought home in Richard Wagamese's novel *Keeper'n Me*, when the protagonist Garnet Raven, dispossessed of his Native heritage, is taken in by a black family in Toronto and becomes a "James Brown Indian" for a time.

As Marlene Nourbese Philip points out, questions of community raise complex issues of audience and conflicting values for immigrant and minority writers in Canada. If writers shape community values, they are also shaped by them in both nurturing and imprisoning ways. "The choice facing a writer from Eastern Europe or Italy or Latin America is a stark one," Nourbese Philip comments; "work in your mother tongue and – at least in Canada – be restricted to an audience sharing a similar linguistic heritage, or work in English with the potential of a much

wider audience – minus your natural audience." (Revealingly, she does not mention French, even though she goes on to refer to Canada's two official languages.) There is also the "nostalgia factor" and its conundrums for immigrant writers to negotiate, she points out. Their own cultural communities can be so starved for anything evocative of "home" and the valuing of its traditions that artists can be constrained by the pressure to meet such expectations.

The dramatic metamorphosis of Canadian literature in the three decades since the 1971 declaration of the Multicultural Policy has brought many conflicts and challenges, but the very intensity of these conflicts points to the importance of this cultural domain in the shaping of public values. Drawing on her experience in directing the cultural portfolio of the Department of Multiculturalism, Judy Young observes that "literature is a field in which debates and questions about diversity, ethnicity, race and gender started earlier than in the other arts." One might add that these debates started earlier in literature than in most other academic fields of study as well. A primary reason for this is that, as Young suggests, the "inclusion or exclusion of writers and works" in literary canons is "based on value judgments which can be influenced by discrimination, racism, bias, ignorance." Another is that creative writers in most instances work outside the academy, producing writings not yet subjected to the regulative force of disciplinary formations. Their works are also widely disseminated, regularly reviewed and debated in the media, and among the general public. Thus literature can have a revisionary impact on reigning paradigms of knowledge, extending far beyond the field of literary criticism and scholarship.

Given its capacity to embed social values within myths, traditions, languages, and communities, literature gives a human face to more quantitative or ostensibly objective studies of populations, issues and social trends.

But are there distinctive values or characteristics associated with Canadian literature that have had a transformative impact beyond our borders, influencing not only Canadian citizens but also those in other countries? A good deal of evidence suggests that multiculturalism itself has developed as a value of this kind, in ways that have aroused much interest in other countries.

Canada "was thinking about globalism and pluralism, the possibilities of multiculturalism, long before the rest of us knew the terms existed," Pico Iyer writes in a June, 2002 article in *Harper's Magazine* on "the promise of the new Canadian fiction." Based on works such as Michael Ondaatjee's *The English Patient*, Ann Michael's *Fugitive Pieces*, Dennis Bock's *The Ash Garden*, and Neil Bissoondath's *Digging Up the Mountains,* Iyer concludes that "multiculturalism is far better handled by writers of fiction than writers of laws." Whereas "the administrator tries to push hundreds of thousands of people into a single category, the imaginative writer, the novelist, does the opposite, seeing how one individual can contain a hundred cultures."

Iyer contrasts multiculturalism "from below" as embodied in the "new" Canadian literature with government-sponsored multiculturalism "from above," accepting Bissoondath's dismissive critique of the latter. And of course, many of the award-winning authors nurtured in their apprenticeships by the Writing and Publication Program of Canada's Department of Multiculturalism have been keen critics of the limitations of Canada's "official multicultural" policies. However, one might argue that it is precisely this dialectical engagement between a multiculturalism managed "from above" and a questioning, conflicted diversity "from below" (generated by writers, readers and their communities) that has transformed a matter of official policy into a dynamic entity and a host of innovative new artistic practices.

Some might also question the ways in which Iyer's globalizing vision glosses over revitalizing and/or intractable cultural differences. Yet from his stance outside Canada, he does offer a perspective on what Canadian authors, nurtured by an infrastructure supporting new voices and diversity in the arts, have achieved, and the importance of that achievement in a global context. In *The English Patient*, for example, Iyer finds an "attempt to chart a new kind of identity outside the categories of the Old World's order," in the representation of an assortment of "post-national souls" coming together in temporary refuge from a world in which people are being killed on the basis of their religion or the passport they carry or fail to carry. Had Iyer read Thomas King's "Borders," he might have found a similar attempt to chart a new kind of identity, though whether inside or outside the categories of a world order is more difficult to say.

If Canadian multiculturalism is now increasingly studied in Europe as a model for the challenges facing the European Union, or in the Middle East as a template for accommodating religious and ethnic differences, or in Sri Lanka, as a means for resolving civil strife, it is thus in part because Canadian writers have disseminated a new vision of the possible. Their works embody cultural diversity valued both as a lived practice, and as previously unimagined form of national identity. Iyer rightly stresses the importance of this vision, observing that "in America and Europe, by and large, multiculturalism is seen as merely a fact of life; in Canada it is often seen, and treated, as an opportunity." For that reason, he comments, "anyone who pays attention to contemporary fiction will see that, on the page at least, Canada is grappling with Act III of a global drama that is elsewhere only in its infancy."

The Construction and Constitutionalization of Canada's Citizenship Regime:

Reconciliation of Diversity and Equality

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During the past six decades Canada has been engaged in a citizenship construction project which has had at least two major thrusts, namely accommodating diversity and advancing equality among members of the Canadian polity. Efforts to accommodate diversity and to advance equality among those with and without official citizenship status have been much more progressive during the past six decades than ever before. The result is a citizenship regime which, whatever its remaining deficiencies, is a remarkable improvement over what existed in the pre-World War II era. The objective of this article is to provide an overview of the key statutory and constitutional reform initiatives undertaken by the federal government during that era to accommodate diversity and advance equality and to demonstrate that there has been a steady albeit incremental movement toward the construction of such a progressive citizenship regime.

Such an overview is instructive and useful because it is imperative that Canadians and newcomers alike have a good understanding of Canada's citizenship regime for at least three reasons: first, to know its implications for the true nature of their citizenship and that of others; second, to engage in a constructive analysis of the positive and problematic features of that regime; and third, to consider what modifications, if any, are needed to that regime. This is all part of improving or at least safeguarding the nature and quality of both our citizenship and our polity (Kymlicka, 1992: 43-44).

For purposes of this paper, a citizenship regime is conceptualized as a set of political values and principles largely regarding the fundamental relationships both between governments and the governed and among the governed themselves (Malcomson and Myers, 2002, 1-2; Jenson: 2002: 4). More specifically it is the values and principles regarding both the rights (civil, political and social) and the responsibilities of at least two major categories of persons who reside in Canada – those who possess the official status as Canadian citizens and those who do not – vis-à-vis both various orders of government as well as various individuals or groups within the polity.

Statutory Basis of Canada's Citizenship Regime

A substantial portion of Canada's national citizenship regime of interest and importance for all intents and purposes of this article is contained in a series of statutes which have been enacted during the past six decades. Those statutes embody important principles and values regarding, among other things, accommodating diversity and advancing equality. The most notable of these statutes are the following: Citizenship Act (1947 & 1977); Canadian Bill of Rights Act (1960); Officials Languages Act (1969); Multiculturalism Act (1978); Human Rights Act (1977); and Employment Equity Act (1985 and 1995). The relevance of each of these for accommodating diversity and/or advancing equality is discussed in turn below. The relevance of these various statutes for the citizenship regime and the reconciliation of diversity and equality is clearly evident in the preamble to one of those statutes (Appendix 1).

Citizenship Acts

The citizenship acts of 1947 and 1977 have made three major contributions to the Canadian citizenship regime: first, they established a Canadian citizenship that was distinct and separate from the British citizenship; second, they established the criteria for recognizing, conferring and revoking citizenship; and third, they outlined the rights and responsibilities of those with citizenship and, by extension, also of those without citizenship (Brodie: 2002). Although there are some differences among those two Acts there is a common thrust. They both embody two fundamental principles related to accommodating diversity and advancing equality. The first of these principles is what might be termed 'open citizenship' because it is open or accessible for people of diverse national origin and socio-cultural backgrounds regardless of place of birth or country of origin, and the second is "equal citizenship" because all, regardless of background, have equal rights and responsibilities (Knowles, 2000: 65). The notable exception, on which the citizenship legislation is silent but the constitution is not, are Aboriginals who possess inherent and treaty rights. It is noteworthy that full equality among foreign born candidates for citizenship was not achieved until the 1977 Citizenship Act was adopted which effectively put all candidates for citizenship on a perfectly equal footing not so much in terms of substantive rights as procedural rights. The 1977 Act eliminated a procedural anomaly in the previous legislation by eliminating the preferential exemption for British subjects (i.e., citizens of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa) from having to appear before a citizenship judge and taking the citizenship oath (Knowles, 2000: 87).

Currently Parliament is reviewing Bill C-18 which, if enacted, would supplant the 1977 Citizenship Act (Canada, 2002: 1-7). The new legislation has some important provisions that are likely to have more important implications for obtaining and losing Canadian citizenship status, than with the nature and scope of the rights and duties that comprise the Canadian citizenship regime per se. The reason for this is that the proposed legislation focuses largely on changes to the criteria and conditions that must be met in terms of residency requirements and the past and present criminal activity of candidates than on what rights and responsibilities accrue to citizens and non-citizens. This reform initiative was undertaken to reconcile the provisions in the citizenship statute with those contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ostensibly to enhance both the integrity of the immigration and citizenship programs and the protection of the community against individuals who have engaged, are engaging, or could engage in criminal or terrorist activities (Canada, 2001: 1-2). The bulk of the debate surrounding the proposed legislation is on whether any of the provisions contained therein constitute either a potential challenge to any of the fundamental rights articulated in various parts of Canada's citizenship regime. At the heart of the issue is whether efforts to protect the community and to advance the cause of justice could create a risk that the rights of some individuals and groups could be seriously compromised based on judgments that are made by elected and appointed officials as well as judges not only regarding their past and present conduct but, most disconcerting of all for some, also regarding their potential for unlawful conduct in the future. Two previous iterations of this legislation were abandoned largely due to concerns surrounding this issue (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 75, 89-90). It remains to be seen whether this piece of legislation suffers the same fate.

Canadian Bill of Rights Act

The Canadian Bill of Rights enacted in 1960 by the Diefenbaker government was the first major attempt to codify and to some extent even constitutionalize a citizenship regime which accommodated diversity and advanced equality. The goal was to recognize and affirm the rights of citizens through what it hoped would be regarded as a quasi-constitutional statute that would have paramountcy vis-à-vis other statutes enacted by the federal government. The government was careful to stipulate in the first section of that statute that it was not conferring any new rights or fundamental freedoms, but merely providing official recognition and affirmation of rights and freedoms which "…have existed and shall continue to exist" and that they should do so on an equal basis for all "…without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex…." The fundamental human rights and freedoms listed were the following: (a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law; (b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law; (c) freedom of religion; (d) freedom of speech; (e) freedom of assembly and association; and (f) freedom of the press (Archer, et al., 2002: 136-139).

The Bill of Rights also recognized and guaranteed some legal rights comparable to those that would ultimately be embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms approximately two decades later. This included the right not to be subjected either to arbitrary detention, arrest, imprisonment, exile, or cruel and unusual punishment. It also included the right to habeas corpus, legal counsel, fair trials and hearings, bail unless there are valid reasons for denying it, and access to an interpreter if needed whenever involved in legal proceedings. Whereas the most of those rights pertained to the

Appendix 1:
Preamble to the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act

WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada provides that every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination and that everyone has the freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada recognizes the importance of preserving and enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canadians;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada recognizes rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada and the Official Languages Act provide that English and French are the official languages of Canada and neither abrogates nor derogates from any rights or privileges acquired or enjoyed with respect to any other language;

AND WHEREAS the Citizenship Act provides that all Canadians, whether by birth or by choice, enjoy equal status, are entitled to the same rights, powers and privileges and are subject to the same obligations, duties and liabilities;

AND WHEREAS the Canadian Human Rights Act provides that every individual should have an equal opportunity with other individuals to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have, consistent with the duties and obligations of that individual as a member of society, and, in order to secure that opportunity, establishes the Canadian Human Rights Commission to redress any proscribed discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin or colour;

AND WHEREAS Canada is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Convention recognizes that all human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination and against any incitement to discrimination, and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Covenant provides that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language;

AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada;

advancement of equality, the right to access to an interpreter constitutes an affirmation of a commitment to accommodate diversity within the legal system.

Multiculturalism Act

The federal multiculturalism policy of 1971 constituted an historic step in accommodating diversity. It committed the federal government to recognizing, celebrating and promoting and the multicultural nature of Canada. That commitment was also embodied in the Canadian Multiculuralism Act of 1988. However the 1988 Act also emphasized in an explicit manner two other policy objectives which were largely implicit in the 1971 policy, namely fostering intercultural understanding and advancing the equality of members of cultural communities under the law. Those core values and principles related to accommodating cultural diversity, advancing equality, and intercultural understanding are embodied in section 3.(1) of the 1988 Act which states that it is the declared policy of Canada to:

(a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage;
(b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future;
(c) promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation;
(d) recognize the existence of communities whose members share a common origin and their historic contribution to Canadian society, and enhance their development;
(e) ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity;
(f) encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character;
(g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins;
(h) advance the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of Canadian society and promote the reflection and the evolving expressions of those cultures;
(i) preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French, while strengthening the status and use of the official languages of Canada; and
(j) advance multiculturalism throughout Canada in harmony with the national commitment to the official languages of Canada.

The basic policy goals articulated in the 1988 Multiculturalism Act were reviewed during the Liberal government's review of multiculturalism policy undertaken between 1995 and 1997 (Leman, 1999). The basic goals were not altered in a substantive manner. Instead, it served to underscore a policy goal that was not fully and explicitly articulated in the act. That is the goal of accommodating cultural diversity as a means to foster attachment and allegiance by members of various cultural communities to Canada. Thus, that review led to a slight reconfiguration of the multiculturalism policy and program based on three overarching goals (Canada, 1998: 2):

Identity: fostering a society that recognizes, respects, and reflects a diversity of cultures such that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.

Civic Participation: developing among Canada's diverse people active citizens with both the opportunity and the capacity to participate in shaping the future of their communities and their country.

Social Justice: building a society that ensure fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins.

It is noteworthy that full equality among foreign born candidates for citizenship was not achieved until the 1977 Citizenship Act was adopted which effectively put all candidates for citizenship on a perfectly equal footing not so much in terms of substantive rights as procedural rights.

The movement away from celebrating diversity to promoting Canadian identity and unity was accelerated by a neo-liberal backlash against the earlier version of multiculturalism (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 105-126). This backlash was clearly evident in the hearings and the 1991 report of the Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future which noted that a common view among Canadians was that multiculturalism contributed to divisiveness and disunity in Canada and posed an obstacle the construction of a shared national identity (Leman, 1999; Knowles, 1996: 202-204).

Human Rights Act

The other two key statutes enacted by the federal government in recent decades which have some important implications for the nature and scope of the citizenship regime in Canada are the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Canadian Employment Equity Act of 1985. Those statutes contain important values and principles related to accommodating diversity and advancing equality in all matters that fall within the scope of the legislative purview of the Parliament. In effect they serve as quasi-constitutional statutes that apply and must be taken into account in undertaking various initiatives pursuant to all other statutes, policies, and operations of the federal government. The Human Rights Act identifies the prohibited grounds of discrimination related to the employment, business and service delivery practices not only of federal government entities but also various non-governmental entities which, by virtue of their activities fall, within the scope of federal laws and regulations. The stated purpose of that act as articulated therein is:

> "*…to extend the laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity…to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.*"

Employment Equity Act

The Employment Equity Act enacted in 1985 and the one enacted in 1995 supplement the Human Rights Act. Whereas the latter was introduced to foster equality in the workplace, the former were introduced to foster equity. The employment equity legislation has provided a regulatory regime that sanctions affirmative action to maximize equity for four designated groups (i.e., women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities, and persons with disabilities) in the employment practices of the following: (a) all federal departments, agencies and commissions for which the Treasury Board is the employers; (b) all public sector separate employers with 100 or more employees such as the RCMP; (c) Crown Corporations: and (d) private sector employers who operate in federally-regulated industries such as banking, communications, and interprovincial and international transportation. The employment equity legislation establishes the same core requirements for all such public and private sector employers to develop and implement employment equity plans and programs that eliminate barriers to employment for members of the four designated groups (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002: 148-151).

Constitutional Basis of Canadian Citizenship Regime

During the past six decades, but particularly during the past four decades, there has been a sustained effort by successive federal governments to codify and constitutionalize key components of Canada's citizenship regime, and particularly the fundamental civic, political, and legal rights, designed to accommodate diversity and advance equality. The Diefenbaker government's Bill of Rights and Freedoms discussed above marked the beginning of that effort by providing a statute that was intended to have a quasi-constitutional status. That quasi-constitutional status proved significant in at least in one court case in 1970, namely Drybones vs. Regina, when the Court ruled that certain provisions in the Indian Act that were central to the case were in contravention of the Bill of Rights.

Between 1960 when the Bill of Rights was enacted and 1982 when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the constitution, there were several aborted efforts to achieve the codification and entrenchment of rights designed to accommodate diversity and advance equality. The most notable of these are found in the Victoria Charter of 1971 which contained some important provisions that were ultimately entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This included, for example, the fundamental freedoms (e.g., religion, speech, assembly) except where limited "in the interests of public safety, order, health, or morals, of national security, or the rights and freedoms of others," and universal suffrage for all who met the basic criteria of citizenship, residency and age as outlined in the electoral laws of the various orders of government.

A second major attempt at constitutional reform prior to 1982 occurred in 1978 when the federal government introduced the 'Constitutional Amendment Bill' in Parliament. The notable objectives of that bill were to accommodate cultural duality in the Senate and the Supreme Court, and to advance equality of human rights by entrenching a Charter of Human Rights that included language rights. The bill died on the order paper in 1979 in the wake of the election call that resulted in the defeat of the Liberal government. What did not die was the passion to succeed in the quest to reform the constitution in a way that included codifying and constitutionalizing a framework for safeguarding individual and collective rights.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The monumental achievement in accommodating diversity and advancing equality within Canada's citizenship occurred with the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982. That constitutional document contains important provisions which, arguably, did more to codify and provide firmer constitutional footing to the key pillars of the citizenship regime, that to expand the parameters of those pillars. To date this remains a moot point and addressing it is beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of its precise effect to the scope of individual and group rights and freedoms, the Charter contributed to a remarkable consciousness raising among citizens and non-citizens alike regarding both the fundamental nature and scope, as well as the value and virtue, of Canada's citizenship regime in relation to individual and groups.

The Charter contains ten categories of rights and freedoms that, either directly or indirectly, have important implications for accommodating diversity and advancing equality. The first category, found in Section 2, consists of fundamental freedoms, including: freedom of conscience, religion thought and speech, peaceful assembly; and associations. The second category, found in Sections 3 to 5, consists of democratic rights including the right to vote and stand as candidate in elections for the national, provincial and territorial legislatures. The third category, found in Section 6, guarantees the mobility rights which guarantees that every permanent resident has the right to enter, remain in, or leave Canada and to move and take up residence and a career in any province and not be subjected to any discriminatory measures in doing so. This right is mitigated somewhat by the qualification to the effect that some affirmative action is allowed in restricting access to careers for persons from other parts of Canada in regions which are deemed to be economically disadvantaged. The fourth category, found in Sections 7-14, are various legal rights comparable to those which had been articulated in the 1960 Bill of Rights, namely the right not to be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure, detention or imprisonment without cause or explanation, and unfair and unduly protracted legal proceedings, cruel and unusual punishment, or to be denied bail without just cause. The fifth category, found

in Sections 15 and 28, consists of equality rights. Whereas Section 15 affirms that every individual is equal before and under the law and has equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on "…race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability," Section 28 affirms that males and females have equal rights. The sixth category, found in sections 16 to 22, pertain to the right to use either of the officials language is certain political and judicial institutions that exist at the national and provincial or territorial levels. The seventh category, founding Section 23, pertains to minority language educational rights. More specifically it affirms that Canadian citizens who belong to a minority linguistic group within a province or territory have the right to chose in which of the two officials languages their children shall be educated provided, of course, that there is a sufficiently large number of students to warrant offering education in that particular language of instruction in a given region. The eighth category, found in Section 29, consists of rights pertaining to the continued existence of denomenational, separate or dissential schools. The ninth category, found in Sections 25 and 35(1), pertains to Aboriginal rights. Whereas Section 25 affirms that the Charter should not be interpreted in any way that would abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty, or other rights or freedoms conferred by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 or any rights or freedoms acquired by way of land claims, Section 35(1) recognizes and affirms the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. The tenth category, found in Section 27, is a recognition, affirmation, and entrenchment of cultural or multicultural rights. That section states that the Charter "…shall be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the preservation of and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."

The monumental achievement in accommodating diversity and advancing equality within Canada's citizenship occurred with the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982.

Before turning our attention away from the Charter it is important to note hat it contains two sections which have an important bearing on the limits that can be set by government to fundamental rights and freedoms and to the application of the Charter. Section 1 states that the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are subject to "…such limits as prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Similarly, section 33 contains the so-called "not-withstanding clause" which states that Parliament or any legislature in Canada may, by adopting an official resolution, choose to enact a law which may contravene any provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter. In effect these provisions provide the national, provincial and territorial governments with substantial flexibility in choosing precisely how to reconcile the accommodation of diversity with the advancement of equality within their respective statutes, regulations, policies and programs.

Meech Lake & Charlottetown Accords

Efforts to codify and constitutionalize a citizenship regime in Canada that accommodates diversity and advances equality did not end with the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. The two major constitutional reform initiatives that were undertaken during the subsequent decade to make Quebec a signatory to the modern constitutional framework, namely the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord are an important part of the legacy.

The most significant elements of those constitutional reform initiatives for the ongoing project of constructing a citizenship regime were what might be termed the "Quebec Clause" in the Meech Lake Accord, and the "Canada Clause" in the Charlottetown Accord. Whereas the former was designed exclusively for the purpose of recognizing Quebec as culturally and politically distinct with unique needs and rights as compared to those of other provinces, the latter subsumed such a recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within a more comprehensive and inclusive statement designed to capture some of the fundamental features of the Canadian polity as well as some of the fundamental values and principles embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the accommodation of diversity and advancement of equality. This is clearly evident in the following provisions contained in Section two of the Charlottetown Accord which constituted the Canada Clause:

2. (1) The Constitution of Canada, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the following characteristics:

(a) Canada is a democracy committed to a parliamentary and federal system of government and to the rule of law;

(b) the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have the right to promote their languages, cultures and traditions and to ensure the integrity of their societies, and their governments constitute one of the three orders of government in Canada;

(c) Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society, which includes a French-speaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition;

(d) Canadians and their governments are committed to the vitality and development of official language minority communities throughout Canada;

(e) Canadians are committed to racial and ethnic equality in a society that includes citizens from many lands who have contributed, continue to contribute, to the building of a strong Canada that reflects its cultural and racial diversity;

(f) Canadians are committed to a respect for individual and collective human rights and freedoms of all people;

(g) Canadians are committed to the equality of female and male persons; and

(h) Canadians confirm the principal of the equality of the provinces at the same time as recognizing their diverse characteristics.

(2) The role of the legislature and government of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct society of Quebec is affirmed.

Clearly, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord constitute a setback to the continuing efforts to codify and constitutionalize an even more progressive citizenship regime in this country designed to accommodate diversity and advance equality in a way that is acceptable to all, including the Quebec governments and people and Aboriginal governments and people. In the decade since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord there have been no substantial attempts to resume the quest for such codification and constitutionalization. If and when that quest resumes remains is difficult to predict with certainty, but it is safe to say that it has not been completely abandoned and that at some point in the future when the requisite confluence of the political forces of history occurs, the quest will resume. In the interim, the various orders of governments are likely to continue to broker and conclude deals between them which establish in statute what may be difficult to entrench in the constitution for accommodating diversity and advancing equality as part of the continuing legacy to construct a progressive citizenship regime for Canada.

Conclusion

Despite some legitimate criticism that can be leveled against the current citizenship regime by those who have their eyes firmly fixed on the ideal or on perfection, there is no denying that during the past six decades Canada has made remarkable strides in reconciling what prima facie seems paradoxical and irreconcilable, namely accommodation of diversity and advancing equality. On both of those counts successive Canadian governments, and in many instances also provincial governments, have contributed to the construction of a more elaborate, sophisticated and progressive citizenship regime both for individuals and groups than what was embodied in constitutional and statutory framework that existed prior to World War II.

The most significant progress for individual rights is the codification and constitutionalization of the fundamental right and freedoms. There is considerable satisfaction with the substantive content of that particular component of the citizenship regime. Complaints that are heard periodically are generally not direct at its substantive content, but at the extent that sufficient efforts are made to ensure that it is adequately respected and upheld.

The most significant progress for group rights have been in one of the three types of group rights identified by Kymlicka (1992: 30-32) namely multicultural rights which include various types of minority rights. Those who value such rights are preoccupied with ensuring that they are safeguarded and enhanced, those who do not value them are preoccupied with diminishing and possibly even abolishing such rights. Some, though admittedly, less progress has also been made in the other two types of group rights identified by Kymlicka, namely representational rights and self-governance rights. Demands for progress on these two types of group rights have been placed on the policy agenda for some time both by the Quebecois and by the Aboriginal communities. In both of those communities there have been and continue to be demands for increased representation in various institutions and for increased self-governance. Although some progress has been made on the self-governance front vis-à-vis both of those communities, many of their members content that neither the pace nor scope of the progress is satisfactory. Such sentiments and the demands for greater representation and self-governance are unlikely to subside for some time to come, if ever, unless substantial reforms are implemented to various political institutions of all orders of government. Thus, the Canadian citizenship construction project remains a work in progress which in the future, as in the past, will continue to evolve based on changes in the political culture and political imperatives.

Values: The Hidden Curriculum in Education

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Each one of my three children have served as "Special Me" in their primary school classes in the local public school in Waterloo, Ontario. The honour included being the teacher's special helper (holding the doors open, etc.), bringing a toy or object for show-and-tell, and displaying a poster board with photographs of family, pets, and mostly, themselves. I could not help but marvel at this manifestation of the "expressive individualism" we sociologists see so frequently in modern societies. My marvel was also rooted in the fact that I am a product of the separate, that is, Roman Catholic system in Ontario some 40 years previously. Back then, if we had a similar "special day" for each child at Our Lady of Perpetual Help School in Toronto, we probably would have called it, "Sinful Me". My children's education emphasizes self-expression, secular values of decency, honesty, and civility, and "real world" (or marketplace) skills.

It has almost become a truism to say that no education is value-free, and liberal education in Canada today reflects the fundamental ideas and values of liberalism itself: individualism, reason, egalitarianism, universalism, and progress (the belief in the open-ended improvability of society and the individual). Given that education is compulsory in all modern, liberal-democratic nation-states, schools play an important role in the social construction of these values – and consequently in the stability of liberal democratic societies and states. These values work themselves into the curriculum as well as the structure, culture and social environment of the school (what scholars sometimes call the "hidden curriculum"). Liberal values even inform classroom practices like "Special Me", which is clearly an expression of both individualism and egalitarianism (*every* child is *equally* special).

Will Kymlicka has pointed out that, while we often pretend that these values are universal and "neutral", in fact every expression of them favours one particular cultural or national identity (for example, just by choice of language, history, and body of literature) (Kymlicka, 2001). In Quebec, for historical reasons, this is openly admitted and promoted in educational policy – much more so than in other provinces. Moreover, the purported "universality" or neutrality of these values are further mitigated by illiberal values and practices that make up what scholars often call the "hidden curriculum".

In the mid-seventies, a classic study by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (Bowles & Gintis, 1976) uncovered the "correspondence" between the values, practices, and structures of public education in the United States and those of the capitalist economy it mirrors and serves. They argue:

> Like the division of labor in the capitalist enterprise, the educational system is a finely graded hierarchy of authority and control in which competition rather than co-operation governs the relations among participants, and an external reward system – wages in the case of the economy and grades in the case of schools – holds sway. (Gintis & Bowles, 1988)

The school system throws up irrational barriers for children of lower socio-economic status families, socializing them into a "working class culture" of obedience and limited horizons. Schools for middle class families socialize children into the culture of supervisors and managers, which emphasizes self-motivation and self-supervision. Upper class children are socialized into the values of independence, entitlement, and confidence appropriate to those who will become leaders in business, politics, and a variety of other activities. Canadian schools have not escaped this "correspondence."

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Feminist scholars have argued that the hidden curriculum of the school system is also defined by patriarchal values. Consequently, despite the egalitarian content of the "official curriculum", children learn androcentric behaviours, values, and outlooks, simply by participating in classes in which teachers allow boys to dominate conversations.[1] In the same way, scholars concerned with racial equity argue that the hidden curriculum also presents Western or "white" values – and ways of knowing – as normative or superior to those of racial and ethnic minorities as well as aboriginal peoples (Banks, 1995). Today, it is more typical for scholars to talk about the intersection of these forms of discrimination (Arnot, 2002); Dei et al. 2000).

The hidden values that influence the curriculum, culture, structure and social environment of schools (and are consequently communicated to students) do not affect all students in the same manner. For example, students who are "minoritized" by the dominant culture, Dei et al. argue, become alienated from the culture of their schools and "drop out". Indeed, they argue that it is more accurate to say that the schools "push out" certain students. Discrimination based on class, ethnicity, race, gender, ability, and other markers narrows the life-chances of students. For example, Black students are often streamed towards the general, rather than advanced, classes. Dei et al. propose that Canadians develop "inclusive schools" rooted in a broader spectrum of values and ways of knowing (which they call, "indigenous knowledges") (2000, 13).

As one might expect, many people challenge the dominant values that pervade the Canadian school system. Historically, this was always the case. Jews and other religious minorities protested that they were served poorly by the public, that is, Christian school systems across Canada. French Canadians fought for the right to their own schools in order to preserve their culture. However, by the 1960s, many Canadians recognized that the Canadian school system, originally created for a more homogenous, and largely Christian, population, was unfair to members of other religious, ethnic, and racial minorities, and to aboriginal children in particular. Echoing the movement towards multiculturalism in government policy and Canadian culture, they proposed a turn to multicultural education (Moodley 1995, 801-802).[2] In the 1970s to 1990s, provincial governments adopted multicultural education policies. However, because education – unlike multiculturalism – is a provincial responsibility, these policies differed from province to province. In fact, they differed from school board to school board within provinces and often depended on the goodwill of individual teachers and administrators. In any case, teacher training and resources have never been adequate (Moodley 1995, 803-804).[3] Proponents of multicultural education wonder to what extent it can really challenge the dominant values in Canadian society and schools. In its most superficial form, takes the form of cultural tourism. Children learn how Jews celebrate Passover, for example, but little else about the history, religion, values, and lives of Jews living in Canada. In any case, this form of multicultural education never goes beyond a celebration of minority traditions and their contribution to our pluralist culture. Here, multicultural education reinforces rather than challenges the dominant values and structures of Canadian society. It cannot expose the relations of power and domination, "where power meets difference" (Dei et al. 14-16). In response to these inadequacies, many scholars and educators have adopted an "anti-racist" stance. Anti-racist education focuses on Canadian society as the problem, connecting racism to issues of class, gender, and regional disparity. Scholars who adopt an anti-racist agenda are more confrontational in style and analyze the problems of minority students as structural rather than personal (Fyfe, 1993).[4]

Lest anyone doubt the ability of multicultural education to transform the values of the education system, one might remember that less than forty years ago it was impossible to imagine education in Canada without Christianity. Even public schools were thoroughly Christian in culture, and in Ontario as in many other jurisdictions, religious instruction and exercises were mandatory (Gidney & Millar, 2001). Changes in government policy dating from the 1960s and court rulings based on the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms have eliminated all overt connections to Christianity in public schools (although separate schools are still allowed as is funding of independent religiously

based schools). In order to accommodate religious minorities as well as atheists and agnostics, religious exercises and assemblies, religious instruction, and the privileges of churches to supervise the moral content of the curriculum or school culture were all declared illegal (Khan, 1999).

This great change in culture does not mean that Canadian public schools are "neutral". They continue to embody Christian values and practices. For example, school holidays are still scheduled around major Christian holy days (Christmas and Easter). Moreover, the "secular" personal values favoured by schools (personal responsibility, work ethic, honesty) are frequently informed by Canada's Christian heritage.

While applauding the secularization of the school system, Lois Sweet argues that Canadians have gone too far in eliminating all religion from public schools. She argues that another element of the "hidden curriculum", secularism (an ideological commitment itself), serves to suppress religion in all its forms. Administrators and teachers have adopted an uncritical secularism, not only forbidding religious instruction (the socialization of children into a particular religious identity) but also discouraging all religious education (education *about* religion). In many provinces, children learn almost nothing about the world's religions as social phenomena (Sweet 1997).

As one might expect, many people challenge the dominant values that pervade the Canadian school system. Historically, this was always the case.

While conservative Christians have long complained about the culture of secular humanism in Canadian public schools and the recession of Christian practices and values, the new critique is framed as an issue of multicultural education – often by authors who are not themselves religious (Davies, 1999). For example, Sweet argues that "religiously illiterate" students cannot understand Canadian history. They are also poorly prepared to participate in Canada's multicultural society when many Canadians see religion as foundational to their cultural, ethnic, or personal identities. Moreover, given the importance of religion to other national and transnational identities and networks of solidarity, these students are ill-prepared to become "global citizens" (Sweet, 1997; Sweet, 2002). Students graduating from public schools today would be hard-pressed, for example, to understand opposition to Western influence in the Middle East or the persistence of ethnic nationalism in parts of the former Soviet Union because they know nothing about the religious histories of those regions.

The effect on religious Canadian children is more pernicious. Dei et al. argue that the elimination of religion and denigration of spirituality in public schools is another feature of a hegomonic school culture. For members of religious minority groups, an important element of their personal and group identity is ignored, denied, or even denigrated (Dei et al., 2000). This increases their sense of alienation.[5] Sweet argues that the alienation experienced by students and parents explains the growth of religiously based independent schools in Canada. Even "moderates", that is religious people who do not reject modernity or Canadian society, are pushed into these sometimes illiberal schools because they find the secular culture of public schools no more welcoming than its Christian predecessor (Sweet 2002).

Here, the conflict over values leads certain parents to form their independent school at great personal cost and sacrifice. In fact, enrolment in independent schools is growing faster than in public schools. In the 1970-71 school year, it was 2.5 percent and in the 1992-93 school year, it was 4.8 percent. While many independent schools cater to specific needs, such as different learning styles and abilities, and others cater to upper class families, most serve religious communities (Theissen 2001, 16). In Canada, these schools reflect most of the values found in public schools (academic excellence, civic virtue, etc.), but parents hope their children will also receive an immersion in specific religious values that are often ad odds with the values of mainstream Canadian society.

For many scholars in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the existence of "private" or independent schools – particularly those rooted in a specific identity and community – pose a threat to the project of fashioning a common civic identity among citizens. Schools are an indispensable forum, according to Will Kymlicka, for learning the values and virtues of citizenship (for example public-spiritedness, a sense of justice, civility and tolerance, and a shared sense of solidarity or loyalty). Consequently, it is important for all students to attend common public schools at some point (Kymlicka 2001, 296-307). Jeffrey Spinner-Halev argues that the "hidden curriculum" of common public schools is an education into tolerance and civic virtue. Students learn these values simply by having to play, work, and cooperate with people who are different from themselves (Spinner-Halev, 2000).

The debate over private schools, like the debate over religion and other facets of cultural pluralism, highlights the limits and boundaries of the public education system. Like the criticisms based on class, gender, race and ethnicity, and sexual orientation, the critique of the secularism in schools highlights the connection of the school system to the socialization of children into the values and virtues necessary for the operation of the Canadian state, market, and society (with both their liberal and illiberal characteristics). The debate over values in education tells us that no discussion of values is complete unless the topic of resistance is included. Resistance challenges and highlights the values operating in the "hidden curriculum", that often-invisible culture that shapes our schools, students, and society. Hence, scholars today pay particular attention to the experiences of people at the margins. While schools act as a vehicle by which society reproduces itself (a concept dear to all sociologists), it also serves as a forum for challenging that very process and inspiring social transformation.

"I don't buy that..."

The Values We Live By Today

Tom Faulkner
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These are the scariest 1340 words I have ever written.

I am asked to discuss "the role media play in shaping our values." For me the discussion begins on two happy notes. First, it seems clear to me that we live in the most diverse society in human history. Our range of choices, experiences, pathways and styles is practically endless, both challenging and enriching us. And this diversity is available to us primarily because the media – that is, the print, broadcast, and web-based media – bring it directly into our lives, knitting us together as a "public" of greater scope than has ever existed in human history.[1] Second, it seems likely to me that historical consciousness is more widely exercised among us than it has ever been before. And I think that we are most fully human when we exercise historical consciousness.

On this second point I am influenced by my former teacher, Mircea Eliade, who discerned three modes of consciousness among human beings.[2] The base mode is mythic consciousness, best illustrated by the Australian aborigine's "dream time" in which one lives securely in an eternal now, and in which each human action is deeply rooted in a mythic universe that defines right and wrong, real and unreal. The second mode is historical consciousness in which the freedom to choose each action and to embrace each value is what makes us most human, but at the cost of being exposed to what Eliade calls "the terror of history" – the radical uncertainty that results from being a finite being who makes absolute choices. In the face of this terror, a human being requires what Protestant theologian Paul Tillich calls "the courage to be."[3] If the effort proves too exhausting – and all too often it does – then, Eliade argues, human beings willingly surrender the freedom of historical

consciousness to an ideological authority whose power rivals the mythic absolutes of the primitive's "dream time." This is the third mode of human consciousness. At their best religious traditions of all kinds invite human beings to share historical consciousness; at their worst they impose ideological straightjackets on people.

And here comes the part that scares me. In theory the media of our modern world are able to encourage and support historical consciousness, but in practice they tend to narrow and undermine the freedom necessary for historical consciousness.

On this point I find George Gerbner particularly persuasive. Professor of Telecommunication at Temple University, there is a delightful irony in the fact that he launches his critique of the mass media from the endowed security of the Bell Atlantic Chair.[4] He argues that the primary source of "stories" in the modern world is the mass media, and that "now stories are told by people with something to sell rather than something to tell."[5] The more accessible the mass media become, and the more scope they provide to us, the more economic pressure drives the mass media to narrow our human freedom. Individual human beings may be urged to bear up bravely under the "terror of history" but markets want to be insulated against catastrophic fluctuations. Forget the freedom of the market that weeds out bad performers! That is all very well in a market place where thousands of performers compete. In a globalized market place in which a few increasingly large conglomerates achieve dominance, competition is to be managed and tamed, not encouraged.

As electronic media become increasingly important and pervasive, the peril to our freedom increases as well.

I know that there are real differences between print media and electronic media as a source of public values – see, for example, the recent study of Canadian history by Gerald Friesen.[6] But for our purposes here the distinction means little because electronic media tempt the powers-that-be to manage the public for economic gain even more than print media do. As electronic media become increasingly important and pervasive, the peril to our freedom increases as well.

The relevance of this to religious life in modern Canada should be clear. "Stories" have always been the foundation of religious life – the first means by which we explored answers to the fundamental questions of "Who am I?" and "What ought I to do?", and the means to which we usually return when other, more sophisticated means prove shaky. In primitive society the storyteller met each of us face-to-face, and each of us was encouraged to develop our talent for storytelling. As technologies developed that permitted the stories to be preserved beyond the limits set by face-to-face transmission, we still tolerated and even expected a variety of stories. Consider, for example, the fact that the central story of the Christian community is mediated through no less than four gospels, and then further refracted every time a preacher passes it on orally to the flock.

But the modern world purchases power and scope for its stories at the expense of narrowing the opportunities to become a storyteller. Compare a Scoutmaster yarning to the boys around a campfire with Steven Spielberg spinning out nine episodes of *Star Wars*. Both storytellers are engaging the attention of those who are seeking resources with which to assemble an identity, a reliable framework within which to know who they are and what they ought to do. But with a little effort and a modicum of talent virtually anyone can become a Scoutmaster, while only someone capable of commanding an entire Hollywood studio and millions of dollars in backing can hope to produce *Star Wars*, surely one of the most influential stories of the modern world.

What is worse: we live in a day in which a Scoutmaster is easily tempted to gather the boys around a television while he feeds a tape of *Return of the Jedi* into the VCR.

I take cold comfort from the observation that my children's generation is growing up with a powerful inclination to scepticism and outright disbelief in the truth of what the mass media offer. Yes, it is empirically true that watching several hours of television every day leaves their generation unconvinced that the enthusiastic claims made by commercial advertisers are likely to be true. Their reaction to most commercials is, "I don't buy that." So we should not fear that the mass media will succeed in brainwashing the modern public. And that holds true, I think, even in totalitarian societies where the media are controlled by the state for political ends rather than by big private corporations for economic ends.

But it is tragically ironic that this tendency towards skepticism also disposes modern people to be intensely private at the expense of social bonds and goals.[7] The privatizing tendency of religious life in the modern world undermines the human search for meaning that is at the healthy heart of religious life. The danger is compounded by mass media that create the illusion of depth and engagement while in fact undermining them. Consider e-mail and chat rooms that encourage us to think that they are intimate even as they prune away the rough and tumble of physical presence. Consider the television personality who smoothly thanks us for "inviting me into your living room."

The power of the mass media to shape our values scares me, and their inclination to narrow our freedom so as to show a tidy profit offends me. Perhaps I should shun the mass media by refusing to submit this screed for publication. Yet I take some comfort in knowing that many who read it will turn up in the audience at the Congress on Monday, 2 June, ready to correct my errors and unlikely to feel any restraint about doing so. To the extent that this issue of the magazine encourages a broader public with a deeper historic consciousness, there is evidence that the mass media of the modern world may yet have a useful part to play in humanizing us.

But if you quit reading after the first line because you'd rather wait for the movie, then we're in more trouble than I thought.

From the Backdrop to the Foreground: Understanding Religion in Canadian Society

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Although multiculturalism as a policy and as a general orientation toward difference leads us to celebrate Canada's increasing religious diversity, we should not forget the historical and current power of Christianity. I suggest this not as a civilized gesture of kindness toward a disappearing tradition (which is not disappearing in any event), but because over our country's relatively brief life, Christianity has been thoroughly woven into almost all dimensions of contemporary Canadian culture. I would like to explore both the text of Canadian religious diversity, and the subtext of the power of Christianity in Canada.

Consider this partial list of values and ideas: our generally shared notions of *civility and moderation*, the elements of the Canadian identity most frequently marketed to ourselves, newcomers, and outsiders; the advanced or late *capitalism* that has become so naturalized that many of its proponents no longer see it as one ideology among many; the *charity and commitment to solidarity* on which our social safety net is based; the *justice and forgiveness* on which aspects of our criminal justice system are purportedly based; the *patriarchy* which is such a crucial feature of our form of governance and economy; the *heterosexual monogamous* model of (and for) marriage; the *chastity* that guides some groups' sexual mores; the *objectification* of the natural world; the *individualism* that undergirds our education systems. These are just some of the dimensions of our society that spring directly or indirectly from certain forms of Christianity. Canada's non-Christian religious traditions also embrace and promote several of these values, but most emerged out of the dominant role of Christianity in Canadian society.

Unfortunately, what is conspicuously absent from our public conversation about citizenship is a meaningful acknowledgement and excavation of the fundamental role of religion in the emergence and continual renegotiation of values such as those outlined above (Coward 1999). One way to enter into the question of the contemporary relevance of religion in Canada is to consider the ways religion continues to influence social values, group values, and individual values.

Society

It is hard to overstate the influence of popular culture's depiction of American society in the way Canadians think about our own society. A friend of mine describes this as the "Law and Order effect," referring, of course, to the way many Canadians believe that our legal system reflects the system depicted in this popular American television program. This is why many Canadians believe we have "Miranda rights," "District Attorneys," and the absolute right to free speech.

A similar kind of influence prevents many of us from understanding the historical and contemporary roles of religion in Canadian society. Many Canadians will tell you that Canadian society is characterized by a "separation of church and state," even though our state has never framed itself in this manner. This is not to say that we are, or were, a theocratic society; but it is to say that the theoretically clean notion of the separation of church and state is a quite inappropriate way of characterizing Canadian history.

Many Canadians will tell you that Canadian society is characterized by a "separation of church and state," even though our state has never framed itself in this manner.

Several examples of the intimate relationship between church and state in Canada should illustrate this point. Among people with even a passing familiarity with Canadian history it is common knowledge that Christianity was an absolutely crucial component of the confidence – even the hubris – necessary for the colonization of Canada and the marginalization of First Nations people. "A Mari usque ad Mare," (from sea to sea) the motto on the Canadian Coat of Arms, is based on Psalm 72:8, ("He shall have dominion from sea to sea and from the river unto the ends of the earth") and was assumed to resonate strongly with the European settlers' and governors' efforts to domesticate and Christianize (the two processes were understood to be part and parcel of the same endeavour) what is now Canada.

Also well known is the at least ethno-centric and at worst shameful role of Christian missionaries (my maternal great-grandfather among them) and residential schools in the government's efforts to assimilate the "savages." Natives and non-natives are still reaping the socio-economic whirlwind sown by that particular policy, and it is a small miracle that there is currently a renaissance of, rather than a requiem for, aboriginal spirituality in this country.

Similarly, any consideration of the educational systems throughout Canada will also indicate the power of religion (again, here we are speaking mostly of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism as another variant of the two solitudes) to shape the content of classroom teaching, the location of schools, and a number of other features of educational systems that in several provinces have only recently become fully secular (Sweet 1997). The age-old questions over the public funding of religious schools (unheard of in the United States) not only remind us of the still constitutionally-guaranteed privileges accorded to certain religious groups in some provinces but of some of the ways Christianity has shaped and still shapes some of the basic values of our society.

Groups

As a result of the virtual invisibility of the power of Christianity in Canadian culture and society, inasmuch as the place of religion in the creation of our values is addressed directly, it is usually in appreciative tones regarding the important role played by religion in the social cohesion of well-contained ethnic groups. In these cases the role of religion should be understood neither as a quaint transient anachronism, nor as an obstacle to integration. For many ethnic communities (the Italians, Portuguese, Greeks, Punjabis, Tamils, Japanese, Chinese, Salvadorans, to name only a few), religious organizations often provide newcomers with an established network of familiar people speaking a familiar symbolic and actual language; however, such groups also represent for many newcomers their first personal connections with and entry-points to Canadian society.

Although these churches and temples and so forth serve as contexts in which people can maintain continuity in their religious and cultural lives, it would be a mistake to conclude that such groups are exclusively oriented toward preserving a static notion of ethnic and ethno-religious identity. In fact, these groups are vital and often highly creative integrative sites in which newcomers can negotiate their unique Canadian identities out of a combination of new and old resources. The values that we might think of as Greek-Canadian, or Salvadoran-Canadian are often formed with the help of religious traditions that are increasingly transnational and flexible in nature. The assumption that members of ethnic communities will eventually cease to negotiate their Canadian identities in religious contexts and manners is based mainly on the secularization hypothesis, the notion that religion *per se* will fade away as more people embrace modernization and western rationality. To the disappointment of many social scientists, empirical evidence has again and again failed to confirm this hypothesis. Some groups and individuals will fall away from religious involvement and identification, some will not, and some will and then will return. Perhaps it has always been thus.

Individuals

It is quite difficult, and quite tiring, to point out to educated friends and neighbours that, as I mentioned, the

evidence quite clearly indicates that religion and spirituality are not in retreat in the face of reason, science or modernization. The classical secularization hypothesis may explain or describe certain pockets of Western Europe, but it certainly fails to explain the enduring place of religion in the lives of North Americans (Swatos 1999). Although Canadians are clearly no longer firmly loyal to specific places of worship, and are less and less inclined to see regular church or mosque attendance as crucial markers of their own spirituality, they do continue to indicate in various non-traditional and traditional ways that they embrace ideas, values, and beliefs deeply embedded in religion (Bibby 2002).

So, what has changed is not the influence of religion on individual values, but what one might call the trajectory of that influence. That is, religion and spirituality, as sources of influence in individual lives, are a great deal more differentiated (in an influential book, Reginald Bibby (1987) used the term "fragmented," but this has a pejorative connotation), and diffused throughout our society and its concomitant cultures. It is tempting to tell the story of religion in Canada as a story of gradual disinterest on the part of individuals, leading to a decline in institutions, leading ultimately to a decline in what one might call the overall "volume" or "mass" of religion in Canada. Some of this has happened, in some places, for particular reasons, at least for now.

However, it is more appropriate, I believe, to think of the diminished power of Canada's religious institutions as indicative of a radical process of societal and personal reorientation perhaps similar in scope to what happened in Europe in the wake of Martin Luther's reforms. This is largely the result of the increasing religious and ethnic diversity of Canadian culture, increasing (though partial) efforts on the part of government officials to extirpate religious influences from public institutions, and an increasing public suspicion of established institutions and their representatives. All of this leads to a Canadian context in which the established ways of organizing religious groups and maintaining individual religious identities is characterized by flux.

If such a state (such a "post-modern" condition, perhaps) is ever to resolve itself, it is by no means necessarily the case that it will resolve itself in the direction of atheism or simple secularization. In fact, as many people seek support for their often inchoate feelings of alienation from the consumerism, individualism and corporate form of globalization they may feel is ruining our earth, they may be surprised to discover that over the past forty years, religious groups have continued in their own ways to oppose or critique these elements of modernity. Such a convergence of the post-modern individual (casting about for a new means of defining herself over and against a culture she may see as hegemonic) with the sometimes surprisingly dynamic and prophetic church, temple or synagogue, could usher in a new era for both the individual and the religious organization. This is but one possibility, of course.

The age-old questions over the public funding of religious schools (unheard of in the United States) not only remind us of the still constitutionally-guaranteed privileges accorded to certain religious groups in some provinces but of some of the ways Christianity has shaped and still shapes some of the basic values of our society.

Conclusion

In order to promote the goals of multicultural citizenship, and as a tacit acknowledgement of the damages inflicted on many people (and peoples) by religious groups, over the past forty years members of the Canadian elite opted at least to try to exclude religion (that is, all religion) from the conversation taking place in the media, the government, and public schools. The underlying assumption here, of course, was that since religion is perceived by some observers to be unruly, anti-rational, and incendiary, it would be prudent simply to marginalize it altogether. There was very little malice in this tacit decision, but there was also precious little forethought. And now we are dealing with the fallout from the half-century old decision to compress religion into the private realm and to deal with it only when it noisily intrudes into our public sphere – as a problem in need of a social or political solution. To cite the most obvious example, the tragic events of September 11th 2001 revealed the appalling societal ignorance in Canada and the US with respect both to Islam and to the "cosmic battle" members of many small and not-so-small religious groups (including many North American Christian groups) are waging in various ways against what they perceive to be a hegemonic secular establishment bent on the destruction of all righteous values (Juergensmeyer 2001).

Over the centuries in North America, religion has not receded, though it has definitely changed in some fairly unpredictable ways. But it still influences the shared values of the larger society, the particular values of religious or ethnic (or ethno-religious) groups, and the often highly particular values that individuals might embrace. An enlightened public examination of current and future forms of Canadian citizenship therefore requires a consideration of these three enduring yet dynamic modes of influence.

CITIZENSHIP OF CANADA ACT

Strengthening the Value of our Citizenship

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On October 31, 2002, Bill C-18, the Citizenship of Canada Act, was tabled in Parliament. This paper provides a sense of what led to the tabling of this Bill, an overview of its content, and some of the key changes from current legislation.

Context

Before 1947, Canada did not have its own citizenship legislation. There was no such thing in law as a Canadian citizen. Married women did not have full authority over their nationality status. They were classified along with minors, lunatics and idiots.[1] Three different pieces of British legislation applied.

The Second World War brought a sense of self-awareness that led Canada in 1947 to become the first Commonwealth country to enact its own citizenship legislation. All Canadian citizens were given the automatic right of entry to Canada. Residency requirements for citizenship were set out. Married women were given full authority for their nationality. Loss of citizenship was defined. And most importantly a provision for instruction in citizenship and citizenship ceremonies, including a revised oath came into effect.

The next citizenship legislation came into force in 1977. It further simplified the naturalization process and provided clearer and more equitable criteria for naturalization. Since 1999, three attempts have been made to modernize the 1977 *Citizenship Act*. Bills C-63 and C-16 reflected the consultations and polls on citizenship that had been ongoing since the 1980s. Both bills were thoroughly reviewed but died on the Order Paper before completing the legislative process.

Most recently, the 2002 Speech from the Throne reconfirmed the Government's commitment to modernize citizenship legislation, to reassert the rights and reinforce the responsibilities that go with being a Canadian citizen. Bill C-18 responds to that commitment and reflects the concerns raised throughout the legislative process.

Why modernize legislation

Our current legislation is over 25 years old. The time has come: to establish clear, fair and objective criteria for Canadian citizenship; to respond to inconsistent legal interpretations and ambiguity concerning the current legislation; to respond to decisions of Courts and the Human Rights Tribunal that some provisions are discriminatory or contrary to the *Charter*; and to streamline the processing of high volumes of applications.

For example, since 1978, the Federal Court of Appeal has made inconsistent rulings on appeals related to residence. In one exceptional case, a judge required only four days of physical presence in Canada whereas other judges have required a full three years of physical presence. This creates confusion and is patently unfair.

Another problem arises because the current Act does not allow the Minister to take quick and effective action against persons who have obtained citizenship through fraudulent means. The inability of the Government to take action against known war criminals and known criminals in general continues to attract media interest and public criticism.

Supreme and Federal Court as well as Human Rights Commission rulings have demonstrated that the 1977 Act is not in line with the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* because it continues to discriminate against certain groups. For example, children adopted by Canadians abroad are treated differently than children born to Canadians abroad.

Processing citizenship applications is not as efficient as it should be under the current law. Right now an application is reviewed three times: first at the Case Processing Centre, second by a citizenship judge, and finally by an officer who is delegated the authority to grant citizenship. As well, no application can be rejected without the applicant personally appearing before a citizenship judge. This is required even when it is clear that a person is not eligible, perhaps because of recent criminal convictions that prohibit granting citizenship and the applicant readily admits those facts.

Many elements of the 1977 Citizenship Act work well and will not change

The proposed law will not make any changes to the rights and privileges that new citizens currently have, such as voting, participating in elections and having a Canadian passport. The proposed legislation will not affect the current application fees.

Children born in Canadian territory will still acquire citizenship automatically. And, children born in other countries to a Canadian parent will still have a right to acquire Canadian citizenship. However, the Bill proposes some changes to the restrictions that exist for the second and third generations of children born abroad. These are explained later in the paper.

There is no change in dual citizenship. Canadian citizens will still be able to be citizens of other countries. And most importantly, applicants will still have to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of Canada and of one of the two official languages before being granted citizenship. These are important requirements. These skills enable newcomers to integrate more quickly and successfully into Canadian society.

Key differences between this Bill and the current *Citizenship Act*

Each of the following proposed changes reflects responses to public concerns.

Purpose Clause

A new provision in the Bill sets out the principle objectives of the Act:

- to define who is a Canadian citizen and who may become one;
- to encourage the acquisition of citizenship by all who qualify;
- to protect the integrity of Canadian citizenship;
- to reaffirm that all citizens, no matter how they became citizens, have the same status;
- to require strong attachment to Canada for the acquisition of citizenship;
- to heighten the awareness of citizens that the acquisition of citizenship is a significant event worthy of celebration; and
- to promote respect for the principles and values underlying a free and democratic society.

Residence defined as physical presence

Under the current act, close to 30,000 people a year become citizens without spending at least 3 years in Canada. This Bill requires that people be physically present in Canada for a full 3 years in order to be eligible for citizenship and to demonstrate their attachment to Canada. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and the United States (US) have comparable requirements.

Administrative process

The Bill streamlines and simplifies the decision-making process for granting citizenship. It eliminates unnecessary steps. For example, the Bill proposes that decisions can be made at the earliest possible stage. An officer who identifies an applicant as one who admits to having recent criminal convictions can advise that person right away that they are not eligible for citizenship.

Prohibitions

There is little incentive under the current Act for the RCMP and the Courts to pursue charges. Bill C-18 allows for maximum punishment levels that are significantly higher than the present law. It also recognizes offences committed by government officials and not just the general public. It allows for actions to be taken when the offence occurred outside of Canada.

Power to Annul or Refuse Citizenship

Under the current Act, the Minister cannot take quick and effective action when it is clear that someone has acquired citizenship fraudulently. This Bill gives the Minister authority to pursue a simple process to annul a person's status. This power would only be exercised in limited circumstances, in cases where there is clear-cut fraud involving criminality or false identity. In these situations, citizenship should not have been granted at all.

Another important provision in this Bill provides for refusal of citizenship. In exceptional cases where all criteria for citizenship are met but the person has demonstrated a flagrant and serious disregard for the principles and values underlying a free and democratic society, the Governor-in-Council may deny citizenship for a period of 5 years. Although this decision is not subject to appeal, the person retains their permanent resident status and can apply again at the end of the restriction.

Fully-judicial Revocation Process

Revocation under the Bill goes from ultimately being a Governor-in-Council power to a fully judicial process. This responds to the perception that the process is not sufficiently transparent. The Federal Court revocation judgment may be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and with leave to the Supreme Court. In addition, the Bill proposes an expedited removal process for war criminals and terrorists, as well as a special procedure to protect information when needed.

Finally the Bill provides additional protection for the children of parents who are the subject of a revocation order by ensuring that the children will <u>not</u> cease to be citizens.

The time has come: to establish clear, fair and objective criteria for Canadian citizenship; to respond to inconsistent legal interpretations and ambiguity concerning the current legislation; to respond to decisions of Courts and the Human Rights Tribunal that some provisions are discriminatory or contrary to the *Charter*; and to streamline the processing of high volumes of applications.

Derivative Citizenship

Today, in most cases, Canadians living outside Canada can pass their citizenship on to their children over many generations. Under the Bill, children who are the second generation of their families born abroad must accumulate, before age 28, 3 years of physical presence in Canada in the 6 years before applying to retain citizenship. This is 2 years more of physical presence than in the current act.

People who are the third generation of their families born overseas will not have automatic access to citizenship. However, the Bill allows them to become Canadian if they would otherwise be stateless. This type of provision is not unusual. Other countries such as the UK, Australia and the US place restrictions on acquiring citizenship by descent or through registration abroad.

Adoption

One of the key underpinnings of Bill C-18 is the objective to lessen the distinction between natural-born and adopted children. The issue is one of principle and equity: a foreign child adopted by a Canadian citizen should enjoy the same rights and privileges as a child born outside Canada to a Canadian. The Bill is also in line with *the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* in dealing with adoptions of persons over 18 years old who were in a genuine parent-child relationship before turning 18 and at the time of the adoption.

The inability of the Government to take action against known war criminals and known criminals in general continues to attract media interest and public criticism.

Commissioners

Under the proposed Bill, citizenship judges have a new role and title. They become Citizenship Commissioners. Commissioners' appointment criteria are defined in the Bill to make sure that they are people of high caliber and have been recognised for valuable civic contribution. The main role of the new commissioners will be to preside at ceremonies (at least 2,000 per year) and otherwise promote active citizenship. They will also be expected to advise the Minister on citizenship issues.

Oath of Citizenship

Another major change is the new citizenship oath which reflects our country's contemporary values. The new oath is concise and easier for citizens to recite. As with the current oath, new citizens will continue to pledge allegiance to the Queen and promise to fulfill the obligations of Canadian citizenship. However, the proposed legislation provides that they will additionally pledge loyalty to Canada and will promise to respect our country's rights and freedoms, laws, and democratic values.

Transitional Provisions

Under the current legislation, transitional provisions allow individuals born abroad between 1947 and 1977, one of whose parents was Canadian at the time of birth, to obtain citizenship without having to meet the usual requirements. These provisions, which were first established in 1977 for a period of two years, have continually been extended.

Under the Bill, a new transitional mechanism will provide for a facilitated grant of citizenship to persons born to a Canadian parent between 1947 and 1977, who never before acquired citizenship. In order to treat adopted children on an equal footing, the facilitated grant will also apply to any person adopted as a child by a Canadian between 1947 and 1977. These new measures seek to remedy the injustices of the old *Canadian Citizenship Act* of 1947 in regard to children of Canadian citizens who have never been able to obtain citizenship because of the marital status of their parents at the time of birth.

By allowing a period of three years to persons born outside Canada to a Canadian parent, they will enable new classes of persons to avail themselves of citizenship. The 3-year period will also provide the persons concerned with a reasonable opportunity to apply for citizenship, without perpetuating the inequities of the past.

Clear policies will guide the treatment of cases during the transition period. All cases before a citizenship judge at Proclamation will be so completed and new cases that have lagged in the system will be given consideration for the processing delays should that have an impact on the final decision. The main issue for transition will be residency time in Canada.

The new *Citizenship of Canada* Act will enable the government to achieve some very significant objectives:

First, it will establish clear, fair and objective residency criteria to obtain Canadian citizenship;

Second, it will provide new measures to ensure that only those who have the right to Canadian citizenship will receive it. The Bill will allow the Minister to take quick effective action against persons engaged in fraudulent behaviour or criminal activities to acquire citizenship;

Third, it will modernize the application process. Under this Bill, citizenship will be assessed administratively on the basis of clear and consistent criteria and tests;

Fourth, it will ensure children adopted abroad by Canadians will be treated fairly and equitably. This bill will help us to treat these children as much as possible like those born to Canadians; and

Lastly, the proposed Act will do more than clarify and address issues in the current law. It will ensure that the new Act reflects what Canadians believe citizenship should mean, promote respect for our country's rights and freedoms, and, above all, celebrate what it means to be a citizen of Canada.

Meech : une occasion manquée de faire échec à la fragmentation de la citoyenneté canadienne

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Traditionnellement, la citoyenneté s'articule autour d'une identité nationale particulière et renvoie au sentiment d'appartenance que ressentent les individus à l'égard de la communauté politique à l'intérieur de laquelle ils évoluent. Bref, la notion de citoyenneté connote généralement une certaine idée du vivre ensemble. Elle est d'abord et avant tout, dans la tradition libérale, une notion politique même si, plus tard, suite aux revendications ouvrières et aux mouvements sociaux, la notion de citoyenneté sera élargie pour y inclure non seulement des droits politiques et juridiques mais aussi des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels[1]. Jusqu'à récemment, l'appartenance politique et sociale ainsi que l'expérience démocratique ne se concevaient que dans le cadre de l'État-Nation où il n'y a qu'une nation, qu'une culture, qu'une langue et, dans le cadre duquel, la citoyenneté se définit essentiellement en rapport à une nation, un peuple, vivant sur un territoire national bien délimité. Or, cette conception classique de la citoyenneté a été fortement ébranlée au cours des dernières décennies. La mondialisation de l'économie, l'émergence de sociétés multiculturelles et l'universalisation des droits et libertés – universalisation qui entraîne forcément leur déterritorialisation et leur dénationalisation – ont déstabilisé et engendré une crise de l'État-Nation et, ont amené analystes, politiciens et théoriciens à repenser la citoyenneté dans une perspective transnationale voire postnationale pour reprendre la formule consacrée de Habermas. Dans un monde où il y a une pluralité de lieux de production du droit, résultant des interactions entre les différents ordres juridiques, infra ou supra-étatiques, où la source des droits et libertés n'est plus le seul apanage de la constitution et de la législation étatique, il était inévitable que l'on remette en question la pertinence du modèle étatique actuel et de la conception classique de la citoyenneté qui en découle.

A l'instar de la plupart des sociétés occidentales, le Canada s'interroge sur la manière d'organiser le mieux-vivre ensemble. Pays multinational, pays d'immigration, largement hétérogène et pluriethnique, le Canada cherche à rallier toutes ces composantes. Depuis l'échec de l'Accord du Lac Meech, en passant par le dernier référendum québécois sur la souveraineté et l'Accord constitutionnel raté de Charlottetown, il est clair que l'État canadien cherche à définir les contours de l'espace public global à l'intérieur duquel les différentes composantes de la communauté politique canadienne pourront évoluer. À ce jour, l'initiative fédérale visant à définir la citoyenneté canadienne présente par divers aspects une «affinité élective» avec le concept habermassien de patriotisme constitutionnel[2]. En effet, le Canada cherche à définir une citoyenneté qui repose essentiellement sur l'adhésion aux principes universalistes relatifs aux droits fondamentaux enchâssés dans la constitution et aux principes de l'État de droit, plutôt que sur le sentiment d'appartenance à la nation comme entité historique. Il en va ainsi de la politique multiculturaliste développée par le Canada et de l'inscription dans la Constitution d'une charte des droits et libertés qui sont autant de tentatives visant à redéfinir notre référence identitaire sur la base des grands principes universalistes relatifs aux droits fondamentaux, tels que les libertés individuelles et le droit à l'égalité[3] ; on évite ainsi la difficulté d'invoquer une hypothétique nation canadienne comme fondement de notre référence identitaire. Mais peut-on fonder une citoyenneté, une identité collective politique sur la seule adhésion aux principes universels de justice et de l'État de droit ?

L'expérience canadienne est loin d'être probante à cet égard. La construction sociojuridique d'une citoyenneté canadienne fondée sur l'adhésion aux principes de l'État de droit a renforcé, de manière paradoxale, le mouvement de fragmentation de la citoyenneté en garantissant des droits 'particularistes'[4] visant des groupes spécifiques, tels que les minorités ethniques, religieuses, culturelles, sexuelles, les personnes handicapées, etc. et a engendré une fragmentation de la citoyenneté. Examinons brièvement deux regards posés sur la fragmentation de la citoyenneté canadienne, celui de Bourque/Duchastel[5] et celui de Alan C. Cairns[6]. Les convergences entre les deux analyses sont nombreuses. Cairns voit un

premier élément –et le plus important– dans la présence de trois communautés nationales (le Québec, les nations autochtones et le ROC) dont les aspirations sont souvent en conflit et dont le rapport à la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés est fort différent : ce n'est que dans le ROC que la Charte est devenue le point de référence symbolique de la citoyenneté. Une seconde dynamique de différenciation, qui fait pendant en particulier à la diversité ethnique et culturelle du Canada, trouve son expression dans la recherche d'un statut spécifique -en rapport à la race, à la culture, au sexe, au handicap, à l'orientation sexuelle, etc- garanti par la Charte canadienne. Il y aurait ici un danger évident, suivant Cairns, parce que chacun de ces groupes revendique un statut particulier qui est fermé aux non-membres de la catégorie : "*The Charter is a political battleground between supporters of competing clauses and between rival claimants to being the leading advocate for a particular clause*" (p.183). Le diagnostic est fort similaire chez Bourque et Duchastel (1996). Ceux-ci voient dans la référence symbolique à la Charte le développement d'une citoyenneté particulariste fondée sur la multiplicité des groupes réclamant un statut constitutionnel spécifique. Pour les auteurs, on peut lire dans cette dynamique « l'affirmation de la judiciarisation acharnée des rapports sociaux au sein d'une société dépourvue de toute symbolique commune » (p.302).

Force est de constater que la citoyenneté représente plus qu'une simple panoplie de droits et d'obligations, elle renvoie au sentiment d'appartenance que ressentent les individus à l'égard de la communauté politique à l'intérieur de laquelle ils évoluent, une certaine idée du vivre ensemble. Revenons aux analyses de Bourque/Duchastel et de Cairns. Elles diffèrent quant aux perspectives que les auteurs mettent de l'avant pour surmonter cette fragmentation de la citoyenneté. Cairns écrivant comme Bourque/Duchastel dans un contexte historique où la question du Québec était revenue à l'avant-scène- met de l'avant un fédéralisme « asymétrique » qui accorderait un statut spécifique au Québec. Bourque et Duchastel, attribuant eux aussi une importance centrale à la question posée par le nationalisme québécois, veulent cependant régler le problème posé par la dynamique particulariste des droits à l'égalité dans la Charte canadienne. C'est pourquoi ils défendent un retrait de la sphère constitutionnelle vers la garantie de droits formels universalistes (les libertés fondamentales classiques) plutôt que vers l'octroi de droits substantifs à l'égalité (v. p.307). Et ils envisagent le développement d'une identité postnationale qui reprendrait à son compte l'idée de « patriotisme constitutionnel » défendue par Habermas. En fait, il n'est pas évident, tel que mentionné, que la spécificité de la réalité canadienne nous permette de fonder notre référence identitaire, notre citoyenneté, de construire notre sentiment d'identité collective sur le seul patriotisme constitutionnel au sens où l'entend Habermas.

Il est clair que l'État canadien cherche à définir les contours de l'espace public global à l'intérieur duquel les différentes composantes de la communauté politique canadienne pourront évoluer.

La diversité est un des traits positifs de la société canadienne mais elle n'est pas sans poser problème lorsqu'il s'agit de constituer une identité et un système de valeurs communs. Or l'idée développée par Cairns semble prometteuse. Elle s'apparente au concept de «diversité profonde» développé par Taylor[7] ou à celui de «citoyenneté différenciée» de Young[8], ou au concept de citoyenneté démocratique développé dans le contexte européen[9]. La citoyenneté est vue davantage comme revêtant une nature duale à la fois statutaire et identitaire : statutaire car fonction de l'attribution d'un statut juridique, de droits spécifiques et d'obligations corrélatives (...), et identitaire, car correspondant à un sentiment d'appartenance à la communauté politique»[10]; l'identité permettant de promouvoir une société qui reconnaît, respecte et reflète la diversité culturelle, en instaurant chez des personnes aux antécédents variés un sentiment d'appartenance. Elle implique donc la reconnaissance d'un statut ou de droits particuliers, reconnus à certains du fait de leur appartenance à une communauté particulière à l'intérieur de la communauté globale[11]. Toutefois, la citoyenneté ne se définit pas uniquement par le fait de l'appartenance. Il faut déduire de cette appartenance une capacité à prendre part, la citoyenneté se définit donc aussi par l'acte citoyen, par la participation. La participation, y compris celle des minorités, apparaît de plus en plus en plus comme un facteur important de la citoyenneté. Il s'agit pour chacun d'être un acteur, de maîtriser son cadre de vie, de trouver sa place dans la société, de s'y engager et de contribuer à son développement.

Dans cette optique, la citoyenneté ne saurait s'accommoder de l'exclusion et de la marginalisation, phénomènes qui vont à l'encontre des droits de l'homme. Mais la reconnaissance d'une telle citoyenneté différenciée fait craindre pour l'unité politique du pays d'où l'opposition continue portant sur le sens et le contenu du vivre ensemble prévalant au Canada, entre les individus et les groupes minoritaires qui réclament un aménagement de la sphère publique qui reflète plus fidèlement leurs préoccupations économiques, politiques et identitaires et leur permette de jouir plus équitablement des ressources disponibles, et, d'autre part, tous ceux qui préconisent le statu quo[12]. D'où également le rejet de Meech, projet qui aurait permis de fonder la citoyenneté canadienne à la fois sur l'adhésion au principe de l'État de droit et sur des référents identitaires, et aurait peut-être permis de trouver des moyens de renforcer la cohésion et l'unité de la société canadienne par-delà la diversité culturelle. Meech ou pas, on devra y revenir puisque seul un projet politique visant la reconnaissance de la citoyenneté démocratique ou différenciée pourrait concilier les exigences de la diversité culturelle et identitaire dans la sauvegarde de l'unité canadienne.

Transcending Diversity: Envisioning Shared Citizenship

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Seeking Unity Within Diversity

Canada's multicultural policy envisions a culturally plural society guided by principles of freedom, equality, tolerance and respect for individual differences. Both the initial Policy Statement and the subsequent Multiculturalism Act articulate a vision of inclusion and incorporation of ethno-cultural minorities into Canadian society on an equal basis and sought to lay the foundations of a society "based on fair play for all." Initially presented in our parliament as a model for the integration of immigrant ethnic communities into a society primarily defined by the dominant British and French Charter groups, the policy emerges as a prescription for interethnic harmony in complex, culturally diverse societies.

Over the past few decades, multiculturalism policy and programmatic initiatives have largely realized a transition from expected assimilation to the celebration of cultural diversity. Increasingly the emphasis has also shifted from a focus on culture and language to greater awareness of other socially salient identifications including 'race' and more recently religion, as well as to their respective intersections with other dimensions of diversity including age, sex/gender, class, dis/ability, sexual orientation, official language status, and regional, aboriginal, or newcomer identities. Greater attention has also been given to institutional and organizational structures that either hamper or promote inclusiveness.

Official recognition of Canada's linguistic, cultural, racial and religious diversity is invaluable. By establishing that Canada's non-charter ethno-cultural groups are neither transitory phenomenon nor simply "overflow" cultures, and by also paying attention to other dimensions of diversity, multiculturalism policy transformed formerly excluded individuals and groups into important stakeholders. The underlying commitment to peaceful co-existence based on tolerance and mutual respect also continues to underwrite the growing demographic complexity of a country that has one of the highest immigration rates and migration flow from a wide array of source countries in the world. Most importantly it legitimates different types of identities as well as the right to choice of identity, and effectively underscores Canada's commitment to facilitating civic participation and ensuring social justice.

For all its strengths and successes, multicultural ideology, policy and programmatic implementations have nevertheless been critiqued for emphasizing 'difference' at the expense of 'commonality.' Whether by intent or via latent function, the directional focusing of individuals' identifications and energies towards the activities, interests and concerns of respective ethno-cultural communities is sometimes felt to exacerbate separation between various cultural, linguistic, 'racial' and religious communities and discourage greater participation in the wider Canadian public arena, thereby undermining the policy's expressed unity goal.

Multiculturalism policy encourages strong identification of Canadians with their ancestral ethnic group origins while simultaneously encouraging identification with Canada and Canadian citizenship, both of which are vital to Canadian unity. This apparent contradiction gives rise to a number of important issues. First, while Canada's multicultural policy perceives no incompatibility between the maintenance of ethno-cultural traditions and its expressed goals of social cohesion and unity, the actual mechanism by which to achieve a hither-to elusive sense of national unity seems not yet to have been worked out in full. Second, it is not quite clear how we might move from our rather complex accommodation of diversity to the construction of a sense of unity and a shared national identity. Third, nor is it evident how a policy promoting "cultural diversity within political unity" might continue to serve as the foundation of a post-modern nation state in the context of a new world order characterized by increased economic interdependence, geographical mobility and information flow. In brief, the challenge before us is the location and articulation of unity within multiple dimensions of diversity.

From Cultural Difference to Shared Citizenship

To-date attempts to achieve "unity in diversity" have often been stymied by two erroneous assumptions. The first is that while accommodation of pluralism may be useful in maintaining social cohesion, uniformity – defined as "sameness" – is required to ensure a truly meaningful sense of national unity. This assumed inherent tension between unity and diversity arises out of a faulty equation: homogeneity (=unity) versus heterogeneity (= diversity). Forgotten is that while some socially salient identifications may serve to differentiate among individuals or groups, others seek to establish commonality and may therefore be used to unite. What is critical is the selection and saliency of the respective identification criteria used.

The second assumption is that primary cultural and national identifications must necessarily overlap if a meaningful sense of national unity is to be achieved. However, these respective identifications are actually based on quite different identity criteria that are, moreover, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Cultural identifications focus on shared history, values,

traditions and lifeways that are usually supported and transferred through language. In contrast, national identifications reflect geographically bound, largely autonomous, self-governing political entities. The assumption regarding necessary overlap only holds true if one remains firmly committed to the notion of a nation state predicated on the belief in "one culture, one autonomous self-governing entity;" it otherwise readily collapses.

The crux of the matter is whether we really need to fully share an identifiable Canadian culture in order to have a common civic identity as Canadians. The answer is no. Civil societies do not need to be bound by a complete set of common values, traditions and shared history. What they do need, however, is member allegiance and active commitment to a common politico-economic community that is based on shared core values and principles. This in turn forms the foundation of a sense of national unity and cohesiveness firmly rooted in and expressed through participatory citizenship. The solution, in other words, is to simply decouple culture and nation, and to subsequently re-define nation in terms of shared citizenship. Common citizenship then becomes the basis for national unity and ultimately, in time, a national identity.

The true mediation between unity and diversity is commonality, not sameness. In the state's management of cultural, linguistic, 'racial' and religious pluralism, it is our commonality that has received short shrift. What we are now left grappling with is what defines, supports and guides us as a unique social, political and economic entity. While it remains both constructive and morally imperative to continue to accommodate diversity in the interests of social integration, cohesion, equity and justice, it is important to balance official recognition of differences with a consideration of what we in fact have in common as Canadians. In short, we need as a polity to move from an at times myopic preoccupation with the various ways in which we are all different, to an examination of what we in fact have in common and to use this knowledge as the foundation for a shared citizenship that both expresses mutual commitment and fosters a sense of belonging.

For all its strengths and successes, multicultural ideology, policy and programmatic implementations have nevertheless been critiqued for emphasizing 'difference' at the expense of 'commonality.'

An Overarching Citizenship Charter

In brief, the issue is not so much "what is 'Canadian'?" but rather "what does it mean to be a Canadian?" The answer may be found in an expressed commitment and allegiance to a sovereign entity called Canada that is firmly founded on shared societal values and enhanced participation in collective decision-making.

What is needed is a Citizenship Charter that both embraces our cultural, linguistic, "racial," and religious differences and transcends the various dimensions of diversity (Rummens 2002). Such a Charter would clearly articulate our society's overarching core values and locate the very responsibilities of a common citizenship in our active commitment to them. These shared values include: individual freedom of thought and expression; appreciation and respect for difference; peaceful co-existence; the rule of law; pursuit of equality; support for human rights; social "safety net" provisions; sustainable economic development; negotiation and compromise; all within the context of a parliamentary democracy. Participatory citizenship would then be based on an expressed commitment to these existing core values, as well as a heightened sense of allegiance to Canada rooted in more truly inclusive collective decision-making. An explicit, consensual social contract such as a Citizenship Charter would move us beyond the definition of our rights and freedoms as outlined in the existing Citizenship and Multiculturalism Acts and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to increased public awareness of our commonality and active commitment to the responsibilities of a shared citizenship firmly rooted in a clearer sense of our obligations to each other. National unity is thus concretely facilitated via a shared participatory citizenship firmly rooted in a joined sense of commonality and collectivity.

The basic tools required for such an invigorated citizenship are already largely in place in existing multiculturalism programming priorities that focus on identity, civic participation and social justice. However, commonality rooted in shared core values requires not only official recognition and articulation but also concrete expression. The issue here is how best to act upon our democratic ideals in a way that is truly reflective of our inherent diversity; the challenge, how best to engage citizens in a way that is truly meaningful. The key to both lies in more inclusive and enhanced civic participation in democratic decision-making, a process most effectively facilitated by newly emerging information technologies.

Shared citizenship need neither begin with a common culture nor require it as a final end-product. What it does require is a transitional shift from an exclusive focus on multiculturalism and a renewed diversity discourse to complementary discussions regarding a trans-cultural citizenship as the basis for national unity and – ultimately – a strong national identity. The challenge is to first incorporate and then transcend the various dimensions of diversity to focus on a shared national civic identity defined in terms of common citizenship and expressed via shared values firmly embedded in notions of participatory democracy. It is time to move away from an exclusive preoccupation with difference rooted in largely essentialist notion of 'culturalism" towards the articulation of commonality more firmly rooted in our shared experience. Only then will a newly-invigorated participatory citizenship be able to contribute not only to the goals of national unity and identity, but help transform a "deficiency model" of difference to an "asset-building" one better geared to an increasingly transnational, information driven, globalized world order.

The Public Policy Role of Citizenship in a Globalized World

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The views expressed here should not be taken to reflect the position of the Metropolis Project or of the government of Canada

Despite the apparent setbacks to multilateralism in international diplomacy that we witnessed in the lead-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, we continue to live in a highly-connected international community that is relentlessly forging high levels of transnational activity. Multilateral trade agreements, multilateral human rights agreements, the advantage to which people use contemporary communications and transportation technologies to do business and exchange ides, all these and more indicate that the drive towards greater global integration continues apace, at least for those able and interested. Never before have so many been able to think of themselves as citizens of the world and to realize a portion of this attitude in their daily lives. This aspect of globalization, the growing global integration of ordinary people and the remarkable convergence of the ideas and attitudes that they bring forth, prompts questions about the role of national citizenship in the modern world.

It is now commonplace to note the ease with which one can simultaneously think oneself a member of two or more societies. Fast and cheap transportation allows one to live in two far-removed homes with comparative ease. Modern communications technologies allow one to be fully abreast of the goings-on and to take part in the culture and political life of one's other home. Direct printing of daily newspapers from an ocean away is now routine, as is watching distant local television via satellite. This means that not only can the business traveler maintain constant contact with his home and home office both, but that an immigrant living, say in Vancouver, can readily partake of much of daily life in the original homeland, say in Hong Kong. The transnational flow of goods, services, people, and ideas has resulted in two phenomena that I want to emphasize in this brief essay, strengthening transnational communities and a growing tendency towards universal human rights. Both these effects of globalization, if I may use this term so loosely, challenge our traditional understanding of national citizenship.

Transnational communities are important from a citizenship point of view because of the strong and frequent ties that their members maintain with their country of origin, ties manifest not only in the interactions between the two communities but in the holding of dual citizenship.[1] Members of strong transnational communities might have no intention of supplanting their attachment to the homeland with an attachment to their new society, in contrast with what was considered the norm for immigrants in the days when communications with the home community were far less frequent and travel a major and costly endeavour. As a consequence, one's sense of attachment and belonging can be divided between two societies, as can one's allegiances and loyalties. The Canadian oath of citizenship[2] incorporates a swearing of allegiance that presumes a singularity of this allegiance. Further, the Canadian concept of citizenship, bound up with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Multiculturalism Act, and other such pieces of legislation and policies designed to foster inclusiveness, expresses the expectation that new citizens will assume full membership in Canadian society and regard Canada as their home, their primary if not their sole home. This expectation is being met with less frequency as newcomers to Canada, like immigrants throughout the world, can more easily have dual or multiple places of belonging, and, further, as native-borne Canadians increasingly see their home as extending well beyond our political borders.

One reason that it is easier to feel part of the world beyond one's national borders is the expansion of a familiar governance model, the expansion of liberal democracy, the expansion of a set of familiar human and political rights. Travel is easier and cheaper not only from technological advances but from a lowering of legislative and administrative barriers. For a Canadian to spend time in the United States, most of Europe, Australasia and many other countries produces no abrupt change, and it is relatively simple to be at ease or to feel at home. Not only do human and political rights seem to be gradually converging towards a universal norm, some countries including Canada are extending these rights and some entitlements to their non-citizen residents.

Extension of rights and entitlements to non-citizens, in some cases upon immediate arrival, has in the minds of some people diminished the value of citizenship to little more than the right to vote and to hold a passport. Moreover, in some countries, non-citizens now have limited voting rights, for example, in municipal elections. In addition, passports, being travel documents, needn't necessarily be tied to citizenship, and the existence of dual citizenship might allow one to travel on the passport of one's country of origin.[3] Admittedly, national citizens living or travelling abroad may be afforded a degree of protection and assistance from their governments, something that stateless persons might envy, but the need for such protection is rare and we have seen a growing support to extend such protection to landed immigrants as well.[4]

What some envision, then, is an eventual decline into irrelevancy of national citizenship regimes with a concomitant ascendancy of some form of world citizenship or regional (for example, European Union) citizenship. At the same time, we are witnessing, in Canada and elsewhere, much more attention being directed towards the ideas of shared citizenship, or societal

membership, or social inclusion, ideas of common principles of social justice that apply to both citizens and non-citizen residents.

Although I do not expect to see national citizenship actually decline into irrelevancy or nostalgia, these trends do raise the question *of the remaining role of legal citizenship as an instrument of public policy*. In an environment of near-equal access to rights by citizen and non-citizen, where immigrants retain stronger ties to the homeland for longer periods of time regardless of whether they take on national citizenship, where even native borne citizens feel an ever widening sense of belonging across the globe, what is left for citizenship to do in the public realm? What remains of its public policy role? What do contemporary governments hope to achieve through the legal instrument of citizenship?

The history of national citizenship regimes illustrates the strong public policy role that they once played. Rooted in the distinction between member and non-member (think, at one extreme, of the slave), citizenship afforded rights and privileges simply unavailable to the non-citizen, societal goods that precluded a life on equal terms with a society's full members. The extension of the offer of citizenship to immigrants marked not only a symbolic welcome but a tangible set of social and personal benefits. No longer, however, can Western societies segregate their members from others with the impunity of the past.[5] Where governments once, as a matter of public policy, distinguished citizens from non-citizens and offered less by way of rights and entitlements and demanded less by way of duties (such as military service), governments now with fewer exceptions offer and demand the same of citizens and non-citizens. Further, some of the special demands on citizens, notably allegiance, may well be less realistic given the proliferation of dual citizenship and, potentially, multiple allegiances. Citizenship once connoted a special attachment; does this continue to have a place in our globalized world?

Citizenship once connoted a special attachment; does this continue to have a place in our globalized world? The answer would appear to be yes.

Despite the social forces to which I have alluded above, the answer would appear to be yes. Consider the continued demand for legal citizenship. 85% of immigrants to Canada become legal citizens, something that requires not only an expression of allegiance and commitment, but a certain amount of effort which is required to prepare for and pass a citizenship test. This demand suggests that Canadian citizenship has value in itself. It is not just access to passports, for, again, many new citizens continue to carry the passports of their country of origin, which allows them to travel internationally just as easily as if they carried a Canadian passport. Perhaps the reasons align with the contemporary interest in the more broadly elaborated concept of "shared citizenship", a notion of social inclusion to be extended to all residents, citizen or not. Sharing citizenship is to share with all members of a society the basic rights, benefits, and entitlements that full members, citizens, possess. Full membership is to be extended to all residents from considerations of social justice and a sense of the universality of human rights. But of notable importance is *the extension of membership* in society to all, the offer of a sense of belonging to a society whether one is an immigrant or refugee, whether one is a member of an ethnic, racial, or religious minority, no matter one's sex or sexual orientation, whether one is disabled, aboriginal, and so on. Implicit in the concept of shared citizenship is the value that most people place upon membership.[6]

Is the contemporary public policy role of legal citizenship, then, to be founded on the value of officially sanctioned membership in a society? Canadian citizenship is conferred through public ceremonies of accomplishment, of welcome, and of acceptance by the new citizen of the responsibilities that come with the new legal status. Citizenship ceremonies place considerable emphasis on the immigrant joining Canadian society, joining the Canadian family. In some of the ceremonies that I have witnessed, participation in, for example, the political process, in one's community life, in the school system, in the voluntary sector, is portrayed as a consequence *of becoming a member*. In these public acts of being granted and being seen to accept Canadian citizenship, the prime message is now one of membership, and this has enormous symbolic importance.

But is this enough to afford the concept of legal citizenship a significant public policy role? It all depends upon whether doing so makes a tangible and sufficient difference. Canada, like many countries, is trying to foster a strong sense of national identity in the face of globalization, an identity that more and more is grounded in the multicultural nature of our population and less and less in the history of the founding people of Canada, the aboriginal, the English, and the French. A multicultural identity, in order to form the basis of a single national identity must, one might argue, be accompanied by a force of cohesion, especially in an environment of strong identity politics. It may not be sufficient for the majority to grant to the multiplicity of minorities the same rights as enjoyed by all under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Multiculturalism Act, and so on. Without a strong message of the offer of citizenship and of full societal membership and without the concomitant acceptance of this membership and the responsibilities that it carries, a national identity may be more difficult to come by.[7] More importantly, without this message a fractured society may be all the more difficult to avoid. A vibrant citizenship policy that encourages all Canadians, including those born here, to understand and to adopt the values that Canadian citizenship implies, that expects all to accept the principle of full societal membership for all citizens, might well have tangible effects. For a national citizenship regime to carry this off, however, may require it to wear an even more public face than it now does, to display more prominently the rights, duties, and societal benefits that flow from it.

I occasionally think back to the civics classes that I endured in school. Am I merely being nostalgic, or am I recollecting a useful means of expressing public policy?

Social Confusion:
The Decline of 'Cohesionism' in Canada and its Lessons for the Study of Citizenship

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It is common in the realm of policy-making to develop a common language or shared discourse in the pursuit of societal objectives. In western societies, democracy, equality, human rights and pluralism have been amongst the dominant social goals of the last half of the twentieth century and are widely considered as fundamental in the pursuit of the public good. Large bodies of literature have been constructed around these themes and hence they have had considerable influence in shaping much of the contemporary public policy discourse.

Over the course of the 1990's related goals and connected concepts have increasingly become the object of public policy discourse. An engaged citizenship, good governance and social cohesion were frequently referred to as priorities for policy deliberation. Promoting both diversity and shared values have also given rise to the introduction of a wide range of government initiatives. While some objectives are more easily defined than others there is always a challenge in attempting to introduce policy frameworks around very lofty objectives. Some concepts are so far reaching that they do not easily lend themselves to policy formulation.

Neither academics nor policy-makers are immune to conceptual fads and the recent excitement over the concept of social cohesion provides a good example. Social cohesion attained the status of 'buzzphrase' before it ever met the test of conceptualization. The term was employed by many a decision maker in Canada however uncertain they were to either its meaning or consequence. A certain status seemed bestowed upon those attending one of the national capital's many get-togethers to discuss social cohesion. Several think tanks and funding agencies got on board the social cohesion bandwagon and provided support for all kinds of studies that employed the concept. What once seemed to be dialogue over the challenges of democracy and pluralism were really debates about social cohesion. Notwithstanding the cohesion craze amongst some academics and policy-makers, the term never captured the broader public's imagination and not surprisingly is now used more sparingly.

Over the past few years the concept of social cohesion came under close scrutiny from such respected thinkers as sociologist Paul Bernard and political theorist Will Kymlicka. The latter rightly points out that social cohesion has become a catch-all term for a wide range of often unconnected phenomena. In its maximal form, social cohesion means something like a "harmonious" society, in which people cherish each other's identities and differences, and in which there are no conflicts or misunderstandings or fears related to ethnic diversity. Kymlicka adds that: "...the multiculturalism policy in Canada has certainly not produced such a society, but in his view, this sort of "harmony" in not only unrealistic, but inappropriate as a goal of public policy."

For his part in his 1999 essay entitled "Social Cohesion: a Critique" Paul Bernard rightly points to the tensions among the three contending values of solidarity, equality, and liberty that are hard to reconcile under the social cohesion paradigm. However the thoughtful criticism of the notion of social cohesion - that he refers to as a quasi-concept- is transformed by 'cohesionists' into a constructive contribution that builds directly upon their efforts to map the idea.

No Definition Required?

Although social cohesion is a notion that originates with the work of Emile Durkheim its most recent incarnation is linked to social policy development in the European community. Canadian academics thus imported it from their European counterparts. The Conference of European Ministers of Education (Cracow, October 2000) defined social cohesion as an unlimited, multidimensional concept, which seeks to mould society into a coherent – but not homogeneous – whole. It is contended that social cohesion comprises a sense of belonging – to a family, a social group, a neighborhood, a workplace, a country, and even a continent, in this case Europe.

In effect, the European approach to social cohesion is marked by the absence of an explicit or even widely accepted working definition of the term. As such, there is greater consensus about what threatens social cohesion than over that which promotes it. For its part, the OECD has no single, formally agreed-upon definition of social cohesion and, indeed, in much of its recent documentation on this subject has often used the term as if it required none. As one Canadian analyst notes it has

proven difficult to find much descriptive material in documents produced by and for the European Union, the OECD and the Council of Europe on the determinants of a cohesive society.

On the other hand, the Council of Europe, has an extremely broad definition of cohesion – so broad, in fact, that it has separated cohesion into three interrelated categories – democratic cohesion, social cohesion and cultural cohesion. Although, there appears to be no consensus in this literature with regard to factors that promote social cohesion, both the European Union and the Council of Europe agree that solidarity is an important element of European cohesion. However those Canadians referring to the lack of a definition for social cohesion see this as an opportunity to fill a policy vacuum.

The ambiguity of the concept of social cohesion has opened up space for a host of actions by the EU, the OECD and the Council of Europe that loudly proclaim concern with social cohesion despite the conceptual vagueness of the paradigm. Despite the lack of consensus about a definition of social cohesion or about major threats and factors promoting it, the EU, OECD and Council of Europe have undertaken initiatives in the name of cohesion. Some of these are so-called "soft" measures, such as research and consultations, but many are also "hard" measures in the form of legislation, policy and programs.

While the European Committee for Social Cohesion (May 2000) did not define the term, it nonetheless referred to mechanisms and institutions that were set up to prevent the factors of division (such as an excessive gap between rich and poor or the multiple forms of discrimination) from becoming so acute as to endanger social harmony; decent employment; combating poverty and social exclusion, family policy, etc. In short social cohesion is needed to curb divisions within the society.

Paul Bernard stresses that social cohesion is not an unmitigated good. He contends that its "…darker side shows up when cohesion is used to exclude rather than include, for example. It is also true that a society that fragments into a population of disconnected, self-interested individuals can end up making choices which are damaging to the quality of life of both current and future generations." Yet this is precisely one of the problems of the concept. There are many that believe the promotion of this individualism is the key to cohesion and that this risks being jeopardized when the state is too interventionist. In fact underlying the rhetoric of cohesion are different views of the role of the state by those on opposing sides of the ideological spectrum. It is in effect the role of the state that is at the root of the issue with respect to diversity a debate that is often obscured by the focus on cohesion.

Canadian Cohesion

If one can define the issues of cohesion in a manner particular to Europe than it is no doubt possible to have a Canadian version. Social cohesion is described as a major concern of the Government of Canada because of a growing sense among policy makers that the social fabric linking Canada's many overlapping communities may be unraveling. Advocates of the notion maintain that in the past, social cohesion was based, to a large extent, on an unspoken but deeply held belief in Canada as a land of opportunity – a society where Canadians could realize their aspirations and be treated with fairness and dignity. In 1996 the federal government's Policy Research Committee suggested that various fault-lines may be opening, there are growing pressures on social cohesion and as such Canadians' faith in the future of their families, their communities and their country may be eroding. Rarely however is any empirical evidence provided to support this idea and if we are served with data on higher divorce rates or growing income disparities it is deemed unnecessary to explain how this truly affects our sense of cohesion in its qualitative connotation.

Notwithstanding the cohesion craze amongst some academics and policy-makers, the term never captured the broader public's imagination and not surprisingly is now used more sparingly.

One leading Canadian analyst defines social cohesion as the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians. Having taken us from ambiguity to generality, the federal government's Social Cohesion Project notes that the term continues to evolve as does its definition. Canadian cohesionists note that efforts to define the concept are rare and that it is much more common to deploy the term rather than to define it, to treat it as if "it goes without saying."

Others contend that the term "social cohesion" is used to describe a process more than a condition or end state, while it is seen as involving a sense of commitment, and desire or capacity to live together in some harmony. Social cohesion clearly indicates that problems arise when institutions, particularly public institutions, fail to manage conflicts over recognition, legitimacy of claims and do not provide sufficient space for democratic dialogue. Again over the past decade rarely has anything empirical been offered to elucidate cause and effect when it comes to social cohesion.

Under the heading dimensions of social cohesion is the juxtaposition of belonging and isolation; inclusion and exclusion; participation and non-involvement; recognition and rejection and legitimacy and illegitimacy. Of course this dialectic involves assumptions about what contributes to cohesion that requires a more precise definition of the concept. What is legitimate for some may be illegitimate for others and recognition of some may result in feelings of rejection for others. In effect what is cohesive for some may be less than cohesive for others. Other issues connected to the study of social cohesion are the capacity to construct a collective identity and a sense of belonging; a society's commitment and capacity to assure equality of opportunity by including all its citizens and reducing marginality. However in the name of social cohesion the state can suggest diametrically

different actions purportedly aimed at reducing marginality. Social cohesion is also discussed in relation to democratic practices, including patterns of participation, and the legitimacy of representative institutions such as advocacy groups, political parties, unions and governments. 'Cohesionists' frequently refer to legitimacy without giving answers as to what or who would be responsible for conferring such status.

Those seeking clarity on the meaning of the concept of social cohesion will no doubt be baffled by the mapping exercise commissioned by the Canadian Policy Research Networks. The 'kafkaesque' title '*Can Social Cohesion Be a Threat to Social Cohesion?*' is followed by a proposed research agenda that includes: can citizens' identities be both varied and multiple, without threatening social cohesion, or is adherence to a single national vision necessary?; are the mechanisms and institutions needed to create a balance between social justice and social cohesion in place?; whose belongingness and recognition is being maximized?; Do recipients of community services derive the same benefits as volunteer provides or do they experience a loss of citizenship status?

Limiting Cohesion

Both in Canada and in Europe 'cohesionists' have exhibited a particular preoccupation with the impact of diversity on the society. By diversity they presumably imply multiple attachments and identification that they suspect are a problem for social cohesion. Ironically it is a matter that unites persons of opposing ideologies. The Council of Europe notes that the dangers of a divided society are clear and evident. The pursuit of social cohesion is thus an important aspect of the Council of Europe's efforts to strengthen human dignity and social rights in a spirit of solidarity.

A Council of Europe report contends, "integration of immigrants and national minorities is one of the pillars of social cohesion" (September 2000). Three issues on which to pursue the challenges for diversity and cohesion in Europe have been identified as solidarity, not only within the societies, but also between countries; good governance and the empowering of immigrants and minorities so that they might address their specific problems in partnership with governments and other actors; finally, there is multiple affiliation which consists in going beyond legal definitions, of, for example, citizenship and focusing rather on social acceptance of multiple affiliation due to circular migration or to intermarriages. Although many cohesionists would disagree with the last two recommendations they nonetheless represent a more progressive vision for minority communities than some Canadians advocates of cohesion have provided when discussing the challenge of managing diversity. In 1996 an important strategic report on Canada's multicultural policy commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage notes with concern that: 'the emphasis on multiculturalism might increase cultural group identification at the expense of Canadian social cohesion.' It asks under what circumstances that multiculturalism might threaten "social cohesion"? The report concludes that: "…there is a discomfort that multiculturalism programs have not met the ideals and goals that many hold for it, there is also widespread support for an emphasis on cultural diversity as part of an integrated, cohesive Canadian society based upon the values and norms that Canadians share."

The federal government's Social Cohesion Network has explored this under the theme of "What Will Hold Us Together?" Elsewhere a conference held in October 2001 entitled 'The Limits to Diversity?' purports to focus on the point at which diversity in a community undermines its social cohesion and how to ensure social cohesion within a multi-cultural citizenship? The underlying assumption is that a multicultural citizenship interferes with cohesion further reinforces the idea that certain forms of identification render problematic this yet ill-conceived goal.

What is legitimate for some may be illegitimate for others and recognition of some may result in feelings of rejection for others. In effect what is cohesive for some may be less than cohesive for others.

Fortunately, the Department of Canadian Heritage no longer takes this approach. As Kymlicka notes, "…there always will be tensions and disagreements over how best to accommodate diversity. To hope that these disagreements will disappear is as inappropriate as hoping that disagreements over the economy will disappear. Indeed, part of what it means to accept multiculturalism is to accept that people hold different conceptions of the good life which are, to some extent, in competition with each other. So accepting multiculturalism entails rejecting the fantasy of "harmony", which can only be achieved by suppressing our real diversity."

He concludes that "…if social cohesion is defined minimally as a consensus on peaceful democratic procedures, then multiculturalism has not threatened it; and if it is defined maximally as "harmony", then it is a fantasy that is not worth pursing."

Difference and cohesion are not on opposing ends of some dialectical spectrum. Less demographic diversity has not implied more social harmony in several parts of the world. Moreover pluralistic societies can simultaneously value difference while sharing basic commitments to for example a democratic system of government. In democratic societies citizens possess multiple identities and attachments. Very often it is the failure to recognize this and accommodate it when necessary that is detrimental to intergroup relations and so-called cohesion.

Studying Citizenship: The Lessons from Cohesionism

There are valuable lessons to drawn for the current enthusiasm over the study of citizenship from the continued decline in the use of the social cohesion paradigm amongst academics and policy-makers. In the past decade there has been a virtual explosion of studies dealing with citizenship. What was previously referred to as Charter rights has often been repackaged as the rights of citizens, relations between groups has become part of 'citizens relations', studies of

poverty are described by some analysts as the socio-economic challenges of citizens, voluntarism and voting are either citizenship participation or civic engagement and so on and so forth. None of this detracts from the considerable work that provides interesting and thoughtful insights into numerous issues under the citizenship paradigm. However there is a risk that the transformation of the study of citizenship into the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary concept that is so far reaching risks seriously obscuring its value for the academic and policy-making community.

For example the idea that we are citizens above all else may detract from the importance of economic, social and cultural difference amongst the population. Moreover where the use of the term citizens becomes a euphemism for the notion of the ordinary citizen and/or a concept designed to tell us what the masses think several methodological problems emerge.

A more recent example of this appears in the *'Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future: A 21st Century Social Contract'*. In this study the term citizens substitutes for Canadians as it embarks on a series of generalizations based on random selection of interviewees that participated in a series of workshops across the country-a series of citizens forums. Before embarking on a set of generalizations arising from these consultations the authors of the report contend that randomly selecting participants is more valuable than the top-of -mind public opinion analysis that does not offer the opportunity for reflection in what are undoubtedly a series of guided discussions. This despite the fact that public opinion polling respects the demographic realities of the Canadian population whereas random selection pays insufficient attention to this necessary pre-condition for gauging national opinion. Many an open-line talk show purports to represent the voice of citizens through random selection of audience. True American pollster Daniel Yankelovitch – an advisor to the project – endorses this approach but it is designed to compliment the public opinion survey. The generalizations offered below arise from the study permit Yankelovitch to distinguish the mind-set of Canadians and Americans.

Similarities

- A broad embrace of pluralism and multiculturalism (ethnicity, values, lifestyles).
- A deep attachment to an ethic of self-help and individual responsibility.
- A growing emphasis on reciprocity: those who receive are also obliged to give.
- An abiding faith in the kind of education that permits people to take charge of, and accept responsibility for, their own lives.
- A thin crust of skepticism and cynicism about both government and business, overlaying a deep hunger for citizen engagement and positive, constructive action.
- A strong sense of identification and pride in the country and its values.

Differences

- Government and the market. The American government's role is that of the cop and the watchdog – to enforce the law and catch the cheaters. In Canada, government is seen, ideally, as a partner and facilitator as well as guarantor of protections the private sector cannot provide.
- The individual and the community. In the U.S., the dominant form of individualism is an assertive, competitive, my-needs-come-first variety.
- Individualism, American-style, tolerates huge inequalities. Canadian individualism is tempered by a sense of community and a rejection of gross inequalities at the level of basic human needs such as health care and shelter.
- Social morality. American social morality is closely linked both to legalism ("if it's not illegal, it's OK") and to religion. Morally acceptable behaviour is defined in terms of law rather than social norms. The religious underpinnings of morality lead Americans to favour highly punitive responses to those who trespass. In Canada, social morality is less legalistic and is based on a common set of shared norms.
- Attitudes toward other countries. Canadians have a deeper sense of obligation towards other nations and feel more interdependence with them. While Americans prefer to exercise leadership in concert with allies, they feel that their power buys them independence from world opinion.

Conclusion

The risk in these above comparisons which will no doubt appeal to those who think that Canada is a more compassionate and fraternal society than its neighbor is that they undercut important differences in opinion across regions, cultural and social groups in both countries. What purports to be a study of the ethos of citizenship in the two countries may actually be more a wish list for a vision of Canada held by an important segment of the country's intellectual leadership. But these 'visioning exercises' may obscure real differences in attitudes and behaviour amongst the population. Much like the concerns of 'cohesionists' those adopting the above – described approach to citizenship are concerned about gaps, divisions and inequities and believe that we insufficiently discuss the things that we share. In each instance the need for generalization risks obscuring those differences that are fundamental to understanding of the complexities of pluralistic societies.

The Canadian American Research Symposium (CARS)
Le Symposium Canado-Américain de recherche (SCAR)

2003 seminar
September 10-12, 2003 in New York City
Theme: Diversity

A Canadian-American Research Symposium (CARS) on the subject of diversity will be held in New York City from September 10-12, 2003. Academics and representatives of government and non-governmental organizations are invited to participate in this important conference. Issues to be discussed include:

comparative immigration policy
demographic differences
economic adaptation
political participation
diverging philosophies of settlement

As this event coincides with the 2nd anniversary of the September 11th tragedy, participants will have an opportunity to join a commemorative event to mark that occasion.

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FULL REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES
RÉFÉRENCES ET BIBLIOGRAPHIES COMPLÈTES

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Unless otherwise noted, "citizen" is used here in its informal sense to encompass not only legal citizens, but also non-citizens who are resident in the country.

[2] Polling on social cohesion, which was commissioned by the departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Canadian Heritage in February 2002, revealed that Canadians identify strongly with particular values and are not entirely uncomfortable with limits on some Charter rights. Indeed, the rights enshrined in the Charter are not absolute and are subject to limitation. For example, there are built-in qualifications, such as the denial of the "right to life, liberty and security of the person" (section 7) if such denial is "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The "notwithstanding clause" (section 33) allows federal and provincial governments to pass legislation in contravention of particular sections of the Charter for a five-year renewable period. Finally, the Charter's preamble guarantees the protection of the rights and freedoms outlined but "subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society," effectively allowing for the override of any Charter right with good reason. See Radha Jhappan, "The Charter and the Courts," Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4th ed., Glen Whittington and Michael S. Williams, eds. (Toronto: Nelson, 1995) p. 344-345.

[3] Waldron writes, "Like many duties, the duty of civic participation is not just a duty to do X but a duty to do X carefully and responsibly." Jeremy Waldron, "Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility," Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 155. See, also, Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

[4] Jon H. Pammett, "Elections," Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4th ed., Glen Whittington and Michael S. Williams, eds. (Toronto: Nelson, 1995) p. 238.

[5] Anthony Sayers and Inayat Jetha, "Ethnic Minority Politicians in Canada," papers presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, May 29-31, 2002, p. 1.

[6] T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002) p. 55; Pammett, p. 238.

[7] See Dahl, for example.

[8] Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 18.

[9] Alenikoff and Klusmeyer, p. 45.

[10] Policy Research Initiative, "Social Capital as a Public Policy Tool," www.policyresearch.gc.ca.

[11] Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, p. 55.

[12] Qtd. in Centre for Research and Information on Canada (CRIC), "Voter Participation in Canada: Is Canadian Democracy in Crisis?" Number 3 of The CRIC Papers (October 2001) p. 29.

[13] Richard Johnston, " A Conservative Case for Electoral Reform," Policy Options 22.6 (July-August 2001) p. 13; see also CRIC, "Voter Participation in Canada."

[14] André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte, Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election (Peterborough: Broadview, 2002) p. 46-49.

[15] Jon H. Pammett and Lawrence LeDuc, "Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A New Survey of Non-Voters," paper for Elections Canada (March 2003) p. 20.

[16] CRIC, p. 22-23.

[17] See, for example, Pammett and LeDuc, p. 27-28; André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Neil Nevitte and Richard Nadeau, "The Evolving Nature of Non Voting: Evidence from Canada," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California (August 30-September 2, 2001) p. 1.

[18] Blais et al., "The Evolving Nature of Non Voting," p. 1.

[19] André Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001) p. 52.

[20] Jerome Black, "Immigrant political adaptation in Canada: Some tentative findings," Canadian Journal of Political Science 15.2 (1982): 3-27.

[21] Tina W. L. Chui, James E. Curtis, Ronald Lambert, "Immigrant background and political participation: examining generational patterns," Canadian Journal of Sociology 16.4 (1991): 391.

[22] Pammett and LeDuc, p. 27-28.

[23] Pammett and LeDuc, p. 25-27.

[24] Livianna Tossutti, "Minority Representation in Nomination and Election Contests," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario (May 29-31, 2002).

[25] Courtney argues persuasively that Electoral Boundaries Commissions could be used to enhance minority representation, particularly if the Commissions themselves are designed to reflect the demographic profile of the general population. In the case of Nova Scotia, it is noted that "'the commission could not have ignored minority representation given the presence of Acadian and Black representatives on it.'" John Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada's Electoral Districts (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) p. 103.

[26] See Erin Tolley, "Political Processes," paper presented at the seminar on Intersections of Diversity, Niagara Falls, Ontario (April 25-26, 2003); Elections Canada, "Participation in the Electoral Process: The Involvement of Women, Youth and Ethnocultural Groups," Electoral Insight 3.1 (2001); Jerome Black, "Representation in the Parliament of Canada: The Case of Ethnoracial Minorities," Citizen Politics: Research and Theory in Canadian Political Behaviour, Brenda O'Neill and Joanna Everitt, eds. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 355-372; Carolle Simard, "La representation des groupes ethnoculturels dans la région montréalise: vers une participation politique accrue?" Journal of International Migration and Integration, forthcoming.

[27] Political Participation Research Network, "Diversity in Canadian Governments: The Numerical Representation of Women, Immigrants in Minorities in 13 Cities," forthcoming.

[28] Lynda Erickson, "Entry to the Commons: Parties, Recruitment, and the Election of Women in 1993," Women and Political Representation in Canada, Manon Tremblay and Caroline Andrew (eds.) (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998) p. 219.

[29] This practice has been used by Prime Minister Jean Chretien to appoint "star candidates" in particular ridings.

[30] After she criticized Bloc Quebécois leader Gilles Duceppe, Pierrette Venne was expelled from the BQ caucus and now sits as an Independent in the House of Commons. Even the Canadian Alliance, which is often perceived as the most democratic and transparent of all the federal political parties, has used this discretionary power, refusing to allow dissident Member of Parliament Jim Pankiw back into the Alliance caucus after he left to protest Stockwell Day's leadership.

[31] For example, the Constitution of the federal Liberal Party, section 2.1(b), provides that membership in the party can be denied to those who are members of other political parties.

[32] Witness, for example, the negative public reaction toward the privatization of health care. Even the title of the highly-touted Romanow Report on the Future of Health Care – "Building on Values" – is instructive.

[33] A forthcoming project of the Political Participation Research Network is aimed at compiling data on diversity in governments in a range of Canadian cities. See, also, Carolle Simard, "Les élus des groupes ethniques minoritaires à Montréal : perceptions et représentations politiques, une étude exploratoire," Politique et Sociétés 22.1 (2003) p. 29-54; Myer Siemiatycki and Anver Saloojee, "Ethno-racial Political Representation in Toronto: Problems and Patterns," Journal of International Migration and Integration, forthcoming; Erin Tolley, "'The Higher, the Fewer'? Assessing the Presence of Women at Three Levels of Government," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Western Ontario (2000).

[34] See, for example, Alain Pelletier, "Politics and Ethnicity: Representation of Ethnic and Visible-Minority Groups in the House of Commons," Ethno-cultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics, Kathy Megyery, ed. Volume 7 of the Research Studies for the royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991) p. 101-160; Simard, "La representation des groupes ethnoculturels dans la région montréalise."

[35] See, for example, Black, "Representation in the Parliament of Canada"; and Political Participation Research Network.

[36] Henry Milner, "Civic Literacy in Comparative Context," Policy Matters 2.2 (2001); also, this magazine.

[37] See www.torontoyouth.com.

[38] See Philip Haid, Elder C. Marques and Jon Brown, "Re-focusing the Lens: Assessing the Challenge of Youth Involvement in Public Policy," (June 1, 1999) www.iog.ca.

[39] See Sylvia Bashevkin, Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[40] Sayers and Jetha's interviews with ethnic minority politicians point to "the permeability of Canadian parties."

[41] Daiva Stasiulis, "'Deep Diversity': Race and Ethnicity in Canadian Politics," Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4th ed., Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds. (Peterborough: Nelson, 1995) p. 203-204.

[42] Stasiulis, p. 201.

[43] Tossutti, p. 23; See, also, Sayers and Jetha.

[44] See, for example, Anver Saloojee and Myer Siemiatycki, "Formal and Non-Formal Political Participation by Immigrants and Newcomers," Canadian Issues (April 2003) p. 42-44.

[45] Kymlicka, p. 120.

[46] See Erin Tolley, "Supplement, Substitute or Stepping Stone?: Understanding the Electoral and Non-Electoral Participation of Immigrants and Minorities" paper presented at the Sixth National Metropolis Conference, Edmonton, Alberta (March 21-24, 2003).

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[1] Respondents were divided into the following groups: sex (male, female); age (18-34, 35-50, 51 years and over); education (high school or less; some post-secondary or more); and annual household income (less than $40,000; $40,000-69,999; $70,000 or more).

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[1] Kymlicka,. Norman, (2000), in their article "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts Concepts", distinguish between "common citizenship" and democratic citizenship Kymlicka,. Norman, 2000: 10).

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[1] Published in 2002 by the University Press of New England, distributed in Canada by UBC Press.

[2] For many years the US National Election Survey has been asking respondents which party is more likely to favour a greater role for government in the economy, and which is more conservative. The average answering "Democrats" to the first is less than 30 percent, while just over 50 percent answer Republican on to the second.

[3] John Pammett and Lawrence Leduc. "Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A New Survey of Non-voters." Ottawa: Elections Canada, 2003.

[4] This approach taken here is contrasted with the prevailing current in the contemporary literature on declining civic participation, which revolves around the concept of social capital, as developed notably by Robert Putnam (Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). When applied internationally, Putnam's conceptualization is not all that helpful in explaining differences in levels of voter turnout across countries. This is because, I argue, many of the kinds of activities associated with social capital by Putnam do not contribute to civic literacy and, hence, do not enhance political participation. Moreover, the promotion of civic literacy is also, to an important degree, influenced by a country's political institutions and the opportunities and incentives these provide for political actors to engage in the activities needed to nurture and sustain an informed polity, a dimension neglected in the "social capitalists" focus on civil society.

[5] Norway, Finland and Sweden subsidize daily newspapers that are not leaders in their markets. The subsidies traditionally account for 3 to 4 per cent of all newspaper revenues.

[6] This is one of many measures seeking to encourage reading. Also exemplary is that district public-health nurses, at the time of the first post-natal home visit, leave behind The Child's First Book, a compilation of rhymes and stories for children, to underscore that reading, like proper nutrition and hygiene, is vital to the development of a healthy child.

[7] For example, the ABF's fall 1999 program in Umeå (where I teach) offered the usual range of study circles in languages, computers, art, music, and nature appreciation, but also courses in organizing groups and co-operatives, in public speaking, writing and understanding media, as well as study circles on social and civil rights, the United Nations, war and peace, the future of democracy, feminism, various aspects of history, and important contemporary books.

[8] See "Literacy Skills for the Knowledge Society: Further Results from the International Adult Literacy Survey. (Paris: OECD, 1997); and Literacy in the Information Age: Final Report of the International Adult Literacy Survey. (Paris: OECD, 2000).

[9] See www.cmec.ca/pisa/2000/rapportcanada.fr.pdf.

[10] In another study, however, at least among first-year university students, the British outclass their North American and Canadian counterparts. On questions about past and present political leaders, the average percentage correct was 25 for both the U.S. and Canada; for Britain it was 42. In ranking foreign countries on the basis of population and GDP, it was 43, 45 and 72 respectively (Steven Holloway, "Through a Glass Darkly: Documenting Asymmetries in Neighbourly Knowledge," in the Bulletin of the Canadian Political Science Association, Spring 1995: 51-56.)

[11] http://geosurvey.nationalgeographic.com/geosurvey/download/RoperSurvey.pdf

[12] Paul Howe, "The Sources of Campaign Intemperance," Policy Options, January-February 2001.

[13] Paul Howe, "Where have all the Voters Gone. Inroads #12, Fall 2002. The 1956 Gallop surveys showed respondents a list of 10 prominent political figures, of which two were Canadian, and asked them to identify the country and position of each, as well as a list of Canada's ten provincial premiers and asked them to identify their province. The 2000 CES included an unprecedented number of knowledge items: the names of the leaders of the Liberals, PC, Alliance and NDP, the name of the federal finance minister, and the name of one's provincial premier.

[14] Nor are they any less distrustful of multinational corporations than older Canadians. In fact, they are less prone to see them as too powerful than all groups except those aged 28-37. (Brenda O'Neill, "Generational Patterns in the Political Opinions and Behaviour of Canadians: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff." Montreal: IRPP, 2001.)

[15] Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: A Global Report on Political Participation. Stockholm: IDEA 1997.

[16] In their study of New Zealand after its adoption of PR, Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci found that compared to supporters of large parties, supporters of small parties are more satisfied with the political process under PR ("The Impact of Proportional Representation on Turnout: Evidence from New Zealand," Australian Journal of Political Science, 33: 4, 1999.)

[17] See, for example, Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

[18] Consider how States where the outcome is not in doubt are ignored in US elections. The Center for Voting and Democracy's statistical analysis of the 1994 elections for the House of Representatives, reports a clear correlation between margin of victory and voter participation, with a 13 percent difference in turnout between the 87 most contested and 54 most lopsided districts.

[19] "The National Journal … reports that … four of the nation's top eight media markets -- Boston, Dallas, New York City, and Washington, DC -- had a grand total of six presidential ads aired, while eight media markets in battleground states each aired more than 6,500 presidential ads." (November 22, 2000, electronic report of the Center for Voting and Democracy - www.fairvote.org.)

[20] See for example "The Civic Mission of Schools." Report from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE (University of Maryland), 2003

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[10] Portes, A. and Landolt (1996), "The downside to social capital". The American Prospect 26 (May-June): 18-21, 94.

[11] Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey: http://www.cfsv.org/communitysurvey/

[12] Rodrik, D. (1998), "Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses", NBER Working Paper, No. 6350.

[13] Li, Peter S., (2003) Destination Canada : Immigration Debates and Issues, Oxford University Press.

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[1] Voir, en particulier, L'équité en emploi dans la fonction publique fédérale 2000-2001, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor, 2002 [http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/empequi/2001/ee-01_f.html]

[2] Le Petit Robert, édition 1988.

[3] À l'occasion, entre autres, de la table ronde du Conseil national des minorités visibles, tenue à Ottawa le 25 novembre 2002.

[4] Allusion au procédé imaginé par Aldous Huxley dans son roman d'anticipation Le meilleur des mondes, qui permettait de produire des individus aux caractéristiques homogènes.

[5] Sondage auprès des fonctionnaires fédéraux 2002 – Voici ce que vous avez dit… Résultats pour l'ensemble de la fonction publique, Ottawa, Présidente du Conseil du Trésor, 2002 [http://www.survey-sondage.gc.ca]

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1. By recording and measuring the distribution of teacher attention, the use of gender-specific examples (in textbook illustrations, for example), gender stereotypes, outright put-downs as well as a host of other overt and more discrete vehicles of learning, Myra and David Sadker (Sadker & Sadker, 1994) attempt to demonstrate that students learn that males and their concerns are more important. While "cheating" or short-changing girls, these practices – and the values they communicate – also make up the "miseducation" of boys. Naturally, these claims are disputed. For example, Christina Hoff Sommers (Sommers, 2001 <2000>) argues that boys in fact are poorly served by the education system, a fact borne out in their lower scores and higher drop-out rates.
2. Policy considerations aside, individual students and student groups also resist the dominant culture of the education system. One example is the creation of Muslim Student Associations by Muslims high school students to fight against discrimination, to enjoy mutual support, and to lobby the administration for consideration of specific religious needs (an unused classroom for prayer, for example) (Zine, 2000).
3. James Banks, perhaps the most prolific author on multicultural education, lists the five dimensions of multicultural education: 1. Content Integration (including information about women or minority cultures in history classes for example); 2. Knowledge Construction (teaching students how knowledge is created and how it reflects bias of the creator's social class, race, gender, etc.); 3. Prejudice Reduction (programs to combat racism); 4. Equity Pedagogy (introducing teaching techniques and methods of assessment that ensure equality for all students); and 5. An Empowering School Culture (changing grouping practices, student labeling, the social climate of school, and staff expectations so that all students feel equal and empowered) (Banks 1995, 4-10).
4. Canadian debates on inclusive schooling and multicultural education follow those in the United States and the United Kingdom (Moodley, 1995). However, there are debates on similar issues in every pluralist society.
5. For an example involving Muslim students, see Zine 2001.

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3. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1952.
4. For a lucid summary and application of Gerbner's views see James Shanahan & Michael Morgan, Television and its Viewers. Cultivation theory & research (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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1. Voir les travaux de T.H MARSHALL, « Citizenship and Social Class » dans (1963) Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays, Londres, Heinemenn, p.67 - 127. Pour une critique, voir M. BULMER et A. M. REES, Citizenship today : The contemporary Relvance of T.H. Marshall, Bristol, University of California Press,1996. Voir aussi M. COUTU, «Introduction : droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté » dans M. COUTU, P. BOSSET, C. GENDRREAU, D. VILLENEUVE (dir),Droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté, Une citoyenneté fragmentée, limitée ou illusoire ? , Montréal, éditions Thémis, 2000, p. 1 - 20.
2. Voir P. GUIBENTIF, « Approaching the Production of Law through Habermas' Concept of Communicative Action" (1994) 20 Philosophy and Social Criticism, 45-70. à la p. 59.
3. Voir D. LEYDET, « Patriotisme constitutionnel et identité nationale » tel que cité dans M. COUTU, « Citoyenneté et légitimité. Le patriotisme constitutionnel comme fondement de la référence identitaire », à la p. 637.
4. En se situant ici dans une perspective sociologique et non juridique.
5. Voir G. BOURQUE et J. DUCHASTEL, L'identité fragmentée. Nations et citoyenneté dans les débats constitutionnels canadiens, Montréal, Fides, 1996.
6. cf. A.C. CAIRNS, "The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship", dans Alan C. Cairns, Reconfigurations. Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1995, pp. 157-185).
7. C. TAYLOR, »Convergences et divergences des valeurs entre le Québec et le Canada» dans C. TAYLOR, Rapprocher les solitudes. Écrits sur le fédéralisme et le nationalisme au Canada, Québec, Presses de l'université Laval, 1992, p.179.
8. I. M. YOUNG, «Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship» dans C. SUNSTEIN (dir.), Feminism & Political Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p.117.
9. F. AUDIGIER, «Concept de base et compétences-clés de l'éducation à la citoyenneté démocratique : une première synthèse », Séminaire Concept de base et compétences clés, Conseil de l'Europe, document DECS/CIT (98) 7, 1997. à la p. 7.
10. M. COUTU, «Introduction : droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté », dans M. COUTU , P. BOSSET, C. GENDREAU et D. VILLENEUVE (dir.), Droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté. Une citoyenneté fragmentée, limitée ou illusoire ? Montréal, éditions Thémis, 2000.
11. Voir W. KYMLICKA et W. NORMAN, «Return of the Citizens : A survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory», (1994) 104 Ethics 352.
12. M. LABELLE et D. SALÉE, «La citoyenneté en question : l'État canadien face à l'immigration et à la diversité nationale et culturelle», (1999) 31 Sociologie et Sociétés 125, à la p. 141.

Rummens text – bibliography

Joanna Anneke Rummens. "Redefining the Canadian Demos: Towards a Trans-Cultural Citizenship Charter." Canadian Issues. February 2002: 15-18.

Duncan text – footnotes

1. There is no conceptual reason to limit ourselves to two communities or to dual citizenship. Multiple citizenships are quite conceivable and multiple transnational communities exist in the form of well-established diaspora, such as the Jewish diaspora.
2. "I swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen." (From the Citizenship Act)
3. Some of which, one must acknowledge, have more value than others.
4. Citizenship regimes afford governments the ability to deport non-citizens for certain criminal acts. Deportation is a good deal more difficult, although not impossible, for naturalized immigrants.
5. One might argue that the reaction of some governments to the September 11, 2001 attack on New York and Washington have brought at least a partial return to a much differentiated society, differentiated along citizenship lines in part. There is some evidence for this, but I would suggest that this is a temporary anomaly whose impact will diminish in turn in the face of the relentless features of globalization.
6. Of course, an important aspect of shared citizenship is to seek greater assurance of the equality of opportunity, of freedom from discrimination, of freedom from deep poverty, etc.
7. Note the current concerns of some European countries of maintaining their national identities in the face of the increasingly multicultural nature of their populations. Note, too, that Canadian policy requires new citizens to have a minimum proficiency in one of Canada's official languages

Catalogue of sessions organized by member associations of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences to be held at the 2003 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 28 – June 4, 2003

Catalogue des séances organisées par les associations-membres de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines qui aura lieu au Congrès des sciences humaines 2003 à Halifax, Nouvelle-Écosse du 28 mai au 4 juin 2003.

Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA)
Association canadienne de science politique (ACSP)

Friday, May 30 | 9:00 - 10:45
Room TBA

A1: Democratic Deliberation and Participation
Chair/Présidence: Harold Jansen (Lethbridge)
Papers/Communications:
Miriam Smith (Carleton),«Social Movements and Political Participation: Constructing the New-Liberal Citizen»
Alain Noël (Montréal), «Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational Federation»
Keith Culber (New Brunswick) and Paul Howe (New Brunswick), «Calling All Citizens: The Challenges of Public Consultation»

E1: Cities, Social Movements, and Globalization
Chair/ Présidence: Loren King (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Papers/Communications:
Julie-Anne Boudreau (York), «Reflections on Theories of Urban Social Movements: A Comparison of Los Angeles, Montreal, and Toronto»
David Camfield (McMaster), «The Politics of Municipal Public Sector Restructuring and Collective Bargaining: The Case of Toronto 2002"
Christopher Leo (Winnipeg), «Rethinking Urban Governance in the 21st Century»
Discussant/Commentaire: Gaston Alonso-Donate (Brooklyn College)

Friday, May 30 | 11:00 - 12:45
Room: Burbidge 12

B2: Women's Citizenship Rights
Chair/Présidence: Lavinia Stan (Dalhousie)
Papers/Communications:
Rachel K. Brickner (McGill), «The Changing Significance of Organized Labour and its Impact on the Development of Women's Citizenship Right in Mexico»
Susan Franceschet (Acadia) and Laura Macdonald (Carleton), «Women and Citizenship in Latin America: Lessons from Mexico and Chile»
Discussant/Commentaire: Viviana Patroni (York)

Friday, May 30 | 13:45 - 15:30
Room: Dentistry 1718A

E3: Roundtable/Table ronde: The Future of the Study of Urban Politics in Canada
Chair/Présidence: Andrew Sancton (Western Ontario)
Participants:
Julie-Anne Boudreau (York)
Douglas M. Ihrke (Wisconsin at Milwaukee)
Patrick J. Smith (Simon Fraser)
Richard Stren (Toronto)

Room: Dentistry 1718A

F3: Support and Trust
Chair/Présidence: TBA / À venir
Papers/Communications:
Richard Johnston (British Columbia), Stuart Soroka (McGill) and Keith Banting (Queen's), «Multiculturalism and the Welfare State»
Antoine Bilodeau (Toronto), «The Origins of Political Trust: Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories Within the Immigrant Population in Canada»
Ronald Eric Matthews (Kent State), «Suburbia and Social Capital Among Religious Denominations»
Discussant / Commentaire: TBA / À venir

Friday, May 30 | 15:45 - 17:15
Room: Burridge 9

C4: Autonomy and Decentralization
Chair/Présidence: TBA / À venir
Papers/Communications:
André Lecours (Concordia) and Nicola McEwen (Edinburgh), «Voice or Recognition? Accomodation Dilemmas in Multinational States»
Lawrence Anderson (McGill), «Recommending Autonomy as a Conflict Reduction Mechanism: Lessons From the North American Context»
Discussant/Commentaire: TBA / À venir

Room: Dentistry 1718A

E4(a): Immigration and Cities
Chair/Présidence: David Camfield (McMaster)
Papers/Communications:
Yasmeen Abu-Laban (Alberta) and Judith A. Garber (Alberta), «Immigration and the Construction of the Urban»
Gaston Alonso-Donate (Brooklyn College), «In the Shadows of the State: Immigrant Incorporation in Global Cities»
Discussant/Commentaire: Christopher Leo (Winnipeg)

Saturday, May 31 | 9:00 - 10:45
Room: Burbidge 14

E5: Decentralization and Urban Politics
Chair/Présidence: Geoffrey Martin (Mount Allison)
Papers/Communication:
Christie Gombay (Toronto), «Decentralization and Urban Politics in Latin and Central America»
Richard Stren (Toronto), «Decentralization and Developing Countries: Rhetoric or Reality?»
Ronald K. Vogel (Louisville), «Decentralization and Local and Regional Governance: Toronto and Tokyo»
Discussant/Commentaire: Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (Victoria)

Room: Burbidge 8

H5(b) Applying the Politics of Difference
Chair/Présidence: Greg Dinsmore (Cornell)
Papers/Communications:
Willem Mass (Yale), «Conflict Among Concitoyens: Managing Differences in EU Constitutionalism»
Kathryn Trevenen (Ottawa), «Rethinking Cosmopolitanism: Politics Beyond Nations»
Andrew Robinson (Regina), «Universal Human rights, Multiculturalism, and Contextual Justice: Canadian Experience with the UN Human Rights Committee»
Discussant/Commentaire: Richard Sigurdson (New Brunswick-Fredericton)

Room: Burbidge 318

K5: Workshop/Atelier: Rethinking the Welfare State: Social Inclusion and Citizenship/Repenser l'État providence, des triangles aux losanges : l'État, le marché, la famille et la collectivité
(Joint workshop with the Law and Public Policy Section/Atelier conjoint avec la section Droit et analyse de politiques)
Chair / Présidence: TBA/À venir
Papers/Communications:
Ann Sheila Orloff (Northwestern), «Gender and Social Citizenship»
Jane Jenson (Montréal), «Redesigning Welfare State and Citizenship Regime»
Lynda Erickson (Simon Fraser), «The Mass Politics of Social Citizenship»
Paul Kershaw (British Columbia), «Does 'Social Inclusion' Comprise Domesticity?»
Discussant/Commentaire: TBA/À venir

Room: Dentistry 4112

L5(a): Citizenship, Refugees and Anti-Terrorism
Chair/Présidence: Edna Keeble (Saint Mary's)
Papers/Communications:
Stephen Gallagher (McGill), «A Commitment to Openness: Examining the Basis of Canada's Liberal Refugee Policies»
Joseph Garcea (Saskatchewan), Canadian Citizenship Policy: The Continuing Search of the Holy Grail»
Avery Plaw (Concordia), «Why We Would be Better Off Without an Anti-Terrorism Act»
Discussants/Commentaires:
Yasmeen Abu-Laban (Alberta)
Audrey Macklin (Law, Toronto)

Saturday, May 31 | 11:00 - 12:45
Room: Dentistry 1718A

E6: Locality, Urbanity, and Democracy
(Joint session with the Political Theory/Séance conjointe avec la section Théorie politique)
Chair/ Présidence: Melissa Marshall (Illinois at Chicago)
Papers/Communications:
Loren King (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), «Making Cities Safe for Democracy»
David Whitson (Alberta), «The Urban Agenda and the Fate of Modern Communities»
Discussant/Commentaire: Judith A. Barger (Alberta)

Room: Burbidge 11

H6(a): Political Recognition and Accomodation in Canada
Chair/Présidence: TBA/À venir
Papers/Communications:
Matt James (Victoria), «Redress, Recognition, and Redistribution: The Changing Moral Contours of Contemporary Canadian Citizenship»
Idil Boran (McGill and Dimitrios Karmis (Ottawa), Consequentialism, Non-consequentialism, and Language Politics in Multination States»
Discussant/Commentaire: TBA/À venir

Sunday, June 1 | 9:00 - 10:45
Room: Burbidge 8

J9: Conceptualizing Recent Cultural and Institutional Changes in Canada's
North and Their Impacts
Chair/Présidence: TBA/À venir
Papers/Communications:
Ailsa Henderson (Wilfrid Laurier), «Northern Political Culture? Political Attitudes and Behaviour in Canada's Territories»
Annis May Timpson (Sussex), «»Hey That's Some Way to Say Goodbye»: The Division of the Northwest Territories and the Creation of Nunavut»
Discussant/Commentaire: TBA/À venir

Room: Dentistry 4117

E10: Governance in Canadian Cities
Chair/Présidence: Joseph Garcea (Saskatchewan)
Papers/Communications:
Douglas M. Ihrke (Wisconsin at Milwaukee), «The Economy and Governance in Saskatchewan: Perceptions of Municipal Officials»
Geoffrey Martin (Mount Allison), «Municipal Reform in New Brunswick: The Never-Ending Project»
Tom Urbaniak (Western Ontario), «Regime Theory and the Politics of Mississauga»
Discussant/Commentaire: David Whitson (Alberta)

Sunday, June 1 | 13:45 - 15:30
Room: Dentistry 4117

A11: Roundtable: The Canadian Democratic Audit: Challenges and Reforms (1)
Chair/Présidence: William Cross (Mount Allison)
Participants:
Elisabeth Gidengil (McGill), «Citizens Capacity for Democratic Citizenship»
John Courtney (Saskatchewan), «The Canadian Electoral System»
Lisa Young (Calgary) and Joanna Everitt (New Brunswick), «Interest Groups and Social Movements»
Jennifer Smith (Dalhousie), «Federalism»
David Docherty (Wilfrid Laurier), «Legislatures»

Sunday, June 1 | 15:45 - 17:15
Room: Dentistry 4116

J12: Roundtable/Table ronde: The Future of Canada: Regional Perspectives
Chair/Présidence: Andrew Parkin (Centre for Research Information on Canada)
Participants:
TBA/À venir

Sociology and Anthropology Association (CSAA)
Société canadienne de sociologie et d'anthropologie (SCSA)

Sunday, June 1 | 10:45 - 12:15

K1: Nations and Nationalism I
Organizer: Stanbridge, Karen (Memorial University of Newfoundland)
Chair: Stanbridge, Karen (Memorial University of Newfoundland)
1. Civilizing Adolescence: Nation Building in the American South, 1918-1944
Bickford, Annette (Long Island University)
2. Imagined Borders and Fuzzy Frontiers: The Development of Nationalism and Identity in New York and Ontario in the 1800s
Leclerc, Patrice (St. Lawrence University)
3. Nationalism and International Factors: The Irish Question in the Era of the First World War
Stanbridge, Karen (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

Sunday, June 1 | 12:30 - 14:00

A2: Rurality
Organizer: Emke, Ivan (Sir Wilfred Grenfell College)
Chair: Woodrow, Anna (Concordia University)
1. Off-Farm Employment as a Household Livelihood Diversification Strategy: The Case of Agro
Monu, Erasmus (University of Botswana)
2. Rural Dwellers, Rural Health: a critical study of health information technology in rural communities
Peddle, Katrina (Simon Fraser University)
Buchholz, Kaye (Simon Fraser University)
3. Organic Solutions? Rural Development and the Organic Farming Movement
Sumner, Jennifer (University of Guelph)
4. Neighbouring in Rural Canada
Wilkinson, Derek (Laurentian University)

G3: Women and Men in Families: Paid and Unpaid Work
Joint Session: June 1-3 so he can be at Canadian Population Society
Organizer: Beaujot, Rod (University of Western Ontario)
Chair: Beaujot, Rod (University of Western Ontario)
1. Pioneer children: the roots of unpaid labour on the Canadian Prairies, 1871-1913
Magnusson, Sandra (University of Alberta)
2. Women, Family and Production: Comparing Constructs in the 1950s and 1990s
McKenna-Farrell, Shannon (University of Waterloo)
3. The Employment Experiences of Canadian Refugees: Measuring the Impact of Human and Social Capital on Quality of Employment
Lamba, Navjot (University of Alberta)
4. Women's Inequality in the Workplace and News Discourse: Framing Out of Gender Ideology
Gazso-Windle, Amber (University of Alberta)

Sunday, June 1 | 14:15 - 15:45

F2: National Security, Racial Profiling and Citizenship
Organizer: Park, Hijin (OISE/Univ. of Toronto) & Haque, Eve (OISE/Univ. of Toronto)
Chair: Park, Hijin (OISE/Univ. of Toronto)
1. Political Policing in Canada
Johal, Gurpreet (OISE/University of Toronto)
2. «I hate Arabs and I always have»: Arab-Americans Facing Hate Crimes
Djeball, Taoufik (Université de Caen)
3. The Media, the Police and Racial Profiling: Examining the dialectics of citizenship through attitude formation and norms construction with regards to subjects and others in Canadian society
Foster, Cecil (University of Guelph)
4. Border Patrol: The Eugenics Movement and the Making of the Nation State After September 11
Cohen, Michelle (OISE/University of Toronto)

F3: L'immigration francophone et le racisme au Canada / Francophone Immigration and Racism in Canada I
Organizer: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto) & Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)
Chair: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto)
1. Le parcours et l'émergence de la communauté Congolaisse d'Edmonton: récit portant sur les problèmes et défis de l'intégration-inclusion
Mufuta, Bitupu (University of Alberta)
2. Quand diversité rime avec fonds de commerce
Muse, Roda (Government of Canada)
3. Le rôle de l'Amicale Francophone dans l'intégration des immigrants de minorités ethno-culturelles francophones
Ndiaye, Ablaye (L'amicale francophone de l'Alberta)
4. Welcoming as Cultural Practice: The Case of Edmonton, Alberta
Dalley, Phyllis (University of Alberta)

H1: Women, Wealth and Creativity: Feminist Themes Challenge the Paradigm - Feminist Practice and the Gift
Joint session: CWSA
Organizer: Christiansen-Ruffman, Linda (Saint Mary's University) & Miles, Angela (OISE/University of Toronto)
Chair: Christiansen-Ruffman, Linda (Saint Mary's University)
1. Nomadic Journeying, Nomadic Consciousness, and a Global Home
Hart, Mechthild (DePaul University)
2. Revisioning Wealth and Recreating Community: The Application of Vaughan's Gift Paradigm in the Analysis of Community Transportation
Simpson, Patricia (OISE/University of Toronto)
3. Women, Estates and Inherence
Raddon, Mary-Beth (Brock University)
4. Enclosure of the Commons and Rural Women's Modernization in Central America
Isla, Ana (Brock University)

H2: (Bi)Sexuality and Gender I
Organizer: Owen, Michelle (University of Winnipeg)
Discussant: Odette, Fran
1. Becoming Women: What Body Narratives Tell About the Passage to Womanhood
Rice, Carla (York University)
2. Exploring Disabled Erotic Identities
Zitzelsberger, Hilde (Regional Women's Health Center)
3. Transgender/Sex/Gender and its Material Prohibition in Space
Morgan, Kathryn (Universtiy of Toronto)

K2: Nations and Nationalism II
Organizer: Stanbridge, Karen (Memorial University of Newfoundland)
Chair: Stanbridge, Karen (Memorial University of Newfoundland)
1. «Go Home Haole»: The Role of Collective Memories in Nationalist Movements
Haveman, Melissa (University of Kansas)
2. Commemoration and the Political: Monument and Identity in Belgrade
Lavrence, Christine (York University)
3. TBA
Vallant, Arafaat (Columbia University)

Sunday, June 1 | 16:00 - 17:30

D4: Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Linking the Local, the National and the Transnational I
Joint Session: CASID
Organizer:Tastsoglou, Evangelia (Saint Mary's University) & Man, Guida
1. Towards a Framework for a Feminist Analysis of Citizenship of Caribbean Immigrant Women in Canada
Denis, Ann (University of Ottawa)
2. State Versus Market Regulation: Comparing the National Contexts for Transnational Domestic Workers, Canada and the U.S.
Arat-Koc, Sedef (Trent University)
3. Citizenship and the 'mafia republic': the crisis of women and children refuge movement in
Herman, Nadine (Saint Mary's University)
4. The Bleeding Borders: Gender, Nation, Citizenship and State Boundaries
Mojab, Shahrzad (OISE/University of Toronto)

F4: L'immigration francophone et le racisme au Canada / Francophone Immigration and Racism in Canada II
Organizer: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto) & Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)
Chair: Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)
1. Les sentiments à l'endroit des groupes ethniques immigrants au Canada: une analyse empirique exploratoire
Laczko, Leslie (University of Ottawa)
2. Incidence relative de l'intégration professionnelle dans le choix d'allégeance culturelle des immigrants francophones de couleur à la communauté franco-manitobaine
Lafontant, Jean (Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface)
3. Perceptions de la discrimination chez l'immigration francophone d'origine africaine à Edmonton, Alberta
Babou, Malick (University of Alberta)
4. Les facteurs conflictuels affectant professionnellement l'intégration des policiers d'origine haïtienne dans la police québécoise
Benoit, Ernst (Université de Montréal)

Monday, June 2 | 9:00 - 10:30

A4: Social Cohesion and Community I
Organizer: Gingrich, Paul
1. Social Cohesion in Communities in Rural Saskatchewan
Diaz, Polo (University of Regina)
2. How Cohesive are Canadian CMAs?: A Measure of Social Cohesion Using the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering, and Participating
Rajulton, Fernando
Ravenera, Zenaida (University of Western Ontario)
Beaujot, Rod (University of Western Ontario)
3. Civic Participation in Work-Related, sport, Religious, and Political Organizations in Canada
Ho, Connie (University of Calgary)

F5: L'immigration francophone et le racisme au Canada / Francophone Immigration and Racism in Canada III
Organizer: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto) & Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)
Chair: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto)
1. Ce sont nos écoles aussi: Voix de minorités et ethnoculturelles francophones aspirant à la profession enseignante en Ontario
Mujawamariya, Donatille (University of Ottawa)
2. Participation écoles-familles immigrantes francophones à Toronto
Farmer, Diane (Institut d'études pédagogiques de l'Ontario de l'Université de Toronto)
Labrie, Normand (Institut d'études pédagogiques de l'Ontario de l'Université de Toronto)
Wilson, Denise (Institut d'études pédagogiques de l'Ontario de l'Université de Toronto)
3. La Racialisation: Interculturalisme, Antiracisme, et la Question des Minorités dans les Écoles Franco-Ontariennes
Ibrahim, Awad (Bowling Green State University)

Monday, June 2 | 10:45 - 12:15

D5: Reconfiguring Gender, Race and Class Through Globalization and Migration
Organizer: Ng, Roxana (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto)

F7: L'immigration francophone et le racisme au Canada / Francophone Immigration and Racism in Canada IV
Organizer: Makropoulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto) & Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)
Chair: Laczko, Leslie (University of Ottawa)
1. L'exclusion raciale vécue au sein d'une école franco-ontarienne: enjeux reliés au chevauchement des compétences fédérales et provinciales au niveau de l'immigration en milieu scolaire
Makropulos, Josée-Hélène (OISE/University of Toronto)
2. L'immigration et les langues officielles : Obstacles et possibilités qui se présentent aux immigrants et aux communautés
Quell, Carsten
3. Les francophones de minorités ethnoculturelles et raciales et la Convention sur l'élimination de toutes formes de discrimination raciale: dynamiques d'une relation controversée
Dufresne, Fred (Government of Canada)

Tues., June 3 | 9:00 - 10:30

A6: Space and Community: Mapping Social Worlds I
Organizer: Deutschmann, Linda (University College of the Cariboo)
Chair: Blute, Marion (University of Toronto at Mississauga)

1. Searching for Meaning in the Landscapes of Community
O'Connell, David (School of environmental Design and Rural Development University of Guelph)
2. Escape, the City, and community
Svenson, Steven (University of Waterloo)
3. Using GIS in Community Research
Deutschmann, Linda (University College of the Cariboo)

Tues., June 3 | 10:45 - 12:15

F12: Advanced Research on Aboriginal Conditions: Understanding, Community

Organizer: White, Jerry (University of Western Ontario)

Tues., June 3 | 12:30 - 14:00

A8: Social Capital, Community and Region in Canada

Joint Session: June 3 or 4, can't conflict with Conflict and Cooperation: Current Issues and Research in the sociology of Science and Technology
Organizer: Matthews, Ralph

Tues., June 3 | 16:00 - 17:30

C6: Culture and the Re-making of the Nation

Walcott, Rinaldo (University of Toronto)
Chair: Walcott, Rinaldo (University of Toronto)
1. The Pedagogy of Heritage
Rukszto, Katarzyna (York University of Alberta)
2. Edmontonian Beauty: Racial and Sexual Repressions in Urban Space
Shehid, Gamal Abdel (University of Alberta)
3. Other Canadians: Culture Re-making the Nation
Walcott, Rinaldo (University of Toronto)

D7: Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Linking the Local, the National and the Transnational II

Joint session: CASID
Organizer: Tastsoglou, Evangelia (Saint Mary's University) & Man, Guida
1. Global Economic Restructuring and International Migration
Folson, Rose (OISE/University of Toronto)
2. Linking the Local and Global: Examining Immigration, Gender and Work in the Canadian Garment Industry
Ng, Roxana (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto)
3. Migrant Mexican women workers and Canadian horticulture: Gender and the Global Restructuring Agro-Food Systems
Preibisch, Kerry (University of Guelph)
Santamaria, Luz (University of Guelph)

K5: Citizenship and the Politics of Subjectification

Organizer: White, Melanie (York University)
Chair: White, Melanie (York University)
1. Character and the Body of the Citizen
White, Melanie (York University)
2. Globalizing Inequality: Citizenship Politics of Diasporic Women: The Case of Homeworkers in Toronto's garment Industry
Rygiel, Kim (York University)
3. Child Citizenship in the Infancy of the Synaptic Self: Governing Childhood in Canada's Social Policy Renewal
Currie, Gail (University of Toronto)
4. Communities, Bystanders and Critical Events: From Local to National Aboriginal Mobilization in Canada, 1951-2000
Ramos, Howard (McGill University)

Wed., June 4 | 9:00 - 10:30

A10: Restructuring in Coastal Communities: What Are the Impacts on People, Policies and Programmes?

Organizer: Jackson, Lois (Dalhousie University)
Chair: Jackson, Lois (Dalhousie University)
Discussant: Jackson, Lois (Dalhousie University)
1. Restructuring and changing work patters in rural Newfoundland and Labrador
Grzetic, Brenda (Memorial University)
MacDonald, Martha (Memorial University)
Neis, Barbara (Memorial University)
2. The challenge of tourism development in Canada's coastal communities
Hood, Robert (University College of the Cariboo)
Jackson, Lois (Dalhousie University)
Tirone, Susan (Dalhousie University)
Donovan, Catherine (Dalhousie University)
3. Leisure, Social Support and Friends Who Move Away: The Experience of Youth in a Newfoundland Community
Tirone, Susan (Dalhousie University)
Jackson, Lois (Dalhousie University)
Donovan, Catherine (Dalhousie University)

D9: Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Linking the Local, the National and the Transnational III

Joint Session: CASID
Organizer: Tastsoglou, Evangelia (Saint Mary's University) & Man, Guida
1. Creating a Space in Multicultural Canada: Muslim Women and Post-September 11
Khan, Shahnaz (Wilfred Laurier University)
2. Contract, Charity and Honourable Entitlement: The 1967 Abortion Act in Northern Ireland After the good Friday Agreement
Side, Katherine (Mount Saint Vincent University)
3. The Astronaut Phenomenon: Transnational Migration and the Hong Kong Chinese Immigrant Women in Canada
Man, Guida

Wed., June 4 | 10:45 - 12:45

K6: Researching the Canadian Border/Lands

Organizer: Helleiner, Jane (Brock University)
Chair: Butovsky, Jonah (Brock University)
1. Governing the border
Pratt, Anna (Brock University)
2. Sanctuaries, Borders, and Governmentalities
Lippert, Randy (University of Windsor)
3. Childhood and Youth at the Niagara Canada / U.S. Border
Helleiner, Jane (Brock University)

Wed., June 4 | 12:30 - 2:00

A12: Space and Community: Mapping Social Worlds II

Organizer: Deutschmann, Linda (University College of the Cariboo)
Chair: McBlane, Nan (University College of the Cariboo)
1. Community, Memory, Identity: A Neo-Durkheimian Theory of Space
Stepnisky, Jeffrey (University of Maryland)
2. Virtual Space for Virtual Communities
Kayahara, Jennifer (University of Waterloo)
3. Inventing Space in the Molson Centre: Modern Marketing Meets Playoff Tradition in Montreal
Gunderson, Lisa (University of Waterloo)
4. Needing Treatment: Targeting the Absence of Addiction Programming
Kitchin, Heather (Acadia University)

C8: Social Movements and the Media: Accommodations and Transformations

Organizer: Carroll, William (University of Victoria)
Chair: Carroll, William (University of Victoria)
1. Two Cities, Two Movements, Alternative Medias and Alternative Imaginaries: The Avant-Garde and Black Liberation Movements in New York city and Halifax, Nova Scotia
Verrall, Krys (OISE/University of Toronto)
2. The Appropriation of the Global by the Local: The Coexistence of Traditional and Modern Practices in Indigenous Communities
Reinke, Leanne (Globalism Institute, RMIT University)
3. What's a Slogan Against Globalization? French Canadian Media and Anti-Globalization Activism
Désy, Caroline (Université du Québec à Montréal)
4. When Policy Fails: Media Politics and the Trials and tribulations of Electricity Restructuring in Ontario, 1995-2002
Greenberg, Josh (McMaster University)

Wed., June 4 | 14:15 - 15:45

F16: Migration, Social Adjustment and Socio-Cultural Adaptation: The Eastern Experience

Joint Session: CASID
Organizer: Law, Kenneth (Lingnan University)
Chair: Lau, Stephen (Hong Kong Polytechnic University)
1. Perceptions of discrimination and Social Adjustment of New Arrival Women from Mainland China in Hong Kong
Lee, William (Lingnan University)
Tsoi, Sunday (Lingnan University)
2. «I Want to Get More in Touch with the Indian Side of Me»: Exploring the Social Adjustment Process of South Asian Young in Southern Ontario
Kratzmann, Meredith (Dalhousie University)
Tirone, Susan (Dalhousie University)
3. Social Reactions to Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong: History and Perspectives
Law, Kenneth (Lingnan University)

4th International Forum of the Citizenship Education Research Network
4ième Forum International du Réseau de recherche sur l'éducation à la citoyenneté

The Potential of Citizenship Education: Generating Synergy and Partnerships

Le potentiel générateur de l'éducation à la citoyenneté : synergie et partenariat

In conjunction with the Comparative and International Education Society of Canada
Tenu en conjonction avec la Société canadienne pour l'éducation comparative et internationale

Saturday, May 31

1:30 - 2:45 pm

Welcome: Drs. Sue McGregor, Programme Chair, and Yvonne Hébert, Coordinator, CERN
Mot de bienvenue : Mdes Sue McGregor, Présidente du Forum, et Yvonne Hébert, Coordinatrice, RRÉC

Opening Session: Political Participation, Democracy and Citizenship Education
Chair: Lori Wilkinson (University of Manitoba)
Discussant: Daniel Schugurensky (Ontario Institute for Studies of Education, University of Toronto)

Political participation: Its affective nature (political integration of newcomers)
Neyda H. Long (St. Thomas University) and Andrew Hughes (University of New Brunswick)

What kind of citizen? The politics of educating for democracy
Joel Westheimer (U Ottawa) and Joseph Kahne (Mills College)

Citizenship education: Its perceived role and importance in the social studies curricula of six Canadian provinces
Richard Julien (University of Saskatchewan)

3:00 - 4:15 pm

Stream A: Constructivism, neoliberalism and citizenship education
Chair/Président: Jean Séguin (Citoyenneté et Immigration, Canada) (To be confirmed)
Discussant: Jan Pouwels (Hogeschool van Arnhem en Nijmegen, Netherlands)

On the ridiculous, violent and unstainable epistemology of the knowledge economy: Implications for citizenship
David G. Smith (University of Alberta)

Praxical participation as active citizenship in an international student exchange
Karsten Mundel (Ontario Institute for Studies of Education, University of Toronto)

Piecing together the links between popular culture and citizenship
Doug Zook (University of Regina)

Citizenship as a practice of learning: What might that look like in the Social Studies?
Hans Smits (University of Calgary)

3:00 - 4:15 pm

Stream B: Restorative justice and the ethic of care: Moving towards a transformational model of education
Chair/Président: Miguel Andrade Garrido (Catholic University of Chile)
Discussants: France Jutras (Université de Sherbrooke) and Georges Richardson (University of Alberta)

Wanda Cassidy (SFU), Christie Whitley (Chartwell Elementary School, BC), Phil Mann (Whytecliff Education Centre, BC), David Oborne (Coquitlam School District, BC) and Shaheen Shariff (McGill University)

4:15 - 4:30 pm

Refreshment Break / Pause santé

4:30 - 5:45 pm

Stream A: We've come a long way, baby - haven't we? Exploring gender and sexuality in citizenship education
Chair/Présidente : Shaheen Shariff (McGill University)
Discussants : Heli Vail (Nipissing University) and Kent den Heyer (University of British Columbia)

Kurt Clausen (Nipissing University), Kathy Bradford (University of Western Ontario), Lynn Lemisko (University of Saskatchewan) and Todd Horton (Nipissing University)

4:30 - 5:45 pm

Stream B: Teachers and Citizenship: Preparation and Perspectives
Chair/Président: Christopher Komlavi Afatsawo (University of Calgary)

Discussant: Richard Julien (University of Saskatchewan)

Beliefs of students in teacher education concerning the stakes underlying citizenship education
S. Courtine Sinave, A. Beauchesne and Mario Laforest (Université de Sherbrooke)

Citizenship learning as a lifelong and lifewide process: A study on civic teachers
Daniel Schugurensky (University of Toronto)

Lifelong learning and the teaching of civics (a survey of teachers)
John P. Myers (University of Toronto)

Dinner at Peggy's Cove (Reservations required: Contact Dr. Sue McGregor sue.mcgregor@msvu.ca) or DRUM, a musical extravaganza at the Dalhousie Arts Centre, Halifax

Dimanche, 1 juin

8h30 - 9h45

Développement et impact des standards provinciaux sur la responsabilité sociale: résultats de la mise en réalisation des standards dans une variété de contextes et de partenariats
Présidente: Katherine Covell (University College of Cape Breton)
Commentateurs: Haroon Mahomed (Gauteng Institute for Educational Development, South Africa) et Neyda Long (St. Thomas University, Canada)

Sharon Jeroski (Horizon Research and Evaluation Inc), Anita Chapman (BCTF), Maureen Dockendorf (Blakeburn Elementary School, BC) et Nancy Walt (BC Ministry of Education)

9h45 - 10h00

Refreshment Break / Pause santé

10h00 - 11h15

Courant A: Perspectives des jeunes sur ce que veut dire 'être citoyen'
Présidente : Jennifer Wen-shya Lee (University of Calgary)
Commentateur: Joel Westheimer (University of Ottawa)

Attendre Superman, Batman et Monsieur Bond : les étudiants de l'Europe de l'Ouest et de l'Amérique du nord expliquent les agents historiques et le changement social
Kent den Heyer (University of British Columbia)

La représentation sociale de la citoyenneté parmi les étudiants chiléens : une étude de cas
Christian Miranda, Karenine Troncoso and Miguel Andrade Garrido (Catholic University of Chile)

Activisme chez la jeunesse et la culture scolaire traditionnelle: Comment les retenir à leurs pupitres lorsqu'ils ont participé à Seattle?
Marita Moll (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives)

L'éducation à la citoyenneté à l'époque post-11 septembre : Perspectives des étudiants au secondaire en Ontario

Stéphane Lévesque (University of Western Ontario)

10h00 - 11h15

Courant B: Une approche socio-constructiviste à l'étude et l'enseignement de la citoyenneté démocratique
Présidente : Shirley Jones (University of British Columbia)
Commentateurs: Doug Zook (University of Regina) et Ana Maria Jimenez (Universidad Externado de Colombia)

Alan Sears, Andrew Hughes, Manju Varma-Joshi, Ottilia Chareka et Carla Peck (University of New Brunswick)

11h30 - 13h00

Lunch and Annual General Meeting / Repas du midi et Assemblée générale annuelle
Chair/Présidente: Yvonne Hébert (Coordinatrice, RRÉC/CERN)

Four Items:
• Becoming a SIG of the CIESC (Stéphane Lévesque, University of Western Ontario);
• Search for new editor of the CERN Newsletter (Y. Hébert, U Calgary);
• Founding an international journal of citizenship education (Nathalie Éthier, Metropolis, Ottawa); and
• Selection of Program Chair of the 5th CERN Forum at the next Congress to be held at the University of Manitoba (May 29 - June 5, 2004)

Quatre items :
• Devenir un groupe d'intérêt de la SCIÉCI (Stéphane Lévesque, UWO);
• Recherche d'un nouveau rédacteur du Bulletin du RRÉC (Y. Hébert, U Calgary);
• Fondation d'une revue internationale sur l'éducation à la citoyenneté (Nathalie Éthier, Métropolis, Ottawa); et
• Sélection du président de la programmation du prochain Forum du RRÉC au prochain Congrès qui aura lieu à l'Université du Manitoba (29 mai – 5 juin 2004)

13h30 - 14h45

Courant B: Devenir canadien : l'intégration des immigrants en tant que défi pour la citoyenneté
Président: Kent den Heyer (University of British Columbia)
Commentateur: Lori Wilkinson (U Manitoba)

Le sens d'être canadien : une comparaison entre des jeunes non-immigrants et ceux de la première génération
Jennifer Wen-shya Lee et Yvonne Hébert (University of Calgary)

Le rôle de l'éducation bilingue dans l'éducation à la citoyenneté des jeunes minoritaires: Une étude de cas d'un programme chinois bilingue dans l'Ouest canadien
Joe Wu (University of Alberta)

Les histoires de vie de jeunes canadiens de souche immigrante : évidence d'une compétence émotionnelle
Chiara Berti (Università delgi Studi di Genova), Yvonne Hébert, Jennifer Wen-shya Lee et Christopher Komlavi Afatsawo (University of Calgary)

13h30 - 14h45

Courant B: L'éducation aux valeurs et aux droits de la personne : Perspectives planétaire et nationales
Présidente: Melanie Young (Simon Fraser University)
Commentateur: Manju Varma-Joshi (University of New Brunswick)

Un programme axé sur les droits pour une éducation globale à la citoyenneté
Katherine Covell (University College of Cape Breton)

L'éducation aux valeurs et aux droits de la personne pour les jeunes gens en Colombie
Ana Maria Jimenez (Universidad Externado de Colombia)

Une éducation aux droits des enfants en tant que l'éducation à la citoyenneté
Brian Howe (University College of Cape Breton)

14h45 -15h00

Refreshment Break / Pause santé

15h00 - 16h15

Courant A: L'éducation en perspective planétaire et la cybercitoyenneté
Présidente, Brian Howe (University College of Cape Breton)
Commentateur: Andy Hughes (University of New Brunswick)

Participation dans un cours d'éducation planétaire dans une école secondaire: implications pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté
Melanie Young (Simon Fraser University)

Et si le monde pourrait (étude d'un programme d'éducation en perspective planétaire)
Shelly Jones (University of British Columbia)

Non à la violence: Perspective de la Colombie sur la non-violence
Harun M. Abello Silva (Universidad Externado de Colombia)

Cybercitoyenneté et éducation
Reza Nasirzadeh (York University)

15h00 - 16h15

Courant B: Les stratégies d'enseignement et de programmation pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté
Président: Christian Miranda (Catholic University of Chile)
Commentatrice: France Jutras (Université de Sherbrooke)

L'élaboration d'une approche multiple à l'éducation à la citoyenneté (inclusive des droits humains, du patrimoine et de l'anti-discrimination)
Haroon Mahomed (Gauteng Institute for Educational Development, South Africa)

L'éducation à la citoyenneté : une perspective morale pédagogique

Cathy McGregor (Simon Fraser University)

Vivre la démocratie : le renouvelement de notre vision de l'éducation à la citoyenneté – le rapport de 2002
Bernie Froese-Germain (Canadian Teachers Federation) et Marita Moll (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives)

16h15 -16h30

Refreshment Break / Pause santé

16h30 - 18h00

Closing Session: Values in a Transnational Postmodern World
Séance plenière: Les valeurs dans un monde transnational et postmodern
Chair/Présidente: Rosaline Frith (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa)
Discussants/Commentateurs: Stéphane Lévesque (University of Western Ontario) and/et Manuela Zeitlhofer (University of Linz, Austria)

Citoyenneté et valeurs en déshérence en Euroafrique
Charles Romain Mbele (U de Yaoundé, Cameroun)

Les valeurs, l'immigration et le transnationalism
Lori Wilkinson (University of Manitoba)

École, valeurs et mieux vivre ensemble
France Jutras (Université de Sherbrooke)

L'éducation aux droits de la personne, à l'éthique et aux valeurs dans un monde postmodern
Jan Pouwels (Hogeschool van Arnhem en Nijmegen, Netherlands)

La société canadienne se transforme au rythme de la diversité; comment se dessine l'avenir de nos deux langues officielles?

Pour commander notre nouvelle étude, *L'immigration et les langues officielles : Obstacles et possibilités qui se présentent aux immigrants et aux communautés*, communiquez avec nous ou visitez notre site Web, www.ocol-clo.gc.ca.



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

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Courses Topics

1. Immigration in Context: History, Demography and Settlement
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3. Immigration, Transnationalism and Citizenship
4. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration and Cultural Diversity
5. "Race" and Racism in Canada
6. Enforcement, Criminality, Smuggling and Security
7. Canada's Refugee and Humanitarian Policies
8. Economic Impact and Integration
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3. Immigration, transnationalisme et citoyenneté
4. Attitudes publiques à l'égard de l'immigration et de la diversité culturelle
5. "Race" et racisme au Canada
6. Exécution de la loi, criminalité, immigration clandestine organisée et sécurité
7. Politiques humanitaires et de protection des réfugiés du Canada
8. Impact économique et intégration
9. Intégration sociale, politique et culturelle
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