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National Identity and Diversity

Identité nationale et diversité

METROPOLIS

With an introduction by / Introduction faite par
Rainer Bauböck, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna


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CANADIAN DIVERSITY CANADIENNE

Deconstructing and accommodating national identities

National identity is a difficult object of analysis for the social sciences. Since the 1980s a number of prominent theorists have attempted to deconstruct this object. They have argued that we need to understand nations as "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) and that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round." (Gellner 1983) More recently, some have criticized "methodological nationalism" in the social sciences. This shows in the tendency to take nationally bounded societies "as the naturally given entities to study" (Glick-Schiller and Wimmer 2003), or in hidden assumptions that ethnic and national categories correspond to "internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis." (Brubaker 2002) Trapped in the pitfalls of essentialism, reification and 'groupism', even critical social science may unintentionally reinforce nationalist ideology. Instead of studying national identity as a stable property of individuals or groups, we should focus on 'nationness' as a contingent event, something that happens in moments of political mobilization, but that may also subside thereafter.

These are important warning signs and they ought to be taken seriously by anybody who wants to analyze rather than promote national identities. Most contributions in this magazine are written in this spirit. A few focus explicitly on debunking certain national identity myths, for example by arguing that in order to explain the trend towards more inclusive citizenship regimes in western democracies we must abandon the idea that such regimes express different kinds of national identity (Joppke). Other authors highlight the fluidity of minority identities and the role of political elites in defining the identities of groups they then claim to represent.

Yet deconstructing the concept of national identity is not sufficient, since it is not a mere chimera but a powerful tool for constructing political communities and rallying individuals behind political banners. In order to understand how national identities operate and why they are so pervasive in contemporary societies, we need to raise four different questions. The first one is about structural causes that emerge from general features of modern societies, rather than from particular constellations of forces in a certain country and historical period. Among these causes we can list: an industrial division of labour, a modern state bureaucracy, the international state system, and the legitimation of political rule through popular sovereignty rather than superior force or divine grace. The second question is about specific incentives and resources for the formation of cultural and political elites who are capable of launching a nation-building project and about the building materials available to them (homeland territories, ethnic identities, historical narratives). The third question is about political action. We need to study strategies used by such elites in order to promote the identification of potential constituents with a national project and the result of their efforts. The final question concerns the entrenchment of national identities in public institutions. These include public education systems and official state symbols, but also less visible ways in which governments structure social life so that national identities are taken for granted as an ever-present background even when they are not mobilized. Most importantly, the boundaries of nearly all modern states – their territorial borders and distinctions between citizens and aliens – have historically been associated with particular nation-building projects and (as Richard Day points out) the international state system itself perpetuates national identities by dividing humanity into relatively stable compartments.

It is important to be aware that nation-building projects can fail in many different ways. First, the general causes and conditions listed above create obstacles for forging national identities among territorially dispersed groups and aboriginal peoples, or among linguistically heterogeneous groups united by a religious creed. Second, some potential projects may never materialize because the group is so marginalized that it can't produce a nation-building elite, or, inversely, because a minority intelligentsia accepts assimilation as the price for cooptation into a dominant elite. Third, in case of successful mobilization, political actions may backfire or lead to lasting defeat that leaves minorities with assimilation or mass emigration as the only options. Finally, even fully institutionalized national identities are exposed to challenge and change. Since the 1960s Canada and several Western European states have witnessed a resurgence of minority nationalism. This has transformed nation-states into multinational ones that recognize distinct linguistic groups as constitutive political communities within a larger polity.

This brings me to a second response to the sociological critique of national identity. After deconstructing the concept and reconstructing how particular national identities have been forged, we are still left with the practical question how to deal with them politically. This question arises sharply whenever there is a mismatch between established political boundaries and politically mobilized national identities. There are three challenges of this kind that call for quite different political answers.

The first challenge is that of cultural diversity raised by minorities that experience discrimination because of their

skin colour, language, religious practices, cultural traditions, sexual orientation, or ways of life. Claims raised on behalf of such minorities vary widely. Certain religious groups desire a social space for themselves where they can exist as separate communities with little contact with the wider society. Most cultural minorities, however, demand some form of recognition or support from the wider society through antidiscrimination policies, special exemptions for religious practices (such as *kosher* and *halal* slaughtering that conflicts with animal protection laws), public support for minority languages, or symbolic recognition in public speeches, celebrations and educational curricula. All of these demands are directed against overt or hidden bias in the construction of a homogeneous national identity that ignores diversity in the society. In most cases, this is a challenge that comes from within. It is a call for transforming a given national identity rather than a battle between rival projects of nation-building.

This battle is at the core of demands for self-determination or political autonomy raised on behalf of stateless nations, national minorities, and indigenous peoples. Such claims may be triggered by persistent socio-economic discrimination, political oppression or cultural disadvantage, but the primary goal of mobilization is not to remove obstacles for freedom and equality within a shared national identity. Instead, this second challenge concerns the boundaries of the political community itself. It aims at redrawing international or internal state borders so that the group in question can set up its own independent state, join a neighbouring kin-state, or achieve self-government within a distinct part of the present state territory. It is important to understand the genuinely political nature of such projects. If the goal of nationalist struggle were merely to protect a distinct language or culture, then a generous public recognition of such diversity, e.g. through official multilingualism in public institutions combined with regional education systems in the minority language, might suffice to demobilize a national identity. However, in nationalist mobilizations, cultural preservation serves more often as a means for marking the boundaries of a national territory and population, whereas political power exercised through autonomous institutions of government is the ultimate goal.

There is a third rubric under which we can group together a range of different phenomena that challenge national boundaries from outside or above rather than from inside. These include supranational political integration in the European Union, where every move to shift core elements of sovereignty towards European institutions triggers political mobilizations of dominant national identities in the member states. Another relevant phenomenon is political transnationalism among migrants who engage themselves actively in their sending countries' political developments, or mobilize a diaspora dispersed across several countries in support for a homeland cause (Lorenzkowski). Even those who are not politically active often combine significant social ties and legal rights in two countries. An increasing number also hold multiple citizenships. Finally, there is the case of native minorities that are not of recent immigrant origin, but whose history links them to external kin-states that may provide cultural support, admit them freely to their territory and citizenship, or mobilize them politically in their homeland. This latter constellation is frequently found in Central and Eastern Europe.

All three challenges raise difficult questions when minority claims conflict with basic norms of liberal democracy, e.g. how to reconcile religious toleration with gender equality, or how to defend the territorial integrity of multinational democracies faced with a threat of secession. But they also raise the question whether these states have already done enough to accommodate justified minority demands for equal opportunities, cultural recognition, political autonomy or transnational citizenship. This is not only a moral question, but also a political one: how can democratic majorities be persuaded to endorse minority rights?

The essays in this magazine show a mixed record. Canada is in many ways a model case whose official multiculturalism has provided a framework for addressing nearly all the issues raised above. Yet, as Bernier, Bowlby, Tolley and Rummens argue, this model is still contested and evolving, and, as Li and Teo demonstrate, it may not yet have succeeded in overcoming a racialized framework that blocks upward mobility for some groups. Collins' somber portrait of the recent Australian backlash against asylum seekers and multiculturalism in general illustrates the dangers of reversal. Pfaff-Czarnecka and Martiniello show the difficulties of fitting the new diversity emerging from immigration into complex models of accommodating traditional cleavages in Western European societies. And Guzina's Balkan model of nation-building illustrates how demands for political autonomy meet fierce opposition in contexts where minorities are perceived as threats to national unity and security.

In spite of all these sceptical voices, there is reason for cautious optimism. The general trend in democratic states may not yet be towards a postnational constellation where national identities are no longer politically relevant, but towards 'multicultural nationhood' (Oberoi) – a transformation of national identities in response to the challenges of diversity.

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CANADIAN DIVERSITY CANADIENNE

La déconstruction et la prise en compte des identités nationales

Le concept d'identité nationale ne se prête pas aisément à l'analyse en sciences sociales. Depuis les années 80, un certain nombre de théoriciens très en vue ont tenté la déconstruction de ce concept en arguant que nous devons appréhender la nation comme une « communauté imaginée » (Anderson, 1983) et que c'est le nationalisme qui engendre les nations et non pas l'inverse (Gellner, 1983). Plus récemment, certains ont mis en cause « le nationalisme méthodologique » des sciences sociales. On le dénote dans la tendance à prendre les sociétés soudées par la nation comme « étant les entités qui se prêtent le plus naturellement à l'étude » (Glick-Schiller et Wimmer, 2003), ou dans la présomption cachée que les groupes ethniques et nationaux correspondent « à des groupes homogènes à l'intérieur et limités à l'extérieur, comme composantes de base de la vie sociale, comme principaux protagonistes des conflits sociaux et comme unités fondamentales de l'analyse sociale » (Brubaker, 2002). Piégées dans les embûches de l'essentialisme, de la réification et du « groupisme », certaines sciences sociales critiques pourraient même par inadvertance renforcer l'idéologie nationaliste. Au lieu d'étudier l'identité nationale comme propriété stable d'individus ou de groupes, nous devrions porter notre attention sur le fait national comme fait contingent, c'est-à-dire un phénomène qui survient lorsqu'il y a mobilisation politique, mais qui parfois disparaît ensuite.

Il s'agit là d'importants signaux dont il faut absolument tenir compte si l'on souhaite analyser plutôt que promouvoir les identités nationales. La plupart des contributions à ce magazine sont rédigées dans cet esprit. Certains s'attachent explicitement à déloger les mythes associés à l'identité nationale, en arguant entre autres que si l'on veut expliquer la tendance, dans les pays occidentaux, en faveur de programmes de citoyenneté plus inclusifs, nous devons abandonner l'idée que de tels programmes expriment divers types d'identité nationale (Joppke). D'autres mettent en évidence la fluidité identitaire des minorités et le rôle des élites politiques dans la définition de l'identité de ces groupes qu'ils disent représenter.

Pourtant, la déconstruction du concept d'identité nationale n'est pas suffisante, du fait qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une vague chimère mais bien d'un puissant outil pour structurer les collectivités politiques et rallier les individus derrière un étendard politique. Pour comprendre comment opèrent les identités nationales et pourquoi elles occupent tant de place dans les sociétés contemporaines, il nous faut aborder quatre questions distinctes. La première porte sur les causes structurelles qui émergent des composantes générales des sociétés modernes. Parmi ces causes, citons : la division industrielle du travail, la bureaucratie de l'État moderne, le système international des États et la légitimation du pouvoir politique par la souveraineté populaire plutôt que par une force supérieure ou la grâce divine. La seconde question porte sur les incitatifs et les ressources spécifiques nécessaires à la formation d'élites culturelles et politiques, capables d'un projet d'édification nationale, et sur le matériau de construction à leur disposition (espace territorial du pays natal, identités ethniques, récits historiques). La troisième question porte sur l'action politique. Il nous faut étudier les stratégies qu'appliquent ces élites afin de promouvoir l'identification d'éléments potentiels dotés d'un projet national, ainsi que le résultat de leurs efforts. Enfin, la dernière question porte sur l'implantation des identités nationales dans les institutions publiques ; il s'agit notamment du système d'éducation et des symboles officiels de l'État, mais aussi de signes moins visibles par lesquels le gouvernement structure la vie sociale de manière à ce que les identités nationales soient prises pour acquises, comme une toile de fond permanente, même lorsqu'elles ne sont pas mobilisées. Plus important encore, les frontières de la plupart des États modernes – c'est-à-dire leurs frontières territoriales et la distinction entre le citoyen et l'étranger – ont été historiquement associées à des projets d'édification nationale spécifiques et, comme le souligne Richard Day, le système international des États renforce la notion d'identité nationale en divisant l'humanité en compartiments relativement stables.

Il est important de savoir que les projets associés à l'édification nationale peuvent échouer de diverses façons. D'abord, les causes et les conditions susmentionnées sont à l'origine des obstacles à la réalisation d'une identité nationale parmi les groupes dispersés territorialement et les peuples autochtones ou, encore, parmi les groupes hétérogènes au plan linguistique, mais unis par une appartenance confessionnelle. Certains projets potentiels peuvent ne jamais voir le jour lorsqu'un groupe est marginalisé au point où il ne peut plus même produire une élite apte à édifier la nation ou, inversement, parce que sa classe intellectuelle accepte l'assimilation comme le prix de sa cooptation à l'élite dominante. Dans le cas d'une mobilisation effective, l'action politique peut imploser ou déboucher sur une défaite durable, laissant aux minorités le seul choix de l'assimilation ou de la migration en masse. Finalement, même l'identité nationale pleinement institutionnalisée s'expose à des défis et au changement. Depuis les années 60, le Canada et plusieurs États de l'Europe de l'Ouest constatent la résurgence des nationalismes minoritaires, ce qui dès lors transforme les États-nations en États multinationaux qui reconnaissent des groupes linguistiques distincts comme entités politiques constitutives au sein d'une politie plus large.

Ce qui m'amène à formuler une seconde réponse à la critique d'ordre sociologique concernant l'identité nationale. Après la déconstruction du concept et la reconstruction sur la manière dont les identités nationales se forgent, il nous reste la question pratique de savoir comment les traiter au plan

politique. L'acuité de cette question apparaît notamment lorsque la frontière politique et l'identité nationale mobilisée au plan politique ne coïncident pas. Il existe trois défis de ce genre qui demandent chacun une réponse politique tout à fait différente.

Le premier défi est celui de la diversité culturelle que soulèvent les minorités qui font l'expérience de la discrimination en raison de la couleur de leur peau, leur langue, leurs pratiques confessionnelles, leurs traditions culturelles, leur orientation sexuelle ou leur mode de vie. Les revendications faites au nom de ces minorités varient considérablement. Certains groupes confessionnels souhaitent obtenir un espace social pour eux seuls, où ils peuvent exister comme collectivité distincte sans grand contact avec l'ensemble de la société. Toutefois, la plupart des minorités culturelles aspirent à une certaine forme de reconnaissance ou de soutien de la part de l'ensemble de la société, grâce notamment à la mise en place de politiques antidiscriminatoires, à des dispenses pour pratique du culte (comme par exemple, l'abattage *cascher* ou *halal* auquel s'oppose la législation pour la protection des animaux), à un soutien public aux langues minoritaires ou encore à une reconnaissance symbolique dans les discours officiels, les célébrations et les programmes d'études. Toutes ces demandes visent à contrer les préjugés manifestes ou dissimulés susceptibles de participer à la réalisation d'une identité nationale homogène qui, elle, tend à ignorer la diversité de la société. Dans la plupart des cas, le défi vient de l'intérieur. C'est un appel à la transformation d'une identité nationale donnée plutôt qu'une lutte entre projets d'édification nationale rivaux.

Cette lutte est au cœur des revendications d'autodétermination ou d'autonomie politique présentées au nom des nations sans État, des minorités nationales et des peuples autochtones. De telles revendications peuvent être provoquées par une discrimination socioéconomique persistante, la répression politique ou un désavantage d'ordre culturel, mais l'objectif essentiel de la mobilisation n'est pas de faire tomber les obstacles à la liberté et à l'égalité au sein d'une identité nationale commune. Plutôt, ce second défi relève des frontières de la collectivité politique elle-même. On vise ici à retracer les frontières internationales ou internes, afin que le groupe en question puisse créer son propre État indépendant, se joindre à un État limitrophe avec qui il existe une parenté ou parvenir à l'autonomie gouvernementale dans une région distincte du territoire de l'État présent. Il est important de comprendre la nature authentiquement politique de tels projets. Si le but de la lutte nationaliste se limitait à vouloir protéger une langue ou une culture distincte, une reconnaissance publique et généreuse de cette diversité – telle que le multilinguisme officiel des institutions publiques, combiné à un système d'éducation régional dans les langues minoritaires – pourrait être suffisamment démobilisatrice quant à la poursuite d'une identité nationale. Toutefois, dans la mobilisation nationaliste, la préservation culturelle est le plus souvent un moyen de délimiter les frontières d'un territoire et d'une population nationale, et le pouvoir politique qui s'exerce à travers les institutions autonomes d'un gouvernement en est le but ultime.

La troisième rubrique peut servir à regrouper une série de phénomènes divers qui posent un défi aux frontières nationales, de l'extérieur ou d'un niveau supérieur plutôt que de l'intérieur. On pense notamment à l'intégration politique supranationale de l'Union européenne, où chaque tentative visant à transférer des éléments fondamentaux de la souveraineté nationale vers les institutions européennes déclenche une mobilisation politique des identités nationales dominantes dans les États-membres. Un autre phénomène pertinent est à noter, soit le transnationalisme politique des migrants qui s'engagent activement dans la vie politique de leur pays d'origine ou qui mobilisent une diaspora dispersée dans plusieurs pays pour soutenir la cause de leur pays natal (Lorenzkowski). En fait, même ceux qui ne sont pas politiquement actifs combinent souvent des liens sociaux et des droits importants dans deux pays ; par ailleurs, un nombre croissant d'entre eux ont plusieurs nationalités. Enfin, il y a le cas des minorités autochtones qui ne sont pas d'immigration récente, mais dont l'histoire les lie à des États voisins qui pourraient leur accorder un soutien, les accepter librement sur leur territoire et leur accorder la citoyenneté ou les mobiliser politiquement dans leur pays natal, situations que l'on trouve fréquemment en Europe centrale et en Europe de l'Est.

Ces trois défis soulèvent des questions difficiles, lorsque les revendications des minorités se heurtent aux normes démocratiques et libérales ; ainsi, comment concilier la tolérance confessionnelle avec l'égalité des sexes et comment défendre l'intégrité territoriale d'une démocratie multinationale devant la menace de sécession. En revanche, ils soulèvent également la question de savoir si l'action de ces États a été suffisante lorsque les aspirations de ces minorités se justifient – égalité des chances, reconnaissance culturelle, autonomie politique ou citoyenneté transnationale. Il ne s'agit pas ici seulement d'une question morale, mais aussi d'une question politique également : comment les majorités politiques peuvent-elles être persuadées de donner leur aval aux droits des minorités?

Les essais publiés dans ce magazine font état de résultats divers. Le Canada est par bien des aspects un cas modèle, dont le multiculturalisme officiel s'est avéré être un cadre pouvant traiter presque toutes les questions susmentionnées. Pourtant, comme Bernier, Bowlby, Tolley et Rummens arguent, ce modèle est toujours contesté et poursuit son évolution et, comme le démontrent Li et Teo, il n'est peut-être pas parvenu à dépasser le cadre racial qui bloque l'ascension sociale de certains groupes. Le tableau sombre que brosse Collins sur les récentes protestations australiennes contre les demandeurs d'asile et le multiculturalisme illustre bien les dangers d'un renversement de situation. Pfaff-Czarnecka et Martiniello démontrent eux aussi la difficulté de faire cadrer la nouvelle diversité émergeant de l'immigration avec des modèles complexes prenant en compte les clivages traditionnels dans les sociétés de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Et le modèle balkanique de Guzina en matière d'édification nationale illustre combien la volonté d'autonomie politique peut se heurter à une violente opposition lorsque les minorités sont perçues comme étant une menace à l'unité et à la sécurité nationales.

En dépit de tout le scepticisme ambiant, un optimisme prudent est permis. En effet, la tendance générale des États démocratiques n'est peut-être pas encore vers une constellation « postnationale », où les identités nationales auraient perdu leur pertinence politique, mais vers des nations multiculturelles (Oberoi), c'est-à-dire une transformation des identités nationales face aux défis que pose la diversité.

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Interview with

Hélène Chalifour-Scherrer: Minister of Canadian Heritage

1. Canadian Heritage has an interesting mandate that makes it responsible for both several diversity portfolios (official languages, multiculturalism, off-reserve aboriginals) and many of the key programs that contribute to national identity (cultural programs, sports, etc). How has the department sought to blend these two areas to ensure that our diverse stories are part of the national narrative?

You're right to point out that the twin goals of the Department of Canadian Heritage relate to diversity and cultural expression: we seek to ensure that Canadians express and share their diverse cultural experiences, while fostering an inclusive society built on intercultural understanding and participation.

These two goals are mutually reinforcing. A society that fosters creative expression across the diversity of its peoples also permits dialogue, intercultural understanding and ultimately a more inclusive society. Creative expression is an important factor in building a cohesive country. Similarly, a society founded on values of inclusion and openness to diversity is better able to generate new ideas from a broader spectrum of experiences and views. When people come together despite their differences, culture becomes richer in quality and quantity, and reaches new audiences.

Seen this way, I would not say that our diverse stories are just part of the Canadian narrative – the Canadian narrative *is* the coming together of our diverse stories into something grander, a kind of Canadian drama. The French language version of our national anthem calls it an *épopée,* an epic.

This is not to say that there are not challenges for creators among Canada's diverse communities. In fact, our programming focusses on helping diverse and Aboriginal groups overcome barriers. The National Arts Training Contribution Program, for instance, supports organizations which train Canadians for professional artistic careers, including Aboriginal Arts and non-European artistic traditions. This awareness of the challenges faced by diverse creators is integrated across the range of our portfolio, through initiatives, such as Arts Presentation Canada, The Canada Council's Exposed Roots, and the National Film Board's Reel Diversity, and the Spark Initiative.

2. Increasingly, identity as a solid immutable construct is giving way to a more multi-faceted approach. Many academics would argue that separate programs for specific identities fails to grapple with the complexity of the real lives of Canadians. How has Canadian Heritage sought to address this more complex reality?

Canadians have developed a complex and nuanced approach to defining who they are, and I believe that government has to offer support and programs that are flexible to deal with this reality.

As I mentioned before, our goal is to foster an inclusive society where there is a "space" for Canadians to create and communicate with each other, expressing their voices and sharing their own stories. The starting point in achieving this goal is to ask those affected: What do you need? What problems do you experience? What do you want to contribute to your country and community? and what approaches and solutions would work for you?

Flexibility and responsiveness are already a critical part of our programs. But they need to be continually evolving, and we must bring a broader participation to their design, in order to better reflect Canada's growing diversity.

That being said, we have to recognize that certain communities face particular challenges that demand a specific program component or mechanism. For instance, elements of the official languages policy, and the new Aboriginal Languages and Culture Initiative, address specific issues as part of ensuring the foundations of cultural and civic participation, and in the case of Aboriginal peoples, to illustrate and validate their unique place in Canadian society. Our ongoing work to combat racism is also a strong example of how we are taking a broader, holistic view of the challenges that face diverse communities.

3. One of the most unique elements of the Canadian identity is the centrality of multiculturalism. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act commits the Government of Canada to seek the full participation of all Canadians in the social, cultural, economic and political facets of Canadian life. After thirty years of multiculturalism as an official policy, have we made progress in these areas?

Yes, absolutely we have made progress.

Since the adoption of the Multiculturalism Policy in 1971, we have continued to expand and strengthen the Canadian legislative framework to ensure that barriers to full and equitable participation in Canadian society are removed. For instance, legislative changes adopted since 1971 include, but are not limited to, the *Citizenship Act* of 1977, the *Canadian*

Human Rights Act of 1977 (revised 1985), the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* of 1982, the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986, and the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* of 1988.

Progress and commitment across government to creating a more inclusive and cohesive society are also captured annually through the Annual Report on the Operation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act.* The Report is a testament to the resolve of the Government of Canada to creating a more inclusive and cohesive society.

In order to keep pace with the needs of our evolving and increasingly diverse society, the Multiculturalism Program underwent a renewal in 1996-97 to further our common objective of helping all Canadians to participate fully in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. Along the way, we have also developed important tools to support the implementation of effective policies and programs. Tools such as the Ethnic Diversity Survey, which was released in September 2003, will provide decision makers with key information on the emerging needs and challenges of our diverse society.

I think though, that the most important indicator of the success of *Canada's Multiculturalism Policy* is the way that Canadians have embraced multiculturalism. Recent public opinion research shows that a large majority (83%) of Canadians feel that people from different cultural and racial groups are enriching the cultural life of Canada, and nearly the same proportion (82%) agree that our multicultural society is a source of pride for Canadians (Environics, Focus Canada, 2002). While we have made significant progress, much remains to be done. I am proud of what we have achieved so far and confident that by working with all Canadians, we can continue to make meaningful progress in furthering our collective vision of an inclusive society.

The implementation of the multiculturalism policy has evolved in the direction of promoting civic participation in the larger society, and to increasing mutual understanding and co-operation between the members of different ethnic groups.

4. Multiculturalism is now being attacked in many countries (especially in Europe) as being divisive, as reinforcing difference and fracturing societies. How much does Canada need to be concerned about these critiques?

Official multiculturalism has been around for 30 years in Canada, yet controversy over its meaning and significance persists. The concept of multiculturalism recognizes that diversity is now, and will be, a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and of its national character. It confirms that only a positive pluralism will ensure that Canada will gain all possible advantages from this diversity. Above all, it means the full participation in all aspects of Canadian society for all Canadians, regardless of culture, ethnic or national origin, religion, race and colour.

Over the years, several avenues of criticism have been championed in denouncing the value of official multiculturalism. Critics of multiculturalism have argued that it fragments Canadian society and makes it less cohesive by emphasizing differences. They view the multiculturalism "agenda" as leading to a push for enhanced minority rights at the constitutional level.

In fact, if we look at various factors of integration like naturalization rates, political participation, adopting a Canadian identity, participating in broader Canadian institutions, official-language competence, and intermarriage rates, the comparative evidence does show that the critics are wrong. Increasingly, Canada is a world leader on virtually every dimension of integration. The same story would hold true in comparison with other immigrant receiving countries that have rejected multiculturalism in favour of an exclusive emphasis on common identities.

In short, there is no evidence to support the claim that multiculturalism is promoting ethnic exclusiveness or impeding immigrant integration. The implementation of the multiculturalism policy has evolved in the direction of promoting civic participation in the larger society, and to increasing mutual understanding and co-operation between the members of different ethnic groups.

If we can agree that multiculturalism has become a shared value in Canada, then we can agree that it has become part of our shared notion of citizenship. Given the success of official multiculturalism in this regard, there is no compelling need to change the Policy or the Act. Indeed, official multiculturalism is a fundamental policy of modern Canada and a core value of its people.

I strongly applaud the work done and progress achieved by my colleague, Jean Augustine, Minister of State (Multiculturalism and Status of Women) for her leadership in advancing the file, contributing to strengthening our social cohesion.

Interview with

David Pratt: Minister of National Defence

1. Whenever national identity is considered, the armed forces come to mind. Canada has positioned itself since the 1960's as multi-lateralist and as peacekeepers. Does the diversity of the Canadian population contribute to our ability to act as peacekeepers?

We know that Canadians regard diversity as one of our core values. As a national institution, the Canadian Forces strives to reflect Canada's cultural, ethnic and linguistic makeup, as well as its regional diversity. And Canadians can be confident that the men and women who serve in their armed forces—regardless of race, religion, or culture—share the goal of protecting Canada and its interests and values, while contributing to peace and security around the world.

As the Prime Minister recently said, Canada is well positioned to assume an important role in the world due to our international reputation and our cultural diversity. Our military operations in Afghanistan and Haiti are recent examples of our basic commitment to human rights and human security. Everywhere and every time our Canadian Forces are deployed abroad they touch the lives of the people they encounter.

Peace support missions—and by this I mean the full spectrum, from peacekeeping to peacemaking—are all about providing security and stability where there might otherwise be none. In unstable and war-torn regions, no higher progress is even possible if you can't provide basic human security. In part, we can achieve this by sharing Canadian values, including our respect for diversity, with local populations. In addition, we are working closely with our colleagues in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency as part of the government's 3D approach to international affairs—the three Ds being defence, diplomacy and development. In so doing we hope to foster new traditions of peaceful and democratic conflict resolution wherever our forces are deployed throughout the world.

2. Military service is considered an excellent means to contribute to a sense of national solidarity. Indeed, like the education system, in many nations it is one of the key engines of integration. How do the armed forces contribute to a cohesive and inclusive national identity in Canada?

The Canadian Forces are one of Canada's most important and most recognized national institutions. Canadians look to the Canadian Forces as a powerful symbol of security, stability, and reliability. I believe the respect that Canadians have for the Forces is well-placed when you look at the kind of work our military does every day, from guarding our domestic security, to responding to natural disasters within our borders, to being placed directly in harm's way defending Canadian beliefs and values far from home.

Our diversity remains a source of strength and creativity, and continues to play a central role in making the Canadian Forces a modern and forward-looking organization. From coast to coast to coast the Canadian Forces reflect Canada's considerable cultural variety, drawing on members' diverse backgrounds for the ideas, experiences and skills that will benefit all.

The Reserve Force is a concrete example: located in communities across Canada, the Reserves draw on the diverse cultural fabric of the country, further strengthening the partnership between ordinary Canadians and the Canadian Forces, which in turn helps to reinforce our national identity.

3. Recruitment is often a challenge for the armed forces and as a result recruitment drives tend to target traditional groups. How does DND seek to recruit from all Canadian communities?

We are committed to ensuring that the Canadian Forces is seen as a rewarding career choice for all qualified Canadian citizens.

We have made significant strides in our recruitment efforts. For several years now, we have been very active in seeking recruits outside of our traditional recruitment pool. For example, we actively recruit from designated groups, including Aboriginal Peoples, members of visible minorities and women.

To reach these diverse communities we are actively seeking Canadian Forces members from all ethnic and cultural groups to serve as recruiters. We are networking with community leaders and we are taking part in outreach events to reach members of these groups. In addition, we have opened more recruitment offices accessible to rural Canadians

The Canadian Forces strives to be an employer of choice that offers equal opportunity to all and embraces and promotes diversity. We are making every effort to create an inclusive workplace.

4. In the wake of some unfortunate incidents in the late 1990s, what has DND done to ensure that it counters racism, harassment and discrimination?

We simply don't tolerate racist attitudes or any type of harassment or discrimination. Any recruit who is unable or unwilling to comply with our policies on racism and harassment is not welcome and will not be enrolled. Any conduct by Canadian Forces members that violates these rules will result in disciplinary action, which can include being released from the Canadian Forces.

Still, we're not just punishing offenders here: we're taking positive action as well. Recent changes to harassment policy have shifted the emphasis to prevention and early resolution, and have brought military and civilian personnel under the same policy.

We've made harassment awareness training part of every Canadian Forces member's training and every unit has a harassment advisor to carry out awareness and prevention activities and to advise commanding officers and managers.

Like any other type of change, this is a work in progress: we will continue to strive toward eliminating racism, harassment, and discrimination in the Canadian Forces and National Defence.

National Identity and the "Canadian Way":

Values, Connections and Culture

Erin Tolley

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ABSTRACT

This article outlines the Government of Canada's current definition of a national identity based on values, connections and culture, and the many practical ways in which it seeks to promote these three key elements. The author explores the language of diversity and nation-building, as well as the various successes and shortcomings of the Canadian model.

Diversity and the Canadian national identity are intimately – and almost indistinguishably – linked. Canada has so deliberately situated its identity in pluralism and multiculturalism that Canadians often conflate all of these concepts. This is not to say that the path has been a smooth one. Jenson and Papillon note that "Canadians have worried about national identity and maintaining unity in a context of cultural diversity for all of the country's history,"[1] which is perhaps because, as Uberoi points out, multiculturalism is believed to be at odds with a shared national identity.[2] In spite of this, Canada has, with relative success, melded diversity and a shared national identity. Diversity is institutionalized in laws, in the structure of government and in the Canadian psyche. Public opinion polling consistently shows that Canadians take pride in the country's multicultural reputation, and the 'mosaic' is one of Canada's most oft-invoked symbols of identity. We have a generous citizenship policy that allows for the extension of citizenship rights after just three years of residence, and continue to be seen as one of the world's most generous immigrant-receiving countries. We not only 'deal with' diversity, we embrace it, and this is a central part of the Canadian identity.

There is ample evidence of a conscious effort to accommodate and embrace diversity in Canada. Various policies, including the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms,* the *Official Languages Act,* the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act,* the *Employment Equity Act,* the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,* and anticipated legislation to amend the *Indian Act,* provide a legislative snapshot of the Government of Canada's response to diversity. The creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, federal involvement in the World Conference Against Racism, and the funding of intercultural activities through the Multiculturalism Program are further examples of the Government's institutionalization of diversity. Academics have also had a hand in this, as evidenced in the growing body of research on diversity, and the creation of several university-based institutes mandated to look at matters related to diversity, such as immigration, disability, queer studies and gender studies.[3] In addition, a growing number have realized that diversity must be studied in more complex ways. Research related to intersectionality and the intersections of diversity is just one example of this.[4] In the non-governmental sector, the upsurge of active lobbying efforts on the part of ethnocultural organizations has served to further embed diversity in the public agenda and the Canadian identity.[5] These efforts to understand, accommodate and take diversity into consideration are woven into the Canadian identity and simultaneously enforce it.

Observers have come to regard this interplay between diversity and national identity as uniquely Canadian, and they variously refer to it as the "Canadian diversity model" or the "Canadian way." The nation-building 'model' is really a somewhat loose collection of ideas and strategies for bringing together people of diverse backgrounds and life circumstances. Articulations of the Canadian model are often imprecise and sometimes muddy, and the matter is complicated by the birth, with almost annual frequency, of new language for the model as scholars, pundits and policy-makers continue to put into words the components of Canada's approach to diversity and nation-building.[6]

This article sketches not the historical or theoretical underpinnings of the Canadian national identity, but rather looks at the Government of Canada's framing and promotion of a national identity based on values, connections and culture. In the absence of a single culture, language or religion in Canada, values, connections and culture are viewed by the Government as the basis of what Kymlicka calls "social unity." One of the first articulations of this approach was in a speech that our then Prime Minister gave at Duke University in 2000. Although the government has changed since this unveiling of the model, recent policy documents follow in a similar vein suggesting that the Canadian model has been ingrained to the extent that it can transcend changes in political leadership.

However, nation-building and identity formation are evolutionary. Identities – whether individual or collective – are complex and fluid, and so is the climate in which they develop. Canada's approach to nation-building has varied depend-

ing on the country's demographic make-up, economic realities, the international arena and political will. As such, this article is really only a snapshot, a singular portrait of the Canadian model at one point in time when values, connections and culture are at its heart.

Values

Values are a key, and perhaps *the key,* component of the Canadian model. This is evident in statements by senior government officials,[7] the Speech from the Throne,[8] recent government reports,[9] and various pieces of legislation.[10] Indeed, although the Canadian model is comprised of three parts, it is really from values that the Canadian model gets its lifeblood, its very definition. This is in part because there is no single culture, no single language, no single history onto which the Canadian identity can be pinned, or around which it can be strengthened; values are viewed as something that all can hold in common. Connections and culture function more as tools for strengthening, rather than shaping or defining, the model. This was reinforced in a recent speech by the Prime Minister that listed a range of future Government initiatives – including those that would fall under the rubric of culture and connections – but suggested that "we begin with our values."

This begs the question: what values? Are there "Canadian values?" The recent Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future, which was funded in part by the Government of Canada, suggested that shared community, equality and justice, respect for diversity, mutual responsibility, accountability, and democracy are all "core Canadian values."[12] An earlier exercise by the Canadian Policy Research Networks found that Canadians espouse the values of "self-reliance; compassion leading to collective responsibility; investment, especially in children as the future generation; democracy; freedom; equality; and fiscal responsibility."[13] A decision by the Supreme Court of Canada found that "the values of tolerance, equality and respect… [are] at the heart of Canadian citizenship."[14] The Government, for its part, tends to focus in various speeches and documents on respect for diversity, peace, equality, fairness and democracy.

Some argue that "Canadian values" really do not differ in any significant way from the values of other Western liberal democracies. This is a central critique of the model, and it is an argument that does, in some respects, have merit. Americans, for example, also identify democracy, equality and freedom as core values, but there are differences in how Americans rank these values and in the subtleties that come through when discussing how to put these values into practice.[15] For example, Americans view the role of government differently than do Canadians. As a result, statist approaches to diversity and multiculturalism have less currency. The model rests on the assumption not so much that Canadians have 'unique' values, although this argument is advanced, but rather that these values play themselves out differently in the Canadian context.[16]

Critics also argue that values alone are an insufficient basis for building a strong national identity. As Cairns notes, "We cannot act together unless we have some basis of cohesion. Sharing values is insufficient to provide that cohesion."[17] Norman suggests, perhaps more caustically, that the "ideology of shared values [is] a peculiar… bit of constitutional theorizing that Canadians should neither export nor continue to dump on the home market."[18] The criticism in much of the literature appears to be not so much that framing a country's national identity around values is inherently wrong, but rather that it is not enough. Something more is needed.[19] It is perhaps for this reason that the Government has added "something more" to its model in the form of connections and culture.

Nonetheless, a model based on 'shared' values, although seemingly innocuous, may unintentionally foster division by favouring particular paradigms or cultural, social, or religious identifications over others. An appeal to "Canadian values" is assumed to be neutral, but most of these values are based on Western liberal traditions and values proposed in religious discourse which, in Canada, has traditionally been Judeo-Christian.[20] This can lead to the construction of an 'us versus them' dichotomy that pits majority perspectives against minority perspectives.[21]

There does, however, appear to be an appetite for a values-based discourse. The Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future revealed that "as [participants] talked with each other across different backgrounds, socio-economic groups and ages, they were astonished and reassured by how much they had in common." The more citizens talked about their values, the better they understood their own values and those of others. Further, "citizens repeatedly stated their wish that they or other citizens could delve more deeply into many of the subjects they were able to consider only briefly."[22] Dialogues on values take place, often implicitly, everyday, but structured, institutionalized dialogues may be a means of further delineating, negotiating and articulating Canadian values and could lead to more informed debate, which Kymlicka and Norman as well as Coulombe all point to as being important.[23]

Unfortunately, much of the public discourse now contains a "limits of diversity" thread, which the focus on values appears to encourage. Many fear that diversity will "go too far" and may threaten a broad Canadian identity or impinge upon deeply held Canadian values. The report on the recent Citizens' Dialogue confirmed this, noting that Canadians' "respect for diversity is strongly affirmed, but is now seen as an important part of (and limited by) a broader set of core Canadian values."[24] Kymlicka suggests that "people are not averse to minority rights within limits, but they want to know that there are indeed limits… People who are willing to accept certain policies as pragmatic compromises may reject the same policies if they are seen as endorsing a new principle with potentially far-reaching implications."[25] The events of September 11th suggested that Canadians may be willing to allow some limits on entrenched rights, although they are selective about which rights could be infringed upon for reasons of national security, and this selectivity would most markedly affect those suspected of terrorism.[26]

We need to think this through. We need an articulation of Canada's model that does not exclude those who are viewed as different or "too diverse." Indeed, the very people targeted by the limits discourse are those that Canada is attempting to include through concerted nation-building. This is in part because the benefits of immigration, multiculturalism and diversity tend to be minimized or are viewed as accruing

to newcomers and "diverse" Canadians alone even though immigration, multiculturalism and diversity are valuable resources and contribute to the economy, population growth, cultural variety, and the intellectual pool.

The idea that immigration is mutually beneficial – for immigrants themselves as well as for established Canadians – is reinforced by various pieces of legislation that are based on a reciprocal understanding of diversity. Our multiculturalism policy, for example, suggests that diversity is the right and responsibility of all Canadians (not just newcomers and ethnocultural minorities), while the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* recognizes the "mutual obligations" that new and established Canadians have with respect to integration. In short, newcomers and ethnocultural minorities do not just benefit from the Canadian identity, they also contribute to and enrich it. A recent article in one of Canada's largest dailies suggests that this point bears repeating. The columnist noted that "the federal government in its endless propaganda incessantly reminds immigrants and refugees of their rights, rarely reminds them of their obligations to their new country, and preaches to Canadians that it is they, not the newcomers, who must adapt and that the onus of accommodation lies forever with them. There are those who consider these goals, if not always the result, noble; I'm not one of them."[27]

Although there are indeed limits in Canadian society – limits that are supported by our legislative framework[28] – articulations of the Canadian model need to be open to an understanding of identity that is based on reciprocity and flexibility, rather than being primarily grounded within a discourse of "limits."

Connections

Connections create ties among Canadians. These ties, built through sustained interaction, highlight points of commonality and provide a space for understanding – and perhaps even resolving – differences. The crux of the Canadian model really is the creation of opportunities that allow individuals to find points of commonality while respecting differences. In this space, a national identity can flourish while differences can be retained. The importance attributed to "connections" as part of the Canadian model is evident in the renewed interest in social capital, which crops up in the work of the Policy Research Initiative, Statistics Canada, and the Metropolis Project.[29] Connections can be built through various means which could be loosely organized under the categories of infrastructure, interaction, and sectoral collaboration. I will describe each of these in turn.

The first means for fostering connections is through infrastructure, which includes the national railway, the TransCanada Highway and the Government's commitment to bring broadband Internet service to every Canadian community. These are "bricks and mortar" initiatives to link Canadians together. The second means of fostering connections is interaction, which includes exchanges, such as the Government of Canada's five-week official language exchange program, or the Forum for Young Canadians, which brings young people from across Canada to Parliament Hill for a week-long learning program. The third means for fostering connections is sectoral collaboration, which includes grants and contributions programs, third-sector delivery of programs, and other initiatives that foster collaboration between institutions, the state, and communities.[30] These are initiatives that encourage diverse Canadians, communities and sectors to work together for common causes. The Voluntary Sector Initiative is one such example,[31] as is the renewed Multiculturalism Program, which cast the focus less on "heritage retention" through ethno-specific funding, and more on "common citizenship, participation and inclusion" through project-based funding that requires partnerships.[32] Increasingly, the Government is using the language of "interculturalism" to signal this shift.[33]

Although the Government has done much to encourage connections among Canadians, some of these programs do not go far enough. For example, Exchanges Canada, although an important element in fostering connections, largely does not target its programs to encourage connections between diverse groups. Representatives from Exchanges Canada recently participated in a conference hosted by the Association for Canadian Studies, which looked at the impact of diversity on youth exchanges; this is perhaps a signal of change. The Official Languages Summer Bursary Program, which provides language instruction and the opportunity to live with a family in the other official language is a notable exception, but exchanges that explicitly bring together Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples and those from diverse religious and cultural communities and regions all have the potential to bridge existing divisions. Traditional exchanges that encourage face-to-face contact should be encouraged, but experiments with online communities could also prove fruitful and more cost-effective. The HOST Program, which develops a mentoring or helping relationship between new immigrants and established Canadians is another model that could be extended to include other groups, including youth and the elderly, the employed and unemployed, and those from low- and high-income groups.

Culture

Culture – "our collective sense of who we are"[34] – is the third prong in the model. Culture is, in some ways, different than the other components of the model because, unlike values and connections, which are important because they create points of commonality, culture is important in large part because it creates a space where difference is accepted and can flourish. This contributes to the building of a strong national identity because it says to individuals that they belong, that their stories, their art, their heritage, are a part of the whole.

It is, in part, out of historical necessity that culture is included in the Canadian model; Canada has always been understood as a compact between "two founding nations" with different languages, religions, and traditions. Gradually, this understanding of Canada has expanded to include not only the country's "founding nations," but also the First Nations, who were blatantly excluded from the 'founding' conception of Canada, as well as the newcomers who have followed. Of course, Canada has not always been a stellar example of cultural inclusion. History is rife with examples of exclusion on cultural grounds: the expulsion of the Acadians, the internment of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War, and the placement of Aboriginal

children in residential schools[35] threatened and, in many cases, destroyed cultures. Thankfully, the Government has taken some steps to repair this damage.[36]

The Government has also supported initiatives to strengthen and promote Canadian culture. For example, the Canadian Television Fund provides resources to support Canadian television programming. Telefilm Canada administers programs to support Canadian films. The Aboriginal Peoples Television Network, which began broadcasting in 1999, showcases Aboriginal programming and issues and includes some broadcasting in traditional Aboriginal languages. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and Radio-Canada, the country's national broadcasters, bring news and culture to Canadians in both official languages on radio and television. The websites of Canadian museums, galleries, and the National Library and National Archives bring the country's culture and stories into the homes of Canadians. Canadian content regulations promote Canadian content on television, radio, and in print.

In spite of this, many criticize Canadians' knowledge of culture. Public opinion research indicates that Canadians are not informed about their own history; in 2001, only 17 percent could pass a test on Canadian history and institutions that was based on the citizenship exam for new Canadians.[37] Moreover, Magsino argues that Canadians do not fully understand the perspectives of those with different religious or cultural backgrounds because there is an "absence of study about religions and cultures" in school curriculum.[38] Following September 11th, the backlash against Muslim, Jewish, Hindu and Sikh Canadians, as well as those of Arab origin and "in at least one puzzling case, Aboriginal Canadians," pointed to the extent of our misunderstanding.[39] Culture can also be divisive; it may exclude or offend and some may not see themselves reflected in the cultural narrative. Moreover, even when a space for the construction, celebration and maintenance of one's culture exists, the loss or absorption of cultural identity by the mainstream remains a threat.[40]

Citizenship education is one means for instilling an awareness of history and culture in Canadians. The Government is cautious in this area, given that the Canadian constitution identifies education as a provincial responsibility, but still plays a role in citizenship education, most notably through Citizenship Week activities undertaken by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, as well as through the Canadian Studies Program at Canadian Heritage, which provides grants for the development of learning materials on Canada. Citizenship ceremonies are also a means of promoting Canadian culture, and further attention should be given to using them as an avenue for cultural education. Guidelines for hosting citizenship ceremonies, for example, suggest that a cultural component could be included; Britain has suggested that a cultural component be mandatory.[41] Partnerships with various media to showcase and teach Canadians about the cultures within our country could also be pursued.

Conclusion

Nations, identities, models… these are all works in progress and as a result are, of course, incomplete. Nonetheless, the Government has, since our former Prime Minister's unveiling of the Canadian model four years ago to our most recent *Speech from the Throne,* affirmed its approach in policy documents and numerous initiatives. So, is the "Canadian way" the right way? Are values, connections and culture enough to create a strong national identity? That other countries look to the Canadian approach for insight suggests that Canada is doing something right. At the same time, visible minorities continue to report occurrences of racism, polling reveals that support for immigration is tenuous, and there have been a rash of anti-Semitic incidents in Toronto and Montréal recently. One could see all of this as evidence that the Canadian model does not work, that values, connections and culture cannot create a strong national identity in the context of diversity. These incidents, along with the events of September 11th and the aftermath, have indeed tested our model, but the fact that they occurred is not so much an indicator of failure as a warning that the Canadian identity is fragile. The Canadian model is not perfect, but when we assess Canada's response to incidents that challenge it – a response based in part on values, connections and culture – it does, on the whole, appear to work. Of course, the challenges that Canada faces are multi-faceted and cannot be addressed by the model alone; we must couple values, connections and culture with other measures that facilitate inclusion in the social, economic, cultural and political arenas. Values, connections and culture by themselves are not a panacea, but if we want a strong national identity in the context of diversity, the Canadian experience suggests that they are absolutely key components.

Notes

1 Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon. "The 'Canadian Diversity Model': A Repertoire in Search of a Framework." Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2001. p. 1.

2 See Varun Uberoi, this volume.

3 Mulholland's examination of Canadian theses and dissertations on diversity notes that "there is a marked and increasing presence of graduate research undertaken in Canada on immigration, integration, multicultural education, social justice, racism, hate and discrimination." See Mary-Lee Mulholland, "Annotated Bibliography of Canadian Theses and Dissertations on Diversity: 1980-2001" (Ottawa: Canadian Heritage, 2001).

4 See *Canadian Diversity* magazine on Intersections of Diversity (3.1 Winter 2004), the special issue of *Canadian Ethnic Studies* on Intersections of Diversity (Vol. 34, No. 3, 2003), as well as related papers on the Metropolis website at http://www.canada.metropolis.net/events/Diversity/diversity_index_e.htm.

5 See Peter S. Li. "Visible Minorities in Canadian Society: Challenges of Racial Diversity." *Social Differentiation: Patterns and Processes.* Ed. Danielle Juteau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. p. 138-139.

6 The most recent *Speeches from the Throne* are just one means of tracing the evolution of the terminology. Nation-building is grounded alternatively in social unity, social inclusion, social cohesion, shared citizenship and social foundations. See www.sft-dft.gc.ca.

7 In a speech at the Progressive Governance Summit in July 2003, the then Prime Minister of Canada noted that "our longstanding experience with bridging cultural, linguistic, religious and regional divides has resulted in a shared set of values and principles." Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, "Immigration and Multiculturalism in Canada," speech delivered at the Progressive Governance Summit (London UK, 12 July 2003).

8 The 2002 *Speech from the Throne,* for example, speaks of "the values of pluralism, freedom and democracy," the necessity to frame international and defence policies on the basis of our values, and notes that "our health care system is a practical expression of the values that define us as a country." The most recent *Speech from the Throne,* delivered on 2 February 2004, makes similar references to values. The text of these documents can be found at http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft.htm.

[9] The final report of the Romanow Commission on Health Care, for example, was entitled "Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada." The Department of Foreign Affairs initiated a Dialogue on Foreign Policy in January 2003 and framed it in terms of "protecting the security of our nation and contributing to global security; increasing prosperity in Canada and expanding global prosperity; and promoting the values and culture that Canadians cherish."

[10] The *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,* the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act,* and the most recent proposed revisions to the existing *Citizenship Act,* for example, include direct references to Canadian values. The *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* has been particularly influential. In a review of public opinion in Canada over the past 20 years, Mendelsohn notes that "most Canadians have embraced the identity laid out for them in the Charter of Rights. There is strong support for bilingualism and multiculturalism, and these have become cornerstones of the Canadian identity across the country. Canadians have also become more supportive of immigration." See Matthew Mendolsohn, "Canada's Social Contract: Evidence from Public Opinion," Discussion Paper No. P|01 (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2002) v. These findings were largely confirmed in a study on "The New Canada," which was done by the *Globe and Mail* and the Centre for Research and Information on Canada in the spring of 2003. Parkin and Mendelsohn note that "if the Charter's values did not fully reflect who we were as a country when it was adopted in 1982, they have shaped what we are today." See Andrew Parkin and Matthew Mendolsohn, "A New Canada: An Identity Shaped by Diversity," CRIC Paper No. 11 (Ottawa: Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2003).

[11] Prime Minister Paul Martin, "Address by the Prime Minister in Reply to the *Speech from the Throne,*" 3 February 2004, www.pm.gc.ca.

[12] See Mary Pat MacKinnon, Judith Maxwell, Steven Rosell, and Nandini Saxena, "Citizens' Dialogue on Canada's Future: A 21st Century Social Contract" (April 2003) ix. Available at www.cprn.org.

[13] Suzanne Peters. *Exploring Canadian Values: Foundations for Well-Being.* CPRN Study No. F01, Revised Version (Ottawa: CPRN, 1995).

[14] *Lavoie v. Canada* [2002] SCC 23, line 15.

[15] Carol Goar. "We do have distinctive values." *Toronto Star* (April 21, 2003).

[16] See Michael Adams. *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada the Myth of Converging Values.* Toronto: Penguin, 2003; Neil Nevitte. *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective.* Peterborough: Broadview, 1996.

[17] Alan C. Cairns. "Introduction." *Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives.* Eds. Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999. p. 19.

[18] Wayne Norman. "The Ideology of Shared Values: A Myopic Vision of Unity in the Multi-nation State." *Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Perspective from Anglophone Canada.* Ed. Joseph Carens. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995. p. 137.

[19] See Rainer Bauböck. "Farewell to Multiculturalism? Sharing Values and Identities in Societies of Immigration." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 3.1 (2002): 1-16; Will Kymlicka. *Multicultural Citizenship.* Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995.

[20] Although Canada has been influenced significantly by Judeo-Christian traditions, Coward notes that the "various religions have never been distinct entities. In their instrumental forms, …the religions have constantly borrowed from and interacted with each other." See Harold Coward, *Pluralism in the World Religions: A Short Introduction* (Boston: Oneworld, 2000) 143. Coward's observation further weakens the "us versus them" discourse that has developed with respect to religion and was fuelled by the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.

[21] This was particularly evident following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, which pitted so-called Muslim values (defined, largely, on the basis of the alleged terrorists' actions) against so-called Canadian values. Public discourse after September 11th highlighted not only the role that religion plays in defining values (real and perceived), but also the lack of knowledge on religious traditions.

[22] MacKinnon et al., 31-33.

[23] Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman. "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts." *Citizenship in Diverse Societies.* Eds. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 8; Pierre A. Coulombe. "Citizenship and Official Bilingualism in Canada." *Citizenship in Diverse Societies.* Eds. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 285.

[24] MacKinnon et al., v.

[25] Will Kymlicka. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 8.

[26] Environics Research Group, "Social Cohesion in Canada," report prepared for Canadian Heritage (Ottawa: Environics Research Group, 2002) 77.

[27] Christie Blatchford. "How multiculturalism breeds hate." *Globe and Mail* (March 27, 2004) M3.

[28] See, for example, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;* section 1 reads "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such *reasonable limits* prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" [emphasis added].

[29] Details on the Policy Research Initiative's horizontal project on social capital can be found at http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm=socap. Statistics Canada's General Social Survey on Time Use and Social Engagement will examine some aspects of social capital. Results are expected in 2004; see www.statcan.ca. Finally, a recent Metropolis Conversation examined Social Capital in government programs. A report is forthcoming on the Metropolis website, http://www.canada.metropolis.net/events/index_e.html.

[30] Metropolis Project, "Social Capital and Government Programs," Metropolis Conversation Series No. 11 (forthcoming).

[31] The Voluntary Sector Initiative, which was announced in June 2000, is a joint project of the voluntary sector and the Government of Canada, which aims to, among other things, "enhance the relationship between the sector and the federal government and their ability to serve Canadians." See Voluntary Sector Initiative, "About the VSI," http://www.vsi-isbc.ca/eng/about.cfm.

[32] Coulombe, 284; Marc Leman, "Canadian Multiculturalism," *Current Issue Review* 93-6 (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1999) p. 8.

[33] See, for example, the 2002 *Speech from the Throne.* It is important to note that Quebec has long articulated its model as one of interculturalism with a foundation of French as the language of public life. See Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, "Framing Citizenship Status in an Age of Polyethnicity: Quebec's Model of Interculturalism," Canada: The State of the Federation 2001, Canadian Political Cultures in Transition, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar, eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) p. 327.

[34] Government of Canada, "Connecting to the Canadian Experience: Diversity, Creativity and Choice," Response to the Ninth Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (Ottawa: Government of Canada, November 1999) p. 4.

[35] This was just part of a larger assimilation strategy that included disenfranchisement and the loss of Aboriginal status upon intermarriage.

[36] The Japanese Canadian Redress Agreement, which was signed in 1988, made some reparations for the internment of Japanese Canadians, including the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation and the (largely symbolic) compensation of 16,000 people. See www.cr.ca. The Indian Residential Schools Resolution framework provides guidelines for compensating Aboriginal peoples who were placed in residential schools and suffered cultural and linguistic loss, as well as physical and sexual abuse. See http://www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca. Reparations for the Acadian expulsion are less evident; thus far, the Canadian government has not apologized for the expulsion, although several Opposition motions in the House of Commons have encouraged this. However, the Government does provide support to Acadian communities through the Canada-New Brunswick-Acadian Community Agreement of the Official Languages Support Programs. See www.pch.gc.ca.

[37] Compas Inc., Global TV and the Ottawa Citizen, "I am Canadian? Canada Day Poll" (June 2001).

[38] Romulo F. Magsino. "Study of Religions for Citizenship: Why Not?" *Canadian Diversity / Diversité Canadienne* 2.1 (2003): 25.

[39] John Biles and Humera Ibrahim. "After September 11th, 2001: A Tale of Two Canadas," paper presented at the 7th International Metropolis Conference (Oslo Norway, 11 September 2002) p. 5.

[40] The department of Canadian Heritage noted in 2002 that "the continuing erosion of Aboriginal language threatens Aboriginal cultural survival and represents irreparable loss to the cultural heritage of Canada." The department estimates that "close to half of the 50 to 70 Aboriginal languages in Canada are near extinction or endangered, and 10 once-flourishing languages have become extinct over the last 100 years." See Department of Canadian Heritage, "Minister Copps Announces the Creation of an Aboriginal Languages and Cultures Centre," News Release (Winnipeg MB, 19 December 2002). The federal government committed to establishing an Aboriginal Languages and Cultures Centre, while the Action Plan for Official Languages looks at the preservation and promotion of official language minority communities.

[41] Alan Travis. "New Britons to pledge loyalty to country: Minister wants local flavour for Canadian-style citizenship ceremonies." *The Guardian* (26 July 2003).

Mon pays ce n'est pas un pays, c'est une idée...

Chantal Bernier

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RÉSUMÉ

Chantal Bernier propose qu'on oublie la dichotomie identité-diversité dans le but de nous concentrer sur un projet social fondé sur un contrat canadien. Le Canada n'est pas le foyer d'un peuple, mais d'une société. Bien qu'il soit considéré comme pionnier dans le domaine de la diversité, le Canada confronte encore des défis, surtout en ce qui concerne les Premières Nations, les minorités culturelles, et la société québécoise. L'auteure croit sincèrement qu'à travers un dialogue honnête et ouvert, ces faiblesses peuvent être corrigées.

Trouver une forme d'association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant ? Tel est le problème fondamental dont le contrat social donne la solution.

J.-J. Rousseau, *Du contrat social* (1762)

Il y a presque trois cents ans, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposait la solution au dilemme, vécu au Canada comme dans plusieurs sociétés occidentales, entre la diversité et la cohésion. Cet article suggère de dépasser cet antagonisme en redirigant nos efforts de cohésion nationale pour abandonner la recherche d'une identité commune insaisissable et favoriser plutôt la consolidation du projet de société qui nous anime. Ce projet réunit des identités et des valeurs diverses, mais il est fondé sur des principes relationnels partagés qui rassemblent la force commune, autour de la force de chacun. C'est le contrat social canadien.

La prémisse qui sous-tend cette démarche est que le Canada n'est pas constitué d'un peuple mais de plusieurs peuples et que ces peuples ne partagent pas un seul ensemble de valeurs mais se rallient autour de principes relationnels communs. Ces principes forment une société selon un pacte de citoyenneté, un contrat social de co-existence et d'interaction. Ce pacte est unique et rassembleur même si ses composantes sont campées dans des identités différentes.

Si le pacte est fort il a tout de même des failles, des exclus, et notre politique sur la diversité et la cohésion doit porter sur l'ouverture du pacte à tous les segments de la population pour assurer leur engagement et leur participation à la société canadienne, dans le juste équilibre de leur intégrité et de leur appartenance. Après avoir développé cette prémisse, nous tenterons de définir les paramètres du contrat social canadien, mettre en lumière ses failles et finalement proposer des avenues de résolution.

La prémisse : le Canada n'abrite pas un peuple mais une société

Si nous nous efforçons encore de définir l'« identité canadienne » c'est par atavisme, par attachement à la tradition politique de l'État-nation, fort de l'unicité de sa culture, de sa race, de ses valeurs, de sa langue et de sa religion, qui règne depuis toujours, de force ou de fait. Pourtant, nous avons depuis longtemps dénoncé la répression endémique à l'État homogène, l'appauvrissement culturel et social qui en découle et constaté la diversification inexorable de la société canadienne. La quête d'une « identité canadienne » n'est donc qu'un réflexe, un vestige d'une tradition politique dépassée, dont il faut se départir.

Délaisser l'idéal d'un « peuple canadien » peut être difficile pour ceux qui y voient le vecteur essentiel de la cohésion sociale. Traditionnellement, c'est la force d'expressions identitaires communes qui mobilise les personnes face à un but collectif[1] ou le corpus de symboles et de mythes qui fait que les États fonctionnent[2] ou un sentiment d'histoire partagée qui forge la cohésion sociale[3]. Cependant, même si on accepte qu'un État doive créer un point de ralliement pour rassembler la force commune, au Canada, les faits s'opposent à la création d'une expression identitaire unique, fondée sur une

histoire ou des mythes partagés : notre expérience historique diverge selon qu'on est autochtone ou non, anglophone ou francophone, Canadien chinois, Canadien japonais ou Canadien européen, nouvel arrivant ou né ici. La symbolique qui nous rejoint diffère également selon notre culture et notre langue. En fait, partout la diversification et la démocratisation des sociétés font que le point de ralliement d'un État ne peut plus être défini par des traits et des valeurs communes mais plutôt par des principes relationnels partagés, par un contrat social.

La conceptualisation de la cohésion sociale autour d'un pacte plutôt que d'une identité est un progrès intellectuel et moral. En effet, le Canada est une œuvre, un effort d'humanité, une expression de l'intelligence et de la moralité humaine, plutôt qu'un accident historique. La comparaison entre peuple et société fait ressortir ce caractère délibéré du Canada : on adhère activement à une société alors qu'on émane, passivement, d'un peuple. Les individus déterminent les paramètres de leur société alors qu'un peuple définit les individus qui le compose. Une société rassemble plusieurs identités alors qu'un peuple n'en nourrit qu'une.

Au Canada, donc, la cohésion sociale est un processus de socialisation, autour d'un pacte que chacun contribue à définir. Il est inachevé et nous aborderons ses failles plus loin mais d'abord, tentons de définir les paramètres du contrat social canadien.

Les paramètres du contrat social canadien

Le contrat social est « un acte d'association (qui) produit un corps moral et collectif »[4] donc un pacte de citoyenneté, un ensemble de principes auxquels les membres d'une société ont choisi d'assujettir leurs relations. Ce ne sont pas des valeurs communes, mais ce pourrait certainement être le principe selon lequel les valeurs de chacun doivent être respectées à certaines conditions convenues. Sous cet angle, le paradoxe identité-diversité s'estompe puisque l'union n'est pas identitaire.

Dans notre recherche, toujours infructueuse, de « l'identité canadienne », il est intéressant de voir comment les Canadiens et Canadiennes sont unis à l'égard des principes qui régissent les rapports entre les gens même s'ils sont divisés à l'égard de certaines valeurs. Par exemple, dans un sondage d'octobre 2003[5], les personnes interrogées ont exprimé leur plus grande fierté nationale face à des symboles qui peuvent être décrits comme des aspects du contrat social canadien : l'harmonie entre les différentes cultures (71 %), la contribution au maintien de la paix (70 %), la politesse et le civisme (67 %), la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* (62 %), le multiculturalisme (54 %) et les deux langues officielles (42 %). Il est intéressant également de noter que ces symboles de fierté reçoivent un endossement supérieur parmi les segments d'influence croissante de la société canadienne : les jeunes et les néo-Canadiens. C'est dans cette vision que le Canada se définit, non pas comme un peuple, mais comme une société.

Officiellement et juridiquement, le contrat social canadien est constaté dans la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.* L'équilibre proposé par Jean-Jacques Rousseau entre la liberté individuelle et la protection de la force commune est articulé dans le premier article de la *Charte* qui garantit les droits et libertés, sujets aux impératifs d'une société libre et démocratique.

Quelles sont les caractéristiques du contrat social canadien ? Joseph Heath, qui n'adhère pas au discours des valeurs communes, reconnaît plutôt des principes communs qu'il résume à quatre « principes sous-jacents à la structure institutionnelle de notre société » : l'efficacité, l'égalité, l'autonomie et la non-violence[6]. Dans cette même veine, en lisant de pair l'opinion publique et les lois constitutionnelles, incluant la *Charte,* il émerge des paramètres du pacte qui nous lie : la valorisation, active, réelle et officielle, de la diversité, l'ouverture entre nous et au monde, le pacifisme, l'adaptation à l'autre, le respect mutuel, l'inclusion et la participation égale à la société, l'égalité des droits et des chances, la primauté du droit et la dualité linguistique. En quoi cela est-il unique au Canada ? En ce que nous sommes les premiers à avoir adopté une politique officielle et active de valorisation de la diversité, où l'État, plutôt que de constater passivement la diversification de sa population se fait le gardien de cette diversité comme d'une richesse. En ce sens, le Canada est le pionnier d'un nationalisme non pas identitaire mais moral, c'est-à-dire une fierté qui nous unit non pas au sein d'une identité commune mais au sein de principes partagés.

Les failles au contrat social et leur résolution

Ceci étant dit, le contrat social canadien a encore des failles qui marginalisent les Autochtones, les Québécois et les minorités culturelles. Leur sentiment d'appartenance ne sera réalisé que lorsqu'ils auront participé à la définition du contrat social canadien à leurs conditions, protégeant à la fois leur intégrité et leur appartenance. Il faut préciser d'emblée que les failles dont nous traitons ici sont les failles politiques, les failles d'allégeance, et non les écarts socio-économiques.

Pour comprendre les ramifications de ces failles d'allégeance il faut se rappeler l'importance du contrat social : il est essentiel à la paix et à l'ordre public en favorisant l'harmonie des comportements, il assure la convergence et la synergie des efforts multiples face à des objectifs communs et il assure la participation équitable de tous à l'effort et à ses récompenses. À l'inverse, il en va de la sécurité publique si certains Canadiens et Canadiennes ne se sentent pas visés par les lois du pays, ou si certains Canadiens et Canadiennes ne se sentent pas protégés par les lois et les institutions du pays. Il en va de la stabilité du Canada si certains groupes minoritaires se sentent systématiquement exclus de l'accès au pouvoir économique et politique.

La faille la plus profonde reste celle qui marginalise les peuples autochtones qui n'ont toujours pas négocié, à leur satisfaction et selon leurs principes, les conditions de leur appartenance à la société canadienne[7]. Encore aujourd'hui, plusieurs Autochtones disent « votre » constitution en parlant de la *Constitution canadienne,* « votre Charte » en parlant de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* ou « vos tribunaux » en parlant des cours fédérales et provinciales, ne se sentant visés par aucune de ces institutions. Tant que les termes de la relation entre les Autochtones et le reste du Canada ne seront pas établis, de façon paritaire et réciproque, cette faille minera toujours le contrat social canadien et sa capacité, donc, de rassembler la force

commune. Bien que la *Loi constitutionnelle de 1982* ait jeté les bases de cette relation équitable et que la reconnaissance du droit inhérent des Autochtones à l'autonomie gouvernementale en 1995 en soit une expression concrète, il reste à en définir les diverses modalités.

Pour rétablir la relation avec les Autochtones, nous devons d'abord et avant tout poursuivre le dialogue sur la réconciliation et sur la réparation des injustices historiques. Ce dialogue a été ouvert lors des conférences constitutionnelles des années 80 puis approfondi dans le cadre de la Commission Royale d'enquête sur les peuples autochtones. Il serait utile de le reprendre de façon structurée, de gouvernement à gouvernement, fondée non seulement sur les principes enchâssés au contrat social canadien que nous avons cités plus haut, mais également sur les principes relationnels proposés par les Autochtones : la reconnaissance mutuelle, c'est-à-dire, d'une part, la reconnaissance par les non–Autochtones du fait que les Autochtones sont les premiers habitants de ce territoire et qu'il en découle des droits et, d'autre part, la reconnaissance par les Autochtones des liens d'affection et de loyauté qui rattachent les non-Autochtones à ce même territoire ; le respect mutuel, c'est-à-dire le respect des institutions, de la langue et de la culture de l'un et de l'autre ; le partage, soit la reconnaissance réciproque des droits et la participation équitable à la richesse ; finalement, la responsabilité mutuelle, soit la transformation de la relation coloniale en un partenariat fondé sur l'autonomie et l'interdépendence[8].

D'autres États, plus déchirés que le nôtre, ont dû avoir recours à un processus officiel de réconciliation simplement pour pouvoir avancer, notamment l'Afrique du Sud, le Guatemala, l'Argentine, le Chili ou le Sri Lanka. Il n'est pas question de reproduire ici l'ampleur de telles initiatives mais d'y emprunter les principes de justice réparatrice collective qui les sous-tendent : la reconnaissance du tort causé, l'intervention thérapeutique et le rétablissement de la justice pour tous[9].

Sur cette assise, le dialogue officiel proposé ici engagerait les parties dans un échange qui comporterait l'expression franche et complète des aspirations et des récriminations de part et d'autre, dans un débat sur cet échange, et dans une réflexion sur la position de l'autre pour développer, ensemble, une vision partagée d'un avenir commun[10].

Une autre faille fondamentale au contrat social canadien est celle qui sépare le Québec du reste du Canada : il ne faut pas oublier que le Québec n'a toujours pas souscrit à la *Loi constitutionnelle de 1982*, l'instrument juridique contenant le contrat social canadien. L'engagement du Québec à ce contrat social canadien est assorti d'une condition claire et incontournable : l'unité canadienne passe par la reconnaissance du fait que le Québec forme une société distincte qui se manifeste sous à peu près tous les angles de la vie sociale que ce soit par la langue, la culture, les valeurs, les us et coutumes, en somme tout ce qui définit un peuple. L'ouverture complète au Québec du contrat social canadien procède donc de l'aménagement dans la constitution canadienne, du caractère distinct du Québec et le gouvernement fédéral doit en prendre la charge pour le Canada.

Finalement, il faut résoudre la faille d'allégeance au contrat social qui laisse toujours en marge de notre société les minorités culturelles, composée essentiellement de néo-Canadiens. Bien que les nouveaux arrivants déclarent généralement leur adhésion, sinon leur admiration, face au contrat social canadien, il n'en reste pas moins qu'ils ne se reconnaissent pas dans nos institutions qui, effectivement, leur ressemblent peu. Le fait que les minorités culturelles, avec les Autochtones, représentent la plus grande portion de notre croissance démographique signale l'importance d'ouvrir rapidement le dialogue avec les minorités culturelles sur les modalités de leur participation au Canada.

À cet égard, la résolution est plus une question d'inclusion que de réconciliation. En effet, contrairement aux failles qui séparent du reste du Canada les Autochtones et les Québécois, les failles d'allégeance qui excluent les minorités culturelles ne se rapportent pas aux termes du contrat social canadien. C'est plutôt une question de respect et d'engagement. Le défi est donc d'assurer l'application équitable des principes de ce contrat social et la possibilité à tous d'en influencer l'évolution. Le dialogue d'inclusion doit donc s'engager non pas sur les principes du contrat social, mais plutôt sur son ouverture, son accueil aux minorités culturelles et sur leur participation.

En somme, la cohésion et l'unicité du Canada résident en un contrat social qui prône le respect mutuel et qui dévolue au gouvernement le devoir de le préserver. Le rôle du gouvernement du Canada est de favoriser la réalisation de ce contrat social et cela exige, en priorité, l'ouverture du dialogue sur ses termes avec ceux qui en sont encore en marge. L'idée est trop belle pour ne pas la partager.

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Notional Nations:

The Myth of Canada as a Multinational Federation

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ABSTRACT

What is the difference between a nation and a country, and how many nations is too many? The notion of a plurality of nations under one roof in Canada is not as clear-cut as it may first appear. In this article, Jack Jedwab highlights some of the problems with the theory that Canada is a multinational federation, providing a variety of interesting figures to support his case. He demonstrates how identity, ethnicity, citizenship and region all have an important role to play.

Several respected thinkers insist that Canada is a multinational federation comprising an English Canadian nation, a Québécois nation and an Aboriginal nation(s). In fact, some have argued that the ongoing denial of this reality by Canada's political elite puts the future of the federation in perpetual peril. Following the logic of advocates of this notion of a multinational federation, if Canada does not refute its national existence it will lose its standing as a country. Still, it is tempting to ask whether the recognition of several nations within Canada is not the greater threat to its existence as a country.

In 2003, the Quebec National Assembly unananimously adopted a resolution which declared that the people of Quebec formed a nation in response to the House of Commons' rejection of a similar motion proposed by members of the sovereignist Bloc Québécois – a federal opposition party. Underlying the idea that Quebec forms a nation is the notion that Canada constitutes a multinational federation; however, parliamentarians simply declaring that Quebec is a nation does not make it so. No Canadian constitutional document recognizes the concept of three nations, despite certain thinkers frequently repeating the idea. Saying that Canada is a multinational federation is staking a claim rather than stating a fact. While its proponents may argue that it is a novel notion, it is equally valid to contend that the idea's time came and went.

Though the affirmation of Quebec nationhood dates back two centuries, it is in the post-Confederation period that initially emerged the much-debated premise that Canada is the creation of two founding nations or peoples. In the 1960s, Canada established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which was mandated to recommend measures whereby the Canadian federation could be developed on the basis of an equal partnership between what was then referred to as its two founding peoples (the English and the French). Confederation, declared in 1867, was a new partnership between English and French colonists to manage lands and resources north of the 49th parallel. It was negotiated without reference to Aboriginal nations, the first partners of both the French and the English.

Beginning in the 1980s, the growing attention directed by Canadian opinion leaders towards aboriginal aspirations saw advocates of the founding peoples discourse evolve towards the three nation theory, thus rendering their concept more inclusive. In other words, the previously failed idea of two founding nations or peoples is presumably corrected by the addition of the Aboriginal peoples or nations. Gagnon and Rocher (1997) contend that: "…Canada has every advantage in rediscovering the fact that the country is a federation which endeavored from its inception to reconcile the existence of different national groups within a broader political entity. The failure to recognize this diversity mortgages the relationships among the various national components. They conclude that Canada's transformation into a multinational state is one possible means of alleviating the country's state of perpetual political crisis and ushering it into modernity."

Will Kymlicka believes that the real threat to Canada's long-term stability remains the failure to reach a satisfactory arrangement with Canada's non-immigrant national minorities – namely, the Québécois and the Aboriginal peoples. To get beyond Canada's constitutional impasse, the much-respected philosopher claims we need to accept that Canada is and will remain a multinational state – a federation of peoples. It is a view echoed by James Tully, who notes that in multinational federations like Canada it is essential to accord the status of peoples to the Québécois and the Aboriginal population and offer them a right to what he calls internal self-determination (Tully, 1999). Tully's Federative model differs from that of Kymlicka in that there are only two peoples or nations, and perhaps ironically, it can be described as a new version of the two-nations theory.

In the multinational Canada proposed by Kymlicka it is necessary to persuade English-speaking Canadians that they have common interests as a language-based community. These interests, he adds, are relatively similar to those of the Québécois and Aboriginals. Kymlicka refers to two major obstacles to the idea. He acknowledges that English-speaking

Canadians have little or no sense of group identity and little or no sense that they form a distinct community within Canada. Indeed surveys reveal that language is not the dominant marker of identity for English-speakers, with perhaps the exception of those who live in Quebec. If indeed the English language were the common marker of identity for Canadians outside of Quebec, how would they be different from other North Americans? Therefore Canada's anglophones must be convinced that they have similar 'national' identity needs, something that Kymlicka acknowledges is unlikely to resonate with this group.

But there are a number of other equally serious matters that would have to be overcome in order to attain popular support for this concept, including the presence of francophones outside Quebec and notably the Acadian population, which itself may lay claim to the status of nation. Would they be part of the English-Canadian nation? Conversely, would Quebec anglophones be part of the English-Canadian nation or the Québécois nation? The same question would apply to allophones both within Quebec and in the rest of Canada. In a hypothetical future negotiation between these nations, would their interests be represented on a territorial or linguistic basis? And would the sixty-plus Aboriginal nations each be individually recognized as such, or would they have to constitute one nation to accommodate the other two nations and not to upset a situation where the 'three' nations would deal with each other on a nation-to-nation basis? How does the three-nation theory take into account dual or multiple attachments of members of each 'nation'?

Would the sixty-plus Aboriginal nations each be individually recognized as such, or would they have to constitute one nation to accommodate the other two nations and not to upset a situation where the 'three' nations would deal with each other on a nation-to-nation basis?

Canadians outside of Quebec might choose to define themselves as several nations under a multinational model. Albertans and Newfoundlanders may insist upon national recognition were Quebec to secure it within such a redefined Canadian federation. Each has indicated on several occasions that it has interests that diverge from those expressed elsewhere in Canada. Political scientist Alan Cairns has argued that: "…the search for the ROC's reconstitution after Quebec's departure would, other things being equal, likely privilege provincial governments, especially those of the wealthier provinces, and thus lead to a more fragmented, provincialized successor state than would be probable if haste could be avoided. It might even result in two or more separate polities." (Cairns, 1998) No doubt it would suit some Quebecers if the rest of Canada were to constitute one nation, thus permitting the outdated notion that English and French peoples of Canada would interact as two equal nations.

Kymlicka and Tully propose a redefinition of the federation that is based on three different notions of nationhood that would be difficult to reconcile. The 'Québécois' nation would be territorially defined, the rest of Canada's national status would be based on the sharing of the English language, and the Aboriginals would in theory possess nations within the nation defined by ancestry and 'rootedness.' Undoubtedly the political value of 'national' status would vary considerably under such an ill-conceived formula. It is indeed curious that advocates of the Canadian multinational federation can easily carve an anglophone nation within the federation, but refuse to refer to a francophone nation in Canada, despite the fact that language is a powerful marker of identity for the country's French-speakers, not only within Quebec, but also outside the province. Clearly the sociological reality of the francophone nation within Canada runs counter to the political aspirations of nationhood advocated by certain Quebec thinkers.

National Recognition: Sociology and Politics?

Once responsible for Canada's constitutional dossier Stephane Dion (2001) claims that Quebecers form a nation in sociological terms – in the French sense of the word. According to Dion, in legal terms – in the English sense – it is Canada that constitutes a nation, that is an independent state with its own seat at the United Nations. Formerly responsible for Quebec's constitutional dossier, Joseph Facal (2001) retorts that Dion makes a false distinction between the English and French conceptions of nation and that in general the idea is defined in a similar manner. It is true that whether anglophone or francophone many Canadians fail to distinguish the sociological dimension of nationhood from its political expression. For many English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, the idea of nation and country are synonymous. In this regard it is worth noting that from an identity standpoint English Canadians see Quebec's presence as a fundamental part of Canada's national identity. Létourneau (2000) argues that thinking about the future of Quebec without taking into account the centrality of the Canadian fact as part of the identity of Quebecers is akin to thinking about the future of Canada while neglecting the centrality of the French fact to Canadian identity.

Dion (2001) argues that: "…a nation exists as soon as humans consider that they form one. They feel like they share common historic, cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious traits and see themselves as a nation on that basis." Some Quebecers would no doubt argue that on this basis Canada does not form a nation in that it fails to share the aforementioned commonalities. Yet given its own diversity neither might Quebec qualify for such national status? Alternatively it might be argued that Quebec could consider itself a multinational federation with an English Canadian nation and Aboriginal nations.

VIVE LE QUANADA!

The ongoing debate over our Canada's constitutional future remains very much influenced by Quebecers' attachment to Quebec and Canada respectively. It is clear that over the past two decades there has been a diminishing identification with Canada amongst many francophones. For some, the extent to which one considers him or herself a Canadian, Quebecer, or both, is believed to be at the heart of the identity question. In an effort to get to the bottom of the issue, public opinion polls have obliged Quebecers to decide whether they identified more with Quebec or with Canada. Often, the way a question is formulated on attachments to Quebec and Canada has helped determine the results. Not surprisingly, such surveys have frequently uncovered an important dichotomy along linguistic lines where a greater percentage of francophones tended to choose Quebec first, while the overwhelming majority of non-francophones choose Canada. A Quebec-wide survey conducted by the research firm CROP (1998) noted that some 67% of Quebec respondents claimed that they were proud to be both Quebecers and Canadians and were upset when politicians asked them to choose between their two identities. However, when asked how they define themselves, some 51% of Quebec francophones declared they were Quebecers and then Canadians (37%) or just simply Quebecers (14%). Some 31% of francophones defined themselves as equally Canadian and Quebecer. For their part 47% of Quebec anglophones declared that they were Canadians first and then Quebecers (38%) or simply Quebecers (9%). Some 40% of Quebec anglophones defined themselves as being equally Canadian and Quebecer. The province's allophones more closely resembled the anglophone population as regards their national identification, and only 13% described themselves as either more Québécois than Canadian or Québécois only.

> The histories of Quebec and the rest of Canada are closely connected and represent stories of cooperation and conflict in a process than many describe as nation-building. It is hard to detach the major events that have shaped Quebec from those contributing to the evolution of Canada.

The reality regarding the Quebec/Canada identity issue is frequently more complex than is revealed by these numerous surveys. First, the respondents are invited to attribute their own meaning to the concept of national identity where there may be some confusion with the notion of ethnicity, citizenship and region. In effect, even the choice of being a 'Quebecer' first may simply imply that for some the Canadian 'national' identification is less important than attachment to some ethno-national form of identity. Undoubtedly, respondents attribute different meanings to being a Quebecer. According to former Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau: "The vast majority of non-francophones during the [1995] referendum reclaimed their desire to remain Canadian… their interest dictates this attitude. Until a referendum is won they will stay as they are. Following that they will adapt. Until then they are Canadians and proud to be …never will the Anglo-Quebecers accept to exchange their attachment to a vast majority in Canada against minority status in Quebec." (Parizeau, 1997)

We the People

In their pre-referendum manifesto for a sovereign Quebec, a leading group of intellectuals argued that: "…Quebecers form a people. Not all peoples need to form a sovereign state and Quebecers have for some time made efforts to operate within the Canadian federalist framework. But Canada refuses to recognize Quebec's status as a founding people and give it the tools it needs to develop fully. It is necessary to take note of the incapacity of Canada to see itself as a multinational state." Approximately two years after the 1995 referendum, Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard stated that: "If English Canada wants to hold a big contest to name us, let them do it. It's a waste of time. We aren't interested in such a contest. We know what we are called, it's the people of Quebec." (Bauch, 1997) It would seem that while for many Quebecers constitute a people, so too do Canadians. The survey cited earlier reveals that a vast majority of Quebecers regard themselves as being part of at least these two peoples (CROP, 1998).

Canada as a Multinational Federation: The People's Choice?

Kymlicka maintains that the 'Québécois' and Aboriginals agree that Canada is a multinational federation (1998). However, there is no evidence that public opinion in the province or elsewhere in Canada supports this notion. In September 2002, Environics asked some 2,000 persons to select a description of Canada that best represents their own view of the country. Of the three options offered a majority of Canadians described Canada as a multicultural country with two official languages, one-fifth saw Canada as a multinational federation consisting of three nations (the Quebecois nation, the English-Canadian nation and the Aboriginal nations) and some 13% as a country characterized by two founding peoples. Outside of Quebec two-thirds saw Canada as a multicultural country with two official languages. Within Quebec this vision was endorsed by 47% of the population. It still remained the most popular description amongst Quebecers, with some 30% opting for the multinational federation, and 18% the two founding peoples. Some three-quarters of immigrants view Canada as a multicultural country, a view shared by just less than half of Aboriginals surveyed. One-quarter of Aboriginals regard Canada as a multinational federation.

The idea of Canada as a multinational federation gains limited support amongst the 'member nations,' that is English-Canadians (19%), Quebecers (29%) and Aboriginals (24%). The exception to what is otherwise the rule is

amongst supporters of the Bloc Québécois most of whom endorse the concept of Canada as a multinational federation with 40% supporting the notion, 32% the multicultural vision with two official languages and 22% a Canada of two founding peoples (which is the highest level of support for this idea amongst the various sub-groups).

National Identity and Common Histories

Proponents of the idea that the province constitutes a 'single' nation have argued that, contrary to Canada, the citizens of Quebec possess a shared history and therefore a common destiny. A national public opinion survey of some 2,000 Canadians conducted at the end of September by the firm Environics does indeed point to differences between English and French Canadians as to what they consider the principal developments in Canada's history to be. Yet the same survey reveals an important divergence amongst Quebecers as to their view of the shared Canadian story.

When asked about the birth of Canada some 44% of the population indicated that it began with Confederation in 1867. While a majority of anglophones gave this response, francophones more often referred to the European settlement of New France as the event marking Canada's creation. But Quebecers are not united on this question. Those supporting the Federal Liberals were more inclined to associate Confederation with the origins of Canada, while those favoring the Bloc Québécois believed much more so that it was the settlement of New France. There was also a considerable generation gap in responses to the question with most Quebecers between 18 and 29 years of age contending that European settlement of New France is the turning point; those over the age of 45 trace the origin of Canada to Confederation.

When asked about the most significant event in Canada's history, once again there are divergences within the Canadian population along language lines. Whereas one out of five francophones in Canada regard the defeat of the French at the 1759 Battle of the Plains of the Abraham as the most significant event in the country's history, this response is given by less than one out of ten anglophone Canadians. Again, Quebecers are divided on this question along partisan lines. About one out ten Liberal supporters declared that the defeat of the colonists in New France at the Plains of Abraham is the most significant event in Canada's history, a view held by more than one-third of Bloc Québécois supporters. Generational differences are especially prevalent in responses given by Quebecers. A majority of those between the ages of 18 and 29 believe that the defeat of the French at the battle of the Plains of Abraham is the most significant event in Canada's history, a view shared by less than one of ten Quebecers over the age of 60.

The histories of Quebec and the rest of Canada are closely connected and represent stories of cooperation and conflict in a process than many describe as nation-building. It is hard to detach the major events that have shaped Quebec from those contributing to the evolution of Canada. Many Quebecers understand that they are not two separate stories characterized by irreconcilable goals and visions. It is just as difficult, if not more so, to argue that Quebec and Canada are distinct and separate nations with divergent memories and different aspirations. The fact that so many Quebecers wish to remain Canadian suggests however that this constitutes an important part of their identity.

Facing the Nation

Underlying the debate over multinational federations is the definition to be attributed to nationhood. In 1996, Canada's Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples referred to the term 'nation' as something that came into common usage in the 1970s to replace the word 'Indian,' which some people found offensive. Although the term First Nation is widely used, no legal definition of it exists. Among its uses, 'First Nations peoples' refers to the Indian peoples in Canada, both status and non-status. Some Aboriginal peoples have also adopted the term 'First Nation' to replace the word 'band' in the name of their community. In Canada the term nation is also used to refer to the Métis, who represent the mix of Aboriginal, English and French. Clearly some analysts employ the term in referring to Quebec as a stateless nation that should ultimately be past of the concert of nations as a former provincial Premier insists. Bernard Landry (2001) insists that the absence of Quebec from the summit of the Americas in 2001 demonstrates the price that a nation pays when it does not have its sovereignty. Clearly the Premier blurs the line between nation and country in numerous interventions. The national notion to which he seems to refer is the one that a majority of Quebecers have rejected twice, in 1980 and 1995.

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The Place of Immigrants:

Politics of Difference in Territorial and Social Space

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ABSTRACT

Canada's immigration discourse tends to treat immigrants as the object of inquiry. The discourse itself is taken for granted and seldom scrutinized. This paper discusses the framework by which immigration discourse is shaped and articulated. The goal is to understand the representation of immigrants in the construction and safe-keeping of Canada's actual and virtual boundary. The author contends that the discursive mapping of immigrants in Canada's territorial and social terrains is an extension of politics of difference.

Canada's public immigration discourse tends to treat immigrants as the object of inquiry, focusing on who they are, how they perform in Canada, and whether they bring economic and social value. Rarely is the discourse itself being scrutinized. This paper examines the cultural framework by which the understanding of immigrants has been shaped, focusing on the historical continuity and contemporary relevance of 'race' or 'racialized others.' The focus is on the representation of desirable and undesirable immigrants in the construction, maintenance and safe-keeping of Canada's actual and virtual boundary. The place of immigrants in territorial and social space indicates not only the nature and quality of immigrants, but also the ideological and discursive grounds by which 'insiders' represent 'outsiders' and by which those who have successfully secured legitimacy and power racialize others deemed to be fundamentally different. Thus, the discursive mapping of immigrants in Canada's territorial and social terrains is an extension of politics of difference.

Ideological Framework and Immigration

Gramsci (1973) and Hall (1996a, 1996b) have stressed the importance of cultural frameworks in giving meaning to different classes to enable them to make sense of the world around them, and in doing so, cultural frameworks assume a life of their own capable of changing the material and political world, and thus contributing to reproducing it. In other words, the objectified social world is represented through ideas, language, symbols, and culture, and in turn, the representation gives meaning of the social world to people. As Hall (1996c) put it, "regimes of representation in a culture do play a *constitutive,* and not merely a reflexive, after-the-event, role." In this way, contestations in the social world, whether they are based on class, gender and race, necessarily involves contestations in the symbolic order of representation. The study of representation frames incorporates many facets, including what Hall (1996c: 442) called "relations of representation" such as the "contestation of the marginality," as well as how "a set of ideas comes to dominate the social thinking of a historical bloc" (Hall, 1996a: 27). In short, unequal relations in the social world are both reflected and constituted by unequal relations of representation.

Immigrants are not only latecomers to Canada's geographical space, but also symbolic representations in ideas, norms and language, and indeed in a system of understanding. In other words, immigrants are actual people born outside the country having been admitted to Canada, as well as symbolic representations of those who, in the eyes of the resident population, should be given or denied entry to Canada. This system of understanding, or cultural framework, is used by Canada's resident population to evaluate immigrants and to pass judgments on their merits and shortcomings. This cultural framework is influenced and shaped by the relations in society, but in turn, it also provides meanings to old-timers and affects how they relate to latecomers.

International migration involves individuals and families uprooting from a country of origin, crossing the physical boundary of another nation, and venturing into the social boundary of the destination society. No doubt, the outcome of immigration is contingent upon the self effort of immigrants in overcoming the hardship of boundary crossing, both geographical and social, but it also depends on how much the resident population is prepared to open the door to welcome the outsiders at the gate. The "warmth of the welcome," as Reitz (1998) calls it, depends on the institutional features of the receiving society, including educational opportunities, welfare accessibility and labour market arrangements. However, it also depends on the representational frame by which those who see themselves as old-timers use to evaluate newcomers at the border.

Much of this representational frame is shaped by ideas, concepts, and norms which old-timers inherit and develop in their understanding of 'others,' that is, those who are deemed to be different by virtue of their birthplace, race, language and other cultural idiosyncrasies. Historically, Canada has maintained a racialized cultural framework to judge those being excluded or included as immigrants within its national borders. The cultural framework continues to influence the way Canada sees the security of its territorial boundary as well as the integrity of its social boundary. Thus, to understand the warmth of the welcome also involves studying insiders' cultural representation of 'outsiders' and how the discursive frame enables insiders to maintain and safeguard the physical and symbolic boundary of the nation.

Like other discourses, the immigration discourse is guided by a normative framework, an ideological road map, and a linguistic coherence. Naturally, there are diversities in the way the discourse is articulated, but the discourse has coherence, and has in common certain ideas, concepts and terminologies regarding how 'outsiders' are to be represented. The representation revolves around demarcating the national boundary in terms of two types of space: territorial space and symbolic/social/cultural space.

Racializing Canada's Border

Canada's immigration discourse has been framed from the vantage point of self-interest, as defined by old-timers' predisposition of the type of newcomers to Canada that would advance or harm its national interests. From such a vantage point, the interests of immigrant sending countries and of global inequality and redistribution are seldom considered (Li, 2003a).

Historically, the immigration discourse has racialized the territorial boundary of Canada in upholding the value of European immigrants, notably those from Britain, northern Europe, and the United States, and discounting the contributions of non-white immigrants, particularly those from Asia. In other words, Canada's territorial security and interest were expressed in clear racial terms, with an unequivocal understanding that the value of non-European races to Canada was questionable. This discursive framework has been influenced by Canada's long-standing racial ideology which saw Asian immigrants as racially, morally and culturally inferior to the Occidental tradition of Canada (Anderson, 1991; Roy, 1989; Ward, 1978). Hence, the historical restriction and exclusion of Asian immigrants to Canada were equated with safeguarding Canada's borders and its European tradition from what was seen as the "yellow peril."

Even during the period of wheat boom at the turn of the nineteenth century when Canada adopted the expansionist immigration policy of Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior, the official discourse made a clear distinction between the European settlers and the questionable Asian workers (Hoerder, 1999; Kelly and Trebilcock, 1998; Li, 1998). It was a period of open door for Europeans, and 3 million of them came between 1896 and 1914, as settlers in the prairies and workers in urban Canada (Li, 2003a: 19). But the same period also saw the enactment of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1900 to raise the Chinese Head Tax to $100, another act in 1903 to further raise the Chinese Head Tax to $500, and the "continuous journey" act in 1908 to discourage the sailing of East Indians from India to Canada (Li, 1998). These legislative measures were seen as necessary to protect Canada as a nation of Europeans from the racial and social contamination of Asians. "Racial" distinction was deeply engraved in Canada's ideological framework of nation building and was effectively used as an instrument of settlement, population growth, and border control.

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The need to safeguard Canada's border from racially undesirable immigrants was reaffirmed by Mackenzie King in 1947, in his famous statement to reject what he called "large-scale immigration from the orient" because of its potential harmful effects to Canada, at a time when Canada was planning to expand immigration. Throughout the 1950s, Canada restricted Chinese immigration on the grounds that it could become what J.W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 1954 to 1957, called "an avenue for the back door infiltration of communist agents" (Canada, House of Commons, 9 June, 1960: 4715-16). Indeed, during the period of the Cold War, Canada's concerns of national and border security were guided by its anti-communist stance that interpreted communist regimes as a threat to Canada and western democracy. Since Chinese immigrants originated from China, a communist state, Chinese immigrants were seen as posing a potential security threat to Canada (Li, 1998: 93). No doubt, the historical image of the Chinese as morally questionable, culturally inferior and socially unassimilable could only contribute to the stereotype of their being untrustworthy.

If communist China was an enemy of the west, then anti-communist elements could only advance the national interests of Canada as a democratic state. Undoubtedly, the mentality of the Cold War prompted Canada to accept, between 1956 and 1958, about 38,000 of the 190,000 refugees who fled Hungary following the Soviet suppression of the 1956 anti-communist uprising (see Hawkins, 1988: 114).

The "point system" of selecting immigrants introduced by the 1967 Immigration Regulations was often cherished as marking the end of racialization of immigration. In 1979 and 1980, Canada showed the same generosity to the

Vietnamese refugees as it did to the Hungarians by accepting 60,000 "boat people" from Vietnam after the fall of Saigon (Li, 1998: 95). The admission of Vietnamese boat people in the late 1970s served a political purpose of the time: it reinforced the image of Canada as a humanitarian and democratic nation in contrast to the horror of a communist regime even though it succeeded in uniting North and South Vietnam. But Canada was reluctant to continue to admit large numbers of Vietnamese in refugee camps from Southeast Asian in the 1980s because the Vietnamese refugees had outlived their political value to Canada, and had become an international burden.

By the time several boatloads of Chinese migrants came to the west shore of Canada in 1999 to claim refugee status, Canada was more interested in trading with countries behind the "iron curtain" than to use those who fled the country to undermine the regime. The 599 Chinese who landed illegally on the west coast in 1999 were seen as a threat to Canada's security because the migrants were pauperized and because more were suspected to follow. Canada reacted with panic and took extraordinary steps to incarcerate them. The public too, was unsympathetic to the Chinese despite their hazardous journey. A 1999 public poll found 70% of Canadian respondents rejected the idea of automatically granting the Chinese boat people a claim to be political refugees (*Globe and Mail,* 1999). A minister referred to the migrants as "law-breakers" who abused Canada's generosity, and as a result had stirred up an anti-immigration backlash (*National Post,* 1999).

By 2000, of the 599 Chinese migrants who came by boat in 1999, only 16 were granted refugee status, but the government spent $36 million in processing and incarcerating them (*Globe and Mail,* 2000). In their analysis of the media reporting of the Chinese arrival, Hier and Greenberg (2002) argued that a racialized moral panic was created in Canada, with a large part of the public and the new media viewing the refugee system and the "illegal Chinese" as a threat to national security. In particular, the news media highlighted the potential threat of Chinese migrants in bringing infectious diseases to Canada, increasing organized crime, and using Canada as a conduit of illegal immigration to the U.S. (Hier and Greenberg, 2002). The moral panic towards the undocumented migrants created in the print media was out of proportion, and Hier and Greenberg (2002) attributed it to a racial backlash against the Chinese.

The threat of racialized populations to the security of Canada is also articulated in concerns over organized crime and violence. The idea of Asian immigrants bringing a higher level of organized crime and violence to Canada has periodically surfaced in the media. As early as 1991, *Macleans* magazine ran a feature article entitled "Terror in the streets: Ruthless Asian Gangs bring a new wave of violence to Canadian cities" (*Macleans,* 1991). Based on several incidents, mostly in Toronto, the article said the killings have established a "new threshold in a surge of **Asian violence** sweeping the country" (*Macleans,* 1991). In her book entitled *Immigration: The Economic Case,* Diane Francis described the growth of Tamil community in Canada under the heading of Tamil terrorists, and quoted a source to refer to Tamil Tigers and their accomplices as having been "involved in a wide range of criminal activities in this country" (Francis, 2002: 145). In their analysis of news reports of crimes committed by Asians in Canada, Henry and Tator (2002: 201) pointed out that the media often made stereotypic assumptions of Asian immigrant communities as violent and gang-infected, and elevated crimes committed by individuals to the level of collective features of the communities.

The 9-11 disaster brought a new round of security concerns for Canada to safeguard its border. The allegations by the U.S. that the border of Canada has been lax and terrorists could easily infiltrate Canada created added pressures to tighten security, targeting in particular individuals from the Middle East and Islamic countries. Immigration critics such as Daniel Stoffman seized the opportunity to attack immigration policy. He described what he called the "root causes of Canada's vulnerability to terrorism" as follows: "an immigration program that lets in more people than is consistent with public safety, and a refugee system that allows known criminals and terrorists and unidentified people from all over the world to roam freely in Canada" (Stoffman, 2002: 53).

In the aftermath of 9-11, the need to manage immigration and to keep racialized elements suspected of being prone to terrorism from entering became a priority security issue. The 9-11 attacks have provided the grounds for the general public to condone vigilance and suspicion towards certain racial groups. A poll conducted by Environics in August of 2002 indicated that 43% of respondents said Canada accepts too many immigrants from Arab countries (*Ottawa Citizen,* 2002). Raja Khoury, president of the Canadian-Arab Federation, said that the Arab community has suffered from an increase negative stereotyping and prejudice since September 11, 2001, and that "there is a continuous association between Islam and terrorism in the media, while there is nothing to balance the image." (*Montreal Gazette,* 2003) In the post 9-11 period, there is wide acceptance by the Canadian government and the public that draconian measures towards those from Arab and Islamic countries are necessary steps to protect the borders of Canada and to safeguard its national security.

Beside the recent concerns of terrorism from those of Islamic origin, Canada has also associated certain origins with potential health hazards. For example, in a 2002 article entitled "Immigration fuels soaring TB rate", the *Times Colonist* (Victoria) reported: "…most of the immigrants who come to B.C. arrive from countries where TB is rampant – India, China, the Philippines and Vietnam." (*Times Colonist,* 2002) The paper also printed the comment of Dr. Kevin Elwood, director of TB control for the B.C. Centre for Disease Control, as follows: "The Chinese immigrants are particularly not interested in preventable drugs." (*Times Colonist,* 2002) During the outbreak of SARS earlier this year, the Chinese-Canadian community in Toronto reported experiencing hostility and discrimination from the general public, as the Chinese were being blamed for having brought the disease to the city and devastated its economy (*Mingpao,* 2003; *Globe and Mail,* 2003). However, concerns over the mad cow disease

of Britain were not translated into blaming immigrants in Canada originated from there.

These examples show that a racialized ideological framework has influenced Canada's ideas of nation-building. Even though the groups being racialized have changed, a racialized cultural framework continues to influence Canada's representation and discourse of outside threats to national security.

Safeguarding Canada's Social Space

Much of Canada's immigration discourse has to do with keeping the wrong people out and safeguarding its territorial space from intruders who are often depicted with a racial overtone. Canada also uses a cultural framework in guarding its social boundary from 'undesirable' immigrants, including those who have been admitted to Canada. In other words, Canada maintains a normative standard to differentiate different kinds of immigrants being admitted, based on how much immigrants are deemed to enrich or undermine the social boundary of Canada as a nation.

In their highly sensational attack on Canada's immigration system, critics such as Diane Francis (2002), Daniel Stoffman (2002) and Martin Collacott (2002) advocate a substantial reduction in immigration on the grounds that the types of immigrants Canada admits do not contribute very much, and indeed may be harmful, to the economic, social, demographic and fiscal well-being of the nation. Besides using selective evidence and fallacious arguments, these authors dwell on a harsh utilitarian dictum: immigrants not obviously enriching Canada are useless to Canada. Indeed, it is precisely based on this principle that Collacott attacked priorities given to family class sponsorship as having what he called "the most negative impact," on the presumed grounds that these immigrants do not bring human capital and take resources from Canada (Collacott, 2002: 19).

The ideological premise upon which the immigration critics construct their arguments is in fact not far from the official stance. Canada has maintained a *de facto* dual policy regarding immigration: the selection of economic immigrants and the admission of 'unchosen' or 'self-selected' family members and asylum seekers (Li, 2003a). Much attention towards immigration policy development is directed towards selecting immigrants of high human capital capacity, and restricting and managing the sponsorship of family members and asylum seekers. The official discourse consistently attributes a greater value to economic immigrants and blames the so-called self-selected immigrants – family class and refugees – for squeezing out the economic stream (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1993: 2, 7). The 1996 annual report to the Parliament by the minister of citizenship and immigration stated: "Research shows that economic immigration is the component that benefits Canada and Canadians most quickly and to the greater extent." (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1996: 7) It was this mentality which prompted the recent changes in immigration policy in allotting a greater proportion of land immigrants to the economic class. Since 2000, the economic class has made up 60% or more of the total landed immigrants to Canada every year (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2003).

Periodically, the immigration discourse dwells on extended familism of other cultures as a challenge to managing the 'unchosen' family-class immigration. A 1994 report of the Citizenship and Immigration Canada entitled *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship* outlined the problem as follows:

> "In Canada, the traditional definition of family has been changing. Single parent families are now common. Family is also defined differently in other cultures. The traditional family unit, i.e. father, mother and independent children, has long been at the heart of Canadian society. However, in other countries close ties frequently exist with extended family members. These are some of the factors which need to be considered in Canada's approach to family immigration." (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994a: 11)

The subtext is clear: immigrants from cultures foreign to Canada uphold extended familism and maintain a large family network that is contrary to Canadian family values. There is a strong overtone regarding the need to re-conceptualize the family reunification program based on the nuclear family of Canada and not the extended family of Asia or Africa. Several academic studies have attributed the declining earnings of immigrants in the 1980s relative to earlier arrivals to the increase in the family immigration stream and the disproportional distribution of Asian immigrants across the admission classes (Bloom, Grenier and Gunderson, 1995; Miller, 1992). Taken together, the discourse portrays an urgency to control the family-class stream of immigration used more often by non-European immigrants in order to uphold Canada's living standard and to reserve immigration allotments to those more deserving 'selected' immigrants.

It is on the subject of immigrant diversity that the ideological framework used to maintain Canada's social boundary can be more fully understood. It is a widely accepted conclusion that as a result of changes in immigration regulations in 1967, there has been an increase in the 'diversity' of Canada, brought about by an increasing number of immigrants from 'non-traditional' source countries (Li, 2003b). As early as 1989, a report by Employment and Immigration Canada (1989: 8-9) had this to say: "…Canada's immigration is coming increasingly from 'non-traditional' parts of the world. Thirty years ago, more than 80% of Canada's immigrants came from Europe or countries of European heritage, whereas 70% now come from Asia alone… As a result, many Canadians are concerned that the country is in danger of losing a sense of national identity." The notion of diversity in the immigration discourse has become a standard term used to refer to 'non-white,' and sometimes to the problem of having too many 'non-whites.'

For example, under the heading "Immigration and Diversity", a 1994 CIC report (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994b) discussed how Canadians' concerns about immigration were triggered by increasingly large numbers coming from Asia (Li, 2001). Another CIC report of the same year talked about how Canadians were concerned about the impact of immigration on "values and traditions

that form the foundation of Canadian society," and worried about their country being fragmented and becoming "a loose collection of parts" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994a: 10). Throughout the 1990s, the immigration debate reiterated the idea that the rapid upsurge in immigration from Asia and Africa was changing urban Canada too radically (Li, 2001). Thus, too much diversity from non-white immigrants is seen as undermining Canada's traditional values, changing its social fabrics, and weakening its cohesiveness.

The immigration discourse also depicts Canada as a demographic and open society that supports multiculturalism and allows immigrants to integrate without requiring them to abandon their cultures. The contradiction of endorsing multiculturalism on the one hand and questioning immigrants' diversity on the other is resolved by adopting a rhetoric that upholds the ideological value of multiculturalism but dismisses the merit of cultural specificities. For example, official statements often repeat the following message regarding integration: "In Canada, integration is a two-way process of accommodation between newcomers and Canadians: It encourages immigrants to adapt to Canadian society without requiring them to abandon their cultures." (Dorais, 2002: 4) However, when it comes to the value of cultural specificities such as the immigrant enclaves, an official report has this to say:

> "Ethnic enclaves can play a positive role in easing the shock of adjustment to a new culture… To the degree that ethnic enclaves restrict their members and shield them from alternative norms, values and behaviours, they can discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation… Ideally, in an integrated society, immigrants move through the ethnic enclave, using its resources in order to enter the mainstream society." (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1993: 4-5)

Thus, the underlying normative frame upholds a social boundary of Canada within which newcomers are expected to conform, and within which institutionalized cultural differences are seen as promoting segregation, hindering integrating, and acting against the interest of 'mainstream society.'

Immigration critics tend to be more blatant in their condemnation of essentialized cultural differences. Stoffman (2002:16), for example, referred to multiculturalism as "divisive… because different cultures have irreconcilable values… (and) because Canada is built… around a shared belief in the values of democracy and individual freedom." In short, people from different cultures are described as having "irreconcilable values" that threaten Canada's democracy and freedom at the encouragement of official multiculturalism. Collacott (2002:29-30) made a similar point when he blamed family-class immigration and modern communication technology for assisting immigrant enclave development in urban Canada, thus slowing immigrant integration.

Breton (1984) has argued that the racial and ethnic tensions of the late 1970s and 1980s reflected the process of restructuring a symbolic order and status hierarchy in which the cultural dominance and complacency of British-origin Canadians were being challenged. Indeed, the tensions that underline the reactions of some old-timers to many social changes in Canada reflect a prevailing normative representation to essentialize superficial racial differences. Over time, as immigrants' racial differences are associated with undesirable changes in normative representative, diversity becomes incompatible with the demographic tradition and core values of Canada, or a threat to Canada's romanticized social space. The battle over the so-called Chinese 'monster homes' in Vancouver in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Li, 1994), the attempt to restrict the Asianization of suburban malls in Markham in the 1990s (Li, 1998:146-148), and the general blame towards non-white immigrants for crowding the city and changing the urban landscape and indeed altering the Canadian way of life reflect a racialized normative standard which some old-times use to territorialize Canada's urban and social space.

Conclusion

The place of immigrants in Canada is influenced by the cultural representation of 'outsiders' used by those who have successfully secured and legitimized the territorial claim to safeguard the physical and symbolic boundary. As Stuart Hall (1996a) reminds us, cultural representation has its central place because it is in representation that categories and relations are to be understood and shaped.

Cultural representation relies on the use of codes as conveyed in language, symbols, texts and subtexts, which have a history and a pre-existing understanding. The notion of 'race' survives in a democratic country like Canada as a meaningful social code because its symbolic meaning has been reshaped and transformed to suit the time. Part of the transformation is to distil the ugly aspects associated with overt racism to retain other aspects of race that make them palatable to people as though they are not concerned with 'race' and are indeed against racism. Thus, the new representation of race can appear as rational, public-minded (as opposed to self-serving) and indeed liberal minded.

Much of Canada's assessment of immigrants has to do with its representation of racialized new immigrants as diversity problems for Canada – crowding of major cities, contribution to urban crime, environmental degradation and travel congestion, overburdening of the educational system, social, health, welfare, and infrastructural services, adding pressures to the job market, housing market, and altering the social fabric of Canada. In short, the immigration problem is represented as problem of too much diversity, and racialized new immigrants are represented as endless intruders to urban and social space.

Racialized immigrants are also being represented as 'newcomers' from 'non-traditional' sources despite their long history in Canada. This representation reflects how racialized immigrants have been marginalized throughout history in Canada as foreign workers and not as deserving permanent citizens. Racialized new immigrants are also represented as multicultural objects, and not subjects of multiculturalism. As multicultural objects, they only bring superficial novelties and add quantity to Canada's diverse

population. As objects, they are to make Canada look better as a tolerant society, but not to demand Canada to change for their sake.

The representation positions racialized new immigrants at the margin, as objects of evaluation, and not subjects whose values, aspirations and wishes are to be taken into account. This is an extension of the normative, historical representation of non-whites in Canada, and it reflects their marginality in Canada's discursive space (see Hall, 1996b). The marginalized representation of racialized immigrants is justified on the grounds that old-timers have a right to decide who should be admitted as newcomers and citizens, and on the grounds that immigrants are not in a position to demand changes in Canada because they have made the choice to come to a pre-existing social order. In short, the representation successfully silences the voice of new immigrants and denies them a place in the representational space of the normative and symbolic order. The representation shapes the politics of difference and becomes in itself the politics of difference. Many relations and factors may have influenced the cultural representation of newcomers, but it is in the representation itself that social relations and social categories are given meaning in people's lives. In short, the representation provides concrete meanings and contours to the symbolic and geographic space of a nation.

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Between Imagination and Reality:

Tales of Skilled Immigrants from China

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ABSTRACT

Sin Yih Teo provides an anecdotal look at the vision Chinese immigrants have of life in Canada before and after they arrive. For example, while most newcomers are optimistic at the start, many are disappointed to find they cannot secure professional jobs to match their training. The author suggests that the four major sources of information available in China are not always accurate, including reports from family and friends already living abroad. More detailed information about Canada is needed prior to migration in order to better prepare immigrants for the challenges they will face.

"Why are we in the countryside?" Wenxiu asked her husband as their plane touched down at Vancouver International Airport. A new immigrant, Wenxiu had anticipated towering skyscrapers – a feature of modernity associated with her native Shanghai, and a recurrent motif in popular Chinese television drama series such as *A Bejing Native in New York* that depict migrants abroad. The unexpectedly flat landscape was the first of several surprises to follow Wenxiu's immigration to Canada. This article is located precisely at the juncture between pre-migration imagination and actual reality upon arrival. Drawing on focus groups and in-depth interviews with 78 immigrants from the People's Republic of China – the top source country of immigrants to Canada since 1998 (CIC, 1998, 2002) – who landed in Vancouver, British Columbia, between 1996 and 2001, I briefly explore some of the disconnections that occur. At the same time, I emphasize that immigration is ultimately a *human* issue, faced with all the concomitant rationalities and irrationalities, contradictions and emotions.

Imagining North America

> *People think that North America is very similar. Canadian lifestyles are very close to the Americans' and their cultural backgrounds are very similar. Therefore many people who aren't able to fulfill their American dream have come to Canada.* (Haiwen)

Two issues lie at the heart of this replacement of Canada for America that Haiwen suggests. First, there is the People's Republic of China (PRC) migrants' idealization of America as a premier destination by virtue of its position as a world superpower. Despite this favoured status, several respondents explained that America was often not an option since its immigration policy was tailored towards family reunification. Instead, Canada presented an opportunity with its more open policy for skilled immigration. This leads to the second issue, which is the close identification of Canada with America for many migrants prior to departure. In their words: "Canada and America are one family" and "Canada is part of North America, basically the same, not much difference" (Teo, 2003). For some respondents however, there was a distinction. According to Selena:

> *Canada is different even though it is close to America. In terms of politics, I wouldn't really want to go to America as it is more extreme. It has a stronger sense of superiority towards other countries whereas Canada does not.*

When asked about specific impressions before migration, respondents relied on a fairly similar repertoire of images that included Canada's status as a member of the Group of Seven industrial nations, its scenic beauty, as well as its excellent educational and welfare systems, a consequence many respondents linked to the marketing rhetoric of immigration consulting companies. These contemporary images aside, a number of respondents also suggested that Canada might have a venerated place in the minds of the Chinese due to Dr. Norman Bethune (1890-1939), a Canadian doctor who cured many patients in China during the Second World War and lost his life in the process. Ironically, although some Canadians may not even know of Bethune, his remains lie in the Mausoleum of Martyrs in the city of Shijiazhuang, southeast of Beijing, where there is a Bethune International Peace Hospital and Bethune Medical School. Mao Zedong, then Chairman of the Communist Party in China, further immortalized him in an essay, which was part of a selection of reading materials that were considered to be ideologically correct during the early days of the Cultural Revolution;

primary school courses, for example, centred on them (Landsberger, 2002). Unsurprisingly then, to many respondents who had read and even memorized the essay, Bethune personified Canada's image as a friendly and peaceful country.

Experiencing Canada

After their arrival in Canada, the PRC immigrants' expectations often did not coincide with reality. One respondent, Siwan, revealed, "I have told my family and friends not to imagine what this place is like. It is totally different from their imagination." Siwan's remark stemmed primarily from a commonly felt disappointment over the acute difficulty faced by many PRC skilled immigrants in finding commensurate employment. It has become a routine observation among immigrants and immigrant service agencies alike that former engineers, accountants, and doctors are now working as dishwashers, factory workers, and janitors.

This phenomenon is reflective of a more general problem in Canada where there is growing evidence that a substantial proportion of immigrants are not able to convert their foreign qualifications into jobs that match their training (Couton, 2002). Canadian policy makers are well aware of this situation: a number of key documents, including the 2001 Speech from the Throne, the new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,* many policy research projects, and statements by various federal departments list foreign credential recognition as a priority. At the provincial level, which is where most of the jurisdictional leverage lies, several policy initiatives have been introduced (ibid). Non-governmental organizations, such as S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in British Columbia, have also been providing more direct support to new immigrants through employment counseling and job-finding workshops. Despite much effort and rhetoric, the non-recognition of credentials remains a critical issue.

The experiences of Ruhao and his wife, Ailin, illustrate the employment difficulties faced by PRC skilled immigrants. Ruhao, 31, and Ailin, 30, were formerly an engineer and an accountant (respectively) in China, leading relatively comfortable lifestyles with an annual income of RM200,000 each. In 2001, they immigrated to Canada in search of better professional opportunities and to widen their horizons. Upon arrival, Ruhao sent out more than a hundred resumes to companies without receiving any response, and after discussing with fellow PRC immigrants, concluded that the lack of local credentials and work experience meant that he would not be recognized as an engineer in Vancouver. A friend subsequently suggested a job at a warehouse which paid $9 per hour. Reflecting on his situation, Ruhao confided:

> *I feel that it is very much a shame that the more than ten years of experience I have [in engineering] cannot be utilised here […] I think there is quite a huge impact on your state of mind when you have not been able to find a suitable job after searching for a very long time.*

As for Ailin, she volunteered at a non-governmental organisation to widen her social network while preparing to attend English lessons at the Vancouver School Board, and planned to eventually take courses for a certificate in accountancy. She too alluded to "a strong feeling of defeat" in her job search, a sentiment compounded by the absence of her two-year-old son who had been sent back to China recently. Their predicament echoed that of a significant number of other respondents with young children who have found childcare to be a source of concern. Previously in China, the children were usually looked after either by their grandparents or placed in childcare centres while both parents were at work. Now in Canada, the absence of the extended family and affordable childcare means that only one parent can work while the other has to stay at home, making it difficult for the latter to improve his or her career prospects.

Some respondents with children of school-going age raised a different concern: their unexpected finding that the Canadian educational system, which formed part of their initial reason for migration, was less rigorous at the elementary level compared to China, particularly in mathematics and science subjects. Peirong wondered aloud, "The adults are all very anxious. Can they learn anything? Especially for the kids in grades one and two, can they learn anything?" Nonetheless, there were also other parents who were pleased to discover that the schools in Canada encouraged creative thinking skills.

Turning to the adults themselves, the upheavals caused by migration and the drastic drop in household finances have caused marital problems for some families, and as Haojie poignantly noted:

> *You can say that every new immigrant family is under stress. If you ask ten people who migrated from Mainland China, I believe there are none who are not stressed… unless both spouses are very lucky and found a job immediately. There are such people, but I believe there are few of them.*

PRC immigrants face a further complication – that of English language proficiency (outside of Quebec), especially in verbal communication. Poor English language skills mean that it is even more difficult for them to apply for jobs other than in ethnic businesses, which in Vancouver's context sometimes require knowledge of Cantonese, rather than Mandarin, which is the national language in China. A vicious cycle is thus created: the more the immigrants cannot find jobs in an English-speaking environment, the more difficult it is for them to improve their English, which in turn lowers their chances of obtaining such jobs. Another possible serious implication is that it may become an obstacle for PRC immigrants to interact with the predominantly English-speaking society. Respondents frequently commented on how their attempts to integrate into "Canadian" society were being hindered by the lack of social bridges, resulting in their friendship circles being still largely Chinese – a situation which they had not envisaged before migration.

The Significance of Information

The "large gap between expectations and reality" my respondent, Gerald, discerned among new immigrants, and their accompanying "sense of loss", can be partly

attributed to the kind of information that potential migrants receive when they are in China. I now turn to the four main information sources: immigration consultancies, earlier migrants, the media, and more recently, the Internet.

Immigration consultancies play a very important role in promoting immigration to Canada. An interviewee even suggested that the geography of migration in China could be mapped according to where their offices were located (Teo, forthcoming). The consultancies maintain a very high profile through holding frequent immigration seminars in prominent hotels, advertising in newspapers, and maintaining Internet websites. A general sentiment was that the consultants only highlighted Canada's positive aspects, emphasizing its excellent living conditions and natural beauty, with little mention of the local employment conditions.

On the whole, earlier migrants are regarded as the most trusted sources (Teo, 2003). Yet when relaying their news to family members in China, many respondents admitted to a convention of *baoxibubaoyou* (reporting only the happy news and not the bad news), a kind of self-censorship to prevent their families from worrying. For a different audience, the issue of *mianzi* (face) was significant for some respondents. A fear of "losing face" meant that they would not want other people to hear about the problems they were facing in Canada. Eventually though, Gerald believes:

> *The information will return to China with a certain discount, but once the time is long enough, and there are more cases, people will slowly understand that it is quite tough here in the beginning […] The earlier the information returns, the better, and the more detailed the information, the better; potential immigrants can consider this for reference. They can then make a more complete judgment.*

While one group of respondents would censor the information transmitted to friends planning to immigrate, another group was emphatic in stressing that even though such a practice might be common, they would "tell the truth as it is" – the "truth" almost invariably being the difficulty in finding professional jobs in Canada. How then do potential migrants react to this information? Here, I suggest that the phenomenon of the "inadmissible truth" plays an important role (Teo, 2003). Contrary to rational expectations of information reception, potential migrants may not necessarily change their decision even when they learn of the negative aspects of immigration. Cecilia espoused this view:

> *Basically 80-90% [will come]. Most of the people who have this thinking are almost there already. We can't really prevent them much. They have already made up their minds. They just want to hear the positive news. Maybe they can't even absorb the negative ones! Just like when we first came, we thought how bad can it be, right?*

A third important source has been the media, which has popularized the notion of a migrant in the social imagination in China, for instance through television drama series that reflect the fate of Chinese migrants overseas. One particularly well-known example is *A Beijing Native in New York,* which nearly all my respondents watched. Most felt that the message was that migrants had to work very hard during the first few years, but eventually their efforts would pay off, thus representing a success story. The series was part of a wider cultural context which saw the appearance of a new genre of autobiographical and semi-fictional writings by Chinese who lived in the United States or Japan. In the last few years, immigration guidebooks have also appeared on the market, with titles such as *Walking towards Canada: A Guide for Studying Abroad, Working Abroad, Immigration, Business, Family Visits, and Travel.*

Recently, potential migrants have been turning more to the Internet as a source of information. The immigration websites range from pragmatic guides on application procedures to personal accounts in the form of journal entries, some of which have gathered a steady following. The anonymity of the Internet suggests that stories which earlier migrants might not have been willing to share may now be more freely circulated. However, the reliability of the information remains an issue, and a respondent pointed out that the rationale of the "inadmissible truth" may still apply.

Conclusion

I suggest that there are two possible policy implications from my findings. First, there is a critical need for potential migrants to have more detailed information about Canada prior to migration. All my respondents agreed that this would have helped them to be better prepared for life in Canada, not just mentally, but also in the more pragmatic aspects of job-finding. Second, there could be greater assistance for those who are already in Canada, particularly in terms of credential recognition, to enable immigrants to obtain jobs that reflect their professional skills more closely. Apart from the important consideration of social justice, there is also the real possibility that these immigrants may decide to return to China. When asked about their future plans, some respondents declared that they will stay on while the majority have yet to decide, with the common refrain being "*zouyibukanyibu*" (taking one step at a time). Their experiences during this period hence determine to a large extent whether or not they will remain. Thus for the PRC skilled immigrants, migration is a lived reality, and a geographical process that does not necessarily end at the point of landing.

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The Conundrum of Religious Diversity in Canada's Multicultural Society

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ABSTRACT

Dr. Paul Bowlby examines the role of religious difference in Canada, while questioning the popular postmodern view of Canadian society. How can we construct an authentic postmodern ideal with the goal of making multicultural belonging meaningful? This "ongoing civil project," the author argues, must take into consideration the need for true recognition, which includes recognizing the fundamental importance to many groups of religious life.

Religious freedom is one of the benchmarks for human rights. At the same time, even before 9/11, and certainly in its wake, religions were often viewed as sources of divisiveness in democratic societies. In common speech, "secular society" describes a place for religions as one of many types of voluntary association. Such a place for religious life, however, ignores the fact that religions have been among the most important characteristics of societies and cultures and have had major political, social, economic and cultural consequences. The peculiar tension between religious freedom as a human right and the place of religions in culture and society invites a reflection on the relationship between religion and multicultural policy in Canada.

For an understanding of religions it has been a long-standing principle that it is essential to understand religions on their own terms. Multiculturalism in Canada has appeared to echo that principle in that its purpose was to endorse the existence and the preservation of ethnic and religious diversities in Canada. At the same time as such high purposes are endorsed there has emerged a suspicion that multiculturalism is a postmodern solution to ethnic and religious diversity. As such, it endorses a view of society called 'secular' into which all diversities must fit. For all citizens a secular framework seeks to encourage historical forgetfulness[1] about the complex roles of ethnic and religious traditions in social and political life. To privilege such forgetfulness is to undercut an aspiration for an authentic multiculturalism which would hold out to Canadians the hope that religious and ethnic diversities could contribute substantively, out of their fundamental traditions and convictions, to the future of Canadian society.

Religions, like race relations, have contentious, indeed oppressive dimensions to their history, to say the least. But it is also around religious difference that there are, I want to argue, intimations of the substance of authentic "recognition" (Taylor, 1994) fundamental to multiculturalism. Canada could not have been created without building into its constitution recognition of the differences between French Roman Catholics and English Protestants (O'Toole, 1996). Recognition of the role of religious difference in education and health, not to mention the lines of allegiance to political parties meant that Canada's constitutional solution stood over against both the separation of church and state in the American constitution and the British model of an established religion. In what follows, I will argue that the historic role of religious difference in Canada provides a clue to what counts as authentic recognition for a contemporary multicultural society.

Postmodern Multiculturalism

What does it mean to live in a "habitat" (Day, 2000:200), the principal governing feature of which is to socially construct forgetfulness of historic and religious traditions? In North America, Europe and elsewhere, nation states have already undergone, or are still undergoing, the transformation from polities inhabited primarily by single ethnicities or nations into societies in which citizenship is constituted by a pluralism of ethnic and religious diversities. In the transition there is the attendant fear among the nations which were once dominant that their particular construction of citizenship and society cannot be sustained when fractured by such a range of differences. The once dominant 'nations' see themselves becoming simply one of the many ethnicities existing within the habitat of a state and its marketplace globally designated as secular society.

Canada's immigration policies once depended upon the forcible exclusion of undesirable immigrants or the forced assimilation of peoples into either the French or English nations. Multiculturalism sets out to remedy such solutions by appearing to endorse the maintenance of enduring difference among immigrant populations, while enforcing by all the

means available to it the "rational-bureaucratic discipline" of the economic and political orders. (Day, 2000:204) The ubiquitous terms 'values' and 'styles' drawn on the one hand from economics and on the other from the fashion industry, illustrate the seductive ways of speaking which permit illusions of diversity. Individuals possess their values and styles but only within the "rational-bureaucratic discipline" of the state and the marketplace. Within Day's view then, multiculturalism exists to leave people "as they are" so that they can be free to participate as human capital in the common habitat provided for them by the state's political economy. The effect is to create a concept of citizenship and a polity which is immune to granting authentic 'recognition' that might threaten to alter substantially the terms and conditions of the established socio-political order. Religious schools cannot be recognized on a par with public schools, unless like the Roman Catholic schools in Ontario they can claim an historic constitutional ground for separateness. Religious schools are viewed as a threat to the sphere of the common or the secular, rather than as a contributor to substantive diversity as a resource for a multicultural society. Whether we like it or not, such exclusion from recognition creates a postmodern multiculturalism in which the diversities can exist in appearances – colourful dress and traditions of dance and music – while being required to situate as invisibly as possible their substantive culture and religious life at the margins of society.

A Critque of Postmodern Multiculturalism

A substantial critique of multiculturalism comes from the voices of peoples whose intimacy with colonialism is only a few generations past. Ziauddin Sarder is one of those voices. He is of Pakistani origin, a British citizen, Muslim, and culture critic. In his view, postmodernism is the shape of the "new imperialism of western culture." (Sardar, 1998) To create a postmodern habitat of forgetfulness is to deny validity to traditions as recognized participants in a civil society. Invalidation becomes the precondition for an neo-imperial dominance overall cultural and religious diversties.

The focus for his analysis of the postmodern habitats centres on the production of forms of high and low culture which reify as they popularize the endlessly varied forms of disinformation about the "other." Disinformation and ridicule of their religious and cultural traditions serve in his view the purposes of western economic dominance. The disinformation arises out of four fundamental characteristics of a postmodern polity. First, all worldviews are transformed from truth-claims grounding ways of life by a relativisim insisting that all "grand narratives of all world views are socially constructed in time and by chance." (1998:8) Such a relativism renders all reality into a contingency. In turn, the relative and the contingent qualities of reality provide the context for ridicule since no truth-claim can ever be what it is claimed to be by those speaking it. Without any absolute ground for what is real, Sardar argues that the postmodern view further transforms all reality into "simulations, models, pure images and representations." (1998:10) Such a conviction means that difference or diversity in a postmodern culture are just social constructs whose temporary existence is an irritant awaiting its cure through assimilation.

Such an end for ethnic or religious difference begs the question about the cure. For what is it that defines the healthy state toward which postmodern assimilation leads? There can only be more relativistic social constructions which are created and defined by those who wield power within a political economy. Such a social and individual nihilism in the final analysis cannot sustain any enduring conception of justice morality, law or political economy (1998:10). All there is, is the exercise of power in a vacuum. For multiculturalism, the postmodern amounts in the end to the theft of any substantive meaning of difference, be it religious or ethnic. So understood, multiculturalism becomes the means to colonize again, "to render the Other into its [the west's] own image." (1998:15)

Postmodernity leaves its habitat in a conundrum. Where it envisioned liberation from the constraints of modernity and the lingering traditions left by the Enlightenment and religious traditions, it creates a habitat in which postmodern thinking deconstructs all sources and structures of meaning.

Postmodernity leaves its habitat in a conundrum. Where it envisioned liberation from the constraints of modernity and the lingering traditions left by the Enlightenment and religious traditions, it creates a habitat in which postmodern thinking deconstructs all sources and structures of meaning. What remains are two forms of power, the state and its marketplace as the matrix within which only the illusion of the freedom to be different can be exercised. For Sardar the consequence of this postmodern understanding of diversity is summed up with rhetorical flourish, "multiculturalism stinks" like produce that has been left out too long (Sardar, 2002:137; Sardar "Managing Diversity" 2003:5-8).

The Search for an Authentic Postmodernism

> *Multiculturalism is a necessary quest not just for any self-respecting society, but for human social evolution as such.* (Sardar, 2003:7)

Multiculturalism sets out to solve a perceived problem. Critics of modern imperialisms know that there is a long lineage of European anthropological discourse which constructed European national identities over against a barbaric 'otherness' of the Asian, African, aboriginal or

Middle Eastern peoples. The construction of the Other in Canada – that is, the non-British or French, the non-European – must be understood first and foremost within the framework of an orientalist worldview. In orientalist discourses disinformation (a form of ridicule) about other peoples and their religious and cultural traditions is the basis for the arguments that justice, freedom, liberty or human rights are names for ways of civil living which have no existence outside the European anthropology and its polities. The cultural resources of Chinese, Japanese, South Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Muslim, Native Peoples have no corresponding experience of, or comparable principles for, civil life. To hold such an orientalist and imperialist view of the Other grounded arguments about why Chinese or Japanese peoples should be excluded from Canada. The argument also ensures that the Canadian civil life and its institutions are viewed as non-negotiable interpretations rather than as a common ongoing interpretive project of the diversity which it constitutes.

What then are the resources we can call up to reformulate the discourse within which we speak of "being Canadian," and the fact of our ethnic and religious diversity? Both Sardar and Day are asking what might count as an authentic multiculturalism or, to use Charles Taylor's term, what might count as authentic recognition of ethnic and religious diversity? As major urban centers in Canada and many places around the world are transformed into multi-ethnic, multi-religious habitats, such questions about what multiculturalism is to mean, broaden into the most fundamental politico-religious questions about the meaning of the state and its governance as a means to express justice, freedom, liberty and human rights.

Alan C. Cairns, in his remarkable book *Citizen's Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State* (2000), sets out to discuss the renewal of civil society and by implication, the place of multiculturalism in it. To that end I want to take up Cairns' general question: "What kind of country-wide Canadian political community are we aiming for?" He continues:

> A viable constitutional vision, I argue, must address two facts: Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians differ from each other; our differences are not total. There is much overlap – and we share a common space. *Are our future constitutional arrangements going to foster some version of common belonging so that we will feel responsible for each other, and will be eager to engage in some common enterprises, as well as accommodate our differences?* (Cairns, 2000:5-6 emphasis mine)

That Cairns formulates this question with regard to the history of colonial relations with native peoples is, of course, of primary importance since the effects of Canada's appropriation of the British imperial – orientalist discourses have defined a shameful history which implicates both government and the major Christian churches (cf. Miller, 1999). At the same time, the question he poses, which focuses around themes of common space or habitat, the grounds for being "responsible" for one another and accommodating differences is of profound significance for an authentic "recognition" of native peoples and, I would argue for an authentic multiculturalism which can provide for real religious or ethnic differences as enduring social realities in Canada.

As major urban centres in Canada and many places around the world are transformed into multi-ethnic, multi-religious habitats, such questions about what multiculturalism is to mean broaden into the most fundamental politico-religious questions about the meaning of the state and its governance as a means to express justice, freedom, liberty and human rights.

Cairns' question points away from the radical individualism so important to postmodernist views of secular societies, toward a view of the interdependence of peoples and nations as the primary civil context of society. Such a view is not without some tension-laden precedent in the Canadian context. I can only allude to it as a subject for deeper reading.[2] A homogenous nation either ethnically or religiously was never a possibility in Canada. Recognition of religious and linguistic difference translated into a rejection of the British model of an Established Church, and no less significant, a rejection of the American constitutional model of separation of church and state. At Confederation, the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec and the Protestant churches in the English speaking provinces had, as Sardar suggested, "access and opportunity in political representation, in education and in the pursuit of economic goals." (Sardar, 2003:8)

The example of recognition in the 1867 constitution sets out a precedent and a measure for recognition within an authentic multiculturalism. To what extent are we prepared to recognize religious difference as a basis for renegotiating jurisdiction over education, or language, or justice in culture. To take schooling as but one example, the deconfessionalization of schools and the refusal to extend the opportunity for other traditions to develop tax supported schools comparable to the Roman Catholic schools in Ontario suggests that there is a long way to go if we hope to have an authentic multiculturalism and substantive recognition of ethnic and religious difference as constituents of Canadian civil society.

What is crucial here is that recognition is defined by access to real social roles and powers within a civil society. Allegiance or loyalty are not abstractions, but virtues given substance in the specifics of the communities in which people live. As peoples create their mosques, synagogues,

temples, churches in their communities, not only is the community transformed architecturally, it is transformed by the diversity of peoples staking their claim to their place in society and with it the length and breadth of their civil society. As those same religious institutions build schools to educate their children in their religious life and cultural ways, they are building an attachment to their place within Canada. Out of such buildings come roots and the conviction that the habitat belongs as much them as it does to their neighbours. In such a shared habit families can know that they share the virtues of a citizenship which claims them not in spite of their differences, but because of their differences of religion or ethnicity. Such a claim is impossible to imagine from within a postmodern view of citizenship.

If multiculturalism is to name the aspiration to integrate people into the ongoing civil project called Canada, then one of the most important strategies is to remember what created and sustained civic virtues through wars and through and the great depression and modernization. Those virtues were grounded in the localities in which people lived. Their lives were made within intersecting institutional commitments which ranged across schools and stores, named byways and highways, large and small businesses, landscapes and cities, churches and synagogues. Duplication of these realities is neither desirable nor possible. What is required is the recognition that enhancing their contemporary analogues is a ground upon which a modern multicultural civil society becomes possible. What are the diverse locations within the Canadian habitat which cultivate the experiences of virtues conducive to a civil society? To ask that question invites an exploration of the interdependence about which Cairns' books so eloquently speak. It invites an exploration of difference as grounds of contribution in the concrete architecture of lived habitats rather than exercises of the powers of exclusion.

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Notes

1 "Religious memory is endangered because all memory is problematic in modern societies, and such societies appear increasingly unable to produce meaning systems based on a chain of believing or to sustain 'a living, collective memory as a source of meaning both for the present and for the future.' (Hervieu-Leger 1994, 125-6. Cited in O'Toole, 2000:48)

2 Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon point out that:

> [T]he linguistic and religious differences between the two European peoples who founded modern Canada were explicitly accepted and recognized in institutions, first by the British Crown and then in the 1867 Constitution, which set up new rules for democratic decision-making. Formal recognition of the relevance of cultural differences through the attribution to provinces of jurisdiction over education, language, justice in private matters and culture was a "non-negotiable condition in turn for Quebec's acceptance of a federal Parliament where the French-speaking Canadians would be a permanent minority." (Jenson and Papillon, 2001:10)

Dialogue and Differends:

On the Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

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ABSTRACT

This article presents an immanent critique of the dominant strain of state-based liberal multiculturalism found in the work of theorists such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. Despite their claim to advocate and participate in free, and equal dialogical conversations, these writers have consistently avoided engaging with those who are critical of their lack of discussion on systematically structured forms of domination and exploitation such as capitalism, racism, heterosexism, and the attempt to technologically master nature. It is argued that there cannot be any hope of further advances toward justice, mutual recognition, and a truly free and equal dialogue unless all aspects of all of the critiques that have been leveled against liberal multiculturalism are addressed.

In the current context of globalizing capital and an increasingly fragile system of nation-states, two dominant political ideologies are now engaged – often violently – in what appears to be a 'zero-sum' battle over the allocation of national territories to state apparatuses: ethnic nationalism and liberal multiculturalism. Ethnic nationalism is most often taken up by those who identify with a colonized people; it uses the structural principle of the modern European nation-state (one people, one state) to challenge the current configuration of the system of states. That is, it seeks to articulate a self-identified 'people,' currently dominated by a 'foreign' state, with *its own* bureaucratic apparatus that would control *its own* particular territory. Of course, the 'ethnicity' of ethnic nationalism exists only in comparison to the 'nationality' of peoples who have already achieved a state articulation, and whose interests are therefore crucially different.[1] For their part, many established state peoples are tending to advocate modifications to the structural principle of the system of *nation*-states as a means of preserving its current configuration. That is, they are attempting to become either nations-states, in which more than one nation can share an articulation with a single state (as in official Canadian policy), or *nationless* (civic) states in which all matters of identity are supposedly cast into the 'private realm' (as in official American policy). In these ideologies, talk of domination is replaced by 'integration,' and self/other differentiation is down-played in the name of 'shared citizenship'.[2]

While multiculturalism and ethnic nationalism are commonly cast as binary opposites, they can also be seen as complementary approaches. Each, in its own way, is conservative of the system of nation(s)-states, and therefore tends to perpetuate the very problem it sets out to solve. In the case of ethnic nationalism, it is clear that any 'new' nation or nations which are set up to address a problem of diversity will themselves almost certainly fail to achieve a 'pure' territory (witness the plight of those living in the satellite regions of the former Soviet Union). In the case of state multiculturalism, as I have argued in *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity,*[3] 'recognition' of certain minority and ethnic identities tends to lead to the proliferation of problematic diversity rather than to its taming, and thus produces further dislocation (witness the plight of the perpetually fragile Canadian identity). Thus it would seem that attempts to manage problematic diversity have worked no better than attempts to eliminate it. Perhaps the problem, then, is with the conception of the problem itself, that is, with the idea that subjects somehow *need* to be assigned to nations, and that nations somehow *need* to be assigned to states. Partisans on all sides of these debates seem to forget that human beings haven't always lived this way; indeed, we haven't lived this way for very long at all.

If we want to make any headway on the question of 'ethnic strife,' I would suggest that we need to invert the fundamental assumption of multiculturalism and ethnic nationalism. Rather than believing that 'misplaced' ethnic and national identifications create problems for particular states, we need to see that *it is the system of states that creates and perpetuates the problem of ethnic and national identifications.* That is, if it were not seen as necessary to take part in a zero-sum game over the allocation of territories to identities, neither multiculturalism nor ethnic nationalism would need to exist. Of course this observation could be seen as trite, as begging a further question: why, precisely, do subjects form into identity clusters and seek control over territories? Is Charles Taylor correct in assuming that what is at stake here is a quest for individual/group

authenticity,[4] or should we, following Marx, stand Taylor on his feet and orient instead to concrete relations of power between situated subjects and identity formations? That is, should we not be looking beyond ethnic/national identities as such, to consider the links between these formations and other discourses of power/knowledge?

Little, perhaps, can be expected from ethnic nationalism in this regard, as it has fallen greatly in stature since its zenith as a European justification of the singular nation-state.[5] No self-respecting theorist of the White Male First World would make an argument in support of this kind of 'pure particularity' today. But liberal multiculturalism has bestowed itself with a profound philosophical lineage, and presents itself as a universalistic discourse capable of solving 'the problem of ethnic diversity' wherever it might be found. Hence it would not be too unfair to ask whether this discourse lives up to its own standards of justice, recognition, and dialogue. Here, unfortunately, there is a great shortcoming.

First of all, the texts of the leading proponents of liberal multiculturalism are based upon a constitutive blindness to the links between the system of nation-states and a network of interlocking axes of domination and exploitation. Never do we read of racism, sexism, homophobia, capitalist exploitation, or the domination of nature. It is as though the system of states has sprung up in a vacuum, as though, for example, one can understand the genocide of Great Turtle Island as merely an accidental and unfortunate 'failure of recognition' rather than as a concerted and conscious effort to acquire spaces and resources for the expansion of the Euro-capitalist ecumene under the sign of two new national formations: 'Canada' and 'the United States of America.' It is as though one can understand the employment of women of colour in Canadian sweatshops and upper-class family homes without reference to racist hierarchies or the logic of capitalist (re)production – when one woman leaves the home to participate in the money economy, another has to take her place.[6] While all too willing to give the often unwanted and generally meaningless gift of 'cultural recognition,' multiculturalism as liberal theory and state policy remains staunchly silent on inequalities and injustices that are intimately entwined with the system of states it so desperately wishes to preserve, and thus fails to live up to one of its own highest values.

This ideology does not fare much better in meeting its own standard regarding recognition. There is a fundamental problem in Charles Taylor's handling of the Hegelian narrative, since the recognition that he advocates is not equal, reciprocal, and freely given, but a partial and grudgingly bestowed *gift* from a canonical self group to a series of problematic others.[7] As Taylor notes, "truly recognizing difference" involves "recognizing the *equal value* of different ways of being."[8] But Taylor finds it difficult to make this move. It bothers him that those advocating a 'politics of recognition' demand that "we all *recognize* the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their *worth*."[9] This reticence is based on two points which Taylor is unwilling to accept. First, while he emphasizes the positive contribution that recognition makes to identity formation, he is less willing to acknowledge the damage that can be done through its absence. Indeed, when he comes to speak about how the process of recognition can *fail,* he is always careful to put the claims in the mouths of others. This is apparent when he writes about the concept of 'misrecognition' as it is used in so-called 'identity politics.' "The demand for recognition in these… cases [minority groups, feminism, multiculturalism] is given urgency by the *supposed* links between recognition and identity…"[10] In *The Malaise of Modernity,* Taylor writes that "[e]qual recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it, *according to a widespread modern view.*"[11] Taylor goes on to acknowledge that refusal of recognition, or non-recognition, can be a "form of repression," but again he hedges by suggesting that the importance of this refusal may be "exaggerated."[12] Taylor himself claims to be one of those who believes very strongly in the 'links between recognition and identity.' So why does he degrade this link to the status of a 'widely held supposition' and 'exaggeration'? Taylor fails to inform us, and thereby fails to meet his own standard for mutual recognition.

Finally, let us consider the extent to which liberal multiculturalism has lived up to its commitment to 'dialogue.' The responses of two First Nations writers to Canadian state policy might be instructive here. Jean Morisset is unequivocal in his denunciation of the 'myth' that compels the Métis to "participate joyously as a cog in the multicultural machine."[13] Marianne Boelscher-Ignace and Ron Ignace see multiculturalism as denying the right of Aboriginal peoples to what Will Kymlicka would call their own 'societal cultures', and therefore as "simply a more subtle form of domination than the overt racist and assimilationist policies of previous decades and centuries."[14] In a similar vein, Himani Bannerji has noted that "some among us [Canadian 'immigrants,' 'ethnics,' 'visible minorities'] …demanded the end of racist capitalism – and instead we got 'multiculturalism.'"[15] These kinds of arguments have also been advanced in the global context by post-colonial scholars such as Homi Bhabha, who has expressed his suspicions regarding a "multiculturalist pluralism that dreams of a federation of 'minority' or ethnic groups stitched together in a multi-culti quilt." Such efforts "aspire towards the assimilative" and "neglect the problems of power differentials, conflicts of interest, and cultural dissonance."[16] With reference to heterosexism in the United States, Judith Butler has argued that "the struggle for rights and entitlements… is liberal in the sense that it is… not interested in radical social transformation. It is interested in getting access to existing rights. And making sure existing rights are equally distributed. And when politics becomes rights based in the US it is usually very normalizing."[17]

Even though these objections have been repeatedly voiced since at least the early 1980s, they have been utterly ignored by the leading figures of liberal multiculturalist theory.[18] The problem of the limits of the liberal conception of dialogue has been aptly diagnosed by Bikhu Parekh:

> To call contemporary western society liberal is not only to homogenize and oversimplify it but also to give liberals a moral and cultural monopoly of it and treat the rest as illegitimate and troublesome intruders.[19]

Parekh here raises the question of what J.F. Lyotard has called *differends,* cases where "the regulation of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom."[20] Nation-states, in differentially allocating the power to impose a specific – and often violent – resolution to troublesome conversations, have tended to function as differend-producing *machines.*[21] While this characterization may seem somewhat polemical, it would be difficult to deny the massive proliferation of one-sided 'conversations' within the Eurocolonial system, ranging from genocide to slavery to coercive assimilation. It also seems clear that the more universalizing a given pole of identification, the more violent, destructive, and long-lasting will be the differends it produces. Here we might consider the case of the British Empire, which has bequeathed a legacy of bitter struggle to peoples around the world, or that of the US Empire, which appears as I write to be taking this process to new heights of destruction and misery in Iraq and Afghanistan (to name only two of the most visible examples).

What can be done about these unequal relations of power? Are they not a constitutive feature of any social order? Unless one is willing to make an appeal to a transparent society, one has to concede that differends will always be with us. Yet this concession need not necessarily lead to an uncritical acceptance of the system of racist, heterosexist, capitalist nation-states, nor even to an advocacy of its slow progression towards a democracy 'to come.' Rather, I would pose the following question: if differends are always going to be with us, how might we *minimize* both their quantity and destructive potential? On the assumption that mass, universalizing identifications lead to mass differends, we would want to reduce the scope of such identifications. But this is very difficult to achieve within a system of nation(s)-states that tends rather to *maximize* and *massify* poles of identification through their articulation with a multi-leveled bureaucratic system. It is no accident, I would argue, that the style of dialogue which animates liberal multiculturalism is highly monological. The system of nation(s)-states limits the possibilities for dialogue to an us-them form played out in a context where those who possess a state articulation have an advantage over those who do not, and takes advantage of 'productive' interlocks between nation-states and racism, heterosexism, capitalism, and the domination of nature.

Thus I would suggest that multiculturalism and ethnic nationalism are both misguided – neither reforming the structural principle of the system of states nor altering its current configuration can have the effect of minimizing differends. This can only be achieved by challenging the underlying principle of articulation between subjects, nations and states; that is, by exploring new kinds of community that break away from the Hegelian recognition-theoretic, that push beyond the 'horizon' of European notions of nation and state, self and other. Only if those whom Parekh calls 'the rest' are not treated as 'illegitimate' interlocutors, only if *all* aspects of *all* of the critiques that have been leveled against liberal multiculturalism are addressed, can there be any hope of further advances toward justice, mutual recognition, and a truly open and equal dialogue. Only in this way can we begin to move from state multiculturalism as 'deep diversity'[22] – that is, as more well-managed difference within an already-instituted social space saturated by relations of domination and exploitation – to multiculturalism as radical imaginary – that which would dig so deep that it might even, with time, show the way beyond the system of racist, heterosexist, capitalist nation-states itself.

Notes

1 In the interest of readability, I will no longer place the words 'ethnicity' or 'nationality' in quotes. The reader is invited to consider these terms as under contest, along with all references to 'ethnic groups' such as 'English,' 'French,' 'Chinese'. Any 'problems' of 'diversity' such groups might 'cause' should be treated in the same way, that is, as discursive constructs which constrain and enable fields of action and signification.

2 For the purposes of my argument, I am treating civic nationalism as a variant of multiculturalism, i.e. as one way of attempting to modify the structural principle of the system of nation-states. There are of course other ways of categorizing these ideologies. The work of Jan Pieterse is particularly interesting in this regard, e.g. "Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse." *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power.* Eds. E. Wilmsen & P. McAllister. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

3 See Richard J.F. Day. *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

4 Taylor, Charles. "The Politics of Recognition." *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.* Ed. Amy Gutman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

5 I am thinking here, of course, of the line that leads to G.W.F Hegel, and 'ends' with his *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

6 On Canadian sweatshops, see Roxana Ng, *Homeworking: Home Office or Home Sweatshop? Report on Current Conditions of Homeworkers in Toronto's Garment Industry* (Toronto: UNITE, Ontario District Council, 1999. On the Canadian 'nanny industry', see Pauline Hwang, 'Racism, sexism and Canadian immigration' (http://colours.mahost.org/articles/hwang.html).

7 For a sustained critique of the multicultural gift of recognition, see Richard J.F. Day "Who is this 'we' that gives the gift? Native American political theory and 'the Western tradition,'" in *Critical Horizons* 2:2, p. 173-201.

8 Taylor, Charles. *The Malaise of Modernity.* Concord: Anansi, 1991. p. 51, emphasis in original.

9 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 64, emphases in original.

10 Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," p. 25, emphasis in original.

11 Taylor, *Malaise,* p. 49, emphasis added.

12 Taylor, *Malaise,* p. 50.

13 Morriset, Jean. "The Native Path and its Trance-Cultural Connections." *Multiculturalism in a World of Leaking Boundaries.* Ed. Dieter Haselbach. Munster: LIT, 1998. p. 106.

14 Boelscher-Ignace, Marianne & Ron Ignace. "The Old Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? Canadian Aboriginal Peoples and Multiculturalism." *Multiculturalism in a World of Leaking Boundaries.* Ed. D. Haselbach. Muenster: LIT, 1998. p. 153.

15 Bannerji, Himani. "On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of "Canada." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 31:3 (1996), p. 105.

16 Bhabha, H. & J. Comaroff. "Speaking of Postcoloniality, in the Continuous Present: A Conversation." *Relocating Postcolonialism.* Eds. David Theo Goldberg & Ato Quayson. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. p. 17.

17 Interview with Judith Butler, 'The desire for philosophy', in *Lola* No. 2 (2001), <http://www.lolapress.org/elec2/artenglish/butl_e.htm>.

18 Indeed, postcolonial theorists and activists have been struggling since the late 1950s to bring to attention the many ways in which liberalism relies upon a very deep-rooted Eurocentrism.

19 Parekh, Bhikhu. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory.* London: Macmillan Press, 2000. p. 112.

20 Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *The Differend.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. p. 9.

21 Claude Denis' *We Are Not You* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1997) offers a compelling discussion of this feature of relations between the Canadian state and aboriginal peoples.

22 Taylor, Charles. *Hegel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 461.

Strengthening Canada's Social Weave:

Diversity, Identity and Belonging

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ABSTRACT

Given Canada's complex diversity along cultural, linguistic, 'racial' and religious lines, how might we best foster a sense of national unity, identity and belonging? Examinations of existing identification overlaps and intersections suggest that a common civic identity is best able to serve as an effective bridging, linking and bonding mechanism among otherwise disparate, unconnected, social groups. This underlying commonality is most effectively articulated in the form of a shared citizenship that is both inclusive and participatory in nature. Common core values, mutual rights and responsibilities, expressed commitment and allegiance to the collectivity, and an enhanced participatory framework, form the essence of a proposed 'trans-diverse' Citizenship Charter that would help transcend multiple dimensions of difference.

PREFACE: Canada is, historically speaking, a settler society forged through the colonization of indigenous peoples and repeated influxes of diverse newcomer populations. Bounded on three sides by oceans and marked by a fairly inhospitable climate throughout much of the year, its territorial integrity vis-à-vis other geo-political entities has been largely ensured by natural geographic barriers. At the same time Canada's economic and political realities have been greatly influenced by its more powerful American neighbour to the south, from which it has traditionally differentiated itself in historical and socio-cultural terms. Though it shares some common history and cultural congruity with the United States, Canada defines itself both as a society and as an emergent nation in part by pointing to important underlying differences between the two countries and their respective inhabitants. Canada is further characterized by a fairly low population density; its enormous territory contains a relatively small, highly urbanized population largely concentrated within a belt that extends along its border with the United States. It has also been favoured with relatively little internal strife: other than initial battles for control between the English and the French, border skirmishes between empire loyalists and break-away revolutionaries, plus a handful of localized armed rebellions, Canada has seen neither civil wars nor armed invasions by occupying forces. In all of these considerations Canada differs from many other countries. All of these factors have had, moreover, clear implications for what has been thought needed, desirable and possible at various points in our country's relatively short history in terms of the construction of a sense of unity and national identity.

Canada's Increasing Complexity

Amost 250,000 new immigrants and refugees arrive each year in Canada. A total of 2.2 million immigrants and refugees were counted between 1991-2000, *the highest immigration flow* for any decade since the beginning of the century and close to double the 1.3 million figure for the 1980s (Statistics Canada, 2003b: 6). 18.4% of the current Canadian population is now *foreign-born,* representing close to 5.4 million people, the highest level in 70 years (Ibid: 5). At the same time Canada has been undergoing a fundamental demographic shift due to *a major change in primary source countries.* European-borns made up 90% of all immigrants coming to Canada prior to 1961 (Badets 1989); this dropped to 25% between 1981-1991. In sharp contrast, 58% of immigrants who arrived during the past decade came from Asia and the Middle East, with only 20% from Europe, 11% from the Caribbean, Central and South America, 8% from Africa and 3% from the United States (Statistics Canada, 2003b: 6). As a result nearly half (46%) of the current first generation of immigrants and refugees – representing some 2.4 million people – reported non-European origins in Canada's recent Ethnic Diversity Survey (Statistics Canada, 2003c: 6)

These immigration trends have resulted in a society that is increasingly diverse along cultural, linguistic, 'racial' and religious lines. Not surprisingly, Canadians reported *249 different ethno-cultural origins* during the 2001 Census. To this should be added the diversity reflected across indigenous aboriginal cultures. Grouped into three distinct populations – North American Indian, Métis, and Inuit – the aboriginal share of Canada's total population reached nearly 1 million people in 2001 and continues to increase (Statistics Canada 2003a). One quarter of Canada's aboriginal peoples are able to speak Inuktitut, Dene, Montagnais-Naskap, Attikarnekw, MicMac, Dakota/Sioux, Oji-Cree, Ojibway, Cree, Blackfoot, South Slave, Dogrib, Chipewyan or any of a number of Salish or Wakashan languages, reflecting fairly strong cultural retention rates in various parts of the country.

Within this *multicultural* framework, Canada is an *officially bilingual* country that uses English and French in public discourse. However, a full 18% of Canadians speak neither official language – English or French – as a first language (2001 Census). In the private realm, moreover, the use of *numerous ethno-cultural languages* is common. 61% of immigrants who came during the 1990s use a non-official language as their primary home language, and the proportion of newcomers who speak a non-official language at home is also increasing (Ibid).

In 2001 almost 4 million individuals (13.4% of the total population) identified themselves as *visible minorities* – defined by the Employment Equity Act as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour" (Statistics Canada, 2003b: 10). This represents more than a *three-fold increase* over the course of only two decades. While 1 out of 3 individuals who self-identify as such are native-born members of ethno-racial groups with long histories in this country such as Blacks and Japanese, changing immigration trends have been the biggest contributor to this significant demographic shift. According to Statistics Canada, 73% of immigrants who arrived between 1991-2001 are members of visible minority groups. Canada's visible minority population is now growing much faster than the total population and will likely account for one fifth of the total population by 2016 *(Ibid)*. The impact is already being felt in Canada's larger urban areas where most newcomers settle: Asians, East Indians, Blacks and Filipinos make up more than a third of the population of Toronto (36.8%) and Vancouver (36.9%) respectively (2001 Census).

Canada's increasing diversity is also manifested in religious terms. 83.8% of the population identify themselves as belonging to one of 33 world religions (2001 Census). This *increasing religious diversity* is most clearly reflected in the rapid growth of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Christian Orthodoxy within a predominantly (77%) Christian population. This correlates directly with the demographic shift in immigrant sending countries: according to the most recent census results, two-thirds to three-quarters of Canada's Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Orthodox Christians are foreign-born.

To complicate matters further, due to *increasing rates of intermarriage* among ethno-cultural groups, 38% of Canada's population reported *multiple ethnic origins* in the 2001 Census (Statistics Canada, 2003b: 12). This reporting pattern is more common among Canadians of European origin whose ancestors settled in Canada several generations ago, as well as newcomers who have immigrated from countries that are themselves multicultural (Ibid: 15). In addition, 3.1% of all marriages and common-law unions in Canada involve a visible minority person with either a non-visible minority person or a person from a different visible minority group, a 30% increase since 1991 (Ibid: 12). These 'racially'-mixed unions are more likely to occur in larger metropolitan areas such as Vancouver and Toronto where they account for 7% and 6% of all couples respectively. Increasingly Canada's combined immigration and demographic trends are also resulting in small but growing number of individuals who consider themselves mixed in cultural, linguistic, racial and/or religious terms.

Transcending Diversity

As a complex pluralistic society characterized by high levels of sustained immigration, Canada faces a number of unique challenges. These include the need to: integrate diverse newcomers into the social, cultural, economic and political spheres of Canadian society; balance the respective rights of various linguistic communities; address historical injustices to aboriginal peoples; recognize the existence of 'nations within nations;' ensure equity within and across visible and non-visible populations; absorb growing diversity along religious lines; and reflect ever-changing face of its citizenry. Canada's current social reality is one of multiple, overlapping and intersecting layers of difference, firmly set within the context of an increasingly globalized world order and the additional, oftentimes competing, transnational allegiances that this can entail. In the face of such diversity, how might a sense of ***national unity*** be fostered and maintained? How might an overarching ***national identity*** be created, and a meaningful ***sense of belonging*** to this unique socio-political entity achieved?

Canada's historical approach to this conundrum has been one of explicit accommodation of cultural and linguistic differences. This has led to the existing hierarchical view of Canadian society as comprised of 'three forces:' its two 'Founding Charter Groups,' the English and the French; other immigrant populations, termed 'ethnics;' and indigenous First Nations peoples. It has also led to the articulation of an official government policy of "bilingualism within a multicultural framework." At issue, however, is whether Canada's existing multicultural policy remains sufficient to meet the evolving needs of an increasingly diverse population.

Canada's Multiculturalism Policy simultaneously supports strong identification of Canadians with their *ancestral ethnic group origins* and encourages identification with *Canadian society.* Both are seen as vital to social cohesion. This apparent contradiction gives rise to a number of important questions. ***First,*** is multi-*culturalism* – understood as sociocultural rather than political pluralism – in fact compatible with *national* unity? If so, via what mechanism is this accomplished? ***Second,*** where and how does national *identity* fit in? Given the policy's sequential emphasis on language, culture, race and religion to current considerations of their respective intersections with other identity markers, how exactly does Canada move from its rather complex accommodation of diversity to the social construction of a shared identity? ***Third,*** can a policy promoting 'cultural diversity within a single political entity' serve as the foundations for a meaningful *sense of belonging* to the social entity that is Canada? ***In brief,*** given the complexities of Canada's multiple diversities, how exactly does one foster a sense of unity, identity and belonging within its population?

Previous attempts to achieve "unity within diversity" have been stymied by a number of erroneous assumptions. The *first* is that uniformity or homogeneity is required to ensure a strong sense of *national unity.* What is often forgotten is that different *types* of identity are operative in any given social context. Some of these serve to differentiate among individuals and groups while others seek to establish sameness and may therefore be used to unite.

What is critical is the *selection* and *salience* of the respective identification criteria used. The task thus becomes the location and subsequent articulation of a common, shared identity.

The *second* erroneous assumption is that primary *cultural* and *national* identities must necessarily intersect if national unity is to be achieved. However, these identifications are based on quite different identity criteria that are, moreover, not mutually exclusive. Cultural identifications signal commonality based on shared history, beliefs, values, and traditions; these lifeways are embedded in language, instilled through socialization processes, and passed down from generation to generation. In contrast, national identifications reflect geographically bound, largely autonomous, self-governing political entities. Cultural and national identities sometimes intersect; however, they need not do so and can also simply overlap. The assumption regarding necessary intersection only holds true if one remains firmly committed to the notion of a nation state predicated on the belief in 'one culture, one autonomous self-governing entity.' It otherwise readily collapses (Rummens 2002).

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Third, when it comes to the fostering of a unique Canadian *national identity per se,* it is often erroneously assumed that an individual can only have one national – or cultural – identity at any given time. In fact, multiple affiliations and allegiances reflecting a wide variety of different types of identifications are increasingly common within today's highly mobile populations. Such an assumption also fails to carefully distinguish between the distinct kinds of organizing principles that underscore various national identities, whether these are shared place of birth, culture, language, religion, territory or social polity. It is also often incorrectly assumed that cultural and national identities necessarily trump other types of identities – including those based on linguistic, 'racial,' religious or gender criteria – in any given historical, situational or interactional context. Instead the real issue is which identities are most central to individuals' sense of self at any given point in time? How are these identifications articulated, by whom, and to what purpose? How do they intersect or overlap with other salient social identifications? And finally, from which kinds of identities do individuals and groups derive their primary, most profound *sense of belonging?*

Locating a Common Identity

Throughout Canada's exercise in social integration, attention has largely focused on the various ways in which Canadians differ from each other in order to better accommodate the most salient distinctions among them, all in the interest of social harmony. What has not yet been figured out is how to make everyone different in the *same* kind of way, or more importantly, the same in a *different* kind of way. The true mediation between unity and diversity is commonality. In the state's management of multiple diversities, it is our commonality that has received short shrift. What we are consequently left grappling with is what defines, supports and guides us as a unique social, political and economic entity *(Ibid).*

In order to be able to transcend our complex diversity, we need ***first*** of all to recognize and embrace – as we have already done – the many lines of difference among Canadians. The ***second*** step is to then locate, articulate and celebrate our "sameness" by recognizing a common identity from among existing possibilities. The ***third*** and final step is to effectively engage and foster this shared identity by making it more central in a truly meaningful way.

The challenge before us is the location and articulation of sameness within multiple dimensions of difference. The goal is to counter-balance various forms of diversity with an underlying commonality that unites. What is therefore needed is a careful examination of the rich, multi-hued tapestry of Canada's 'social fabric' in order to uncover its underlying connecting 'weave.'

How might this be best accomplished?

It is important to begin by recognizing that both personal and social identifications of 'self' and of 'other' involve a wide array of identity criteria, each of which forms the basis both of different types of identity and of the specific identifications themselves (see Rummens 2003b; 2004b; 1993). The salience of each of these unique identity markers is determined by the specific historical, societal, situational and interactional context in which the identification occurs, as well as by the particular identification processes (development/formation, construction, negotiation) involved *(Ibid).* Each identification entails an explicit recognition of either sameness or difference based on one or more of these identity criteria. These cumulative decisions about who is 'same' and who is 'different' form the basis both for individual self-identity and for group formation. The inclusions and exclusions that they reflect form the cornerstone of all social interaction and as such are both culturally and socially informed. The critical point is that there is more that one type of identity, any one of which may or may not be potentially salient in any given context. The key is to consider all, examine how they interact, and select the one most relevant at any specific moment in time.

Not only are there different types of identities and specific expressions thereof, identities also readily *overlap* and *intersect* each other (see Rummens 2003b; 2004a; 2004b). Identities that rest upon each other but have minimal or non-existent interactional effect between or among them may be said to overlap. In sharp contrast, identities that consistently inform or influence each other in important ways they may be seen to intersect. The question is where and how various socially salient identifications overlap or intersect each other, for this can point the way to underlying – and thus unifying – commonalities. In short, careful examination of the different ways in which key social identities overlap or intersect within a given societal context makes possible the detection of *shared* identities that effectively cross-cut various individual ones. Commonalities thereby identified in turn provide the basis of a meaningful sense of

'sameness' capable of providing the mechanism for a new form of social bonding.

Overlaps and intersections among different types of identities are particularly important because they also permit the formation and expression of what Putnam has identified as 'bridging' and 'linking' forms of social capital (2000). Mutually exclusive identities offer maximum ***bonding*** potential among individuals *within* a given social group. They thereby help to unify. Overlapping and intersecting identities, on the other hand, provide effective ***bridging*** and ***linking*** possibilities *across* various population groups or categories. In so doing they strengthen the very weave of our social fabric in an entirely different kind of way. 'Bonding' promotes a sense of unity. 'Bridging' facilitates horizontal integration through connection across various social statuses, while 'linking' permits vertical integration across social hierarchies and thus helps to address equity concerns. A strong, healthy social polity requires effective articulations of all three mechanisms.

Strengthening the underlying weave of Canada's social tapestry therefore requires consideration of all three types of identification patterns (exclusive, overlapping, intersecting) as well as of the three forms of social capital (bonding, bridging, linking). If social unity is to be achieved and harmony maintained, it becomes critically important to examine the state's management of the relationship between diversity and social connection. If unity is the goal, common identification is the process, and increased social capital its most compelling expression.

Building Belonging

The single thread that systematically weaves through Canadians' multiple diversities is our shared *civic* identity. This shared identity reflects common affiliation, identification and/or allegiance to the distinct geographically bound, relatively autonomous, sovereign, self-governing political entity that is Canada. It is in this shared civic identity that we find the strongest articulation of 'commonality amidst difference' and thus our most meaningful sense of interconnectedness.

Shared citizenship (Rummens 2002; 2003a) refers to the explicit recognition of this common civic identity in a way that is fully inclusive of all members of society. Such commitment to inclusion requires that all are equally able to participate in key aspects of social life and that none are excluded from this opportunity. It entails engagement in the communal activities that serve both to connect Canadians with each other and to facilitate various expressions of Canadian identities, and seeks to ensure true participation in collective decision-making. In so doing, our common, shared, inclusive, engaged, participatory citizenship effectively 'bridges,' 'links,' and – through sustained interaction – ultimately 'bonds' previously distinct communities. This helps to build a collective sense of who we are as a people, and in time becomes an integral part of group tradition. Shared citizenship thus forms the basis for an emerging sense of national unity, identity and sense of belonging.

In truth we do not really need to all share a unique and clearly identifiable Canadian culture in order to have a common national identity as Canadians. Civic societies – as opposed to ethno-nationalistic ones – do not need to be bound by an extensive common history as well as a comprehensive set of shared values, beliefs and traditions. What they do need, however, is shared member allegiance and commitment to a common politico-economic entity that is firmly based on common *core* values and principles. This helps in turn to foster a sense of social connection founded upon, and expressed through, a truly inclusive, actively engaged, and fully participatory citizenship. The solution, in other words, is to simply decouple culture and nation, and to subsequently re-define 'nation' in terms of common citizenship. Shared citizenship then becomes the basis for national unity, and ultimately, with time, a unique national identity (Rummens 2002).

In the end the real question is not "what is '*Canadian*'?" but "what does it *mean* to be a Canadian?" The answer may be found in an expressed commitment and allegiance to a sovereign entity called Canada that is firmly rooted in a mutually reinforcing articulation of shared core values, extended rights and responsibilities, and enhanced participation in collective decision-making. What is needed is a ***'trans-diverse' Citizenship Charter*** that both embraces our cultural, linguistic, 'racial,' and religious differences and transcends our multiple diversities. Such a Charter would seek to articulate our society's overarching core values and locate the very responsibilities of our shared citizenship in our active commitment to them.

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The Many Dimensions of Belgian Diversity

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ABSTRACT

Like the other countries of the European Union, Belgium currently finds itself in both a migratory and post-migratory situation. This paper describes the various dimensions of Belgian diversity and the process of diversification of Belgian diversity, to use David Hollinger's expression (Hollinger, 1995). The conclusion presents some observations on the political construction of the democratic multicultural society.

Just as other societies, Belgian society is far from being homogenous. The persistence of a certain diversity within Belgian society has essentially been recognized since the failure of attempts to "French-ify" the country in the 19th century. Traditionally, this diversity corresponds to the fundamental schisms within Belgian society (Martiniello and Swyngedouw, 1998): the linguistic and community-related divisions separating the French-speaking population and the Walloons from the Dutch-speakers and Flemings; the socio-economic division between the working class and the capitalists; and the philosophical division between Christians (especially Catholics) and secular liberals. Given these conditions, the dilemma of reconciling such diversity with a necessary unity continues to be significant in Belgian society. The issue of national identity, in particular, has proved to be extremely complex. As much as a Belgian identity was considered possible, it could only be a composite of collective identities (somehow including everyone by respecting them) more or less corresponding to the three historical divisions listed above. Even if the questions "Who are we?" and "What are we?" were never met with a simple response in Belgium, a Belgian was, at the very least, allowed to be either a Fleming or a Walloon, a French-speaker or a Dutch-speaker, a Catholic or a secular liberal, a worker or a capitalist (Martiniello and Swyngedouw, 1998).

With time, the importance of these traditional societal rifts in Belgium changed little by little. Belgian diversity has become even more diverse over the course of the last fifty years, adding to the country's currently changing appearance. It regroups a mainly heterogeneous population demographically, economically, culturally, and politically – revealing a great variety of collective identities. Combining this diversity with a sufficient amount of unity in order to make communal life more or less harmonious remains, today as yesterday, one of the major worries of this little society that is less peaceful that it often appears.

What are the main dimensions of the Belgian "diversification of diversity," (Hollinger 1995)? Firstly, the linguistic and/or community-based divisions that traditionally oppose the Flemish and the Dutch-speakers to the Walloons and the French-speakers has grown enriched by new collective identities often perceived as "autochthonous" due to the process of federalization. In this manner, the German-speaking community has progressively affirmed its desire to be recognized as a unique cultural entity in Belgium and, more specifically, in Wallonia. The tens of thousands of German-speaking Belgians that live in a handful of towns and villages near the German border peacefully demonstrated that all attempts to assimilate them were useless. They expressed their profound attachment to the German language and their cultural identity while at the same time exhibiting a solid Belgian identity.

Secondly, immigration has profoundly changed Belgian society (Martiniello and Rea, 2001). Perceived at the beginning as a temporary phenomenon linked to the economic conjuncture, immigration slowly revealed its structural dimension. Without realizing it very well, Belgium – like its neighbours – had become a country of permanent immigration. The settlement of immigrants and their descendents significantly contributed to the process of Belgian "diversification of the diversity" in every sense. Demographically, immigration certainly contributed to slowing down the ageing of the population and to putting the breaks on the growing imbalance between generations. In addition, immigration implied the coexistence on Belgian soil of several dozens of nationalities from throughout the world (see Table 1.). In 2000, the foreign population of the country reached 8.8% of the total population. This figure does not include foreigners living illegally in Belgium nor does it include Belgians of foreign origin, those who acquired Belgian citizenship either via naturalization or by other legal procedures. Therefore, the immigrant population and the population of those of immigrant origin clearly surpass the official national figure of 8.8%.

Belgian and Foreign Populations in Belgium by Region (2000)						
	Foreigners (EU)	Foreigners (Non-EU)	Foreign Population	Belgians	Total Population	Percentage of Foreigners (%)
Belgium	563,556	333,554	897,110	9,341,975	10,239,085	8.8
Flanders	164,569	129,081	293,650	5,646,601	5,940,251	4.9
Wallonia	270,228	71,813	342,041	3,068,306	3,410,347	10.0
Brussels-Capital	140,356	133,257	273,613	685,705	959,318	28.5

Source: Martiniello and Rea (2001); Institut National de Statistiques (2000)

Additionally, the foreign population is unequally distributed throughout the country. While the foreign population makes up 28.5% in the Brussels-Capital Region (with concentrations sometimes remarkably higher in certain disadvantaged neighborhoods located in the former industrial belt), foreigners make up only 5% of the total population in the Region of Flanders and 10% in the Region of Wallonia (the region that is home to the oldest immigration in the country). The foreign population in Flanders is above all concentrated in the provinces of Limburg and Antwerp, while the foreign population in Wallonia is mainly situated in the former industrial provinces of Liège and Hainaut.

In terms of the nationalities of foreigners legally residing in Belgium, Italians top the list with around 200,000 people. They are followed by Moroccans, with 121,000 people more or less concentrated in Brussels. The French, a population rarely discussed in studies on immigration, come in at third place with more than 107,000 people living in Belgium. They are followed by the Dutch, with more than 85,000 people. In fifth place are the Turkish with 69,000 people. In addition, there are more 45,000 Spaniards, more than 34,000 Germans, around 26,000 British, close to 12,000 Americans and Congolese each, etc. Contrary to popular belief, a significant majority of foreigners living in Belgium hail either from an European Union member-state or another "developed" Western country. Those from non-Western countries remain the minority, even if their concentration in large urban areas make them particularly visible and can at times aggravate the notion that the country is being overwhelmed by non-Western immigrants, despite the fact that such a belief does not at all correspond to reality. For others, the presence of immigrants and foreigners is, on the contrary, an additional bonus for Belgian towns that quickly draw a population attracted to cultural diversity.

Culturally, immigrants and their descendants were not satisfied with submitting to some sort of assimilation that was often implicitly expected of them. They clearly judged it to be problematic, given the inexistence of a strong national culture. Thus, while adapting to the local culture, they encouraged it to evolve along with their own often rural cultures that they had brought with them. The cultural diversity of Belgium subsequently grew, whether referring to the material culture or to the more profound dimensions of the culture (Martiniello and Swyngedouw, 1998).

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Among the more profound dimensions of culture, religion assumes a fundamental position. Following the settlement of immigrants from predominately Muslim countries, Islam became the country's second religion. As a result, the classical philosophical division between Christians and secular liberals found itself altered. It was necessary to examine the place of this new religion in society (Dassetto, 1997; Panafit, 1999). As a result, besides traditional Belgian groups, there now exist Moroccan Belgians, Turkish Belgians, Italian Belgians and Muslim Belgians that present "new" collective identities and that underscore the diversification of Belgian society. These categories have no formal legal existence because, like France, "Belgians of foreign origin" are not included in the law.[1] Sociologically, however, they correlate to unavoidable realities, in the eyes of some social actors in any case.

Thirdly, European construction had a considerable impact on the diversification of Belgian society, principally in Brussels, one the capital-cities of the European Union. Within and around Brussels, the presence of European institutions has engendered the formation of a category of inhabitants sometimes pejoratively referred to as "Eurocrats." The European workforce, hailing from all of the European Union's member-states, enjoys a quality of life noticeably better than that of the average Belgian. Their integration into local society often leaves much to be desired, however, given that many have very little contact with Belgians and live more or less in their own world with expatriates of the same nationality and socio-economic status as themselves. The local population is far from being entirely favorable to the presence of a population sometimes perceived as being remarkably rich and privileged by comparison. Others scarcely take note of this barely visible European presence

in Brussels' many neighborhoods. This immigration of European employees will, in any case, only continue with the enlargement of the European Union. In time, these distinctive early immigrants will influence the urban fabric of Brussels.

Conclusion

Belgian "diversification of diversity" practically touches all spheres of human existence, from the cultural to the political, the social to the economic. Thus, the question of unity for this society is of fundamental importance: what is it that can unite a worker who is originally from a rural area in the Rif Mountains in the north of Morocco and is a Muslim, a Flemish businessman who heads a large computer technology company, a homeless man living in Brussels, a European Union employee posted permanently in Brussels and a young manager of Turkish origin living in Wallonia? What might be the meaning of Belgium for these individuals whose histories and plans are so radically different? Can they see themselves as participating in a common project? Must they necessarily be participating in a common project? Opinion is divided on this issue. For some, the respect of a type of "constitutional patriotism" (Ferry, 1990), of law and order is enough. For others, the population, whether it is immigrant or non-immigrant, must share a foundation of common values.

Be that as it may, these seemingly insignificant questions in reality shed light upon the difficulty of imagining the connection between social cohesion and cultural, economic and social diversity. In effect, some type of social cohesion is crucial in order to be able to assure society's continuity. Yet, certain current trends in Belgian society do not go in the direction of this indispensable cohesion. Firstly, the growing fracture between the haves and have-nots, given the difficulty to patch it up, is in and of itself an undeniable threat to cohesion. Is a society in which the unemployed remain unemployed from generation to generation and in which the wealth circulates almost exclusively in particular social milieus still united and cohesive. Secondly, does not a society in which collective identities and cultures that are considered legitimate and dominant (i.e., groups recognized by the Belgian State) coexist with identities and cultures considered illegitimate and dominated (i.e., populations for whom their presence in Belgium has been a result of migratory fluxes and with those fractions of the Belgian population who try to span the gaps between different cultural communities) lead to a gradual separation from the ideal of social cohesion?

Clearly, Belgian democracy must somewhat re-examine its foundations if it wishes to continue to exist. To do this, it is crucial that a powerful majority of those who live in Belgium recognize one another in these foundations in order to give place to, with their participation as citizens, a social life and to control the centrifugal forces that continually call Belgian society into question.

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The term "multiculturalism" is ambiguous. It is often masked by a variety of sometimes contradictory definitions. For some, multiculturalism reflects a fragmented society, segmented in the way in which ethno-cultural groups lead more or less discrete crusades to attain power and resources and within which the concept of "common good" has completely disappeared. For others, multiculturalism is, on the contrary, a principle of reciprocal acknowledgment that is supposed to help avoid the weakening of society. We must then be careful in our usage of the term (Martiniello, 1997).

Applied to the Belgian case, it supposes an awareness that the process of "diversification of diversity" that Belgium has experienced is probably irreversible. Loyal to its history, Belgian society is assuredly diversified culturally as well as in terms of collective identifications. There is, then, space to examine the need to recognize "new" identities that arise as well as the methods of recognizing them. The unity of Belgium cannot rely uniquely upon one culture nor can it rely upon a single and exclusive national identity. The multicultural project consists of better accommodating the principle of political unity – not in institutional terms but rather in terms of the project and of the fundamental rules of political functioning – and the principle of mutual respect of the cultural and identity-based diversity that is specific to the country. In other words, "multiculturalism" is much more than a slogan confined to debates on the integration of immigrants. It identifies a project belonging to a democratic society in which citizenship and cultural belonging would be decoupled.

This project is however largely dependant upon the improvement of social justice. It is foolish to disassociate the debate about multiculturalism from that about the fight against social exclusion and inequality. In effect, if the social and economic divisions and inequalities continue to increase, if they superimpose themselves upon ethno-cultural belongings, any project for a democratic multicultural society will remain an illusion. Socio-economic

"balkanization" would be much more dangerous to the concept of public interest than cultural and identity-based diversity that is so often stigmatized.

Two questions are at the same time being posed in Belgium. Do not all identity-based and cultural expressions that respect human dignity have the same right to some sort of collective recognition? Should not all human beings have the right to a dignified existence regardless of their identity choices or their cultural practices? If Belgium responds positively to these questions, it could even become a model for the construction of a multicultural Europe. If it ignores or responds negatively to them, what will the Belgian experience mean to its inhabitants in the future? At best, it will be an abstract space in which every group will selfishly pursue its own particular interests without any thought to the respect of the common good. At worst, Belgium will disappear, at least as a democracy, not because of its diversity but rather because of the inability to extract the riches from the diversity or, in other words, to manage it. Today, Belgium oscillates between the project for a multicultural democracy and the slow movement towards a small "balkanized" enclave in the heart of Europe. The future remains uncertain and will largely depend upon the choice and the involvement of democratic people in all of the country's regions and communities, regardless of their cultural belonging.

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Note

[1] However, administrative information that is more or less official often permits references to "Belgians of foreign origin."

National Identity in Australia:

Cosmopolitan Contradictions Down Under

Jock Collins

Jock Collins is Professor of Economics, School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) Australia. He has been writing about Australian immigration and multiculturalism since the early 1970s. His latest book (with Scott Poynting, Greg Noble and Paul Tabar) is Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other (Federation Press, 2004).

ABSTRACT

Just what does an Australian national identity mean where profound cultural diversity prevails? Dr. Collins sets out to answer this complex question by examining immigration policies and philosophies in Australia over the past twenty years. He provides relevant illustrations from the 1988 bicentenary of white settlement, the 2001 centenary of Federation, and the current debate over ethnic crime in Sydney to contextualize and argue his point.

The Australian nation is one of the most cosmopolitan in the world today. There are two main roots of this cultural diversity: Australia's indigenous peoples, whose history dates between 40,000 and 70,000 years, and the immigrants who came with, and after, white settlement in Sydney in 1788. This article deals with the latter. In relative terms, Australia has received, one of the largest intakes of immigrants of any the western nation, with some 23 percent of its population first generation immigrants from some 180 different birthplaces (OECD, 2001). The place of indigenous and immigrant minorities in a nation built by the Anglo-Celtic British and Irish immigrants and their descendents – who were a majority in terms of numbers, power and influence – has always been problematic, particularly given the explicit and government endorsed racism that made the White Australia policy the cornerstone of the nation at Federation in 1901 and the prime determinant of immigrant selection for the first three quarters of the twentieth century. In the last three decades, multiculturalism (a policy that celebrated cultural diversity and funded programs and services for immigrants of a non-English speaking background (NESB)) replaced assimilation, and citizenship became available to immigrants, who were encouraged to take it up after two years settlement.

As Australia approached the milestones of the bicentenary of white settlement in 1988, the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, and the centenary of Federation in 2001, the issue of national identity was to the fore. At all of these occasions Australia's cosmopolitan diversity was acknowledged and celebrated, with Prime Ministers, Premiers and politicians of all sorts waxing lyrical about Australia's indigenous peoples and indigenous minorities. Yet this rhetoric of cosmopolitanism occurred at the very same time that the very same politicians were undermining the programmatic content of multiculturalism and opportunistically playing the politics of prejudice for political advantage. The enlightened decades of the 1970s and 1980s began to fall apart in the 1990s, when Australia moved from an inclusive model of immigration and settlement (an experience that new immigration countries in Europe might wisely follow) to the current model of reactionary and divisive policies with a tolerance of, rather than enthusiasm for, cultural diversity. As Stephen Castles and Gianni Zappala (2001:156) have argued, "[m]any of the reform impulses of the late 1980s and early 1990s have been abandoned – often tacitly rather than overtly… There is no clear direction for Australian citizenship at present, and this can only heighten the insecurity of immigrants, Indigenous people and other minorities."

This article explores these cosmopolitan contradictions of national identity down under and probes Australia's about-turn in the policies and philosophies of immigration and immigrant settlement. It does this through the lens of the bicentenary in 1988, the centenary of Federation in 2001 and the federal election of that year, and the recent ethnic crime debate in Sydney.

The Bicentenary and the Politicization of the Australian Immigration Debate

The roots of the current Prime Minister's uneasy attitude towards multiculturalism were apparent in 1988, the bicentenary of white settlement in Australia, when John Howard was the leader of the Federal Opposition. Desperate to win an election against Labor's Bob Hawke, and requiring only a few percentage points to swing his way, Howard played the 'prejudice' card, abandoning a long-held bipartisan stance on the issue and turning immigration and multiculturalism into an election issue. Returning from a visit with the then British conservative PM, Margaret Thatcher, Howard declared that when he became Prime Minister he would reduce Asian immigration and abandon multiculturalism in favour of a policy of 'One Nation' (Collins 1991:301-6).

Howard was clearly attempting to attract Labor voters who opposed Asians and/or multiculturalism. But Howard's political masterstroke backfired. He was dumped as leader before the election, a victim of the contradiction that racism

sometimes produces unexpected results: Howard's anti-Asian sentiments were reported widely, and negatively, in the Asian media and this worried CEOs of Australian corporations anxious to tap into the economic opportunities of the Asian market. The Coalition returned to a bipartisan immigration policy, including an acceptance of multiculturalism and abandoning any suggestion that Asian immigration would be treated any different to immigration from other regions. However, Howard proved to be resilient, returning to the conservative Coalition leadership in time to defeat Labor's Paul Keating at the March 1996 federal election. Since that time, the Howard coalition government has tried to rebuild the bridges with Asian and other ethnic communities in Australia but has, simultaneously, dismantled much of the programmatic content of Australian multiculturalism. Phillip Ruddock, Howard's Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs from 1996 to 2003, axed the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research (BIMPR), severely dismembered and disempowered the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), and imposed mandatory detention on 'boat people' (Mares 2001).

The Howard government now makes new immigrants – other than refugees and special humanitarian intakes – wait for two years before they become eligible to receive basic welfare rights like unemployment benefits and sickness benefits. This denies them access to support at the most difficult time of settlement when assistance is most needed. Moreover, funds have been cut from adult migrant education, health, welfare and human rights areas as the Howard Government adopted neo-liberal policies such as privatization of welfare and unemployment services and the dismantling of labour market programs, though to be fair it was Paul Keating's Labor party who first enthusiastically embraced the globalization agenda and who first cut into immigrants welfare entitlements (Collins 2000).

This stance proved effective, in the sense that boat arrivals dropped dramatically. Ironically many of these boat people were escaping the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, regimes that Australia overturned in military action fought side by side with the US and British allies.

Truth Overboard and the Centenary of Federation in 2001

Issues related to undocumented migrant flows dominate (mainly negative) immigration discourses in Australia as they do throughout Europe and North America as events in 2001, the centenary of Federation in Australia, showed. In late August 2001, Prime Minister Howard refused to allow a boatload of 433 asylum seekers, most from the Middle East (rescued by the Norwegian cargo ship MS Tampa in Indonesian waters) to enter Australia and land on Christmas Island, the north western landing post for those seeking asylum on Australian shores. The boat, the KM Palapa 1, had lost power and was drifting slowly with little food and water and had no navigation equipment other than an old box compass. Its passengers – 26 females (two pregnant), 43 children and 369 men (Marr and Wilkinson 2003:19) – were thirsty, hungry and scared for their lives. Most could not swim. The captain of the MS Tampa, Arne Rinnan, had responded to calls from Australian rescue authorities to pick up the asylum seekers aboard the KM Palapa 1, carrying "the biggest load of asylum seekers ever to set out for Christmas Island" (Marr and Wilkinson 2003:3). Most of those adults on board had paid an average of $US 10,000 to snakeheads who arranged this trip, though children were charged less.

In a bizarre Antipodean twenty first century version of John Wayne leading the US cavalry to the rescue in numerous Hollywood westerns, Howard sent in the Australian navy and special military personnel (the SAS commandoes) to prevent the MS Tampa, as well as any boat carrying undocumented immigrants, from landing on Australian shores. As a response to the growth of undocumented boat arrivals to Australia, the Australian Parliament passed a series of new laws in September 2001 that it said were "designed to strengthen Australia's territorial integrity and to reduce incentives for people to make hazardous voyages to Australian territories" (http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/65humanitarian.htm). These new laws take away the rights of people who arrive at an "excised offshore place" – such as Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, staging points for boat smugglers – from making a valid visa application and allows for the possible detention and removal from those places of unauthorised arrivals.

The boat people of the Tampa never made it to Australian shore, but like the undocumented immigrants on the boats that tried to enter illegally after the interception of the Tampa, they were intercepted by the Australian Navy and taken to Pacific island states like Numea and New Guinea, which had become part of the Howard government's 'Pacific solution' to the boat people problem. In effect, the Howard government has paid large sums of money to persuade Pacific Island states to take undocumented immigrants who were intent in seeking asylum in Australia. Marr and Wilkinson (2003:287-8) suggest that this stance has cost the government at least $500 million to keep 2,390 boat people from landing in Australia. This stance proved effective, in the sense that boat arrivals dropped dramatically. Ironically many of these boat people were escaping the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, regimes that Australia overturned in military action fought side by side with the US and British allies.

The MS Tampa was not the first boat carrying asylum seekers to Australian shores in recent years, but it was the first one to be turned away, to be refused permission to land on Australian territory. It is not coincidental that this occurred in the months leading up to the national election. John Howard had played the race card, opportunistically drawing on public antipathy to so-called 'illegal' immigrants, particularly those from the Middle East, that was enhanced by the destruction of New York's World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001. John Howard had a resounding victory in the 2001 national elections, with most political pundits agreeing that the hard line stance on the Tampa boat people and on refugees in general was the decisive factor. Indeed, it is no coincidence that at the 2001 national elections, that the Pauline Hanson *One Nation Party* collapsed. Howard had, by moving to the far right on issues of immigration, stolen her thunder and her votes. As Marr and Wilkinson (2003:283) put it, "by carefully finessing his response to Hanson for years, then seizing her policy on boatpeople, John Howard had made One Nation irrelevant."

Central to the 2001 election campaign and to the discourse about the Tampa boat people was the 'children overboard' incident. Defense Minister Peter Reith maintained up to the day of the election itself that there was photographic evidence obtained by the Australian Navy that children from the KM Palapa 1 were thrown overboard by their parents in a desperate attempt to save themselves. Everyone could see, the Prime Minister argued with passion, that such an act was 'un-Australian,' significantly undermining public sympathy for the plight to those aboard the KM Palapa 1. Howard played the issue right up to election eve. On the last day of the election campaign, Howard told John Laws on national radio that "I can't guarantee to the Australian people that there will not be more of them [boat people]. But I can guarantee to them that if I'm re-elected tomorrow I will continue to stop these vessels coming to Australia" (Marr and Wilkinson 2003:274). It has been subsequently revealed that the incident did not happen, that there was no photograph, no children thrown overboard. But it was too late.

National Identity and the Ethnic Crime debate

The other dominant contemporary anti-immigrant discourse in western countries relates to immigrant crime. Concern about crime and fear of crime appear to be one of the characteristics of the age, not just in Australia, but in all western societies. As Findlay (1999:1) recently put it: "Crime has been a silent partner in modernization… Globalization creates new and favourable contexts for crime." Controversy related to the link between crime, immigration and ethnic diversity has led over the past five years or so to a resurgence of the Right in places such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark and drives much of the political agenda in Tony Blair's New Labour Britain (Collins 2003).

In Australia, the issue of ethnic crime has largely been a Sydney-based issue since the 1998 fatal stabbing of 14-year-old Korean-born Edward Lee in Punchbowl and, two weeks later, a drive by shoot up of the Lakemba police station. Lebanese gangs were immediately identified with both crimes by the NSW Premier, Bob Car, and the then NSW Police Commissioner, Peter Ryan, and Lebanese-Australian males have since been charged and convicted of these crimes. Since that time a series of national and international events have kept the media buzzing with ethnic crime headlines in general, and Middle Eastern and Lebanese crime in particular (Collins et al 2000). Perhaps the most sensational of these events nationally was the so-called *race-rape* case involving a group of Lebanese youth and a number of 'white' Australia young women in Sydney (Poynting et al. 2004). The ringleader, Bilal Scaff, born in Australia of Lebanese-born parents, was sentenced to 55 years jail, by far the longst sentence for such an offence. Added to the mix was the fear of 'Middle eastern' 'terrorism' following the events of September 11: the result is a heady cocktail which, once accepted, leads to visions of criminality behind every immigrant minority face, particularly those of Middle eastern appearance (Poynting et al 2001; Hage 2002:241-8; Poynting 2002).

Moreover, in the public discourse on Lebanese or Middle Eastern crime in Sydney, the accused – mostly second generation immigrants born in Australia – have been robbed of their nationality. They are reported as being 'Lebanese' or 'Middle Eastern,' and never Australian or Lebanese-Australian. The whole discourse is conceptually sloppy.

What is significant about the ethnic crime debate in NSW is the willingness of politicians on all sides to make political capital out of it. In the NSW March 2003 election campaign, Labor Premier Bob Carr and conservative Opposition leader John Brogden engaged in an auction to appear toughest on crime, particularly with the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for a range of crimes. This repeated the pattern of the 1999 election, though at that time the face of the Opposition leader was different (Collins et al 2000).

One problem with the current public discourse on immigrant crime in Sydney is the tendency to move from the criminality of individuals to the criminality of cultures (Collins et al 2002). Moreover, in the public discourse on Lebanese or Middle Eastern crime in Sydney, the accused – mostly second generation immigrants born in Australia – have been robbed of their nationality. They are reported as being 'Lebanese' or 'Middle Eastern,' and never

Australian or Lebanese-Australian. The whole discourse is conceptually sloppy. The very concept of ethnic crime is questionable: the dominant Anglo-Celtic majorities are also ethnic groups, though the term is meant to mean 'ethnic minorities.' In addition, the reportage of, analysis of, and responses to so-called ethnic crime is different to that of 'non-ethnic' crime. It is sensationalized, woven in crude cultural stereotypes and racialized.

Conclusion

Australia has still not come to terms with the issue of national identity in a cosmopolitan society where a dominant Anglo Celtic majority – itself very diverse – shares the nation with the indigenous peoples they invaded and the people from some 180 different birthplaces who have been caught up in the huge appetite that the Australian nation has had for immigration in modern times. Just what does an Australian national identity mean in this context of enormous cultural diversity? One necessary part of the answer to this question is that inclusiveness of diversity would be central to such a national identity. Yet the recent trend is to move the other way, away from what Stephen Castles (2000) calls 'multicultural citizenship' in Australia in the past decade or so as the rhetoric and reality of Australian multiculturalism continue to diverge and new exclusions are being forged. Such politics might win elections in the short term, but may undermine community relations in the medium to longer term.

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Beyond Multiculturalism

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown is a Senior Researcher at the Foreign Policy Centre, a leading European think tank. She is a commentator on race, multiculturalism and human rights, writing regularly for the Guardian and the New Statesman, and broadcasting on radio and television.

ABSTRACT

The author contends that in order for Britain to create a new, more inclusive national identity it must move beyond old notions of multiculturalism. Social democrats must find better ways of binding people together, through education, politics, and culture. She suggests Britain has something important to learn from a country like Canada, which encourages equality, diversity, and citizenship rights. A common citizenship culture, based on a fundamental respect for human rights, is what will allow diverse nations to prosper.

Seeds have now been planted which may lead all Britons to grow into to a new sense of themselves as active participants in a collective enterprise. The Human Rights Act is in place; the idea of dynamic, self conscious individual responsibility and involvement is becoming ever more important; class deference is slowly fading away. As Jonathan Freedland, Tom Nairn[1] and other writers have argued, we need to be connected in more meaningful ways than through our existing institutions and emblems, which no longer work or resonate in the way they once did. The citizenship culture is upon us, and with the national landscape reshaping itself so dramatically, old multiculturalism – which I critique in detail in my pamphlet *After Multiculturalism*[2] – has come to the end of its useful life.

All societies and communities need to take stock periodically to assess whether existing cultural and political edifices are keeping up with the people and the evolving habitat. Nothing is forever. The most progressive ideas, which are right and appropriate at one historical moment can, in time, decay or become defensively self protective. The old British multicultural model has reached that point in 21st century Britain. It does not inspire the young and cannot embrace our most important social developments. It blocks the imagination needed to comprehend and respond to the changes described above. And it is disabling Britons of colour from seeing themselves as key shapers of the emerging citizenship culture.

Our world has been unimaginably transformed. Devolution has set into motion a process of fragmentation and reinvented nationalisms which will imperil the ideal of an open state with diversity at the heart of it. A Mori survey in the *Economist* revealed that only 18% of Scots and 27% of Welsh identified with Britain. In England the figure rose to 43%, but even here 41% described themselves as English and 49% felt an affinity with their regions above all else.

Too many groups – now also including the Scots, Welsh and English – have only a competitive agenda where they struggle against other communities for resources and power and for cultural superiority. They do not really see the world view of others. Where once people of colour were happy to call themselves Black, we are now Asian, Hindu, Caribbean, African, Muslim, Shia Muslims., Kashmiris, Khalistanis. This then gives us a platform for making demands which are not only positive, but also negative, against other groups. Liberals who were once happy to be multiculturalists (because it was easy) now have grave reservations about the project.

Our national identity is in a state of flux and is causing endless anxieties. It is not only the right which is afflicted. Recent furores have been engineered by the editor of the serious left of centre quarterly David Goodhart and others who argue that both national identity and the welfare state are threatened by "too much diversity." Reactionary politics are fashionable now.

The uncertainties produced by globalization are creating new insecurities across the planet. Global business enables the making of immeasurable economic gains, but also creates a loss of control, of self determination, cultural annihilation and greater global devastation and inequalities. As Andrew Marr puts it, "global power is inside the products that are inside our houses and inside the computer web that is now inside our heads."[3] In many cases the reaction to this bewildering opening up of our lives has been a greater (and more idealized) identification with old histories and smaller, neater identities.

Although enlightened political leaders are increasingly talking about diversity and our connectedness to Europe and globalized economies, there is much work to be done before a real confidence settles in again. Professor Stuart Hall agrees that this is a testing time for both old fashioned multiculturalism and post enlightenment liberalism, with both sides struggling with the enormous implications of their encounter: "I think one of the things that multiculturalism has done is to problematize some of the traditional political ideologies leaving unresolved the two major issues of our times – difference and equality."[4]

The concept of citizenship has the capacity to transcend these unresolved binary debates and to start putting into place binding values, even if these lead to some 'multicultural losses.' An expansive citizenship is indispensable in the modern world. Multiculturalism and anti-racism were essential during the Thatcher era to fight for cultural entitlements and racial justice, but both had unforeseen consequences which must now be addressed.

The discourse of multiculturalism and the reality of integration

We have made remarkable progress since Mr. Powell gave speeches about foaming rivers of blood, and this is most evident in assertive, multifarious cities like London and Manchester. But we do not yet have the optimistic and integrated society we all hoped for, in spite of thirty years of multicultural theology and practice. For many British citizens it is a self evident truth that Britain is now incontrovertibly a multicultural country. For others, this statement feels patently absurd. They argue that the majority of indigenous people have yet to personally meet a Black or Asian Briton; they live in their safe white enclaves, continuing long settled conventions. In demographic and geographical terms this is an indisputable truth. Two thirds of the British people still live within five miles of where they were born.

The glitzy, talked-up version of multiculturalism, although embraced by a good many Britons,[5] probably means even less to the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, officially among the poorest people in Britain today. Eighty percent of Pakistanis have incomes which are below half the national average. Consider the historian Linda Colley's scepticism:

> Politicians and pundits shape existing national identities. They rarely by themselves invent or sustain them. And while it may be valuable to try to identify core national values, it is in practice difficult to do so in a way that commands broad assent, unless you descend to uttering platitudes. This is particularly the case in a multi-national, multi-cultural, infinitely diverse polity like Britain.

She gives two examples of communities she lives close to – white people in rural Norfolk and Bangladeshis in the East end of London – who do not buy into the idea of a "fast paced, high octane multicultural Britain."[6] On the other hand, those who understand and advocate advanced and deeper multiculturalism, accept that this remains an ideal that is trying to flower and that will require determined effort to keep alive and spread.[7]

To most people, multiculturalism is something that black folk do and that is also entirely located in domestic urban politics and policies. In part this is because the entire discourse on multiculturalism in this country has been built around these assumptions, by both black *and* white Britons. In local areas throughout the country, people have been encouraged by grant giving bodies and local politicians to promote themselves as particular ethnic minorities. You get money for projects if you can show that as group A you are more 'excluded' than group B. Rarely do we get the encouragement of projects which foster a sense of common purpose or collective citizenry. Multicultural turf wars are everywhere.

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Anti-racist and multicultural policies

In 1997, the European Youth Survey published by MTV found that young white Britons (16-24 year olds) were the most racist in Europe. Thirty percent disagreed that all races and cultures are equal, and 26% said they would never date anyone who was of a different colour. Many of these people were born into multiculturalism.

At school in particular, white children have been alienated by the way multiculturalism was played out, in that all previously colonized societies were uncritically 'celebrated' and white civilizations implicitly accused and undermined. There is essential work to be done on providing a more relevant and inclusive curricula, but one does not redress past injustices by inflicting guilt on or diminishing those who are three generations removed from those who were responsible. Yet that is what has happened in far too many cases. As Roger Hewitt found when he studied young people in schools in South London where the black teenager Stephen Lawrence was murdered by racists: "White pupils, to some extent, seem like cultural ghosts, haunting as mere absences the richly decorated corridors of multicultural societies."[8]

But in an ironic twist, some of those who have most resented multiculturalism are now resorting to using the arguments perfected by multiculturalists. A very angry representative of the Countryside Alliance told Andrew Marr that his folk were the new despised minority in this 'multicultural' society.[9] In 1999, the Commission of Racial Equality had a number of complaints from English Britons about discrimination against them by the Scots, and a major investigation into racism in prisons launched in 2000 by the CRE includes a prison in Wales where English prisoners are complaining about discriminatory practices.

Ties That Bind

Social democrats have got to find a way of responding which allows for the tribal needs of all Britons and yet rejuvenates the national spirit – for a deeper attachment to the European Union and also a sense of global connectedness. All of this must be underpinned by ideals of human rights and justice. Gordon Brown best describes this when he says:

> My vision of Britain comes not from uniformity but from celebrating diversity, in other words a multi-ethnic and multinational Britain… outward looking, open, internationalist with a commitment to democracy and to tolerance.[10]

Progressive people need to promote the view that this island belongs to everyone, and that it is confident enough to progress devolution and feel empowered by the ever changing demographic profiles and cultural inflows which are a condition of modernity. It is only the unimaginative or the uncourageous who fear this. But for the centre to hold, there are binding values based on human rights and social responsibilities which apply to everyone.

Progressive people need to promote the view that this island belongs to everyone, and that it is confident enough to progress devolution and feel empowered by the ever changing demographic profiles and cultural inflows which are a condition of modernity. It is only the unimaginative or the uncourageous who fear this.

Those from societies which have unacceptably unequal gender roles will have to surrender these for the greater good. Those with an inflated view of their own greatness will have to do the same. No one group has more rights than any other group. We need to recognize that fundamentalist secular liberalism (based entirely on individual rights and freedoms) diminishes too much the need for individuals to belong and believe, and that social spaces must strive for integration and cross fertilisation of ideas which can be interrogated by others. This has serious implications. There can be no room for an established religion, nor any state funded denominational schools. Arts funding should foster artists from all backgrounds who are negotiating integration, cultural enlightenment, and growth, instead of going largely to 'establishment' art and then 'ethnic' art.

All this is best achieved if we become a nation of 'live' citizens. Linda Colley has usefully suggested that we should develop a Millennium Charter for Citizens or a Contract of Citizenship Rights. This would be a good starting point.

Stories to connect and to liberate

The integrity of this nation state is under severe pressure. The Internet, migration, e-commerce, and multinational co-operations may be exciting, but they destabilize customary boundaries and props. Britain is particularly susceptible because of the ubiquity of the English language and because all of the institutions and ideas which anchored this nation for so long – the monarchy, and the class structure for example – are losing their grip.[11] Will we just muddle through, a, state full of inchoate allegiances[12] or will we need something more substantial to reconnect us?

The old British identity is indeed passing away. Something modern is coming into being. It is a pity, therefore, that these modern ways of describing this cosmopolitan nation are constantly undermined by politicians, nervous not to offend middle England and the xenophobic popular press. You cannot be a cosmopolitan nation if the main narratives about your country dwell on threats (mostly imagined from the 'other'). You need other narratives, which reveal a different history and which emphasize connections.

This regenerative project has already been initiated in the United States by enlightened people. In his excellent book, *A Different Mirror,* Berkley Professor Ron Takaki asks: "Will Americans of diverse races and ethnicities be able to connect themselves to a larger narrative? Whatever happens we can be sure that much of our society's future will be influenced by which 'mirror' we see ourselves."[13] We need these ties that bind even more since we have no active written constitution, nor flag worshipping tendencies. Here the challenge is to bind and enthuse by fundamentally rethinking notions of heritage, belonging, and greatness. As the critic Maya Jaggi says: "Cultural heritage is widely seen as an embodiment of the spirit of a nation, part of the cement of a national identity for what is after all an 'imagined community.'"[14]

Instead of saying that Britain has become a multicultural country since the war and that we should learn to 'tolerate' difference, people need to take pride in the fact that Britain has always been a country ready to embrace difference throughout its history, albeit sometimes through control and acquisition. Thinking the unthinkable is an essential part of leadership. True globalization should mean the free movement of capital and goods, as well as skills and people. *The Economist* has consistently argued for more liberal and rational immigration policies. Europe, with its ageing population and low birth rates, will require the energy of more immigrants. It is important to release the British population from its own panic about hordes of immigrants. Their good life may depend on it.

Education

In schools, colleges, and universities, black and white children must be taught their connected yet diverse heritage. Equality, and only equality, can ensure such an

exchange. Both will need to go beyond these historical identities while remaining connected to them. They will also need to develop a deep affinity to Europe and to their diasporic communities, while learning ways of critically interrogating both. No black or Asian child should be left to detach themselves from Shakespeare and Tolstoy. No white child should be ignorant about C.L.R. James or Salman Rushdie, even if they never get around to reading their words. The complex histories of Empire and slavery (including the culpability of non-white people) should be a central part of the history syllabus. This kind of curriculum would foster integration and real dialogue.

Citizenship education is another tool which will prove to be ground breaking, although 'multiculturalists' are concerned that race is not given enough space and is submerged by other more broad based ideas. These are misguided concerns. This is the way to avoid the mistakes made by those promoting multicultural education in the seventies and eighties. It is about all the children. The emerging curriculum concentrates on values, participation, respect, and an open-minded approach to knowledge, which for too long has been deliberately restricted by the powerful and (ironically) the powerless.

The curriculum for the future would incorporate cosmopolitanism, 'Europeanism', local, ethnic, religious, and regional identities. It would teach Muslim children to see themselves as European Muslims and English children to see themselves as European Englanders. They would also be proud to be British, participants in a global economy, as well as international bodies and conventions, and upholders of common human rights.

Culture and politics

We need to completely rethink every sector to do with the arts. Social memory, which depends on the stories we tell about ourselves, should be re-cast.[15] Vast areas of success (the British Film industry, for example) remain stubbornly white. Any public funding of projects needs to ensure that cultural white heartlands change and modernize and emulate those who have already begun the process. The best example at present is the British Council, which is rapidly moving away from its image of an old Imperial institution to one that is dynamic, modern, diverse, and internationally valued.

A new strategy using the vocabulary of citizenship should be developed in this country. Political leaders should plan this strategy to include attitudes on Europe, diversity within the British Isles, and globalization. Joined up government means that the Foreign Office, Home Office, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Overseas Development, Cabinet Office, the Department of Education and Employment, The Department of Culture, Media and Sport can now work together and begin a process of change.

We can learn from other countries. In Canada, diversity is encouraged within strong boundaries of commonality. The project is steered by the federal government and the central principles of equality, diversity, and common values are reinforced by policies, speeches, and citizenship rights. The word includes indigenous people, the English and the French, and all other immigrants groups. Like the new South Africa, in spite of some resistance, the country proudly defines itself positively as a nation of various peoples.[16] Both countries have extended international responsibilities and take pride in this fact. The always threatening isolationism of the United States is rarely, if ever, seen in Canada.

Anti-discrimination

The only logical institutional framework to facilitate the changes described above is a Human Rights Commission. All citizens must be enabled to get redress if they are discriminated against. They include the young, the old, white, Asian, black, and other Britons, gay people, women, lone parents, those locked in poverty, people who follow the various religions, and so on. To have only some of these people protected while others suffer injustices is not only unfair, but extremely unwise, because it makes the unprotected victims resent the laws and institutions which exist to help particular groups.

A vibrant common citizenship culture which can foster genuine respect, equality, and consideration across various groups – including those who have arrived in recent years – and diversity together with tough anti-discrimination measures may just give us the kind of country for which so many of us yearn. The challenge is to persuade those who are determined to go back to the future, the cynics who see such ideas as vacuous and sentimental, and those who feel (understandably) that letting go of the multicultural agenda will only lead to losses which will never be recovered.

Notes

1 See J. Freedland, *Bring Home the Revolution,* Fourth Estate, 1998 and T. Nairn, After Britain, Granta, 2000.

2 Published by the Foreign Policy Centre, 2000.

3 *The Day Britain Died,* Profile, 2000, p. 134. This book accompanied the television series with the same title referred to below.

4 Interview with Yasmin Alibhai-Brown for *National Portrait,* Op. Cit.

5 For a good example of this view see *BritainTM: Renewing our identity,* Mark Leonard, Demos, 1997.

6 *Britishness in the 21st Century, Downing Street Millennium Lectures,* January 2000.

7 Professor Stuart Hall acknowledged this on *Radio 4, Desert Island Discs* on 13th February 2000.

8 *Routes of Racism, The Social Basis of Racist Action,* Roger Hewitt, Trentham books, p. 40.

9 BBC2, *The Day Britain Died,* BBC2, 2nd February 2000.

10 *The Guardian,* 12th November 1998.

11 See Chapter 1 of *Who Do We Think We Are?* Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Penguin, 2000.

12 *Britishness in the 21st Century,* Linda Colley, Downing St Millennium Lectures, 8th December 1999, p. 8. See www.number-10.gov.uk for full text.

13 *Little, Brown,* 1993, p. 17.

14 *The Guardian,* November 3rd 1999.

15 See my pamphlet *After Multiculturalism,* Foreign Policy Centre, 2000.

16 For details see *True Colours,* Institute for Public Policy Research, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, 1999.

Citizenship as a Communitarian Nation Building Project in Turkey

Feyzi Baban

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ABSTRACT

The concept of universal citizenship embodies both the basis upon which liberal nation-states build their 'different yet equal' societies, and the foundation upon which republican nation-states base their political, communitarian and social reforms. Turkey, one of these republican nation-states, has encountered some setbacks in its modernization project based on universal citizenship. The author argues that neither de-stratification nor equality has been attained thus far in Turkey, and that rather than focusing on claims of universal citizenship, states should be concentrating on evaluating the actual condition of membership in their societies.

The nation-state's claim to unite a diverse group of people within the same community rests on the concept of universal citizenship. This provides not only the legal framework of who can be member of the community but also a social and political framework within which members of the community seek representation. One of the main promises of universal citizenship of civic republicanism is equal representation before the law which assumes that despite differences within the private realm, individuals are located in the public sphere as equals in terms of fulfilling their potentials and participating in their own affairs. There are, of course, variations between modern societies and the way they organize their citizenship regimes. In countries such as Britain or the United States, where the liberal tradition has historically been dominant, the citizenship regime focuses on the primacy of the individual and diversity rather than the communitarian aspect of the republican tradition.[1] Different as they may be, citizenship regimes usually function as a derivative of national narrative and contribute to homogenization.

Turkey for instance is a good example of a republican regime where citizenship practices played a central role in consolidating the national identity. The republican citizenship regime as an integral part of nation building project has not been hospitable to the idea of diversity and has usually adopted the position that diversity is detrimental to national unity and social cohesion. Notwithstanding the historical connections between the Ottoman Empire and France, the French style, Rousseauian citizenship regime, with its clear distinction between the public and the private, and its assumed role of the state as neutral institution, became a natural model for the citizenship regime in Turkey. The republican regime defined its political project as creating a modern national community and the citizenship regime became the central site through which such community is created. Over the last decade, however, the republican political project has come under scrutiny by groups who claim that their values and aspirations have been excluded from the conditions of membership in the republican project. While Kurdish nationalism has expressed itself in a separatist movement, Islamist groups have addressed the question of citizenship both in terms of political representation and cultural politics.

Citizenship as a Nation Building Project

The modernizing elite in Turkey identified group-based membership as one of the biggest obstacles standing in the way of creating a socially integrated national community. Universal citizenship was important for creating a new self and society because it was the site of all that which was deemed to be new, modern and progressive. The republican elite considered the community defined by ethnic and religious loyalties as one of the biggest obstacles standing in the way of realizing a modern national *gesellschaft.* Mardin argues that the Kemalist elite saw the communitarian organization of the traditional Ottoman society as a serious obstacle to the creation of modern society.[2] The republican modernizing elite knew that in order to create a modern nation state, they had to break with the traditional communitarian system by introducing a series of reforms ranging from education to the control of religion.[3] Universal citizenship became the medium through which these reforms were established as part of the nation building project. The properties of this universal citizenship were rationalism, progress, the modern nation, and secularism, whereas those relegated to the private realm were ethnic identities, religion, and traditional social relations.[4] The citizenship regime in Turkey had the specific mission of representing a modern and rational society, while

the habits of traditional society were left to the private sphere. What is important to emphasize, however, is that the modern project did not seek to eradicate tradition from the heads of the people. Rather, the universal citizenship practices simply worked to confine tradition to the private realm.[5]

As mentioned earlier, the Turkish Republic based the legal framework of citizenship on positive law, where all citizens are equal before the law, while establishing a modern bureaucracy to provide services to all citizens. The principle of populism proposed that no difference exist among citizens, refusing 'preferential' treatment to any group, class, family or individual. The modern reforms were detailed enough to ensure the impartial public life where the state treats citizens as equals. Toprak defines the neutrality of the citizenship regime in Turkey as follows:

> Turkey is among the few non-Western countries which was not colonized and which inherited a bureaucracy and an intellectual milieu already under the influence of universal legal forms. The reforms of the early republican period laid the foundations for a secular legal system which recognized gender equality, secular education, and a conception of public service, both within the bureaucracy and in the political arena, which did not rest on class differentiation, ethnic background or kinship ties. Thus, the political and the bureaucratic establishment never belonged to a specific ethnic group, family, clan or people of the same class. This is important for state-society relations. A conception of the public sphere which is value neutral in terms of ethnic or kinship ties and which rests on universal criteria does not exist in many parts of the developing world and perhaps explains the unique position of Turkey in the Middle Eastern context…[6]

Toprak's description of the citizenship regime in Turkey as unique in the Middle Eastern context is a correct assessment. Yet the implementation of universal citizenship in Turkey is also different from the Western experience. Contrary to Western tradition, based on exclusionary practices and a long history of painful political struggle for inclusion by marginalized groups like ethnic minorities or women, Turkish citizenship was inclusionary from the beginning. In order to create a socially integrated national community out of heterogeneous groups of people, Turkish modernization included various ethnic and religious groups under the umbrella of universal citizenship. However accurate Toprak's account of the neutrality of Turkish citizenship, it fails to recognize the double problematic of the citizenship regime, which is that the very principle of universal citizenship is centered around a notion of the common good. This depends on creating a homogeneous national identity, resulting in other forms of exclusionary practices which hinder the representation of particular groups and identities. This particular understanding of citizenship regime assumes that the neutrality of the public sphere is sufficient to ensure the existence of a democratic and inclusive political system. Furthermore, it assumes that the differences and complexities of the private realm can be offset by the public sphere as long as its neutrality can be preserved.

In stratified societies, as Fraser has argued, the institutional framework produces inequality among citizens and the idea of a single, neutral public does not address these existing inequalities. Furthermore, disadvantaged groups and identities do not have a real chance to participate in the public sphere no matter how neutral citizenship practices may be. Even in a multicultural society, the single, neutral public does not provide justice to all groups and identities within society because the framework of the public is defined by the culturally dominant group.[7] In sum, the institutional neutrality of the citizenship regime does not also automatically lead to economic and cultural neutrality. Power imbalances emerging from economic and cultural differences will exclude some groups from full participation such as the representation of their cultural identities and limit others from participating in it altogether. The neutrality of the citizenship regime, therefore, does not guarantee equal participation, nor that people can engage in peaceful negotiation of differences.

The cultural, not to mention economic, differences that existed in Turkish society thus rendered meaningless any institutional neutrality in the citizenship regime. The principles of a state-controlled secularism, nationalism and rationalism framed the boundaries of membership in such a way that its citizens could only be equal, and the operation of the citizenship regime could only be value neutral, within the boundaries of these principles. In the case of state-controlled secularism, where secularism was not only a principle of the regime but also part of the regulative aspect of everyday life, the issue of dress, such as women's dress or male hats, became an important source of exclusion.[8] Similarly, where national identity constitutes the basis of citizenship, the existence of other particular groups in the public realm could turn into a crisis. Like any other nation state, Turkey contained, and still contains, different cultural and ethnic groups. By assuming that there was a single public sphere whose authorized identity was the national one, the modern project eliminated the possibility that other groups would participate in the public with their own identity. This strictly crafted and controlled public sphere, which ensured the unity of the people and the state, not only operated as a strictly communitarian project, but it was also based on the exclusion of the other(s) whose values and aspirations were not in harmony with the general will.

Citizenship, Change and Democratization

The key defining characteristic of the post-1980 political landscape in Turkey was the multiplication of identity positions and their struggle for inclusion in the public sphere. Kurdish nationalism and political Islam have presented the most important challenges to the boundaries of universal citizenship, and its homogeneous representation of national identity. By drawing attention to the exclusionary nature of the national identity, Kurdish nationalism poses a serious challenge to its privileged position of Turkish identity. Political Islam represents another challenge to secular citizenship and unlike Kurdish nationalists, however, Islamists were able to establish themselves in the public sphere as political actors and to question the fundamental aspects of citizenship and national identity.[9] Islamists have consistently

attacked the equation of modernity with secularism and Westernization. The growing urban Islamist population, which has considerable economic power and an intellectual background, demand that a religious life style be included in the public sphere. Islamists have been particularly successful in organizing themselves in civil society.[10] The Islamic bourgeoisie, with very efficient and active business organizations, and the Islamist intellectuals, with their vibrant publishing community, have been extremely crucial in opening up space in the public sphere.[11]

Central to both Islamist and Kurdish challenges to citizenship is the attempt to question the conditions of membership in the national community. Universal citizenship in Turkey rests on the exclusion of group identities from the public sphere, privileging national identity as the only legitimate identity. It, therefore, functions as a basis for social integration, or as I argued earlier, fulfils the role of realizing the aims of the modernization process. In this way, citizenship is not just simply a set of legal codes, defining the boundaries of membership in the national community, but also a set of cultural practices, representing modern national identity. Ethnic and religious concerns reveal universal citizenship's limits in that having the same legal status does not necessarily satisfy the demands of groups and identities who have specific claims of representation. Tensions in the Turkish case run particularly high as citizenship has the specific mission of realizing and representing the premises of the modern regime.

Citizenship does not constitute an unchanging and static practice but its history in modern times manifests a great deal of struggle by which various groups and identities have sought recognition and inclusion.[12] The current debates around citizenship point to another phase in this process of not only redrawing the boundaries of membership to a national community but also how those members use their citizenship rights. Citizenship debates reflect a desire to broaden plurality and accommodate the life-world of various groups and identities that exist in nation states. In this respect, citizenship practices should not simply be seen as legal practices that define the condition of membership, but as active political struggles that broaden membership boundaries as well as allowing different groups and identities to articulate their differences.

Citizenship debates in the Turkish context demonstrate that universal citizenship is not flexible enough to enable the representation of different identities in the public sphere. However, any alternative that suggests the reorganization of membership strictly on communitarian principles also contains the danger of both segregating differences but also potentially freezing meaning of identities by denying the political negotiation between them. Overcoming this obstacle requires, as suggested by Fuat Keyman, a radical democratization process in which issues of identity/difference cease to be a matter for the private realm but become part of citizenship practices.[13] Rethinking citizenship practices within the context of radical democracy requires a framework that enables the recognition of contradictions as part of the formation of identities. Only here will claims for recognition cease to be a threat to the existing citizenship regime and become practices that further democratize it.

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Notes

1 Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood. *Citizenship and Identity, Politics and Culture.* London: Sage, 1999.

2 Serif Mardin. *Turk* Modernlesmesi. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1992.

3 Ibid.

4 Ilkay Sunar. "State, Society and Democracy in Turkey." *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power.* Ed. Vojtech Magtny & R. Craig Nation. Westview, 1996.

5 Given the fact that secularism was one of the principles of modern citizenship that received special attention from the modernizing elite, because they firmly believed that society could not be modern if religion played a public role, religion was not banned on a personal level. Comparisons are usually made between the early days of the Turkish Republic's attitude towards religion and those of socialist countries. Unlike the socialist countries the modernizing elite in Turkey did not ban religious practice altogether but paid special attention to eliminate religion's role in public life. The best example of this attitude is probably the role of the state in religious education. With the 1924 law of unification of all education, religious education came under strict control of the state. For more on the relationship between the state and religion see Ali Yasar Saribay, *Turkiye'de Modernlesme, Din Ve Parti Politikasi* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1985). and Istar B. Tarhanli, *Musluman Toplum, "Laik Devlet": Turkiye'de Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi* (Istanbaul: Afa Yayinlari, 1993).

6 Binnaz Toprak. "Civil Society in Turkey." *Civil Society in the Middle East.* Ed. Augustus Richard Norton. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996. p. 87.

7 Nancy Fraser. "Rethinking the Public Sphere." *Habermas and the Public Sphere.* Ed. Calhoun Craig. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.

8 Nilufer Gole. "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey." *Civil Society in the Middle East.* Ed. Augustus Richard Norton. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.

9 Umit Cizre Sakallioglu. "Islam-State Interaction in Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, No. 2 (1996).

10 Toprak. "Civil Society in Turkey." p. 106-22.

11 For the case of Islamist intellectuals see Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt against Industry and Technology," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities,* Eds. Metin Heper, Ayse Oncu & Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993). and Nilufer Gole, "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, No. 1 (2000).

12 Isin and Wood. *Citizenship and Identity.*

13 E. Fuat Keyman. "Globallesme Ve Turkiye: Radikal Demokrasi Olasiligi." *Kuresellesme, Sivil Toplum Ve Islam.* Eds. E. Fuat Keyman & A. Yasar Saribay. Istanbul: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998.

Analyzing the intersections of diversity:

A strategy towards equality

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ABSTRACT

In the quotation below, Geddy Lee (lead singer of Rush) exhorts those who have the authority to effect change to do so by creating a new reality. This article – which was mistakenly omitted from the previous issue of Diversity magazine – supports the idea that intersections of diversity are an important consideration in the context of ensuring that national identities are inclusive. The author proposes a practical approach to helping decision-makers implement government policy that reflects a reality which is more inclusive, and therefore closer to the heart.

And the men who hold high places
Must be the ones who start
To mould a new reality
Closer to the heart
Closer to the heart
The blacksmith and the artist
Reflect it in their art
They forge their creativity
Closer to the heart
Closer to the heart[1]

Intersections analysis is a step in the policy development process. It refers to the process by which decisions are made when taking into account the complexity of human identities. In the same way that a gender analysis requires consideration of how outcomes may differ between men and women, intersections analysis requires policy-makers to consciously take into account the complexity of the lived experiences of people they do not necessarily know well. The objective of intersections analysis is for policy and decision-makers to understand the individual and cumulative characteristics associated with an individual or community in order to 1) minimize any negative impacts of initiatives under consideration, and 2) accentuate positive impacts.

Intersections analysis is important because, despite a half a century of intense immigration, the government of Canada has yet to achieve a workforce of policy-makers and legislators that reflects its population. As a result, options tend to reflect the experiences and perspectives of that particular group of policy makers or legislators. In relying on this information, decision-makers may not appreciate the impact of their decisions. Consequently, decisions taken may trigger unexpected outcomes on groups of people whose lived experience and identities were not taken into account early on in the policy-making process.

The purpose of applying an intersections analysis is to ensure that decision-makers make informed choices. When policy-makers adequately understand the characteristics of stakeholders, programs, policies and legislation can be tailored to meet particular needs and/or to achieve predictable outcomes. The application of an intersections analysis can also inform decisions about whose needs should be prioritized. In the context of decisions about who gets public funds, the analysis can support decisions to focus funding on particular groups, for particular results.

The application of Intersections analysis

People are made up of a multitude of characteristics such as gender, race, age, ability, income. Intersections analysis seeks to understand the relationship between these characteristics in order to achieve equitable policy outcomes. In some cases, a dominant characteristic will emerge to drive the policy or program choice. For example, a young man with a physical disability will need physical access to school as a priority. In such a case, the dominant characteristic will be the mobility impairment. One can expect that school decisions about services for this student will aim first to ensure physical access. To the extent that service implications emerge from an analysis of other intersections such as the student's age, race, or income, these become secondary considerations.

Another example of intersections analysis could involve the assessment of the recreational facility needs of inner-city youth. An appreciation of the compounding intersections of race, income, age, religion, and immigrant status might yield the following information for use by community centre program directors:

- To the extent that Christian religious holidays result in the closing of local community centres, non-Christian youth will require alternative programming when centres are closed for statutory holidays they do not celebrate, such as Christmas and Easter. (Intersections of youth+religion).

- To the extent that youth in inner-city neighbourhoods are likely to be non-white and from low-income single-parent families, the choice of scheduling activities in the evening may limit the participation of youth who provide primary childcare when their mothers are at work. (Intersections of youth+race+low income)
- To the extent that parents who have immigrated from police states avoid interaction with authorities in Canada, these parents are less likely to encourage their children to engage in recreational activities which involve basketball games with local police officers. (Intersections of youth+ immigrant status)

The outcome of incorporating the information elicited by these kinds of intersections analyses is that policies and programs can then be adjusted to address lived experience.

Intersections Analysis – A retrospective

My exploration of intersections analysis stems from work in the 1980s and 90s at the Equality Rights Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario. Then and now, policy issues such as civilian oversight of police and racial profiling in the justice system were at the forefront of the justice agenda. Policy-makers were required to address the impact of programs, policies and legislation on youth who were racialized[2] and whose identities were as often Canadian-born as immigrant. Information was elicited via formal and informal consultation with members of African Canadian communities, enabling policy analysts and Crown Attorneys to look at the problems they were trying to solve in a new way.

In the l990s work on a variety of more formal analytical tools (diversity lenses) took place across government departments. At one point there were over 16 lenses being developed by individual departments to assess particular policy impacts. In 1997, intersections analysis became more formalized at the federal Department of Justice. At that time, a gender analysis tool was being implemented across federal departments. That tool noted that "gender equality analysis should be part of a more comprehensive analysis of the impacts of policy, law or programs on diverse groups (or 'diversity analysis')."[3]

Building on the gender analysis work, policy officials at the Department of Justice worked with colleagues across the country to implement a tool to assist in more formally analysing the impact of intersecting identities. This work culminated in the development of an analytical tool called IDEAS (Integrated Diversity and Equality Analysis Screen)[4] endorsed by Deputy Ministers of Justice across the country for use by their justice officials. IDEAS was a simple set of focusing designed to elicit information that might otherwise not come to the attention of decision-makers. As the guiding principles of IDEAS state: "Diversity analysis does not attempt to determine whether an initiative should proceed; rather it provides information on the impacts of the initiative on diverse groups."

The IDEAS tool identified thirteen groups deemed to "frequently experience disadvantage in their dealings with the justice system."[5] Enumerated below, the tool initiated thinking about these groups with the following question: "Are there foreseeable specific impacts of the initiative on individuals who can be identified by membership in one or more[6] of the following groups?"

1. Women
2. Aboriginal People
3. Persons with disabilities[7]
4. Recent immigrants
5. The elderly
6. Persons with literacy problems
7. Racialized[8] minorities
8. Religious groups
9. Refugees
10. Youth and Children
11. Social assistance recipients and the poor
12. Gays and Lesbians, transgendered and bi-sexual persons
13. People who speak neither Official Language[9]"

The process of agreeing to these groups was not without hurdles. The reality is that the tool required an understanding of communities we did not necessarily know well, and about whom there was limited information. As the tool was developed, fact sheets were compiled to assist in guiding the thinking about each group. The fact sheets were a source of intense debate. Some officials worried that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" and that brief descriptions about group characteristics could perpetuate negative stereotypes. Others felt that basic information, even if limited, was better than no information given that decisions were being made which would affect members of these groups. In the absence of consultation with members of these groups, the primary source of information was Statistics Canada data.

A colleague, Mala Khanna, developed another training piece around intersections entitled: "When Blue and Yellow make Green"[11] thus cleverly capturing the impact of intersections (blue and yellow) and the ensuing creation of a completely new colour (green) which exacts appreciation on its own merits. In the body of that piece Mala acknowledged the complexity and the backlash that a requirement to assess the impact on so many groups can trigger. She noted:

> At the same time, recognizing all of the possible intersections that can exist between and within the profiled groups, and understanding the realities of those intersections is a challenging task. There is a fear that the boundaries between these profiles will be blurred so much so that policy makers and decision makers will have to account for all of the complex and intricate combinations that could be made. This fear is not unfounded. As stated earlier, it is not possible, nor is it desirable to attempt to objectively determine the outcome of various intersections. They are infinite. However, we can make an effort to recognize that policies will impact some groups and some individuals within those groups more so than others.

Applying Intersections Analysis in the Cultural sector

Artists and arts communities have long recognized the creative advantage which emerges from the intersections of multiple identities and ideas. A recent issue of *Rice Paper* is dedicated to "the end of Pure Race," a controversial title tied directly to hybridity.[12] *Fuse Magazine* has spent over 25 years reflecting on the relationship between political issues and contemporary culture, advocating from the perspective of a multitude of intersecting voices.[13] Nonetheless, the reality is that the extensive diversity of voices, histories, and talent resident in Canada is not well reflected on stage, screen, in radio, films, music, books, museums or galleries.

In the cultural sector, the application of an intersections analysis is about minimizing the exclusion and disadvantage which arise from limited access to funding. At the federal level, the Department of Canadian Heritage is responsible for policy and programs in support of the cultural sector. In this context, the application of an intersections analysis seeks primarily to ensure programs and policies encourage diversity in Canadian content by promoting access to arts and heritage for all Canadians. In recognition of an identified need to better reflect the diversity of Canadian talent, the Department of Canadian Heritage adopted a Strategic Plan on Diversity and Culture in 2003.[14] Using an approach similar to that of IDEAS, questions are asked about program and policies impacts in relation to membership in five groups enumerated as: Culturally and Racially Diverse, Aboriginal Peoples, Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgendered people, Official Languages and Persons with Disabilities.

The Appendix to the Strategic Plan on Diversity and Culture sets out the following guiding principles:

> Diversity analysis removes imbalances in order to achieve:
> **Access:** Opening up the Canadian Heritage Portfolio programs and activities.
> **Equity:** Ensuring inclusion.
> **Social Cohesion:** Facilitating participation and interaction across communities.
> **Fair Decisions:** Making decisions based on informed choices about the impact of policies on diverse communities.

The questions outlined in the Diversity and Culture Strategic Plan, will assist departmental officials in setting priorities for funding as the department seeks renewal of several programs and initiatives. Arts institutions such as the Canada Council, who implemented targeted funding towards diverse artists several years ago, are now beginning to see the results of efforts to increase their reach into diverse communities. As noted in their 2002/03 Annual Report referring to the Council's Capacity Building program, the Report notes:

> The impact of the program can be seen in the overall artistic growth of the companies involved, which is being felt throughout the diverse communities they serve. In Vancouver, the board and staff of Centre A, the Vancouver International Centre for Contemporary Asian Art, are engaged in a promising strategic planning process that will sustain growth of the organization. Arsenal Pulp Press, an award-winning Vancouver publishing house, has hired a marketing manager – and increased sales by 43%. In Montreal, the Black Theatre Workshop, inspired by renewed leadership, has presented a full season of cultural activities, including a community project that weaves the stories of the francophone and anglophone African diasporas. And in Toronto, the AfriCanadian Playwrights Festival has hired an in-house web designer, thereby creating a virtual home for Black Canadian playwrights.[15]

These efforts by government to understand how to meet the needs of communities with complex intersecting identities are important steps towards achieving equality of outcomes. As dub poet, cultural activist and teacher, Lillian Allen, has written: "Representation is presence, and presence is participation and more equitable re-distribution of resources…"[16] In this sense, intersections analysis is one step along the continuum of effort required to achieve representativity in public institutions and equity in resource allocation.

At the end of the day, governments will need to pay attention to the outcome of intersections analysis in order to maximize scarce resources. Equitable access to arts funding will remain a challenge for all government funders given limited funding envelopes and high demand from new and established arts institutions. An intersections analysis can help determine whether a program is likely to achieve its objectives or to incur extra costs due to unforeseen impacts. Public resources remain scarce so care must be taken to ensure that funds are well-spent. While the level of public resources will never be able to meet all public needs, to the greatest extent possible, informed choices should be made about the impact of initiatives, what needs should be met, and in what order of priority.

In conclusion, I quote Lillian Allen who writes: "We must keep working to support what is fundamental to our identity and our communities and what offers not only a way forward but great and exciting possibilities as a nation."

Notes

1 Lyrics from Closer to the Heart, by *Rush* From the album "A Show Of Hands"; Words by Neil Peart and Peter Talbot, Music by Geddy Lee and Alex Lifeson

2 "Racialization is the process by which societies construct race as real, different and unequal in ways that matter to economic, political and social life." Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (1994) (From concepts by Stuart Hall, Robert Miles, and others.)

3 www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/guide/evaluation.htm://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/guide/evaluation.htm

4 IDEAS – An Integrated Diversity and Equality Analysis Screen, a document approved for use by |Federal Provincial Territorial Deputy Ministers of Justice and the F/P/T Working Group on Diversity, Equality and Justice (1997)

5 Extract from Purpose section of IDEAS

6 "one or more: refers to whether there are foreseeable specific impacts on individuals who can be identified by membership in one or more of these groups.

7 Persons with disabilities includes persons with physical and/or developmental disabilities

8 "Racialization is the process by which societies construct race as real, different and unequal in ways that matter to economic, political and social life." Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (1994) (From concepts by Stuart Hall, Robert Miles, and others.)

9 This group was identified in order to distinguish between the experiences of recent immigrants and older immigrants who have never learned English or French.

10 Refers to women such as prostitutes who tend to be subject to regular police scrutiny

11 "Khanna, Mala "When Blue and Green make Yellow", Draft article prepared for the Department of Canadian Heritage, 1999.

12 http://www.ricepaperonline.com

13 http://www.fusemagazine.org

14 Appendix 2 – Department of Canadian Heritage – Strategic Plan on Diversity and Culture Draft Diversity Questions for Program Renewal http://www.pch.gc.ca/special/dcforum/pubs/strat/index_e.cfm

15 http://www.canadacouncil.ca/council/annualreports/2002-2003/equity_equite-e.asp

16 Lillian Allen, as extracted from The Vancouver-based periodical *Rice Paper* (www.ricepaperonline.com) The end of Pure Race, Ricepaper, 2003 RicePaper, http://www.ricepaperonline.com/curren

Conversing About Diversity

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ABSTRACT

In this article Professor Spoonley examines the role of mass and minority media in the process of public debate. As audiences become increasingly fragmented, it is all the more difficult to conduct discussions about national identity in an inclusive manner. With the resurgence of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments in many parts of the world, forums for meaningful exchange about cultural diversity are of the utmost importance.

John Ralston Saul has noted that nationalism has "made a remarkable and unexpected recovery" with mainstream parties seeking to capitalize on the nationalist vote.[1] In many western countries, this heralds the reassertion of majoritarian and dominant interests and the dismissal of critical and progressive expressions of cultural pluralism. Narrowly-defined 'needs' replace more inclusive, as well as group specific, 'rights' as the basis for social and economic policy and the attribution of political entitlement. Anti-immigration sentiments expand from the extremes of the political spectrum and appear in mainstream political agendas to attract the attention of centrist parties, including those of a social democratic persuasion. In this environment, conducting informed conversations about the issues and possibilities gains new importance. The question is, what forums exist for public discussions about identity (national or local) and the implications for particular constituencies of cultural diversity?

In the classic as well as more recent immigrant receiving societies, national education systems provide one obvious mechanism for contributing to an understanding of the issues and for conducting public discussions. Another important opportunity for collective discussion has been the mass media. There is a literature dating from the Frankfurt School and the use of the mass media by fascists in the 1930s which has asked some fundamental questions of its role in contributing to private understandings and public discussions. These questions deserve to be repeated because the mass media in all its diverse forms – print, radio, television, electronic – remain a key institution in the distribution of images and messages. Will the mass media continue to largely reflect the interests and values of dominant groups and cultures, thereby contributing to majority nation-building projects? At the same time, by misrepresenting and marginalizing minority groups, they are a key institution in the process of 'minority nation-destroying'.[2] But the media landscape has seen some important shifts in terms of participants and practice. The era which was dominated by state-sponsored mass media and certain corporate interests, especially in relation to television, has been transformed by new information and electronic technologies. This is especially important for indigenous communities, ethnic minorities and immigrant groups. There are diverse alternatives to the mass media for these communities, as transborder media develop and provide linkages to immigrant 'homes', alongside local minority (narrowcast) media which speak directly to immigrant and minority communities. If local media have privileged some voices and the nation-building of dominant groups, do these new media fragment audiences and preclude shared discussions about the nature of diversity and the implications for contemporary states

Diversity and the Mass Media

As various states have entered a new phase of immigrant-derived cultural diversity, concern continues to be expressed about the contribution of the mass media to democratic debate and a constructive understanding of the issues.[3] Since the 1970s, the mass media have tended to provide negative images, have misrepresented the issues or racialized particular groups, and have been reluctant to include minority representatives as key industry players. Moreover, the media have played an important role in the regular moral panics that have, in different periods, been focussed on urban decay and the involvement of minority ethnic and immigrant groups in inner city disorder, the fears of 'being swamped' by culturally different others and, more recently, with concerns about the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers.[4] As one of the most significant contributors to an understanding of the mass media and racialization has argued, the media have played a key role as an elite institution in their own right as well as "shaping and changing the social mind."[5] The discourse analysis provided by Van Dijk and others has provided compelling evidence of the racial text and subtexts of media portrayals of immigration, immigrants and cultural diversity, ranging from an explicit threat value through to the privileging of some groups at the expense of others. Inevitably, questions have been raised about what the racializing and misrepresentation of immigrant and ethnic groups means for public conversations about the desirability of diversity and the establishment of inclusive national communities. Alongside these research and policy concerns have been those which raise additional

questions about the representativenss of the mass media workforce, about the culture of media organizations and their control. Concerns about the role of the mass media in culturally diverse democracies have been paralleled by criticism of the operations of media institutions, and their lack of cultural inclusivity.

If the Anglo-conformity of the mass media in countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the accompanying misrepresentation and under-representation of particular communities remain continuing issues, there have been some indications of change. The development of state-funded minority interest media organizations, the establishment of regulatory bodies to ensure cultural inclusiveness, the funding of immigrant and ethnic programming, a greater awareness and sensitivity of some media workers and organizations to cultural diversity and assertive minority representatives have all contributed to shifts in the mass media over the last two decades. Yet there remain obvious differences between various media organizations, and within them. One contrast is often between news reporting, which tends to reflect explicit and narrow 'news' values, and the features or documentary programs/articles which have provided more nuanced and sympathetic information on diversity.

What is less obvious is how various communities as audiences select, filter and react to the mass media. The media interpret the social world for us, the audience, but then so do audiences actively interpret the media. Audiences are seldom passive recipients of media information and world views. But what is less well understood is how different communities react to the media's views of other groups and intergroup relations. Our research on audiences indicates that this is rather more sophisticated and informed for both majority and minority communities than we give them credit for.[6] For example, different ethnic groups in New Zealand, including those from the dominant Pakeha (European-descent) group, were aware of media agendas which meant that what they read, listened to or watched did not treat ethnic groups equitably, that there was an emphasis on simplifying issues, and that entertainment and commercial values took precedence over information. Minority ethnic and immigrant groups were particularly sensitive to misrepresentation and they were frustrated at their inability to influence or respond to negative images and messages. But that frustration was widely shared, even if it varied in intensity, and others recognized that some groups might have more reason to feel aggrieved at the way in which they were treated by the mass media. Research which does not pay adequate attention to diverse audiences is limited in what it can say about impact.

These interests in media performance and influence reflect well-established and relatively orthodox research and policy interests. What has received less attention is the proliferation of minority ethnic media, and the implications for the engagement of various communities in discussions on what diversity might mean.

Audiences are seldom passive recipients of media information and world views. But what is less well understood is how different communities react to the media's views of other groups and intergroup relations.

Minority Media

There are now a variety of media sources, both from the country of origin and from within immigrant and ethnic communities, which rely on conventional and new electronic technologies. Cottle[7] lists these as "international communications, audio and visual cassettes, mobile phones, mobile music systems, the Internet and email, digital cameras, photocopiers and fax machines, camcorders, and home-based computerized music recording and productions systems." They provide an increasingly diverse, often cheap, real time alternative to the mass media and they speak directly to the experiences of being an immigrant or a member of an ethnic minority.

There are two different types of media: those which operate locally to meet immigrant and ethnic community needs in their country of residence, and those which provide transnational links back to a country of origin or amongst a diaspora. Often, the media are a mixture of these two as homeland media products are interspersed with a local immigrant focus. New technologies such as global satellite broadcasting systems, the circulation of images and information on CDs, videos and discs, and the Internet have greatly enhanced the ability of communities to maintain trans-border networks. The reach and involvement of communities in these forms of media should not be underestimated.

Tongans represent a total global population of approximately 150,000, both in Tonga and as part of a diasporic population resident in the Pacific rim, especially New Zealand. Telephone densities, and therefore the Internet, is limited in Tonga with only 10% of the population having access to a phone. But a New York-based Tongan, Taholo Kami, established a website in the 1990s, the Kava Bowl. It provided an opportunity for Tongans to discuss matters of cultural, political or personal significance, and at its height, the website saw 600,000 hits per month. Kami saw potential in that political debate in cyberspace was unhampered by traditional cultural practices.[8] Tongans, as long as they had access to the Internet, could have their say on practically anything, without restrictions imposed by cultural elites and gatekeepers, or by the filtering and restrictive practices of the mass media. While this might be liberating, there was concern that it also had a corrosive impact on traditions.[9] It has raised some interesting questions about the significance of electronic-based cultural activity (being a cyberTongan) amongst a diasporic community who had already begun to shift in their cultural practices and identities by virtue of their migration.

In Australia, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) has provided a compromise in that a state-funded television

channel provides minority groups with an opportunity to watch programs that represent them and their interests. The quality has been such that a wide range of audiences have been regularly attracted to 'minority' programs over the last two decades. In New Zealand, a mix of community and state initiatives has provided media that reflect the interests of the indigenous Maori. The Maori print media began in the mid-1800s, and continue, largely funded by Maori organizations and communities. Maori radio programs were confined to small segments on the state-funded network until the 1970s when state and iwi (tribes) established an extensive radio network. MaiFM, an Auckland-based radio station which was aimed at urban Maori and Pacific youth, combined Maori content and language with hip-hop and rap. By 2002, it had the largest audience share of any radio station. In 2004, a state-funded television Maori channel was launched. By the mid-1980s, Maori had gained significant concessions from the state in terms of cultural and linguistic recognition, reparations for historical grievances and the establishment of bicultural government services. The various media reflected these political concerns and added to the problematization of a majoritarian nationalism as well as providing alternative renderings of citizenship and a New Zealand identity. This is available to non-Maori and is an interesting contrast to the messages of an orthodox mass media.

However, state involvement is often minimal and more significant are the initiatives which have been taken by individuals and communities to establish alternative minority interest media. Opportunities are being utilized wherever migrants and ethnic communities reside for a variety of reasons: establishing new networks or retaining old ones, participating in economic activities locally and internationally, cultural and language maintenance, help in the adjustment process post-migration, and the provision of information that is not available from the mass media or other host institutions. There are many new transmission and reception options and the costs have been significantly reduced. There is an opportunity to speak directly to a particular community without being mindful of moderating the message for a non-minority audience or of having the information generated and filtered through a mass media lens. Trans-border media, aided by satellite relay systems, helps maintain contact with a homeland and encourage the maintenance of sidestream languages and cultural behaviours in new ways. While these media are typically linguistically and culturally-specific, they are supplemented by other trans-border media which reflect global media systems, such as CNN. Relatively little is known about minority media, especially in terms of the implications for national debates and understanding about diversity.

There are many positive aspects to the activities of minority media but they seldom deliver to a mass audience. They can inform and encourage a particular community to consider questions of identity and diversity, yet by their very nature they do not typically speak to other communities. Perhaps they should not be expected to because it might undermine their role as a safe environment for communities that feel unsafe in terms of the mass media. But their role in broad civic debates is not clear.

Debating Diversity

Whatever the limitations of the mass media, they provided and continue to provide an opportunity for a discussion about nationality, citizenship and cultural diversity. Concerns remain about how well they do this, and whether they can respect the integrity of immigrant and other minority communities, especially if they normalize majority institutions and values. But they provide an opportunity to reach many communities about matters of importance. However, if many of the conversations are being held within media which are specific to a particular community and often in a language not shared by others, has the opportunity for holding an inclusive discussion about diversity been eroded? Do immigrant and minority media constitute an important factor in maintaining the cultural well-being of the community in question, or do they act as an impediment to successful settlement by virtue of the fact that audience is confined to a specific cultural or linguistic group? The media might provide a "safe place for ethnic cultures to thrive… [and] an entree for newly arrived immigrants who wish to adapt to their new environment"[10] but are broader questions of societal integration and understanding being omitted because they encourage introspection?[11] There are many positive aspects to the activities of minority media but they seldom deliver to a mass audience. They can inform and encourage a particular community to consider questions of identity and diversity, yet by their very nature they do not typically speak to other communities. Perhaps they should not be expected to because it might undermine their role as a safe environment for communities that feel unsafe in terms of the mass media. But their role in broad civic debates is not clear. Alongside questions about the mass media, other and sometimes similar questions need to be raised about the role minority media play in the processes of public and inclusive debates.

Conclusion

Two broad issues remain. The first is the need to understand the nature and impacts of the media that serve minority

communities. The mass media remain important vehicles for the generation of images and messages with considerable influence; but to consider such mass media without also understanding the media now available to any community is misplaced. In any country, electronic media, with their reduced costs and transmission options, have provided opportunities which have been extensively utilized by minority communities. The layers of media now apparent, from intimate and confined systems through to extensive trans-border networks, have been a significant development and deserve much greater attention. The second issue is what this means for national conversations about a common future.

The paradox is that while the mass media may have provided little "conversational equality"[12], the minority media do not necessarily provide an adequate alternative. The proliferation of media of all forms has fragmented audiences. The opportunity for minority groups to control the media, media organizations and the messages they generate has improved. But it makes the process of discussing matters of national significance that much more problematic. Their own well-being as immigrant and minority communities might be enhanced by minority media, but the opportunities for discussing broad political issues with other minorities and majority groups is often constrained. Creative ways need to be found to conduct such dialogues in the minority media without compromising their positive functions as safe vehicles for these communities. If Saul is correct in his concern that a narrow and exclusive nationalism has returned (if it ever left), forums must be found to conduct a well-informed and inclusive debate about diversity.

Notes

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2 Kymlicka, W. *The Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 231.

3 Mahtani, M. "Representing Minorities: Canadian Media and Minority Identities." *Canadian Ethnic Studies,* XXXIII (3): 99-133; Fleras, A. & Kunz, J.L. *Media and Minorities: Representing Diversity in a Multicultural Canada.* Thompson Educational, Toronto, 2001.

4 Cottle, S. "Introduction. Media Research and Ethnic Minorities: Mapping the Field." *Ethnic Minorities and the Media – Changing Cultural Boundaries.* Ed. S. Cottle. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000.

5 Van Dijk, T. *Elite Discourse and Racism.* London: Sage, 1993. p. 279.

6 Spoonley, P. & A.D. Trlin. *Immigration, Immigrants and the Media. Making Sense of Multicultural New Zealand?* New Settlers Programme, Massey University, Palmerston North, 2004.

7 Cottle, 2000, p. 3.

8 Vui-Talitu, S. "Tapping into Technology." *Achievers 2000.* 1999: p. 38-39; Spoonley, P. "Transnational Pacific Communities: Transforming the Politics of Place and Identity." *Tangata O Te Moana Nui. The Evolving Identity of Pacific Peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand.* Eds. C . Macpherson, P. Spoonley & M.Anae. Palmerston: Dunmore Press, 2001.

9 Howard, A. "Pacific-Based Virtual Communities: Rotuma on the World Wide Web." *The Contemporary Pacific,* (11)(1) (1999): 160-175.

10 Mahtani, 2001, p. 114.

11 Mahtani, 2001.

12 Barker,C. *Television, Globalisation and Cultural Identities.* Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991. p. 153.

Managing Democratization and Nation-Building

in South-eastern Europe (the Western Balkans)

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between ethnic majorities and minorities is of vital importance to any polity. In this article Dr. Guzina questions whether the Western approach to liberal democratization is appropriate in the Balkans, considering the lack of positive results over the past decade. The model being utilized in the region favours a type of nation-building that does not support multi-cultural integration, nor reinforce democratic reform. The author believes the international community has underestimated the role that ethnic groups have to play, even where the desire for political autonomy exists.

Given the horrific experiences with fratricidal, ethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, an international consensus was agreed upon (the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the USA) which emphasized that conventional institutes of democratic governance (regular free and fair elections, rule of law and respect for human rights) should be fine-tuned to manage ethnic and cultural diversity in conflict-torn societies. For these reasons, the newly emerged belief system of the international community was organized around achieving two interrelated goals: developing politically stable, liberal-democratic states on the one side, and integrating ethnicity as an unavoidable political ingredient of the post-communist South-eastern European societies, on the other.

But such an approach invites two important questions. Should the Western philosophical principles of liberal pluralism and ethnocultural justice be promoted as a means to solving ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans and elsewhere? (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001) And, is there a strong direct correlation between the Western project of liberal democratization and the local projects of nation-building in the region? Or, to put it differently, are the interests and belief systems of the international policy-makers and local political elites qualitatively different?

The answer to these questions will proceed in two parts. I will first elaborate on the international blueprint for democracy building, and then compare the blueprint with the theory and practice of nation-building in South-eastern Europe. The ultimate objective of the paper is to evaluate the basic assumptions of the international approach to democratization and nation-building and offer some tentative suggestions for the unsatisfying results of the reform policies in the region.

Blueprint for Democratization

The benchmark of the entire democratization literature has been the experiences with democratization in Latin America and southern Europe in 1970s and 1980s. For better or for worse, most of the reigning wisdom in the literature has found its way into post-communist studies in a rather non-discriminatory fashion (Bunce, 2003). Thus, despite the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, nobody seemed to challenge the core assumption of the democratization paradigm that state and democracy-building are supposed to be mutually reinforcing exercises – two sides of the same coin.

However, after 15 years of experimenting with democratization in post-communist, multi-nation countries, a series of challenges has emerged that require sober second thought on the applicability of the central tenet of this paradigm. For example, why should we assume that there is a direct correlation between the nation and democracy-building? What if the optimism of the dominant literature and international policy makers is unjustifiable? What if fundamental individual liberties and communal claims are not necessarily reconcilable in each and every case, or even in the long run?

These questions seem to be of the utmost importance for the South-eastern European countries. As early as 1970, Dankwart Rustow wrote that transition to democracy might be a futile exercise without the so-called "background condition." In Rustow's words, "[I]t simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy to be must have no doubts or mental reservations at to which political community they belong to." (p.350) In other words, the background condition represents the level of achieved national unity in any given state beyond which the very boundaries and identities of the state and political community will not be challenged.

It is fair to say that the International Community has been concerned with the lack of national unity in conflict-torn societies. This is the reason why managing ethnic and cultural diversity plays such an important role in their approaches to Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. The OHR's (the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina) imposition

of constitutional amendments in April, 2002 to bring institutional arrangements of the entities in line with the constitution of the entire state, the Ohrid Agreement on the relationship between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, the Belgrade Agreement on the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, and the imposition of an entire constitutional framework in Kosovo in May, 2001 are all examples of the IC's awareness of a very tense relationship between the (lack of) national unity in the region and democratization.

Still, whether international involvement is to be perceived as bureaucratic meddling (Chandler, 2004) or necessary and just intervention in support of democratization is open to debate. John McGarry, one of the leading scholars on power sharing arrangements as the right tools for managing diversity, is quick to point out that "[T]he prospects for success will be enhanced if the federation emerges internally from a bargain worked out by the leaders of all the groups." He also argues that "constitution making process should be as democratic as possible, and that no outside force should pick delegates, directly or indirectly." (2004, p.5)

These standards are of a very high order and none of the internationally run states fulfils them. In fact, not only are these standards not fulfilled, but they are constantly being bypassed with *bona fide* actions on the part of the IC representatives in Bosnia or Kosovo in the name of democracy: overwriting parliamentary decisions, banning certain politicians from participating in elections, imposing laws and regulations, and so on (Chandler, 2004; Bieber, 2004). Hence, even though international policy makers are aware of the "background condition" problem, their approach is still based on trust in the primacy of democratization over nation-building; that is, in the coincidence between the state and democracy building. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the international protectorate of Kosovo, where the question of its ultimate status is constantly being postponed in vain belief that democratization will make the question irrelevant (International Crisis Group Report, 2003).

But, in the essentially contested states, institution and nation-building practices are not mutually reinforcing exercises. Rather, they should be understood as convoluted and mutually contradictory practices that quite often work against one another. In the next section, the reasons why they do not always work together will be further explored.

(Lack of) National Unity and Democratization

After the collapse of communism, a multiparty system was adopted everywhere in South-eastern Europe (the Western Balkans), while fundamental freedoms were recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution in each and every post-communist state. However, the role of the state and the relationship between its citizens has been, and still is, conditioned by controversial relations between ethnic majorities and minorities. The prevailing model of the state in the Balkans is still a combination of two traditional European models of modernization – the French and the German. I will call this model the Balkan model of the nation-state, and for most scholars and practitioners this model is at the heart of the problem with unsuccessful democratic changes in most of the Western Balkan states. So what are the main features of this hybrid model of development?

The French model emphasizes centralism, while the German model provides/legitimizes the link between the majority ethnic group and the state. Fused together, they provide a model of a perpetually homogenizing and centralizing nation-state. Under such conditions, the fear of minority claims is so strong that the Balkan states prefer not to grant local government to the whole population rather than guarantee similar rights to their respective minorities (Bianchini, 1998). An excellent example of the fear of decentralization has been Macedonia (at least until the Ohrid Agreement). Only under great international pressure did the Macedonian government agree to decentralization. Another one is the case of the northern region of Vojvodina in Serbia, whose toothless autonomy does not bear any resemblance to the previous province's status in the former Yugoslavia (Devic, 2003).

Consequently, despite the persistent international emphasis on civil society and the protection of human and minority rights in the region, domestic elites perceive nation-building in a strategic fashion, while the democratization discourse is used solely for tactical purposes of legitimizing one's position internationally.

The state in the Western Balkans is seen by most political entrepreneurs as a precious prize to be won for the purposes of protecting one's nation (a dominant ethnic group) over the interest of various "others" (ethnic minorities). Consequently, despite the persistent international emphasis on civil society and the protection of human and minority rights in the region, domestic elites perceive nation-building in a strategic fashion, while the democratization discourse is used solely for tactical purposes of legitimizing one's position internationally. Constitutional legislation (whether it is internationally imposed or not) on the protection of minority rights in the region does not change the fact that members of minorities, or dissenting members of one's nation, are objectified as political enemies or the inferior other by the very ideal of a perpetually homogenizing nation-state.

The key to the region's democratization thus is in changing the very ideal, model, and practices of the Balkan nation-state. However, there are two problems with this account – the problems that are also present in the IC approach to the region. First, the argument is circular; in

order to become democratic local elites have to give up on nation-building, but in order to do so, they already have to be democratic. At least in the case of the IC, this paradox is easily solvable. If local leaders (and population) are not yet democratic, they will become so through the gubernatorial decrees of UN representatives in Bosnia and Kosovo (Rousseauldian solution of forcing someone to become free by enforcing upon them the "right" democratic choice).

In the case of local elites' choices, the problem is much harder to solve. A short overview of domestic policies that dominated the political agenda of the 1990s will support my point that the clash between democracy and nation-building is still perceived as the most important social cleavage in the region.

Both Bulgaria and Croatia enjoy stability that is based on the status of the majority nations as a *staatsvolk* (state dominant nation). The road to stability, however, didn't follow the normative concepts of liberal pluralism and ethnocultural justice (as prophesized by liberal theory), but rather typical 19th and early 20th century European homogenizing policies towards achieving an ethnically homogenized nation-state, but in the context of the late twentieth century. Still, in both cases the dominant nations enjoy a comfortable majority of over 80% of the population. So it is fair to argue that their elites are close to discovering that it is more politically opportune to trade the security discourse for the one on the post-modern western European practices of non-territorial autonomy and multicultural integration. The lure of the EU is strong in both countries and it can only work towards softening ethnic aspects of national identities is these states.

The road to stability, however, didn't follow the normative concepts of liberal pluralism and ethnocultural justice (as prophesized by liberal theory), but rather typical 19th and early 20th century European homogenizing policies towards achieving an ethnically homogenized nation-state, but in the context of the late twentieth century.

Serbia is facing the tough choice – should it continue to perceive Kosovo as a legitimate part of its territory or not? Without, Kosovo, Serbia may emerge as a state in which Serbs enjoy the same numerical preponderance as is the case with Croatia and Bulgaria. However, as long as the Kosovo question remains on the agenda, ethnicity rather than political integration, and security discourse rather than democratization, will most likely continue to haunt Serbian reform policies.

Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia all represent an experimental ground for the International Community's efforts to democratize failed states through external pressures (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003). However, the right balance between various forms of ethnic conflict management and democratization techniques keeps escaping the international policy-makers, forcing the permanent institutionalization of the international presence in the region.

With the exception of Vojvodina and small areas in Bosnia (Tuzla region), multiculturalism has not fulfilled its promises so far; in fact, quite to the contrary. When it was tried (or imposed by the IC), as in Kosovo and Bulgaria, multicultural integration was perceived by the domestic populace as an ideological export that is either completely out of the context (Kosovo), or just a catchy phrase for the old-fashioned policies of ethnic containment (Bulgaria, in the case of the Roma population and the Pomaks).

Instruments of power sharing did not fair much better. So far they were more successful in reinforcing centrifugal tendencies than in providing a framework for multi-ethnic cohabitation. Why did they fail? The lesson that international policy framers keep forgetting is that when they work (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain) a crucial requirement for power sharing is present – a grand coalition of willing partners that are fully devoted to the rules of consociationalism and democracy. So far, this criterion has not been fulfilled in Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia, which makes the entire effort of the International Community openly problematic.

In addition, the federal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined in the Dayton, Ohio Peace Agreement of November 21, 1995, is perilously close to that of former Yugoslavia with only one discernible difference: the rhetorical emphasis on the formal institutions of liberal democracy rather than principles of socialist self-management. If this remains so, then the latest experiment in territorial arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina simply will not work. Moreover, federalism suffers from the same flows as the power sharing arrangements in the region. For Bosnian Serbs and Croats' national elites (or Albanian in Macedonia), territorial autonomy represents a second-best solution, far more inferior to the idea of separation from Bosnia (Macedonia). Hence, despite all the international efforts, the unintended consequences of territorial decentralization, power sharing and federalism in the region are the ones of the further encroachment of ethnicity over supposedly democratic institutions of newly democratizing multinational states in the region.

Conclusion

Why have these "proven" techniques of democracy building and power sharing not worked so far? An easy answer might be that applied power sharing techniques never succeed and that time has come for the International Community to continue only with the imposition of traditional institutes of liberal democracy in the region. I am inclined to look for the answer somewhere else.

Both democratization and nation-building approaches are quite often used in a template-like fashion rather than

as tools that should be fine-tuned to fit the concrete conditions in the area. The international approach does not take into account how political resources are being mobilized in the region in the first place. What is missing from the IC's approach is that mobilization potential controlled by an ethnic group is vital for its survival as a political and social movement. In other words, only those ethnic groups who, prior to first multiparty elections, have already had a full control over large organizational and financial resources could create strong (ethnic) parties. Pro-democratic parties could not emerge strong simply because their access to polity was effectively blocked (Devic, 2002).

The entire constitutional structure of Bosnia and suggested constitutional arrangements in Kosovo and Macedonia further solidified gains of nationalist parities, while at the same time effectively blocking the links between civil society and political structures across the region (Bieber, 2004). Thus, no wonder that the final outcome of democracy and nation-building experiments in the remaining multination states in the Western Balkans is a mono-ethnic individual living in a multiethnic state. Such an individual can at best perceive such a state as a temporary shelter, but it is still an open question whether such a state could be perceived as a home as well. The answer to this question will ultimately suggest the response to another question: to what extent the international experimentation with democracy and nation-building in the Western Balkans is successful (or not)?

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Diversity, Citizenship & National Identity in Denmark

Bashy Quraishy

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ABSTRACT

Bashy Quraishy explores the Danish national identity and the place of ethnic minorities in Denmark where a negative public discourse and an unfortunate lack of cross-cultural understanding fuels not only extreme far-right movements, but also mainstream politics. The author is supportive of minority rights, emphasizing that these pose no concrete threat to the Danish identity. He implores those who believe in pluralism and democracy to encourage the search for a more meaningful and manageable diversity.

From 1945 until the middle of the 1970s, particularly during the rapid expansion of the industrial sector that took place between 1960 and 1975, the import of labour was a marked feature of all industrially advanced western countries. Many employers were looking for a young, cheap, and flexible workforce, and temporary foreign workers matched this requirement. They provided labour as was needed, without having any adverse effect on inflation or wage settlements, and without overburdening social expenditure.

Denmark opened its door

Denmark was no exception in this regard. From 1965 to 1973, it also admitted a relatively small number of unskilled migrant workers from developing countries. Later on, it allowed refugees from different parts of the world to come and settle within its borders. Migrants were initially referred to as "guest or foreign workers", but contrary to expectations, they stayed and became immigrants.

According to the latest official figures, there were 430,689 immigrants and their descendants in Denmark per January 1, 2003. Denmark's total population is 5.3 million. The above numbers also include 265,424 foreign citizens in Denmark, meaning people with non-Danish nationality. The Danish society and state makes a clear distinction between different nationalities. The term immigrants and their descendants, does not apply to people from Scandinavia, the E.U. or North America.

Break down (of Ethnic Minorities in) Denmark

Europe	225,679
Africa	43,386
North America	8,205
South and Middle America	7,567
Asia	142,552
Far East	1,585
The Rest	2,717

All these groups consist of 160 nationalities.

National identity in progress

Historically Denmark did permit small numbers of European immigrants and refugees from France, Poland, Sweden, Germany, and Spain to come to Denmark. A small German-speaking minority lives in southern Jutland; a mostly Inuit population inhabits Greenland; and the Faeroe Islands have a Nordic population with its own language. As one can see from this short examination of Danish history, Denmark has not always been a static society. Denmark has, as most of the countries in the world, been affected by, and benefited from, the eternal migration of peoples, and the intermingling of many different cultures. In discussing the formation of the Danish national identity, one cannot avoid mentioning that Danes describe their culture in terms of an unchanging entity. Danes consider themselves a homogenous Gothic-Germanic people, who have inhabited Denmark since prehistoric times.

Somehow, Danes seem to forget that their unique culture, which they claim forms their national identity, is a combination of the basic ideas and behaviours of a people influenced by the history, language, religion, social and material levels, institutions, artistic, and literary progress of their country. In short, how and why one thinks and acts the way one does. Most cultures are dynamic and evolving, very few cultures can evade change. Danish culture is no exception.

Another interesting aspect of national identity is that nowadays, many Danes mistake technological development for cultural progress, and thus draw the conclusion that some races and cultures are better than others. These ideas have of course been proven wrong by anthropologists, sociologists, archaeologists, and historians through scientific studies. The presence of different nationalities in Denmark then leads us to ask an essential question.

Is there a multicultural society in the making in Denmark?

Clearly, the situation at present would indicate that a cross-cultural understanding in Denmark is a condition still in the process of being achieved. For example, the cultural pluralism gained in recent years is being challenged by economic upheaval, and by the increased negativity surrounding the ethnic and religious discussions taking place.

Professor Samuel Huntington, from Harvard University, is a modern day prophet of doom, but very popular in Denmark. His book, *Clash of Civilizations,* which is based on an assumption that Western civilization should be the guiding light for human development in the future, is often used in intellectual discourse.

Over the course of many years, the Danish attitude towards immigrants has been steadily hardening. The borders have been closed since 1973, so that only refugees and family members have been allowed to enter the country, and unlike the countries of southern Europe, Denmark has never be subject to the influx of sizable ethnic groups that settled and formed their own cultures.

Since many Danes have been frightened into believing that ethnic minorities might actually change Danish culture for good, they insist, not only on maintaining their own cultural dominance, but also on arrogantly dismissing everything that is non-Danish. This officially prescribed denial of the multicultural reality has created self-sustaining subcultures, which are forced to turn their backs on the majority culture, which of course will always be Danish.

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Public debates

In addition to the media, there are also intense discussions taking place in almost every political and social debate forum regarding the presence of the ethnic minorities in Denmark. Whether or not these discussions are being held in Parliament or on the street, by intellectuals or by common people, it is interesting to note that they usually give rise to more questions than answers.

Some of the questions which are often raised by the Europeans are: Why do people from the developing world specifically want to come to Denmark in search of a new life? Does the presence of ethnic minorities endanger the local culture and a common sense of identity? Compared to these complex theoretical questions, ethnic minorities find themselves asking two very basic questions: Are we welcome to stay here, be accepted, respected, and allowed to live in peace? And if so, under which conditions and on whose terms?

Such debates have been exploited not only by the extreme far-right movements, but also by the mainstream political establishment in Denmark. The resulting reactions can be summarized as the following:

- Tightening of asylum rights, visa, and family reunion laws
- Rise in Islamophobia and anti-Semitism
- Attacks on ethnic minority communities
- Focus on exclusive practices in the society
- The virtual introduction of forced integration through penalizations and penalties
- Renewed calls for a "cultural struggle and clash of civilisations" against ethnic minorities
- Inclusion of openly racist parties in the government

In political discussions, expressions such as "floods of refugees," "hordes of asylum seekers," and "immigrants will take over" are continually applied. Worst of all, this engenders a feeling of powerlessness among minorities, forcing many to react by "turning their backs on society." It is taking hold with an alarming rate, driving some young people to crime, and others into the clutches of ignorant and exploitative religious movements.

Citizenship

Citizenship undoubtedly gives ethnic minorities legal protection, equal rights, and a sense of security on paper, but it plays a very insignificant part in the process of real integration. And even this basic right is now under threat. Legislation passed in the Parliament gives the

Danish State the right to withdraw citizenship from a minority person who in the State's opinion has acquired it under false pretext.

The law is retroactive and would be applicable to all, even if they have lived in Denmark for 30 years. It is thought provoking that this proposal was initially advocated by the extreme right-wing People's Party in the year 2000. The same party which is now the third largest political party in Denmark, and which forms the basis of the present government, and which also has many new proposals in the pipeline.

The national industrial society as it evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries articulated three elements: Society, Nation, and State. Society referred to an economic and social system based on rational principles within a bounded territory. State referred to a political system based on secular and democratic values, capable of regulating economic and political relations and change. Nation referred to a people defined on the basis both of belonging to the territory of the state and having a common ethnic, cultural, and religious background.

Is the classical definition of citizenship changing?

The fine difference between being a national and citizen of Denmark is now brought forward by nationalist forces in the country. It means that ethnic minorities who live here must also adhere to the majority culture and ethnicity.

Citizenship is a very broad term and for many ethnic minorities it has meant being "legally secure," living without fear. Belonging to a nation is often neither possible nor desired. The new age of globalization has proven that citizenship is not necessary to live, work, raise a family, or travel with ease. This has been compounded by the ever-expanding globalization, which is challenging and affecting the concept of citizenship. According to Castles and Davidson: "Globalisation affects citizenship in many ways, both directly and indirectly. First of all, globalisation questions the concept of (the) nation-state and its sovereignty over its citizens. It indirectly breaks down the territorial boundaries on which a state is built." (Citizenship and migration 2000)

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Does citizenship produce a feeling of belonging among ethnic groups?

As citizens, their rights depend on the national laws of Denmark, local political establishments, the economic situation, as well as media discussions. But a feeling of belonging to the Danish nation, or of sharing a common identity with the majority population depends on many factors. We believe that:

1. The notion of identity must not be based on imaginary shared values. Identity must be fluid and dynamic. It must progressive and not be confined by fixed boundaries.
2. Identity must be inclusive and not exclusive. It requires power sharing in decision-making and listening to dissent.
3. It should be based on an individual's own choices and needs, and not on forced and artificially constructed demands for regimentation. People cannot be photocopied!
4. If there is to be clearly defined parameters, these should be for all to follow and not only for the newcomers.
5. Identity must not be based on uniformity produced by multiculturalism, but diversity based on intercultural coexistence.
6. Respect for the newcomers' initial sense of belonging, history, values, traditions, and place in the society. It takes generations to supersede even the most trivial of habits and ways of life.

Basic rules of society

Since an individual is not an island, he or she has to function within the society in which he or she lives. This requires an effort to create a space for oneself, without hassle and pressures from one's surroundings. There are certain basic rules of society that everyone should follow – minorities included. Minorities should:

- Learn the local language
- Respect the laws of the land
- Have good neighbourly relations
- Adapt to certain aspects of the local culture (but minorities should be able to choose the tempo and scale of adaptation to the majority culture)

Ethnic minorities have a right to retain their cultural values, food, clothes, literature, mother tongue, and religions. Although this is not acceptable to many Danes, there are many instances, such as in the UK, France, Switzerland, and Holland, where minorities live separately from the cultural norms of the majority society, and they function perfectly well. Sometimes it is better to be divorced and happy rather than live in a bad marriage and be miserable for the rest of one's life.

Ethnic minorities are not a threat to Danish national identity. In contrast to the popular belief, the presence of these ethnic groups poses no threat to the host nation's identity, culture, or religion. This is true for a number of reasons:

- Ethnic minorities in Denmark comprise no more than 6% of the whole population. This is a relatively insignificant number.
- Minorities have no power – political, economical, social, or military. Power lies with the majority (the natives).
- The Danish sense of identity has been shaped over many years by an ideology glorifying what is white, Christian, and "culturally superior to all and everything." This is so deeply rooted in people's subconscious that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to change, challenge, or destroy.
- Minorities very rarely challenge the locals on a cultural level. This, they know, is not the reason for their being here. They do not consider themselves cultural crusaders. For example, different Muslim communities which constitute nearly 70% of all religious minorities in Denmark, hardly ever propagate their religion publicly. Their activities are restricted among themselves.
- Denmark, with its technologically advanced society, media monopoly, and economic superiority, is strong enough to withstand any crisis, or any test it may encounter from a relatively small percentage of highly motivated immigrants.
- If there is any challenge to the host nation's identity because of the presence of ethnic minorities, it can only be positive. By learning about (as well as from) ethnic minority values – for example, family ties, respect for elders, hard work, social networking, strong religious beliefs, great hospitality, and pride in their own culture – Denmark has an opportunity to rediscover the strength in it's own "long-lost" values.

In Denmark, people often mix different terms such as identity, citizenship, and nationality with relation to society's functional harmony. On the surface, these terms may intermingle, but they have specific meaning and use in their own right. This mixing up results in decisions being forced and not reached after a consultative process has been completed. The great Lebanese philosopher and poet Khalil Gibran once said, "Love is not looking at each other, but looking in the same direction."

The quest for diversity

There is a tendency in Denmark to move away form concepts such as anti-racism and anti-discrimination. Instead, the concept of diversity is taking over as being the best way to create a society where all its citizens are included. Concepts such as diversity and management are good tools, and work constructively towards creating more inclusive spaces, especially within organizations. However, sacrificing anti-racism at the altar of diversity will not achieve a just society. What is important is that a well thought out and well-defined concept of antiracism is maintained to deal with different forms of racism, and not lost in the world of "diversity management."

If after diversity management policy has been talked about and implemented there are still "losers," then the victims need to have mechanisms they can turn to in order to redress the balance in their favour. Legal tools based on well-defined race discrimination concepts can provide that. Without these the "unwanted" have only the good will of others to rely on. But in order to influence a political system, it is necessary for one to understand how it works; something that can only be learned through experience. Therefore, minorities must demand the right to be represented by themselves and not by surrogates. This wish can be transmitted publicly through the media and through the political system.

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Finally, a just word of caution. Influence will not be served up on a silver platter; it has to be gained through political struggle, based on a clear analysis, doing away with wishful thinking, and with the close cooperation of those Danes who still believe in human rights, pluralistic development, and most of all, in keeping their society democratic. Ethnic minorities and the progressive forces within society must join forces, and this cooperation must be above party politics, political ideology, and human pity. To build a society, free of prejudices, bubbling with tolerance and heart-felt openness is the task ahead. Let us grasp it!

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Celebrating the Nation:

The German Peace Jubilee of 1871

Barbara Lorenzkowski

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ABSTRACT

Dr. Lorenzkowski describes the effects of the 1971 peace jubilee in Waterloo County on German immigrants in terms of the German-Canadian identity. She builds here on anthropological and sociological traditions of looking at the popular expression of cultures to discern a given ethnic group's core values. The author argues that "at the nexus of intersecting ethnic and national identities" the Canadian nation is built. In other words, one must define one's own ethnic membership to be able to define one's nation.

"Today was a public holiday as there was a great peace-jubilee in town," Louis Breithaupt scribbled into his diary on May 2, 1871. In a few broad strokes, the sixteen-year old captured the festive air of the celebration that marked Germany's military victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War. Self-consciously modeled after similar gatherings across North America, the jubilee in Waterloo County was ushered in by a salute of twenty-one cannon shots, followed by divine service "in all the German churches of Berlin & Waterloo."[1] Once the visitors from afar had been welcomed at the train station, a procession wound its way to the court house where orators celebrated Germany's "righteous" triumph over France. As exuberant as the speeches that conjured German unity and might, were the ten thousand celebrants who clapped enthusiastically when an oak was planted "as a truly German symbol." In the evening, a torchlight procession marched down King Street that was "ablaze with illuminations, every house, workshop, factory, hotel and building being gracefully hung with Chinese lanterns, colored illuminations, devices in glass, and transparencies of every kind."[2] With revelers singing German songs and loudly cheering at portraits of Emperor Wilhelm I and his "grim Chancellor," Bismarck, the jubilee culminated in a fireworks display and the unveiling of an oil-painting of *Germania.*

In an age of nationalism and national movements, the Waterloo County peace jubilee brought to the fore conversations on national identity and cultural diversity that resonated far beyond the geographical confines of the county. It is in the "thick description" of such micro-historical events that we may hope to address questions pertaining to the interplay of ethnic and national identities. How did German celebrants come to imagine themselves as part of a national community? What national rituals and symbols did they invent? How were ethnic identities constructed against an internal or external "other"? What, and whose, nation finally was celebrated in the popular festival?

German festive culture in Waterloo County stretched back to the 1850s and 1860s and would spring into bloom in the grand singers' festivals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that blended ceremonial celebrations of German folk music with informal social gatherings and copious amounts of lager.[3] But the German peace jubilee represented a turning point. Its grandeur, gushed the Toronto *Daily Telegraph*, "was never surpassed by any similar event in Canada."[4] The very scale of the event thrust the German settlers of Waterloo County into the public spotlight and forced them, for the first time, to reflect publicly on what it meant to be German in Canada.

To study the history of celebrations as a window into the making of ethnic and national identities is to join a burgeoning field of scholarship.[5] It also means to follow in the footsteps of anthropologists and sociologists who have long seized upon "ceremonies, rituals, myths, and symbols as keys for the understanding of deeply held popular attitudes and values."[6] While providing important insights into social practices and traditions, the peace jubilee was not so much a mirror of social reality as it was an expression of cultural ideals. The jubilee endeavored to gather the local German community (that did not necessarily think of itself as "German" yet) under the banner of ethnic unity, and to establish German ethnic culture as central to the project of Canadian nation-building. In so doing, the celebrants highlighted the striking parallel between national and ethnic consciousness. Although the latter does not aspire to either "state power" or "sovereignty," it, too, as the historian Mathew Frye Jacobson has pointed out, cherishes a collective sense of community, draws boundaries between "us" and "them", and indulges in chauvinism.[7]

It is at the nexus of these intersecting ethnic and national identities that we have to situate the Waterloo County peace jubilee. Located in the gently rolling hills of Southern Ontario, the German settlements of Waterloo County shared in

many of the characteristics of the surrounding British counties; theirs was a rural world whose residents pursued agricultural activities or worked in the modest-size factories of the county seat Berlin. Yet the rhythms of everyday life had a distinctly German twist, as did the imaginary landscapes in which the county's residents located their sense of identity. Since German-origin settlers constituted the majority of the population – numbering fifty-five per cent in the county overall and seventy-three per cent in Berlin – they did not simply assimilate into Canadian society.[8] Instead, they wove together notions of nation, myth, unity and diversity into their very own "imagined community."[9] What made the resultant conversation on ethnicity and nationhood so complex, and so utterly intriguing, was the multitude of audiences involved.

Looking inward, the peace jubilee brought together German celebrants from Toronto, Hamilton, London, Guelph, Breslau, Hespeler, Hamburg, Listowel, and a host of other towns and hamlets, in a celebration of cultural nationalism. Looking outward, the jubilee impressed upon English-speaking Canada the colourful appeal of "the biggest and most successful demonstration which has ever taken place in Canada."[10] But the forces shaping the peace jubilee were not restricted to the local, regional, or even national levels. This was a transnational venture that liberally borrowed its festive cues from German-American peace jubilees. In the United States, no less than seventy-two German-American communities had celebrated peace jubilees that were described, in vivid detail, in Waterloo County's German-language press, thus furnishing a festive vocabulary with which to compose a local celebration.[11] The community of print also spanned the Atlantic Ocean. News from celebrations in Germany reached Waterloo County's residents, who, in turn, mailed printed accounts of their very own peace jubilee to relatives in Germany. Ironically, the German Fatherland that figured so prominently in these exchanges was a nation yet in the making. It would take several decades until Germany's citizens learned how to invest the national community with the feelings of loyalty and belonging previously reserved for local homelands.[12] Yet viewed from a trans-Atlantic distance, the newly created political entity had, almost instantaneously, donned the mantle of national greatness.

Nation

In eavesdropping on the conversations at the festivities, we find that nation was a malleable term. For the celebrants in Waterloo County, it signified both the political nation-state of imperial Germany and the cultural community of German migrants in Canada. Typically, orators began their speeches by recalling the disgrace of the German people in the era before national unity. Its internal divisions, Otto Klotz in Berlin declared, bode poorly for the Franco-Prussian struggle of 1870-71.[13] But as if to defy the boundaries of German principalities and kingdoms, the narrative went, the German people rose like one man to defend the country's integrity.[14] "The Prussian did not look with disdain on the Hessian or the Swabian," Otto Klotz enthused, "every one appeared in his place, from the sandbanks of the North Sea to the foots of the Alps. The whole people were united, and sacrificed willingly even more than they were asked to do."[15] Young and old, artisans and scholars, sons of day labourers and millionaires, Prussians, Mecklenburgers, Swabians, and Bavarians, republicans and monarchists all joined hands to fight against the neighbour to the West.[16] Out of their courage and unity, it was suggested, the nation was born. Hitherto, the editor of the *Canadischen Volksblatt* reflected, Germany had signified a geographical territory only. Now, it stood for a nation. At long last, he wrote, "our dear, old Fatherland" occupied the position which it so duly deserved.[17] From the triumphant cry "They were all Germans," it was a short step to exclaim that "We, too, are all Germans."[18] Basking in the glory of Germany's national ascendance, the unity of German migrants in Canada seemed a tangible goal.

The conciliatory air of the festivities impressed English-language observers who noted that the celebrants in Waterloo County "did not gloat over the sufferings of the French nor do anything by word or deed that could have pained the hearts of the most sensitive Frenchmen."[19] Despite attempts to devise a festive script devoid of martial overtones, orators tended to draw upon the binary opposition of "noble Germany" and "jealous France."[20] Ethnic group feeling, much like nationalism, depends "on one group's defining itself *against* another," as Matthew Frey Jacobson has reminded us.[21] In the case of the peace jubilee, this other was France.

In Waterloo County, the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War had pitted German-origin migrants from Alsace-Lorraine (then part of France) against migrants from the German core areas. In August 1870, these latent hostilities erupted into altercations and fist-fights.[22] One is left to wonder how those "German-French," who constituted four per cent of the county's population, reacted to Otto Klotz's vocal endorsement of a policy of assimilation that would bring the provinces back into the fold of German nationality, or how they viewed the ubiquitous banners that celebrated the return of Alsace and Lorraine to the Fatherland.[23] Their voices would remain inaudible in the subsequent festivities.

In recounting the history of the war, Waterloo County's German elite firmly placed the blame on the shoulders of France. Its "jealousy… at seeing Germany becoming one and united," James Young, the Member of Parliament for South Waterloo County said amidst cheers, had triggered "the triumphant but bloody march from Berlin to Paris."[24] Orator Schunck, in turn, pitted Germany's "noble, prudent and brave conduct of war" against "the revengeful, helpless and cowardly behaviour of the French."[25] Unjust, jealous, frivolous, presumptuous, arrogant, insolent, barbaric and criminal – this was the arsenal of adjectives that orators used to describe the beaten foe. Clearly, it was the laurel of the glorious victor, not the humble olive brunch that fired the imagination of orators in Berlin.

Myth

But if a German identity was forged against an imagined other, it also invoked "myths of ethnic descent" that were broad enough to appeal to different groups, yet narrow enough to be readily identifiable as German.[26] These myths were suffused with ideas of romantic nationalism as they

had been developed, most prominently, by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). Herder regarded nations as organic structures that were intimately shaped by the natural environment. Nature, in turn, he suggested, embodied many of the characteristics that made the German nation different from any other.[27] At the 1871 peace jubilee, the special closeness of the German people to their natural environment was evoked in a powerful symbolic gesture.

By planting an oak tree in front of the Berlin Court House, the Waterloo county jubilee drew upon a symbol that had formed part of the repertoire of German celebrations ever since the first German national festival of 1814, in which celebrants had adorned houses and streets with oak leaves, branches and wreaths to commemorate the liberation of Germany from Napoleon at the Battle of Nations. In the course of the festivities, the oak – "an incarnation of fertility, steadfastness, and strength" – transformed into a metaphor of the German nation itself.[28] Over half a century later and a continent away, jubilee president Otto Klotz saw in the young oak, which had been imported from Germany for the occasion, a symbol of historical continuity. "The old Germanic tribes," he said, "regarded the oak as the forest's foremost tree; in oak groves they preferred to assemble to make decisions on war and peace, to hold court and divine service; for the old Teutons honoured god not in temples but in nature, in the grand temple of sacred nature."[29] Reminiscent of Tacitus's *Germania* that had contrasted German authenticity with Roman decadence, Otto Klotz projected onto the German tribes an image of noble savages whose inner strength and forthright morals were as admirable then as now.[30]

If the oak reached far into Germany's past – back to its ancient roots, so to speak – it also served as a reminder for future generations. "May this oak…," the orator's voice urged the audience, "always remind us and our descendants of the great German accomplishments, be it a memorial of the virtues of the old Teutons…"[31] Although the oak failed to prosper in later years, its meagre growth a poor testimony to German greatness, Otto Klotz's words did fall on fertile ground. Between 1874 and 1912, the German-origin residents of Waterloo County staged no less than eight singers' festivals to celebrate the German soul in song and sound. Here, indeed, an imagined past had inspired an ethnic revival.

Although the organizers of peace jubilee celebrations made use of a festive vocabulary that had been developed in national celebrations in Germany, they did add their own symbols that corresponded to their experience of migration. Judging from the coverage of the jubilee celebrations, the symbols of dual loyalty that graced the festivities were as ubiquitous as they were persuasive. From buildings fluttered the Union Jack alongside the German tricolour, while the celebrants bowed their heads to their adopted homeland; only upon the rendition of "God Save the Queen" did the crowds disperse and the public celebration end.

Unity/Diversity

In Waterloo County, where German-speaking migrants presented the majority of the population, neither newspapers nor orators dared to question the loyalty of "the Germans of Canada."[32] Instead, speaker after speaker lauded "the German character – naturally quiet and unobtrusive, obedient to the laws, patient under extreme suffering, possessed of dauntless bravery," as Charles Magill, M.P. for Hamilton, put it.[33] The very presence of dignitaries who included members of the House of Commons and the Ontario Legislature, the County Court Judge and the bar of the county, the town council and neighbouring county officials, indicated that the jubilee was an 'institutional' celebration, one that was "leveled with the power structure."[34] The local establishment of both German and British cultural origins vocally endorsed the festivities.

It is, perhaps, not surprising that the *eminence grise* of the jubilee, Otto Klotz, sought to translate the festive exuberance into political claims. "We Germans, here in Ontario…," he announced, "should occupy in this country the position to which we are entitled as sons of the grand, enlightened Germany."[35] His tone of confidence was palpable. Evidently, Waterloo County's collective memory did not harbour stories of nativist attacks or even native resentment, so prominent in German communities south of the border. As local charter group, German-speaking settlers had cut the forest and cultivated the land. As pioneers, they claimed a place in the nation's narrative that was at its centre, not its margins.

In what was one of the most remarkable characteristics of the peace jubilee, this place was readily conceded to them. Members of the House of Commons, who climbed the speaker's platform in Waterloo County, emphasized the close ties between the German and the British peoples, who were united "by the bonds of sympathy between the German and British Empires."[36] By emphasizing the ties of kinship that bound together Great Britain and Germany, orators cast expressions of German patriotism as unthreatening. "While the German people took natural pride in the success of the Fatherland," James Young, M.P. for South Waterloo said, "they loved the Queen of England, and the glorious constitution under which they lived."[37] Nowhere was this image of an essential union between the German and British peoples more powerfully captured than in an address by local English-speaking citizens, presented to the organizers of the jubilee:

> You can hardly fail to remember that the bond of union between your Fatherland and our Motherland is one that has been cemented by relationships the most tender and sacred possible, that in the hatred of oppression and aspirations after true liberty, the genius of our fellow-countrymen in both lands is the same; and that in reverence for truth, morality and religion, the observance of law and order, and respect for constituted authority, as well as in the cultivation of al the graces of every day national life, the people of Germany and Britain have long been in mutual accord.[38]

It was in the Dominion of Canada, the address continued, that "German" and "British" citizens had joined forces to build a "Great Canadian nationality." In the New World, these two great peoples were merging "as Canadians and

Colonists relying upon the same rights, civic and political, animated by the same principles and aims." In fact, so similar were their character and mission that the "English Residents of Berlin" were proud to assert that "we are so much one with you in every-thing as it is possible for any two peoples to be."[39]

Conclusion

A snug self-confidence permeated the speeches at the 1871 peace jubilee. Living in a heartland of migration, where the cultural norm was German, not British, German orators reveled in their entitlements as nation-builders. English-speaking orators, in turn, confirmed the privileged role that German migrants held in Canadian society by pointing to the close ties between the German and British Empires. This rhetorical device was soon appropriated by migrants themselves, for it allowed them to camouflage as "almost British" in the years of imperialism, when cultural differences came to be regarded with suspicion. Although the peace jubilee did not result in a national organization, its impact at the regional level was unmistakable. In Berlin, the jubilee sparked a campaign to cultivate "German nationality in language, customs, and traditions" that was spearheaded by the German-Canadian Choir Federation, founded in November 1873. A loose association of German choral societies of Berlin, Waterloo, Preston, Toronto and Hamilton, the *Sängerbund* organized no less than eight singers' festivals in Waterloo County between the years 1874 and 1912. If the peace jubilee had spoken in the language of cultural nationalism, its musical successors helped formulate just what this German identity meant in a Canadian context.

As such, the most "German" of celebrations, whose proceedings the young Louis Breithaupt had so faithfully recorded in his diary, harboured important lessons for the making of Canada's national identity. If the forging of group identity, be it ethnic or national consciousness, involves drawing boundaries between "us" and "them", the German peace jubilee of 1871 reminds us how categories of social integration and exclusion may derive from transnational conversations. The jubilee celebration further highlights the cultural creativity entailed in the forging of ethnic and national symbols, whose origins were projected into a symbolic space and time. In the final analysis, the festival helped shape a cultural tradition that would, many a decade later, become deeply embedded in the national consciousness; the peace jubilee sought to weave changes into the fabric of mainstream society by demonstrating that ethnic difference was a legitimate category within the Canadian nation-state.

Notes

1 *University of Waterloo.* Doris Lewis Rare Book Room, Breithaupt Hewetson Clark Collection. "Diaries of Louis Jacob Breithaupt," May 2, 1871.

2 Toronto *Daily Telegraph,* May 3, 1871, 4; *Canadisches Volksblatt,* May 10, 1871, 2-3; *Berliner Journal,* May 4, 1871 and May 11, 1871, 2-3.

3 Barbara Lorenzkowski. *Border Crossings: The Making of German Identities in the New World, 1850-1914.* Ph.D. (History), University of Ottawa, 2002.

4 Toronto *Daily Telegraph,* May 3, 1871, 4.

5 Key studies in a North American context include Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Ethnicity as Festive Culture: Nineteenth-Century German America on Parade," in Werner Sollors ed., *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 44-76, April Schultz, *Ethnicity on Parade: Inventing the Norwegian American Through Celebration* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), and David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

6 Geneviève Fabre and Jürgen Heideking. "Introduction." *Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century.* Eds. Geneviève Fabre, Jürgen Heideking & Kai Dreisbach. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 1.

7 Matthew Frye Jacobson. *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46 & 77.

8 *Census of Canada, 1871.* For exemplary historical accounts of Waterloo County see Elizabeth Bloomfield, *Waterloo Township Through Two Centuries* (Waterloo: St. Jacobs Printery, 1995), Geoffrey Hayes, *Waterloo County: An Illustrated History* (Kitchener: Waterloo Historical Society, 1997), and John English and Kenneth McLaughlin, *Kitchener: An Illustrated History* (Toronto: Robin Brass, 1996).

9 Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* (London: Verso, 1991).

10 Galt *Reformer,* quoted in the *Berliner Journal,* May 18, 1871, 2.

11 For a summary description of German Peace Jubilees in the United States see *Die Deutschen in Amerika und die deutsch-amerikanischen Friedensfeste im Jahr 1871: Eine Erinnerungs-Schrift für die Deutschen diesseits und jenseits des Oceans* (New York: Verlags-Expedition des deutsch-amerikanischen Conversations-Lexicons, 1871).

12 Alon Confino. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

13 *Berliner Journal,* August 25, 1870, 2.

14 *Ibid.,* May 11, 1871, 2-3 and Toronto *Globe,* May 3, 1871, 4.

15 *Berliner Journal,* May 11, 1871, 2-3.

16 *Die Deutschen in Amerika,* 1.

17 *Canadisches Volksblatt,* May 10, 1871, 2-3.

18 *Berliner Journal,* May 11, 1871, 2-3.

19 Toronto *Daily Telegraph,* May 3, 1871, 4. See also Hamilton *Daily Spectator,* May 4, 1871, 3 and Toronto *Globe,* May 3, 1871, 4.

20 This distinction mirrored the anti-French tenor of Sedan celebrations in 1870s Germany. See Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor,* 47.

21 Jacobson, *Special Sorrows,* 18.

22 *Berliner Journal,* August 25, 1870, 2.

23 *Ibid.,* May 11, 1871, 2-3 and Toronto *Globe,* May 3, 1871, 4.

24 Toronto *Daily Telegraph,* May 3, 1871, 4.

25 *Berliner Journal,* May 4, 1871.

26 Anthony D. Smith. "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent." *Research in social movements, conflict and change,* 7 (1984): 96.

27 Schultz, *Ethnicity on Parade,* 93-7 and Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (London: Harper Collins Publisher, 1995), 102-3.

28 Dieter Düding. "Das deutsche Nationalfest von 1814: Matrix der deutschen Nationalfeste in 19. Jahrhundert." *Öffentliche Festkultur: Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg.* Eds. Dieter Düding et al. (Hamburg: Rowohls Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 76 & 68.

29 *Berliner Journal,* May 11, 1871, 2-3.

30 Schama, *Landscape and Memory,* 87 & 96-7.

31 *Berliner Journal,* May 11, 1871, 2-3.

32 Toronto *Globe,* May 3, 1871, 4.

33 Hamilton *Daily Spectator,* May 5, 1871, 1.

34 Schultz, *Ethnicity on Parade,* 92.

35 *Berliner Journal,* May 11, 1871, 2-3.

36 Hamilton *Daily Spectator,* May 5, 1871, 1.

37 Toronto *Daily Telegraph,* May 3, 1871, 4.

38 *Kitchener Public Library.* Grace Schmidt Room of Local History, Waterloo Historical Society. Manuscript Collection 15.1c. "Address of the English Deputation to the Managing Committee of the German Peace Festival, 1871," Berlin, Tuesday, May 2, 1871."

39 *Ibid.*

Diversity, immigration, and national identity in Switzerland

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ABSTRACT

With four national languages (three of them official) Switzerland exemplifies great linguistic and cultural diversity. In order to manage key differences in an inclusionary fashion, republican-style "institutional solutions" have been implemented. But how well do immigrants fit into an already divided Swiss identity? Not well at all, the author contends. Public recognition of religious rights and freedoms for immigrants in particular remains an on-going issue.

For many years, Switzerland has been depicted as one of the few success stories in cultural diversity management. Indeed, when it comes to its 'own' linguistic groups, that is people speaking French, Italian and Romansh, along with Swiss German (itself divided into uncountable dialects), Switzerland is a fascinating country in the ways of its dealings with cultural difference. For centuries, before and after the country reached its current geographical shape, administrators, politicians, civil society members, and ordinary people in everyday encounters have succeeded in transgressing linguistic and other cultural barriers not necessarily coinciding with language divisions.

Significantly less known are the religious tensions culminating in the Swiss *Kulturkampf* over the course of the 19th century. The bright picture of a multi-cultural harmony is, however, definitely marred when we consider the 'alien' or 'new' minorities that immigrated in the last 50 years. Can their cultural accommodation in Swiss society be seen as a success story, too? Are the immigrants included in the current Swiss We-group definition? The answer is in the negative, as this essay will argue. Let us first consider the Swiss self-perceptions of national unity as formed across 'own' differences, then proceed to the 'new' differences coming about with immigration, and inquire in the final part how the 'new' identities are currently negotiated, and whether they re-shape the Swiss self-perceptions of national identity.

In debates on the nature of national identities two models obtain. Best known is the ethnic or cultural model of national identity *and* unity. This model highlights cultural commonalities in the realm of language, religion, and custom, and those given through sharing past memories of significant events and heroic action. Multiculturalist models of inclusion can also be seen as culturalist because they stress cultural characteristics and differences when conceiving of national communities as thriving in cultural difference. The republican version, on the other hand, sees the citizenry as bound together not by cultural commonalities, but by sharing equal rights and obligations. The Habermasian notions *'nation by will'* and *'constitutional patriotism'* are informed by the idea of political cultures as shaped by dealings between states and societies. Institutional solutions guaranteeing equal rights and duties, and compromises, agreed upon procedures and norms, are seen in this model as foundations of political cultures binding societies together. There are problems of distinction between both models, though (see Brubaker 1999), for in particular historical periods the cultural underpinnings of the civic model tend to become reinforced – as the Swiss example amply illustrates.[1]

Could Switzerland have developed a culturalist notion of national identity? Obviously, there is no common language and no common religion, in the sense that Christianity is divided along denominational lines. In addition, the Swiss see a variety of other distinctions among themselves: regional dialects, local customs (for instance, there exist a variety of ways of celebrating carnival), town-country-side divide, class interests, civil/political allegiance, regional/cantonal belonging. A closer look at the Swiss management of language and religious difference will indicate the ways in which commonalities are perceived, despite all of the differences.

The pre-immigration *multi-lingual Switzerland* consisted of 73% of persons speaking Swiss German; 19% speaking French; 8% Italian; and less than 1% speaking Romansh as their mother tongue. All four languages are acknowledged as 'national' in the amended Constitution of the year 2000, and with the exception of Romansh, also have the status of an 'official' language. The Swiss administrative units – cantons and communes – coincide with linguistic boundaries, defining the language used in schools and in administration. Interestingly, no political division lines have ever been drawn along linguistic boundaries in Swiss history.

The reason why language has not been deployed as a divisive force can be explained mainly by political and administrative inclusionary tactics and legal provisions. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Swiss authorities strove to represent all three official languages in key governmental positions. To give some examples: the seven Ministers forming the Federal Government are selected, among other things, according to linguistic considerations with the result that Latin languages continue to be over-represented with at least two Ministers being usually French or Italian-speakers. Similarly, the high ranks among the ministerial staff (parliament members, central administration, members of parliamentary committees) consist of a proportional number of Latin language speakers. Remarkably, this quota-regulation is based upon tacit agreements, while legal regulations are not seen as necessary. Indeed, according to Andreas Wimmer, "It is telling that (in the process of drafting the 1874-Constitution, JPC), the parliament almost forgot to add a constitutional article that declared all three languages national and official." (2002: 231) There are tensions, of course. Especially, on the occasion of federal votes, differences in value orientations and life-styles come to light. Take for example the vote on whether to wear safety belts in private cars. The Swiss in the French and Italian part saw themselves more libertarian and overruled by duty-conscious Swiss-Germans. Still, instances of open conflict have not occurred.

The *multi-religious Switzerland* has lacked a comparative accommodative genius. Pre-immigration Switzerland was divided into 44% Catholic population and 55% Protestant population, the rest being 'Jews and others.' Until the mid-19th century, populations living within one Canton – but for the small numbers of the non-Christians – had to belong to one of the Christian denominations. Only after the citizens were granted permission to free settlement did this clause cease to exist. However, until few decades ago, instances of discrimination have repeatedly been reported by Christian minorities living in predominantly Protestant or Catholic surroundings.

Swiss party politics has reinforced the religious divisiveness. Throughout the 19th century, programs carried by political parties strongly coincided with religious allegiance. The Protestants managed to obtain political dominance over the Catholics through party-politics, and in consequence the complex process of Swiss secularisation has been strongly oriented towards liberalist agendas embraced by Protestant-dominated political parties. The Swiss Constitution of 1874 is a caesura in secularisation politics; it lays down that such crucial fields of societal life as education and birth, marriage and death are under governmental authority, and not religious domain, as in former times. Cantonal legislations were redrafted as well. In the Canton of Zurich, a new legislation ruled for instance that it was no longer allowed to subdivide spaces at public cemeteries. One important rationale for this step was given in the authorities' care to affect religious freedom between the Protestants and Catholics and in ruling out marginalization through spatial arrangements.[2]

Notwithstanding the lack of uniformity in Swiss past and present, a strong notion of unity and common belonging has developed. However, cultural criteria are not abundant when it comes to forging Swiss identity. Only a 'thin' culturalist We-group definition is possible here, due to the lack of a common cultural denominator, such as one language. 'Alpine' imageries, if ever considered, have lost their salience with the on-going urbanization, even if folkloristic depictions (prone to cows grazing on mountain slopes) are present in some rather nostalgic visions of a common Swiss realm. Remembering a common past in school books and in political speeches on high national holidays has definitely had Swiss We-group overtones, but recent debates addressing the Swiss role during the Second World War resulted in ambiguous undertones when recollecting the Fatherland's past bravery.

Notwithstanding the lack of uniformity in Swiss past and present, a strong notion of unity and common belonging has developed. However, cultural criteria are not abundant when it comes to forging Swiss identity. Only a 'thin' culturalist We-group definition is possible here, due to the lack of a common cultural denominator, such as one language.

Lacking in joint cultural-religious characteristics, the pronounced fragmentation along language and religious lines had to be managed through institutional solutions. Indeed, precisely by forging institutional bridges and by striving to reach compromises, did common grounds for managing diversity and other social goals, that do not lie in cultural factors, result. Legal provisions regulate freedoms, rights and duties, and rule out various forms of discrimination. Tacit quota systems according to language and regional belonging are part and parcel of governmental policies such as public appointments. The public sphere is organized by dense civil society networks that cut across language, regional and – to a fair extent – religious barriers. Lifting out key competences, such as marriage or burials, from religious organizations has enabled state actors to create institutions overarching differences. In the same vein, the potential social divisiveness likely to be given by religious difference has been rather successfully managed by largely confining religious expression to the private realm.

The emerging political culture in Switzerland is strongly oriented towards ideals which are commonly depicted as republican: what binds the citizens together is a strong sense of mutuality and commonness buttressed by a high value stress on equal civic rights and duties. Seen from this perspective, the Swiss avenue for managing difference is not geared towards a culturalist identity construction, but

rather guided by a range of inclusionary practices carried out by governmental bodies and civil society networks. The republican model of common national belonging is not devoid of culturalist overtones, however. There is a strong pride of place among the Swiss population. What makes a good Swiss? Many citizens would highlight neutrality, laboriousness, solidity, and courage, strong sense of realism, honesty, reliability, modesty and non-conspicuousness as character traits widely shared in the country. Such common celebrations of Swiss quality translate into an almost culturalist perception of a unique character of Swiss institutions which have made the country prosper. The material benefits of the efficient institutional set-up (especially through the welfare system) tend to accompany exclusivist attitudes towards persons not considered Swiss (Wimmer 2002: 222-268).

Enter the immigrants. Looking back at a prolonged migration out of the country throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, in the second half of the 20th century Switzerland saw the situation reversed. Measured in proportion to population numbers, Switzerland is among those countries worldwide with the highest immigration rates. For fifty years now, labour migration, including the 'guest workers' from Italy and Spain, highly skilled experts, asylum seekers, and the 'second' and 'third immigrant generations' have significantly changed the composition of the Swiss population, 20% of which are not Swiss citizens at present.

Are the immigrants and their descendents included in the Swiss We-group definition? The answer is no. The Swiss trajectory as a multicultural society remained strongly oriented towards accommodating 'own' minorities. Immigrants have largely remained outside of this model and several moments of shifting conjectures in constructing social distance can be discerned. From the 1960s to the 1980s, discourses of '*Überfremdung' (over-alienation)* were abundant. Populist leaders have repeatedly managed to draw large popular support against immigration and migrants' rights, barely missing the margin at several popular votes. A presumed distance vis-à-vis non-Western European values and codes of conduct found expression in the 'three-circles' model endorsed by the Swiss administration until the mid 1990s that gave priority to immigrants from Western Europe and North America, to be followed by those from remaining European countries, with persons from the remaining overseas regions coming last. As a result, a culturalist We-Swiss orientation was strengthened in opposition to the alien newcomers. The country was not considered an immigrant society in popular perceptions.

The non-acceptance of Switzerland as an immigrant society goes hand in hand with a rather low visibility of the 'new' elements of cultural-religious difference. It is the case that there are comparatively less persons from overseas in Switzerland than in most other Western countries, that there are few immigrant enclaves, and that immigration from overseas is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Yet overt displays of cultural-religious difference are not encouraged, if not actively discouraged, as Swiss integration policies reveal. Several Swiss policy-makers and scholars working in the field of immigration management have endorsed integration policies which stress the importance of structural assimilation – language, skills, education, access to labour market and civic competence in selected areas – while declaring cultural-religious aspects as a matter of individual discretion, to be enjoyed in the private realm.

It is the case that there are comparatively less persons from overseas in Switzerland than in most other Western countries, that there are few immigrant enclaves, and that immigration from overseas is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Yet overt displays of cultural-religious difference are not encouraged, if not actively discouraged, as Swiss integration policies reveal.

This integrationist model so strongly embraced by the inlanders' perspective has, until recently, dominated the societal discourse and the institutional dealings with difference. Currently, a new trend comes to surface: civic negotiations emerge as an important vehicle for immigrants to express their cultural-religious difference. Notably, the negotiations over outer religious freedom (i.e. such religious practices as dressing codes, religious prescriptions and proscriptions regarding food and prayer) carried out within governmental and civil society institutions, including legislation, tend to highlight the new elements of cultural-religious difference. The more *civic inclusion* (to use a term in Brubaker 2001) religious activists enjoy today, the more cultural and religious goals transgress the embattled public-private divide. The more the new minorities' cultural and religious objectives are negotiated as public issues, the more immigrants become part and parcel of the Swiss public sphere.

During the last 20 years, immigrants have carried diverse versions of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism into Switzerland. Together with the adherents of Judaism, they count about 5% of the Swiss population.[3] While Swiss legislation guarantees freedom of religion and rules out discrimination (Kälin 2000), the problems in realizing such fundamental freedoms came to light, from the early 1990s onward. Exponents of religious organizations have repeatedly confronted state authorities and the public with religious demands and objectives such as school dispensations, erecting own religious structures (mosques, temples and cemeteries) as well as public recognition for non-Christian religions and organizations.

Several recent trends are of interest with regards to identity formation. The public attitudes as displayed in

mass media, or in the recent vote whether to publicly recognise Islam and Judaism in the Canton of Zurich that resulted in a very clear-cut rejection, continue not to be favourable to 'alien' faiths, especially towards Islam. On the other hand, civil servants, governmental and non-governmental commissions and forums, politicians, representatives of various organizations, and individual persons have repeatedly combined their efforts in supporting religious representatives in communicating their objectives and seeking for suitable modes of religious accommodation, negotiating solutions, and looking for compromises.

In the current negotiations over modes of managing religious difference resulting from migration, the successful Swiss pattern of confining the cultural-religious difference to the private realm appears to be impeding the non-Christian minorities' goals. The authorities and their civil society partners have been careful to withdraw these negotiations from public scrutiny, in some cases rightly fearing negative interference through publicity. Also, the earlier established Swiss patterns in dealing with religion and religious difference have set certain standards. The Jewish citizens, the numerically most important non-Christian minority until the 1990s, have been collecting private funds for their own cemeteries, synagogues and religious schools, and by doing so, keeping religious issues out of public agendas with their low profile.

This Swiss pattern of keeping religious agendas private is currently under stress. The Jewish practice, corresponding so well to the general trend to privatize religion, proves unfeasible when immigrants dispose of less financial funds, a lower degree of organizational skill, and when insights from other Western countries reveal that realizing minority rights should not put the entire burden upon the minorities themselves. Therefore, alternative solutions are sought. These appear to be public in character, however, one option being provisions of public funds for religious purposes (still very seldom in Switzerland); another, change of legislation in cases of collusion with religious freedom rights. The change of legislation in the Canton of Zurich in the year 2001, which resulted in dropping the law prescribing subdivision of burial spaces, is a good example. This law, considered progressive in late 19th century because it aimed at establishing religious freedom between the Catholics and Protestants, proved to be cumbersome at the end of 20th century for the adherents of the Muslim faith whose ritual burial prescriptions require special plots.[5] Yet another option lies in enlarging the areas of discretion in interpreting legislation – for instance, in cases of dispensation from classes at state schools.[6]

The Swiss history and the unique Swiss political culture have provided a particular institutional 'script' for accommodating immigrant cultures and religions, highlighting republican ideals and (putatively) embracing politics of neutrality. This script proved successful in accommodating 'own' minorities for over 100 years, but currently a new avenue is opening up. While dealing with immigrants' religious objectives, Switzerland is now undergoing a significant shift in orientation and practice, but this process has not been generally acknowledged. A substantive rift exists between popular perceptions thriving on social distance discourses, on one hand, and the manifold efforts to realize freedoms and acknowledge the 'new' dimensions of Swiss diversity on the other. For Switzerland certainly became an immigrant society!

One important implication of this on-going change is that public agendas are no longer defined solely by the 'inlanders.' Immigrants increasingly take part in civic negotiations, even if largely concentrating upon religious issues (whereas there are hardly any key public figures among the immigrants involved in other matters). Whether the Swiss We-group self-perceptions will acquire more pronounced culturalist overtones in this process, and whether the We-group self-definition will oscillate towards a 'Swiss multi-cultural immigrant society'-model remains to be seen. What we can discern at present, is a subtle shift from a structural assimilation paradigm endorsed in accommodation practices to a more inclusive *civic negotiation*-model.

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Notes

1 There is a third model emerging in current debates. An increasing number of social and political theorists highlight post-national, translocal and flexible societal self-perceptions that clearly transgress the national boundaries.

2 Earlier practised for instance against suicides or adherents of non-Christian religions.

3 In the year 2001, 311,000 (4.3% of the entire population) Muslims, 28,000 Hindus (0,4%), 21,000 (0,3%) Buddhists, 18,000 (0.2%) Jews were counted by the official statistics.

4 See Pfaff-Czarnecka 1998. 'Let sleeping dogs lie'

5 See Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004. Subdivision of burial grounds for the Muslim death is necessary because the direction of the tombs towards Mecca must be followed whereas the tombs are to lie in parallel rows.

6 See Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004, forthcoming.

Mariachi and Mexican National Identity

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ABSTRACT

In this article, Mary-Lee Mulholland explores the many meanings of mariachi and the ways in which the Mexican identity was, and in many respects still is, a reflection of its historical origins. She highlights in particular the importance of cultural forms of expression to the building and maintenance of unified national identities.

Yo soy mexicano, mi tierra es bravía Palabra de macho que no hay otra tierra Más linda y más brava que la tierra mía.	I am Mexican, my land is wild My word as a macho, there is no other land More pretty or more fierce than my land
Mi orgullo es ser charro entero, valiente y bragado traer mi sombrero con plata bordado que naiden me diga que soy un raja'o.	My pride is being a charro, brave and whole Carrying my silver embroidered sombrero, nobody can tell me that I am cowardly
Correr mi caballo en pelo montado Pero más me gusta ser enamorado. Yo soy Mexicano muy atravesado[1].	I ride my horse bareback But what I love most is being in love I am Mexican, I am a trouble maker.

Images of mariachi musicians wearing sombreros and silver-studded cowboy outfits, strumming guitars, drinking tequila and serenading women have long penetrated the Mexican imaginary as well as the imagery of Mexico. At worst, mariachi is a stereotype, the drunken mariachi singing a sad ballad of unrequited love while stumbling down the street with a bottle of tequila in hand (as illustrated by Speedy González); at best it is a national symbol celebrating Mexico's revolutionary past, regional diversity, and mestizaje.[2] As noted by ethnomusicologist Daniel Sheehy, mariachi "is a symbol and stereotype, ancient and modern, glorified and scorned, profession and avocation, a form of musical expression, and a way of life." (Sheehy 1999) Performances of mariachi and representations of its historical origins reflect, erase and produce certain ideals of what is Mexico and who is Mexican. Specifically, mestizaje, machismo and regionalism are important notions in Mexican nationalism that are entangled with a nostalgic longing for an authentic Mexican essence performed by mariachi. It is this link between mariachi and a perceived Mexican "essence" that allows mariachi not only to perform idealized and, at times, hegemonic representations of the Mexican identity, but it also becomes a powerful site wherein this identity can be contested, transgressed and fragmented.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, mariachi has transformed from a rural, regional and indigenous musical style to an urban, mesitzo and national popular cultural phenomenon. As early as the 1850s mariachis were popular in predominantly rural regions of western Mexico and were comprised of small groups of 3 or 5 musicians that played string instruments such as the violins, guitars and harps. These mariachis were not full-time musicians, but rather peasants and workers who would play dressed in work clothes or in the traditional white cotton clothes of the local indigenous people at fiestas, such as weddings, in and around their town or village.[3] Contemporary mariachis[4] are musical ensembles comprised of 8-12 predominantly male musicians that play string instruments such as violins, guitars, vihuela (small mandolin-like guitar), guitarrón (large bass guitar) and unlike traditional mariachi, most contemporary mariachis include trumpets. Mariachis play a variety of music including danceable *sones, jarabes* and polkas, as well as romantic and epic ballads. Most well-known outside of Mexico is the Mexican Hat Dance, or *Jarabe Tapatío*[5], and *Cielito Lindo* ("Ay ay ay, canta no llores," sung most famously by Speedy González). Mariachis play at a range of venues including plazas, restaurants and bars, large state-sponsored performances, and in private parties such as weddings and baptisms. Modern mariachi ensembles dress in matching *trajes de charro* (literally, a cowboy's suit) which are stylized outfits consisting of sombrero and suit with silver or gold buckles.

Mariachi in Pre-Revolutionary Mexico

The performance of regional or folkloric musical forms at state-sponsored events has been an important strategy in political campaigns and nation-building in Mexico since the 19th century. After achieving independence from Spain in 1810,

it was an important task for Mexico's new governing elite to forge a Mexican identity that would resonate with a large, diverse and disparate population while at the same time distinguishing itself from Spain. As a result, the concept of mestizaje, the mixing of Spanish and Indigenous people and culture, and the recognition of Mexico's indigenous heritage became central to the Mexican national identity. There is evidence indicating that music was used by the state to rally a sense of national identity as early as reform president Benito Juarez (1855-1858, 1867-72), who incorporated the performance of *jarabe* between acts at national plays (Geijerstam 1976).

However, it was under the 30-year long rule of Porfirio Díaz, known as the Porfiriato (1876-80; 1884-1911), that the use of popular music to construct a national unity became more common. It was during the Porfiriato that the *indigenisma,* situating modern Mexican identity on the foundation of its indigenous past, developed as a major motif in Mexican nationalism. Porfirio Díaz sought to create a modern cosmopolitan image of Mexico by contrasting it with its indigenous past. This performance of folkloric and indigenous traditions set the state stage for the elevation of "regional mestizo culture into iconic referents of national belonging." (Zolov 2001: 237)

Mariachi, a regional musical ensemble popular among the working class and peasants in western Mexico, exemplified characteristics believed to be essential in folk culture in that the musicians were peasants (campesinos), dressed in indigenous clothing, whose music was a true product of the mestizaje in its mixture of Spanish and Indigenous instruments, rhythms and melodies. Although mariachi ensembles had faced some censure by local elites in western Mexico, their performance of a quintessential regional folk music elevated their image to one that was "typical," "regional," "folkloric," and most importantly "picturesque" (Jáuregui 1990: 30).

It is not surprising then that in 1905, Juan Villaseñor, administrator of a hacienda in Cocula, Jalisco, took the local mariachi, led by Justo Villa, to the state capital of Guadalajara and later to Mexico City to play for Porfirio Díaz during the national celebrations. This is the first documented performance of a mariachi in Mexico City and the first one to play at a national event. This mariachi, later known as the Cuarteto Coculense, would return to Mexico City to perform and would be the first mariachi to record in 1908. Mexican anthropologist Jesús Jáuregui cites a description of their concert in a major park in Mexico City in 1907 from a local newspaper:

> In front of the grandstand, small boats full of flowers paraded by, some carrying typical orchestras on board while others carried an indigenous couple wearing classical regional clothes. A Jaliscican mariachi that came expressly from Guadalajara played *sones* and *jarabes,* while two charros and two *tapatías* were dancing in time to the harps and the violins. (El Mundo Ilustrado, October 6, 1907, as cited in Jáuregui 1990: 30)

In this description we see how the notions of regionalism, mestizaje, and indigenous culture, were collapsed into a romantic image of Mexican identity.

The Revolution

Although Porfirio Díaz was ousted in the 1910 Revolution, the incorporation of regional music in the promotion of Mexican nationalism thrived and, in fact, became "a systematic nationalistic ideology." (Mayer-Serra 1946:32) After the revolution, Mexico was extremely unstable and perhaps even more divided by class, race, and regionalism than it was after Independence. Through different educational and cultural policies, the revolutionary government sought to create a unified Mexican identity through the promotion of *patrias chicas* (literally small nations, a notion that Mexico is a country of many cultures and peoples), mestizaje, and the glorification of an indigenous past. For example, the government sponsored artists, most famously Diego Rivera, David Siqueiros, and José Clemente Orozco, to paint murals in public buildings throughout Mexico that promoted its indigenous heritage, the tragedy of colonialism, the triumph of independence, and the evils of the Porfiriato, fascism and capitalism. Music and dance were also supported by the state, most notably music nationalism and the folkloric ballet, which became influential national cultural institutions.[6]

In the years following the revolution there was a mass migration of people in search of work to Mexico City, including mariachi musicians from the western state of Jalisco. With the presence of musicians and workers from Jalisco and other western states, music from the region began to enjoy increased popularity and attention. Although mariachis were common in many parts of western Mexico before the revolution, it was the mariachis from Jalisco, particularly from the towns of Cocula[7], Tecaltitlán and Tecolotlán that would popularise mariachi in the capital and as a result shape its future. In 1920, under the patronage of Dr. Luis Rodríguez, the Mariachi Coculense de Cirilo Marmolejo became the first mariachi to permanently move to Mexico City. First this mariachi travelled to Guadalajara to play for the Governor of Jalisco and, due to its success in the state capital, was later invited to play in Mexico City by Dr. Rodríguez for members of Mexico's new revolutionary elite, including then President Alvaro Obregon. Cirilo Marmolejo and his mariachi decided to stay in Mexico City and would become one of the most popular and influential mariachis of their time. They would become the first to appear in a Mexican film[8], the first to make electronic recordings, and they would travel to Chicago in 1933 to represent Mexican culture in the World Fair.

Other mariachis would soon arrive in Mexico City from Jalisco to take advantage of the growing popularity of the music, including the Mariachi Tapatío de José Marmolejo (nephew to Cirilo Marmolejo) and Mariachi Vargas de Tecalitlán. In this new urban context, the look, style and form of the ensemble would change dramatically. In order to appeal to an urban middle-class audience, many mariachis grew in size, incorporated trumpets, adopted new types of songs, and most drastically they replaced indigenous or work-clothes with the flashier and more expensive *trajes de charros.* This outfit was adopted by mariachis from charros, professional Mexican cowboys who were generally the land owners or hacienda managers. Interestingly, charros would have been the bosses of

traditional mariachi musicians who worked as peasants or underlings of hacienda bosses. Jesús Jáuregui argues that the *traje de charro* was adopted to disguise the roots of mariachi as indigenous or African, to become a "mestizo prototype" situated in an international paradigm of the American cowboy and the Argentine gaucho (Jáuregui 1995).

By the 1930s the promotion of regionalism, or patrias chicas, had reached its pinnacle. With the left-leaning presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), the promotion of regionalism in nationalism was further augmented by a renaissance of all things indigenous and anti-imperialism. During this time, cultural industries such as painting (particularly the muralist movement), nationalist music, ballet folklorico, and folklore studies thrived. With the intent to "unify all things Mexican" (Zolov 2001: 241), images of the rural, indigenous and revolutionary past became important in the myth making of an imagined Mexico. Cárdenas wanted to use a regional music in his election campaign, a music that would "unite the Mexican races" appealing to workers and peasants (Ochoa Serrano: 1994: 108). He selected mariachi marking the beginning of his patronage and appreciation of the music, and in particular his patronage of Mariachi Vargas de Tecalitlán who would play at his inauguration. In addition, Cárdenas would later help protect mariachi from police harassment and would assist Mariachi Vargas de Tecalitlán obtaining a job as the official musical group for the Mexico City Police Department (Clark 1992). The incorporation of mariachi into Cárdenas' political campaign and official state events were significant in the legitimization of mariachi in the capital and its status as a national tradition.

The Golden Age

Although the patronage of Cárdenas legitimized mariachi as an example of Mexican regional culture, it was the power of film and radio that would transform mariachi into a national icon. In the 1930s and 1940s, while cultural institutions such as art, music and dance were heavily supported by the state, emerging cultural industries such as film, radio, and popular music became extremely powerful in the promotion and articulation of Mexicanness in and outside of the country.[9] Carlos Monsiváis, Mexico's leading public intellectual, commented that "between 1935 and 1955 (approximately, of course), it was the cinema more than any other cultural instrument that… reshaped the notion of Mexican national identity by turning nationalism into a great show." (1993:144) Often referred to as the "Golden Age" of Mexican culture and nationalism, this era produced several important cultural icons, most importantly the *charro cantor,* or singing cowboy, genre of film. Combining the music of mariachi and the cowboy tradition of charros, these films produced an image of the idealized Mexican man: a rural, mestizo cowboy who possessed a loyal, brave, and stubborn character.

As mentioned, mariachi appeared early on in Mexican film, first debuting in Mexico's first sound film, *Santa* (1932). However, it was the release of the film *Allá en el Rancho Grande* (1936) that marked the beginning of the immensely popular *charro cantor* films that dominated Mexican film and Mexican identity in the Golden Age. This film was typical of the genre in that it was set in rural Mexico (in this case, on a hacienda in Jalisco) and it combined three important symbols of Mexican nationalism and masculinity: tequila, mariachi, and charros. The heroes of these films were hard-working, hard-loving and hard-drinking charros who fell in love with either a noble poor indigenous woman whose family worked on his hacienda, or a foreign wealthy exotic woman seduced by the rugged charms of the Mexican machismo and landscape. Essential components in these films were the serenade and the cantina scene in which the hero, backed by a mariachi, would either sing to his love outside her window, or lament the loss of her love in a cantina. During the Golden Age, Mariachi Vargas de Tecalitlán became Mexico's most famous mariachi, due in large part to their appearance in over 200 films.

In conjunction with the popularity of *charro cantor* films, radio also had an influential role in the promotion of mariachi's popularity and its status as a national symbol. During this era, Mexico City was home to several important radio stations, but it was the powerful XEW, "the voice of Latin America," that would have the largest impact. Beginning in the 1920s, XEW had live shows that showcased different types of Mexican music and several of the mariachis now residing in Mexico City were invited to play live at the radio station. These performances were very popular (particularly those of Mariachi Vargas de Tecaltitlán) with the audience and station owner Don Emilio Azcárraga. Eventually, Mariachi Vargas de Tecaltitlán would have their own show and would accompany many of the stars of the *charro cantor* films on screen and in the recording studio. Stars of the *charro cantor* films, such as Pedro Infante or Jorge Negrete, popularized *musica ranchera,* a genre of music where a singer performs dressed in *traje de charro* backed by a mariachi. The image of the macho mariachi popularized on screen and radio by *charro cantor* films, *musica ranchera* and mariachi itself became entangled with the image of Mexican identity not only within Mexico, but also Latin America and the rest of the world.

Morphing Mariachi: Music as Identity Narratives

Roger Barta, a leading Mexican academic on nationalism, argues that in the face of the rapidly modernizing world and the influx of foriegn, specifically American, cutural influences, Mexico began a "frantic search for 'Mexicanness' that accompanied the postwar modernizing boom." (Barta 2002: 5) A combination of state support for music, dance and folkloric studies and the powerful influence of cinema and radio, mariachi transformed into a national symbol and archetype of ideas at the core of Mexican identity: mestizaje, machismo and regionalism. The use of expressive culture, whether it be music, dance or art, was, and continues to be, a central strategy in the "frantic search for Mexicanness" due to the ability of these cultural forms to express, create and produce what Bennedict Anderson (1983) has called "imagined communities."

According to Anderson, nationalism is based on a collective identity that is "imagined" (Anderson 1983) producing a sense of connectedness between people who will never meet. It is the emergence of print capitalism that provides the means to facilitate such an imagined

community and the promotion of common histories and traditions that produces a sense of continuity and connectedness. The emotive nature of music, dance and folkloric art make them powerful tools in the evocation and reproduction of important origin myths and symbols of the nation. For example, the performance of mariachi is at once an emotive performance of nostalgia for Mexico's revolutionary, rural and macho past, as well as reflection and production of a cultural and racial mestizaje.

Moreover, musical styles or genres, such as mariachi, are often productive narrative spaces in which struggles of conflicting identities of gender, region, class, nation, ethnicity and generation are performed and contested. Musical styles are "fought over" and "crossed" as regularly as nation-state boundaries (López 1997) and the danger of conceiving genres or styles as discrete is that the "fixing" of music categories can also lead to the "fixing" of identities (Guilbault 1996). Subsequently, the saliency of images of mariachis as male, macho, heterosexual, rural and mestizo has also transformed the performance of mariachi into a powerful site for the contestation, transgression, and fragmentation of hegemonic notions of Mexican identity. The relationship between mariachi and the idealized male Mexican is continually interrupted and unsettled by claims and counter-claims to the origins of mariachi by different segments of Mexican society and by jokes and parodies of mariachi as stereotypes of Mexican masculinity, ethnicity and class.

For example, debates over the origins and authenticity of mariachi call attention to the indigenous and African influence in the music, whereas the increased participation of women in mariachi has both challenged and reproduced certain norms of femininity and masculinity in Mexican society. Furthermore, the performance of mariachi as mestizo, masculine and rural has become archetypical opening up the performance to parody, critique and failure. Elsewhere I demonstrate how performances of traditional and conservative notions of Mexican identity and Mexican masculinity by well-known mariachi singers are interrupted and undermined by rumours and gossip regarding their (homo)sexuality (Mulholland: forthcoming).

To conclude, mariachi became an integral part of the longing to create a unified national imagery in a time of great national conflict and regional discontent. Expressive culture forms, such as mariachi, are important in the imagining of national identities due to their emotive power in the telling of the national history and origin myth and their production of national identity. Paradoxically, mariachi is at once a symbol of an essentialised Mexican identity and a powerful site wherein this identity can be contested and fragmented due to its immense symbolic capital in the national imagining.

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Notes

1 Exerts from "Yo Soy Mexicano (I am Mexican)" written by E. Cortázar and M. Esperón in 1943 and performed most famously by Jorge Negrete. All translations by author unless otherwise noted.

2 Mestizaje is a term used in Mexico to describe the historical mixing of Spanish, Indigenous, and, to a lesser extent, African peoples. The majority of Mexicans identify as mestizo and is an important notion in Mexican nationalism.

3 Due to the association of the mariachis with weddings, it was believed for many years that the word mariachi was adopted from the French word *mariage* during the French occupation of Mexico in the 1860s. Although the specific meaning and origin of the word is still debated, it is generally accepted that the word is of indigenous origins and predates the French presence in Mexico.

4 It is important to note that while most mariachis in Mexico are predominantly all-male, some mariachis do include female musicians and there is a growing presence of all-female mariachis. Interestingly, many mariachis in the United States include both male and female mariachis. Finally, "traditional" or *mariachis antiguos* are still common in western Mexico.

5 Tapatío or tapatía means someone or something from Guadalajara or more generally from the state of Jalisco.

6 Music nationalism, "fathered" by Manuel M. Ponce and later developed by Carlos Chávez, promoted the composition of orchestral music inspired by regional, indigenous and pre-Colombian melodies. Similarly, folkloric ballet emerged as an institution that celebrated indigenous and regional cultures. A typical performance of folkloric ballet begins with a representation of a pre-Colombian Aztec dance followed by a tour of different regions of Mexico with dancers dressed in "authentic" costumes, dancing "traditional" dances, backed by "typical" music.

7 The exact origin of mariachi is a highly contentious issue among historians and ethnomusicologists that study it. Many argue that mariachi is a musical form from western Mexico in general, others argue that the town of Cocula is its birthplace. However, it is generally accepted that it is the mariachis from Cocula that had the largest influence on the rise in popularity of the music ensemble.

8 *Santa* (1932) was also Mexico's first film with sound.

9 Mexican film and radio were extremely popular throughout Latin America.

Citizenship without Identity

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ABSTRACT

The author refutes the common notion that citizenship law is a reflection of a state's national identity. Qua law the former simply does not have the requisite variety to help the latter into existence. Instead, a revisionist view of 'citizenship without identity' is suggested. It holds that the main variation is across time, not countries – before WWII all Western states had citizenship laws that were ethnically or racially exclusive, while thereafter the trend has been toward more inclusive, civic-territorial laws of citizenship. This trend is illustrated by examples drawn from Western Europe (especially Germany).

It has become a commonplace to look at a country's formal laws of citizenship as a reflection of its national 'identity' (most sophisticated and agenda-setting Brubaker 1992). This linkage rests on two problematic assumptions. The first is that the concept of identity can be extended from its home domain, the individual person, to collectivities. The second is that, should this extension turn out to be possible, citizenship law constitutes a suitable ground for the expression of collective identity. With respect to the first assumption, a prominent theory of 'collective identity' (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995) perceptively noted that the place of identity is 'in between' the binary distinctions that structure our access to the world (such as 'left and right', 'past and future' or 'sacred and profane'): "The… focus of identity (is the) 'here,' 'now' and 'I'" (p.75). However perceptive this observation may be, it is also self-defeating. Because, if this is 'identity,' how can it *not* refer to an *individual* experiencing the world?

But let us bracket such principled concerns and, following convention, assume that the notion of identity *can* be extended from the individual to collectivities. Then the task remains to further explicate what 'identity' is. I suggest that identity refers to one *aspect* of a unit (be it an individual or a collectivity) locating itself within a context of other, like-constituted units. In a classic discussion, Georg Simmel (1908: ch.10) argued that a sense of self (or individuality) comprises two opposite components, 'autonomy' and 'difference'.[1] Autonomy is the sense of self that individuals share with all other individuals (at least from a certain historical point on, the European Enlightenment). In establishing sameness with others, autonomy is inherently universalistic. By contrast, difference (born in the Romantic counter-movement to the Enlightenment) refers to the ways in which an individual must perceive him- or herself as distinct from all others; it is thus inherently particularistic. While Simmel does not use the notion of identity, the way it is commonly applied today clearly locates identity more on the particularistic difference than on the universalistic autonomy side of the self. An example is the meaning of identity in the contemporary 'politics of identity', which revolves around (usually ascriptive) markers that make individuals or groups *different* from others, and which tacitly rests upon, but notionally repudiates, a shared humanity.

Turning to our topic of citizenship, if national identity refers to the ways in which a collectivity is different from all other collectivities, how can the – always generic and standardized – *law* of citizenship ever be an appropriate medium for this? Qua law it simply does not have the requisite variety to bring this difference into existence. In a recent history of French citizenship law, undoubtedly one of the most symbolically loaded citizenship laws in the world, Patrick Weil (2002:13) argued that jurists copying each other's inventions across borders, rather than national identities, have been the driving force of modern citizenship laws. In line with Weil's suggestion, I hold that the wheel has to be turned back before Rogers Brubaker's (1992) all-too-close association between citizenship laws and national identities (dubbed by the latter 'cultural idioms' of nationhood).

Brubaker had argued that the German tradition of 'ethnic' nationhood has enduringly shaped a citizenship law based on descent from German parents (jus sanguinis), whereas the French tradition of 'civic' nationhood has favoured a citizenship law based on birth in the territory (jus soli). While not without plausibility in these particular cases, the close association of citizenship law and national identity becomes questionable when other cases are considered. For instance, Australia and the United States, like all post-British settler states, have equally adhered to jus soli citizenship; how then is it possible that, well until the early 1970s, Australia had conceived of itself in ethno-racial terms as 'white' and 'British'? And, debunking the complacently civic self-definition of the United States, why until the 1950s had Asians been formally excluded from naturalization?

A revisionist account of citizenship without identity would move to the fore what all states, in a given region and period, have in common rather than what makes them different from one another. From this angle, the main variation is over time, not across countries. Let us illustrate this in the case of Germany. Prussia's adoption of jus sanguinis in 1842 was not home-grown but borrowed from France, whose switch from the originally feudal jus soli to the more contemporary

jus sanguinis in the Napoleonic Civil Code was copied in the first half of the 19th century across continental Europe. Jus sanguinis was the quintessentially modern mode of attributing citizenship at birth, because it made citizenship an inalienable 'right of the person' (Weil, 2002:12), to be transmitted to one's offspring like one's family name, through filiation.

Conversely, individuals were no longer perceived of, as in feudal times, as attachments to the soil and belonging to the overlord – this had been the original meaning of jus soli citizenship that was instantly discarded in the wake of the French Revolution. Accordingly, the question for Germany cannot be why she adopted jus sanguinis citizenship in the mid-19th century; all continental European states of the period did. Rather, the question must be why Germany refused to add elements of jus soli to its strict jus sanguinis citizenship, especially in the momentous Citizenship Law of 1913 that remained the law of the land throughout the 20th century? For the moment of the crafting of the 1913 Citizenship Law, an answer must refer to the intended exclusion of ethnically undesired Jews and Poles at the eastern flank of the *Reich* (while the law's prolongation after World War II, as I shall show shortly, requires a different explanation). However, a penchant for ethnic purity was no specialty of the Germans; rather it was the general norm in the early 20th century, and through ethno-racially selective naturalization rules and immigration policies the United States, Canada, Australia, or France achieved much the same result (see Joppke 2004a).

The ethnic uses of jus sanguinis do not vitiate the fact that, as long as the possibility of naturalization existed (as it always did in Germany, in pre-WWI colonial times even for African natives), the 'blood' in the principle of jus sanguinis was formal and instrumental, not substantial, as a historian of German citizenship succinctly put it (Gosewinkel 2001:326). In a nutshell, jus sanguinis did neither prejudge nor as such express an 'ethnic' or even 'racial' sense of national self. Conversely, some civic-political principles had always held in check the ethnic bias of the 1913 Citizenship Law – witness that Germans abroad could be stripped of their German citizenship if they evaded the military draft.

A revisionist history of citizenship without identity would stress that before WWII *all* states had citizenship laws or policies that were ethnically or even racially exclusive, and that after the Holocaust watershed the entire 'vision and division' (P. Bourdieu) of the world according to ethnic and racial principles fell into disrepute. In the process, throughout the states that came to be called 'Western,' citizenship laws became more inclusive. In continental Europe, this went along with a reinterpretation of jus soli citizenship from feudal relict to prerequisite of democracy, because only in this way could European states' rapidly growing immigrant (or guestworker) populations be speedily and lastingly brought into the citizenry. Accordingly, while practically extinguished in continental Europe by 1900, jus soli was successively reintroduced toward century's end. Most European Union states today grant as-of-right citizenship to second-generation immigrants, either *jure soli* at birth or – in a kind of jus domicile – optionally at a later stage (see Weil 2001). As is visible in strong European opposition to disturbingly ethnic citizenship laws in some post-communist states in eastern Europe, civic-territorial conceptions of nationality have now become the norm in Europe. As one international lawyer explicates the nexus: "(S)tates owe human rights obligations to individuals who are vulnerable to their exercise of sovereign power." (Orentlicher 1998: 322, fn.117)

However, the pan-European trend has not been from purely ethnic to purely civic-territorial citizenship, but toward *mixed* regimes that combine jus sanguinis and jus soli elements. Accordingly, the territorial attribution of citizenship has been made contingent on a threshold of legal residence time on part of a parent or (in what amounts to a jus domicili) of the citizenship candidate herself. This reflects that an unconditional jus soli regime (as in Canada or the United States) is as much at odds with the exigencies of liberal democracy in an age of international migration as is a pure jus sanguinis regime, being as over-inclusive as the latter is under-inclusive. Since the famous Nottebohm case of the International Court of Justice of 1955, international law prescribes that citizenship expresses a genuine link between an individual and a state. Both pure jus soli and pure jus sanguinis regimes fall short of this, because next to the random fact of birth no further attachment to the state is required in both. It is therefore no contradiction that some formerly pure jus soli states, such as Portugal and Britain, added elements of jus sanguinis to their citizenship laws in the early 1980s, while some jus sanguinis states, such as Belgium and most spectacularly Germany, moved in the opposite direction of incorporating jus soli elements at about the same time – instead of being conditioned by alleged 'national identity' changes (either contractive or liberalizing), both movements are part of the same trend toward mixed citizenship regimes that approximate the 'genuine link' requirement in an age of migration cum liberal democracy.

Germany had long resisted the trend toward incorporating jus soli elements in its citizenship law. This requires an explanation sharply different from standard accounts that centre on Germany's 'ethnic' national identity. If Germany's ethnic identity was responsible for this, how could the sharp turn-around in the great citizenship reform of 1999 have ever happened? After all, it is unlikely that a nation changes its identity overnight. Instead, the lack of congruence between state and nation before the post-communist revolutions of 1989 is responsible for Germany trailing behind in the European trend toward more inclusive citizenship.

Before 1989, Germany was a bit like its unacknowledged sister republic, Israel, in perceiving itself as homeland of all Germans who were repressed under communism and even faced retaliation there for the crimes of Nazism. A blood-based citizenship law was perceived as the bridge to national unity and it allowed retaining the links with the besieged diasporas further to the east. If an 'identity' had backed up this law, it was one that was geared to be abolished once the geopolitical situation had changed. Accordingly, a first cautious liberalization of access to citizenship, in terms of eased naturalization rules for long-settled guestworkers and their offspring, occurred in the very year of national unification, 1990, and by the end of

the decade Germany adopted a conditional jus soli regime that is now fully within the European norm.

However, one might object, if the *attribution* of citizenship at birth leaves little space for the expression of national identities, maybe their grip is firmer on the post-birth *acquisition* of citizenship, in terms of naturalization procedures that are everywhere more coloured by national particularisms and where state discretion has generally been stronger? This possible objection is invalidated by the fact that the liberalization of citizenship has not stopped short of naturalization. Most states now grant a right to naturalization if certain prerequisites (such as schooling and residence time) are fulfilled, and they abstain from making assimilation to a *particular* national culture an individually tested condition of citizenship acquisition. Accordingly, an individual rights logic has entered into a domain that had previously been a prime reserve of the sovereign state. Incidentally this change has been especially drastic in Germany, where naturalization had traditionally been an always-exceptional act of grace by the state, commanded by 'public interest' only, and excluding any consideration of the interest of the citizenship applicant. Since 1992, there is as-of-right naturalization for long-settled foreigners and their children, and the demanding, individually applied cultural 'assimilation' test has been replaced by a weaker, generic 'integration' requirement, which now consists of proved German language competence and a declared commitment to the liberal-democratic order.

The case of Germany represents a larger European trend toward curtailing state discretion in the post-birth acquisition of citizenship. Belgium, for instance, first mellowed its integration requirement from factual to intentional integration (i.e., from *idonéité* to *volunté d'integration*) in 1985, and more recently even abandoned any 'integration' requirement. Only French nationality law still officially asks for the assimilation of her citizenship applicants. One must fathom that France gets away with this anomalous identity constraint because it happily resonates with the universalistic creed of liberal democracy – as one 'Republican' intellectual put it in almost comical pathos, the French 'particularism' is 'universalism' (Todd, 1994: 227f). However, the Conseil d'État, France's highest administrative court, has narrowly interpreted assimilation in terms of 'sufficient knowledge' of the French language (and further made the determination of 'sufficient' dependent on a person's education and social standing), and it has repeatedly reined in on overshooting magistrates who had refused citizenship requests by Muslim immigrants on capricious grounds, such as wearing a veil.

In general, abstaining from a cultural assimilation requirement in citizenship acquisition reflects a dissociation between state and nation in the contemporary liberal state (see Joppke 2004b). Adhering to the principles of nondiscrimination and public neutrality in the context of an increasingly pluralistic society, this is a state that has lost both the intention and the capacity of forging culturally homogenous citizenries in light of a particular national identity.[2]

However, even if reduced to proved language competence and procedural commitments, the continued existence of vaguely defined 'societal integration' requirements for naturalization contradicts what a classic study of nationality law had called the 'abstract character' of citizenship, that is, its being a formal status devoid of a specific content or identity (Makarov 1947: 32). Note that, by contrast, the old communist states had gone further than this, loading state membership with a certain identity and behavior expected on part of the citizen, namely to be a virtuous socialist citizen. In case of violating this expectation, communist 'citizens' could be expelled. By contrast, the impossibility to expel citizens in today's liberal states proves the abstract character of state membership, which is notionally decoupled from any specific behavior or identity on part of the citizen.

The prevailing societal integration provisos in contemporary states' naturalization regimes admittedly fly in the face of this, pushing liberal citizenship precariously close to the virtuous citizenship of the ex-communist states. It is therefore apposite to argue, with a prominent Dutch nationality lawyer, that "(f)rom the point of view of a modern citizenship conception it is not justified to ask new citizens to be better and more virtuous than many persons who have acquired their citizenship through birth" (de Groot, 1989: 258). Further minimizing or even abolishing the societal integration requirement for citizenship acquisition marks the inevitable end-point of a citizenship without identity.

Endnotes

[1] This resembles Charles Taylor's (1992) distinction between 'dignity' and 'authenticity' as the two pillars of modern individualism, which find expression in a 'politics of universalism' and a 'politics of difference', respectively.

[2] For a vivid picture of the 'high modernist state' that *was* intent on and capable of forging nationally streamlined citizenries, see Scott 1998.

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Making multiculturalism and nationhood compatible

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ABSTRACT

The author argues that multiculturalism and national identity are indeed compatible. Finding areas of commonality is a process that may take on a variety of forms, and public policies can be made to encourage cultural diversity and to promote its value. Nations have the ability to adapt, so that a multicultural identity can become the basis of what a political community has in common. Uberoi points out that Canada is a good example of this.

In this article I aim to show how it is possible to combine nationhood and multiculturalism. By multiculturalism I simply mean the protection of cultural diversity and the promotion of its value,[1] and by nationhood I am writing in particular about national identity. Traditionally it has been believed that the goals of multiculturalism can not exist, at least not in any coherent fashion, within a political community that possesses a national identity. This is because a national identity acts as the shared identity of a political community and serves an important purpose in that it cultivates unity.

A national identity cultivates unity by defining and reflecting what the political community as a collective is. In doing so, it emphasizes and focuses on the commonalities of those who comprise the community, acting as a constant reminder of what community they belong to and why they belong to it. Because national identities achieve unity by focusing on commonalities it is thought that they tend to work best when a political community is mono-cultural. The rationale applied here is that if all members of the nation share the same culture, there will be more areas of commonality that can be emphasized in the national identity, and thus there is likely to be more unity. National identities are thought then to not only define and reflect the political community, but also to exclude minority groups, or force their assimilation, in order for them to gain acceptance.[2] This is because in a political community that is culturally diverse, or where minority groups have the distinctiveness of their cultures protected, there are very few commonalities upon which the national identity can focus. By comparison, multiculturalism aims to protect cultural diversity and promote its value, and in doing so it is unfathomable to possess a shared identity that would exclude some minority groups or force their assimilation. The aims of multiculturalism and nationhood have therefore traditionally been seen to be antithetical.[3]

Other than Bhikhu Parekh, few can claim to have offered a means to navigate a way around the traditional view that multiculturalism and nationhood are antithetical.[4] This is true despite the fact that most political theorists of multiculturalism would recognize that any multicultural society needs to foster reciprocal attachments – or as Will Kymlicka would call them, the mutual 'ties that bind' – between at least most of the individuals and groups that comprise a political community so as to avoid fragmentation and instability.[5] I will attempt to follow in Parekh's footsteps by describing a form of nationhood that is compatible with multiculturalism. I will proceed in two stages. Firstly, I will discuss the definition of national identity. This is important because, in order to understand how to make the aims of multiculturalism and national identity compatible, we first need to understand precisely what a national identity is. Secondly, I will move on to describe a form of national identity that is compatible with the aims of multiculturalism.

What is a national identity?

In attempting to define what a national identity is, we must first understand what a nation is. At the conceptual level, national identities are cognates of nations and therefore it is impossible to understand the former without first understanding the latter. In attempting to define a nation, I am cognisant of the fact that many in the past have found this task notoriously difficult. Max Weber claimed that part of this difficulty lay in the fact that no two nations appeared to possess the same objective features. Definitional discussions regarding the word 'nation' are further complicated because scholars tend to disagree about how nations emerged and what precursors were necessary for them to become so widespread and established. However, to dwell on all such definitional discussions and to then sort our way through them would require a separate paper. For reasons of brevity I will address the two dominant paradigms that attempt to explain what nations are.[6]

The first paradigm is that of Modernism, which emerged in the 1960s under the influence of Elie Kedourie[7] and Ernest Gellner.[8] Kedourie dates nationhood to the emergence of the Enlightenment philosophy of Kant, which was skewed by Romantics like Fichte. In terms of its intellectual history, nations are modern entities based on modern philosophies. Ernest Gellner saw nations as emerging in the industrial epoch to aid the rise of industrialization. Nations are said to be literate expressions of high culture trained through a compulsory education system, to support industrialism. For Gellner,

nations are entirely modern, constructed in the industrial age, before which the 'loyalties and solidarities' necessary for nationhood were not possible.[9]

As a reaction to Modernism, the Ethno-Symbolic school of thought emerged. Ethno-symbolists like Anthony Smith are critical of, amongst other things, the modernist paradigm[10] for failing to account for pre-modern ethnies and collective sentiments that make nationhood possible.[11] In short they claim that modernists place too much emphasis on elite or overpowering structural forces that turn men into nationals. If the nation is to evoke the necessary sentiments of solidarity and be responsive to institutional/structural or elite forces, there must be at least some common sentiment that existed prior to nationhood. This is an important point, for at times many modernists take the responsiveness of people to nationalist ambitions for granted, as if people are incapable of identifying what is obviously spurious. If people are to be responsive to the drumbeat of nationhood, it is because, at minimum, they recognize the tune. Ethno-Symbolists then look both up (to elites and intellectuals) and down (to the people) when assessing how nations are constructed. They do not disregard the fact that nations are modern, they simply pay more attention to the historical roots, symbols, traditions, and values that allowed the nation to emerge.[12]

Ethno-symbolic definitions provide a more cogent understanding of nationhood because they are able to explain why nations have such a unifying effect. It is for this reason that Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolic definition of nationhood seems more convincing. Smith describes the nation as: "A named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members."[13] Further, Smith describes a national identity as: "The continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements."[14]

There are four points to note here. Firstly, whilst at the conceptual level national identities must always be understood as cognates of nations, at the practical level national identities help to shape nations. A national identity defines, produces, and reproduces the nation, and in particular the values, memories, myths, and traditions that shape the nation. A national identity is a collective identity that all members of the nation share, and it seeks to define what that collective is. Secondly, nations and national identities are not cast in a mould that can never be reshaped; they are fluid and changing entities.[15] Changes to the nation are usually instigated at the political level, but by whom? This then is the third point, for historically the shapers of nations have been the political class, by which I simply mean politicians, government officials, and intellectuals of the day. From one generation to the next the political class separates the important from the redundant and the necessary from the extraneous. How does the political class do this? What means do they have at their disposal to shape and mould the nature of the national identity? The tools that the political class have are the tools of the state which is understood in the Weberian sense as the legal and political institutions charged with the legitimate powers of coercion within a given territory.[16] State-led endeavours on education, citizenship, media, and so on alter the national identity and the way that the nation is understood.

How to make nationhood and multiculturalism compatible

Now that we understand what a national identity is, we are in a position to understand the nature of the difficulty that most advocates of multiculturalism have in relation to national identities. Broadly speaking, there are two criticisms that multiculturalists might raise. Firstly, if we consider my definition of a national identity we see that it is premised on mono-cultural terms and thus prone to the homogenizing of the political community and either the assimilation or the exclusion of minority groups. Yet if we look at Smith's definition we must also note that nations have a 'chameleon like' quality, in that they are capable of adapting to different contexts and different circumstances. They change because the political class has the power to shape and mould, over a generation of course and within certain limits, the nature of the national identity and thus the nation. Is it then impossible to imagine a national identity and then a nation in which cultural diversity is protected and promoted as a value? If the nature of a nation can be altered, does it have to be incompatible with multiculturalism?

The usual answer given at this point leads me to the second criticism. Advocates of multiculturalism, or at least critics of nationhood, usually claim that history illustrates that nationalists in the political class secure areas of commonality by homogenizing the political community and either assimilating minority groups into the shared understanding of what the nation is, or excluding them. Even John Stuart Mill was guilty of this charge. His advocacy of nationhood is not to be confused with "a senseless antipathy to foreigners; an indifference to the general welfare of the human race… a cherishing of bad peculiarities because they are national, or a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries."[17] However, even he claimed that "inferior and more backward sections of the human race" should be absorbed and assimilated into larger more cultivated groups under the banner of nationhood.[18] Homogenizing the political community is the means by which areas of commonality are found and unity is secured. How else could a nation operate?

This is an important observation, but it comes unstuck when one considers that the homogenization of the political community and the exclusion or the assimilation of minority groups is a *process* of finding areas of commonality. There is nothing intrinsic to a national identity that compels the assimilation of minority groups. Furthermore, the *process* by which areas of commonality are found are determined, to some extent, by the political class. The *process* can then be changed, such that areas of commonality are formed in a manner compatible with the aims of multiculturalism.[19] But how can this be accomplished? How might a nation create areas of commonality that are enshrined in a national identity as a means to secure unity but also protect cultural diversity and promote its value? My suggestion is to make one of the areas of commonality multiculturalism itself. I then advocate the formation of a multicultural national identity, which I define as:

The definition and redefinition of the nation as multicultural, such that the values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions

that compose the distinctive heritage of the nation are premised on the reflection and protection of the nation's cultural diversity and the promotion of the value that this diversity serves.

Through a multicultural national identity, the multicultural nature of the nation is accepted, reflected, and asserted to be positive. It would be inimical to a multicultural national identity to homogenize a political community, because that is not how the political community defines itself. Minority groups could not be assimilated for the same reason and neither could they be excluded.

There are four points to note here. Firstly, a multicultural national identity is a type of national identity. The word 'multicultural' is merely the adjective that describes this type of national identity. What is being discussed here is not a form of political community that is categorically different. Nonetheless, it is a type of nationhood that varies from any other that may have preceded it. Secondly, what is new about this type of national identity is that it attaches positive value to the cultural diversity of the nation and seeks to foster a sense of nationhood through it. Thirdly, it is not a type of national identity that must be prior to other types of identity such that there is created some sort of hierarchy. Indeed the creation of such a hierarchy would be inimical to the very nature of a multicultural national identity. Equally, it is not a type of identity that crowds out any other type of identity. The multicultural national identity is simply one of the many identities that all individuals and groups, regardless of cultural origin, possess. Unlike other identities, however, it is one that all members of the nation share. Finally, multiculturalism does not need to be the one and only area of commonality and hence way in which the nation is defined. There will be other areas of commonality enshrined in the national identity; however, they must be compatible with the aims of multiculturalism.

But how is a multicultural national identity created? As discussed, the political class can through state-led endeavours shape and re-mould a national identity. Education, citizenship, media, race relations, immigration, and a panoply of other policy areas can be used over a generation to alter the nature of a national identity. Indeed, much can be learned from how Canada – which admittedly is not a perfect model of a multicultural national identity, but is the closest approximation to one – has over the years attempted to re-shape the Canadian national identity from visions of Canada as a 'Britain of the north,' to Canada as a nation of 'two founding races,' to being a nation that is partly defined in terms of multiculturalism.[20] Canada's 1988 Multiculturalism Act is instructive: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the government of Canada to… recognise and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future."[21]

Conclusion

In conclusion let me say that multiculturalism and nationhood can indeed be made compatible. They both serve essential roles in a political community, and should not be understood in mutually exclusive terms. A political community, if it is to serve the best interests of those who comprise it, must protect cultural diversity, but also promote unity. It is hoped that a multicultural national identity will help towards securing those ends.

Notes

1 I adopt a Parekhian view of what multiculturalism is. I have discerned this view from Parekh's discussions on the political structures that a multicultural society must possess. See B. Parekh's *Rethinking Multiculturalism,* (Macmillan Press Ltd 2000), p. 196-236. For a different view see Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way,* (Oxford University Press, 1999). Also W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship,* (Oxford University Press, 1995). For further reading see C. Taylor, *Multiculturalism,* (Princeton University Press, 1994). See Also I.M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference,* (Princeton University Press, 1990). For a procedural liberal, anti-multiculturalism approach see Bryan Barry's much commented upon book, *Culture and Equality* (Polity Press, 2001). Barry also comments upon Parekh's work in 'Muddles of Multiculturalism' in *New Left Review* 8:1 2001, p. 49-71. Also see J. Rawls *Political Liberalism,* (Columbia University Press, 1996).

2 See R. Scruton, 'Authority and Allegiance', The meaning of Conservatism, (Palgrave, 2001) p. 17-37. Also, *England an Elegy,* (Pimlico, 2001) and 'In Defence of the Nation' in *Philosopher on Dover Beach,* (Caranat, 1990).

3 David Goodheart's recent article in *Prospect* (Issue 95, 2004) is good recent example of this the alleged antithetical nature of nationhood and multiculturalism. It is a premise that is fundamental to his ill thought through argument.

4 B. Parekh *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,* (Profile Books, 2000) p. 2-107. More recently, see B. Parekh, 'Being British, in *Government and Opposition,* 37:2, 2002, p. 301-317. B. Parekh, 'Defining British National Identity', in *Political Quarterly,* 2000, p. 1-14.

5 Parekh, in his most recent book, *Rethinking Multiculturalism* recognizes that each political community needs to nurture both diversity and unity. Kymlicka also recognises this in *Multicultural Citizenship.*

6 For a discussion of two older paradigms see A. Smith, *Nationalism* p. 49-57. Also see A.Smith, 'The Nation Modern or Perrenial?' in *The Nation in History,* (Polity Press, 2000) p. 27-52. Also see A. Smith, 'Primeordialism and Perrenialism' in *Nationalism and Modernism,* (Rouledge, 2001), p. 145-169.

7 E. Kedourie, *Nationalism,* (Blackwells Publishers, 1998).

8 E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* (Blackwells Publishers, 2001). Also see E. Gellner's *Nationalism,* (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1997).

9 Other important modernist versions of nations and nationaism are Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism since 1780,* (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Hobsbawm works with Gellner's basic definition. See also B. Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (Verso, 1991). J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* (Manchester University Press, 1993). For modernist empirical studies on nations see L. Greenfeld's *Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity,* (Harvard University Press, 2001). M. Keating, *Nations against the State,* (Palgrave, 2001).

10 A. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* (Blackwells Publishers, 1996). See also A. Smith, *National Identity,* (University of Nevada Press, 1991).

11 An exchange between Ernest Gellner, and Anthony Smith exists in the form of the Warwick Debates available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/Warwick2.html

12 Ethno-symbolists also tend to adopt a more sanguine approach to the future of nationhood. See A. Smith *Nations and Nationalism In A Global Era,* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002).

13 Anthony Smith, *Nationalism,* (Polity Press, 2001), p. 13.

14 Anthony Smith, *Nationalism,* (Polity Press, 2001), p. 18.

15 Obviously there are limits within which a nation can be re-shaped or moulded, and those limits reflect, to some extent, the popular beliefs of the people.

16 Variants of this definition of the state are replete in the social scientific and philosophical literature, however, its intellectual lineage dates back to Max Weber. See 'Politics as a Vocation' in *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology,* (Routledge, 1997), p. 77-78.

17 John Stuart Mill 'Coleridge' in *John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham-Utilitarianism and Other Essays* (Penguin Books Ltd, 1987), p. 195.

18 John Stuart Mill 'Of Nationality as connected with Representative Government', in Considerations of Representative Government in *On Liberty and Other Essays* (Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 431. See also R. Scruton, 'Authority and Allegiance', *The meaning of Conservatism,* (Palgrave, 2001), p. 17-37. Also, *England an Elegy,* (Pimlico, 2001) and 'In Defence of the Nation' in *Philosopher on Dover Beach,* (Caranat, 1990).

19 Certainly nationhood is more prone to mono-culturalism, yet it is by no means essential.

20 See E. Mackey, The *House of Difference,* (University of Toronto Press, 2002). See Will Kymlicka, 'Canadian Multiculturalism in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Is Canada Unique'? in F*orum Constitutionnel* 13:1 2003. See Also, Will Kymlicka, Politics of Identity II, 'Being Canadian' *Government and Opposition,* in pending.

21 Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988.

Contemporary Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Role of History:

The Past in the Present

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ABSTRACT

What does 'ethnicity' really mean? What about 'integration'? In this article, Nuno Dias argues that the language of inter-ethnic relations needs to be redefined. Racism and prejudice still exist in our societies, and according to the author, we require a greater number of policy-makers to focus on constructing concepts that will help us to better understand diversity.

Addressing the challenge of old categories and conceptual frameworks that inform inter-ethnic relations (reminiscent of the colonial epoch) is crucial to the edification of a society capable of dealing, without prejudice, with difference of any kind, not only in political discourse but also, and above all, in the academic sphere.

I say 'above all' because academia should be a privileged space for critical reflection on new forms of racism and discrimination. It should be able to involve other stakeholders in the discussion about the creation of a systemic field of debate over what the words race, ethnicity and their many unscientific alternatives represent in the public sphere and how they affect integration of immigrants and other minorities. In fact, despite all of the social and political bodies at work, ethnicity continues to be one of the most complex, multidimensional and scientifically misapprehended contemporaneous social subjects.

According to our theoretical options, it is important to search for the foundations of inter-ethnic relations in historiography and significant philosophical environments (in colonial documentation and other types of literary and academic productions of the epoch). This should be complemented by research into individual histories of the representations of the subjects involved (as product and architects of the interactive definitions that uphold the spaces of ethnicity).

Whether it is taken as a post-war synonym for race or as a post-modern cultural deposit of the commoditisation of globalization, ethnicity, as a concept, has failed to achieve a consensual definition that suits social researchers, policy-makers or even self ascribed definitions of ethnic belonging. Not that it should necessarily be consensual. Given its relational essence it is obvious that it is meant to be the object of fierce discussion. However, we are a long way from being able to find a cooperative and fruitful environment inside academia, let alone between academics and policy-makers.

Irrefutably, words have a strong effect on the creation of social beliefs and hence in the reproduction of social practices – a per formative effect as Austin[1] puts it. It is the origin and historical meaning of words that we should question in order to understand how they evolved, or not, and came to mean what they do now. After such an exercise, going beyond the lexicon definitions and into the social genesis and evolution of words and the social categories to which they refer, we can better understand the stereotyping nature of certain words, even when used as sociological concepts.

Ethnicity presumes a contextual existence; in other words, it entails a relationship between two or more groups in a certain bounded territory. Its political use suggests that is only after social collectives interact with each other that it comes into being. Unless same sort of borders – cultural, national or even social – are at stake, ethnicity would hardly be an issue addressed in politics. However, what empirical work has been telling us is that the representations over ethnic boundaries and unequal relations vary, often inside what could be perceived, or categorized, as a group or a minority.

Ethnicity means different things in different contexts. For instance, in newborn States from the former Yugoslavia, ethnicity means a defiant concept to what a review of the same nature would produce in England, in Portugal, or to that extent in any other country. Yet this does not imply that some characteristics of ethnic minority groups (whatever features their self-definition fall upon) dwelling in different parts of the globe cannot be analogous or summoned in a comparative study.

It is true that the social significance of "ethnic and racial distinctions" may vary from one society to another[2]. However, the outputs of racialization processes are usually similar, varying, we believe, only in degree and time, hindering certain groups from climbing the social ladder or from having access to certain spheres (e.g. housing, education, health, political

representation, cultural expression, etc.). We argue that it is possible to identify some common patterns in the racialization, or in a more straightforward way, the exclusion of certain groups across national borders.

This research field, as ignored by some and held by others, is an intricate and complex labyrinth with different questions and answers to similar social realities. As Banton put it when he said that " at present the field of study [ethnic and racial studies] is a thing of shreds and patches,"[3] there is no reason or argument for enduring so.

Surprisingly enough this field has not benefited as it should have from comparative research, theoretically or empirically grounded. But, we argue, if we focus on the processes rather than only on interpretations of an abstract nature, we should eventually come across an operative and balanced framework proposal for the interpretation of contemporary inter-ethnic relations in western societies.

There are several studies assuming the relationship between imperial notions of race and civilization and the actual place of minorities in old imperial centres concerning racist stereotypes, exclusion and discrimination practices.[4] What does not exist, we believe, is a mapping exercise of how those processes can occur through time in different societies regarding the 'same' minority groups, and to what extent that can lead, or not, to distinct outcomes.

In the work we are now carrying out, we decided to select a particular group of migrants, with a similar social and geographical pre-migration history, and with comparable after-migration trajectories in two different national contexts: Gujarati-Hindus that were established in Eastern African countries and that left to the former metropolises after the 'Africanization' processes following independence from European colonizers. Also, the Portuguese and the British cases are examples of societies where discrimination exists, as asserted by a handful of studies and surveys, and where a condescending state of mind still sometimes disturbs the discernment between perception, or in other words 'categories', and reality.

There is, however, a chronological disparity amongst the Indian origin immigration experience of both countries that could possibly help to explain some differences in the settlement processes in the same. In the British case these populations already crossed several global crises with repercussions in the British labour market. This association is now followed by the rebirth of the inevitable causal connection between unemployment and immigration, and therefore of potential disruptive elements to the illusion of national homogeneity and singularity[5] usually spoken through right-wing political parties. In Portugal there could possibly be an imminent similar situation emerging with the continuous increase and diversification of immigrant populations and the uprising of immigration problems in the media and political agendas, making skin colour difference more noticeable. This concerns, in particular, the increasing flows from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and the present association with Islam and terrorism.

The absence of policy-makers from this particular field – the area of defining and discussing concepts – has contributed decisively to the crystallization of stereotypes attached to the legacies of the broader time that compounded colonial histories and western racially structured societies.[6] It is true that the 'politics of integration' try to anticipate social disruption by designing assimilationist strategies aiming at the more socially conspicuous groups. But it is no less true that visibility and the way 'others' are represented by the majority can change, and is very much dependent on contemporary political readings of national history.

The problematic of immigration and inter-ethnic conviviality does not accept a-historical approaches that are insensitive to the possibility of individual choices and collective existences. Some proposals have already been made by researchers aiming at avoiding limited perspectives by instead moving on to work with post-ethnic citizenships where multiple affiliations are considered and where social identities are not protected by an imagined, as in political, overarching national identity.[7]

The problematic of immigration and inter-ethnic conviviality does not accept a-historical approaches that are insensitive to the possibility of individual choices and collective existences.

The largest flow of immigrants coming from the Indian sub-continent occurred in the period after India's partition and the subsequent foundation of Pakistan. As of the mid 60s to mid 70s, the largest immigrant flow corresponded predominantly to Gujarati naturals who fled from former British colonies in the African continent. The habits of these contingents, upon arrival, soon created for them integration difficulties by virtue of contrast with the autochthonous population conventions, thus emerging at that time several ethnic enclaves spread around major English cities.[8]

An investigation carried out by the European Community in 1989[9] discloses 'Asians' as the most hated group in Great Britain, and not only the one which evidences a larger contrast. Bearing in mind those results, and the results of his own research, Moodod[10] concluded that what existed was not a generalized success of the macro category 'Asians,' but instead, an 'Indian' success, that nevertheless was, and is, not a sufficient condition to eliminate the incorporation problems in the host society.

That success, he claims, was a consequence of the operationalization of particular norms and values, in which family appears before the individual, and of the previous migratory experience that made possible the constitution of a knowledge reservoir fundamental in disruptive situations.[11] The same can be said about Hindu migrants living in Portugal.[12] This study allows, according to the author and starting from the Indian case, to mention the causal relationship that usually connects racial discrimination to weak socio-economic performance.

In Portugal, the post-colonial incorporation of Indians and their present status is quite distinct – there is almost immediate association between populations of Indian origin

and commerce, and furthermore a relative success in the integration process. On the other hand, discrimination towards individuals of Indian origin does not appear to be significant in the picture of inter-ethnic tensions and of racist and xenophobic speeches that have been increasing in the last decade (Dias, 2002).

Hindus clearly depended on the support of social networks and personal resources in the reconstruction of some businesses and in finding a way to create independent ways of subsistence. Yet there were also numerous individuals channelled toward unskilled segments of the labour market, resembling what had happened in England. All of these resemblances should point to the same outputs in terms of problems experienced by the same minority groups in European societies with a colonial legacy, unless the representations of these societies depended on different conceptions of difference, which they do not.

In a survey carried out in Portugal in 1999, 70% of respondents affirmed that they recognize an immigrant by his skin colour.[13] The survey, given to the Portuguese population on immigrants and other groups (potential discrimination targets) allows us to characterize the populations of Indian origin as almost invisible. What stands out is that unlike Portugal, British survey results point to a far greater equivalence between the categories of Blacks and Asians in answers regarding racism, discrimination and lack of integration in the host society.

The constitution of enclaves and spaces regarded as outcasts, relating to the receiving society, doesn't necessary foretell the occurrence of processes of social reproduction that indiscriminately impel successive generations of certain minority groups to inferior segments of the social structure. It is here that the analysis of the racialization of certain groups appears as particularly complex and interesting.

In some situations, studies show an inversely proportional relation between a group's socio-economic performance and the representations by the host society. In England, the discriminatory bias of the South-Asian category hides not only a map of diversified proveniences as it halts possible positive effects of successful social trajectories (Ballard, 2002). How then can we understand mechanisms that shape the adversarial collective representations covered by classic readings on social conflicts?

Roger Ballard (1999) proposes a historical approach to discriminatory ethnicization processes in England. These processes, he argues, are not dissociable of the way English identity was and is constructed. In England, like in the United States, certain groups became invisible due to the absence of mainstream contrasting phenotypic markers. Skin colour has structured societies and conditioned and ruled life experiences of non-white individuals for generations. In Britain, as in Portugal, identity seems to be politically discussed through fixed, and blurred, notions of ethnicity, culture or even nationality (cf. Banton), therefore attaching the issue of ethnicity, and its association with race, in the integration agenda to the field of visibility or invisibility of minority (as in excluded) groups.

Politicians and policy-makers should be aware that inter-ethnic relations and the language and stereotypes associated with it are not in a galaxy different to the one where integration issues dwell. In Britain, as in Portugal, racism and prejudice still live on as observed in several studies, irrespective of the politicians who emphasize the important role of integration of minorities along with the need to block new immigrants.

Multiracial harmony and a distinctive ability to integrate is presented, in both countries, as a historical trait that still marks the political orientation continuing to push into oblivion unequal racial relations, thus jeopardizing a rational analysis of real inherited problems camouflaged with a normative discourse of who is apt to enter the Nation, entrance for which a 'super-citizen' (Soysal, Sayad) performance is demanded.

Inter-ethnic relations are not an absent element of minority claim-making. Nor even the issue of how to name those same minorities and groups. A better understanding of the diversity inside borders and a will to take a leap over the urge to categorize just for the sake of statistics would certainly lead to a different way of making immigrants, and so-called minorities, part of a nation.

A first promising step was the creation of a network of excellence in the domain of International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE), combining the expertise of 19 established European research institutes aiming to build a balanced theoretical and empirical knowledge platform "that can form a reliable basis for policy."[14] The variance in the racialized (hence disliked) groups with similar courses in both countries demands by itself an effort in commencing comparable transnational frame analysis and joint research plans on inter-ethnic relations, in order to perceive what we really have to consider when we discuss integration.

Notes

1 Austin, J. L. *How to Do Things with Words.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.

2 Banton, M. *The International Politics of Race.* New York: Polity Press, 2001.

3 2001:193.

4 Vd. *inter alia* van der Veer, P. *Imperial Encounters.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

5 Fenton, Steve. *Ethnicity.*1999.

6 For a detailed study on race and its role in the configuration of modern western societies see Winant, H. *The World is a Ghetto. Race and Democracy Since World War II.* New York: Basic Books, 2001.

7 vd. *inter* alia Hollinger, D. A. *Post Ethnic America.* New York: Basic Books, 1995.

8 Ballard, R. *The South Asian Presence in Britain.* Ed. Desh Pardesh. New Delhi: BRPC, 1996.

9 In Modood, T. "The Indian economic success: A challenge to some race relations assumptions." *Policy and Politics.* Vol. 19, 3, (1991): 177-189.

10 op. cit.

11 Moodod, 1991: 86.

12 Vd. Dias, N. (2002). "Beyond Familial Dharma Hindu entrepreneurial behaviour in a migratory context." *Immigration and Place in Mediterranean Metropolises.* Eds. M.L. Fonseca et al. Lisboa: Luso-american Foundation.

13 Garcia, J. L. (org.) *Portugal Migrante- Emigrantes e Imigrados, Dois estudos Introdutórios.* Oeiras: Celta, 2000.

14 http://www.imiscoe.org.

Branding Canada: Can We Brand a Country?

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ABSTRACT

John Nadeau describes the challenge of building and managing one brand for Canada, a country that evokes such a wide variety of images in the minds of its inhabitants. He describes the origins of country image as a concept, and emphasizes the importance of consistency and credibility in the message being sent to others across the world. Nadeau concludes that a common theoretical basis allows countries to borrow strategies from the field of brand management in order to successfully market their own national image.

Discover our true nature (Canadian Tourism Commission, 2003)

"A world leader in innovation and learning, a magnet for talent and investment" (Speech from the Throne, September 30, 2002)

Canada – A Profitable Option (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001)

Countries can represent many ideas to many different people, as demonstrated by the quotes above. For some, Canada represents a great open space characterized by wilderness and trees, while for others Canada is a land of innovation and technological development. Within our borders and beyond, this diversity of opinion exists. With such diverse views of our country, is it possible to successfully brand Canada? Can multiple images exist while promoting a central country brand? What is known about country images? To answer these questions, this paper draws on the rich knowledge base of Product-Country Image research. This research stream developed from early questions raised about the impact of 'made-in' labels and their effect on product evaluations and purchase intentions. The field has evolved to examine the broader role of country images in the process of decision-making.

What are Country Images?

Images are simplifications of more complex ideas. They are knowledge structures that are used as mental short-cuts for processing information in decision-making processes (Kotler and Gertner 2002). Images are also defined as the sum of all attributes considered when thinking about an idea (Scott 1965). Country images are a specific instance of images that are closely associated with the political entity of a country. While other images exist for geographical or economic regions, country images are based on political borders. The area of study that has evolved from a marketing perspective is firmly rooted in the interaction of country images with the images of products from that country.

Brands are also a unique subset of images and are distinctly different from the general category of images. The American Marketing Association defines a brand as a "name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition." While images exist in everyone's minds, the act of branding is an attempt to influence and standardize the image into a brand image. Branding is also an attempt to match the brand identity (how the brand is intended to be perceived) with the brand image (how the concept is perceived by the interpreter).

Country Image Foundations

The assertion that branding a country is possible suggests that the country image can be managed among the global public. Some people may argue that country images are unique and difficult to brand due to their high level of complexity. In addition, many issues may exist outside the realm of control for marketers and have the potential to harm a country image; for example, natural disasters, political turmoil, and economic downturns (Kotler and Gertner 2002). However, country images do persist and consistency among these images may also be found. For instance, Germany is often considered as a country that possesses great engineering abilities regardless of its damaging political history. Furthermore, managing a country image is possible because brands and country images share some essential foundations, namely, cues, stereotypes, differentiation, and attitudes.

Cues are bundles of information or 'triggers' that invoke an image in the mind of the beholder. For country images, the traditional cue is considered the 'made-in' label found on textiles and other manufactured goods. While research has demonstrated stronger effects of a country image when only one cue is present (Lim et al. 1994; Ahmed et al. 1994; and Peterson and Jolibert 1995), the country cue remains important in multi-cue settings (Nes and Bilkey 1993; Peterson and Jolibert 1995). At times, country information can have a negative effect on evaluations, so it is not always beneficial to supply country information (Gaedeke 1973, Kiecker and Duhan 1992). For example, a Canadian brewer uses a red maple leaf on its label everywhere except in Quebec where it is replaced by a red wheat sheaf. In this case, the red maple leaf could evoke negative perceptions about the country held in Quebec and negatively affect the purchase outcome. Generally speaking, the application of country image cues is found to have an impact on decision-making processes. In addition, brand marks behave similarly, signifying to consumers what the product represents.

The use of stereotypes is another shared aspect of branding and country image theories. Stereotypes are defined as expanding perceptions based on a central element to all other elements (Scott 1965). In other words, one takes a belief about a single aspect of a country and applies that belief to all other aspects of the country and everything that comes from the country. Stereotypes are a way for people to build images and to simplify complex concepts to reduce information processing time. The association of stereotypes with a person or object's country of origin has been demonstrated by researchers (Bamossy and Papadopoulos 1987) and has been shown to affect evaluations (Niffenegger et al. 1982; Wall et al. 1990; Witt and Rao 1992). For Canada, research indicates that the country is often viewed favourably for beliefs about the country and its people (Papadopoulos and Heslop 2000). The effect of country stereotypes on consumer evaluations is similar to the effect of highly focused brand images. The emphasis of brands on a single attribute purposely creates a stereotype image to aid in the efficiency of communication.

Stereotypes are a way for people to build images and to simplify complex concepts to reduce information processing time. The association of stereotypes with a person or object's country of origin has been demonstrated by researchers and has been shown to affect evaluations. For Canada, research indicates that the country is often viewed favourably for beliefs about the country and its people

As with brands, differentiation is a key aspect of country images, particularly when considering the many applications of public policy. For example, a need exists for countries to select a unique competitive position in order to attract foreign investment (Wee et al. 1993). This can be difficult to accomplish given that there are hundreds of countries in the world that could conceivably compete. In addition, not all countries are perceived as unique entities. Indeed, the country image may become less important and an economic development or regional image can supersede it. For Canada, an image should be defined that is unique from other developed countries and distinct from a North American image. However, this lack of differentiation tends to occur more often with less developed countries where image attributes are perceived as equivalent (Cordell 1992). Without differentiation in country image, the country is unlikely to succeed in attracting more attention and favourable decision outcomes.

The role attitudes play with images is to explain how the use of images affects behaviour. The three parts of attitudes, namely, cognitive, affective, and conative aspects, help to explain this role. The cognitive component of attitudes refers to the beliefs held about an object or person. The affective portion refers to the evaluation of like/dislike of the object or person. The conative component represents the intended behaviour resulting from the beliefs and evaluation. The relationship among these three components is a useful way of describing the effects of country of origin (Papadopoulos et al. 1998). For example, the three parts of attitudes could be represented as 'I believe Canadians are friendly,' 'I like Canadians' and 'I will increase my investment in Canada.' Attitudes explain the country image phenomenon in the same way attitudes explain the impact of brand image on purchase behaviour. Kotler and Gertner (2002) acknowledge the importance of attitudes in branding and echo the three parts of attitudes by writing "brands incite beliefs, evoke emotions and prompt behaviours." (p.249)

Challenges

Managing the image of a country is not a simple task. This paper concludes by discusses key considerations for managing country images, namely, coordination, relevancy, credibility, and consistency.

A quick sampling of messages that are distributed about a country can reveal the many beliefs and perspectives that are held about a country. For instance, the quotes at the beginning of this paper illustrate the divergent views that Canada is a vast wilderness and that it is a land of innovation and technological development. The suggestion that messages be coordinated should not be interpreted as the development and promotion of a single message for all applications. Coordination refers to the search for shared characteristics among applications that uniquely define the country. This is consistent with branding theory that suggests common associations should be portrayed in the event of multiple brand identities (Aaker 1996). Moreover, this suggestion has also been forwarded in the country image literature referred to as an 'umbrella

concept' (Kotler and Gertner 2002) or a 'family branding approach' (Papadopoulos and Heslop 2002).

To consider the matter of relevancy is perhaps stating the obvious, however, it is worth noting here. In consumer products, there is a strong relationship between brand relevance and the number of people who buy the brand (Aaker 1996). For a country brand, there is a risk of diluting the image over the various applications to incorrectly satisfy the coordination consideration, so as to mean nothing in every single application. A good example of this shortcoming may be summed up in the recent slogan for the City of Ottawa as "Technically Beautiful". This slogan fails to resonate strongly with either the travel or technology groups it was designed to appease. Fortunately, a trade-off between relevancy and coordination is not required, as long as the country brand is based on shared underlying ideas. The concept of relevancy remains a useful test for messages in each area of public policy.

The acceptance of a country branding strategy requires an underlying credibility in the messages that are distributed. Credibility is an important aspect of branding and, in the consumer product area, a company typically extends its credibility to the individual brands offered in the market (Aaker 1996). For a country, the messages must coincide with existing beliefs about a country so the image may be viewed as a realistic representation of that country. The Canadian brand image, for example, would lack credibility if the central message were to become 'Canada is a nation of strong cricket players.' There is little or no basis for this claim. To avoid this problem, surveys are a useful tool to assess where the country currently resides in the consciousness of the world (Papadopoulos and Heslop 2002). An alternative method would be to examine existing icons in industry, personalities, natural landmarks, and historical events to understand global perceptions (Kotler and Gertner 2002). Credibility remains an important ingredient for managing a strong brand.

The consistency of implementation is also important to the management of a country brand. The consistent delivery of a message over time can result in being the only brand to represent the ideas and image invoked with the message (Aaker 1996). The consistency challenge for countries is the existence of many distinct and independent points of contact. For example, most people may not consider exporters and other travellers to be official representatives of a country; however, the interaction they have with foreigners will impact the image people have about a country. To improve consistency of the image, Papadopoulos and Heslop (2002) have called for "a greater role by government and trade associations in helping to coordinate and promote the country's export brand." (p.311) While consistency is more difficult to accomplish with a country than a consumer products brand, attaining consistency of a country image is not impossible, particularly, if the other three challenges are met.

In summary, the idea of managing a country image as a brand can be successful because the two types of images share some foundations in theory: cues, stereotypes, differentiation and attitudes. This common theoretical basis enables us to borrow techniques from brand management to the area of country image and assist in the management of a country brand.

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
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