CANADIAN DIVERSITY

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

Outlooks on immigration in the Francophone world

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Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale

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LETTERS

Comments on this edition of *Canadian Diversity*? We want to hear from you!

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INTRODUCTION

A career diplomat who represented Canada for three decades on migration and protection issues, **Caroline Guimond** has also managed large immigration programmes around the world. Today, she continues her commitment to highlighting best practices to welcome, integrate and include migrants and people in exile, particularly within the Francophonie.

Migration is a reality that has shaped humanity since the beginning of time. Accelerated by globalization and climate change, it is today a major issue for the countries of the Francophonie. These countries, scattered across five continents, serve as places of departure, transit, destination, and for receiving migrants. The movement of these men and women has a deep impact on the economic, social, political, and cultural spheres of these countries. Despite the great diversity of realities within the Francophonie, all these countries have in common the challenges and opportunities posed by the influx of migrants. On the model of Metropolis Canada, the Metropolis Institute has established the Réseau Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale to provide a Francophone agora for exchanging and sharing best practices, and to create synergies for joint research.

This special edition of *Canadian Diversity* offers a first glance at the multiple realities of Francophone migration and the role played by the French language in this mobility and as a vector of integration.

The Right Honorable Michaëlle Jean highlights the importance of dialogue on migration issues in the French-speaking world. Her message reminds us that we need a diversity of voices around discussion tables and that the voice of lived experiences of migration and exile must be heard. We are grateful to her for accepting to co-preside Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale during its inaugural year.

"On the model of Metropolis Canada, the Metropolis Institute has established the Réseau Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale to provide a Francophone agora for exchanging and sharing best practices, and to create synergies for joint research."

Commissioner Raymond Théberge, also co-president of Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale in 2021, shares with us the importance of migration for Canada's Francophone communities and how they benefit from the resulting transformations.

Roda Muse, Secretary General of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO and a long-time partner, shares her experiences as a Francophone immigrant, and how integration programs for Francophone newcomers have evolved, along with the underestimated role of diasporas.

In an analysis prepared for the inaugural conference Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale in 2021, Jean Christophe Dumont, Director of the International Migration Division in the OECD at the Directorate for Employment, Labor and Social Affairs, raises two important points: how do we define the Francophone space when speaking about immigration, and should we limit ourselves to movements between member countries of the Francophonie, or do we go beyond that?

The chart below presents Francophon immigrants in OECD countries and reveals that while France is the main destination, the United States comes second and Spain third. Discussions on the question of migration in the French-speaking world cannot, therefore, be limited to the countries of the Francophonie alone, but should instead focus on all the destinations of francophone migratory movements. The example of Senegalese migration presented below illustrates this approach. The French language is not an essential criterion when choosing a destination. However, knowledge of the language may become important or even essential once at the destination, as shown by the examples of the United States and Canada in the following section: *La langue française de la mobilité* (The French language as a medium for mobility).

WHY LEAVE AND WHERE TO GO

This article from the *Observatoire des migrations du Sénégal* provides us with a historical overview of the Senegalese migration and the factors influencing the choice of area of residence. Senegal, the land of teranga, has always welcomed people from the region. Dr. Adrien BATIGA. Université Paris-Est Créteil. France, Dr. Oumoul Khairy Coulibaly. ESEA. Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Dakar. Senegal and Prof. Aly Tandian. Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis, Senegal, provide us with a detailed picture of migration in and from Senegal: internal, regional, and international Senegalese migration. This historical overview examines the place of Senegalese women in such migratory movements, and how they have been absent from the decision-making process.

People also leave their lives and their loved ones behind because the climate changes and resources become scarce. How can we define these movements? What status and protection should be given to those who flee because the climate is changing? Stéphanie Njiomo, Ambassador for the Global Compact for the Environment in Cameroon and Central Africa, and co-founder of the Ci4Ca organization, makes a rallying call.

Professor Mehdi Lahlou of INSEA-Rabat and Secretary General of the Academic Network on Migration in North Africa (NAMAN) – Morocco presents the evolution of Morocco's migration policy. Today, Morocco is a country of departure due to economic reasons, a country through which irregular migration movements transit, and increasingly, it is a country of destination. Indeed, the country's future will depend on its ability to integrate migrants from the rest of the African continent and attract its diaspora back home.



Chart by Jean-Christophe Dumont, OCDE 2021.

As we can see from the OECD chart, France is the main destination for Francophone "immigrants". France is also one of the main source countries for immigration to Canada. Concordia University professors Chedly Belkhodja and Mireille Paquet present a review of what we know about migration from France to Canada and Quebec since the 2000s. This overview highlights the links between migration to and from France.

RECEPTION CHALLENGES OF NEWCOMERS

Matthieu Tardis, Co-Director of Synergies-Migrations, provides us with a lesser-known portrayal of France: that of the citizens who are committed to receiving exiled people. Can this surge of generosity sparked by the Syrian crisis and revived by the war in Ukraine give rise to expanded national legal pathway programs and encourage an increase in refugee resettlement?

Being welcomed can also be a challenge for those who choose to leave, either as economic immigrants or foreign workers. Christophe Berthet, President and CEO of Immigrant Québec, shows us that reception and integration are successful when "the whole village" pulls together.

THE FRENCH LANGUAGE AS A MEDIUM FOR MOBILITY

We have noted that the United States is the second most popular destination for Francophone emigrants, and that Senegalese migration to this country has been significant. Agnès Tounkara, who works at the Face Foundation where she is in charge of the French Heritage Language Program, helps French-speaking immigrants and young Americans of Francophonie origin to preserve their linguistic and cultural heritage. She tells us about her work and how these young people can turn their knowledge of the language into an asset.

In Canada, Francophone immigration is a highly politicized issue, and one that is seen as essential not only from the point of view of Francophone minority communities, but also in Quebec. Richard Marcoux, Professor and Director of the *Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone* at Université Laval, invites us to rethink the concept of the francophone based on the mother tongue in order to understand today's Francophonie and the Canadian Francophonie.

A NEW LOOK

We conclude with a message by Professor Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye, who teaches Migration Law at UQAM. She explains why she founded the Observatoire sur les migrations internationales, les réfugiés, les apatrides et l'asile (OMIRAS). The new perspective she proposes is that of the younger generations who are studying the migration question, and who are familiar with it because they have experienced it first-hand.

Thank you all for your contribution to this special edition, and for your support during the meetings at Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale.

EXCERPTS – SPEECH FOR THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF *METROPOLIS FRANCOPHONIE MONDIALE*, 2020

The Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean is the 27th Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, former UNESCO Special Envoy to Haiti, 3rd Secretary General of La Francophonie and co-founder of the Michaëlle Jean Foundation.

The Francophonie is a space that links peoples across five continents through language and often a shared history and heritage. It is also a space of mobility, migration, and cooperation. Moreover, when we free ourselves from the neo-colonial stranglehold and set up a dynamic of reciprocal relations based on values, there arises a vision of universal humanism. It is these values of mutual recognition and coexistence in diversity – diversity being a precious treasure and not a problem – that enable the creation and implementation of the best integration models and practices for newcomers. What we are discussing here is not a matter of assimilation, but the encounter of cultures, the exchange of experiences, and the interculturality of living together in diversity and respect for the other. These good practices are also widespread throughout Francophone countries. Therefore, establishing a network of partners, which both operate in the field of immigration and originate from the various countries of the international Francophone community, to regularly exchange and [...] address the challenges posed by migration in the Francophone world seems critical to me to fight against indifference and to take action.

[These exchanges can also serve as a] counterweight to the populist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant movements of the extreme right, which are gaining ground and permeating political parties, to the point that their views are infiltrating their way into the heart of debates and electoral campaigns. We have experienced this in Canada. We have seen how some of them work their way into power, and this is very disturbing, even destabilizing.

"Therefore, establishing a network of partners, which both operate in the field of immigration and originate from the various countries of the international Francophone community, to regularly exchange and [...] address the challenges posed by migration in the Francophone world seems critical to me to fight against indifference and to take action."

From my own experience, myself and my own family, like thousands of others who have been there, having experienced this distress, this forced escape towards the unknown in dire circumstances involving life and death, through my presence at the UN during high-level meetings dealing with migration issues, I have been the only one that was able to say that migration is not just a matter of statistics. I have been through it. I know what it is like, what it took, and what made the difference for us to get through it. It is a fundamental duty of solidarity, but also an obligation to assist people in danger whose rights are being threatened.

Therefore, it is imperative that we bring people to the table who can share their experiences and who work in the field. It is not surprising to see, for example, that associations representing immigrant communities are the organizations that best report on how the consequences of COVID-19 impact immigration and reception policies regarding newcomers.

FRANCOPHONE COMMUNITIES – A SOURCE OF DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF CANADA

Commissioner **Raymond Théberge**[1] holds a doctorate in linguistics and has held a number of important positions at the national level, in the public service and in academia. He is the author of 20 peer-reviewed publications, three books, a bibliography and 45 research projects, all of which attest to his interest in official language minority communities. He is the author of *Demain, la francophonie en milieu minoritaire*.

As Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada, I have the privilege of being the honorary co-chair of the Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale network, one of very few organizations that focuses on issues of immigration, integration and inclusion within the international Francophonie. In December 2021, at the network's inaugural conference, I had the pleasure of participating in a roundtable where we discussed how Francophone identity can be promoted in a multilingual environment. I am therefore very pleased to have this opportunity to share these words, especially since, as some of you are no doubt aware, the past few months here in Canada have been quite eventful, to say the least, in terms of official languages and linguistic duality.

As my latest annual report states, my office received "a veritable tidal wave of admissible complaints—over 5,400"[2] in 2021–2022 (a record), largely in reaction to the appointment of a Governor General who is not fluent in French and a speech given in English by Air Canada's CEO to the Chamber of Commerce of Metropolitan Montreal. Another subject that my office has been focusing on in recent months is the federal government's tabling of Bill C-13 to modernize the Official Languages Act. This new bill may be of particular interest to researchers because it includes new obligations to support research in French in all disciplines. Bill C-13 presents a golden opportunity to advance research conducted in French, both in Canada and internationally, and networks like Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale will have a key role to play. The increasing trend of publishing research only in English is an issue that affects Canada and other countries across the globe, and I hope that French-speaking countries around the world will work together to try to halt this phenomenon in the Francophonie and to promote research in French.[3]

In 2021, Canada celebrated the 50th anniversary of its multiculturalism policy, two years after the 50th anniversary of its official bilingualism policy. Over the past half century, these two policies have helped strengthen the Canadian

1 I would like to thank my office's research team for its contribution to this article.

2 Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, *Annual Report 2021-2022*, p. I.

3 This topic and other related challenges were discussed not only by Canadian researchers, but also by researchers from Europe and Latin America at the May 2022 Association francophone pour le savoir (Acfas) conference in the symposium called "*Entre anglicisation de la recherche et libre accès: imaginer l'avenir des revues en sciences humaines et sociales*" [Between the anglicization of research and open access: Envisioning the future of humanities and social sciences journals]. Acfas Conference, Université Laval, May 2022.

> "In 2021, Canada celebrated the 50th anniversary of its multiculturalism policy, two years after the 50th anniversary of its official bilingualism policy. Over the past half century, these two policies have helped strengthen the Canadian Francophonie (a perspective shared by many Canadians), one by affirming the language rights of the minority, and the other by encouraging diversity within a bilingual framework."

Francophonie (a perspective shared by many Canadians), one by affirming the language rights of the minority, and the other by encouraging diversity within a bilingual framework. In a public opinion telephone survey conducted by Environics for my office in 2021, 86% of respondents (and 93% of Francophone respondents) agreed with the statement that "having two official languages, instead of just one official language, sends the signal that Canada values linguistic diversity,"[4] and 68% of respondents (and the same percentage of Francophones) supported the idea that "Canada's official bilingualism policy and its multiculturalism policy work well together."[5] This shows that many Canadians, regardless of their background, seem to share my office's opinion that Canada's official bilingualism and multiculturalism policies are not only complementary, but also mutually reinforcing. This is also what second Commissioner of Official Languages Max Yalden was saying back in 1979 when he wrote that "a nation that goes to the trouble to recognize two or more official languages is implicitly committed to linguistic plurality. Far from excluding the use of other languages, recognition of official languages… is a signal to everyone of the importance to be attached to linguistic traditions and resources."[6]

Despite all of this, some Canadians still think that these two policies are difficult to reconcile and that the country's official languages actually impede its diversity. However, we often tend to forget the extent to which the French language is an essential component of Canadian diversity. Not only do Francophone minority communities help to break up linguistic homogeneity in their region, but the Canadian Francophonie is also very diverse, both in Quebec and in the other provinces and territories. Many Francophones have ancestors who were Indigenous, Irish Catholic, Scottish and even English. In the past half century, Canada's diversity has increased even more with the arrival of immigrants from across the international Francophonie (including Africa, Haiti, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe). Children of immigrants from all over the world attend French language schools in Quebec and elsewhere in the country. According to data from the 2016 Census, one in ten Francophones in Quebec is an immigrant. In the rest of Canada, the ratio is even higher — one in eight. In Ontario, nearly one in six Francophones is an immigrant, and in British Columbia, the number is one in four. Overall, Canada is home to over 800,000 immigrants and some 800,000 visible minorities who speak French as their first official language.[7]

The multilingualism of Francophone immigrants who settle in Canada greatly enriches the country's linguistic landscape. Although they speak French as their first Canadian official language, many of these newcomers speak other languages and come from countries where languages such as Arabic, Creole, Kirundi, Lingala or Spanish are spoken.[8] It is therefore fair to say that Francophone immigrants make a significant contribution to Canada's cultural and linguistic diversity. It is also fair to say that "diversity" and "Francophonie" are clearly not mutually exclusive.

Of course, in addition to recognizing that Francophone communities across Canada are more diverse than ever, we must also understand that these communities want to attract, welcome and support newcomers. Because of the low birth rate and the aging of French-speaking populations outside Quebec, immigration has become an essential way to ensure the vitality and maintain the demographic weight of these communities.[9] In this context, decision-makers in our country must make Francophone immigration outside Quebec a priority, and researchers must continue to study

4 Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, *Official Languages Tracking Survey 2021 – Final Report*, p. 11.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

6 Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, *Annual Report 1979*, p. 28.

7 I also highlighted this diversity in "Let's Be Honest About Multiculturalism and Official Bilingualism: Perspectives from the Commissioner of Official Languages," Multiculturalism @50 and the Promise of a Just Society, Canadian Issues, Association for Canadian Studies, Fall/Winter 2021, pp. 21–26. The statistics were provided by the research team at Canadian Heritage's Official Languages Branch and were based on data from the 2016 Census of Canada and from Statistics Canada. See also Brigitte Chavez, *Immigration and language in Canada*, 2011 and 2016, Statistics Canada, 2019, 195 p.

8 The diversity of Francophone immigration in Canada is discussed in: Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, "Statistical analysis of the 4.4% immigration target for French-speaking immigrants in Francophone minority communities: Almost 20 years after setting the target, it is time to do more and do better," 2021, p. 58. See also Chavez, *Immigration and language in Canada*, 2011 and 2016.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

the issue. This is why my office published a study in 2021 on the 4.4% federal target for French-speaking immigrants in Francophone minority communities. The study data shows that even if the 4.4% target had been met by the initial 2008 deadline, it still would not have been enough to stem the decline of the relative demographic weight of Francophone minority communities.[10] I am concerned about the impact of the deficits in Francophone immigration on these communities, which is why I have recommended that the federal government adopt a new target that would make it possible to re-establish and maintain the demographic weight of this population. We need to ensure that the goodwill our decision-makers have expressed regarding this issue is followed up with concrete actions in order to rectify the situation. Bill C-13 also offers an interesting solution by requiring the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to adopt a policy on Francophone immigration that includes objectives, targets and indicators. It now remains to be seen how all of this will be realized.

Given the general importance of immigration and diversity for Francophone minority communities, I am very much looking forward to the results concerning language from the 2021 Census of Population conducted by Statistics Canada — results which, at the time of writing, should be released shortly. I am particularly interested in seeing the data on the questions about language of schooling, which will tell us how many immigrants and children in exogamous families go to French-language school in Canada. I am also looking forward to reading the new Survey on the Official Language Minority Population, a post-census survey that focuses specifically on the situation of official language minority communities.

I would like to conclude by stating that here in Canada, our official languages and multiculturalism policies ensure that English and French are the two languages of integration in our society. Newcomers to Canada are encouraged to enrich our diversity by preserving their languages and cultures, but French is truly one of the two languages that make up the national dialogue and belong to all Canadians, regardless of their first language or country of origin. In other words, French is one of the two languages of public life in Canada. The presence of French in Canada helps us to build bridges not only between Canadians — regardless of whether they were born in Canada or elsewhere, or whether French is their first or second (or even their third or fourth) language — but also with the international Francophonie. Like the other members of the International Organisation of La Francophonie, Canada is a multilingual country, but through French, all of these countries can communicate with each other. Everything considered, the fact that French — one of the most widely spoken languages in the world — has official status in Canada is an undeniable advantage and, to quote from my office's public opinion survey, "is positive for Canada's international image."[11]

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10 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

11 Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, *Official Languages Tracking Survey 2021 – Final Report*, p. 8.

A LONG ROAD TO INCLUSION FOR FRANCOPHONE IMMIGRANTS

Secretary General of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO from 2021 to 2023, **Roda Muse** has also been a manager at the Ministry of Innovation, Science and Industry, and Ontario Regional Director for Status of Women Canada. A former vice-president and trustee of the Conseil des écoles publiques de l'Est de l'Ontario (CEPEO), she has been an active member of Ontario's francophone community. Roda Muse co-founded the Acacia Foundation, a charitable organization dedicated to fostering excellence in young visible minority francophones through education and mentoring.

An excerpt from the speech given on the occasion of the inaugural conference of Metropolis Francophonie Mondiale in December 2021 as Secretary General of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO.

I have joined you from Ottawa, located on the Algonquin Anishinaabe unceded territory. The members of the Algonquin Anishinaabe Nation have lived on this land for millennia, and their culture and presence continue to enrich this place. This acknowledgment of the land has a special meaning to me as someone who came to Ottawa 28 years ago. This land has allowed me to grow, raise my family and contribute to the society in which I have become a member.

The Canadian Commission for UNESCO connects Canadians to the work of UNESCO and helps to bring the perspectives of Canadian and Quebec civil society to the international stage. This contributes to achieving a triple objective: a more peaceful, equitable and sustainable world.

With this in mind, we have established a fruitful partnership with the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS) and its Metropolis Institute. I will not discuss all of our joint projects, but I would like to take you back a few years earlier to the issue of Francophone immigration and integration.

The *Francophonie mondiale* represents not only a space for diversity and sharing common values and knowledge but also a space for promoting peace and culture. It is also a space for migration, whether chosen or forced. In Canada, about twenty years ago, it was natural that most French-speaking immigrants would settle in Quebec. Francophone communities outside Quebec struggled to receive and retain their share of Francophone immigrants. Settlement services were in English, and Francophone minority community organizations were not prepared to integrate immigrants for their survival.

Francophone immigrants who came to Ottawa organized themselves collectively as elsewhere in the country. This led to multiple demands from organizations, such as the lack of financial support and the challenges of integration within Francophone communities which were perceived as the result of negative biases towards racialized and ethnocultural communities.

In this context, two consultants, Mohamed Brihmi and Mesmin Pierre, and I were mandated in 1999 by the Department of Canadian Heritage to hold consultations to establish the needs and priorities of the said racialized and ethnocultural Francophone communities. In 2001-2002, I met with Jack Jedwab for a study commissioned by the Office of

the Commissioner of Official Languages entitled "Immigration and the vitality of Canada's linguistic communities: policy, demography and identity. This report by Jack Jedwab was the genesis for the federal, provincial and territorial governments' consideration of Francophone immigration outside Quebec. It is on this basis that all the strategies for francophone immigration outside Quebec will emerge as well as the need to have a target for francophone immigration in the annual immigration plan of the federal government.

During my discussion with Jack Jedwab, I reiterated one of the issues that my colleagues Mohamed Brihmi and Mesmin Pierre and I had heard during our consultations. It was about the types of cooperation needed between immigrant and non-immigrant Francophones to meet the needs of newcomers. For us, it was essential to have three types of partnerships for groups:

- partnerships between organizations that represent racial and ethnocultural minorities to align efforts better and avoid duplication;

- Partnerships with existing Francophone institutions and organizations that go beyond the appointment of a racial or ethnocultural minority representation on boards and committees to ensure fair representation of members of these communities;

- partnerships with various levels of government and the private sector.

While Jack Jedwab's report at the time advocated in its recommendations that Anglophone settlement services implement programs for Francophones, I can tell you that today, settlement services by Francophones for Francophones exist from coast to coast.

If I continue on my personal experience, there is a dimension that I do not hear about in this issue of integration in Francophone immigration. It is the diaspora's contributions a vector of integration and inclusion. When I arrived, I was lucky enough to be in contact with people from my country of origin who guided me and paved the way for me to facilitate my integration. The diaspora can share its experiences, explain the pitfalls, informs about resources, and offer shortcuts, which no settlement service can offer.

> "I want to conclude by saying that while Canada and Quebec are continuing their efforts to attract Francophone immigrants, we still have a long way to go to ensure that all Francophone immigrants, regardless of their race, religion or gender, are included, accepted and can contribute to society to their fullest capacity."

In Canada, we are seeing more and more leaders from the diaspora heading up settlement services. This resulted in remarkable vitality as integration becomes inclusion.

I want to conclude by saying that while Canada and Quebec are continuing their efforts to attract Francophone immigrants, we still have a long way to go to ensure that all Francophone immigrants, regardless of their race, religion or gender, are included, accepted and can contribute to society to their fullest capacity. This is why the fight against racism remains one of the priorities of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO.

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION AND MOBILITY ON FAMILY STRUCTURES IN SENEGAL

Dr. Adrien Batiga, has a PhD in Social Sciences and Philosophy of Knowledge from the Université Paris-Sorbonne, and teaches at the Université Paris-Est Créteil, France. His research focuses on the intersection of female migration, domestic work, and care studies.

Dr. Oumoul Khairy Coulibaly has a Doctorate in Socio-Anthropology and is a lecturer-researcher at the Ecole Supérieure d'Economie Appliquée (ESEA, formerly ENEA) at Cheikh Anta DIOP University in Dakar. She specializes in gender issues from a multidisciplinary perspective, in particular empowerment of rural women, political participation of women, gender-based violence, and internal and external migration.

Prof. Aly Tandian holds a Doctorate from the Université de Toulouse 2 Le Mirail, where he taught for several years before joining the Sociology Department at the Université Gaston Berger in Senegal. He is the CEO and founder of the Groupe d'Études et de Recherches sur les Migrations & Faits de Sociétés and Chairman of the Observatoire sénégalais des migrations.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, migration has become a central issue in public debates in almost every region of the world. Just look at how the great Western powers like the European Union have barricaded themselves to keep non-Europeans out of the Union's territories (Krastev 2017). Whether based on a security rationale, an economic argument, a civilizational approach, or, more recurrently, a demographic one, the discourse on (African) migration feeds on a variety of agendas, sometimes wrapped in fantasy.

In the countries in the Global South, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to legal immigration, many countries are confronted with irregular immigration that takes the perilous routes of the desert and the makeshift boats that have turned the Mediterranean into a maritime graveyard.

In this way, migration realities are having a major impact on sub-Saharan societies. The family is therefore the ideal space for observing the consequences of migration in post-colonial societies. There are at least three reasons that justify its relevance. Firstly, African families are not immune to the current challenges of globalization, of which migration and (transnational) mobility are just one of many forms of expression. Secondly, migration most often implies the loss of a family attachment. The would-be migrant is not an isolated individual but is caught up in networks of relationships, of which the family is often the central element. Finally, in the African context, migration is still largely a collective affair. This ranges

from contributions to send a family member abroad, to money transfers that are, to a certain extent, a counter-gift to the efforts made collectively to carry out the migration project. Finally, the migrant who leaves takes with him the hopes of an entire family or even a community, and when he succeeds, he shares the benefits of his success with the whole family.

In the Senegalese context, there has long been a *tradition of mobility and migration*, particularly in the regions around the Senegal River valley and towards France. Senegalese immigration has diversified over time, both in terms of profiles with *the growing arrival* of Senegalese migrant women and destinations (Spain, and Italy), via *zones of departure*, which have expanded to include regions that were traditionally little affected by migration. The growing presence of women raises new questions concerning the relationships between family and migration: whether it's a question of maintaining family relationships at a distance, bringing up children in the absence of the mother, and so on.

This article seeks to explore the transformations that migration brings to Senegalese family structures, with particular emphasis on the impact of gender in both the motivations for leaving and the effects on families.

BETWEEN PERMANENT AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF SENEGALESE MOBILITY

A culture of mobility has taken root in eastern and northern Senegal since the successive conquests of the Great Empires of Ghana and Mali. The movement of the populations of these regions accelerated with the colonial penetrations (1880–1945). This led to temporary migrations, more or less forced, encouraged by the construction of railroads and roads, or land clearing for cultivation of crops intended for export to France and the rest of Europe. The Soninkés and Haalpulaar of the Senegal River valley, a strategic trading area astride the major routes of the ancient trans-Saharan trade, first made contact with Europeans as early as the 15th century. After the conquest, the colonial administration imposed coercive measures (forced labor, taxes paid in cash, etc.) on the Senegal River valley populations. These measures contributed significantly to the first internal seasonal migrations as people were looking for money to pay taxes or due to forcible displacement to work on major projects. The Haalpulaar and Soninké ethnic groups were heavily involved in these early migratory flows. The milieu Soninké area (Upper Valley), the first departures were reported around 1900, while in the Fouta en milieu Haalpulaar area (Middle Valley), until around 1910, population movements triggered by colonial measures led to people fleeing military recruitment campaigns. These soldiers were the forerunners of the first migrations to Africa, but also to Europe, where they remained after the great wars. Between 1915 and 1918, some 100,000 African fighters (*Tirailleurs sénégalais*) were sent to the fronts of Verdun and other battlefields.

As a result, migration was encouraged by recruitment. "It was a time when agents of major companies and various governments were stationed in sending countries to encourage and supervise the departures of migrants or contract workers" (Guengant, 1996: 111). During the 1950s–60s, immigration to France was 'free', Senegalese, Mauritanians, and Malians needed only an identity card to enter France. Grouped around small clusters of former sailors established in the Marseilles, Bordeaux, or Le Havre region, from wherè they arrived by boat, they redeployed to industrialized areas: the Rhone corridor up to Lyon, the Seine valley up to Paris - great host regions for Haalpulaar migrants.

Following the oil crisis of 1973, France, the main destination for Senegalese, introduced an arsenal of measures to control the influx of immigrants, while at the same time – paradoxically – authorizing family reunification and settlement under the 1974 law. However, in 1974, with rising unemployment and mass lay-offs in several industrial sectors, Senegalese migrants found themselves in a precarious situation. In France, despite the arrival of the left-wing government in the wake of the 1981 elections, the desire to control entry remained unchanged, and against all odds, new entry regulations were introduced, transforming the country from a privileged destination into a transit point for other destinations such as Italy and Spain.

Until the mid-1970s, Senegalese migrants' destinations followed a bipolar trajectory: an African migratory pole essentially concerned with cross-border countries and African eldorados (Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Congo), and another European pole oriented exclusively towards France and, a lesser extent, Germany. These poles had centuries-old commercial, historical and geographical links with Senegal. From the 1980s onwards, the growing complexity of entry conditions led to the emergence of new destinations which, a priori, neither history nor geography linked to Senegal. Italy was the destination of vacationer ambulant vendors on the beach in summer, and returning to Senegal in winter. The settling of migrants in the peninsula was the result of an internal redeployment from Southern cities to the industrial North, and a change in occupation from merchant to operaï (worker), thereby increasing the potential for integration. It attracted migrants who had previously settled in France or Africa.

As a result, the Senegalese gradually diversified their destinations. In the early 1980s, New York saw the arrival of many Senegalese migrants. Initially, merchants who had come to buy their goods on Broadway began relocating to the low-cost apartments between 114th Street and the confines of Harlem and the Bronx. The Senegalese merchants who used to purchase electronics there were the first to migrate to the United States, where many Senegalese migrants arrived from the mid-1980s onwards. Upon their arrival, the Senegalese

occupied a famous hotel on 50th Street, before moving to Harlem and the Bronx and settling permanently in the country. Enticed by the potential for professional integration in other States, Senegalese emigrants moved to Atlanta, Detroit, and Ohio (Tall and Tandian, 2011). In these States, they work in the industrial sector and in hairdressing salons targeting an African-American client base, styled by Senegalese women. The country offers easy residential integration, identity checks are rare, and the opportunities for professional integration are commensurate with the size of the country, even if obtaining a Green Card is difficult. These first merchants were later joined by young urban residents from France and Canada, and migrants from the Valley. They settled in Brooklyn, where they took over the Fulton Street shopping street, which they happily renamed Fouta Street after their homeland.

Over the years, the old image of the illiterate, rural migrant has given way to a new profile, educated and urban, sometimes professionally active, driven by a desire to constantly explore new destinations, with which they have no special affinity, whether linguistically, historically, or geographically.

This relative ease of integration made Italy a preferred destination for Senegalese after 1990. Spain, thanks to its entry into the European Union and the start of a number of major projects, has taken up the baton. These countries made Southern Europe the primary destination for Senegalese migrants after 1990. A number of studies have shown that Southern Europe was the first destination of choice for would-be migrants. In fact, South Africa, which at one time was a preferred destination for Senegalese, was simply a destination for those who waited in vain for the opportunity to reach Southern Europe. Difficult security conditions curbed intensive departures to South Africa, but in certain cities such as Durban, the links between the Indian diaspora and the Senegalese migrant group facilitated their integration. However, "the diamond clusters remain very active in the Southern African subregion. They circulate and settle there either through marriage or in search of business opportunities, the two motivations remain linked" (Bredeloup 1993).

Senegalese migration to the Middle East also generates significant flows. But apart from a few categories of migrants, residential and professional integration is difficult. The conditions for wealth creation are available only to a few professional groups, freedom of movement is limited, family reunification is controlled, and female migration is poorly promoted. All these factors mean that migration to these countries, despite their religious ties with Senegal, remains underdeveloped.

The countries of North Africa are home to Senegalese who have settled there, often after having spent some time there, on their way to Europe. These countries (Morocco, and Libya) tend to be transit countries on the way to Europe. With entry requirements becoming more complex in many countries, the exploration of new destinations seems increasingly original. Argentina, for example, has seen a massive influx of Senegalese since the country regained economic stability.

WOMEN AND THE RENEWAL OF MIGRATION PROFILES

It was not until the late 1990s that research into Senegalese migration began to consider the place and role of Senegalese migrant women in migratory flows, even if they did exist, albeit with short stays abroad for some, while for others the purpose of the journey was to join a spouse. In the early days, the few Senegalese women migrants followed their husbands or were students. Senegalese migrant women worked in professional sectors such as hairdressing, catering, commerce, and so on. These Senegalese migrant women carried out similar activities in their country of settlement to those they practiced in Senegal.

In many Senegalese families, the departure of migrant women led to a process of 'roles negotiation', while at the same time triggering negative socio-cultural perceptions of them. In such cases, migration has often been associated with 'unnatural' or even 'risky' practices, often viewed as an offense against societal morals (Ba, 1996; Sow and Antoine, 2000; Rosander, 2004). Senegalese migrants who reach France are sometimes portrayed, rightly or wrongly, as prostitutes who fall victim to mafia networks. This image conceals the many examples of Senegalese women who migrate alone and engage in a variety of legitimate business activities (Coulibaly-Tandian, 2008). More open to change, and less liable to family pressure, some of them make commercial investments and accumulate substantial capital. These success stories reinforce the desire amongst Senegalese women back home to migrate. Unfortunately, this is reflected in the growing number of women among Senegalese clandestine migrants arriving in Spain by pirogues. These Senegalese women migrate alone or together with their brothers or neighbors. The fact that they take part in these extremely risky journeys illustrates their determination and desire to achieve autonomy.

Spain and Italy, until recently viewed as new Eldorados, have received many Senegalese women migrants. The United States has played a major role in the feminization of Senegalese migration. Senegalese women migrate there autonomously and integrate into specific employment sectors, such as hairdressing or catering, which is a way to perpetuate their domestic activities in Senegal.

For Senegalese migrant women, high qualifications do not mean automatic professional integration. Their path to employment often suffers from stagnation. This can be explained by their difficulty to 'mourn' their educational credentials in order to enter other fields with few or no

qualifications or to take another training course to reconvert into another sector. Indeed, surveys have revealed that Senegalese migrant women are more reluctant to take up unskilled work or redeploy into another field (Coulibaly-Tandian 2015).

Moreover, Senegalese women who migrate within the family reunification framework are often portrayed as risky 'followers', whose departure is based exclusively on the decision of the immigrant spouse. Their image is that of dependents, rather than protagonists in their own lives. Indeed, most of them remain inactive for a long time and are perfectly satisfied with reproducing their previous role and status in the destination country. However, as their stay in the host country becomes longer, these women gradually begin to play an active role in a migration whose ultimate aim is to earn a living.

In the context of inter-African migration, three male-initiated family reunification strategies have been identified. The first one is that migrants who are engaged in commercial activities marry in general with their matrilateral (parallel or cross) cousin in their village of origin, upon completing their first or second stage of migration. Thereafter, their wives join them in the destination country for a while.

This is the most common strategy. The second strategy is that other migrants contract a long-distance alliance with a female cousin from their village, whom they subsequently arrange to bring over. The third strategy is evident when some migrants choose their spouse in the host country, from within the migrant community, if this includes large family segments. In the latter case, the migrant avoids interrupting his or her professional activity and massively redistributing his or her savings to members of the extended family in the home village. He usually sends his wife's parents a lump sum, which they use to organize a modest ceremony. What is more, the ceremony in the host country is unlikely to be on the same scale as that in the home village, as it used to be, due to the foreigner's status in the host country and the absence of extended family.

While family reunification is essential for the psychological and social well-being of the migrant, in other circumstances it sometimes contributes to social confinement, as in the case of young girls pulled out of school to be married into a polygamous household. This phenomenon is becoming increasingly rare due to the draconian administrative conditions imposed on family reunification.

The work of Marie Boltz-Laemmel and Paola Villar (2013: 5), suggests that the main reasons for migration are clearly different between Senegalese men and women migrants: for the former, the reasons are economic and professional, while for the latter, they are conjugal: young wives join their husband's household after the celebration of the wedding or the birth of the first child. This divergence reflects the gendered organization of household budgets, which is justified by custom or Sharia law: the man is expected to take care of the material needs of his wife and dependents (Semin, 2007), even if this means migrating, while the wife is expected to ensure the efficient day-to-day management of these resources within the household.

However, the many crises affecting sub-Saharan countries have prompted women to position themselves as actors in the struggle for survival, to the same or even greater extent than men. In Senegal, as in many sub-Saharan countries, families' precarious situation has largely contributed to a *feminization of survival* (Sassen 2006), in a context where the male model as the sole provider of resources for the family is no longer sustainable in light of the many crises shaking the local economy and consequently household budgets. 'Resourcefulness' has become a way of life for Senegalese migrant women, and for many of them, migration is often seen as the quickest and most efficient way to gather the necessary resources and succeed, especially with agriculture undergoing a crisis due to the combined effect of a deteriorating climate and marketing difficulties (A. Tandian and O. K. Coulibaly-Tandian, 2016). Between 2008 and 2012, women accounted for 17% of Senegalese migrants abroad (ANSD 2014, cited by B. Ndione 2018). In Spain, in 2017, women accounted for 20% of Senegalese migrants (B. Ndione 2018).

Senegalese female migrants are essentially divided into two categories. The first category concerns 'elites and middle classes' who have high qualifications and integrate well-paid skilled jobs; as for the second category, it represents 'traders' who develop informal transnational trade networks. In Spain, Italy, and France, Senegalese migrant women's employment in the underground economy often makes their situation even more precarious, marginalizing them and accentuating their invisibility, since their professional activity is obviously not included in labor market statistics. Many of them have skills and qualifications that are neither recognized nor suited to the types of jobs they perform (Oumoul Khairy Coulibaly, 2008).

EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON FAMILIES IN TERMS OF GENDER

If the migration of men has been analyzed in classic terms of attractive factors and the transfer of funds to their families back home, female migration has raised new considerations. In an African sociological context where a large proportion of domestic tasks are carried out by women (married or not), female migration raises questions about long-distance motherhood for mothers who have left their children behind (Batiga, 2021).

In the case of women, the question of transnational households or families is even more compelling. Considering the

role played by women in caring for vulnerable family members (children, elderly and sick parents, and parents-in-law), we are witnessing a sort of care drain (Hochschild 2004), i.e. a transfer of emotional resources from poor countries to the major urban centers of the North. While men export their labor power, women seem to export much more than just their physical power: they export emotional resources (A. Hochschild, *ibid*.; J. Falquet et al. 2010), which will be consumed in various forms of economy and services (home care, care of children, the sick or elderly, prostitution, etc.). More generally, the absence of women raises even greater questions about household stability than in the case of men.

The risks associated with the long-term absence of one of the parents range from marital breakdown to child abuse, not to mention the family conflicts that often arise from the management of funds transferred to the family by the migrant. For example, it has been shown that in certain situations, the absence of the father creates an irreparable void. Children, being unable to work through their pain, recreate a mythical figure, a situation that plunges them into a state of u nreality that does little to foster the construction of a solid identity. When both parents are absent, the same mechanism of idealization of the family occurs, to the detriment of the grandparents (A. Tandian and O. K. Coulibaly-Tandian, 2016). The migration of parents is sometimes also experienced as a source of guilt by children. They feel responsible for the departure of their parents, who are working to improve their situation. The result is a sense of guilt that may be overt or covert, or at least partly a transfer of guilt. Indeed, parents who go abroad 'abandoning' their children argue that they are sacrificing themselves for their children (A. Tandian and O. K. Coulibaly-Tandian, 2016).

However, the positive impact of migration on families should not be overlooked. A large proportion of migrants' income is transferred back to their country of origin to meet the needs of their families and communities. In Senegal, on the Dakar-Thiès-Touba-Saint-Louis axis, the most important transfers, in terms of frequency and amounts, are those sent by migrants to their households of origin with the aim of meeting daily expenses (Boltz-Laemmel and Villar, 2013: 10). In terms of education, studies have also shown that children from families receiving funds sent by migrant parents were less likely to fail at school, as the funds were used to send them to private schools.

Senegalese migrant women are more pragmatic and short-term, prioritizing the family's needs (food, clothing, housing, education, health), whereas men are more interested in saving or investing with a view to generating higher future incomes. From this point of view, fathers' migration is often the most profitable in terms of financial resources. Cash transfers can sometimes reconfigure relationships within the family. According to Boltz-Laemmel and Villar (2013:110), in Senegal, money transfers are based on specific relationships between the sender and the recipient that vary according to the following dimensions: gender, the shared family bond, acquired social status and, finally, economic status. The combination of these characteristics leads to different profiles of dyadic relationships between members of the original household circuit, as well as outside it. Moreover, the recipient of transfers is not necessarily an individual but may be a group, such as the household as a whole, or specific nuclei. Several factors come into play to understand how family relationships are reconfigured when one of the parents migrates.

FAMILY STRUCTURE

Depending on whether the migrant's family, or part of it, is in the country of origin or destination, we may be dealing with an immigrant family, a blended family with part of the family in the country of origin, or simply long-distance parenthood, where the father or mother looks after their children, sending regular remittances through family members who exercise parental authority or guardianship for minor children. Migrant children live either with one of the two parents who stayed home or with a member of the extended family when the father and mother have both left. The next of kin becomes the guardian: grandparents, aunts, and uncles. For mothers looking after other people's children in the destination country, this situation places their own children in the global care chains (Hochschild, 2004), with close relatives as the final link in this long process of delegated care (Batiga, 2021).

Male migration is more often confined to remittances, while wives have to bear thev of looking after the family, household duties, relations with in-laws, and so on. To compensate for delayed or low remittances, some wives back home do not hesitate to invest in income-generating activities or in rotating savings schemes (tontines). By positioning themselves as household managers in the absence of their spouses, Senegalese migrant women are reconfiguring their social position. Rather than being confined to the domestic sphere, they are acquiring roles in the public arena, gaining access to the property for or thanks to their spouses, and initiating and supervising worksites or projects on behalf of their spouses or in their own name. Some even acquire a degree of financial autonomy, partially or totally freeing themselves from dependence on their migrant husbands. So, while the migration of men opens up a margin of freedom for Senegalese migrant women, it often propels them to become the main contributors to maintaining the household. Such situations often destabilize certain sociocultural systems, calling gender relations into question. In some cases, on the other hand, marriage to a migrant abruptly interrupts a school career, at the expense of the in-law's ambitions, who have high hopes for the future and hypothetical success of the migrant son-in-law. The young bride becomes the in-law's maid of all work (A. Fontaine, 2017).

On the contrary, the departure of Senegalese migrant women poses the challenge of carrying out all those tasks traditionally attached to the social role of woman and wife, the househusband being an almost non-existent figure in the Senegalese family tradition. In addition, not all migrant parents have the resources to bring their families to Senegal, or to afford regular trips to visit their families. Factors such as the number of children, the relationship to migration, and the level of education (insertion factor) influence the likelihood of a family living at a distance (Beaugendre, Breton, and Marie 2016: 41). In other words, parents with a high level of qualification, therefore with significant income, a relatively limited number of children with a certain relationship to migration, will find it easier to bring their children over, or at least to reduce the effects of their absence through more regular travel to their country of origin. This is where the difficulty lies for people in irregular situations.

RESIDENCE STATUS OF SENEGALESE MIGRANT WOMEN

Another decisive factor is the migrant woman's residency status. This largely determines relations with the family, since it is the primary condition for social and professional integration in the host country. Migrant women in an irregular situation are unable to find decent, legal work that provides them with a regular income they can draw on to send home to their families. Neither can she reunite with her family. And even worse, she is unable to visit her family regularly, at the risk of being denied entry at the border on her return. As a result, many female immigrants experience important family events – weddings, births, deaths, etc. – at a distance.

Long-distance marriages have become a common feature of Senegalese society. Their development in recent years is largely correlated with changes in the international migration of Senegalese to Europe. From the 1990s onwards, the tightening of entry and residence conditions in a number of countries of destination for Senegalese (France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain), the closures and restrictions on movement for migrants, the more complex conditions for family reunification, and difficult access to a European labor market subject to strict regulations, have all been structural factors behind the occurrence of these marriages in the Senegalese context (Niang-Ndiaye, 2021).

For example, migrant children feel the impact of their parent's absence. Indeed, beyond the psychological aspect that the presence of the parent (father or mother) can play, close contact with the child enables him/her to be monitored on a daily basis. At the same time, it should be pointed out that certain school events (school holidays, parents' invitations, award ceremonies, school reports, etc.) often remind the migrant's child of his or her parent's absence. For this reason, some migrant children envy their peers who live with their parents. The psychological consequences of 'distant suffering' are far from having been fully grasped, on the part of both the immigrant and the family back home.

DIGITAL MEDIATION OR CONNECTED FAMILIES

The evolution of communication technologies has largely mitigated the effects of separation in time and space. While they do not replace interaction and physical presence, they enable parents and children to share a certain virtual closeness through images and sound, partly compensating for absence. Screen mediation paradoxically reveals that family members separated by migration can only be partially available (J. Lachance, 2021:107) to each other since these virtual interactions remain transient before parents and children return to their separate routines. To a certain extent, virtual presence only increases the pain of physical absence, which reactivates with every long-distance conversation.

The predominance of Senegalese migrant women as 'dependent spouses', the invisibility of women's work (such as domestic duties), the restrictions placed on their right to work and to take part in activities viewed as offenses or breaches of public order (such as sex work) mean that a growing proportion of Senegalese migrant women are poorly represented in the statistics.

Senegalese migrant women may themselves constitute obstacles to their integration into the labor market, by embarking on job-seeking activities that are not in line with their skills, their career plans, the demand of the job market, their lack of knowledge of their rights, and so on. As for the lack of professional assessment, the valorization of migrant women's know-how is not often part of their routine.

How can we ask Senegalese migrant women, who are used to working for free, to give value to what is still viewed by everyone as invisible? This can be exemplified in domestic duties. By working in marginal jobs or in the grey zone of labor law, they have little access to social justice. Due to a lack of clear-cut career plans and the ignorance of their rights as workers, Senegalese migrant women are subject to exploitation and discrimination of all kinds in terms of remuneration and working conditions: the right to vacations, medical benefits, working hours, mistreatment, humiliation, insults, racism, sexism, employment contracts, and so on. More often than not, Senegalese migrant women remain in ignorance of the existence of trade unions that can plead their causes.

Moreover, given their lack of knowledge and command of the language, Senegalese migrant women have been unable to develop their individual potential. This situation puts them at a disadvantage and is a handicap to their development. Isolation, lack of language skills, and their illegal residence

status prevent any form of mobilization or collective action. Even when unions do exist, they are either reluctant to publicly expose their precarious situation or they simply lack the union culture and discursive skills needed to make their voices heard. Furthermore, it is not always psychologically or morally comfortable to assume and claim victim status. As a result, Senegalese migrant women cherish what is left of their dignity.

CONCLUSION: THE URGENT NEED TO MAKE WOMEN VISIBLE IN POLITICAL PROGRAMS AND MIGRATION PROJECTS

In Senegal, over the last few years, scientific productions have continued to support a 'feminization of migration', as if women were in their first days on the migratory routes. It should be recalled that in several countries of transit or short-stay settlement (in Africa, Europe, and the Americas), Senegalese women made their presence felt before the arrival of their male compatriots.

From another perspective, women have migrated and continue to migrate for the same reasons as men. They contribute actively to the mobility of the latter in a variety of ways.

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Many women sell their property when it cannot be mortgaged to finance the travels of their husbands, brothers, and children. They embark on risky migratory routes and travel to remote destinations, contributing generously to material and immaterial transfers for the benefit of the populations left behind in their countries of origin. At present, they are playing the fundamental role of sending their children 'back home' for a 'traditional education' which is supposed to be less lenient.

In Senegal, there is an urgent need to raise the visibility of women in programs, projects, and political decisions related to migration and the mobility of the population, as these still continue to be sexist to the detriment of women.

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LAW AND CLIMATE REFUGEES IN AFRICA

Stéphanie Njiomo is Global Compact Ambassador for Cameroon and Central Africa and Climate Program Officer at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Cameroon and Central Africa Office. She is also founder and director of Ci4Ca Communities Information for Climate Action. Through her advocacy, Stéphanie shows us how climate change is influencing and creating the migratory movements of today and tomorrow... and how to avoid these heartbreaking departures for too many men, women and children.

The Law can be obsolete,
The Medias may be mute,
The Climate Council may remain timid,
The Political actors may remain insensitive,
But they are here to stay: the climate refugees!

- Around 60,000 climate refugees in 2021 from Cameroon to Chad;
- According to the IPCC, between 74 and 250 million people in Africa will face water shortages by 2050.

We are taking measured steps towards massive displacement of populations in search of Water, or... fleeing from Water;

We are witnessing a frantic pace of peasants in search of arable land or prey to irreparable wars.

Deadly floods, severe droughts, rising sea levels, depletion of natural resources, and dwindling food supplies are just a few of the problems in Africa which are caused or aggravated by global warming. These problems, which are experienced daily, monthly, and annually by the majority of the deprived populations, are at the heart of the various internal and international displacements.

According to the UNHCR's five-year strategic plan 2017–2021, conflicts are not the only factor driving displacement. In addition to serious human rights violations and poor governance, people are "on the move because of extreme poverty, the collapse of traditional means of subsistence in a context of globalization and rapid urbanization, the effects of climate change, natural disasters, and environmental degradation that often exacerbate the struggle for control over scarce resources. These different factors often overlap or intersect with each other."[1]

With the pace at which climate change is worsening, there is no doubt that climate change-induced displacement will increase in Africa and globally.

The climate refugee should be a person with a different status from the political refugee because of the extraterritoriality of climate responsibility. The climate problem puts the industrialized and developed countries under the spotlight – at least in terms of their consciousness – for the price paid by the countries that are now being hit by this ecological crisis. Climate change can be the cause of conflicts leading to displacement, or simply the direct cause of hundreds of displacements.

1 UNHCR, 16 janvier 2017, *Orientations stratégiques du HCR 2017–2021*, p. 7.

THEN, WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY ABOUT THIS SERIOUS ISSUE OF CLIMATE MIGRATION?

The legal framework for climate, be it the UNFCCC, the CBD, or the UNCCD, has not extended to provide protection for persons displaced by climate change. It was only mentioned/ included in the 1994 International Convention to Combat Desertification, which very clearly and explicitly mentioned the relationship between environmental damage and the consequences of migration in its preamble and in some articles.[2]

Regarding the 1951 Convention of 28 July 1951 related to the status of Refugees, more commonly known as the 1951 Geneva Convention, the criteria it uses to categorize the migrants are unsuitable for climate-related displacement. When it was drafted, this text did not consider the climate as a cause for as a basis for refugee status recognition. The 1951 Geneva Convention, through its definition, construes persecution as being for the following reasons: race, religion, nationality, association with a social group, or the political opinions of the victim. Furthermore, its applicability does not extend to internal displacement.

The fact that laws are silent about climate refugees at the regional and international level makes one wonder what could be done to support the rising wave of migrants in the face of an increasingly prominent driver of migration. The regional texts do not provide any specific framework for this category of migrants, either. And the question remains as to how legal assistance can continue to be delayed in such a way as we face a multitude of current and future climate refugees?

To fill this gap from a legal perspective, Stéphanie Njiomo invites us to take part in the debates and discussions surrounding the Global Compact for the Environment to include recommendations pertaining to the protection of individuals who are directly affected by climate change. Her involvement on the ground in Ci4Ca's activities also shows us small-scale practices that have a great human impact. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7051095834846744576/

She also proposes to rethink the trade union movement to find a way to protect both workers and their environment. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kamerun/19687.pdf

2 The author refers to articles 2 and 5 to 8, which specify the actions to be taken to mitigate the effects of desertification such as drought and the resulting exoduses; Cournil C., "A la recherche d'une protection pour les "réfugiés environnementaux": actions, obstacles, enjeux et protections", Revue Alyson(s), N°6, novembre 2008, Exodes écologiques.

MOROCCO AS A REFERENCE FOR NEW MIGRATION POLICIES IN FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES

FROM THE NEED TO INTEGRATE IMMIGRANTS TO MOBILIZING TALENTS WORKING ABROAD AS A SOLUTION...

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Starting in late 2013, Moroccan migration policy has experienced a radical transformation, globally shifting from an inherently reactive and security-oriented perspective to an approach based on acceptance and integration. In this context, the competent Moroccan authorities helped migrants who were present on its national territory to get access to the training provided by the Office of Vocational Training and Employment Promotion (OFPPT) and to training programs offered by the National Mutual Aid Centers in addition to job search services provided by the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies (ANAPEC).

In the same vein, a National Commission for the Integration and Regularization of Migrants has been established within the Ministry in charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs. Also, since the beginning of the fall of 2013, this Ministry initiated developing a National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (SNIA), which was eventually promulgated by the end of 2014. One of the key objectives of this strategy was to integrate regular migrants, refugees, and Moroccans who have been repatriated for different reasons to Morocco.

The private sector has equally participated in this strategy. To this end, the General Confederation of Enterprises in Morocco (CGEM) published a practical manual in February 2018 on "Recruiting Foreign Employees in Morocco." This guide aimed at "Integrating Cultural Diversity into Business Practices" with the support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

However, despite the government's apparent political will, the integration problem remains relatively complicated for several immigrants and repatriates/returnees Moroccans.

There are many reasons for this, natably:

- The lack linguistic skills des immigrants (in particular in Moroccan dialect and classical Arabic) and the ignorance of their actual skills and qualifications and this also applies to Moroccan returnees, in particular those born outside Morocco;

- The apparent mismatch between the professional profiles of many returnees and immigrants with the local labour market needs;

- The legal and regulatory barriers, as well as the lack of knowledge by returnees/repatriated and immigrants of the country's relevant laws and regulations. Their lack of linguistic skills prevents them from obtaining their due rights for self-employment, business creation or any other income-generating activity.

MOROCCAN MIGRATION POLICY: FROM A SECURITY POSTULATE TO A DESIRE FOR INTEGRATION

Before taking note of the more or less significant presence of irregular migrants among its population and even before admitting that irregular migration through its territory was a serious political issue, Morocco had experienced a period of "non-political migration" between the early 1990s and 2002–2003.

During this period, it experienced a substantial rise in what has been called "transit migration" on its territory, mostly irregular or illegal, going to Spain and other European Union countries, to which the Moroccan government had until then shown relative indifference. This was partly because it considered this new form of migration of little concern for its security and, perhaps, after all, it was believed that it was unlikely to last long. It also assumed that Spain – its immediate European neighbour – benefited from the flow of migrants.

However, the increase in the number of migrants, year after year and the link that will be made after 2001 between migration and terrorism (in connection with the September 11 attacks on American soil) has caused Morocco to change its attitude after the European doctrine shift on this issue.

Within this global framework, the first significant step taken by Morocco at the beginning of the current century was in the legislative field. It was the unanimous adoption by the Moroccan parliament in 2003 of the law on "irregular emigration and immigration in Morocco," known as Law 02-03. In the wake of this law, Moroccan authorities adopted a set of institutional and operational measures that they believed would support their new approach to migration and best serve the interests of Morocco's "privileged partnership" with the EU and its special relationship with Spain.

At the institutional level, the "Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance" and the "Migration Observatory" were created in November 2003. According to their architects, their purpose was to "rationalize working methods, refine analytical tools and optimize the deployment of operational units to monitor infiltration points of illegal immigrants, as well as to federate the thinking of all the parties concerned by the migration issue.

In the wake of creating these institutions, Europe will fully consent to decisions that align with its objectives, indicating that it is particularly attentive to everything that happens on the Moroccan side regarding migration.

At the same time, on the operational level, the new "Moroccan strategy to tackle illegal migration" will prioritize a "community-based and preventive approach" through intelligence work, in particular, to dismantle human trafficking networks. This approach has been strengthened by the significant deployment of personnel and equipment and the establishment of a general and permanent mechanism composed of more than 7,000 members, 4,000 of whom will be primarily dedicated to coastline surveillance.

The combination of this mechanism, the largest ever put in place to control the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of Morocco (over a distance of nearly 3,500 km), and the Spanish "integrated system of external vigilance" established in 2002 in the south of Spain and then off the Canary Islands, as well as the intervention of the European Agency for the Protection of External Borders (FRONTEX), has made the crossing of territorial waters between the two countries, extremely complicated.

More recently, since late 2013, and at a time when Morocco began to have some "migration peace," within 2015, less than 0.40 percent of trans-Mediterranean migration transiting through its territory and maritime space (and that of Algeria), the country was going to adopt a "New Migration Policy," described as "more humane" and based on the regularization of specific categories of migrants and a National Strategy for the Integration of Migrants and Refugees.

Thus, in 2014, the first operation of regularization of migrants allowed 18,000 people in an irregular situation to obtain a residence permit to stay legally on Moroccan territory. In 2017, the number of regularized migrants reached nearly 21,000, involving 113 nationalities, most of whom were of sub-Saharan origin. In 2018, this number reached 50,000.

MOROCCO'S NEW MIGRATION POLICY: KEY HIGHLIGHTS

King Mohamed VI held a meeting on September 10, 2013, with his Minister of Interior and some human rights representatives (among others, the staff of the National Council for Human Rights – CNDH) to launch a new "migration and asylum policy" for foreign residents living in the Kingdom, especially illegal migrants. This announcement was a turning point in the Moroccan human rights approach towards irregular immigrants from the sub-Saharan States of Mali, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, and refugees from Libya or Syria.

The "new migration policy" includes three main elements:

- A special operation to regularize immigrants was carried out in 2014, benefiting nearly 45,000 migrants.
- Expand the authority of the UNHCR to grant asylum to more asylum seekers in Morocco.
- Adopt new legislations to better integrate migrants and asylum seekers into Moroccan society;
- Engage powerful campaigns against human trafficking and traffickers.

The end of 2014 was the date limit for the first exceptional regularization operation. The number of approved regularization applications reached 17916 out of a total of 27332 applications, i.e., with a satisfaction rate of 65%, representing a little more than one-third of the 45000 regularizations announced as the objective of this operation.

A second regularization campaign was conducted between 2016 and 2017, which benefited another 21,000 irregular migrants, involving 113 nationalities, most of whom were of sub-Saharan origin. During the same period, however, the number of migrants transiting through Morocco increased by 130% compared to 2016. This increased to 55,700 by December 2018.

Regarding the other objectives of the "new approach," the Ministry in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs (MCMREAM) has developed a ''National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum – SNIA." The latter strategy, which was adopted following a Government Council held in December 2014, aimed to ensure better integration of immigrants and better management of migration flows within the ''framework of a coherent, comprehensive, humanistic and responsible policy''.

This comprehensive approach was to be based on three main pillars:

- Facilitate the integration of new regularized immigrants;
- Establish and develop an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework;
- Manage migration flows in a way that respects human rights.

The first pillar of this triptych represents the foundation of a new public approach in Morocco, which will acknowledge that the arrival of foreign migrants in the country should be considered a demographic advantage. As such, they will not only allow the local labour market to respond to part of its shortage in terms of talented human resources but also help fill job offers in the "less attractive" sector for the Moroccan labour force.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE MOROCCAN LABOUR MARKET

The Moroccan labour market continues to be marked by two main characteristics.

- Although Morocco – like many other developing countries in francophone Africa – has a young population (46% under 25 years of age) and a rapid growth in school enrollment in recent years, its overall level of education remains low. For example, about 74% of the adult population (15 years and older) has only received primary education or less, and only 5% of the workforce completed higher education in 2015. As a direct result, the skill level of the working-age population and the labour force is limited.
- Labor force participation is low and has declined. The national labour force participation rate dropped from about 55% in 1999 to 47% in 2016. The latter rate affects men and women differently. Indeed, it is more than three times higher for men (70.8%) than for women (23.6%). The latter rate even reached less than 20% in 2019.

These two characteristics, which can be described as structural, have significant consequences.

The first characteristic leads to low *quality of available jobs* and, *consequently*, low *productivity*. This concurrently led to the predominance of the informal economy and, consequently, to high demand for skilled labour and highly qualified workers for the formal and non-agricultural sectors.

Concerning the second marker, even though the statistical decrease in the activity rate of women is mainly used to technically reduce the unemployment rate affecting them, and therefore the general unemployment rate, it resulted in the same consequence, which is a great need for more qualified and highly qualified labour. This is essential for promoting new manufacturing activities that will, in turn, boost innovation and increase added value.

This was confirmed by a survey conducted by the CGEM in 2017 on the theme "Challenges of leaders in the transformation of their enterprises."

According to this survey, the issue of human resources was considered by 44% of respondents as the second most critical

threat they were facing for the future development of their companies.

More precisely, limited human resources have been identified as a significant challenge by 56% of entrepreneurs in the banking, finance and insurance sectors and 45% of entrepreneurs in the information technology sector.

However, the fact is that, despite this general statement of a lack of human resources, there are no precise figures by activity/sector concerning the qualifications or the number of skilled individuals required. Therefore, higher education institutions and vocational training services seem to better respond to the State's policy in supporting industrial and sectoral development strategies. In doing so, they seem less concerned with the demands of the private sector.

This is especially true since social dialogue – between trade unions, entrepreneurs and the State – in Morocco is more often focused on wages and social security coverage than human resource qualification.

THE NEED FOR A QUALIFIED WORKFORCE AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS IT: THE WORK OF FOREIGNERS AND MOROCCAN RETURNEES AS A SOLUTION

The Moroccan authorities have implemented a range of sectoral projects/programs from 2008–2011 in response to the consequences of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis and the so-called "Arab Spring." These include a plan known as the "industrial acceleration" scheme.

The peculiarity of this plan is its focus on establishing industrial ecosystems. This critical element of the new industrial strategy seeks to reduce the sector's fragmentation by promoting the development of targeted and mutually beneficial strategic partnerships between industry leaders and tiny, small and medium-sized enterprises. More specifically, it involves uniting groups of companies around structures that drive ecosystem projects. These drivers can be national industry leaders, professional groups or foreign investors.

This effort has led to the launch of 7 ecosystems in the automotive industry, textiles, aeronautics, trucks and industrial bodywork, 6 in the construction materials industries, in mechanical and metallurgical industries, the chemical industry, the leather sector, offshoring, the pharmaceutical industry, in the agri-food sector and an ecosystem Cherifian Office for Phosphates (OCP).

The new industrial strategy adopted in 2014 set the following general objectives for the sector until 2020:

- The creation of half a million jobs, half of which come from foreign direct investment and the other half from a modernized national industrial base
- A growth of nine points in the share of industry in the gross domestic product (GDP), from 14% to 23% by 2020.

In addition to this industrial plan, it is possible to cite the National Strategy for the Development of Logistics Competitiveness or the Renewable Energy Plan. On this last point, Morocco, which imports nearly 95% of its energy needs, launched a "National Renewable Energy and Efficiency Plan" in February 2008 to develop alternative energies to meet 52% of its domestic markets by 2030 and to increase the use of energy-saving methods. The plan is expected to stimulate more than €4.5 billion in investments and create more than 40,000 jobs by 2020.

These sectors/plans, as well as agriculture, fisheries, higher education or scientific research, require a lot of human resources. But more than these, as it has just been generally mentioned, is needed for the multiple requirements of the country.

Consequently, would competent authorities opt for different methods to cover the demand of the Moroccan economy for qualified and highly qualified human resources?

These methods/means included initial training in national institutions of higher education and vocational training, facilitating access to employment for foreign migrants living in Morocco, and in-service training in production units or through internships abroad. At the same time, they were calls made to benefit from the potential contribution of qualified Moroccan human resources established abroad. These calls have become increasingly urgent in connection with the significant economic and social difficulties arising from the Covid 19 pandemic that the country has been experiencing (along with the rest of the world) since the beginning of 2020.

And these experts – living and working mainly in OECD countries, especially in France but also in Belgium and the French-speaking Canadian province of Quebec, would significantly support Morocco. Their contribution would bring added value to its various sectors of production of goods and services (including agriculture, fishing, renewable energies, etc...). In addition to that, they would also reinforce, both by being present in-person and by possibilities of remote working thanks to ICT means, its national health systems and training/research systems thanks to:

- Their enhanced and updated scientific and technical expertise due to greater global exposure to competition;
- Their long exposure to norms, codes and values established in an organizational framework

(scientific, technical and ethical) that is conducive to greater efficiency and a constant quest for innovation;

- Their way of doing business abroad, according to the best international practices;
- Their understanding of the overall processes of global companies;
- Their presence in various foreign direct investment and innovative technology markets;
- Their qualifications and inside/outside companies' networks, and in manufacturing plants and/or research centers where they work;
- Their capacity to adapt to innovation, openness and flexibility, acquired both during their training and by being exposed to the economic, social and human realities of the environments where they operate and/or live.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION:

The demographic structure of the Moroccan population is in a progressive decline in terms of its youth component. By contrast, the older population is increasing. This implies that the labour market will be similar to that of many developed countries over the next few decades.

Considering the aforementioned point, Morocco will probably need a more active workforce, as it lacks qualified human resources. It will have to approach its overseas diaspora to meet this double challenge. It will also have to organize at its best the hosting of a more significant number and a more qualified foreign population/labour force. Therefore, taking some of the following initiatives seems to be of the utmost relevance both to approach its citizens living abroad and to foreigners residing on its territory:

- Involve national institutions, local communities and potential employers from various economic and social sectors in assessing their human resource needs, especially from a qualitative perspective.
- Identify and promote local employment opportunities and strengthen the attractiveness factors of all Moroccan territories and regions.

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- Improve the attractiveness of the territories for all actors, including migrants, nationals and foreigners. Skilled Moroccan migrants, in particular, should feel that their rights and assets, when available, are well protected despite their periodic absence.
- Anticipate specific incentives in public policies to integrate the skills of migrants, both Moroccan and foreigners.
- Pursuing and diversifying the efforts in collecting statistical data on experts among the diaspora to mirror changes in current migration flows and migrants' expectations.
- Reinforce the support of NGO development initiatives at the local and diaspora levels and support the development of migrants' social networks, including professional migrants.
- Engage more directly with employers, both public and private, to better identify the nature of required skills.
- Restructure training programs and develop integration/reintegration programs based on these needs.
- Develop networking activities, which today represent the best way to mobilize talented human resources inside and outside the country. It is also one of the most effective instruments to promote local and national initiatives, express needs and try to find the best means to satisfy them, including the transfer and exchange of the most innovative practices.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE FRENCH MIGRATION TO CANADA AND QUEBEC SINCE 2000

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This paper presents a knowledge review of the concepts and experiences enabling a better understanding of contemporary migration of French citizens to Canada. It is interwoven with our current research on the contemporary mobility of the French and on the characteristics of these populations in Canada since the early 2000s. In a modern context, France has developed a stance and mechanisms that are in favor of mobility abroad, especially within the framework of the European Union, such as the Erasmus program for the mobility of students and young qualified professionals living in neighboring countries (Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland). It is also interesting to study French migration for reasons specific to the economic and social context in France, which may explain why more French nationals are leaving France. Other elements worth considering are the Canadian and Quebec governments' strategies for promoting and attracting the French market. Based on an analysis of documentary sources, we present some observations on the new generation of French migration in the 2000s.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY

As historian Nancy Green noted, France does not fit into the great tradition of European mass migration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Green, 2005). France was a society that was dependent on its labor force, and which did not experience the "economic cataclysms" that encouraged large-scale migration to the Americas (e.g., famine in Ireland, impoverishment of Italian peasants in the south). A generation of emigration, albeit fewer than the aforementioned population movements, however, occurred towards the colonies (North and Sub-Saharan Africa), as well as certain countries, including Canada (Linteau, Frenette, and Lejeune). This initial French migratory movement to Canada remained a limited phenomenon prior to 1870, before taking on a wider scope at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1871, a little less than 3000 people born in France were living in Canada. By 1921, 19,247 people settled in Canada, mainly in Quebec and in the West. The case of France can be considered

a case study similar to other European migrations to Canada, for example, British and German.[1]

NORTH-NORTH MIGRATION

This French migration is a portion of the North-North migrations, which remains a little explored subject: "Academically, little is known about why Europeans leave the continent, how they choose their destination and how they experience their migrant life" (Suter and Akesson, 2020, p. 1). There is extensive historical literature on mass migration from Europe to the Americas in the late 19th century. In Europe, another well-documented migration movement is the one related to labor processes and to the presence of temporary workers (e.g. Italians and Portuguese in Switzerland, Germany, and France). More recently, the mobility of Europeans to extra-European destinations is beginning to receive scholarly attention (Fabbiano, Paraldi, Poli and Terrazzoni, 2019). Some works focus on migration schemes between the North and South; migrations from North to South are quite trivialized, as they are perceived as the mobility of privileged people. One can think, for example, of French, German, and British nationals, mostly retirees, settling in southern Europe and the Maghreb (Fabbiano, Paraldi, Poli and Terrazzoni, 2019). The landscape of emigration outside Europe, however, is more complex because it consists of a diversity of backgrounds (e.g., dual nationals). It is interesting to compare the situation of European countries: Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and France. On the one hand, one must consider the particularity of the colonial link pertaining to these new migrations: France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy. There are distinctions between countries that have a relationship with former colonies: Brazil, Cape Verde, Angola, and Mozambique (e.g. Spain and Portugal). On the other hand, the 2008 economic crisis often comes up in the works that present it as a catalyst for migratory flows. The "European Crisis" is expressed in the form of economic insecurity, which encourages certain populations to consider emigration (Allou et al. 2020). We have also come up with a diagnosis of Europe's identity malaise that is built around a chronology of tragic events since the early 2000s: terrorist attacks, hate crimes, and anti-Muslim attitudes exploited by the populist radical right (Silverstein, 2018).

"Research on the new North-North migration reflects the diversity of displacement experiences (Suter and Akesson, 2020). French immigration to Canada from the 2000s onwards is not as uniform and homogeneous as its previous generations. During the 20th century, the French migrant was white, Catholic, and professional (Linteau, Frenette, Le Jeune, 2017). Today, the literature presents a more complex profile of the North-North migrant."

PROFILE AND TRAJECTORY DIVERSIFICATION

Research on the new North-North migration reflects the diversity of displacement experiences (Suter and Akesson, 2020). French immigration to Canada from the 2000s onwards is not as uniform and homogeneous as its previous generations. During the 20th century, the French migrant was white, Catholic, and professional (Linteau, Frenette, Le Jeune, 2017). Today, the literature presents a more complex profile of the North-North migrant. To begin with, it is important for us to address the semantics in the way we regard this migrant.

Emigration from Northern countries is often referred to by those who promote it and by the people who are themselves on the move as "expatriation" rather than immigration; especially, when it comes to professionals and skilled people (Kunz 2016, Weiner and Klekowski Van Koppenfels, 2019). The literature highlights that expatriation is embedded in hyper-skilled forms of mobility for individuals with high levels of human capital. In the context of settlement to Southern countries, expatriation takes on a privileged status (whiteness) linked to daily life in separate and secure spaces: homes, stores, work, schools, and places of leisure. The expat lives in a closed space, detached from local society. In the context of North-North migration, the expatriate is a migrant who is sought after for his or her professional skills in advanced economic sectors, for example, advanced technology.

The *Lifestyle migrant* is another category that we use to describe North-North migrations. This concept is used to depict a person in search of an ideal quality of life that is geographical and psychological: wide open spaces, tranquility, but also a sense of well-being and identity. This is the case in a study of British immigrants to New Zealand who are looking for an alternative lifestyle to the hectic pace of European societies. These migrants are drawn to the opportunities and benefits of "making a new life elsewhere" (Higgins, 2017; Benson and O'Reily 2016). French migration is structured

1 Consult the series *Studies in Immigration and Culture* des Presses de l'Université du Manitoba, especially books by Alexander Freund, dir., *Being German Canadian. History, Memory, Generations*, Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2021 and Marlyn Barber et Murray Watson, *Invisible Immigrants. The English in Canada since 1945*, Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2015.

around branding, the manner of how to sell a destination such as Quebec and Francophone minority communities. Destinations are represented by advertising strategies that aim to attract a diverse European migration, including youth, families, and professionals.

CONTRASTING SOCIOLOGICAL REALITIES

The consulted literature interestingly notes that the mobility of French nationals is portrayed as privileged when compared to the experiences of people from other regions of the world. However, the experiences and trajectories of French nationals who are on the move are far from homogeneous. Research has identified feelings of exclusion, based on racialization and religion in French society, as triggers for the migration process for some people. Jérémy Mandin and Jaafar Alloul (2017 and 2020, Alloul 2020) focus on the journey of young Maghrebi youth in France and Belgium. In recent years, this population has experienced challenges in its economic and social integration. In his research, Jérémy Mandin refers to the expression of "stuckness", the feeling of being denied the opportunity to socially ascend. On top of this, many people have decided to leave France because they have no prospects or hope for economic mobility. Young graduates and professionals have difficulty finding employment and feel as if they are being discriminated against. This feeling of economic stagnancy, of not being able to get ahead, and of "experiencing hardship" encourages people to leave France for destinations that seem more welcoming to them; countries where these people would no longer be subjected to "micro-aggressions of everyday racism", and countries and cities that value multicultural diversity (Canada and a city like Montreal). Muslim and cosmopolitan countries (the Gulf countries) are attractive to these young Muslim graduates in the West (Alloul, 2020; *Le Renard* 2016). A recent book focuses on this issue: *L'épreuve des discriminations dans les quartiers populaires* (PUF, 2021). The authors, Jérémy Talpin and Anaïke Purenne, address issues of racism and discrimination in several working-class neighborhoods in France and examine the types of minority skills that allow racialized populations to act through different strategies, one of which is emigration. Canada can be part of the solution, a country dreamed of and depicted as a destination in the French market. This aspect is very present in events such as immigration fairs and recruitment missions in France (Belkhodja and Deshaye, 2021).

THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN MONTREAL SPACE

Beyond knowing how French nationals maintain their bonds to their country of origin, particularly through their registration with the consular services or their right to vote, it is interesting to study the way in which the French experience their presence in a new environment. In a context of greater mobility and diversification of migratory flows, how do immigrant communities establish themselves and experience life in the city? (Désilets, 2019) It is evident that Montreal stands out as the preferred destination for French migration to Canada. There is still the image of a French community centered around certain institutions and present in specific neighborhoods of the city, especially the Plateau Mont-Royal with its French bakeries. However, the French presence is noticeable beyond the traditional July 14th celebration or the rather formal meetings of the Union française. It is diversifying. We carry out observations in several places such as a café, an evening meeting of pvtists in a bar, a "soccer" pitch, fast food restaurants (the famous French Taco), and French shops. An example is the Top Discount store, a French grocery store that opened in 2019 on Mont-Royal Avenue. This business sells French brands of non-refrigerated food, such as cookies, jams, and Mouslin powdered puree. The store has a plan to expand to four branches in Montreal in order to meet the demand. On its Facebook page, Top Discount presents itself as one of the international ethnic grocery stores in Montreal!

In conclusion, French immigration has always been present in Canada, but today it seems to be more dynamic and more complex due to the policies and strategies in place, the diversity of backgrounds, and the choice of destinations. In both Canada and Quebec, French immigrants are in a privileged category and are visible in the many initiatives undertaken by the federal government and by the provinces to promote and recruit for the French market. Moving to Canada has become a reality for many French nationals who aspire to something different in their professional or personal life.

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LEGAL PATHWAYS FOR REFUGEES IN FRANCE: STILL A FRAGILE EVOLUTION

Matthieu Tardis, is co-director of Synergies-migrations, an applied research centre at the crossroads of expertise, decision-making support and stakeholder capacity-building on asylum, immigration and inclusion issues. He was head and researcher of IFRI's Centre for Migration and Citizenship from 2015 to 2022, where he set up the Observatoire de l'immigration et de l'asile. As part of a French refugee aid organisation, Matthieu Tardis notably contributed to strengthening expertise on immigration policies in France, Europe as well as Tunisia through European and international studies and projects. His areas of research expertise include asylum, integration and international migration and their impact on European policies.

The number of refugees has never been so high since 1945. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of the world's refugees at 25.4 million, with 3.9 million Venezuelans displaced and 4.1 million asylum seekers. But beyond the figures, the stark disparity in hosting refugees is the main feature of the current situation as 86% of refugees live in developing countries. According to the UN data, only 3% of international migrants in high-income countries are refugees and asylum seekers. The former account for 50% of migrants in the poorest countries.[1]

In this context, developing legal and safe pathways becomes crucial in protecting refugees and promoting international solidarity. Legal pathways are programs that enable the safe and orderly transfer of people in need of international protection. This term is generally associated with resettlement/rehabilitation programs whereby States identify and select refugees in a primary country of asylum, and then they host them on their territory to begin a process of integration. Complementary pathways supplement resettlement, including humanitarian admission programs, private sponsorship, family reunification, student refugee admission pathways, etc.

Legal pathways programs have had a turbulent history in recent years. The Trump administration and Covid-19 have significantly affected the number of refugees eligible for resettlement programs. In contrast, the multiplication of crises in Syria, Afghanistan and now in Ukraine have prompted several countries to strengthen their efforts. This is the case of Canada, which has always been consistent in this area, as is the European Union (EU). The so called "refugee crisis" of 2015 has accelerated the process of resettlement in many EU Member States.

France has not been left out of this development. After the sluggish beginnings, it is currently one of the most important supporters and contributors to resettlement in the EU. Since 2015, legal pathways have expanded and diversified in France. Resettlement quotas have steadily increased under the EU resettlement program. Besides these governmental efforts,

1 Nations unies, *International Migration 2020-Highlights*, 2021.

civil society organizations, public interest groups, and universities have mobilized to offer complementary pathways for refugees in some creative ways, although they remain limited. The landscape in France has changed, and a growing number of stakeholders are trying to find solutions for refugees. But, legal pathways still need to be fully rooted in the French asylum system. The American example under the Trump administration proves that there is no such thing as a given in this respect.

"Besides these governmental efforts, civil society organizations, public interest groups, and universities have mobilized to offer complementary pathways for refugees in some creative ways, although they remain limited. The landscape in France has changed, and a growing number of stakeholders are trying to find solutions for refugees."

RESETTLEMENT, A FORGOTTEN TRADITION IN FRANCE

The structured operations of hosting refugees – that we call today legal pathways – have profoundly shaped the right to asylum in France. This country played a leading role in hosting Hungarians in 1956, victims of Latin American dictatorships in the early 1970s and then refugees from Southeast Asia. These operations ended when the right to asylum was no longer perceived as a vector of France's foreign policy but as an instrument of its immigration policy. In the late 2000s, France made a modest attempt to revive a resettlement program with the HCR and a humanitarian admission program for Iraqi nationals identified as" persecuted minorities." These programs have been sluggishly implemented by institutional and associative actors who have lost the know-how of the 70s. Above all, these programs are not important enough to be a priority for the State. But everything changed in 2015 when resettlement became a response to the "refugee crisis."

A GROWING AND ASSERTIVE COMMITMENT

Since the summer of 2015, the idea of resettlement has been projected in the framework of the European Union, even though the tasks of selecting, transferring and receiving refugees have still been under the responsibility of the Member States. Based on these European commitments and bilateral solidarity with Lebanon, the French resettlement program aimed at reaching a target of 10,000 people for the 2016–2017 period. This was a substantial quantitative leap, but that has yet to be fully reflected on the ground.

Newly elected, President Macron confirmed France's commitment to target a similar number for 2018–2019. But this time, 10,000 refugees arrived on the territory. France declared it wanted to continue with the same momentum during the World Refugee Forum in December 2019, but COVID-19 seriously hampered this momentum. Nevertheless, France just renewed its resettlement contribution in December 2021, with the same level, for 2022–2023.

At the same time, French civil society is mobilizing itself. In line with the Italian approach, the French government and five faith-based organizations signed a protocol to establish a humanitarian corridor for 500 Syrian or Iraqi refugees in Lebanon. This program is similar in many ways to the Canadian private sponsorship program, as constituent groups welcome, host and accompany refugees identified in Lebanon by partner organizations of this protocol. At the end of 2021, Sant' Egidio and the Fédération Entraide Protestante signed a new protocol with the government allowing this experiment to continue for several more years.

MORE AND MORE STAKEHOLDERS, BUT IN ISOLATION

The change in the scale of resettlement has increased the number of associations providing services on behalf of the State in terms of hosting and integrating refugees and providing them with more visibility before the various social services. This has permitted to better adjust care programs to the needs of the resettled refugees.

The Fédération Entraide Protestante has also succeeded in federating a network of partners around its humanitarian corridor program, including JRS-France, the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), l'Association Nationale des Villes et Territoires Accueillants (ANVITA) and Urgence homophobie. French universities have finally become interested in legal pathways for refugee students. An initial experiment was launched in September 2021 at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, which the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie hopes to extend soon to other universities. A community of players on legal pathways is also emerging in France.

However, this community is too small and isolated to integrate legal pathways in national refugee protection practices sustainably. In the absence of a shared national approach, resettlement, complementary pathways (private sponsorship, university corridors, family reunification, etc.) and the hosting system for asylum seekers are not designed as a single entity in which resources and skills complement and mutualize each other. As such, legal pathways are still perceived as "exceptional" opportunities for accessing protection in France,

including among asylum advocates.

A FLEXIBLE YET UNCERTAIN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There has been no need for any legislative or regulatory changes to create legal pathways in France. Even though resettlement was mentioned in the 2018 Asylum Act, it remained a prerogative of the Ministry of the Interior, which unilaterally decided on the existence and scope of the resettlement program. In the same way, humanitarian corridors benefited from the State's discretionary power to issue humanitarian visas for those who seek asylum in France. Associations have used this legal loophole to initiate this project.

To date, this situation has incontestably served the deployment of legal pathways better than the other way around insofar as it avoids a parliamentary debate, which is undoubtedly democratic but often toxic on immigration issues in the current political context. Proof of this is the proposals of right-wing and far-right candidates for the 2022 presidential election who call for asylum applications to be filed in Embassies outside French territory. Far from being a plea for legal pathways, these proposals aim, above all, to reduce immigration in total ignorance of the realities experienced by refugees but also by consular posts.

Some will say, "*vivons heureux, vivons cachés*" (happiness is in a secret life). However, the absence of political endorsement makes legal pathways in France extremely fragile. Indeed, they can be challenged at the stroke of a pen. Moreover, it isn't easy to improve these programs when they can vanish overnight. This is not without consequences for refugees either, in the context of humanitarian corridors but also, to some extent, of resettlement; they must go through the asylum procedure upon arrival in France before obtaining refugee status and the associated rights. This creates legal and psychological insecurity and delays the beginning of their integration process in France by several months.

CONCLUSION: WHAT COULD BE THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE?

The development of legal pathways in France, and more broadly in Europe, is therefore closely related to the "refugee crisis" of 2015. Today, this crisis seems almost negligible compared to what Europe has been experiencing since February 24. It is still too early to draw conclusions, but the war in Ukraine will have a lasting impact on asylum policies.

The tremendous solidarity of Europeans, many of whom open their homes to Ukrainians, is a large-scale experiment in what could be a private sponsorship program. Nevertheless, the British example, which, under public pressure, established a sponsorship program for Ukrainians to avoid unprompted hosting which underscores that legal pathways are not immune from being instrumentalized by public authorities.

Moreover, as one crisis drives out another, it has been noted in France that the hosting of Ukrainians is done to the detriment of resettled refugees, whose arrival rate has dropped again since the spring. One crisis follows another, resulting in ever-increasing flows of displaced persons. Unfortunately, this sad reality is not about to change. France alone, or even the EU, will not be able to find solutions for all situations of forced displacement. Therefore, we must return to the foundation of the global refugee protection system enshrined in the Geneva Convention: international solidarity. Only cooperation between States in Europe, North America and beyond will make it possible to respond to the ever-increasing scale of the issues at stake while involving the non-state actors that are most likely to guarantee the social cohesion of our societies.

"IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO RAISE A CHILD"

Christophe Berthet, CEO Immigrant Québec and co-founder of the Salon de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration au Québec (SIIQ). "An immigrant at the service of other immigrants" is how he can be presented.

This well-known African proverb reminds us that a child's education is not limited to the one received at home. This saying could easily be transposed to an individual immigrant: it takes a whole community that believes in him and his projects to facilitate his integration.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

I submitted my application for the CSQ (Certificat de Sélection du Québec) mid-June.

I am young - less than 35 years old - French-speaking, with a university education, and I have three children. The response was not long to come: I received a positive answer at the end of September. At the beginning of October, I applied to the federal government: at the end of January, I finally received my permanent residence!

As a French citizen, I hesitated to depart via an International Experience Canada (EIC) program: the PVT (Working Holiday Program). I learned that the 7,000 annual invitations from the federal government had not been taken up due to a lack of candidates for immigration...

When I arrived in Montreal, I faced considerable challenges: the first was finding a job. And the economic indicators were not so encouraging:

An unemployment rate that approached 9%, which is more than twice as high for the immigrant population.

The province lost nearly 40,000 jobs compared to the previous year, despite an active population increasing by almost 15,000 persons.

Nevertheless, I was comforted about my future and that of my children in the long run. The reason for this was that a study published by the Quebec government on the outlook for the labour market raised the alarm: "over the next ten years, Quebec labour market will need 367,000 persons to meet job growth. It will also require more than one million people to take over from those who will retire. Approximately 1.4 million people will have to join or reintegrate their job to meet the labour market's needs, which represents more than one-third of the workforce in 2009. But who will fill the jobs? (Source: https://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/bs2093946)

You will see that my immigration process is not new but goes back to 2008. It illustrates how much things have changed in

less than 15 years, both in terms of the economic situation in Quebec and the issuance of immigration visas.

BRINGING TOGETHER IMMIGRANTS AND THE ECOSYSTEM

It also sheds light on the reality that we have experienced for a long time that the call for workforce will be critical in many fields before 2020 in all the regions of Quebec.

At that time, my status as an immigrant portrayed a reality. There were many initiatives to support newcomers, but knowing who is doing what and what services are offered, could take a lot of time and effort.

I started connecting with the community of newcomers, who shared an interest in migration issues since they arrived, as I did. One of the questions we asked ourselves was how successive governments would respond to economic problems, with the understanding that immigrants must have been part of the equation. How would immigration policies deal with this demographic issue that would put pressure on the province's finances?

We had to participate actively in the societal transformation looming on the horizon.

At that time, we decided to create a fair at the Palais des Congrès to gather the newly arriving immigrants and immigration professionals who provided the former with services in (employability and regionalization organizations, recruiters, etc.). The Salon de l'immigration et de l'intégration au Québec (https://salonimmigration.com) has taken shape. However, it is hard to bring this idea to life as an immigrant when you have no professional contacts... But we had the vision... And luck!

Many people joined the project, including my employer, who became our main sponsor, and a person from the MICC (the former name of the MIFI – Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration) who firmly believed in the project.

This was the actual kick-off of Immigrant Quebec and a fantastic human adventure. We started in 2012 without any advertising budget and received nearly 7,000 visitors whom we helped find answers in their new venture. Based on this success, a website was launched (https://immigrantquebec.com). At the same time, we provided information to immigrants on social networks. We also published free guides where we find all the information on this wonderful province: Immigrating to Quebec (https://immigrantquebec.com/fr/guides).

Immigrant Québec has become the first information media for immigrants in Quebec.

BRINGING THE ECOSYSTEM TOGETHER FOR THE BENEFIT OF IMMIGRANTS

In 2018, we wanted to continue on this path, but we went even further. Indeed, we have seen many initiatives created throughout Quebec over the past ten years around immigration issues of regionalization, attracting and retaining talents, integration, and employability. Some programs and projects have been successful, and others have not met less success. Some have been reshaped differently, and others have been invigorated even though they were doomed to fail. We realized that we must reflect on how each ecosystem actor must adapt to respond to these challenges better.

The Quebec Immigration Summit took shape in our minds (https://sommet-immigration.com). Its objective was meant to gather every year, professionals interested in the field of immigration in Quebec. On October 16, 2019, we created a fantastic networking, collaborative and cross-sectoral discussion space for immigration in Montreal, Quebec. More than 400 participants from the key players of the ecosystem presented initiatives and best practices through conferences and workshops for each of the identified challenges. The government of Quebec has actively participated to this initiative through several ministries, led by the MIFI (Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration) and the MTESS (Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale).

This event is now becoming a major event in Quebec. We are proud to showcase the initiatives of all the organizations in the ecosystem and humbly contribute to advancing reflections on the subject and, in fine, on immigration policies.

AN INFORMED ECOSYSTEM AT ALL TIMES

COVID-19 stepped into our lives in early 2020 and turned many practices upside down in all sectors of activity.

From the perspective of our small organization, the impact has been significant. Meetings, forums and conferences had no more place in this new reality. We decided to continue our mission of informing the ecosystem through a website targeting professionals and providing them with the latest events and the best initiatives.

At the end of March 2021, we were ready to launch immigrantquebecpro.com: a platform aimed at informing professionals dealing with immigration in Quebec and which relies on the expertise of its renowned partners to offer reliable and useful information. This platform is a website updated every day with news, files, technical information and experts' comments.

At the same time, we have launched a 300-page guide for professionals, which can be downloaded free of

charge, in partnership with the Ordre des Conseillers en Ressources Humaines Agréés (CRHA), entitled "Hiring an Immigrant in Quebec." The printed version will be available in October 2021 during the 2nd Immigration Summit. (https://immigrantquebecpro.com/embaucher-une-personne-immigrante-au-quebec).

MANAGING LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS

In the meantime, the Government of Canada, through the Foreign Worker Program, requested us to participate in a call for projects to support TFWs (temporary foreign workers) during COVID-19.

The main idea behind the project was to communicate valuable information and manage a call for projects - to all NPOs in the province – that benefit the most vulnerable TFWs (agricultural workers, agri-food workers, etc.) (https://info-tetquebec.com).

GIVE TO BETTER RECEIVE

Thanks to our work, our experience has been acknowledged as developing innovative experiences and tools to help immigrants make informed choices in their immigration process. At the provincial level, we have been viewed as federating immigrant communities and public and private actors concerned with an immigration constructive approach of "working together."

The efforts exerted by a community of immigrants for nearly 15 years in serving Immigrant Quebec to support newcomers allow us today to build a more prosperous and inclusive Quebec, from event to event and from initiative to initiative.

These accomplishments were born out of the thoughts of immigrants who wanted to do their part to be integrated and help their communities and who have been especially well supported by the enterprise's ecosystem and successive government policies.

They demonstrate in the best way that immigrants must do their part, but for them to succeed, they must receive help from the whole community.

FRENCH, AN INTEGRATION ASSET FOR YOUNG FRENCH-SPEAKING IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES? YES, IT IS, BUT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS

Agnès Ndiaye Tounkara was born and raised in Senegal before leaving for university in France. For over 15 years, she has been involved in French language teaching, first at the Alliance Française de Boston, then at an international bilingual school in New York. Today, she is in charge of the French Heritage Language Program (FHLP), a program of the Cultural Services of the French Embassy. The FHLP helps French-speaking immigrants and young Americans of French origin preserve their linguistic and cultural heritage and build on their language skills, by offering free educational and cultural courses and workshops in public schools and community centers across the United States. Agnès is one of the authors of the book "French all around us" on the Francophonie in the U.S. and is the French language representative for the Coalition of Community-Based Heritage Language Schools. She is also a member of the advisory board of CALEC (Center for the Advancement of Languages, Education and Communities) and Francophonia.

During the 2019–2020 school year, a dozen New York highschoolers, who had recently arrived from French-speaking Africa or Haiti and who were participating in our program, travelled to Easton, Pennsylvania, an hour and a half from New York City. This was part of an exchange program with French students at Lafayette College, a prestigious private college. The Lafayette students demonstrated authentic French in their exchanges with young people of various backgrounds. For their part, the highschoolers learned about the American university system through regular meetings with their American peers, who additionally provided them with academic support in French. For most of our students, this was their first trip outside New York, their first visit to a college, and their first time in a private university.

On the way home, while listening to the students talking about the trip, I realized the full extent of its impact. Being on campus, participating in a university-level French class, meeting with other students (sometimes from non-English speaking countries), hearing from an admissions office representative, and finding out that universities are looking for more diversity, all helped them realize that a university like Lafayette College was not entirely out of reach. Furthermore, they realized they had something unique to contribute, and that this was partly because of their identities.

It was French that formed the common thread between these groups of young people who otherwise seemed to be pulled apart, especially in an American context, where race, socioeconomic status, personal and academic background, and culture made a connection unlikely to happen.

Our students live in the most deprived areas of New York City and are among the 4,000 students identified as speaking French in New York City public schools. We know that this number is an underestimated figure because it is not reflective of the multilingualism of the students, as it only counts those who report French as their language spoken at home and ignores the majority of those who chose to list English or Wolof, Fulani, or Haitian Creole (as one of their native languages) on a questionnaire allowing only one response.

For U.S. statistics, they are considered black, immigrant, and English language learners from underprivileged backgrounds

and therefore, eligible for free school meals. In the U.S., all of these labels point to deficiencies. Yet, these students have a rich cultural heritage, and their experiences and multilingualism have given them skills currently in high demand, such as being good communicators and listeners, being able to work with people with different values and viewpoints, having empathy, having critical thinking skills and the ability to connect complex ideas, as well as a resilience they have developed in dealing with various daily obstacles.

"For U.S. statistics, they are considered black, immigrant, and English language learners from underprivileged backgrounds and therefore, eligible for free school meals. In the U.S., all of these labels point to deficiencies. Yet, these students have a rich cultural heritage, and their experiences and multilingualism have given them skills currently in high demand."

They have set foot in New York from French-speaking Africa or Haiti and have attended public high schools that do not offer language courses, and where the emphasis has been placed on learning the English language. After meeting some of these students who complained about losing their French, Jane Ross, a former French teacher and founder of the program, approached the cultural services of the French Embassy and, through a partnership with the FACE Foundation (French American Cultural Exchange), the FHLP (French Heritage Language Program) was established about 17 years ago.

Our mission is to make French an asset that can help these French-speaking students integrate into American society. To achieve this objective, our program has adopted the unique approach of teaching heritage languages, a multilingual and multicultural approach that requires teachers to adopt a critical and caring mindset. It is based on the premise that heritage language speakers have not only specific linguistic needs but also particular psychological and emotional needs.

So, the heritage approach is, first and foremost, a critical approach that implies that teachers are aware of the fictitious hierarchy of languages, notably influenced by power dynamics and imbalances between different nations. The approach entails teachers questioning these power relations that are obviously present in the classroom.

It is a multicultural approach that recognizes students' cultural and linguistic capital as valuable resources that ensure their involvement in their learning process. When the teacher adopts a co-learning stance and encourages students to assume their identities, it sends a strong message to students that their cultural identities are valued and welcomed in the classroom.

Likewise, it is a multilingual approach. Bilingual students should not be viewed as two monolingual persons existing side by side. Therefore, it is vital for the teacher to create a classroom environment that encourages students' language practices and provides them with authentic opportunities to use their full repertoire.[1] Some authors go further: when heritage language speakers do not see their identities reflected in the classroom, their learning process may suffer. Similarly, if they cannot relate to the content of the lessons, they may become discouraged and lose their motivation in the classroom.[2]

On top of that, a socio-emotional approach considers these students' specific psychological and emotional needs. Indeed, the hierarchy created between the different language variations and accents creates linguistic insecurity in heritage speakers, sometimes making them reluctant to use the language, especially when they are criticized for their accent or the variations of the language they use, considered "incorrect".

In fact, for these students, French is not the mother tongue; it is a heritage language, that is, a language spoken at home in a context where another majority language is spoken outside their home. In the American context, French is both a colonial heritage language and a migrant heritage language, spoken by sons and daughters of immigrants from French-speaking countries who also speak other languages at home. With English schooling and over time, they often tend to speak the majority language more fluently than their heritage language.

They speak their native languages and French, the language they often discovered at school as they were dreaming, imagining and thinking in their native languages, which were often banned from the classrooms. Now that they are far from home, their parents or family members who are hosting them speak to them in Fulani, Wolof, Malinke or Ewe, either out of a reflex of cultural preservation or because it is the only language they speak.

Nowhere or very rarely in their plans is the French given a place. On the contrary, it is often seen as an obstacle to integration in a country where English seems to be the pass toward this dream of success and where multilingualism is

1 Menken, K. and Ofelia García (eds.). 2010. *Negotiating Language Policies in Schools: Educators as Policymakers*. New York: Routledge.

2 Corinne A. Seals & Joy Kreeft Peyton (2016). *Heritage language education: valuing the languages, literacies, and cultural competencies of immigrant youth, Current Issues in Language Planning.*

often presented as a deficiency, a barrier to academic success. Moreover, they do not speak standard French, the Parisian French, with a proper accent; they make syntactic and grammatical mistakes, and the language teaching has so far focused on these shortcomings.

The work we do is not only about teaching French; it is also about reappropriating the language by adapting the content to the everyday life of our students and by making French cohabit with their national languages. It is about deconstructing the linguistic insecurity acquired after years of traditional teaching. The objective behind this is the acquisition of a "certain French". Above all, it is about adopting a pragmatic American-style vision to make French an academic and professional asset.

The FHLP also celebrates the broad diversity of French and allows students to embrace it through educational content directly linked to their cultural heritage in literature, media, cinema, and theatre from their countries of origin. They all have their rightful place in our classrooms, as do their national languages. Because they have very different levels of French, the students also use their mother tongues when they work in groups to complete their projects or to understand a concept.

Thus, our mission goes beyond language preservation. As Maya Smith perfectly puts it in an article published in the *Critical Multilingualism Studies Journal* in 2017,[3] "FHLP does not only offer free French classes, but it also creates a space where these students can craft their identities as multilingual individuals and appreciate the value of their different cultural heritage."

Students join the school with a linguistic and cultural identity; if they see it in the curriculum and if it is celebrated in the classroom, they can take ownership of the language and fully participate in their learning. From my perspective, this ownership is fundamental to our programs' success in New York.

The other decisive factor is influenced by the way we teach. It is about the ability of our program to maintain a desire to learn French. Indeed, for our students, the practice of French is the result of a permanent negotiation between learning English and the place given to other languages. The place given to French will be proportional to the desire to maintain one's connection to one's country of origin, the desire to belong to the francophone community, and the feeling that its use can bring tangible benefits, such as academic and professional opportunities.

In the United States, this desire for the French is a reality. It is a preservationist reaction in the context of a culture absorbing everything in its path. It is also a bond, a linguistic buoy. Nonetheless, more pragmatically, it is a strategy, an investment, a bet on bilingualism and its capacity to let them differentiate themselves in the job market. I also hear this from students who often find themselves among Francophones in their schools, who all have an anecdote about the Francophone comrade they met on the first day of school and who helped them steer their first few months in the United States. A survey conducted a few years ago among our students shows that 50% believe that French will help them speak English better or differentiate themselves in the job market.

I have also heard it from representatives of francophone communities who have contacted us from Maine, Wisconsin, Michigan or Georgia and who all sought programs for their children born here, who do not speak French, or those who arrived a few years ago and are losing their French.

Therefore, French becomes the minority language, a heritage language to be preserved. It allows young francophones to build bridges to their countries of origin and cultures, other francophones worldwide, and their professional future in an increasingly globalized world. In our classrooms, French becomes a part of their identity, the anchor that binds them to their cultures, a link with their fellow francophones in the school and more broadly with the francophone world, as well as a path towards integration into this society so different from those from which they came from.

3 Maya Angela Smith (University of Washington): "French Heritage Language Learning A Site of Multilingual Identity Formation, Cultural Exploration, and Creative Expression in New York City" in *Critical Multilingualism Studies Journal*, Vol. 5 No. 2 (2017): Legitimate Speakers in Contested Spaces.

LINGUISTIC INDICATORS: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MOTHER TONGUE IN PROVIDING INSIGHTS INTO THE FRANCOPHONE REALITY IN CANADA AND QUEBEC[1]

Richard Marcoux, Professor and Director of the Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone (ODSEF), Université Laval. He is Coordinator of the Groupe interuniversitaire d'études et de recherches sur les sociétés africaines.

The release of the results from the latest census concerning linguistic diversity and use of French during the summer of 2022 generated many reactions, especially from the media.[2] It has proven difficult to reach a consensus on the best indicators to use to properly identify the place and evolution of the French language in Quebec and Canada. Given that the international francophone space has been our field of research for more than twenty years, it is interesting to see what we can learn from the realities of francophone countries outside of our borders. It is imperative that we acknowledge that the renewal of French-speaking populations in North America will depend on international immigration, particularly from these new pools of the French-speaking population.[3]

Let's start by recalling a few names. Former Presidents Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Hamani Diori of Niger and Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia are known as the fathers of La Francophonie. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Abdou Diouf, Michaëlle Jean and Louise Mushikiwabo have all held the presidency of the International Organization of the Francophonie. Yasmina Khadra, Alain Mabankou, Ahmadou Kourouna and the Goncourt Prize winners Mohamed Sarr, Amin Malouf, Tahar Ben Jelloun are among the most distinguished authors of the French language, to whom we can add Dany Laferrière, Jim Corcoran, Kim Thuy and Boucar Diouf. What do these people have in common? They are certainly great personalities of the French-speaking world, but none of their mother tongues are French.

They are the reflection of the francophone world, which has been completely transformed over the last few decades. At the beginning of the 1960s, the francophone population was well established in the Global North – more than 90% – and it was essentially composed of people whose mother tongue was French. This is no longer the case in 2022: nearly 60% of the

1 This article builds on and expands on a reflection that we started in an opinion piece published in *Le Soleil* et *Le Devoir* in June 2002 under the title *"Dans une galaxie francophone près de chez vous."*

2 My colleague Jean-Pierre Corbeil, associate professor at Université Laval, and I gave more than twenty interviews between mid-August and mid-September: https://www.odsef.fss.ulaval.ca/actualites/nombreuses-interventions-dans-les-medias-de-richard-marcoux-et-jean-pierre-corbeil.

3 For more information, refer to these two studies: Marcoux, Richard and Laurent RICHARD (2017). *"De nouveaux pays sources d'immigration d'expression française pour le Canada: synthèse et enjeux"* / "New Countries as Sources of French-speaking Immigrants in Canada: Synthesis and Stakes." Quebec, *Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone*, Université Laval, 22 p. Marcoux, Richard and Laurent RICHARD (2017). *"Tendances démographiques dans l'espace francophone."* Quebec, Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone / Université Laval, 31 p.

321 million Francophones are in the Global South where very few have French as their mother tongue.

As I have pointed out on several occasions: **we are fewer and fewer born French-speaking, but we are increasingly becoming so.**

These 321 million people live in what we call the "galaxie francophone", within which we have defined a subset of territories, the "planète naître ou vivre en français", which includes those who are exposed to the French language in their everyday lives. The number of French speakers on this "planet" has grown by 55 million from 2010 to 2022, of which 50 million (91%) are on the African continent, which confirms the shift of the center of the Francophone world from Europe to Africa and more particularly to the Sub-Saharan part of this continent.

However, multilingualism is what predominantly characterizes the linguistic systems of Francophone Africa. A recently published study of ours shows that between 75% and 98% of the populations of the nearly thirty studied cities in French-speaking Africa (Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa) declared that they master two or more languages. Situations varied, but French was omnipresent.[4]

The table attached is taken from this research and summarizes information for five large urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa, encompassing a total of more than 25 million people in 2022.[5] As we can see, between 69% and 98% of the inhabitants are multilingual Francophones, since they have declared that they are fluent in French as well as another language; most of the time, it is a national language widespread in one of these countries. French is also used at home and at work, to varying degrees, subject to the context, of course, but for more than 9 out of 10 people in Abidjan, Douala, and Libreville, and for 1 out of 2 in the huge capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kinshasa, which has more than 12 million inhabitants.

> "It is important to note that school has become the main site for the transmission of the French language in the French-speaking world, a language that is then used in the written media, in parliaments, and on billboards in the vibrant streets of these large French-speaking African cities."

Abidjan presents a compelling example since nearly 96% of its population declared that they predominantly speak French at work. According to the latest census from December 2021, 20% of the more than 5.6 million people who live in this city speak only French at home, while 70% of the inhabitants of Abidjan declared that they use French and an Ivorian language at home. This multilingual Francophone pattern is also characteristic, with some variations, of the major cities of other countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, etc. Elsewhere, French is less present, but is a partner language, along with Wolof in Senegal, Bambara (Bamanankan) in Mali, Arabic, and Tamazight in the Maghreb, and this, while very often being the main or only language of the education systems, from primary school to university. It is important to note that school has become the main site for the

THE PROPORTION OF THE FRENCH-SPEAKING POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER WHO ARE MULTILINGUAL, WHO USE FRENCH AT HOME, AND WHO SPEAK IT AT WORK IN FIVE LARGE URBAN AREAS ACROSS FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA IN 2015.

	Multilingual French speakers	Use French at home	Use French at work
Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)	92.4%	92.2%	95.7%
Douala (Cameroon)	98.1%	92.4%	97.8%
Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)	87.3%	57.6%	51.2%
Libreville (Gabon)	87.1%	91.1%	98.7%
Pikine/Dakar (Senegal)	69.1%	17.9%	37.6%

Source: TNS-Kantar, Data survey from Africascope program of 2015 (processed by the author).

4 Bougma, Moussa et Richard Marcoux (2022). *Portrait démolinguistique de quelques grandes villes d'Afrique subsaharienne et du Maghreb: un plurilinguisme dominant*. Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone, Université Laval, research report from ODSEF, 55 p

5 According to the site Atlas des populations et pays du monde (Populationdata.net) consulted on September 19, 2022

transmission of the French language in the French-speaking world, a language that is then used in the written media, in parliaments, and on billboards in the vibrant streets of these large French-speaking African cities.

It is worth recalling that more and more French-speaking immigrants are coming to Quebec and Canada from this continent. As for multilingualism, the data from the last Canadian census revealed that multilingualism was on the rise: "taking all languages together, in 2021, 58.8% of Canadians are unilingual, 32.1% were bilingual, 7.6% were trilingual and 1.5% could have a conversation in four or more languages" (*Le Quotidien*, August 17, 2022, page 15).

multilingualism among Francophones is not fiction, as some demographers and other experts would want us to believe. It is clear that the mother tongue is an indicator that must continue to be collected in surveys and censuses, but this information is clearly insufficient for defining who is a francophone.

Finally, it is repeatedly being said that Quebec is surrounded by more than 300 million anglophones in America. So why not attempt to bring Quebec and Canada closer to the millions of French-speaking people around the world who may be physically/geographically far away, but only a click or a Zoom away? Why not promote exchanges with these other Francophones across the planet/globe? Is it possible, above all, to stop creating obstacles for those who wish to study here, discover Quebec and Canada, and, why not, live here and start a family? It is surely time to revive the idea of a francophone visa that would facilitate mobility across this galaxy.

Pierre Bourgault wrote in 1997, "Today, our children of all origins recognize themselves with our common language and are aware that French, while it isolates us in North America, also opens up all horizons around the world." These horizons are now composed of more than 320 million Francophones on various continents.

A NEW LOOK: THE OBSERVATORY ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, REFUGEES, STATELESS PERSONS AND ASYLUM (OMIRAS)

Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye is professor in the Department of Legal Sciences at UQAM. She specializes in Canadian, Quebec and international migration law. Professor Ndiaye graduated from Université Laval with an LL.D. in Law, and created an Observatory on International Migration, Refugees, Stateless Persons and Asylum (OMIRAS) affiliated with IEIM (UQAM). Her research focuses on the fundamental rights of migrants, the outsourcing of migration policy management, and the securitization of borders in the management of human mobility and its impact on migrants' human rights.

Europe is experiencing a major migration crisis and is likely to experience a surge of unprecedented migration from Africa over the next 50 years (Stephen Smith, 2019). In the collective memory, the African context, with its underperforming economic realities and its demographic growth, suggests massive flows of migrants from the African continent to the European Eldorado. This assertion notably contrasts with recent studies, which postulate a low rate of emigration from the Global South to the North compared to intra-African migration (Vincent Chetail, 2019). The global volume of South-South migration accounts for almost 40% of total migrants (97 million), that is more than the volume of South-North migration (89 million). Only Latin America is reversing this trend (World Bank, 2016). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Africans largely move within their respective regions [Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Rocca (2018) and IOM, AU, (2019)]. Moreover, migration from the South to the North occurs more commonly in a regular rather than in an irregular manner (Vincent Chetail, 2019). Images of overcrowded boats of desperate migrants fleeing war or harsh economic conditions are all too familiar, still 94% of African migration across the oceans is regular (IOM, 2019). Some states, when describing the phenomenon, prefer to rely on ideologies rather than academic work (François Gemenne, 2021). This distortion of data is mirrored by the restrictive migration policies of the European Union (EU), despite the various contributions by researchers and experts, who have undeniably highlighted the limited impact of South-North migration. This stance is reflected in the restrictive entry and residence measures that have been in place since the 1970s for nationals of African countries. In this regard, there remain major contradictions between these security policies and the forecasts announced by various studies on the desire of Africans to migrate to Europe in particular.

It is in this context that the Observatory on International Migration, Refugees, Stateless Persons and Asylum (OMIRAS) was created in 2018 by Professor Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye. This organization is composed of 8 researchers, experts and migration specialists from different countries and migration specialists from six universities (UQÀM[1], Université Laval[2], Collège militaire Royal de Saint-Jean[3], Université

1 Professors Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye et Issiaka Mandé

2 Professor Abdoulaye Anne

3 Professor Mulry Mondélice

de Sherbrooke[4], Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar[5], Université virtuelle de Dakar[6]), and more than a dozen students from various backgrounds. The observatory aims to analyse issues related to human mobility in a cross-sectional manner, such as irregular migration (Bogusz, Ryszard Chelowinski, Adam ygan and Erica Syzsczak, eds, Irregular Migration and Human Right, 2002), economic migration (Crépeau and Nakache, 2007), development (Kabbandji, 2013), professional integration, temporary migration (students and temporary workers), diasporas (Mangala, 2020), as well as the protection of refugees and stateless persons, and internally displaced persons, in order to suggest tangible, just and sustainable solutions. It is a platform that promotes research about the mobility of people in an inclusive manner, which follows a multidisciplinary approach and offers a place of confluence for all actors (academic and others) with the aim of proposing sustainable solutions to international migration. OMIRAS aims to democratize research by promoting research among young researchers from countries of origin or transit. Both an epistemological perspective and the participation of researchers from various backgrounds are essential to further reflect on structural and inclusive solutions.

Our approach is interdisciplinary and aims to deconstruct this vision of international law and migration policies that is based on partial data, which exclude certain African realities that are essential for the regulation of coordinated, fair and sustainable transnational mobility.

Thus, we have started working on three pillars for elaborating on a global, holistic and inclusive strategy on migration issues that reconciles security and the promotion of human rights and allowing the identification of the real causes of regional, transnational and international migration. This also includes the scope of migration in its demographic, economic, historical, social, legal, political and cultural aspects, among others.

Most importantly, it is essential to note that despite the existence of a rich and diversified body of theoretical thought (Pichet 2020), new issues related to human mobility still require the mobilisation of researchers, and, more specifically, those from migrant-sending countries. The aim, therefore, is to highlight the relevance of revisiting international migration law (Aleinkoff, 2002) and current migration paradigms to better reflect on a new migration theory that is inclusive in its micro (individual) and macro (collective) aspects and that integrates all aspects of the migrant's trajectory. This includes questions of identity and the integration of migrants in the countries that are at the heart of our reflections.

"Our approach is interdisciplinary and aims to deconstruct this vision of international law and migration policies that is based on partial data, which exclude certain African realities that are essential for the regulation of coordinated, fair and sustainable transnational mobility."

Likewise, when operating within a context that strongly criminalises migration (Bigo, 2004) and externalizes migration policies (Lahlou 2009; Ndiaye, 2018), it is important to consider the fact that migration does not only follow a universal logic. It is dynamic, evolving, but also includes specifics such as gender, geographical location, culture, economic and demographic considerations, environmental issues, development challenges (Chetail, 2011), politics, borders and forced migration.

Since the adoption of the *Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees* in 1951 and its Protocol in 1967, various forms of protection have been granted. However, current configurations, which have been marked by the emergence of new considerations, such as economic issues, social inequalities, environmental issues, internal displacement and statelessness, require a comprehensive analysis of the global asylum system.

Indeed, there are more than 10 million stateless persons worldwide and about 1 million in West Africa according to official UNHCR figures (UN 2019). There are multiple causes of statelessness: discriminatory laws against women, migration, conflicts, secession, laws of inconsistency, etc. The consequences are equally disastrous: violations of economic and social rights, loss of rights to recognition of legal personality, family reunification, right to freedom, security, and freedom of movement, etc. Given the scale of this phenomenon, our objective is to create a framework for reflection, study and production that will make it possible to examine the link between statelessness and migration, to document cases of statelessness, particularly in Africa, and to propose avenues of reflection for better consideration of the rights of this vulnerable category, which is often ignored because of their status which is well described by the UNHCR as "those who live in the shadows", and who sometimes must move because of environmental consequences.

Due to climate change, the most at-risk populations must emigrate from their countries, and according to the World Bank, 216 million people will be "internally displaced" by 2050 (IPCC, 2021). Africa is the continent most adversely affected

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5 Professor Abdoul Aziz Diouf et Mme Fatimata Kane Sow

6 Dr Abdou Khadre Diop et Dr Mamadou Lamine Sarr

by the harmful impacts of climate change despite being one of the regions that produces the least amount of greenhouse gasses (GHG). The continent accounts for 4% of total GHG emissions. This is the lowest percentage of any continent; however, its socio-economic development is threatened by the climate crisis. In other words, Africa is the continent that produces the least emissions, yet suffers the most consequences, according to the chair of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Gahouma-Bekale, 2021). Thus, more than 80 million Africans will be forced to flee their countries because of land degradation, desertification, erosion and food insecurity. One of the areas most at risk is West Africa, where more than 30 million people will be forced into exile due to environmental reasons (Rigaud, Kanta Kumari et al, 2021). This issue is of major importance to the international community, but the legal framework necessary to confer status to these people has been slow to materialise (Christel Cournil, 2006). The recent decision by the Human Rights Committee in the case, *Teitiota v. New Zealand*, Communication 2728/2016, Doc off CDH NU CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2019) in which the "Committee recognizes that the effects of climate change are likely to affect the right to life under Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and thus trigger a non-refoulement obligation for receiving States", is receiving a lot of positive reactions insofar as it is viewed as the beginning of a response from international human rights law.

In addition, various activities have been carried out by OMIRAS since its launch symposium in December 2018, including a seminar on migration concepts in February 2020 and a round table on the mobility of researchers within the Canada-Senegal corridor in June 2021. In October 2021, a conference on the impact of climate change was moderated by Professor Amadou Aly Mbaye, Rector of Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal. Over the past year, OMIRAS has undertaken various initiatives to provide its members with the opportunity to participate in the discussions surrounding international migration and to propose solutions to its underlying issues. In May 2022, the Observatory also took part in the 89th ACFAS Congress. ACFAS is the premier francophone network for the scientific community with over 4,500 active members and 32 countries represented. OMIRAS held a one-day colloquium entitled "*Migration, asile et apatridie: le mythe des vagues migratoires du Sud (Afrique) vers le Nord à l'épreuve de la science.*" The Observatory facilitated the participation of some fifteen experts, professors, and students from different backgrounds, which has earned it the recognition of ACFAS, which included OMIRAS in its Congress highlights because of the originality of our scientific approach and the diversity of our themes.

In addition, the Observatory is collaborating with a local partner, the Saint-Louis Economic Research Laboratory (LARES) on a project addressing the socio-economic reintegration of migrants returning to Senegal, and more specifically to Dakar. In view of this, OMIRAS held a symposium in December 2022 in Dakar, Senegal, which brought together more than 150 participants to collectively rethink human mobility from an African perspective. The symposium, based on a multidisciplinary approach, was an opportunity to document new issues facing migrants, asylum seekers, stateless and displaced persons in a context marked by increasingly restrictive migration policies which unquestionably undermine all efforts deployed on the African continent and internationally.

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