

## Summary of key findings:

**Survey of Iranian Canadians  
Commissioned by AHROME and  
conducted by the Metropolis Institute  
(a division of the Association for  
Canadian Studies)**

APRIL 2026

**1,768**

Survey responses

**1166**

Complete responses

# Survey of Iranian Canadians

## Introduction

The largest survey of Iranian Canadians conducted to date arrives at a critical moment, offering a timely and comprehensive snapshot of community perspectives amid heightened geopolitical tensions. It seeks to better understand how Iranian Canadians view the ongoing war, their concerns for the safety and well-being of family and friends in Iran, and their aspirations for the country's future. The survey also explores opinions on what political, social, and structural changes are needed within Iran, as well as views on the forms of leadership that would be most representative and legitimate in guiding the country forward.

# Survey of Iranian Canadians

## Methodology

The survey of Iranian Canadians was commissioned by the Advancement of Human Rights organization for the Middle East (AHROME) and conducted by the Metropolis Institute (a division of the Association for Canadian Studies) between March 29 and April 13, 2026. A total of 1,768 responses were collected, of which 1,166 were fully completed.

The survey was distributed primarily through a range of community-based outreach channels targeting Iranian Canadians, the majority of whom are immigrants (over 80% of approximately 200,000 individuals identified as Iranian in the 2021 Census of Canada).


Most responses were obtained through broad-based community outreach efforts, both online and in-person, across multiple cities including Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Victoria. Distribution methods included: (i) Online dissemination through widely used community platforms, including the Hamyaari Facebook group (approximately 30,000 members); (ii) outreach through diverse community networks representing a range of political and social perspectives (including Kurdish, Baluchi, leftist, and other groups); (iii) student associations and university-based networks; (iv) direct sharing by Iranian Canadian activists and community organizers across major urban centres; (v) in-person distribution in community settings, including outside Iranian businesses, cultural spaces, and community hubs; (vi) QR code distribution in public spaces to facilitate mobile participation; (vii) limited in-person distribution at large Iranian community gatherings, including a major Iranian New Year (Nowruz) celebration in Vancouver at the end of the survey period) (~80 responses collected via this channel).

This survey is based on a non-probability sample; therefore, a conventional margin of error does not apply. However, if the sample were treated as a simple random sample of the same size ( $n = 1,166$ ), the maximum margin of error would be approximately  $\pm 2.9$  percentage points, 19 times out of 20. This figure should be interpreted as an approximate indicator of sampling variability only.


# Who responded

Demographic profile of respondents; question bases range from roughly 1,500 to 1,575 in this section.

## AGE PROFILE



## HIGHEST EDUCATION COMPLETED



**59.2%**

Women

**98.7%**

Born outside Canada

**75.9%**

Canadian citizens

**62.6%**

Lived in Canada 11+ years

# Executive summary

Four headline takeaways from the survey.

## ATTACHMENT

**91% /  
94%**

Respondents report strong attachment to both Canada and Iran, while 84% see their long-term future primarily in Canada.

## FAMILY TIES REMAIN ACTIVE

**91% /  
78%**

Most respondents have close family in Iran, and daily or weekly communication remains the norm.

## REGIME REJECTION

**90%+**

Support for regime change is overwhelming, and many respondents see force or a combined path as the likeliest route to change.

## POST-CHANGE NORMALIZATION

**97  
%**

After regime change, respondents overwhelmingly support diplomatic relations with Israel.

# Belonging and future outlook

Identity and belonging indicators point to strong ties in both directions.

Respondents feel rooted in both countries, while still seeing their future primarily in Canada.

**91.0%**

Very or somewhat attached to Canada

**94.2%**

Very or somewhat attached to Iran

**84.2%**

Yes or probably see long-term future in Canada

## DETAILED DISTRIBUTION

■ Positive or attached

■ Negative or not attached

■ Unsure

Attachment to Canada



91% attached • 7.6% not attached • 1.3% unsure

Attachment to Iran



94.2% attached • 5.3% not attached • 0.5% unsure

Future primarily in Canada



84.2% yes / probably • 9.7% no / probably not • 6.1% unsure

# Family ties to Iran remain intense

Family proximity and communication patterns keep Iran highly present in day-to-day life.

Family connections to Iran remain immediate and emotionally salient for most respondents.

**91.2%**

Have close family members in Iran


**77.6%**

Communicate daily or weekly with family or close contacts in Iran

**93.6%**

Are somewhat or very concerned about family safety and well-being

## HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS COMMUNICATE WITH FAMILY OR CLOSE CONTACTS IN IRAN



# Community connection in Canada

Participation, belonging, and expression do not all move together in the same way.

Participation is high, but formal organizational membership is much lower.

**87.9%**

Feel very or somewhat connected to the Iranian community in Canada

**91.8%**

Participated in an Iranian community activity in the past 12 months

**92.0%**

Have participated in demonstrations or public events related to Iran while in Canada

## DETAILED DISTRIBUTION

■ Positive / yes   ■ Negative / no   ■ Unsure / other


Feel connected to the community



Comfort expressing views about Iran



Member of an Iranian / Iranian-Canadian organization



# Representation and institutional trust

Respondents distinguish between internal diversity and external responsiveness.

Views of representation and institutional understanding are more negative than positive.

**81.1%**

Say the Iranian community in Canada represents a diversity of political, religious, and cultural views

**51.9%**

Disagree that Iranian Canadians have adequate political representation in Canada

**67.7%**

Disagree that Canadian institutions understand the concerns of Iranian Canadians

## DETAILED DISTRIBUTION

■ Positive or agree ■ Negative or disagree ■ Unsure

Community represents diverse views



**81.1%** yes / mostly • **12.6%** mostly not / no • **6.2%** unsure

Adequate political representation



**41.9%** agree • **51.9%** disagree • **6.1%** unsure

Institutions understand concerns



**27.2%** agree • **67.7%** disagree • **5.1%** unsure

# Awareness of the Iranian Canadian Congress (ICC)

Awareness is meaningful, but perceived representativeness is weak.

**Awareness of the ICC is moderate, but most respondents do not think it reflects majority views.**

**62.6%**

Were aware of the ICC before taking the survey

**63.1%**

Disagree that the ICC reflects the views of most Iranian Canadians

## Interpretation

Recognition and perceived representation do not move together here: awareness is relatively broad, but agreement with the ICC mandate is low.

## DETAILED DISTRIBUTION

■ Positive / agree   ■ Negative / disagree   ■ Unsure / other

Aware of the ICC before this survey



62.6% aware • 31.4% not aware • 6% unsure

ICC reflects the views of most Iranian Canadians



11.2% agree • 63.1% disagree • 25.7% unsure / not familiar enough

# Views on the current Iranian government and political change

This section contains some of the strongest consensus in the survey.

Rejection of the current regime is nearly unanimous, and support for regime change is overwhelming.

**92.3%**

Very unfavourable opinion of the current Iranian government

**98.4%**


Say the regime mostly does not or does not represent the will of the Iranian people

**90.4%**

Strongly or somewhat support regime change in Iran

## WHICH PATH IS MOST LIKELY TO LEAD TO POLITICAL CHANGE IN IRAN?

International military action



Some combination of these paths



Internal protest and civil resistance



Other / none / unsure



# War, military action, and regime change expectations

Respondents are highly engaged with the war and tend to interpret it as politically consequential.

Most respondents see the current war as likely to accelerate regime change.

**98.0%**

Follow the recent war involving Iran very or somewhat closely

**90.2%**

Strongly or somewhat approve of international military actions against the Iranian government

**89.4%**

Believe such actions contribute at least somewhat to political change in Iran

**85.7%**

Think the current war is very or somewhat likely to lead to regime change

## STABILITY OUTLOOK

■ More stable   ■ Less stable   ■ No difference / unsure

In your view, will the war make Iran more or less stable in the long term?



72.7% more stable • 16.3% less stable • 11% no difference / unsure

## Interpretation

On balance, respondents not only approve of military pressure but also tend to believe it contributes to political change and improves the odds of regime change.

# Reza Pahlavi as a political reference point

Familiarity, favorability, suitability, and trust all register at high levels.

Reza Pahlavi is widely known, well regarded, and broadly seen as a unifying figure.

**98.6%**

Very or somewhat familiar with Reza Pahlavi

**89.0%**

Very or somewhat favourable overall opinion

## Why this matters

Support extends well beyond name recognition: respondents also rate Reza Pahlavi highly on future role, suitability as a unifying figure, and trust as a transitional leader.

## LEADERSHIP-RELATED MEASURES

Should play a political role in Iran's future



Suitable as a unifying figure for opposition



Have some or a great deal of trust in him as a transitional leader



# Future foreign relations

Views on the United States, Israel, and future diplomatic normalization are strongly aligned.

Support extends to U.S. and Israeli involvement now, and to normalization with Israel after regime change.

**89.1%**

Approve of United States involvement in military action against Iran

**88.7%**

Approve of Israel's role in the war against Iran

**96.7%**

Would support diplomatic relations with Israel after regime change

**95.9%**

Prefer at least normal diplomatic relations with Israel in the future

## PREFERRED FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL


Close allies



Normal diplomatic relations



Limited relations



No diplomatic / unsure relations

