Summary of key findings:

Survey of Iranian Canadians Commissioned by AHROME and conducted by the Metropolis Institute (a division of the Association for Canadian Studies)

APRIL 2026

1,768
Survey responses

1166
Complete responses

Source: uploaded SurveyMonkey export | Percentages shown as share of respondents to each question

Survey of Iranian Canadians

Introduction

The largest survey of Iranian Canadians conducted to date arrives at a critical moment, offering a timely and comprehensive snapshot of community perspectives amid heightened geopolitical tensions. It seeks to better understand how Iranian Canadians view the ongoing war, their concerns for the safety and well-being of family and friends in Iran, and their aspirations for the country's future. The survey also explores opinions on what political, social, and structural changes are needed within Iran, as well as views on the forms of leadership that would be most representative and legitimate in guiding the country forward.

Survey of Iranian Canadians

Methodology

The survey of Iranian Canadians was commissioned by the Advancement of Human Rights organization for the Middle East (AHROME) and conducted by the Metropolis Institute (a division of the Association for Canadian Studies) over the period March 29th to April 13th, 2026. Some 1768 surveys were collected and 1166 were fully completed. The survey was distributed primarily through community-based channels predominantly with Canadians born in Iran (of the over 200 000 Iranians in the 2021 census of Canada over 80% are immigrants). Most responses were collected through in-person outreach at large Iranian community gatherings in Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. This survey is based on a non-probability sample. Therefore, a conventional margin of error does not apply. However, if the sample were treated as a simple random sample of the same size (n = 1,166), the maximum margin of error would be approximately ±2.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. This figure should be interpreted as an approximate indicator of sampling variability only.

Who responded

Demographic profile of respondents; question bases range from roughly 1,500 to 1,575 in this section.

AGE PROFILE



HIGHEST EDUCATION COMPLETED



59.2%
Women

98.7%
Born outside Canada

75.9%
Canadian citizens

62.6%
Lived in Canada 11+ years

Executive summary

Four headline takeaways from the survey.

ATTACHMENT

91% / 94%

Respondents report strong attachment to both Canada and Iran, while 84% see their long-term future primarily in Canada.

FAMILY TIES REMAIN ACTIVE

91% / 78%

Most respondents have close family in Iran, and daily or weekly communication remains the norm.

REGIME REJECTION

90%+

Support for regime change is overwhelming, and many respondents see force or a combined path as the likeliest route to change.

POST-CHANGE NORMALIZATION

97%

After regime change, respondents overwhelmingly support diplomatic relations with Israel.

Belonging and future outlook

Identity and belonging indicators point to strong ties in both directions.

Respondents feel rooted in both countries, while still seeing their future primarily in Canada.

91.0%
Very or somewhat attached to Canada

94.2%
Very or somewhat attached to Iran

84.2%
Yes or probably see long-term future in Canada

DETAILED DISTRIBUTION



Family ties to Iran remain intense

Family proximity and communication patterns keep Iran highly present in day-to-day life.

Family connections to Iran remain immediate and emotionally salient for most respondents.

91.2%

Have close family members in Iran

77.6%

Communicate daily or weekly with family or close contacts in Iran

93.6%

Are somewhat or very concerned about family safety and well-being

HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS COMMUNICATE WITH FAMILY OR CLOSE CONTACTS IN IRAN



Community connection in Canada

Participation, belonging, and expression do not all move together in the same way.

Participation is high, but formal organizational membership is much lower.

87.9%

Feel very or somewhat connected to the Iranian community in Canada

91.8%

Participated in an Iranian community activity in the past 12 months

92.0%

Have participated in demonstrations or public events related to Iran while in Canada

DETAILED DISTRIBUTION



Representation and institutional trust

Respondents distinguish between internal diversity and external responsiveness.

Views of representation and institutional understanding are more negative than positive.

81.1%

Say the Iranian community in Canada represents a diversity of political, religious, and cultural views

51.9%

Disagree that Iranian Canadians have adequate political representation in Canada

67.7%

Disagree that Canadian institutions understand the concerns of Iranian Canadians

DETAILED DISTRIBUTION



Awareness of the Iranian Canadian Congress (ICC)

Awareness is meaningful, but perceived representativeness is weak.

Awareness of the ICC is moderate, but most respondents do not think it reflects majority views.

62.6%

Were aware of the ICC before taking the survey

63.1%

Disagree that the ICC reflects the views of most Iranian Canadians

Interpretation

Recognition and perceived representation do not move together here: awareness is relatively broad, but agreement with the ICC mandate is low.

DETAILED DISTRIBUTION



Views on the current Iranian government and political change

This section contains some of the strongest consensus in the survey.

Rejection of the current regime is nearly unanimous, and support for regime change is overwhelming.

92.3%

Very unfavourable opinion of the current Iranian government

98.4%

Say the regime mostly does not or does not represent the will of the Iranian people

90.4%

Strongly or somewhat support regime change in Iran

WHICH PATH IS MOST LIKELY TO LEAD TO POLITICAL CHANGE IN IRAN?



War, military action, and regime change expectations

Respondents are highly engaged with the war and tend to interpret it as politically consequential.

Most respondents see the current war as likely to accelerate regime change.

98.0%
Follow the recent war involving Iran very or somewhat closely

90.2%
Strongly or somewhat approve of international military actions against the Iranian government

89.4%
Believe such actions contribute at least somewhat to political change in Iran

85.7%
Think the current war is very or somewhat likely to lead to regime change

STABILITY OUTLOOK

More stable Less stable No difference / unsure

In your view, will the war make Iran more or less stable in the long term?



72.7% more stable • **16.3%** less stable • **11%** no difference / unsure

Interpretation

On balance, respondents not only approve of military pressure but also tend to believe it contributes to political change and improves the odds of regime change.

Reza Pahlavi as a political reference point

Familiarity, favorability, suitability, and trust all register at high levels.

Reza Pahlavi is widely known, well regarded, and broadly seen as a unifying figure.

98.6%

Very or somewhat familiar with Reza Pahlavi

89.0%

Very or somewhat favourable overall opinion

Why this matters

Support extends well beyond name recognition: respondents also rate Reza Pahlavi highly on future role, suitability as a unifying figure, and trust as a transitional leader.

LEADERSHIP-RELATED MEASURES



Future foreign relations

Views on the United States, Israel, and future diplomatic normalization are strongly aligned.

Support extends to U.S. and Israeli involvement now, and to normalization with Israel after regime change.

89.1%
Approve of United States involvement in military action against Iran

88.7%
Approve of Israel's role in the war against Iran

96.7%
Would support diplomatic relations with Israel after regime change

95.9%
Prefer at least normal diplomatic relations with Israel in the future

PREFERRED FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL

